

# Q2 Macro Study Guide

2020 Entering Cohort\*

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## Lectures 2 and 3 - Intro to Bellmans & Consumption Savings

Sequence problem:

$$V \sup_{x_{t+1}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t F(x_t, x_{t+1}) \quad \text{F is usually utility}$$

s.t.  $x_{t+1}$  is feasible (budget constraint)

Bellman:

$$V(x) = \sup_{x'} F(x, x') + \beta V(x')$$

Contraction mapping theorems in notes. Feasibility conditions in notes.

**Blackwell's sufficient conditions:**  $B(X)$  is a set of bounded functions and  $T : B(X) \rightarrow B(X)$ .  $T$  is a contraction mod  $\beta$  if:

- $T$  is monotone,  $f(x) < g(x) \rightarrow Tf(x) < Tg(x)$
- Discounting, exists some  $\beta$  s.t.  $T(f + a)(x) \leq Tf(x) + \beta a$
- See PS2-Q2 for example of contractions.

Solving Bellmans:

- Take first order conditions over maximizing variable
- Take envelope condition
- Combine for Euler equation
- Consumption savings (Stokey Lucas Prescott) example at the end of the notes

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\*Contributions made by Sarah Bass, (add names here)

## Lectures 4 and 5 - Optimal Growth Model

**There are not typed notes for this lecture!**

Sequence problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c_t, k_{t+1}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t) \\ \text{s.t. } c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = F(K_t, 1) = f(k_t) \text{ (constant labor supply)} \end{aligned}$$

Note, investment  $i = k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t$ . The above constraint says that demand for goods = supply of goods when markets clear.

Bellman:

$$V(k) = \max_x U(f(k) + (1 - \delta)k - k') + \beta V(k')$$

Solving the Bellman gives the following laws of motion, which can be used to find the steady state:

$$\begin{aligned} U'(c) &= \beta U'(c')(F'(k') + 1 - \delta) \\ F(k) &= c + k' - (1 - \delta)k \end{aligned}$$

Cobb-Douglas example in Lecture 4 slides

Phase Diagrams:

- Lines: see slides, set  $\Delta c = 0 \rightarrow F'(k^*) = \delta + \theta$ ,  $\Delta k = 0 \rightarrow c = F(k) - \delta k$  (or what choice vars are in question)
- Arrows: see lecture 5 slides

## Balanced Growth Path

We are given that technology (A) is growing at an exogenous fixed rate  $\gamma$ . The social planner's problem is:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t, N_t) \\ \text{s.t. } C_t + K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + F(K_t, A_t N_t) \end{aligned}$$

Next, define  $x_t = X_t/A_t$ . Then our maximization problem becomes:

$$\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(A_t c_t, N_t)$$

And our RC becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}
C_t/A_t + K_{t+1}/A_t &= (1 - \delta)K_t/A_t + F(K_t, A_t N_t)/A_t \\
\Rightarrow C_t/A_t + (K_{t+1}/A_t)(A_{t+1}/A_{t+1}) &= (1 - \delta)K_t/A_t + F(K_t, A_t N_t)/A_t \\
\Rightarrow c_t + k_{t+1}(A_{t+1}/A_t) &= (1 - \delta)k_t + F(K_t, A_t N_t)/A_t \\
\Rightarrow c_t + k_{t+1}(1 + \gamma) &= (1 - \delta)k_t + F(K_t, A_t N_t)/A_t
\end{aligned}$$

Note, there are constant returns to scale, so  $F(K_t, A_t N_t)/A_t = F(k_t, N_t)$ . So we have:

$$\Rightarrow c_t + k_{t+1}(1 + \gamma) = (1 - \delta)k_t + F(k_t, N_t)$$

Next take FOCs w.r.t  $c_t, N_t, k_{t+1}$  to get Euler and labor supply. The household/firm problems can be solved using the same normalization process.

Now consider an economy where technology is fixed but the population is growing at an exogenous fixed rate,  $n$ . As before, the social planner's problem is:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, N_t) \\
&\text{s.t. } C_t + K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + F(K_t, N_t)
\end{aligned}$$

Consumption in the utility function is usually per capita consumption, so it is already  $c_t$  (instead of  $C_t$ ). Next, define  $x_t = X_t/N_t$ . Then our maximization problem becomes:

$$\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, (1 + n)^t N_0)$$

And our RC becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}
C_t/N_t + K_{t+1}/N_t &= (1 - \delta)K_t/N_t + F(K_t, N_t)/N_t \\
\Rightarrow C_t/N_t + (K_{t+1}/N_t)(N_{t+1}/N_{t+1}) &= (1 - \delta)K_t/N_t + F(K_t, N_t)/N_t \\
\Rightarrow c_t + k_{t+1}(N_{t+1}/N_t) &= (1 - \delta)k_t + F(K_t, N_t)/N_t \\
\Rightarrow c_t + k_{t+1}(1 + n) &= (1 - \delta)k_t + F(K_t, N_t)/N_t
\end{aligned}$$

Note, there are constant returns to scale, so  $F(K_t, N_t)/N_t = F(k_t, N_0) = f(k_t)$ . So we have:

$$\Rightarrow c_t + k_{t+1}(1 + \gamma) = (1 - \delta)k_t + f(k_t)$$

Next take FOCs w.r.t  $c_t, k_{t+1}$  to get Euler. The household/firm problems can be solved using the same normalization process.

**You need to normalize such that everything is stationary. Normalize using the non-stationary variable.**

## Lectures 6 and 7 - Consumption Savings under Uncertainty

Sequence Problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c_t, a_{t+1}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \\ \text{s.t. } c_t + a_{t+1} = Ra_t + y_t \end{aligned}$$

In this case,  $y$  is stochastic and follows a Markov process with a transition matrix  $Q$ .

$$E[f(y')|y] = \int f(y')Q(y, dy')$$

Bellman equation:

$$\begin{aligned} v(a, y) &= \max_{a'} u(Ra + y - a') + \beta E[v(a', y')|y] \\ v(a, y) &= \max_{a'} u(Ra + y - a') + \beta \int v(a', y')Q(y, dy') \end{aligned}$$

**Optimal policy correspondence:** The values of consumption and assets (and other choice vars) such that the bellman holds.

Euler equation:

$$u'(c_t) = \beta RE_t u'(c_{t+1})$$

See lecture 6 notes for dynamics of consumption.

## Lecture 8 - Arrow Debreu

Looking at states of the world at an individual level. Markov state  $s_t$  with a finite transition function  $P(s'|s)$ . A given sequence of states can be defined as  $s^t = \{s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t\}$

$$P(s^t|s_0) = P(s_t|s_{t-1})P(s_{t-1}|s_{t-2})\dots P(s_1|s_0)$$

Preferences (for individual  $i$ ):

$$U^i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} (\beta_i)^t u^i(c_t^i(s^t)) P(s^t|s_0)$$

Budget constraint:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) c_t^i(s^t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) y^i(s^t)$$

Feasible allocation:

$$\sum_{i=1}^I c_t^i(s^t) \leq \sum_{i=1}^I y^i(s^t)$$

See lecture 8 notes for more detail on competitive equilibrium. [See PS3-Q1 for example.](#)

## Lectures 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13 - Asset Pricing

Large number of identical agents, single nonstorable consumption good, given off by productive units. Owners of productive units receive stochastic dividends  $s_t$  with transition function  $Q(s, ds')$ .

Representative agent problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c_t, a_{t+1}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \\ \text{s.t. } c_t + p_t a_{t+1} = (p_t + s_t) a_t \end{aligned}$$

We can conjecture that prices are a function of dividends (and other stochastic shocks):  $p_t = p(s_t)$ .

Bellman:

$$v(a, s) = \max_{a'} u((p(s) + s)a - p(s)a') + \beta \int v(a', s') Q(s, ds')$$

**At the competitive equilibrium, for all  $s$ ,  $v(1, s)$  is attained by  $c = s, a = a' = 1$ .**

Euler equation:

$$u'(c(s)) = \beta \int u'(c(s')) \frac{p(s') + s'}{p(s)} Q(s, ds')$$

For a lucas tree, if  $p_t = p(s_t) \rightarrow R_{t+1} = p_{t+1} + s_{t+1}$ , return on investment (payoff tomorrow / price today). So,

$$u'(c(s)) = \beta E_t[u'(c_{t+1}) R_{t+1}]$$

Then the equilibrium pricing function of the tree is:

$$p(s) = \beta \int \frac{u'(s')(p(s') + s')}{u'(s)} Q(s, ds')$$

**In general, remember  $p = E[mx]$  for individual assets, where  $p = p(s)$  is the price today,  $m = \beta \frac{u'(s')}{u'(s)}$  is the stochastic discount factor, and**

$x = g(s')$  is the payoff tomorrow.

In a Lucas tree, the payoff is  $x = p(s') + s'$ .

A risk free asset is  $p = E[px]$  where  $x = 1$ . In other words  $p = E[m]$ .  
 See PS3-Q2 and 2020 Final Q2 for example.

Multi period claims pricing kernel (lecture 11):

$$q^j(s, s^j) = \int q(s, s') q^{j-1}(s', s^j) ds'$$

Multi period price expression:

$$p_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \frac{u'(s_{t+j})}{u'(s_t)} s_{t+j} \right]$$

Risk neutrality: with linear utility,  $u'(c)$  is constant, so the risk free rate is  $1 = E_t(\beta R) \rightarrow R = 1/\beta$ . Then:

$$\begin{aligned} p_t &= E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \frac{u'(s_{t+j})}{u'(s_t)} s_{t+j} \right] \\ &= E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j s_{t+j} \right] \\ &= E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{s_{t+j}}{R^j} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Risk corrections:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= E \left[ \beta \frac{u'(c')}{u'(c)} R \right] \\ \Rightarrow R &= \frac{1}{E \left[ \beta \frac{u'(c')}{u'(c)} \right]} \\ &= \frac{1}{E_t m_{t+1}} \end{aligned}$$

SPP and CE example in lecture 12 notes

A recursive competitive equilibrium is a pricing function  $p(s)$ , policy functions  $a'(a, s)$ ,  $c(a, s)$ , and a value function  $V(a, s)$  such that

1. Given the pricing function,  $V$  solves their Bellman equation and  $a', c$  maximize  $V$
2. Markets clear:  $a' = 1, c = s$