

Politics and Policy Take-Up: Evidence from DACA

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Abstract

Participation often determines the efficacy of public programs. While political processes determine the enactment of policies, less is known about how politics influences policy take-up. We argue potential recipients' expectations about future political coalitions influence participation in programs. We analyze state-level applications for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program before and after the 2016 presidential election. This plausibly exogenous "shock" to the political system allows us to compare DACA participation among states with political contexts favorable, neutral, and unfavorable to the program. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest the election led to around 1,800 fewer new applications in liberal states, relative to conservative and moderate states. We find in liberal states, the anticipation of a Clinton win led to a steady increase in new applications—followed by a dramatic decline after the election. In contrast, applications in conservative and moderate states steadily declined across the same period. The results suggest that the anticipation of an unfriendly administration catalyzed the decline of the program prior to actual policy changes.

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1 Introduction

In 2012, the Obama administration announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, with its potential to grant temporary legal status to nearly one million undocumented immigrants.¹ The program generated immediate political conflict, as Republicans in Congress voted to defund it and conservative states' attorneys general sued the administration. The success and survival of the program depended on the political actors holding office.

We argue that potential recipients of government programs are aware of these dynamics, that they anticipate future political turnover, and that these expectations influence policy participation. The relationship between electoral politics and public policy is a perennial subject in social science research.² Recent studies of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) have shown political attitudes influence policy take-up (?), and policy take-up influences election turnout (?). ACA participation influenced the size of insurance risk pools and directly contributed to policy performance (?). Temporary protected status conferred by DACA may impact labor market and health outcomes for recipients (?????).

In an analysis of incoming DACA applications from 2013-2018, we find that state-level trends before and after the 2016 election suggest potential program recipients incorporated political turnover into their decision to apply. This event provides a unique opportunity to study the calculus of program participation, given the widespread belief that Hillary Clinton would be the new president. In other words, the introduction of a hostile administration was plausibly unanticipated by potential beneficiaries.

Difference-in-differences estimates show heterogeneity in the effect of the 2016 presidential election by state ideology. In conservative and moderate states, where political actors were more likely to actively discourage enrollment through litigation and exclusionary policies, the election had a negligible impact on the flow of applications. How-

¹For a summary of the history and details of the program, see ?.

²This literature is vast. For a recent review of the "policy makes politics" literature, see ?.

ever, in liberal states, where leaders were likely to support in-state tuition and drivers licenses, we estimate the election of Donald Trump has led to about 1,800 fewer new applications in a given state. This is driven in part by an increase in applications prior to the election—as potential recipients prepared for a president politically aligned with program. Our findings have important implications for the program itself, as they provide evidence the present decline is partly demand-driven. Put differently, anticipation of hostility toward the program by potential recipients and the subsequent decline in take-up preceded the program’s actual policy phaseout.

More broadly, we provide evidence that anticipated political turnover is one determinant of policy take-up. Conventional models of take-up typically emphasize material application costs or psychological barriers associated with social stigma and program complexity (e.g. ??). Though often the subject of researcher interventions, these features are typically invariant in observational settings. In contrast, elections routinely change expectations about future political leadership. This suggests future research on participation in public programs—including temporary immigration classifications and means-tested programs—should investigate the potential impact of elections.

2 Policy Take-up and Political Turnover

We argue the decision to participate in government programs is partly driven by individuals’ expectations of future political coalitions. Many means-tested programs exhibit chronically low participation rates. Typically, research emphasizes a variety of policy design, administrative and cognitive barriers to policy take-up.³ There are reasons, however, to suggest that future political turnover may be relevant.

First, a subset of public programs are tied to salient political divisions. The official names of DACA, the ACA, and other social welfare programs often carry pejorative

³We omit a wholesale review of this material, but examples of policy design studies include ?; ? examine administrative barriers; and ? investigate cognitive limitations.

aliases used by the opposition. This reduces the informational barrier that would otherwise prevent potential recipients from incorporating political considerations. Second, individuals' expectations about political turnover exhibits routine variation rarely present in other potential determinants. Policy design and administrative forms are subject to occasional amendments, but social stigmas change slowly and are difficult to alter. In contrast, elections bring about routine leadership changes that can be anticipated by citizens deciding whether to participate in government programs.

Our argument is most closely related to recent work by ?, which presents evidence that individuals' partisanship influences take-up because of heterogeneous beliefs about the efficacy of government and the salience of particular in-group identities. They argue that partisanship biases the conventional, rational model of policy take-up based on material costs and benefits (?). Anticipation of future political leaders differs from individual partisanship as an explanation for take-up in several respects.

Incorporating this information into the decision to participate may be consistent with a rational model. Future leaders may end the program abruptly, damage its operation, or punish its participants. In the case of DACA, this issue was particularly stark—since take-up meant participation in a national registry that some feared could be used for mass deportations.⁴ For this reason, following the election of Donald Trump, some lawyers advised potential recipients against enrollment.⁵ Other programs like Medicare/Medicaid may exhibit similar dynamics, since future political leaders may influence program generosity and administrative burdens, which in turn, is consistently shown to influence enrollment (e.g. ??).

Political context may also index individuals' expectations about how particular leaders will influence the program. Political beliefs are associated with perceptions of leaders'

⁴Notably, Donald Trump proposed the creation of a "deportation force." For a media summary of these fears, see: Lind, Dara. 2017. "Immigrants gave the government personal details to get DACA. Will it be used to deport them?" Sept. 8. *Vox*. URL: <https://tinyurl.com/y7pln49q>

⁵For example: "One Immigration Lawyer On How She's Advising DACA Recipients," *NPR*, URL: <https://tinyurl.com/ybvptttp>

competence, and in some cases, factual information (?).⁶ Relatedly, voter preferences are associated with trust in government and the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process itself (??). Of course, potential DACA recipients' opinions do not necessarily reflect the political context of their state. Therefore, we do not argue variation in political context indexes the preferences of *recipients*. Instead, variation in political context may influence individual expectations about how the election of Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton would affect the program. Local political elites have incentives to communicate the most extreme versions of the policy consequences of the opposition winning.

A related mechanism is that local policy decisions by political actors inform voters' expectations about the party's orientation toward DACA. As Figure ?? indicates, states differed markedly in their overall policy orientation to the program.⁷ State legislatures enacted laws that determined whether beneficiaries had access to drivers' licenses and in-state tuition rates. In addition, attorneys general chose whether to join the other state plaintiffs in *United States v. Texas* (2016), which challenged the constitutionality of the program. Put differently, state policies influenced the benefits of enrolling to potential recipients. A sudden change in the chief executive administering the program, then, would impact states where recipients had the most to lose. In contrast, unsupportive political environments may exhibit an enrollment "floor effect" by consistently depressing enrollment.

This leads to two implications. First, potential participants will be more likely to enroll if they expect future political leaders will be favorable to the program. Second, expectations about the leaders' orientation toward the program will vary by local-level partisanship or ideology.⁸ Beneficiaries in areas less favorable toward a particular candidate will discount their future leadership of the program more than beneficiaries who live in

⁶See also ?, who find that partisan differences in response to factual questions can be attenuated by financial incentives.

⁷A list of the actions that informed this classification can be found in the Supplementary Information (SI).

⁸We use these terms interchangeably, since the case examined takes place during an era of polarization that makes the two functionally indistinguishable in many contexts.




Figure 1: Map of States by DACA Policy Actions

regions more favorable to that candidate.

We study this in the context of DACA and the 2016 election, where we expect beneficiaries in liberal (conservative) states to discount the leadership of Donald Trump (Hillary Clinton)—which should influence their decision to apply for the program. The primary benefits of the program are temporary guarantees against deportation, along with any state-level benefits (e.g. in-state tuition or drivers license eligibility). Importantly, unlike many of the means-tested programs that have been the subject of past research, the application process is standardized across states.⁹ Moreover, during the period in question, public attitudes on DACA consistently mapped onto U.S. political polarization. This implies the program is an ideal case to take stock of political turnover as a determinant of policy take-up.

⁹Details about the application process and Form I-821D can still be found at: <https://www.uscis.gov/i-821d>

3 2016 Election as an Exogenous Shock

Studying the influence of beliefs about political turnover on program participation requires a plausibly exogenous source of variation in those beliefs. We argue the 2016 presidential election provides such variation because virtually every credible election forecast (along with betting markets) projected a Clinton win.¹⁰ For example, an October 25th CNN/ORC poll showed that 68% of voters believed that Hillary Clinton would win—up from 55% three months earlier.¹¹ Near the election, the poll indicates that a majority of self-reported Republicans believed their candidate would lose.¹² This allows us to compare a period in which the vast majority believed Clinton would administer the DACA program to a period in which it was certain that Trump would. In this way, we follow other research in the social sciences that leverages this event (??) and other work that leverages election outcomes as exogenous shocks (e.g. ?).

We argue the effects of this sudden change in expectations are heterogenous by state political environment. The key treatment is not the election itself, but the interaction of state political context and beliefs about political turnover. To recover the effect of this interaction, we estimate the following generalized difference-in-difference equation

$$Applications_{it} = \alpha_i + \phi_t + \beta(Election_t * PoliticalContext_i) + \epsilon_i$$

which predicts DACA applications in state i during quarter t , and includes corresponding intercept shifts for time and unit. DACA application data are reported quarterly by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).¹³ To protect the identities of applicants, these data report total new and renewal applications received and approved by state.¹⁴

¹⁰For a summary of these projections, see ?.

¹¹<https://tinyurl.com/y94hqq6j>

¹²Work by ? suggests this outcome-based measure of election predictions may underestimate this figure.

¹³See: <https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-i-821d-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals>

¹⁴In states where fewer than 10 applications were received, information is withheld. This results in the omission of Vermont from the dataset.

State intercepts accounts for variation in take-up driven by the actions in Figure ??, as well as the variation in demand based on the number of potential recipients. Quarter intercepts account for time specific shocks like judicial decisions, as well as the general trend toward the depletion of the potential applicant pool. The results are robust to including a time trend. *Election* is an indicator that takes the value of 1 after the November 2016 quarter. Moving the threshold one quarter in either direction does not appreciably influence the results. We examined pre-treatment application trends to investigate the credibility of the parallel trends assumption. Reassuringly, liberal, conservative, and moderate states were not distinguishable (Figure ??).

In the main results we use a survey-based measure of state-level ideology created by ?. We believe this is the most appropriate measure for several reasons. First, we argue that heterogeneity in candidate evaluations will be driven by the underlying political context. Since ? use CCES responses, this measure is designed to uncover these “average policy preferences” independent of the decisions of the voting population (who are excluded as possible recipients). Revealed candidate preferences such as proportion of the two-party vote share will also be inseparable from variation in turnout and strategic voting considerations, suggesting less association with revealed ideological preferences. This is especially acute in the 2016 election, as the favorability ratings of both candidates were historically low—suggesting that many votes for a particular candidates could be more accurately interpreted as votes *against* the opposing candidate.

For this reason, results differ somewhat among alternative measures: the state-level pro/anti-DACA actions from Figure ??, Republican two-party vote share in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections, and the smoothed average of the three. We present and discuss these results in more depth in the Supplementary Information. In general, results among liberal states are robust, but results among those classified as moderate or conservative vary. Our approach assumes the ideological orientation of a state is constant over this period. We bin each measure, producing indicators for liberal, moderate, and conservative

states based on the terciles of each distribution. This is meant to address concerns about outliers in vote share and ideology (e.g. Washington, D.C.) and measurement error.¹⁵ We report results with continuous measures in Table SI-2. The substantive findings differ only slightly, but we prefer the binned interaction to avoid the linearity assumption (?).

Measuring ideology and DACA applications at the state-level raises potential limitations. Aggregation like this can be reliable (e.g. ?). We rely on related research to argue it is plausibly valid in this case. There are two potential concerns of aggregation. First, the state-level ideology may have poor associations with the “signals” about future leaders received by potential applicants. But in the U.S., research consistently shows Republican party ID and conservatism are closely linked with attitudes toward stricter immigration enforcement—and, in some cases, anti-immigrant sentiment (???). In addition, ? find that local context strongly predicts survey responses, which suggests that state-level ideology based on the CCES should be strongly associated with the candidate evaluations discussed in Section 2. Moreover, since the vast majority of candidates seek external assistance for applications, local political context—which may be associated with the material costs associated with applying—should inform the beliefs of potential recipients (?). A second concern is that ideology may be correlated with other state-level variables like economic and demographic indicators—rendering our argument about political considerations suspect. We have not found this to be the case, though we discuss this concern in the following section.

4 Findings

Overall, we find strong evidence that the 2016 presidential election had an impact on DACA applications in states with left-leaning political environments. An initial, descriptive look at the dataset foreshadows the main findings. Figure ??(a) plots over-time trends

¹⁵The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of Washington, D.C.




Figure 2: New Applications and Renewals, Smoothed by Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative States (Tausanovich and Warsaw 2013); application data normalized between 0 and 1 within state. Points jittered to prevent overplotting.

in new applications by state ideology. For visualization purposes, we normalize the data between 0 and 1 within state.¹⁶ As expected, there are dramatically different trends based on state political context and the 2016 election. Applications in moderate and conservative states decline monotonically, as there are simply fewer potential applicants. Liberal states, however, see a dramatic increase in applications as the 2016 election approaches. Following the election, applications decline more rapidly than conservative and moderate states. This suggests potential beneficiaries in liberal states reacted differently to new information. In fact, the first difference of the cumulative totals in the critical quarter is negative in some states, indicating that applications were *withdrawn*.

These findings are strongly supported by the estimates in Table ?? . Accounting for

¹⁶This does not imply that the raw number of applications was necessarily lower in liberal states, on average—only that these states tended to have more of their applications later in the series.

state and time-specific shocks, the typical liberal state saw, on average, roughly 263 fewer applications per quarter compared with moderate states—indicating an overall reduction in about 1,800 applications in the post-election period. The per-quarter reduction corresponds to a roughly 5% reduction in the median number of applications for liberal states during the complete time-series. We report alternative specifications in Table SI-1 which show how similar estimates when 2016 two-party vote share is used as a proxy for state ideology. One additional concern is that our measures of state-level political leanings may be correlated with alternative explanatory variables, such as urbanization, unemployment, or undocumented immigrant population. We have found, however, any associations to be generally weak. In Table SI-2, we report correlations between political context, undocumented immigrant population, and percent Hispanic. This suggests political context is uniquely associated with the late-2016 take-up changes.

Table 1: Difference-in-Difference Estimates

New Applications			
Election		−291.92 (85.84)	79.08 (111.52)
Election*Liberal	−264.05 (117.49)	−262.75 (121.05)	−263.75 (119.47)
Election*Conservative	−78.26 (119.30)	−76.96 (122.92)	−77.96 (121.31)
Constant	156.72 (192.94)	246.26 (170.65)	542.26 (178.08)
State FE	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend			✓
Quarter FE	✓		
Observations	998	998	998
Adjusted R ²	0.59	0.56	0.57

*Linear model of new DACA applications by state-quarter;
standard errors in parentheses*

There are two other empirical findings consistent with our proposed behavioral mechanism for policy take-up. We analyze renewal applications in addition to initials. This

provides a useful placebo, as future political coalitions should have little influence on the decision to renew. Anecdotal evidence suggests that DACA recipients enrolled at the time of the 2016 election renewed based on the logic that their information was already available to a hostile administration. That is, withdrawing would not reduce the risk that this information could be used against them, and would only deprive them of any benefits of the program. As suggested by Figure ??(b), the negative impact of the election in liberal states appears to be confined to new applications. We estimate that renewals unaffected by this event. Instead, these trends are predicted well by the number of potential renewals alone.

Finally, it should be noted we have no reason to expect that the trends we identify are a function of potential beneficiaries anticipating whether or not their applications will be *approved* in their state context. Though we primarily analyze demand for the program, it is worth noting that there is little state-level variation in the approval of applications. Applications are sent to one of three centralized USCIS processing centers. The standards for qualifying are clear and severely constrained individual immigration officials relative to the status quo prior to the program. Figure SI-2 plots cumulative application approval rates by state, which range from 0.91 to 0.95. Figure ?? plots cumulative approval rates over time by state ideology. The cumulative approval rate is defined as the total number of approved applications over the total applications submitted and not explicitly rejected. The only differences among states are driven entirely by the fluctuation in demand identified in the previous results, as applicants in liberal states withdrew in response to the election—artificially reducing the approval rate for in these states for several quarters. Nationwide downward fluctuations, which were most extreme in late 2014, are driven mostly by large influxes of applications yet to be approved.




Figure 3: Cumulative Approval Rates Over Time by Liberal, Moderate and Conservative States

5 Discussion

We find evidence that the 2016 election had a dramatic, previously unrecognized impact on the DACA program. Rather than leading to an unconditional decline in applications, our results suggest the effect of the election varied, with liberal states experiencing a sharp drop relative to prior trends. We have argued that this was driven primarily by a sudden change in the expectations of potential beneficiaries. Applicants in liberal states went from expecting a friendly presidential administration and Congress to a political coalition explicitly hostile to the program. Importantly, this effect is confined to new applicants, who had yet to incur the risk of voluntarily identifying themselves as undocumented. Together, these findings imply that political calculus sometimes influences the weighing of costs and benefits to policy take-up.

These findings, however, have scope limitations. First, we investigate implications of our argument about take-up at the state level. Data availability prevent us from in-

vestigating individual-level effects. Second, our argument may only extend to politically salient programs in which the consequences of elections are clear. DACA may be exceptional among government programs, since it targets a specific, vulnerable population where the consequences of take-up could be dire. In other words, politically-charged, executive-driven programs with high risks are (historically) exceptional.

These limitations notwithstanding, the case illustrates a broader point about politics and public policy. While numerous studies suggest that transaction costs, information availability, social stigmas, and even ingrained political beliefs may impact policy take-up, we have argued that expectations about future political coalitions may also play a role. If this is the case, participation in government programs may be cyclically affected by routine turnover in public officials. This may implicate programs beyond temporary legal immigration status, which we leave for future research to consider.

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Supplementary Information

Pre-treatment Trends

To test the difference-in-difference model's key assumption of parallel trends, we ran an auxiliary regression in which we interacted the quarter dummies with the ideology variable. Specifically, we estimated:

$$Applications_{it} = \alpha_i + \phi_t + \beta_{it} (Quarter_t * PoliticalContext_i) + \epsilon_i$$

We found that none of the β_{it} were statistically different from zero for any of the pre-treatment periods. The estimated coefficients from this model are plotted below by ideology with 95% CI bars. The base category is Moderate.




Figure SI-1: Pretreatment Trends

Coding State DACA Position

The following list of state actions related to DACA were used to determine if state-level actors were in favor, opposed, or neutral/mixed toward the program.

Alabama:

- HB56 bars aliens who are not lawfully present in the United States from enrolling in or attending any public postsecondary education institution in the state of Alabama. An alien attending any public postsecondary education institution must either possess lawful permanent residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa. This law makes aliens who are not lawfully present in the United States ineligible for any

post secondary education benefit, including, but not limited to, scholarship, grants or financial aid.

- Some institutions allow DACA recipients to receive in-state tuition.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.
- State AG joined Texas in requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.
- State AG joined Texas in suing the Trump Administration to end DACA.

Alaska

- State was neutral in US v. Texas.

Arizona

- Prop 300 states that a person who is not a citizen or legal resident of the United States or who is without lawful immigration status is not entitled to classification as an in-state student or entitled to classification as a county resident.
- Governor Jan Brewer issued an executive order [which was later ruled unconstitutional] saying those with deferred status could not receive state benefits.
- State AG joined US vs Texas.

Arkansas

- State AG joined US v. Texas.
- State AG joined Texas in requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.
- State AG joined Texas in suing the Trump Administration to end DACA.

California

- A2189, enacted Sept. 3, 2012, allows the DMV. to issue a drivers license to DACA recipients who might not be eligible for social security numbers.
- A60 would repeal provisions of existing law that requires the Department of Motor Vehicles to require an applicant for an original driver's license or identification card to submit satisfactory proof that the applicant's presence in the United States is authorized under federal law and to issue a temporary license under certain conditions.
- A540 requires that an unlawful immigrant, other than a non-immigrant alien, be exempted from paying nonresident tuition at state community colleges and the state university if these conditions are met: attendance at a state high school for three or more years, graduation from a California high school or the equivalent, registration at or attendance at an accredited higher education institution in the state, and signed affidavit stating that the student has applied to legalize his or her immigration status, or will file an application as soon as he or she is eligible.

- A131 allows any person who is exempt from paying nonresident tuition at the California State University, the California Community Colleges, or the University of California to receive scholarships from non-state funds.
- Fund healthcare insurance for all children, regardless of immigration status.
- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- Lead state requesting President Trump continue DACA.

Colorado

- S251 allows individuals to qualify for a driver's license, instruction permit or identification card, despite the individual not being lawfully present or being only temporarily lawfully present in the United States if certain conditions are met, such as providing state tax returns.
- Offered in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants (S33). This law allows students without lawful immigration status to be considered in-state residents and exempts people receiving higher education benefits from having to provide documentation of lawful presence in the United States.
- State was neutral in US v. Texas.

Connecticut

- H6495 would provide driver's licenses to applicants who submit a valid foreign passport or consular identification and proof of residency, regardless of legal presence in the United States.
- H6390 extends in-state tuition benefits to post-secondary students without legal immigration status who reside in Connecticut and meet certain criteria. It requires them to have an affidavit with a college stating that they have applied to legalize their immigration status or will do so as soon as they are eligible to apply.
- H6844 amends H6390 to reduce the required number of years in state high schools from four to two.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Delaware

- S59 creates the means for an undocumented immigrant to obtain a driving privilege card in Delaware. A driving privilege card or permit applicant must provide the state with satisfactory documentary evidence and that the applicant has led a Delaware income tax return or resided in Delaware and been claimed as a dependent by an individual who has led a state income tax.
- State was neutral in US v. Texas.
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Florida

- H235 says approval of an application for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals status issued by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services as valid proof of identity for purposes of applying for a driver license."
- H851 includes amendments relating to qualifications for resident (in-state) tuition. Out-of-state fees are waived for students, including but not limited to those undocumented for federal immigration purposes who have attended a secondary school for three years before graduating from a Florida high school, applied for higher education enrollment within two years of graduation, and submitted an official Florida high school transcript as evidence of attendance and graduation. A dependent child who is a United States citizen may not be denied classification as a resident for tuition purposes based solely upon the immigration status of his or her parent. The law prohibits denial of classification as a resident for tuition purposes based on immigration status and allows certain people to be classified as state residents based on marriage or military service.
- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Georgia

- H227 deals with issuance, expiration, and renewal of drivers' licenses, authorizes the issuance of a temporary driving permit to a non-citizen applicant whose Georgia drivers license has expired, or will expire, who has led a request for an extension to remain lawfully within the United States.
- S492 states that noncitizen students shall not be classified as in-state for tuition purposes unless the student is legally in the state and there is evidence to warrant consideration of in-state classification as determined by the board of regents.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Hawaii

- H1007 authorizes the issuance of drivers licenses to residents of Hawaii who cannot provide proof of authorized presence in the United States.
- Offered in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants (State University System).
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Idaho

- State AG and Governor joined US v. Texas.
- State AG and Governor joined Texas in requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.

Illinois

- S957 allows the Secretary of State to issue a temporary visitor's driver's license to an individual who has resided in Illinois for a specified time but is ineligible to obtain a Social Security number, and unable to prove lawful presence. A valid, unexpired foreign passport or consular identification document from their country of citizenship are acceptable forms of identification. H60 allows in-state tuition for a person who is not a citizen or permanent resident of the United States who has an affidavit stating intent to apply for citizenship as soon as is possible.
- Offered in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants (H60). This law allows in-state tuition for a person who is not a citizen or permanent resident of the United States who files an affidavit stating intent to apply for citizenship as soon as is possible.
- Fund healthcare insurance for all children, regardless of immigration status.
- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Indiana

- H1402 states that a person unlawfully present in the United States is ineligible to pay the resident tuition rate.

- S207 amended existing regulation to exempt individuals who enrolled in a state educational institution on or before July 1, 2011.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Iowa

- After USCIS released guidance, the governor and state legislature reversed the DOT's decision to limit the issuance of driver's licenses.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Kansas

- H2145 allows certain nonresidents to be deemed to be residents for purposes of tuition and other fees at post-secondary educational institutions.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.
- State AG joined Texas in requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.

Kentucky

- State was neutral in US v. Texas.

Louisiana

- State AG joined US v. Texas.
- State AG joined Texas in suing the Trump Administration to end DACA.

Maine

- Governor joined US vs Texas.
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.

Maryland

- S715 authorizes the issuance of drivers licenses to those who do not have lawful status or a valid Social Security number. New applicants must provide evidence that the applicant has filed two years of Maryland income tax returns or proof of residency or have been claimed as a dependent by an individual who has filed Maryland income tax returns. The licenses are not valid for Federal identification purposes.

- S167 authorizes in-state tuition benefits at a local community college to unauthorized students who have graduated from public high schools. Parents must be able to prove they pay Maryland taxes to receive in-state tuition. After two years, students have the option of transferring to a state university at in-state tuition rates. Students who are not permanent residents must provide to the public college an affidavit stating that they will file an application to become a permanent resident within 30 days after becoming eligible to do so.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.

Massachusetts

- Fund healthcare insurance for all children, regardless of immigration status.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Michigan

- Offered in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants.
- Following formal guidance from the federal government, the Secretary of State revised his stance to issue driver's licenses to DACA recipients. In response to DACA's announcement, the Michigan SOS issued a statement denying drivers licenses to DACA recipients.
- State AG joined US vs Texas.

Minnesota

- S1236 establishes criteria by which students without lawful immigration status may qualify for the resident tuition rate in state universities and colleges. It also provides for the treatment of undocumented immigrants with respect to financial aid and tuition and public institutions may also use private sources of funding to provide aid to a student eligible for resident tuition.
- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State was neutral in US v. Texas.
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.

Mississippi

- Governor joined US vs Texas.

Missouri

- H3 bars funds to institutions of higher education that offer a tuition rate less than the international rate to students with unlawful immigration status, and bars scholarship funds to students with unlawful immigration status.
- State was neutral in US v. Texas.

Montana

- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Nebraska

- Offered in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants (L239). This law redefines residency and lawful status for the sake of in-state tuition eligibility and allows those residing in the state for three years or more, and who meet other criteria, to become eligible for in-state tuition.
- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.
- State AG joined Texas in requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.
- State AG joined Texas in suing the Trump Administration to end DACA.

Nevada

- S303 creates a drivers authorization card and allows applicants, regardless of legal status, to provide birth certificates or passports issued by a foreign country as proof of identity. This law also prohibits the release of information relating to legal status for purposes relating to the enforcement of immigration laws.
- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.

New Hampshire

- State was neutral in US v. Texas.

New Jersey

- S2479 provides in-state tuition and state financial aid if the individual attended high school for three years, graduated or received the equivalent of a high school diploma and enrolls in a public institution of higher education in 2014. If the person does not have lawful status, he or she must file an affidavit to legalize when eligible to do so.

- State was neutral in US v. Texas.

New Mexico

- H173 allows the Department of Motor Vehicles to accept tax identification numbers as a substitute for a Social Security number regardless of immigration status.
- S582 prohibits denial of college benefits based on a student's immigration status. It provides for in-state tuition and state-funded financial aid to be granted on the same terms to all people, regardless of immigration status.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

New York

- S7784 provides that payment of State University of New York or City University of New York tuition by certain non-resident students shall be paid at a rate no greater than that imposed on resident students.
- Fund healthcare insurance for all children, regardless of immigration status.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- Lead State in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

North Carolina

- State AG Roy Cooper said that DACA recipients are not eligible for in-state tuition. The state legislature killed a bill to make DACA recipients eligible for in-state tuition without a vote.
- Governor joined US v. Texas.
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

North Dakota

- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Ohio

- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Oklahoma

- Offered in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants (State University System)
- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Oregon

- H2787 exempts students who are not citizens or lawful permanent residents from non-resident tuition and fees if the following conditions are met: three years of attendance at an Oregon school; verify years attendance in any U.S., D.C. or Puerto Rico elementary or secondary school; receipt of a high school diploma or equivalent in Oregon within three years of enrolling in a public university in Oregon. The student must demonstrate intent to become a citizen or lawful permanent resident by submitting a copy of the students application registered with a federal immigration program or federal deportation deferral program or statement to apply as permitted under federal law, and an affidavit of application for a federal individual taxpayer identification number or official federal ID. The law allows for a dependent of a non-citizen to receive similar benefits.
- Fund healthcare insurance for all children, regardless of immigration status.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Pennsylvania

- State was neutral in US v. Texas.
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Rhode Island

- Offered in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants.
- State was neutral in US v. Texas.
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

South Carolina

- H4400 prohibits aliens unlawfully present in the United States from attending a public institution of higher learning within the state. It requires the trustees of a public institution of higher learning to develop and institute a process by which lawful presence in the United States is verified. It states that aliens not eligible on the basis of residence for public higher education benefits including, but not limited to, scholarships, financial aid, grants, or resident tuition.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.
- State AG joined Texas in requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.
- State AG joined Texas in suing the Trump Administration to end DACA.

South Dakota

- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Tennessee

- State AG joined US v. Texas.
- State AG joined Texas in requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.

Texas

- H1403 grants in-state tuition benefits and state financial aid to immigrant and unauthorized students based on the following conditions: the student must have resided in Texas while attending high school in Texas, graduated from a public or private high school or received a GED in Texas, resided in Texas for three years prior to graduation from high school or receipt of GED, and provide their institution of higher learning a signed affidavit indicating an intent to apply for permanent resident status as soon as able to do so.
- Governor Rick Perry sent a letter to all Texas agencies, confirming DACA does not confer legal status.
- Lead plaintiff in US v. Texas.
- Lead state requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.
- Lead state suing to end DACA.

Utah

- S227 establishes a one year driving privilege card for unauthorized immigrants. Applicants without a Social Security number must prove Utah residency for six months and pay a tax. The card is expressly prohibited from being used for any identification purposes by a governmental entity.

- Issued drivers licenses to unauthorized immigrants after DACA.
- H144 modifies the State System of Higher Education Code and allows a student who meets certain requirements to be exempt from paying nonresident tuition at institutions of higher education.
- H2 provides an exemption to verification of lawful presence for privately funded scholarships administered by colleges or universities, for graduates of Utah high schools.
- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State AG joined US v. Texas.

Vermont

- S38 allows those Vermont residents unable to establish lawful presence in the United States to be eligible for a motor vehicle operator's privilege card or alternate identification card.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Virginia

- S1090 provides eligibility for in-state tuition for DACA recipients.
- State was neutral in US v. Texas.
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

Washington

- Issued drivers licenses to unauthorized immigrants before DACA (H1444).
- H1444 This law allows drivers license applicants without Social Security numbers to provide alternate documentation to show proof of residence in the state of Washington such as home utility bills and tax identification numbers.
- Issued drivers licenses to unauthorized immigrants after DACA.
- Offered in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants (H1079)

- H1079 defines resident student as any person who has lived in the state for three years before receiving a diploma.
- H1817 allows access to the State Need Grant for individuals granted DACA. Other criteria include completion of the full senior year of high school, and receiving a high school diploma or equivalent from a Washington high school.
- S6523 extends financial aid to students domiciled in the state of Washington. These resident students may receive aid regardless of immigration status.
- Fund healthcare insurance for all children, regardless of immigration status.
- State AG filed a brief in support of DACA (US v. Texas).
- State AG joined California in requesting that President Trump continue DACA.
- State AG joined New York in suing the Trump Administration to halt the dismantling of DACA.

West Virginia

- State AG joined US v. Texas.
- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State AG joined Texas in requesting that AG Sessions end DACA.
- State AG joined Texas in suing the Trump Administration to end DACA.

Wisconsin

- State AG joined US vs Texas.

Wyoming

- Passed legislation to provide legal and/or unauthorized immigrants with professional licenses.
- State was neutral in US v. Texas.

Table SI-1: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (Alternative Ideology Measures)

	DACA Actions			Obama 2012			Trump 2016		
Election		-121.69 (106.28)	248.59 (127.34)		-300.66 (85.30)	69.23 (110.95)		-491.02 (85.09)	-120.51 (110.61)
Election*Pro-DACA	-308.13 (128.20)	-307.54 (132.11)	-308.05 (130.38)						
Election*Anti-DACA	-424.34 (129.51)	-424.57 (133.46)	-424.49 (131.71)						
Election*Obama2012 Liberal				-43.42 (117.42)	-44.71 (120.98)	-43.72 (119.40)			
Election*Obama2012 Conservative				-281.96 (118.89)	-281.96 (122.50)	-281.96 (120.90)			
Election*Trump2016 Liberal							-99.62 (116.57)	-98.71 (120.16)	-99.36 (118.57)
Election*Trump2016 Conservative							370.27 (118.56)	370.78 (122.21)	370.47 (120.60)
Constant	177.85 (191.91)	267.38 (169.62)	563.20 (177.06)	148.05 (192.72)	238.03 (170.42)	533.60 (177.83)	69.56 (191.73)	159.24 (169.66)	454.99 (177.01)
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend			✓			✓			✓
Quarter FE	✓			✓			✓		
Observations	998	998	998	998	998	998	998	998	998
Adjusted R ²	0.59	0.56	0.58	0.59	0.56	0.57	0.59	0.57	0.58

Linear model of new DACA applications by state-quarter; standard errors in parentheses.

Table SI-2: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (Continuous Ideology Measures)

	New Applications			Average Republican Vote Share		
	Ideology (T&W)					
Election	-412.16 (50.24)	-42.05 (87.83)		-934.55 (218.51)	-564.48 (227.45)	
Election*Ideology (T&W)	240.60 (227.61)	240.62 (224.65)	240.56 (220.94)			
Election*Vote Share (R)				10.80 (4.35)	10.80 (4.29)	10.80 (4.22)
Constant	240.86 (169.91)	536.56 (177.42)	151.17 (192.44)	212.54 (169.61)	508.25 (177.08)	122.86 (192.01)
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend		✓	✓		✓	✓
Quarter FE			✓			✓
Observations	998	998	998	998	998	998
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.59	0.56	0.57	0.59

Linear model of new DACA applications by state-quarter; standard errors in parentheses.

Data on undocumented immigration population come from the Pew Research Center, "U.S. unauthorized immigrant population estimates by state, 2016," February 5, 2019; URL: <https://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/u-s-unauthorized-immigrants-by-state/>.

Table SI-3: Correlation Between Ideology (?) and Other State-Level Variables

	Ideology	Population	% Hispanic	% Undocumented
Ideology	1.00	-0.29	-0.26	-0.40
Population	-0.29	1.00	0.50	0.49
% Hispanic	-0.26	0.50	1.00	0.73
% Undocumented	-0.40	0.49	0.73	1.00

* Note: All correlations statistically significant.




Figure SI-2: New Applications and Renewals, Smoothed by Liberal, Moderate and Conservative States (Obama 2012 Vote Share [a & b], Trump 2016 Vote Share [c & d], DACA State-Level Actions [e & f])




Figure SI-3: Map of States by DACA Cumulative Approval Rate




Figure SI-4: Map of States by Ideology (?)