



Review

No guts, no glory: How framing the collective past paves the way for anti-immigrant sentiments[☆]Frank Mols^{a,*}, Jolanda Jetten^b^a School of Political Sciences, University of Queensland, Australia^b School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Australia

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ABSTRACT

Populist Right-Wing Parties (PRWPs) have made a remarkable comeback since the 1980s, especially in Western Europe. In this paper we argue that in order to explain such successes we need to understand the creative way in which PRWP leaders frame the collective past, present and future. We examined speeches of PRWP leaders in France, The Netherlands, and Belgium and examined in each of these unique contexts how these leaders instill collective nostalgia and perceptions of discontinuity between past and present to justify a tougher stance on immigration, asylum-seeking and multiculturalism. We found that these PRWP leaders use temporal narratives about history and identity to persuade their audience that (a) our past is glorious, our future is bleak, (b) we know who brought the country down, (c) we were once glorious because we were tough, (d) we need to be tough once more, and (e) we are the only party prepared to take on “the enemy”. We conclude that PRWP leaders not only feed collective angst and fear of losing collective roots, they also provide (potential) followers with a historicized justification for harsher treatment of migrants and minorities, arguing that history has shown that the nation's survival depends on its ability to be unflinching.

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“My dear friend, we, national fighters, who are the enlightened guardians of the national spirit and the interests of our people, we have to decide our choices guided by the imperative of victory. [...] In the history of countries and nations, one encounters moments where a generation has carried the responsibility for the survival of the group, its continuity, as a conscious human entity. It's this responsibility that our generation, and our organization in particular, carries.” (Marine Le Pen, 14 November 2010)

Populist Right-Wing Parties (PRWPs) openly advocating anti-immigrant sentiments have made a remarkable comeback in recent years in many Western countries. This trend can even be witnessed in countries where multiculturalism was once celebrated as a core value defining the national identity. Consider the Netherlands, where the PVV (Freedom Party) led by Geert Wilders increased its number of seats in parliament from 9 in 2006 to 24 in 2010. Another case in point is Sweden, where, for the first time in the country's history, the extreme-right secured a seat in the national parliament in the 2010 elections. Although PRWP leaders typically refrain from inciting violence, their followers may nonetheless conclude it is time to confront immigrants and asylum-seekers. For example, there is growing evidence that *Golden Dawn* supporters in Greece entice others to violence toward minorities (BBC, 2 October 2013).

These may be rather extreme cases, but it is clear that even in countries where PRWPs are not part of the traditional political landscape, the issue of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers and integration in the host-society are high on the political agenda. Moreover, in many Western countries, mainstream party leaders have ‘moved to the right’. For example, it has become commonplace for influential politicians to argue ‘multiculturalism’ has failed, thereby portraying immigrants as a real threat and those promoting multiculturalism as representing the ‘old left’ and out of touch with reality. For instance, in 2010 Germany's Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel described multiculturalism as obsolete, dismissing it as ‘multikulti-nonsense’. These views were echoed by the British Prime-Minister David Cameron in 2011, when he argued that the “hands-off tolerance of those who reject Western values has failed”, calling for “a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism” (BBC News, 5 February, 2011).

PRWP leaders¹ tend to go a step further adopting an alarmist narrative, suggesting that their country is on the brink of collapse, requiring strong leadership and preparedness to take immediate and decisive action. To make this point, nostalgia is typically evoked, whereby the country's distant past is painted in a positive way, the more immediate past and the present as one of dramatic decline, and its future as one marked by imminent loss of national identity. These nostalgic narratives are one-sided representations of the past and involve considerable exaggeration and a longing for a past that never existed (Cheng et al., 2010; Kashima et al., 2009; Liu & Khan, 2014). Even though PRWP leaders do not hold a monopoly on the use of nostalgia, it is fair to say that these leaders have discovered a new master-frame (Rydgren, 2005), one that relies heavily on, among other things, nostalgia as a strategy to increase their appeal among swinging voters. But why are PRWP leaders drawn to nostalgic narratives? We propose that by presenting the past as glorious and positive and the present as in decline, nostalgic reminiscing about a glorious past not only serves to essentialize, antagonize, and mobilize ‘national identity’ (Liu & Khan, 2014), it also serves to convey a sense of urgency, and need for immediate drastic measures to avoid a break between past and present. More specifically, we propose that PRWP leaders do not ‘lie in waiting’ until a critical juncture (i.e., ‘exogenous shock’) occurs, but that they actively promote the idea of the country facing an as yet unrecognized critical juncture, one that has to be addressed urgently to ensure historical continuity. In other words, by promoting identity threat and fear about the future vitality of the nation (discontinuity), these leaders not only challenge the dominant West European ‘state symbology’ (Liu, Onar, & Woodward, 2014), they also create what can be considered an ‘induced critical juncture’, which is subsequently used to justify calls for drastic policies to protect the nation (Mols, 2010).

In order to illustrate these processes, we unpack speeches of PRWP leaders in France (Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen), The Netherlands (Geert Wilders), and Belgium (Filip Dewinter) and explore how PRWP leaders portray the collective past, present and future, highlighting specific identity threat themes: identity loss, status loss, and loss of identity continuity.

1. National identity and time

According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), part of people's sense of self is derived from their membership in social groups. Akin to personal history being an anchor for knowledge about the personal self, a group or nation's history is essential to develop, establish and shape the collective self (Hilton, Erb, McDermott, & Molian, 1996; Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Sani et al., 2007). Indeed, a shared collective history enhances ingroup cohesion, promotes a sense of common fate, and helps establish the content of group identity (e.g., group values, beliefs, and norms; e.g., Liu & Hilton, 2005; Moscovici, 1988). This is because in reflecting on group history, the unique heritage of one's group becomes salient, which underscores how the ingroup is different and distinct from other groups. A group's collective history thus provides

¹ There is considerable disagreement among social scientists about the exact definition of ‘Multiculturalism’, and the question of which countries and societies can be regarded as truly Multicultural (Berry, 2006; Kymlicka, 2007). We will refrain from entering into this discussion here, and instead focus on the way in which PRWP leaders seek to persuade people that multiculturalism (conceived in rather general terms as the host society having to accommodate for immigrants and cultural minorities) is dangerous, and that those promoting multiculturalism are naïve, blind, and unable/unwilling to recognize the dangers facing the host society.

something fundamental: history makes social identity possible and, as several researchers have noted, the only way to understand a group's social identity is by understanding where that group is coming from and where it plans to go (Condor, 1996; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2011). In other words, social identity cannot be understood in a time vacuum, as either frozen in time, or as something emerging suddenly 'on the spot'. Indeed, social identity is better conceptualized as a process of becoming (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Hopkins, & Condor, 1997; Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001) whereby the present is evaluated in the light of where the group is heading and where it is coming from (Zhang, Jetten, Iyer, & Cui, 2013, see also Tajfel, 1978).

Even though identities are conceptualized as context-dependent, fluid and flexible, it is also fair to say that there has been more attention for their stability than for their continuous changing nature (Condor, 1996). Unfortunately, when social psychologists study identity, the timeline of identity is often ignored. Experimental social psychologists in particular study identity in the here and now, and the reason why they study groups in the laboratory is precisely because this enables them to study groups that have no history, and because history can therefore not 'contaminate' current identity processes (Jetten & Wohl, 2012).

Sociologists and political scientists interested in national identity tend to be more sensitive to the notion that identities have an important time dimension to them. However, there are other problems with the way in which these researchers have theorized the way the past affects the present and future. For example, Mols and Weber (2013) argued that constructivist scholars researching political attitudes often start with strong claims about the malleability and context-dependence of social identities, only to slide gradually into what is best regarded as an overly 'sticky' Historical Institutionalism, in which identities are conceived in an essentialist way, as having evolved over very long periods of time, and reflecting shared historical experiences. That is, very quickly, national identities have regained historically determined stability. It thus appears that when examining the way the past affects the present and the future, the challenge is to avoid both (a) over-reliance on history textbooks (as this could lead to an overly static or even stereotypical understanding of national identities) and (b) a total neglect of history text-books (as this could lead to an overly fluid understanding of national identities).

Social psychologists examining leadership and followership have sought to reconcile this tension between identity stability and identity malleability. For example, it is now widely accepted that politicians are crafty 'identity entrepreneurs', who garner support for their political project by presenting it as consistent with the group's collective past, present and future (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). It is clear from this research that PRWP leaders are not the only ones to interpret society and social relations creatively. For example, research has revealed that Barack Obama went to considerable lengths to downplay his ethnicity, and to become regarded as a quintessential American living the American Dream (Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012).

Of more direct relevance here, though, is research examining the discursive techniques used by PRWP leaders. Much of this research focuses on discursive strategies used to delineate group boundaries ("us-them" distinctions), and to reinterpret the audience's self-understanding. For example, researchers found that PRWP leaders anticipate being accused of racism, and interpret salient in- and out-group identities in a way that neutralizes this criticism (Rapley, 1998; Verkuyten, 2013). Others have shown that PRWP leaders go to considerable lengths to silence dissent, by instilling fear for 'the enemy within' and 'the enemy without' (Finlay, 2007). Yet others have shown that PRWP leaders tend to portray their group as facing multiple enemies, and as the victim of the malicious ruling elite, which has betrayed its roots, and is siding with the enemy (Finlay, 2007; Mudde, 2007; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Van Der Valk, 2003; Wodak, Khosravanik, & Mral, 2013).

An important lesson to emerge from this research is that social influence depends in great measure on perceived leader prototypicality, and on being perceived to be 'one of us' (Turner, 1991). What remains less well understood, though, is the more specific question of how PRWP leaders *legitimize* proposed harsher treatment of immigrants and minorities once they have achieved perceived prototypicality. In other words, perceived prototypicality may be a prerequisite for social influence, and affect whether followers are receptive to the new norms the leader promotes. However, in order to convert followers into active advocates, the leader will have to provide a legitimizing logic, which followers can understand, relate to, and repeat when seeking to persuade others of the need to resort to harsher treatment.

PRWP leaders often portray immigrants and minorities as enjoying preferential treatment by the elite, and one could argue that, in so doing, they 'prepare the ground' for harsher treatment by cultivating a more general sense of resentment among followers. There is evidence from the so-called BBC prison study that such a strategy can be effective, and that tough leadership can nurture perceived injustice and bolster authoritarianism among followers (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). However, as career politicians, PRWP leaders are also expected to display factual knowledge, and to explain in more detail why drastic 'harsh' measures are required. Our hypothesis, explored in this paper, is that PRWP leaders (once regarded and accepted as prototypical) will justify the need for harsh measures and unflinching leadership by coupling harshness with success. More specifically, we hypothesize that PRWP leaders will glorify the past, thereby portraying 'toughness' as the key to past success and glory, and 'softness' as the root of all contemporary woes.

2. The past, present and future

We know that 'perceived identity threat' increases the electoral appeal of PRWPs (e.g., Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; McLaren, 2003), and that PRWP leaders use populist tactics to cultivate such fears (Mudde, 2007; Wodak et al., 2013). We also know that PRWP leaders tend to wallow in nostalgia and traditionalism (Gilmour, 2008), and that they re-imagine the nation's past, present and future in such a way that the group becomes perceived as sharing an ancient and uninterrupted and

uncontaminated ‘pure’ past (Sani et al., 2007). Such representation of the past, present and future, evoke powerful emotions such as nostalgia and pride in the nation’s past, and reduce the need to offer causal explanations (Liu & Khan, 2014). Recent research has shown, with help of social psychological experiments, that exposure to messages in which the nation’s past is framed as either tolerant or intolerant does have a significant impact on people’s attitudes toward immigration and minority rights (Smeekes et al., 2012). This research can be seen as a useful reminder that leaders not only evoke nostalgia to render a particular social identity salient (and to become regarded as prototypical of that identity), but also to disseminate new norms, and to redefine what it means to be a good member of the group in question. We argue that PRWP leaders use nostalgic narratives to popularize and legitimize new norms (harsher treatment), and to discredit the legitimacy of established norms (tolerance and multiculturalism).

Another potential reason why PRWP leaders tend to evoke and cultivate nostalgia is that nostalgia is relatively easy to elicit. For example, there is evidence that individuals experience nostalgia for the past spontaneously when facing a threat at present (see Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, 2008) and that concrete threats such as organizational reforms can increase employees’ nostalgia for the past (Brown & Humphreys, 2002; Milligan, 2003). Such enhanced nostalgia in the face of threat serves a restorative function by producing beneficial effects for psychological functioning, including wellbeing and perceived ability to cope with challenges (Sedikides et al., 2008). It thus appears that fear aroused by threat (that living conditions are about to worsen) and nostalgia (longing back to an imagined glorious past) go hand in hand.

However, it is also clear that nostalgia for the past does not necessarily serve as a resource if that past is no longer available to the individual (i.e., indicating low levels of identity continuity). Indeed, although nostalgia is a positive emotion, as Iyer and Jetten (2011) showed experimentally, the positive effects of nostalgia were only obtained when participants perceived the past and the present as continuous. In contrast, feeling nostalgic about the past had negative consequences and led participants to hold on to the past when the past and present were perceived as discontinuous. This research suggests that identity threat is evoked when people are exposed to a nostalgic narrative that highlights that the past is *disconnected* from the present (as opposed to when people are given reassurances that their social identity will remain intact). We propose that this is exactly what PRWP leaders appear to be doing: they not only emphasize nostalgic accounts of the past, they also emphasize identity discontinuity.

There is a growing body of work showing that perceived identity discontinuity enhances anxiety. This is because perceived historical continuity provides grounding and security (Bluck & Alea, 2008; Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008), and without this security people will experience a decline in psychological wellbeing, and an increase in feelings of stress (see Chandler & Proulx, 2008). There is also good evidence that group members respond quite strongly and will resist change when they fear they will lose their rich history and the connectedness between past and present. Jetten and Hutchison (2011) found in two studies of the merger between six Scottish Army Regiments that historical continuity perceptions were a unique predictor of resistance to the merger: the more that army personnel perceived that their regiment had a long and glorious history, the more they resisted the upcoming merger that would involve the disbanding of their regiment. Jetten and Hutchison (2011) also found that the relationship between historical continuity and resistance to the merger was mediated by the perception that the merger represented a break with the past. In other words, the more participants perceived historical continuity, the more they perceived the upcoming merger as interrupting the connectedness with the past, and this, in turn, predicted their resistance to the merger. Other work examining the effect of historical continuity perceptions (in the representation of English history) has found that it is in particular those higher in identification with the country that feel most threatened by historical discontinuity (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Moreover, and this is relevant for the present research, these researchers found in two studies that only for those more highly identified with the country, opposition to immigration was higher when history was represented as discontinuous rather than continuous.

The combination of nostalgic narratives and instilling perceptions of discontinuity between past and present allows PRWP leaders to present the country strategically as being on a downward trajectory thereby arousing collective angst – a fear for the future vitality of the country (Wohl, Squires, & Caouette, 2012). Such identity threats are powerful because they not only instill a sense of imminent threat, they also create a sense of urgency, which, in turn, is used to justify the use of harsh measures to address the threat (Bar-Tal, 2000) and to make alternative futures more viable (Zhang et al., 2013).

3. The present research

Even though contemporary PRWPs come in different guises (Bale, 2012; Kitschelt, 2007; Mudde, 2007; Wodak et al., 2013), what they share is a common concern with the preservation of Western (Judeo-Christian) national culture and identity, and perceived need to curb the influence of non-Western (primarily Muslim) influence in government and society at large.² Whereas more mainstream parties concerned about the potential dangers of non-Western influences will tend to limit themselves to views about specific policy challenges (e.g., laws allowing/prohibiting Muslim women in the Public Service to wear the veil), PRWPs will cast the net much wider, and use nostalgic and discontinuity narratives to create a pessimistic Zeitgeist, in which immigrants and asylum-seekers are held responsible for the overall (moral and material) decline of ‘the

² Another similarity is the tendency to portray society in populist terms, as the realm of a struggle between ‘the virtuous people’ and ‘the malicious elite’. Rather than to provide examples of this narrative in this paper, we refer the reader to Mudde’s (2007) work on how populist leaders seek to cultivate a populist ‘Zeitgeist’.

nation'. Drawing on existing research showing that attitudes toward minorities are affected differently by the way the past is represented (Smeekes et al., 2012; see also Liu & Khan, 2014), we predict that PRWP leaders, in their eagerness to carve out a unique niche, will engage creatively and strategically with the nation's past, present and future.

We collected and analyzed transcripts of speeches by four well-known PRWP leaders in three different European countries (Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in The Netherlands, and Filip Dewinter in Belgium). In one case (The Netherlands) we were able to retrieve speech transcripts from the PRWP's own website (Geert Wilders' PVV). In two of the cases (France and Belgium) we were unable to retrieve official transcripts, and relied on transcripts made available by independent followers of the leaders and parties in questions (Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen, Filip Dewinter).³

In the French and Dutch case, we were able to retrieve a relatively large number of speech transcripts (France 27; Netherlands 58). However, we were forced to rely on a smaller sample of speech transcripts for Belgium (7). This would be problematic if we were putting forward claims about differences between these leaders and parties. However, our aim is to merely illustrate the widespread use of a particular narrative. We accept that it would have been better to have a large number of cases and a large number of transcripts for each of these cases. However, we feel that we have sufficient data to illustrate that PRWP leaders have a particular way of portraying the past, present and future, which is geared toward justifying harsher treatment of immigrants and minorities.

3.1. Stage 1: content analysis of representations of the nation's trajectory

In order to determine whether 'history' and the group/nation's trajectory (collective past, present and future) were a significant themes in PRWP leader speeches, worthy of further, more systematic analysis, we subjected the speech transcripts to a first round of qualitative analysis, in which we merely highlighted relevant sections in which the narrative had a clear time dimension (collective past, present and future). In order to get a sense of *the way in which* 'time' was discussed, we used different highlighting colors to differentiate between statements about (a) "the nation", (b) the nation's past, present and future, and (c) between optimistic and pessimistic statements about the nation's past, present and future. In order to ensure we did not overlook relevant sections, we subjected all speeches to a search for three types of keywords. They were keywords referring to the nation and the nation's history (e.g., 'our past', 'our future', 'our nation', 'our values', 'our culture', 'our tradition', 'this generation', 'future generations' *notre histoire*, '*notre avenir*', '*onze geschiedenis*, *onze toekomst*'), keywords referring to times in which the nation was successful ('glory', 'glory days', 'glorious', 'golden', 'golden age', 'success', 'prosper', 'prosperity', 'thrive', 'triumph', 'victorious'), and keywords referring to times in which the nation was unsuccessful and in decline (e.g., 'threat', 'crisis', 'decline', 'destruction', 'degradation', 'slipping', 'sliding', 'drifting', 'cliff', 'struggle', 'annihilation').

This first round of analysis was intended to examine support for our first and most basic prediction that, across these different national contexts, PRWP leaders tend to portray their nation as on a downward trajectory, going from a glorious past to a gloomy future.

3.2. Results stage 1 analysis

(a) A glorious past, a bleak future

From the group of PRWP leaders we examined, the French leaders (Jean-Marie, en Marine Le Pen) turned out the most prolific users of references to France's glorious past, its reputation as one of Europe's oldest nations, and to France's thirty years of growth and prosperity (1950s–1970s), an era referred to as '*Les Trente Glorieuses*'. As Tables 1 and 2 illustrate (column a), both Jean-Marie and Marine portray France's (distant and more recent) history as marked by glory.⁴ For instance, Jean Marie Le Pen draws attention to the fact that it is "On France's territory, on this soil, where 20 centuries of Gallic fury, Greek measure, and Roman order come together" (Jean-Marie Le Pen, Nice, 19 April 2007). Both Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen follow narratives that the past was glorious and give strong warnings that the nation's glory has come to an abrupt end. The way the two narratives are connected by these leaders is well illustrated in the following extract:

"They [the liberal Euro-Globalization enthusiasts] who have, since the 1970s, broken everything [...] employment, purchasing power, social cohesion, enterprise, secularity, conscription, schools, agriculture, childhood, birthrate... Since 30 years, the people in power, who succeeded each other, resorted to ideology, demagoguery, only to break everything that worked in our country." [...] "Their arrogance must have been exceptional, for them to lead this France of thirty years of glory, into catastrophe, this France of a mixed economy [...] They must have been exceptionally incompetent to lead this France of thirty years of glory to the France of 30 years of pity, this France of thirty years of shame, in which we sunk from the mid-1970s." (Jean-Marie Le Pen, Bourget, 12-11-2006)

³ Our choice of cases was informed by the authors' language skills (Dutch, French), and our preference to not have to rely on external translation services. We are aware that we could have included a wider range of parties, and that this would have increased our ability to make claims about the generalizability of narratives and themes used by leaders of this party family. However, this was beyond the scope of this study.

⁴ Because of space limitations, only a limited number of speech extracts are provided in the text that are illustrative of the broader narrative. Further examples can be obtained from the first author upon request.

Table 1

Jean-Marie Le Pen (Front National).

	(a) "A glorious past, a bleak future"	(b) "Our opponents brought the nation down"	(c) "We were glorious because we were tough"	(d) "We need to be tough once more"	(e) "Follow me into battle"
Valmy 20-09-2006	"We are the only ones to have fought for this national independence, which enables us to preserve our common heritage, our moral values, and social progress. [...] Let me remind you that the soldiers who triumphed here in [the battle of] Valmy did so shouting 'Vive la France'."	"It is the illegitimate elite who betrayed the nation, its people, and the Republic [...] It is them who, through selfish politics or naïve beliefs, surrendered us to foreign powers, and exposed us to mass-immigration and globalization. What a reversal. How dare they?"	"We, who have fought for France, have every right to be in this sacred place. [...] To those who were surprised that I choose this place [to give a public address], I say, I chose Valmy consciously [because] I have faith in the continuing glory of our people" [...] "Heroic acts like these have made our nation great".	"We have been ridiculed and prosecuted, [but] we have been the only ones to have taken up the courageous fight for national independence, enabling us to preserve our shared heritage. "My dear fellow citizens, the reason I am here today is to announce that a new Valmy awaits us!"	Dear fellow citizens, thinking about the fight that awaits us, I feel rejuvenated. [...] I, the man whose entire life was forged by challenges and struggle, who was born and who lives for this fight, this challenge! [...] at the service of the people [...] entrusted to call you to this peaceful and decisive battle
Nice 19-04-2007	Let us be proud. France is glory or nothing [...] It is our tragic, glorious, renowned history, which gave the world national pride and [...] its sense of liberty, equality, and brotherhood."	"I thank those who helped to inform fellow citizens about what is at stake, and our plan to stop the country being led into disaster by politician on the left and right, who belong to the system"	"I'm proud to lead you to victory [...] I see change on the horizon, a sign from heaven for those betraying us, [...] a time when providence shapes history, like the 1917 battle of Chemin des Dames, when 30.000 French died for France	"Their sacrifices should not be in vain, we owe it to then to win this battle, as we owe it to the millions of French who lived before us, whose heritage comes with duties of remembrance, courage, and recognition.	"Let us unite, my comrades. Let's mobilize ourselves so we can engrave the victories of April 22nd and May 6th 2007 in the marble of history. Long live the nation, Long live the Republic, Long live France."
Toulouse 25-03-2007	[EU integration and unbridled free-market capitalism] are among the causes of a drop in productivity, from 4% during the Thirty Glorious Years, to 1% after 1990."	"This cartel of political establishment seems to forget the dramatic state our country is in, and that they all prefer a smooth election campaign, in a posh, cozy corner."	[We oppose the EU] Think of the French who went before us, who suffered, who fought, to pass on this heritage [in so many battles] to safeguard our eternal homeland."	The situation today [...] requires revolutionary measures to stop this lethal degradation of our people [...] and men with courage, lucidity, honesty, and good character."	"So, and I say this from the bottom of my heart, do not fear! Once more, France will rediscover itself, like in has done so often, in the finest moments in its history."

In the Netherlands, Historical references also play an important part in the way Geert Wilders makes a case for the glorious past and the bleak future (see Table 3, column a). Interestingly too, Wilders also frequently draws attention to the danger of ignoring the looming danger, by referring to historical examples where leaders or cities responded too slowly. For example:

[In English] "Rome is a very appropriate place to address these issues. [...] In the 5th century, the Roman Empire fell to the Germanic Barbarians. There is no doubt that the Roman civilization was far superior to that of the Barbarians. And yet, Rome fell. Rome fell because it had suffered a loss of belief in its own civilization. It had lost the will to stand up and fight for survival." [...] "Rome did not fall overnight. Rome fell gradually. The Romans scarcely noticed what was happening. They did not perceive the immigration of the Barbarians as a threat until it was too late [...] At first, the attraction of the Empire on newcomers could be seen as a sign of the cultural, political and economic superiority of Rome. [...] But then, on December 31st in the year 406, the Rhine froze and tens of thousands of Germanic Barbarians, crossed the river, flooded the Empire and went on a rampage, destroying every city they passed. In 410, Rome was sacked." (Geert Wilders, Rome, 25 March 2011)

At other times, Wilders uses more recent European history to plead his case. For example, speaking in London, he likens the current situation in Europe with the one facing Britain in 1939, thereby portraying Neville Chamberlain's reconciliatory stance toward Nazi Germany as a recipe for disaster, and Winston Churchill's tough stance as the only way to divert downfall.

[In English] "In 1899, in his book 'The River War,' Winston Churchill warned that Islam is threatening Europe in the same way as the Barbarians once threatened Rome. [...] Mohammedanism, Churchill wrote, and I quote, is a militant

Table 2

Marine Le Pen (Front National).

	(a) "A glorious past, a bleak future"	(b) "Our opponents brought the nation down"	(c) "We were glorious because we were tough"	(d) "We need to be tough once more"	(e) "Follow me into battle"
Paris 14-11-2010	"In this moment, when our country is sliding into the abyss, forced to accept globalization and EU integration, when – make no mistake – a carefully prepared plan is rolled out to replace the population, there is no time to sit back and watch."	"President Sarkozy receives his orders from European and Global institutions, instructions to adapt France globalization, to turn our country into the teacher's pet of this [system that believes in a] mortal utopian illusion."	To illustrate what happens to those who are not tough: "Before colonization, Haiti and the Dominican Republic were inhabited by the Taínos, which Columbus described affectionately as a kind, warm, welcoming people [...] In 1492 they were in their hundred thousands, [...] ten years later there were only ten thousand left, living as slaves and committing suicide."	"FN is not a party, we are a resistance movement, driven by a profound belief, a belief that makes us frown upon titles, and orders us to choose right, but dangerous road towards the summit, to charge towards the cliff rather than the easy, winding flowery path that leads nowhere."	"My friends, we have a long way to go [...] More than anyone else, I know that political enterprises are not built by one person alone. I need you all, today, when we elect the next FN leader, and tomorrow – if you grant me the honor to become your leader – in the Presidential election campaign"
Tours 17-1-2011	"For fifteen centuries we strove to become united [...] we are the inheritants of this millennia old legacy, which we should treasure like a jewel." "The whole world studies and admires our ideas, and our philosophers." "FN was established 40 years ago, when France was still in its glory years."	"Brussels imposes its destructive ultra-liberalism and free-market regime everywhere" "Our politicians present us with false choices; the Euro or the Euro? Immigration or Immigration?" "We see it, we feel it. We are nearing the end of the [old] system."	"Our country's history is marked by constant struggle, between the forces of decline and recovery, between those who sleep and those who dare to say 'No'. "FN is not simply a party: it embodies in France today the spirit of resistance, resistance against the feudal system, against injustice, against totalitarianisms such as Islam and Globalization."	"We need to rediscover our Republic spirit" "We, FN, more than anyone else, recall the 1989 declaration on the rights and duties of Man." "To religious groups trying to impose their laws, we repeat Comte Clermont Tonnerre's words, "Everything for the citizen; nothing for communities"	"From today, let's have this fight" "To all French, to all my friends, I say, the most beautiful days are yet to come. Long Live Front National, Long Live the Republic, Long Live France!"

and proselytizing faith. No stronger retrograde force exists in the World. The civilization of modern Europe might fall, as fell the civilization of ancient Rome, end of quote. Churchill is right, if Europe falls, it will fall because, like ancient Rome, it no longer believes in the superiority of its own civilization." (25 March 2011)

Whereas Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen in France, and Wilders in the Netherlands are able to deploy their country's relatively uncontested national narrative, and able to invoke standard textbook references to their country's great 'history-making moments' on the long road to nationhood, PRWP leaders in other countries face a more complex context. For example, Belgium is home to multiple language communities marked by deep historical divisions, placing 'reality constraints' on the extent to which leaders can talk about *one* glorious past (Ellemers, van Rijswijk, Roefs, & Simons, 1997). In the Belgium context, a PRWP leader will be forced to tread more cautiously, and use slightly different narratives to address different audiences. As an example, our analysis of speeches by Filip Dewinter, the leader of the Flemish nationalist and secessionist party *Vlaams Belang*, revealed that he makes references to Flanders' unique history and its struggle for linguistic and cultural distinctiveness within the Belgian nation-state and that it therefore needs to be protected from other cultures.

[In Dutch] "Antwerp, Ghent, Sint-Niklaas, Genk, Hasselt, Kortrijk, Bruges, Vilvoorde and Roeselare belong in first instance to the Flemish. Flanders is first and foremost of those whose parents, grandparents, great grandparents and for many generations, have worked and struggled in difficult circumstances, in order to give us a high standard of living and well-being, which we, and hopefully our children can enjoy. Flanders is of the Flemish, and no one else!" (Antwerp, 7 October 2012)

Also here, these narratives set the stage for other narratives that emphasize the glorious past and the bleak future (see Table 4, column a).

Table 3

Geert Wilders (Party for Freedom).

	(a) "A glorious past, a bleak future"	(b) "Our opponents brought the nation down"	(c) "We were glorious because we were tough"	(d) "We need to be tough once more"	(e) "Follow me into battle"
London 12-2-2009	"I am deeply humbled to speak before you here [in the Houses of Parliament] where Winston Churchill stood firm, and warned for the dangers looming. [...] Today, I come before you to warn of another great threat. [...] Islam means submission. The question is whether the British people, with its glorious past, is longing for that submission."	I am under guard permanently, courtesy to those preferring violence. But for the leftist fan club of Islam, that is not enough. They started a legal procedure against me. [The Court and Home Office] are doing Islam's dirty work: Sharia by proxy. That is apparently the price we have to pay for the project of mass immigration, and the multicultural project.	"For a moment I feared I would be refused entrance. But I was confident the British government would never sacrifice free speech because of fear of Islam. Britannia rules the waves, and Islam will never rule Britain [...] "By letting me speak today you show that Mr. Churchill's spirit is still very much alive."	"Ladies and gentlemen, the dearest of our many freedoms is under attack. In Europe, freedom of speech is no longer a given." "We have to defend freedom of speech. [During World War II] the BBC offered a daily glimpse of hope, in the darkness of Nazi tyranny. [...] The words 'This Is London' were a symbol for a better world coming soon.	If only the British and Canadian and American soldiers were here. What will be transmitted forty years from now? Will it still be 'This Is London'? Or will it be 'this is Londonistan'? Will it bring us hope, or will it signal the values of Mecca and Medina? [...] The choice is ours. Ladies and gentlemen. We will never apologize for being free. We will never give in. We will never surrender.
Rotterdam 26-4-2010	"Today we start our campaign, here in Rotterdam, the city of Pim Fortuyn, who paid with his life for his ideas, the city which suffers from mass-immigration and Islamization like no other. [...] What once was the largest port of the world, has become the capital of Eurabia."	"The diagnosis of most problems facing the Netherlands is the same: the elite have lost touch with reality. [...] they embrace the idea of anything goes, there is no good or evil, all cultures are equal [...] "Moreover, the left authorities have united with Islam [...] and chose to ignore the many problems facing our country."	"Our ancestors saw a muddy river delta and said: this is going to be an oasis. The citizens of Rotterdam once saw their city being reduced to rubble by air raids, and said: let's fix this together. The Party for Freedom sees a country that is sinking further and further in the swamp, and says, let the fight start!"	"Our pride, the welfare state, which the Dutch paid for passionately over many decades, has decayed into a magnet for fortune seekers. [The country] no longer is a protective shield for the weaker in society, but a takeaway for loitering immigrants. And who is paying for that? You! Henk and Ingrid pay for Ali and Fatima!"	"The [labor] mayor of Amsterdam has no backbone. Even his colleagues call him the beach ball, which drifts with the wind." "The Labor Party used to have a red flag. Now it has a red carpet welcoming Islam" I tell you, our country doesn't need beach balls, it needs leadership. My friends, on June 9th, you can choose."

In sum, although PRWP leaders face a different context (and at times different reality constraints), they all highlight aspects of their history that enable them to glorify the nation's (and/or country's) shared past (e.g., victories on the battlefield, its civilization, its values, or its superior culture and identity). Interestingly, the glorious past narrative often precedes a detailed outline of the many ways in which the present is no longer that glorious. Many of the leaders emphasize the downfall and decline of society and talk at length about the problems of the present. Together, these narratives form a powerful discourse, and it is this discourse that PRWP leaders use to instill a sense of identity threat. It makes salient that over time, identity has been lost and that the past is no longer connected to the present (i.e., identity discontinuity). Indeed, it is the combination of a proud and glorious past, which citizens are about to lose forever that makes nostalgia so bittersweet.

3.3. Stage 2: in-depth thematic content analysis

Having corroborated our basic proposition (PRWP leaders portraying "the nation" in 'declinist' terms, as on a downward trajectory), we subjected the speeches to a more fine-grained analysis of the way in which PRWP leaders mobilize ideas about 'the collective past, present and future' to defend/legitimize a harsher stance on immigration and minority rights. The aim of this second round was to identify the factors to which PRWP leaders attribute the nation's successes and failures, and the factor(s) that are deemed in need of change in order to restore the nation's glory. In other words, this analysis was aimed at uncovering the 'causal story' and to identify the logic used to defend/legitimize harsh policies, and to attack/delegitimize more relaxed/tolerant policies. Rather than to search for new key-words, we re-analyzed the relevant sections focusing on what PRWP have to say about (a) the causes of actual or looming downfall and the group or groups deemed responsible for downfall ('blame attribution') and (b) the causes of past success.

Table 4

Filip DeWinter (Vlaams Belang).

	(a) "A glorious past, a bleak future"	(b) "Our opponents brought the nation down"	(c) "We were glorious because we were tough"	(d) "We need to be tough once more"	(e) "Follow me into battle"
Antwerp 17-10-2012	"[Belgium] has become a super-market, or worse still, a theme park, for criminals". "Crime pays" [because our country no longer punishes criminals] "Criminals from around the world come here to steal, to burgle, to rob, and to plunder."	"Leftist politicians want to turn police officers into social workers, turn criminals into victims, and turn victims into criminals." "Let us repeat [our message] loud and clear once more, the soft approach results in hard crime, and not the other way around"	"Non-European immigrants are eleven times more criminal than our own people. [To stop crime] we need to close the immigration tap." "We have not only imported exotic foods, clothing and intolerance towards women and homosexuals, but also a culture of violence inherent in Islam"	"We [nowadays] treat victims of crime as the outlaws, whilst treating the perpetrators as untouchable. It's time we turn the tables and stop cuddling criminals, and to declare them outlaws" "Many [non-European] immigrants only respect authority when backed by force"	"Together we have chosen the difficult path" "Together, we will make sure that, on October 14th, Vlaams Belang will survive, and that our 'own people first' message will be heard." As Thomas Jefferson said, "In matters of style, swim with the current; in matters of principle, stand like a rock."
Lille 28-4-2013	"Our European civilization is superior to Islam, and it is high time we dare to say this loud and clearly!" "Dear friends. What unites us is our fight to save our civilization and our European traditions. The current invasion of immigrants is unparalleled in history, and represents a threat to our identity."	"At present, a cultural and religious war is being fought in our schools, in our companies, in our cities, and our suburbs, a cultural Jihad, in which we are losing more and more terrain." "Politicians and leftist intellectuals behave increasingly as the Islam collaborators."	"We are experiencing a third Islam invasion. The first one occurred in 8th Century Spain and the second came from the East. Each time brave Europeans stopped the invasion, first in Poitiers in 732, then in Vienna in 1683 "Islam is a religion that wants to conquer the entire globe, and, historically, Europe has always been its enemy."	"It is absolutely essential that we put an end to this third [Islamic] invasion, and send Islam back where it belongs, on the other side of the Mediterranean." "Winston Churchill was right when he said that about kindness to the enemy, that it is like continuing to feed the crocodile in the hope he will eat you last."	"Multiculturalism is the Trojan horse Islam uses to conquer Europe." "Comrades, the time has come to show character. We have to end this immigration invasion, defend the superiority of our civilization, stop the Islamization of Europe, and give back Europe to the Europeans."

3.4. Results stage 2 analyses

The narrative we encountered was one consisting of four themes, which together form a narrative that justifies the need for harsher measures and heroic leadership. In addition to (a) a glorious past, a bleak future, these themes are (b) our opponents brought the nation down (often because they forgot their history), (c) we were glorious because we were tough, (d) we need to be tough once more to avoid collective downfall, and (e) I am prepared to lead you into battle. Even though these themes manifested themselves in different ways, and not all themes are equally prevalent in all national contexts, as [Tables 1–4](#) shows there is also remarkable level of similarity between the different leaders. In what follows, we will unpack these differences and similarities in greater detail.

(b) *Our opponents who brought the nation down*

Our analysis revealed that PRWP leaders are quite happy to identify explicitly those who in their view betray(ed) the nation (see [Tables 1–4](#), column b). More mainstream parties and their leaders are typically portrayed by PRWP leaders as either naïve/incompetent and unable to recognize the dangers of immigration, multiculturalism and transnational (EU) cooperation, or in a more populist way as a morally corrupted, self-serving elite, who *willfully* ignore these developments in order to secure personal gains. What is also interesting is the terminology PRWP leaders use to pitch the virtuous people against the malicious elite. For example, our analysis revealed that Marine Le Pen routinely refers to 'a small caste' of powerful elites (e.g., Metz, 11 December 2011; [Table 2](#), column b), this presumably to underscore the unfairness of current social system, and to convey the idea that upward mobility is impossible.

In particular in France and the Netherlands, the accusation is often quite specific and centers on opposition leaders breaking with the nation's glorious past. Such attacks not only involve the accusation that political opponents support/pursue ill-informed policies (immigration and multiculturalism), but also, and more importantly, the charge that they would not

support/pursue these policies if they were more familiar with their nation's glorious legacy. In contrast, their own party is presented as the natural 'home' for those who do remember the collective past, and the lesson that toughness has proven of existential importance. As a result, it becomes possible for PRWP leaders to draw parallels between their leadership and famous heroic leaders (e.g., Jeanne D'Arc, Winston Churchill, William of Orange, etc.), presumably in the hope that they too will be remembered by future generations as courageous, heroic leaders.

(c) Toughness as the key to (past and future) glory

All PRWP leaders we examined defend tougher policies by portraying 'toughness' as the key to success to past national glory, and mildness as evidence of lack of courage and preparedness to 'sell out' to the enemy. For example, DeWinter emphasizes that past glory is not so much linked with past military successes, but more with glory achieved through significant sacrifices made by civilians (see Table 4, column c). These are the ordinary, hard-working battlers, whose glory resides, not in heroic victories on the battlefield, but in their proven ability to survive long periods of hardship and to emerge triumphant.

In contrast, and building on France's long military history and abundance of events that can be interpreted as evidence of the nation's heroic national spirit, Jean Marie Le Pen uses military examples, such as the 1792 Battle of Valmy, and the 1917 Battle of the Chemin des Dames, to convey the message that the French are a courageous nation, who have fought and prevailed in many battles, and, more importantly, that a true French person can be recognized by his/her preparedness to follow the example of past generations (see Table 1, column c). As Table 2 shows Marine Le Pen too tends to reminisce about the many battles that were fought to secure glory for the nation, and she too portrays her party as the only party to remember, and to have a connection with the nation's past.

(d) We need to be tough once more and (e) follow me into battle

Once the enemy has been identified (i.e., the malicious, leftists elite and its lack of courage to challenge immigration and multiculturalism), it becomes possible to declare war, and to call 'the people' to arms to restore the supremacy of their nation's culture and identity (see Tables 1–4, columns d and e). For example, Marine Le Pen, like her predecessor, goes to great lengths to persuade her audience that 'past glory' was secured through toughness, that the problems facing France today are the result of (the elite) having forgotten this important lesson, and that, under her leadership, toughness will be used to restore France's glory (Table 2).

Interestingly in this call to arms is that PRWP leaders tend to use terms such as "we", "us", "them", "our culture" and "our heritage" creatively, and interpret them differently depending on the audience being addressed, and this enables them to promote identity threat at different levels of inclusiveness. For instance, when addressing a domestic audience, Wilders conveys the message that the national identity is at risk, whereas during overseas trips his speeches convey the message that European identity is at stake. Our analysis of speeches by Filip DeWinter revealed a similar pattern of significant changes in self-definition, with the leader at times using the terms "we" and "us" to refer to "us Flemish", and at other occasions to refer to "us Belgians", or "us Europeans" (see Table 4). Consistent with previous self-categorization research into leadership and identity entrepreneurship (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) – we found that PRWP leaders will at times portray 'the nation' as on the brink of collapse, and about to be Islamized, whilst at other times portraying Europe as a whole as on the verge of losing its enlightenment legacy and Judeo-Christian identity. However, in both these accounts (i.e., threat to the nation, threat to Europe) the call for a harsher stance on immigrants and minorities is justified using the same logic: "we were glorious because we were tough", "we became soft and lost our glory", and "we need to be tough once more to restore our (national or European) glory."

3.5. Discussion

In summary, our analysis of speeches confirmed that PRWP leaders go to great lengths to persuade (potential) followers that the nation's history is at stake. Rather than to invoke historical events randomly, our analysis revealed that history is being politicized in a systematic way, using a narrative consisting of five related themes. These are (a) our past is glorious, but our future is bleak, (b) we know who brought the country down, (c) we were glorious because we were tough, (d) we need to be touch once more, and (e) we are the only party prepared to take on "the enemy." In so doing PRWP leaders not only encourage followers to wallow in nostalgia and traditionalism (Gilmour, 2008), they also play up fear for identity discontinuity and identity loss (Iyer & Jetten, 2011; Liu & Khan, 2014; Sani et al., 2008). These insights are well established in the literature. However, what is in our view insufficiently appreciated, is that by drawing attention to instances in which toughness proved necessary to guarantee the nation's survival and identity continuity, migrants, asylum-seekers and their powerful allies (typically the leftist urban elite) are not only portrayed as standing in the way of progress from a glorious past into a prosperous glorious future, but also as a problem requiring the nation to be tough and unflinching. It thus appears that PRWP leaders use their knowledge of shared history not only to underscore their prototypicality, and to call "the virtuous people" to arms against "the malicious elite", but also to legitimize harsher norms (i.e., authoritarianism, see Reicher & Haslam, 2006). To put it differently, our findings show that PRWP leaders can be regarded as norm entrepreneurs, whose

persuasive power derives from their ability to redefine their follower's self-understanding, a process described in the Social identity literature as identity entrepreneurship (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

The findings are consistent with a growing body of work showing that to understand the way that identity affects behavior right now, we need to understand where identity is coming from and where it is perceived to be going (Condor, 1996; Liu et al., 1999; Liu & Hilton, 2005). Our analysis also shows that these understandings are not fixed, but highly malleable. PRWP leaders do more than simply 'harvest' pre-existing perceived (national) identity threat. Rather, they go to great lengths to cultivate such threat perceptions (Mols, 2012; Wohl et al., 2012). Indeed, PRWP leaders present the past, present and future strategically, and in such a way as to instill identity threat (e.g., identity loss, identity discontinuity, and collective angst; Chandler & Proulx, 2008; Iyer & Jetten, 2011; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Thus, historical representations become a tool in the toolbox of PRWP leaders, with narratives about the nation's past struggles and triumphs being used to give weight to the political claim that the nation owes its continuing existence to its 'toughness', and that failure to take on proponents of immigration and multiculturalism amounts to forgetting the collective past, and result in the nation losing its connection with its glorious past (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). The following quote from Geert Wilders illustrates this:

"It is important that we know where our roots are. If we lose them we become deracinated. We become men and women without a culture. I am here today to talk about multiculturalism." (Rome, 25 March 2011)

4. Theoretical implications

The results presented here also have important implications for narrative theory and nostalgia research. Even though the experimental social psychological literature has examined the effects of nostalgia and has identified important moderators that affect the outcomes of nostalgia (Iyer & Jetten, 2011), there has been less attention for the type of nostalgia that is evoked. It is clear that both left-wing leaders and PRWP leaders use nostalgic narratives, and that there is a difference in what these leaders are nostalgic about. For example, whereas left-wing leaders describe the decline of the welfare state, conservative leaders describe the decline of the traditional family (Coontz, 1992). However, as Gilmour's (2008) observed, PRWP leaders are particularly adept at wallowing in nostalgia and traditionalism. The PRWP leaders studied here were nostalgic about a time when the country was ethnically homogeneous (at least in the view of the PRWP leader). By excluding immigrants from the glorious past, the emotional power of evoking nostalgia about that power is further amplified.

Our results lead to three other observations. First, it transpired from our analysis that PRWP leaders like to draw historical parallels involving famous Caucasian wartime leaders (like Jeanne D'Arc, Winston Churchill), rather than iconic non-Caucasian leaders who made history with help of more peaceful means (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King). By pointing to glorious history-making moments in which the nation prevailed because it was prepared to put up a fight and rallied behind an unflinching leader (e.g., Winston Churchill's tough stance on Nazi Germany), as well as to instances where failure to confront a danger resulted in a nation suffering a humiliating defeat (e.g., Chamberlain's soft stance on Nazi Germany), PRWP leaders are able to develop powerful collective angst narratives. Interestingly too, we found that PRWP leaders, when glorifying the past, tend to focus on famous military battles in which their nation made big sacrifices to secure final victory (e.g., Valmy, Chemin des Dames), or battles in which alien forces were kept at bay (Vienna), rather than instances in which conflict was resolved peacefully. This is not to say that PRWP leaders do not refer to periods of unprecedented national prosperity and glory. Both Jean-Marie and Marine LePen refer to the post WWII era as '*les Trente Glorieuses*', and portray this as the very glory France is losing. However, what is not accounted for are the less glorious times, such as the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, in which France was defeated, or the Dutch surrender to Germany on May 14th 1940, only four days after the German invasion started. In sum, PRWP leaders focus selectively on moments in which the nation secured heroic glory.

Second, by describing the nation's identity (and very existence) in war-like terms as under threat from an alien force, PRWP leaders seek to enhance the appeal of a belligerent leader, and to undermine the appeal of leaders advocating a softer, more reconciliatory stance. To use social psychological terminology, by persuading the electorate the nation is 'at war', and by portraying themselves as brave wartime leaders, PRWP leaders seek to increase the extent to which they become regarded as most representative of the nation (prototypical) and regarded as the most suited to lead the nation into the uncertain future (Haslam et al., 2011; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). These findings are consistent with those encountered by Bobowik et al. (2014), who found that representations of WWII influence citizens' preparedness to defend their nation, but also with Wohl et al.'s (2014) finding that fear-arousing state symbolologies tend to increase people's willingness to endorse tougher treatment of outgroups.

Third, this composite narrative enables followers to justify norms that, under 'normal' peacetime circumstances, would be regarded as anti-normative. PRWP voters typically deny being racist or xenophobic, and the above-described narrative enables them to rationalize and legitimize anti-social attitudes. Indeed, this narrative enables PRWP voters to buttress their argument that they hold no grudge against immigrants as individuals, but that they are concerned about the nation/culture as a whole. The PRWP leader, in turn, will typically deny the charge that they are cultivating fear for identity loss, and claim to merely voice popular concern, and 'daring to say what most people think'. However, to accept this rebuttal would be to overlook that PRWP leaders have a remarkable ability to redefine people's shared self-understanding, and it is this ability that enables them to frame relatively mundane policy challenges as existential threats (Mols, 2010).

5. Limitations and future directions

Our analysis revealed remarkable similarities in the way in which PRWP leaders use shared historical knowledge to call the electorate to arms, and we believe it is possible to speak of a rather unique PRWP narrative. However, it is at the same time important not to overstate the case. First, as already noted, our analysis relies on a relatively small number of cases, and it would therefore be necessary to expand the scope of the research before we could make more general claims about 'the typical way' in which PRWP leaders portray their nation's historical trajectory.

Second, what should not be forgotten is that there are similarities between the way in which PRWP leaders and other more mainstream parties seek to obtain followership. For example, both will do their best to show their audience that they are policy experts, that they have up-to-date information about recent/current trends and developments, and possess sound knowledge of the formal policy-making process. What should also not be forgotten is that mainstream party leaders, in their eagerness to harness support for their cause, will occasionally deploy a very similar strategy, and cultivate a sense of 'identity threat' to buttress their case, especially where there is a realistic prospect of the mainstream party losing voters to more radical PRWP parties.

6. Conclusion

As Anderson (1982) wrote, nations are best conceived, not in an essentialist way as groups with a shared ethnic core, but in a constructivist way, as 'imagined communities'. Anderson's work remains useful today, not least because it reminds us that a nation "is imagined" (Anderson, 1982, p. 224). What remains equally useful is Billig's (1995) insights, developed in his book 'Banal Nationalism', that a nation's sense of national identity can lie dormant for quite some time. Billig's work serves as a useful reminder that certain events (e.g., the World Cup Soccer, terrorist attacks) can render the categories 'nation' and 'national' salient spontaneously, and this may have social and political consequences (e.g., a rise in football hooliganism, or increased support for nationalistic parties).

However, what is at times not fully appreciated is that politicians, and PRWP leaders in particular, tend to actively cultivate nationalistic sentiments so as to broaden their support base, and to harness this identity for political purposes. As Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have shown, politicians (not just PRWP leaders) are best regarded as identity entrepreneurs, who garner support for their policy proposals by portraying the proposal in question as a defining feature of what their group/nation is about. PRWP leaders go to rather extreme lengths to prepare the ground for harsher policy-proposals, and they do so using a specific historical legitimizing narrative, one that conveys the idea that the nation faces an as yet unrecognized critical juncture and imminent identity discontinuity (Mols, 2010). Our findings are consistent with earlier narrative theory research, which showed that politicians use metaphors to appeal to emotions, and antagonistic themes to demarcate in- and out-group boundaries (Liu & Khan, 2014). The present research extends this by showing the importance of induced fear for identity discontinuity.

The message conveyed by this historical narrative is one that can be described using the aphorism "No Guts, No Glory", popularized by US Air Force general Frederick C. Bless in his book carrying this title, or the expression "No Pain, No Gain", which is now used in various circles to convey the idea that those who want progress should be prepared to make sacrifices and endure suffering. It is in this way, in the name of being tough to restore the nation's old glory and/or natural supremacy that PRWP leaders seek to promote an alternative state symbology, and justify their calls for harsher immigration and asylum policies.

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