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Proscribing Right-Wing Extremist Organizations in Europe: Variations, Trends, and Prospects

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ABSTRACT

Among the legal instruments that address organized right-wing extremism in Europe, proscription is one of the most severe. Yet there is scant comparative work on where, how frequently, and against which right-wing extremist organization proscriptions have been applied. This article presents a new dataset on Proscribed Right-wing Extremist Organizations (PREOs) in Europe. A typology of countries' proscriptive regimes illuminates how proscription by executive decrees is more frequent than proscription by judicial ruling, and how proscription by executive decrees appears to be more responsive to high-profile incidents of extremist violence. We complement this descriptive overview with a close investigation of patterns in Germany, the state that has most frequently used proscription against right-wing extremist organizations. Furthermore, the article presents paired case studies of the proscriptions of Blood & Honour in Germany (by executive decree) and the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland (by judicial ruling), which point to the causal factors underlying proscription of right-wing extremist organizations.

KEYWORDS

Proscription; banning; listing; extremism; terrorism; Blood & Honour; Nordic Resistance Movement

Introduction

Written into the fundamental laws of most European states is the precept that there are strains of organized extremism that liberal democracy cannot abide; hence, legal instruments have been developed to address, disrupt, and proscribe extremist organizations. Proscription, that is, a form of (state) repression that declares a formal association or group unlawful and criminalizes its further operation, is the most severe of these instruments.¹ Yet, for a variety of reasons, some states have proscribed right-wing extremist (RWE) organizations quite often, while others have used proscription laws only in isolated cases; still others eschew completely such legal instruments. What is surprising, alarming even, is that there is scant comparative research on the variations of proscription practices between European countries. Where, how frequently, against which RWE organizations, and why have proscriptions been applied? This article presents new data generated by a network of European country experts on proscribed right-wing extremist organizations (PREOs). It provides an empirical typology of countries' proscriptive regimes and attempts to open the lid of the black box concealing proscription decision processes.

Several conspicuous violent incidents over the past decade have drawn public and political attention to the threats posed by RWE. From terrorist attacks, to extremist riots at national and regional legislatures, to the quotidian menace of RWE assault and harassment—numerous countries are simultaneously shocked by and inured to the dangers of RWE. When inspecting these incidents, astute observation often picks out two common features: first, RWE, facilitated by internet tools and social media platforms, is marked by transnational influences.

Conspiracy narratives formulated in one country and propagated in another have inspired violence in yet other countries. RWE is not constrained by geopolitical borders. Second, irrespective of the tendency to portray perpetrators of RWE violence as “lone wolves,” they are often embedded in organizations or at least indelibly marked by socialization with organizations. This is certainly the case in many incidents of low-level violence. But even many notorious right-wing terrorists, often cast as isolated actors, are actually imprinted by their experience with extremist organizations: For example, the Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh participated in Ku Klux Klan rallies in the years before his attack, the London nail bomber David Copeland had been active in the British National Party and in the National Socialist Movement, the members of the National Socialist Underground in Germany were socialized by RWE organizations (e.g., Thüringer Heimatschutz) and activism in the early 1990s, Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik was for several years a member of the right-wing Progress Party and was in touch with leaders of the English Defence League shortly before his 2011 attack, and the Christchurch mosque shooter Brenton Tarrant had donated to and communicated with the Austrian Identitarian leader Martin Sellner. Examples abound of violence connected to RWE organizations and actors. Together, the transnationalization of RWE and its organizational embeddedness demand greater attention to the way different states handle extremist organizations.

The data presented here first reveal geographic and temporal trends: Proscriptions have become more widespread and more frequent in recent years. Though most states still rarely proscribe, the readiness to use this legal instrument has clearly acquired greater acceptance. The descriptive analysis of proscription trends is enhanced by combining the PREO data with extant data on RWE activity. Within countries there is typically a set of criminal offenses that relate directly to RWE, which when compared with PREO data could reveal how responsive proscription practices are to criminal RWE activity. There is ample room for further research in this direction. Here, we juxtapose the PREO data with extant cross-national RWE data. Such data sources are few,² but the Right-wing Terrorism and Violence dataset compiled by Ravndal is one of the best since it provides a reliable register of violent right-wing activity, particularly fatal incidents.³ We use these data to display how proscriptions relate to RWE violence. As it is one of the largest hubs of organized RWE and certainly the model of intense proscriptive practices, we dilate on trends and patterns in Germany. We observe a cross-national pattern of the importance of violence for proscriptions, particularly in countries—such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—where proscription is decided by executive decree rather than by judicial ruling. This is likely attributable to mechanisms of political pressure that government ministries typically encounter more often than courts. What is more, it is not violence writ large that seems most helpful in understanding spikes of proscriptions, but particularly visible violent incidents. This too underscores the largely political nature of proscription decisions in certain countries.

We delve deeper into two cases of proscription: Blood & Honour in Germany and the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) in Finland. These two organizations share important features. They both espouse neo-Nazi ideology; they are both active transnationally, with several national branches. The proscription regimes they have encountered, however, differ. Blood & Honour has been proscribed in numerous countries, including through executive decree in Germany. The NRM was proscribed in Finland through judicial ruling; in the other countries where NRM is active there is as yet no legal mechanism for proscribing organizations. Through closer inspection of these cases we identify country- and organization-level factors underlying decisions to proscribe RWE organizations.

Proscription cannot cure all the ills and resolve all the problems of RWE. But it is a tool that many states possess to constrain and disrupt organizational activity that incites hatred, encourages violence, and undermines the constitutional order. This article helps to fill the gap of comparative data and analysis on responses to RWE. The following section reviews the literature and research that speaks to this topic. Next, the article explains the data collection process and presents some basic descriptive analyses as well as an empirical typology of countries’ proscriptive regimes. We pay particular attention to Germany, where proscription has been applied most frequently. Then, the article relates proscription laws and practices to RWE online activity. It concludes with a summary of findings.

Proscribing right-wing extremist organizations

Scholarly examination of proscription clusters in four fields. First, legal scholars have analyzed proscription laws and precedence. Most essentially, this line of inquiry plumbs the juridical limits of proscription applications, how codified law is interpreted and enacted by the courts.⁴ Emerging from this scholarship is the identification of two paths of proscription: via the executive and via the judiciary. McGarrity and Williams provide a particularly useful delineation of these types in Australia, where the two exist in parallel.⁵ (As we discuss below, in Europe, countries that have proscription powers typically have executive or judicial paths, not both.) Broadly, the executive path refers to proscription through a decision by the head of government or responsible minister, often with limited transparency about specifically how proscription law criteria are satisfied, though there may be mechanisms for reviewing decisions. The judicial path involves a judge or jury determining whether a group meets the legal thresholds for proscription. Legal scholars debate the comparative advantages of these two paths. Several have argued that proscription by the executive may be “politically motivated, inconsistent, selective and discriminatory fashion”⁶ or suffer from “due process deficits.”⁷ Though siding or settling this debate is not our aim here, the argument of McGarrity and Williams is well made in support of the executive path: that it is more experienced at making decisions involving political considerations and that it is answerable to the legislature.⁸ The conceptual division of proscription procedures, between the somewhat opaque executive path and the less agile judicial path, splits the countries of Europe.

Second, research in the field of terrorism and security studies highlights the international dimension of proscription. The attacks organized by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 triggered an explosion of governmental action aimed at countering terrorist threats that transcend national boundaries. Proscribing (or “listing”) terrorist groups formed part of a broader development towards more international counterterrorism coordination. In the introductory article to their special issue, Jarvis and Legrand’s description of the reasons for proscription is suffused with foreign policy considerations:⁹

proscription can be variously or even simultaneously instrumental, political, and symbolic. It can seek to communicate a government’s political stance on a conflict; it can bolster global efforts to vanquish common threats; it can trigger policing powers targeting a specific group and its supporters; and it can augment a government’s diplomatic relationship with other states.¹⁰

While countering Islamist groups was obviously a focus, this development towards coordination also encompassed other organizations, such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)¹¹ and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.¹² Moreover, the intensification of securitization processes in some cases led to the extension of proscriptions to political organizations associated with terrorist groups.¹³

Third and closely related to research on terrorism, studies of conflict resolution examine the effects of proscription on peace processes. Several contributions in this area find that proscription hinders resolution, for example by delegitimizing actors essential for peace negotiations¹⁴ or by affecting other states’ position as mediators.¹⁵

In each of these three fields research sometimes omits or obscures the proscription processes enacted against right-wing extremist organizations. Legal scholarship, with its focus on specific legal contexts, may omit comparative perspectives. Research on terrorism, security, and conflict resolution ably conceptualizes international factors, but gives little consideration to the nationally-bounded proscription regimes that are commonly deployed against RWE organizations.

The fourth area of research, a synthesis of study about the far right and militant democracy, reckons with the management of domestic threats and RWE. Whereas 2001 marks a critical turning point for international cooperation against terrorism and the listing of proscribed organizations, modern militant democracy and proscriptive responses to RWE was born in the wake of the Second World War, when European states aimed to prevent the sort of ascensions to power performed by interwar fascist movements.¹⁶ Proscription formed the central tool in a suite of legal instruments to curtail RWE organizing and campaigning.¹⁷ Such militant democracy regimes commonly proscribed fascist parties and their successors as well as retaining powers to proscribe parties and associations that oppose or undermine the democratic order.

Researchers have examined the varying effects of proscribing RWE organizations: by turns, successfully disrupting RWE scenes¹⁸ and triggering adaptation and ultimately benefiting RWE actors.¹⁹ Yet a fuller answer about the effects of proscription, one relatable to variation of time and place, is in some ways premature as extant research has not compiled the factual basis for comparative research. We need to establish the “where” and “when” and, more problematically, “why” of RWE proscription. To this last point, for many cases we may surmise the rationale for proscription. Articles by Macklin and Kotonen, for instance, provide some explanation for the decisions to proscribe RWE organizations in, respectively, the United Kingdom and Finland.²⁰ Bourne and Veugelers compare a decision to proscribe a party in Germany (the *Sozialistische Reichspartei*) with a refusal to proscribe in Italy (the *Movimento Sociale Italiano*), finding that “securitization is a necessary condition for proscription, whereas approval of violence is not.”²¹ However, as the legal scholarship on the executive path of proscription has indicated, because proscription decisions are often taken, at least in part, on the basis of classified information, there are limits to the extent we can explain why certain organizations are proscribed. Future research should work to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for proscription in different national contexts. For the purposes of this article, it suffices to clarify where and when RWE organizations have been proscribed, and to make connections to conditions that can help explain why groups are proscribed.

Data collection

Forty-five country experts worked in teams to identify PREOs in the twenty-seven Member States of the European Union and in the United Kingdom. These experts were recruited based on their having published in peer-reviewed journals on topics related to the far right in their respective countries and were identified through affiliation in a handful of research networks, most prominently including the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right, the Early Career Research Network on the Extra-Parliamentary Far Right, and several standing groups of the European Consortium for Political Research. The experts coded the PREO name, country, year of proscription, and method of proscription (e.g., through court ruling or through a executive decree). To identify traits of the PREOs, experts also coded several organizational characteristics: locality and sub-national region of the organization’s activity, if identifiable; the type of organization banned (i.e., party, movement, or alternative media);²² the extent of the organization’s operational range (i.e., sub-national, national, transnational); and whether the organization was a chapter of an overarching organization.

In its current iteration, updated since coding in mid-2021, the dataset includes 191 proscribed organizations.²³ Table 2 lists these organizations as well as the country and year in which they were proscribed, and the type of organization. “Movement” entities, as opposed to “parties” or “alternative media” organizations, represent the overwhelming majority of PREOs. In part, this is due to the higher standard of justification often required for party proscription. We hasten to add that the “movement” category masks a diversity of organizational types, including mass organizations, small associations (e.g., German *Kameradschaften*) and group-uscules, terrorist groups, and clandestine cells.

Patterns of organizational proscription

Organizational proscription is one type of measure to prevent and counter RWE. While a comprehensive survey of all the laws applied to RWE activity in European states is beyond the scope of this article, we can summarize the modes of organizational proscription decisions as taking place in one of two ways: through executive decree or judicial ruling.²⁴ Juxtaposing these two modes with the number of instances in which they have been applied, as in Table 1, reveals differences among European countries’ proscription regimes.

Table 1. Modes and instances since 1990 (number in parentheses) of organizational proscription in European states

		Executive decree	Judicial ruling
Proscription since 1990	Highly active	Germany (54) France (13) United Kingdom (9)	
	Active	Italy (4) Hungary (1) Austria (1) Estonia (1)	Hungary (3) Belgium (2) France (2) Netherlands (2) Poland (2) Spain (2) Bulgaria (1) Czechia (1) Finland (1) Greece (1) Latvia (1) Romania (1) Slovakia (1) Slovenia (1)
	Inactive	Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Sweden	

On the left-hand side of [Table 1](#) are countries in which executive decrees are the mode of imposing proscription. Laws on associations, as in Austria and Germany, or on terrorism, as in the United Kingdom, provide the legal basis for these ministerial decisions with state agencies providing advisory input. While the extent and weight of advisory input is uncertain, we can say that the proscription by executive decree is essentially a political decision, an action authorized by a party politician acting as the head of a governmental branch (typically the interior ministry).²⁵ This contrasts distinctly with the mode represented on the right-hand side of [Table 1](#) in which courts are the actor imposing proscription. Here, state or governmental actors may bring suit against a RWE organization, but it is the judicial decision that deems an organization illegal. The legal grounds of that decision may vary. For example, the three PREOs in Belgium were all proscribed on different legal bases: the Ghent Court of Appeal in 1983 deemed the Order of Flemish Militants (*Vlaamse Militanten Orde*) a private militia and thus proscribed it under a 1934 enactment; in 2004, Belgium's high court ruled that the Flemish Block (*Vlaams Blok*) had broken anti-racism laws, effectively proscribing the party; and in 2014, the "Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty" (*Bloed bodem eer en trouw*) neo-Nazi group was banned on account of violating laws against denying the Holocaust and against racist and xenophobic acts as well as breaching several sections of the penal code.²⁶

There are a few caveats to this division between executive decree and judicial ruling. First, sharp-eyed readers will notice that two countries are listed twice in [Table 1](#). France and Hungary have applied both modes of proscription. In France, proscription typically occurs through executive decree, but two unions affiliated with the radical right Front National were outlawed by the high court partially on the basis that the unions "advocate distinctions based on race, color, descent, national or ethnic origin."²⁷ Conversely, in Hungary, court rulings have been the more common proscription mode. However, in 1994 an executive decree proscribed the Hungarian Hungarianist Movement (*Magyar Hungarista Mozgalom*), the first organization proscribed in post-communist Hungary.²⁸ Related to this first caveat, several countries that proscribe through executive decrees reserve decisions about party proscription for the courts. For example, under German law proscription of a political party demands a higher standard of justification and must be decided by the Constitutional Court. Finally, one apparently exceptional case emerged from Austria where in 2019 the "Association for living culture and customs" (*Verein für Lebendige Kultur Und Brauchtumspflege*), a sham organization for Identitarian activists, was dissolved by the Upper Austria Police Department for noncompliance with the society's by-laws, particularly regarding financial irregularities.

Overall, proscription of RWE organizations is rare. Since 1990, outside of Germany, which conspicuously accounts for more than half of such proscriptions, only forty-eight violent right-wing

Table 2. List of proscribed right-wing extremist organizations (PREOs)

Name	Country	P Year	Type
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) and auxiliary organizations	Austria	1945	Party
Bund Heimattreuer Jugend (BHJ) Graz	Austria	1953	Movement
Nationales Jugendkorps	Austria	1956	Movement
Sudetendeutsche Jugend	Austria	1957	Movement
Deutsch-Österreichische Jungsozialisten	Austria	1958	Movement
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nationaler Jugendverbände Österreichs (ANJÖ)	Austria	1958	Movement
Bund Heimattreuer Jugend Ungarns	Austria	1958	Movement
Volkstreuer Kampfbund	Austria	1959	Movement
Bund Heimattreuer Jugend (BHJ)- Landesgruppe Niederösterreich	Austria	1959	Movement
Adler Jugend (AJ)	Austria	1959	Movement
Schützenkompanie Andreas Von Liebenberg	Austria	1959	Movement
Schützenkompanie Major Walter Novotny	Austria	1959	Movement
Bund Heimattreuer Jugend (BHJ)- Landesgruppe Wien	Austria	1959	Movement
Wiener Jungvolk	Austria	1959	Movement
Patrouillenstaffel Graz	Austria	1959	Movement
Wiener Sturmjugend	Austria	1959	Movement
Bund Heimattreuer Jugend (BHJ) Kärnten	Austria	1959	Movement
Steirischer Jugendbund	Austria	1960	Movement
Verband Der Donauschwaben- Jugend	Austria	1960	Movement
Grenzlandjugend	Austria	1960	Movement
Kulturverband Der Heimattreuen Jugend Österreichs	Austria	1960	Movement
Verband Freiheitlicher Mittelschüler	Austria	1961	Movement
Olympia- Akademische Burschenschaft	Austria	1961	Movement
Verband Südetendeutsche Hochschüler	Austria	1962	Movement
Verband Heimattreuer Jugend	Austria	1963	Movement
Legion Europa	Austria	1964	Movement
Allgemeine Diskussions- Und Bildungsclub	Austria	1967	Movement
Bund Nationaler Studenten (BNS)	Austria	1968	Movement
Arbeitsvereinigung Für Mittelschüler (AFM)	Austria	1974	Movement
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Für Politik (AfP)	Austria	1975	Movement
Deutsches Kulturwerk Europäischen Geistes	Austria	1976	Movement
Kameradschaft Babenberg	Austria	1980	Movement
Aktion Neue Rechte	Austria	1981	Movement
Nationaldemokratische Partei (NDP)	Austria	1988	Party
Verein Für Lebendige Kultur Und Brauchtumspflege	Austria	2019	Movement
Vlaams Blok	Belgium	2004	Party
Order Of Flemish Militants (Vlaamse Militanten Orde, VMO)	Belgium	1983	Movement
BBET (Bloed bodem eer en trouw)	Belgium	2014	Movement
Lukov March	Bulgaria	2020	Movement
The Workers' Party (Delnická strana)	Czechia	2010	Party
Vaps Movement- Union Of Participants In The Estonian War Of Independence	Estonia	1934/ 2009	Movement
Patriotic People's Front (Isänmaallinen Kansanrintama, IKR)	Finland	1978	Movement
Nordic Resistance Movement (Pohjoismainen vastarintaliike, PVL)	Finland	2020	Movement
Rassemblement national populaire	France	1944	Movement
Commandos de Saint-Ex	France	1949	Movement
Phalange française	France	1958	Movement
Jeune Nation	France	1958	Movement
Le Parti patriote révolutionnaire de M. Jean-Baptiste Biaggi	France	1958	Movement
Le Front d'action nationale	France	1958	Movement
Le Mouvement populaire français	France	1960	Movement
Front national des combattants	France	1961	Movement
Occident	France	1968	Movement
Ordre Nouveau	France	1973	Movement
Fédération d'action nationale et européenne (FANE)	France	1987	Movement
Le Front national-Pénitentiaire	France	1997	Movement
Le Front national-Police (FNP)	France	1997	Movement
Elsass Korps	France	2005	Movement
Unité Radicale	France	2006	Movement
Dare to dream (Envie de rever)	France	2013	Movement
Nationalist Youth (Jeunesses Nationalistes)	France	2013	Movement
Revolutionary Nationalist Youth (Jeunesses nationalistes revolutionnaires)	France	2013	Movement
The French Work (L'Œuvre Française)	France	2013	Movement
Third Way (Troisième Voie)	France	2013	Movement
Bastion Social (Les petits reblochons/association lugdunum /cercle frederic mistral/ciation lugdunum /cercle frederic mistral/cercle honore d'estienne d'orves/solidarite)	France	2019	Movement

(Continued)

Table 2. (Continued)

Name	Country	P Year	Type
Blood & Honour Hexagone—Combat 18	France	2019	Movement
Grey Wolves (Loups Gris)	France	2020	Movement
Generation identity (Génération identitaire)	France	2021	Movement
L'Alvarium	France	2021	Movement
Les Zouaves Paris	France	2022	Movement
Bund junger Deutscher	Germany	1951	Movement
Deutsche Sozialistische Partei (DSP)	Germany	1951	Movement
Bund für Wahrheit und Recht	Germany	1952	Movement
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP)	Germany	1952	Movement
Unpolitische Interessengemeinschaft (UIG)	Germany	1952	Movement
Vereinigung ehemaliger Internierter in Moosburg	Germany	1952	Movement
Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP), including sub-groups (Reichsfront, Reichsjugend, SRP Frauenbund)	Germany	1952	Party
Bund der Schaffenden	Germany	1952	Movement
Deutscher Arbeiter-Verband (DAV)	Germany	1952	Movement
Technischer Dienst im Bund Deutscher Jugend	Germany	1953	Movement
Deutscher Heimatschutz (DHS)	Germany	1953	Movement
Diskussionskreis der ehemaligen SS	Germany	1953	Movement
Nationale Sammlungsbewegung	Germany	1953	Movement
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nation Europa	Germany	1953	Movement
Freikorps Deutschland	Germany	1953	Movement
Bund Deutscher Jugend	Germany	1953	Movement
Technischer Dienst	Germany	1953	Movement
Sozialistische Jugend Europas	Germany	1953	Movement
Vereinigung freier unabhängiger Deutscher	Germany	1953	Movement
Deutsche Gemeinschaft (DG)	Germany	1953	Movement
Europäische Verbindungsstelle (EVS) Nationale Sektion	Germany	1954	Movement
Vereinigung ehemaliger Angehöriger des SS-Kavallerie-Korps in Bad Wildungen	Germany	1956	Movement
Bund für Deutschlands Erneuerung	Germany	1956	Movement
Arbeitsgemeinschaft nie vergessene Heimat	Germany	1956	Movement
Gründungsausschuss der Deutschen Gemeinschaft	Germany	1956	Movement
Nationaljugend Deutschlands (NJD)	Germany	1960	Movement
Bund Nationaler Studenten (BNS)	Germany	1960	Movement
Bund Vaterländischer Jugend (BVJ) [and, in Hamburg, Freundeskreis Vaterländischer Jugend]	Germany	1962	Movement
Stahlheim e. V.—Bund der Frontsoldaten, Ortsgruppe Bad Bergzabern	Germany	1966	Movement
Vereinigung zur Veranstaltung eines Treffens der Angehörigen der ehemaligen SS-Division Nordland	Germany	1966	Movement
Bund Deutscher Nationalsozialisten	Germany	1969	Movement
Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann	Germany	1980	Movement
Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands/Partei der Arbeit, including Junge Front	Germany	1982	Movement
Wehrsportgruppe Wolfspack/Sturm 12	Germany	1983	Movement
Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten/Nationale Aktivisten	Germany	1983	Movement
Unabhängiger Wählerkreis Würzburg—Arbeitskreis für Wiedervereinigung und Volksgesundheit (UWK)	Germany	1984	Movement
Nationale Sammlung (N.S.)	Germany	1989	Movement
Nationalistische Front (NF)	Germany	1992	Movement
Deutsche Alternative (DA)	Germany	1992	Movement
Deutscher Kameradschaftsbund Wilhelmshaven (DKB)	Germany	1992	Movement
Nationale Offensive (NO)	Germany	1992	Movement
Nationaler Block (NB)	Germany	1993	Movement
Heimatreue Vereinigung Deutschlands (HVD)	Germany	1993	Movement
Freundeskreis Freiheit für Deutschland (FFD)	Germany	1993	Movement
Wiking-Jugend (WJ)	Germany	1994	Movement
Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (FAP)	Germany	1995	Movement
Nationale Liste (NL)	Germany	1995	Movement
Direkte Aktion/Mitteldeutschland (JF)	Germany	1995	Movement
Skinheads Allgäu	Germany	1996	Movement
Kameradschaft Oberhavel	Germany	1997	Movement
Heideheim e.V.	Germany	1998	Movement
Blood & Honour Division Deutschland (and White Youth)	Germany	2000	Movement
Hamburger Sturm	Germany	2000	Movement
Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz (SSS)	Germany	2001	Movement
Bündnis nationaler Sozialisten für Lübeck	Germany	2003	Movement
Fränkische Aktionsfront (FAF)	Germany	2004	Movement
Alternative Nationale Strausberger Dart Piercing und Tattoo Offensive (ANSDAPO)	Germany	2005	Movement

(Continued)

Table 2. (Continued)

Name	Country	P Year	Type
Berliner Alternative Süd-Ost (BASO)	Germany	2005	Movement
Kameradschaft Hauptvolk (and Sturm 27)	Germany	2005	Movement
Kameradschaft Tor Berlin (KTB) (and Mädelsgruppe Kameradschaft Tor Berlin)	Germany	2005	Movement
Schutzbund Deutschland	Germany	2006	Movement
Sturm 34	Germany	2007	Movement
Collegium Humanum (CH) (and Bauernhilfe e.V)	Germany	2008	Movement
Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen Bestreitens des Holocaust Verfolgten (VRBHV)	Germany	2008	Movement
Frontbann 24	Germany	2009	Movement
Heimattreue Deutsche Jugend—Bund zum Schutz für Umwelt, Mitwelt und Heimat e.V. (HDJ)	Germany	2009	Movement
Mecklenburgische Aktionsfront (M.A.F.)	Germany	2009	Movement
Freie Kräfte Teltow-Fläming	Germany	2011	Movement
Hilfsorganisation für nationale politische Gefangene und deren Angehörige e.V.	Germany	2011	Movement
Besseres Hannover	Germany	2012	Movement
Kameradschaft Aachener Land	Germany	2012	Movement
Kameradschaft Hamm	Germany	2012	Movement
Kameradschaft Walter Spangenberg	Germany	2012	Movement
Nationaler Widerstand Dortmund	Germany	2012	Movement
Widerstandsbewegung in Südbrandenburg	Germany	2012	Movement
Nationale Sozialisten Döbeln	Germany	2013	Movement
Autonome Nationalisten Göppingen	Germany	2014	Movement
Freies Netz Süd	Germany	2014	Movement
Nationale Sozialisten Chemnitz	Germany	2014	Movement
Schwarze Schar MC	Germany	2014	Movement
Oldschool Society	Germany	2015	Movement
Sturm 18 e.V.	Germany	2015	Movement
Altermedia Deutschland	Germany	2016	Alt. media
Gruppe Freital	Germany	2016	Movement
Weisse Wölfe Terrorcrew	Germany	2016	Movement
Phalanx 18	Germany	2019	Movement
Combat 18 Deutschland	Germany	2020	Movement
Geeinte deutsche Völker und Stämme (and Osnabrücker Landmark)	Germany	2020	Movement
Nordadler (aka, "Völkische Gemeinschaft," "Völkische Renaissance," "Völkische Jugend," and "Völkische Revolution")	Germany	2020	Movement
Wolfsbrigade 44/Sturmbrigade 44	Germany	2020	Movement
Nationale Sozialisten Rostock und Baltik Korps	Germany	2021	Movement
Golden Dawn	Greece	2020	Party
Hungarian Hungarist Movement (Magyar Hungarista Mozgalom, MHM)	Hungary	1994	Movement
Blood and Honour Cultural Association (Vér és Becsület Kulturális Egyesület)	Hungary	2005	Movement
Hungarian Guard Movement (Magyar Gárda Mozgalom)	Hungary	2009	Movement
Association for a Better Future (Szebb Jövőért Egyesület)	Hungary	2014	Movement
Ordine Nuovo	Italy	1972	Movement
Avanguardia Nazionale	Italy	1976	Movement
Azione Skinhead	Italy	1993	Movement
Base Autonoma	Italy	1993	Movement
Il Movimento Politico Occidentale	Italy	1993	Movement
Fronte Nazionale	Italy	2000	Movement
Gustav Celminsh Center	Latvia	2014	Movement
Nationaal Europese Sociale Beweging (NESB)	Netherlands	1955	Movement
Nederlandse Volks-Unie (NVU)	Netherlands	1979	Movement
Jongeren Front Nederland (JFN)	Netherlands	1990	Movement
Centrumpartij '86	Netherlands	1998	Movement
National Radical Camp	Poland	2009	Movement
Duma i Nowoczesność	Poland	2019	Movement
Partidul Total pentru Tara	Romania	2014	Party
Slovenská pospolitošť—Národná strana	Slovakia	2006	Party
Gibanje Zedinjena Slovenija	Slovenia	2019	Movement
Hammerskins Espana	Spain	2009	Movement
Blood & Honour Espana	Spain	2010	Movement
National Action	UK	2016	Movement
National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action (NS131)	UK	2017	Movement
Scottish Dawn	UK	2017	Movement
Feuerkrieg Division (FKD)	UK	2020	Movement
Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD)	UK	2020	Movement
System Resistance Network (SRN)	UK	2020	Movement
Atomwaffen Division (AWD)	UK	2021	Movement
National Socialist Order (NSO)	UK	2021	Movement
The Base	UK	2021	Movement

extremist organizations have been proscribed in Europe. Yet there are places and, more importantly, times when proscription practices are applied with greater frequency. Taking the number of proscriptions since 1990, which thereby includes democratized post-communist countries and excludes earlier eras such as the flurry of post-war proscriptions (see Table 2), Table 1 divides between countries that have been highly active, active, and inactive in their use of proscription.²⁹ Of course, the number of instances in which proscription is applied partially depends on the level of potentially applicable cases emanating from a country's RWE scene. But there are brown spots all around Europe: most countries contain several RWE organizations that may warrant proscription on the basis of their anti-constitutional and/or racist, xenophobic, or otherwise malevolently discriminatory behavior.

As the table shows, Germany has been the most active, proscribing fifty-four RWE organizations since 1990, followed by France (fourteen proscriptions) and the United Kingdom (nine proscriptions). However, the proscriptions by these most active states are not spread evenly throughout the last thirty years; Figure 1 shows several spikes in proscription. We turn our focus to the German cases below. Looking first at other countries, in France, a handful of neo-Nazi organizations were proscribed in 2013; and more recently, six groups have been proscribed in the last few years, including three transnational organizations: Blood & Honour Hexagone, the French chapter of a transnational neo-Nazi organization; the Grey Wolves (*Loups Gris*), a far-right organization rooted in Türkiye (Turkey); and Generation Identity (*Génération Identitaire*), the French iteration of the Identitarian movement.

The dissolution of violent RWE organizations in France in 2013 and 2019–2022, several through proscriptions, preceded significant reductions in right-wing violence in the following years. Simultaneously, the prominence of a far-right political party (the Front National) seems to mollify some extremists and mitigate violent actions, albeit by accepting greater radicalism in the public sphere.

The United Kingdom, which has only recently started proscribing RWE groups, banning National Action in 2016, has been the most active state in recent years. One of the recent proscriptions in the UK suggests a new approach to disrupting RWE activity. In July 2021, the UK Home Office designated “The Base” a right-wing terrorist organization and accordingly proscribed it. Yet The Base has been




Figure 1. Proscribed right-wing extremist organizations since 1990 by year and country.

active mainly in North America; a few examples of online recruitment of British residents are the only apparent attempts to organize in the UK. Nevertheless, the UK government chose to act preemptively, adopting a proactive rather than reactive approach. Particularly with “accelerationist” organizations like The Base, preemptive proscription ostensibly aims to prevent RWE organizations taking root.³⁰ This approach also implies understanding RWE violence as a transnational threat.

Contrasting with the relatively high rate of proscription in some countries is Italy. In the post-war era, the frequency of RWE violence in Italy perhaps suggested the need for highly active use of proscription powers. The so-called “Years of Lead” (*Anni di piombo*), roughly 1968 to 1988, were characterized by intermittent terrorist attacks by right-wing (and left-wing) extremists. In the case of groups like *Ordine Nuovo* (proscribed in 1972), organized terrorist activity was part of an explicit attempt to overthrow the democratic order and reintroduce a fascist regime. Though *Ordine Nuovo* was proscribed, it and the other PREOs from Italy (see Table 2: *Avanguardia Nazionale*, proscribed in 1976; *Azione Skinhead*, *Base Autonoma*, and *Il Movimento Politico Occidentale*, all proscribed in 1993; and *Fronte Nazionale*, proscribed in 2000) exhibit Italy’s more circumspect legal approach to RWE. Italy’s post-war Constitution prohibited any restoration of the Fascist Party, but juridical interpretation deemed that this applied narrowly to a renewal of the specific party that governed under Mussolini, thus permitting “new” RWE organizations. A 1952 law (known as Scelba’s Law) broadened this prohibition to organizations that attempt to depose the democratic system, enabling two cases of proscription in the mid-1970s. Most recently, Mancino’s Law, passed in 1993, criminalizes glorification of fascism and associated figures. Four organizations have been proscribed under its provisions (see Figure 1). Thus, in a stepwise manner Italy developed far-reaching legal powers to address organized RWE; the extent, going so far as establishing an ideological criterion in Mancino’s Law, is analogous to powers in Germany. Where Italy differs is in the readiness of governments and the judiciary to apply proscription powers, to wit, only six organizations have been proscribed in Italy’s post-war history. At time of writing, a local branch of the CasaPound movement is on trial for the charge of reforming a fascist party. This process, against an organization that attacked counter-protesters at Matteo Salvini’s rallies, is the latest test of Italy’s capacity and willingness to address RWE violence.

Comparative study of RWE extremism often omits Eastern European countries. Similar to most other states, the post-socialist European states have imposed few proscriptions. In Slovakia, a high court ruling in 2006 proscribed the “Slovak Togetherness National Party” (*Slovenská pospolitost—Národná strana*), but a new iteration of this organization, the Peoples Party Our Slovakia, won national parliamentary representation in 2016 (and won more seats in 2020). With a total of four, Hungary has imposed the most proscriptions in the region: the Hungarian Hungarianist Movement in 1994, the Blood and Honour Cultural Association (*Vér és Becsület Kulturális Egyesület*) in 2005, the Hungarian Guard Movement (*Magyar Gárda Mozgalom*) in 2009, and the Association for a Better Future (*Szebb Jövőért Egyesület*) in 2014. The Hungarian Guard Movement is particularly noteworthy since it was a SA-style paramilitary organization associated with the radical right Jobbik party. The erstwhile leader of the Hungarian Guard Movement, Gábor Vona, led Jobbik to strong electoral performances in 2014 and 2018—approximately 20 percent of the vote on both occasions. Slovakia and Hungary embody a troubling development in the region: RWE organizations have significant legislative representation. Among other issues arising from this development, it poses serious challenges for researchers and practitioners seeking to work with governments to address extremism.³¹

Poland has legal provisions to proscribe RWE groups that parallel Germany’s, but has shown much greater reluctance to apply them. Article 58 of the Polish Constitution establishes a prohibition against groups that contravene the constitutional order and Article 13 explicitly forbids totalitarian-inspired ideological programs (“Nazism, fascism, and communism”). Only twice have these instruments been applied, though: against a regional branch of the National Radical Camp (*Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*), proscribed in Brzeg in 2009, and against the Pride and Modernity (*Duma i Nowoczesność*) group in 2019.³² However, the National Radical Camp simply moved its national registration to Krakow (i.e., out of the region where it had been proscribed) and remained largely unaffected by the proscription. Subsequent proscription applications against the National Radical Camp were rejected—not without controversy—in 2021.

Several proscriptions also serve as a reminder of the deep historical roots of contemporary RWE and the importance of post-war proscription regimes. Poland's National Radical Camp takes its name and foundational tenets from an interwar fascist movement. The proto-fascist Vaps Movement was proscribed in Estonia in 1934; in 2009, an application was submitted to restore it, but was rejected, affirming the 1934 ban. Beyond such continuities, though, the post-war era epitomizes the utility of proscription: countries throughout Europe faced the challenge of eliminating vestiges of fascist organizations and burgeoning new RWE organizations; proscription was the main tool used to meet that challenge. And it had the desired effect.

In surveying the proscription data, two patterns are particularly arresting. First, proscription is increasing and proliferating as a tool to disrupt RWE. [Figure 1](#) (and below, [Figure 3](#), showing only Germany) shows a slight increase in the number of organizations proscribed and in the array of countries using proscription. Several countries that have rarely (if ever) used proscription seem to be shifting their position: in Denmark, notwithstanding a long tradition of emphasizing and ensuring broad freedom of association, a law passed in 2016 (the "Act amending the Public Education Act and the Tax Act, Public Information Law") opened the way for the proscription of a gang (Loyal to Familia);³³ in the Netherlands in June 2021, "the Upper House of the legislature passed a law on anti-democratic organizations, giving judges the power to proscribe extremist organizations, prevent their leadership from running new organizations, and jail members that continue to be active for proscribed organizations";³⁴ and in Sweden an all-party committee has recently suggested amending the criminal code to impose penalties on racist organizations and their participants, that is, a form of proscription.³⁵ Proscription may yet become a more widely used means of disrupting RWE activity.

Second, RWE has long been a transnational phenomenon. Activists and organizations have worked deliberately to connect across borders and form international networks. Online communication supports this networking—though the phenomenon predates digitalization—and indeed facilitates wider recruitment and radicalization. Several organizations have embraced transnationalism and adopted a franchise model: common discourse, ideational traits, and symbols, but organized in separate, typically national branches. The neo-Nazi Blood & Honour organization, founded in the United Kingdom, is archetypal. Branches of the organization appeared in several other countries. Proscriptions followed: Germany in 2000 (see the case study below), Hungary in 2005, Spain in 2011, and France in 2019. More recently and more vigorously, the Identitarian movement has spread around Europe (and beyond).³⁶ In 2021, France became the first country to proscribe an Identitarian group (*Génération Identitaire*). The most recognized figure of the movement, Martin Sellner, has been deplatformed from Twitter and YouTube since 2020.³⁷ But Identitarian organizations remain active in numerous other countries;³⁸ groups and activists may have been hindered by social media deplatforming, but have adapted by using alternative accounts to defy bans and by migrating to other platforms.³⁹ Addressing the heightened transnationalism of violent RWE may require international coordination; recent cases suggest that national proscriptions alone are inadequate.

RWE violence and organizational proscription

Violence is a relevant condition for proscription decisions. As mentioned above, the decisive factors underlying proscription are somewhat elusive, traceable in ministerial announcements and court documents but also concealed behind state secrecy. Further research may detect patterns of factors in proscription, connecting specific violent incidents to proscription cases and detailed national crime statistics to rates of proscription. For now, we may presume the enactment of political violence is an important consideration and relate the rates of severe RWE violence to proscription.

The right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) dataset, covering eighteen Western European countries from 1990 onwards, comprises information on attacks and plots motivated by right-wing extremist beliefs.⁴⁰ Of particular use for longitudinal and cross-national comparison are the dataset entries on fatalities, which have more reliable coverage.⁴¹ Plotting side-by-side rates of RWE violent




Figure 2. RTV and bans in Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, and the UK.




Figure 3. Number of groups proscribed by year in Germany.

incident, fatalities, and proscription, Figure 2 is not readily suggestive of a close connection among these phenomena. Yet the apparent lack of a pattern belies the relationship between violence and proscription. A handful of cases shed light on the connection. Finland had not proscribed any RWE groups since the 1970s (see Table 2), but the Supreme Court cited violence by longstanding activists of the Nordic Resistance Movement in justifying their decision in 2020 to outlaw the organization.⁴² Similarly, in Greece, despite the absence of a “constitutional option to ban political parties once they have been authorized to participate in elections,” the Criminal Court of Appeals in Athens made the unprecedented decision in 2020 to proscribe Golden Dawn;⁴³ most prominent among the justifications were several conspicuous violent incidents, including the murder of anti-fascist activist Pavlos Fyssas in 2013.⁴⁴

On the other hand, cases of proscription in Belgium and Spain suggest that violence is not a necessary condition—nor solely sufficient—for proscription. In Belgium, the judicial proscription of the Flemish Block in 2004 and the Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty group in 2014 were predominantly justified with reference to an anti-racism law. Flemish Block in particular faced no accusation of perpetrating violence, but instead was convicted on the basis of distributing racially discriminatory publications. In Spain, two organizations have been proscribed: Hammerskins España (in 2009) and Blood and Honour España (in 2010). Both of these are national branches of transnational organizations with decidedly violent profiles. Yet both were proscribed under Article 515.5 of the Spanish criminal code, which relates to the promotion of discrimination, hatred, or violence. Clearly, in some contexts it is not so much the perpetration of violence as it is offenses of incitement or discrimination that justify proscription.

Recent French cases are also illuminating for the importance, but non-necessity, of violence for proscription. In 2013, Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls announced the proscription of three organizations (*Envie de rever*, *Jeunesses nationalistes révolutionnaires*, and *Troisième Voie*) for their participation in dueling demonstrations in Paris that resulted in the death of anti-fascist activist Clément Méric.⁴⁵ In 2019, the French government announced it was considering proscription of *Génération Identitaire*. This was complicated by the absence of violence connected to the group, as country expert Nicolas Lebourg explained: “It’s very delicate, because the main argument for disbanding a group is usually violence. There is none [in the case of *Génération Identitaire*].”⁴⁶ Only section six of Article L212-1 of the Internal Security Code, against promoting discrimination, hatred, or violence, might have served as a legal basis for proscription. Unlike in Spain, this factor was evidently considered insufficient justification in France. But in March 2021 the government did ban *Génération Identitaire*, citing section six as well as section two (a provision against private militias). What changed between 2019 and 2021? The governmental decree announcing the proscription decision mentioned three developments since 2019: activists organized a summer camp in August 2020 where participants wore uniforms and engaged in combat sport training, uniformed activists performed vigilante border patrols in 2020 and 2021, and (perhaps most significantly) it was revealed in 2020 that *Génération Identitaire* had received donations from Brenton Tarrant, the terrorist responsible for mosque shootings in 2019 in Christchurch, New Zealand.⁴⁷ While it may not have provided as much legal substantiation as the group’s uniformed activities, the connection (even tenuously) to such a major incident of right-wing terrorism likely provided the biggest prod towards proscribing *Génération Identitaire*.

Cases in the UK reveal how a specific type of violence can be important for the development of proscription practices. For the entirety of the post-war era, no RWE organization had been proscribed in Britain.⁴⁸ That changed in December 2016 with the decision to proscribe National Action. The small neo-Nazi organization had loudly supported the murderer who killed MP Jo Cox in June 2016. That endorsement of violence, the assassination of a sitting MP, no less, was cited in the proscription announcement.⁴⁹ The move to proscribe organizations following violence against government officials is mirrored in recent cases in the state most actively applying proscription powers: Germany.

Practices and trends in Germany

Of all European states, Germany has imposed proscriptions on RWE organizations most frequently. Spates of proscriptions were imposed in the era just after the Second World War, disrupting the attempts of right-wing extremists to continue or reconstitute fascist movements. As Figure 3 shows, twenty-five RWE organizations were banned between 1951 and 1956, the highest rate at any time in Germany’s post-war history.⁵⁰ Apart from representing both defense of a new democracy and demonstrative lustration, this wave of proscriptions was partially a diktat from occupying Allied forces.⁵¹

Following the wave of post-war proscriptions, violent right-wing extremist organizations and activity diminished and became less visible in the public sphere. Correspondingly, the three decades between 1960 and 1990 were marked by less proscriptive action. Germany, almost always the country most frequently employing proscription against violent right-wing extremists, banned six organizations in the 1960s, zero in the 1970s, and—triggered by the 1980 Oktoberfest bombing and the activities of militant organizers like Michael Kühnen—a further six in the 1980s (see Figure 3).

Since the 1990s, fifty-four RWE organizations have been proscribed in Germany. We can observe a relationship between the rates of proscription and right-wing terrorist incidents and fatalities, as in Figure 4, and more broadly violent right-wing crimes as recorded by German state security agencies, as in Figure 5. Spikes of violence in the early 1990s, the late 2000s, and during and after the refugee crisis in 2015–2016 were all met with several proscriptions. It is not wrong to conclude that proscriptions in Germany have often been used as one response to reduce RWE violence. However, it is again, as in France and the United Kingdom, conspicuous violent incidents that evidently play a crucial role. A series of xenophobic attacks-cum-pogroms in the early 1990s—particularly in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Solingen, and Mölln—provoked several large demonstrations calling for government action against the violence and eventually resulted in several organizational proscriptions⁵² as well as prohibitions against major RWE demonstrations.⁵³




Figure 4. Germany RWE bans and RTV incidents and fatalities.




Figure 5. Violent right-wing crimes and number of PREOs in Germany since 1990.

Fully six proscriptions were ordered in 2012. While it is possible that these were a response to elevated rates of RWE violence, it is more likely that the political will to take strong measures against RWE surged after information about the National Socialist Underground (NSU) terrorist cell came to light late in 2011. The revelation that the NSU, aided by RWE activists and organizations, murdered ten people and carried out several bombings and robberies between 1999 and 2007, and further that state security services may have been (at minimum) negligent, stoked a furor. Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her remorse and promised action against right-wing extremism, even promising to seek (ultimately without success) proscription of the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD), the largest organizational hub of German RWE.

Most recently, a series of bans followed two serious and widely publicized incidents of RWE violence. On June 2, 2019, Walter Lübcke, head of a regional council, proponent of Germany's intake of refugees, and critic of the opponents thereto (such as PEGIDA), was murdered by a right-wing extremist with connections to the NPD and Combat 18 organizations. Then, on October 9, 2019, a neo-Nazi killed two people and injured two others in the city of Halle, having attempted to shoot up the city's synagogue during Yom Kippur observances. In the aftermath of these incidents, from November 2019 to December 2020, five RWE organizations were proscribed; four of these were proscribed at the federal level, including Combat 18.

These waves of proscription lend further weight to the perspective of Germany's proscription decisions as essentially political: executive decrees (see Table 1) driven by public pressure and intensified political will following highly visible incidents.

Finally, the analysis of proscription decisions, in other European countries as well as Germany, can be enhanced by attending to the spatial dimensions of proscriptions and RWE violence. Is proscription used more often where RWE violence occurs more frequently? Figure 6 shows that, yes, it appears that proscriptions in German regions roughly align with RWE homicides, with the greatest clusters of regional proscription decisions coinciding with the higher proportions of fatalities.⁵⁴ Botsch, Kopke, and Virchow have already detailed the reliance of Brandenburg—where seven organizations have been proscribed by the regional interior ministry since 1990—




Figure 6. Map of Germany shaded according to the proportion of RWE-motivated homicides (source: RTV dataset) with the number of proscriptions since 1990 in each region. The numbers in parentheses indicate organizations that were proscribed by the federal government, but which were mainly active in the indicated region.

authorities on proscription, and verify its beneficial (but not panacean) effects. That only a total of six organizations have been proscribed in Saxony, where there is the highest proportion of RWE fatalities, is curious; one might suspect that here, again, the political considerations of the executive decree mode of proscription are important. More detailed spatial analysis could provide further illumination about the geographic distribution of proscriptions.

Taken together, the data on organizational proscription of RWE across Europe reveal several patterns: a divide between states where proscriptions are decided by ministries and others where they are decided by courts, as well as states that have not used or even eschew proscription; the spread in recent years of proscription against RWE, epitomized by the UK but also signaled in legislative debates in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden; the transnational character of several recently proscribed organizations, prominently including Identitarians and national branches of the Blood & Honour and Nordic Resistance Movement organizations. This last pattern has led to a greater emphasis on transnational monitoring.⁵⁵ Such monitoring is made all the more important by the

deliberate attempts by RWE organizations to shift bases of operation to countries with more lenient proscription practices; it would also seem to suggest a need for greater coordination between states.⁵⁶

These patterns of proscriptions can be explained in part by RWE violence, whereby proscription serves as one response to conspicuous violent incidents. Domestic attacks, not least against political representatives, and even incidents in countries far removed, most especially New Zealand, have pushed the executives of several states to proscribe organizations.

Transnational cases: Blood & Honour and Nordic Resistance Movement

To move from our descriptive analysis to a causal assessment of the thresholds for proscription in executive and judicial paths, we present below two short case studies. Blood & Honour and the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) share many similarities: both are active transnationally, with branches in multiple countries; both unabashedly espouse neo-Nazi ideology; and both have been proscribed. Of the several proscriptions applied to Blood & Honour, the 2000 proscription applied to the German branch is a typical case of the executive path. By contrast, the NRM, proscribed in Finland through a protracted judicial process, exemplifies the judicial path. Inspecting these two cases shows what sufficed for different authorities, Germany's Interior Minister and Finland's court system, to impose proscriptions.

Blood & Honour

Blood & Honour was established in the UK in 1987 by Ian Stuart Donaldson, the lead singer of skinhead band Skrewdriver. Blood & Honour is notable in at least two regards: On the one hand, for exemplifying and deepening the association between the skinhead music scene and right-wing extremism; and on the other hand, for establishing chapters in a wide range of countries across Europe and beyond, such as the U.S. and Australia. These characteristics of Blood & Honour as an organization were evident from its early days, with Donaldson founding a music label in the UK to enable the direct release of racist music in his home country, as well as collaborating with a German music label to support distribution internationally.⁵⁷ Deriving its name from the Hitler Youth slogan, the organization's explicit support and nostalgia for neo-Nazi ideology has also made it a prominent target for proscription.

Four countries in the PREO dataset have proscribed Blood & Honour, making it the organization with the most transnational proscription coverage (in fact, the only other organization which spans multiple country lists is the closely-related Combat 18 group, proscribed in both France and Germany). We focus here on the decision to ban Blood & Honour in Germany in order to illustrate some of the dynamics of this executive-based method of proscription in terms of thresholds and timeframes.

The German division of Blood & Honour was founded in 1994 and by the time of its proscription had twenty branches across the country. When Germany's Federal Ministry of the Interior announced the group's proscription in 2000, its justification relied on the provisions of the Law on Associations (*Vereinsgesetz*), permitting the proscription of organizations which set themselves against Germany's constitutional order. The proscription came into effect immediately from the day of its announcement. Because of the stipulations of the law, which does not require evidence of violence, the proscription announcement focused primarily on the group's ideology and goals.⁵⁸ Blood & Honour's promotion of Nazi ideology, such as its distribution of the "Route 88" magazine and links to other proscribed neo-Nazi groups, as well as its associated goal to establish an authoritarian state were underscored in the Ministry's announcement. The organizational activities highlighted focused on questions of recruitment and ideology dissemination rather than violence, in particular organizing skinhead concerts and distributing publications. Although it is important to acknowledge the background climate of violence directed at ethnic minorities at the time, such violence did not form part of the explicit justification for Blood & Honour's proscription. Interior Minister Otto Schily put a fine point on it: "It's enough that they adopted the goal of spreading Nazi ideology."⁵⁹

Nordic Resistance Movement

The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) is rooted in Sweden's neo-Nazi scene. After serving prison sentences for violent criminal offenses, Klas Lund⁶⁰ and several other neo-Nazi activists sought to create a "strong hierarchical organization with the long-term ambition of radicalizing people through steadfast propaganda and street activism."⁶¹ The Swedish Resistance Movement, founded in 1997, was the first chapter of the NRM. Other chapters were subsequently established across Scandinavia, including the Finnish NRM (*Pohjoismainen Vastarintaliike*).⁶² The NRM is avowedly national socialist in its ideology, aiming to create a Nordic ethno-state, and is connected to violent crime and terrorist activity.⁶³

In Finland, the NRM operated in a legal context, unlike in Sweden and Denmark, where proscription was possible. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, still in force, commits Finland to "dissolving fascist-type organizations";⁶⁴ the Associations Act allows for proscription if an organization acts "against law or good practice";⁶⁵ and Finland is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, which charges states to protect individuals from violations of their fundamental rights (for example, from violence and harassment by extremist groups). The mechanism of effecting Finland's proscriptive powers is judicial: the state sues and the case goes to court, where it must be confirmed to be instituted.

The Finnish NRM was fully and finally proscribed by a Supreme Court decision on September 22, 2020, but the timeline of its proscription process spans several years—disregarding exhortations for "speed and urgency," with consequences for the NRM's post-proscription adaptation (see below).⁶⁶ First, in connection with a NRM demonstration on September 10, 2016 at Helsinki's main rail station, a NRM member fatally injured a dissenting passerby.⁶⁷ That December, the Finnish National Police Board announced that it would sue to proscribe the NRM, alleging in its filing in March 2017 violation of the Associations Act. The Birkland District Court ruled in favor of the petitioner in November 2017, which was upheld by the Turku Court of Appeals in September 2018 and ultimately confirmed by the Supreme Court in 2020.⁶⁸ These rulings were not justified with reference to the violent actions of NRM members, but rather to the group's illegal objectives (i.e., overturning the democratic order and establishing an ethno-state), agitation against minorities, and vocal support for acts of violence.⁶⁹ Unlike the proscription of Blood & Honour in Germany, where espousing neo-Nazi ideology itself is grounds for proscription, it was not NRM's neo-Nazism per se that passed the threshold for proscription; instead, specific ideological tenets (i.e., subversion) and manifestations (i.e., harassment and support for violence) were decisive. The Supreme Court also established in its ruling a high threshold for any future proscription suits, stressing that the Association Act stipulates "substantial contraventions of law may come to form the legal grounds for banning associations."⁷⁰

The proscription forbade continuation of the NRM's activity, dissolving the main organization and its associated financing organization (Northern Tradition, *Pohjoinen Perinne*). Yet the lengthy proscription process entailed advantages for the NRM. Ideologically aligned organizations, such as the Soldiers of Odin, performed supportive actions. Members of the NRM organizationally adapted, forming numerous new associations,⁷¹ and individually adapted, joining other neo-Nazi groups.⁷² If not exactly triggering a "backfire mechanism" of further radicalization, the post-proscription adaptation of NRM is noteworthy.⁷³ It is still unclear how Finnish law and politics will address this adaptation, a challenge to the efficacy of Finland's proscription regime. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether other Scandinavian countries, especially those described above that are considering instituting proscription powers, will take proscriptive action against branches of NRM active in their territories.

Reviewing these two cases of Blood & Honour and NRM, four factors appear significant in understanding when right-wing extremist organizations may or may not be proscribed. The first two of these factors operate at the country level to produce relatively persistent national thresholds for proscription, while the second two factors operate at the organizational level and are measured case-by-case against these thresholds. At the country level, we observe that institutional design and political history shape thresholds for proscription. By institutional design we refer to the already-described difference between executive and judicial pathways, whereby executive decision-making has generally more discretion and

less reviewability than judicial decision-making, enabling faster and more liberal use of proscription powers.⁷⁴ By political history we refer to the specific post-1945 trajectory of individual countries, where some countries moved from Nazi regimes through to policies of denazification, establishing strong precedents for proscription of particular organizations and forms of communication from public life. This may, for example, go some way toward explaining the striking fact that Blood & Honour was first proscribed in Germany but never in the UK where it was founded. We argue that the combination of institutional design and political history shape country-specific contexts for proscription decisions. Against this backdrop, two factors of individual RWE organizations emerge from our case studies as particularly significant: ideology and violence. By ideology, we mean not just extremism in general but also connection to Nazism in particular, as described above; just as Beck and Miner identify Islamic ideology as a predictor of proscription in terrorist organizations in general, we could expect within the subset of RWE organizations that Nazi ideology may play a similar predictive role.⁷⁵ And lastly, violence itself—particularly in connection with the organization itself as in the case of NRM, but also potentially operating as a more loosely related contextual phenomenon as with Blood & Honour Germany—is clearly a contributing factor in proscription decisions, reflecting the already-established primacy of security risks in proscription decisions more generally.⁷⁶ The fact that individual country lists in our dataset contain so few shared groups suggest that, in contrast to research on listed terrorist organizations more generally, proscription of RWE organizations is more determined by the above set of factors than by diplomatic concerns.⁷⁷

Conclusion

This paper has presented an original dataset summarizing the proscription of right-wing extremist organizations in European countries. Our attention to domestic right-wing extremism across a cross-national scope contrasts with a general tendency within proscription literature to focus on responses to Islamic terrorism or conflict resolution in settings like Northern Ireland, and helps to highlight some of the dynamics which are particular to this set of groups.

Looking at the way European states have applied proscription against RWE organizations, several patterns and trends emerge. First, a conspicuous divide exists between states that impose proscription through executive decrees and those that do so through judicial ruling. While the states belonging to the latter group are more numerous, those of the former, which includes Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, more frequently proscribe RWE organizations. While all proscriptions are rooted in specific laws, it appears that the executive decree mode creates an opening for political considerations and public pressures, resulting in a greater proclivity to proscribe. Our more detailed comparison of the proscription of Blood & Honour Germany and the Finnish Nordic Resistance Movement illustrates how executive proscription can be implemented more quickly, with less public justification, and with fewer opportunities for review compared with judicial mechanisms. Further research should examine the patterns of additional factors that coincide with proscription, but we have suggested several possibilities emerging from our case studies including the country's political history, the group's ideology (and in particular connection to Nazism), and RWE violence.⁷⁸ We emphasize here that the connection between proscription and RWE violence is not general; it is specific: a response to particularly conspicuous incidents. This is most evident in Germany, where major incidents of RWE violence have often been met with proscription of several organizations, along with other counter-measures against RWE activity. The pattern is discernible too in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, as well as in countries that proscribe through judicial ruling, such as Belgium, Finland, and Greece.

There are also signs that proscription will be adopted more widely. In 2016, the government of the United Kingdom, spurred to action by the assassination of MP Jo Cox, proscribed a RWE organization for the first time since the Second World War. The UK has since used proscription several times. In states that have rarely used (e.g., the Netherlands) or even outright rejected (e.g., Denmark, Sweden) proscription, recent debates and committee deliberations suggest a shift in policy.

This article's data provides a necessary descriptive basis for research, specifically about proscription of RWE organizations and more broadly about governmental and non-governmental responses to RWE activity. Further research can usefully investigate the justifications for proscription decisions, particularly in the mode of executive decrees, which are often concealed in classified deliberations and processes. Research focusing on activist biographies could trace how activists move through RWE scenes and how they are affected when an organization they are affiliated with is proscribed. And more comparative study should precede and guide the development of policies and practices to address transnational RWE, the need for which has been revealed in several recent violent incidents.

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Notes

1. We refer to "proscription," though the practices we examine have been variously named banning, listing, blacklisting, exclusion, outlawing, sanctioning, or criminalisation in scholarly literature.

2. For one example, see the mapping project supported by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and the Khalifa Ihler Institute: <https://antifascist-europe.org/>.
3. Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe," *Journal for Deradicalization* 15, no. 3 (2015): 1–38.
4. e.g., Iain Cameron, "European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting," *Human Rights Law Review* 3, no. 2 (2003): 225–56; Daniel Moeckli, "Stop and Search Under the Terrorism Act 2000: A Comment on R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis," *The Modern Law Review* 70 (2007): 659–70; Andreas Stegbauer, "Die Propaganda- und Äußerungsdelikte der §§ 86, 86a, 111, 130, 140 StGB," in *Rechtsextremismus und Rechtsterrorismus*, ed. Frank Lüttig and Jens Lehmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2020), 245–78.
5. Nicola McGarrrity and George Williams, "The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 2 (2018): 216–35.
6. Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Monash University, *Submission No 2 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Terrorist Organisation Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)*, (January 22, 2007).
7. Craig Forcece and Kent Roach, "Yesterday's Law: Terrorist Group Listing in Canada," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 2 (2018): 259–77.
8. McGarrrity and Williams, "The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia," 219.
9. See also Chia-yi Lee and Yasutaka Tominaga, "The Determinants of Terrorist Listing," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (in press): 1–27.
10. Lee Jarvis and Tim Legrand, "The Proscription or Listing of Terrorist Organisations: Understanding, Assessment, and International Comparisons," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 2 (2018): 199–215.
11. Vicki Sentas, "Terrorist Organization Proscription as Counterinsurgency in the Kurdish Conflict," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 2 (2018): 298–317.
12. Suthaharan Nadarajah, "The Tamil Proscriptions: Identities, Legitimacies, and Situated Practices," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 2 (2018): 278–97.
13. Angela K. Bourne, "Securitization and the Proscription of Terrorist Organizations in Spain," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 2 (2018): 318–35.
14. See note 11 above.
15. See note 7 above.
16. See note 10 above.
17. However, as Zeller reveals, non-state actors' counter-mobilization against RWE has often been necessary to push the state to apply these instruments. Michael C. Zeller, "Patterns of Demobilization: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of Far-Right Demonstration Campaigns," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (2021): 267–84; Michael C. Zeller, "Demobilising Far-Right Demonstration Campaigns: Coercive Counter-Mobilisation, State Social Control, and the Demobilisation of the Hess Gedenkmarsch Campaign," *Social Movement Studies* 21, no. 3 (2022): 372–90.
18. Gideon Botsch, Christoph Kopke, and Fabian Virchow, "Banning Extreme Right-Wing Associations in the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe. Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labour-Market Oriented Exit Strategies*, ed. Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Forum Berlin, 2013), 255–80; Tommi Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland: Analyzing the Process and Its Outcome," *Journal for Deradicalization* 29, no. Winter (2021): 177–204.
19. Michael Minkenberg, "Repression and Reaction: Militant Democracy and the Radical Right in Germany and France," *Patterns of Prejudice* 40, no. 1 (2006): 25–44.
20. Graham Macklin, "Only Bullets Will Stop Us!—The Banning of National Action in Britain," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 12, no. 6 (2018): 104–22; Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland."
21. Angela Bourne and John Veugelers, "Militant Democracy and Successors to Authoritarian Ruling Parties in Post-1945 West Germany and Italy," *Democratization* 29, no. 4 (2022): 736–53.
22. Although PREOs were mostly classified as movement organizations—with few political parties and even fewer alternative media organizations—this typology broadly captures the contemporary organizational ecology of the proscribed right-wing extremism, while providing a foundation adaptable to future research on proscription.
23. The full dataset is available from the corresponding author upon request.
24. Some previous research has endeavored to provide such a legal survey. Bleich and Lambert provide a brief overview of the relevant laws in ten states they examine. More recently, a report by the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime provides a thorough review of the legal frameworks applied to RWE in six countries—Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America—particularly affected by right-wing terrorism. UNODC, Terrorism Prevention Branch, "Manual on Prevention of and Responses to Terrorist Attacks on the Basis of Xenophobia, Racism and Other Forms of Intolerance, or in the Name of Religion or Belief" (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Terrorism Prevention Branch, 2022). Similarly, looking at practices in Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S., there are three types of approaches to prevention and countering violent extremism: Scandinavian, multifaceted, and

- counterintelligence and counter-crime. David Ibsen, Lara Pham, Hans-Jakob Schindler, Alexander Ritzmann, Kacper Rekawek, Joshua Fisher-Birch, and Marco Macori, “Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism—Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures” (Berlin: Counter Extremism Project, 2020). Still, a broader survey of laws applicable to RWE in European states remains undone.
25. Cf. McGarrity & Williams, “The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia.”
 26. David Art, “The Organizational Origins of the Contemporary Radical Right: The Case of Belgium,” *Comparative Politics* 40, no. 4 (2008): 421–40.
 27. See <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/juri/id/JURITEXT000007040971/>.
 28. László Szócs, “A Tale of the Unexpected: The Extreme Right Vis-à-Vis Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 6 (1998): 1096–115; Zsuzsanna Vidra and Michael C. Zeller, “Hungary,” in *Routledge Handbook on Violent Extremism and Resilience*, ed. Richard McNeil-Willson and Anna Triandafyllidou (Abingdon: Routledge, 2023), 181–95.
 29. As one of the country experts for Finland, Kotonen, noted there were as many as 3,327 Finnish organizations proscribed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War because the armistice between Finland, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union committed the country to disband all “Hitlerite” or “fascist-type” organizations as well as other groups that propagandized against the Allies.
 30. Accelerationism is the action-oriented view that governments and state institutions are irreversibly corrupted and therefore the optimal action is to “accelerate” their collapse through intentional disruption and creation of socio-political tension, thereby hastening the establishment of a white ethnostate.
 31. Richard McNeil-Willson, Michael Vaughan, and Michael C. Zeller, “Critically Examining the Role of the Scholar in Policymaking on the Far Right,” in *The Ethics of Researching the Far Right*, ed. Antonia Vaughan, Joan Braune, Meghan Tinsley, and Aurelien Mondon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, in press), 1–10.
 32. The proscription of Pride and Modernity has been imposed, so it is included in the list of PREOs in Table 2—but this case is still under judicial review at time of writing.
 33. We are indebted to the country experts for Denmark, Anita Nissen and Richard McNeil-Willson, for this observation.
 34. We thank the country expert for the Netherlands, Sarah de Lange, for this information.
 35. We thank the country experts for Sweden, Tina Askanus and Patricia Rodi, for this note.
 36. Anita Nissen, *Europeanisation of the Contemporary Far Right: Generation Identity and Fortress Europe*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2022).
 37. Maik Fielitz and Karolin Schwarz, “Hate Not Found: Deplatforming the Far Right and Its Consequences” (Jena: Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, 2020).
 38. For example, one Identitarian group has sought to evade monitoring by operating in less restrictive context of Poland. See Marta Kasztelan and Denis Hruby, “Far-Right Group Builds Polish Shield from German Scrutiny,” *Politico*, 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-group-established-polish-foundation/>.
 39. See note 37 above; Karolin Schwarz, *Hasskrieger: Der Neue Globale Rechtsextremismus* (Friedburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2020); Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, “Broadening the GIFCT Hash-Sharing Database Taxonomy: An Assessment and Recommended Next Steps” (Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, 2021).
 40. Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Madeleine Thorstensen, Anders Ravik Jupskås, and Graham Macklin, “RTV Trend Report 2021. Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990–2020” (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2021).
 41. *Ibid.*, 5.
 42. Kotonen, “Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland,” 178.
 43. It is important to note that Golden Dawn has not been proscribed as a “right-wing extremist organization,” that is on the basis of some ideological criteria, but instead as a “criminal organization,” on the basis of organized violence and other criminal behaviour by its members. We are indebted to the country experts for Greece, Andreas Dafnos and Vasiliki Tsagkroni, for making this distinction clear.
 44. Maik Fielitz, Vasiliki Tsagkroni, and Andreas Dafnos, “The Banning of Golden Dawn,” in *CARR Organisation Research Unit Year in Review Report 2020*, Ed. Michael C. Zeller (Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR), 2020), 27–29.
 45. See <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23262406>.
 46. See full comments in the interview with *Le Figaro*: <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/le-gouvernement-peut-t-il-dissoudre-generation-identitaire-20190404>.
 47. Available online: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043210363>.
 48. By referring to “Britain,” we exclude the special set of cases of loyalist paramilitaries that operated in Northern Ireland.
 49. Available online: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-action-becomes-first-extreme-right-wing-group-to-be-banned-in-uk>.
 50. Gideon Botsch, “Die ‘Hakenkreuzschmierwelle’ 1960 Und Das Verbot Des Bundes Nationaler Studenten,” *Zeitschrift Für Geschichtswissenschaft* 65 (2017): 855–74.
 51. Though the first post-war German governments under Konrad Adenauer (1949–1963) implemented denazification in many areas, some implementation was conspicuously hollow. Most notably, several members of

- Adenauer's governments had held senior positions in the National Socialist regime, for example: Hans Globke, who was appointed Chief of Staff for the West German Chancellery, had helped draft the racist Nuremberg Laws and worked closely with Adolf Eichmann to administer parts of the Holocaust; Interior Minister Gerhard Schröder had been a Nazi party member and storm trooper since 1933; the minister for refugees Theodor Oberländer had served in a SS battalion implicated in war crimes in Poland and Ukraine; and Reinhard Gehlen, a leading military intelligence officer in the Nazi regime, became the first president of the German Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*).
52. Botsch et al., "Banning Extreme Right-Wing Associations in the Federal Republic of Germany"; Martin Lee, *The Beast Reawakens* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1997), 331–37.
 53. For example, Zeller, "Demobilising Far-Right Demonstration Campaigns"; Fabian Virchow, "'Wem Die Strasse Gehört': Wunsiedel Als Symbolischer Ort Der Demonstrationspolitik Der Extremen Rechten," in *Wunsiedel Ist Bunt—Nicht Braun! Die Auseinandersetzungen Um Das Hess-Grab Verändern Die Politische Kultur*, ed. Julia Hasse, Gregor Rosenthal, and Joachim Twisselmann (Bad Alexandersbad/Berlin: bfdt/BPgr, 2013), 171–85.
 54. Figure 6 does not include Combat 18, which was active in many regions and not predominantly in any one.
 55. Ibsen et al., "Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism"; UNODC, Terrorism Prevention Branch, "Manual on Prevention of and Responses to Terrorist Attacks on the Basis of Xenophobia, Racism and Other Forms of Intolerance, or in the Name of Religion or Belief."
 56. See note 38 above.
 57. Timothy S. Brown, "Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics: Skinheads and 'Nazi Rock' in England and Germany," *Journal of Social History* 38, no. 1 (2004): 157–78.
 58. Verfassungsschutz, "'Blood & Honour'-Bewegung," *Verfassungsschutz*, September 14, 2000, <http://www.verfassungsschutz.bayern.de/service/mitteilungen/01572/> (accessed via WayBackMachine May 30, 2023).
 59. BBC News, "Germany Bans Neo-Nazi Group," *BBC*, September 14, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/925,009.stm> (accessed May 30, 2023).
 60. Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "The Emergence of Transnational Street Militancy: A Comparative Case Study of the Nordic Resistance Movement and Generation Identity," *Journal for Deradicalization* 25 (2020): 1–34.
 61. Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Why the Nordic Resistance Movement Restrains Its Use of Violence," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 14, no. 6 (2020): 37–48.
 62. For more detailed treatment of the NRM, See *ibid.*; See note 60 above; Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland."
 63. Bjørgo and Ravndal, "Why the Nordic Resistance Movement Restrains Its Use of Violence," 40–41.
 64. Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland," 181.
 65. *Ibid.*, 178, 180.
 66. See Marieke De Goede, "Proscription's Futures," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 2 (2018): 336–55.
 67. Reinhard Wolff, "Finnische Neonazis töten Passanten: Der Angriff auf Jimi Karttunen," *TAZ*, September 21, 2016, <https://taz.de/Finnische-Neonazis-toeten-Passanten/!5,338,937/> (accessed May 23, 2023).
 68. Daniel Sallamaa and Tommi Kotonen, "The Case Against the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland: An Overview and Some Explanations," *Right Now! Blog*, <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2020/the-case-against-the-nordic-resistance-movement.html> (accessed May 23, 2023).
 69. See note 68 above.
 70. *Ibid.*, emphasis in original.
 71. Including Towards Freedom! (*Kohti Vapautta!*), Nordic People's Socialists (*Pohjoismaiset Kansansosialistit*), National Socialist Youth (*Kansallissosialistinuoret*), *Berkano*, Northern Guard (*Pohjanvartio*), National Progress (*Kansallinen Kehitys*), and Law of the Blood (*Veren Laki*).
 72. Cf. Daniel Koehler, *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism* (Abington: Routledge, 2016).
 73. See note 19 above; Julia Gerlach, "Der Umgang mit politischem Extremismus auf dem Prüfstand—Vereinsverbote in Deutschland seit 1990," in *Extremismus in Deutschland*, Ed. Gerhard Hirscher and Eckhard Jesse (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2013), 527–48.
 74. In line with the distinction drawn by See note 5 above.
 75. Colin J. Beck and Emily Miner, "Who Gets Designated a Terrorist and Why?" *Social Forces* 91, no. 3 (2013): 837–72.
 76. See note 9 above.
 77. Lee and Tominaga find some evidence that ally behavior may increase the likelihood of proscribing a group; for an overview of shared terrorist group bans, see Benjamin Freedman, "Officially Blacklisted Extremist/Terrorist (Support) Organizations: A Comparison of Lists from Six Countries and Two International Organizations," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 2 (2010): 46–52.
 78. Bourne and Veugeler's comparative case study—using the framework of a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) calibration exercise, though not in fact conducting a QCA—of RWE party proscription is an instructive example.