

# Thinking about Games

ECON 420: Game Theory

Spring 2018


## Reading

- ▶ This week: Chapters 1 and 2
- ▶ Next week: Chapter 3

## Nim

- ▶ Today we'll play an alternative version of nim
- ▶ One row of 20 lines
- ▶ Each turn, the player must choose to remove 1, 2, or 3 lines
- ▶ The last person to remove a line wins





## Decisions vs games

- ▶ *Decisions* are choices that can be made "without concern for reaction or response from others"
- ▶ *Strategic games* (or just *games*) are choices that occur among "mutually aware players"
  - ▶ Players in strategic games take into account the cross-effects of their actions and the actions of other players

## Classifying games

- ▶ Games can be:
  - ▶ Sequential or simultaneous
  - ▶ Zero sum or non-zero sum
  - ▶ Single state or repeated
    - ★ Infinite or finite repetition
  - ▶ Perfect or imperfect information
  - ▶ Fixed or manipulable rules

## **Sequential vs simultaneous games**

- ▶ Sequential games
  - ▶ Players take turns (one after another)
  - ▶ Players look ahead at what might happen in the future to make choices
- ▶ Simultaneous games
  - ▶ Players make choices at the same time
  - ▶ Must predict what other players will do contemporaneously

## Nim

- ▶ Sequential or simultaneous?
- ▶ *sequential*



## Rock, paper, scissors

- ▶ Sequential or simultaneous?
- ▶ *simultaneous*

## Chess

- ▶ Sequential or simultaneous?
- ▶ *sequential*

## **A single play in American football**

- ▶ Sequential or simultaneous?
- ▶ *simultaneous*

## A soccer penalty kick

- ▶ Sequential or simultaneous?
- ▶ *simultaneous*

## Registering for classes

- ▶ Sequential or simultaneous?
- ▶ ?

## Constant-sum vs non-constant-sum games

- ▶ Constant sum
  - ▶ The sum total payoffs are fixed
  - ▶ Playing the game only determines the allocation of payoffs, not the total amount
- ▶ Zero sum
  - ▶ A special case of constant sum where total payoffs are zero
  - ▶ Often used to refer to constant-sum games
- ▶ Non-constant sum
  - ▶ Total payoffs depend on choices of players

## Nim

- ▶ Constant or non-constant sum?
- ▶ *constant* (zero)

## Rock, paper, scissors

- ▶ Constant or non-constant sum?
- ▶ *constant (zero)*



## Splitting the last piece of cake with someone

- ▶ Constant or non-constant sum?
- ▶ *constant (not zero)*

## Chicken (stay straight or swerve)

- ▶ Constant or non-constant sum?
- ▶ *non-constant*

## International trade

- ▶ Constant or non-constant sum?
- ▶ *non-constant*

## Example

- ▶ All-pay auction
  - ▶ You will bid to receive a \$5 bill
  - ▶ You have to pay me your highest bid *regardless if you win or lose the auction*
  - ▶ Everyone who bids has to pay, but only one person will win the \$5

## Constant-sum games

- ▶ Constant-sum games can be either:
  - ▶ Negative sum (war, household chores)
  - ▶ Zero sum (sports, games with a "winner" and "loser")
  - ▶ Positive sum (eating cake)
- ▶ Non-constant-sum games can be any of the above, too
  - ▶ Sometimes positive *and* negative sums are possible in the same game (all-pay auction)

## **Single-stage and repeated games**

- ▶ Single-stage games are played (against some particular opponents) and never again
- ▶ Repeated games are played over and over
  - ▶ Can be finitely or infinitely repeated
  - ▶ Choices in one round (stage) might affect later rounds (and vice versa)

## Golden Balls (split or steal)

- ▶ Single-stage or repeated?
- ▶ *single-stage*

## "Battle of wits" (poison cups)

- ▶ Single-stage or repeated?
- ▶ *single-stage*



## **A baseball plate appearance (pitcher vs batter)**

- ▶ Single-stage or repeated?
- ▶ *repeated*

## OPEC oil production

- ▶ Single-stage or repeated?
- ▶ *repeated*

## **Perfect and imperfect information**

- ▶ Perfect information
  - ▶ Players know exactly what choice are available to each player and what the payoffs will be (given choices)
- ▶ Imperfect information
  - ▶ Uncertainty over choices or payoffs (or both)
  - ▶ External uncertainty: "Nature" (the state of the world) changes choices or payoffs
  - ▶ Strategic uncertainty: Imperfect information about what other players are doing or have done in the past

## Nim

- ▶ Perfect or imperfect information?
- ▶ *perfect information*

## Chess

- ▶ Perfect or imperfect information?
- ▶ *perfect information*

## Vacation planning

- ▶ Perfect or imperfect information?
- ▶ *imperfect information (external uncertainty)*

## Applying for jobs

- ▶ Perfect of imperfect information?
- ▶ *imperfect information (strategic uncertainty)*

## Poker

- ▶ Perfect of imperfect information?
- ▶ *imperfect information (strategic uncertainty)*



## **Fixed and manipulable rules**

- ▶ Fixed rules can't be altered by players
- ▶ The choices available to each player are constant and known

## Nim

- ▶ Fixed or manipulable rules?
- ▶ *fixed*

## Political campaigns

- ▶ Fixed or manipulable rules?
- ▶ *manipulable*

## Advertising

- ▶ Fixed or manipulable rules?
- ▶ *manipulable*

## Defining a game

- ▶ A strategic game must contain three elements:
  1. Players
  2. Strategies
  3. Payoffs
- ▶ We make various assumptions about these elements

## Players

- ▶ The participants in the game who make choices
- ▶ Humans, firms, "nature", etc
- ▶ We assume players are *rational*
  - ▶ They can calculate outcomes from different strategies and will choose the optimum
- ▶ We assume players have *common knowledge of the rules*
  - ▶ Rules are fixed *at some level*
    - ★ Example: Releasing tax returns when running for president
    - ★ Example: Battle of wits
  - ▶ Whether or not to follow rules is *itself* part of a larger game

**Example** Who are the players in a game of poker?

## Strategies

- ▶ The set of choices available to the player
- ▶ A complete strategy is a "map" (set of instructions) on how to play a game given any possible set of choices from the other players
- ▶ Strategies are collections of choices
- ▶ A strategy is complete if you could give your instructions to someone else (or a machine) to do



## Payoffs

- ▶ The outcomes of the game
- ▶ Can be profits, utility, money, wins and losses, etc
- ▶ In this class we will assume that higher payoffs are more desirable
- ▶ We will often need to calculate *expected payoffs* if there is some randomness or uncertainty (imperfect information)
  - ▶ For any possible outcome  $i$  with payoff  $\pi_i$ , expected payoffs are  $\sum_i p_i \pi_i$ , where  $p_i$  is the probability of  $i$  occurring

## Examples

1. Suppose I flip a coin
  - ▶ Heads: You get \$100
  - ▶ Tails: You lose \$50
2. Suppose I flip 2 coins:
  - ▶ Heads/heads: You get \$100
  - ▶ Heads/tails: You get \$20
  - ▶ Tails/tails: You lose \$40

## Equilibrium

- ▶ The outcome where nobody can do better by *unilaterally* changing their strategy
- ▶ At equilibrium, nobody can say "I wish I had done that differently"
- ▶ Equilibrium does *not* mean that the outcome is optimal
- ▶ We don't expect to always obtain an equilibrium
- ▶ There is *at least* one equilibrium in every game

**One half the average game** What is an equilibrium of this game?

- ▶ Everyone picks 0

**Extra-credit game (choosing points)** What is an equilibrium of this game?

- ▶ Everyone chooses 1 point
- ▶ Any other equilibria?

## **Guess the average**

- ▶ Everyone write down a number between 0 and 100
- ▶ The winning number is the average number guessed
- ▶ Trade papers after writing down your number