

# Q1 Macro Study Guide

2020 Entering Cohort\*

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## Overlapping Generations

### Social Planner's Problem

#### Objective function

- Maximize utility function for current old and current young  $(c_t^t, c_t^{t-1})$

$$\max U(c_t^t, c_t^{t-1})$$

#### Constraints

- Sum of consumption across generations = sum of young and old endowments
- Other assets = initial stock + interest

$$c_t^t + c_t^{t-1} = w_1 + w_2$$

#### Other notes

- Planners don't take into account price level, wages, or rental rate of capital
- Planners account for population size in the constraints, but not in the objective function

## Competitive Equilibrium

#### Objective function

- Maximize utility function for one generation while they're young and old  $(c_t^t, c_{t+1}^t)$

$$\max U(c_t^t, c_{t+1}^t)$$

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\*Contributions made by Sarah Bass, (add names here)

### Constraints

- Time  $t$  consumption + assets = time  $t$  endowment \*\*\*adjust for price level at  $t$
- Time  $t+1$  consumption = time  $t+1$  endowment + assets \*\*\*adjust for price level at  $t+1$

$$\begin{aligned}p_t c_t^t + M_{t+1}^t &= p_t w_1 \\ p_{t+1} c_{t+1}^t &= M_{t+1}^t + p_{t+1} w_2\end{aligned}$$

- When  $M_{t+1}^t > 0$ , this can be consolidated into one budget constraint:

$$p_t c_t^t + p_{t+1} c_{t+1}^t = p_t w_1 + p_{t+1} w_2$$

- Introducing lump sum Social Security taxes/payments:

$$p_t c_t^t + p_{t+1} c_{t+1}^t = p_t (w_1 - \tau) + p_{t+1} (w_2 + b)$$

- Solve for steady states by combining HHBC w/ FOC

### Market Clearing

- Competitive equilibrium occurs when agents optimize and markets clear
- Market clearing conditions are basically the constraints from the planner's problem (subscripts must match)
- Population size doesn't factor into constraints, but does factor into MCC
- Use total production for MCC supply = demand
- MCC doesn't take into account price level, wages, or rental rate of capital

$$\begin{aligned}c_t^t + c_t^{t-1} &= w_1 \\ M_{t+1}^t &= \bar{M}\end{aligned}$$

### Welfare Theorems

- **First Welfare Theorem:** Any competitive equilibrium is pareto optimal
- **Second Welfare Theorem:** Any pareto optimal allocation can be achieved by a competitive equilibrium with the right transfers (taxes)
- There are multiple CEs that are all pareto optimal

## Labor Choice

### Social Planner's Problem

- Planner chooses  $\{c, n\}$  to maximize utility of representative agent:

$$\begin{aligned} \max u(c) - g(n) \\ \text{s.t. } c \leq y = f(n) \end{aligned}$$

### Competitive Equilibrium

- Firms are owned by households, so firm profits are returned to households
- Firm Problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max F(n) - wn \\ \rightarrow w = F_n \end{aligned}$$

- Household Problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max u(c) - g(n) \\ \text{s.t. } c = wn + \pi \end{aligned}$$

- Market Clearing:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Labor Market: } n^d &= n^s \\ \text{Goods Market: } c &= f(n) \end{aligned}$$

## Ramsey Problem (With Commitment)

### Timing

- 1) Government chooses tax rate  $\tau$
- 2) Households choose investment

- Households solve for  $x$ , taking  $\tau$  as given.
- Consistency:  $x^r(\tau) = X^r(\tau)$
- Goods markets clear:  $c + g = w + (R - 1)X^r(\tau)$
- Government solves for max of utility given household  $X$ .

## First Solve Social Planner Problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max u(c) \\ \text{s.t. } x + m = w \\ \text{and } c + g = m + Rx \\ \rightarrow \text{Invest in productive technology} \end{aligned}$$

## Second Solve HH Problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max u(c) \\ \text{s.t. } x + m = w \\ \text{and } c = m + (1 - \tau)Rx \end{aligned}$$

- A CE is when HHs solve this problem, the government budget constraint clears, and markets clear.
- If  $(1 - \tau)R > 1$ , same solution as planners problem.
- Laffer curve: Maps out the government tax revenue as a function of tax rate. Peak revenue occurs at  $(1 - \tau)R = 1$ .

## Nash Equilibrium (No Commitment)

### Timing

- 1) Households choose investment
- 2) Government chooses tax rate  $\tau$

- Government solves for  $\tau$ , taking  $X$  as given.
- Households solve for  $x$ , no household makes an impact individually, but they all make the same decision.

### Same social planner as Ramsey

### HH problem

- Households know the government will set tax rate  $\tau = 1$ , so they will not invest at all. No need for math

## Capital-based Model

### Other notes

- write MCC in terms of production function,  $K$ ,  $L$  (show firm side = household side)

## Idiosyncratic Model

- Households are going to be assigned a shock of high or low employment
- **Duong is going to cover this in OH 5/18**

## Other Definitions

- Pareto-Optimal: no one situation can be improved w/o making someone worse off
- Autarkic equilibrium: no trading, no one wants money in the money market