



ePBS design evolution



mike neuder – ethereum foundation
pbs.salon – july 17, 2023

Outline

- Desiderata
- Two-slot PBS
 - ▶ Sketch
 - ▶ Reorgs
- Desiderata pt. II
- Payload
Timeliness-Committee
 - ▶ Sketch
 - ▶ Splitting
- Juxtaposition
 - ▶ Sub-slot mechanics
 - ▶ Builder fork-choice






- *honest builder publication safety*
- *honest builder payment safety*
- *honest proposer safety*
- *permissionlessness*
- *censorship resistance*
- *roadmap compatibility*

Two-slot PBS


Sketch



- Original design from Vitalik in October 2021
- Partition attesting committee over beacon block and intermediate block
- Became the canonical design. What people referred to when they discussed ePBS

Two-slot PBS


Ex-ante reorg



- Malicious proposer splits the honest attesting committee
- Malicious proposer continues the split over a second slot
- Honest proposer builds on the empty chain
- Malicious proposer releases private attestations, orphaning HB1

Two-slot PBS


Reorgs



- Malicious proposer still controls two slots, but not enough attestations to beat proposer boost
- No ex-ante reorg possible in this case

Two-slot PBS


Reorgs



- Same allocation as before
- The ex-ante reorg *is possible* because the proposer boost is weaker

Two-slot PBS

Reorg probabilities



- Just ex-ante reorg probabilities, lower bound on all reorgs
- *Conclusion* – significantly weakens the protocol against reorgs

Desiderata

Part II


A total of 211,902 forked blocks found

Height	Age	Txn	Uncles
17710885	20 mins ago	105	0
17710773	43 mins ago	164	0
17710754	47 mins ago	157	0
17710630	1 hr 12 mins ago	113	0

- Replace *honest builder publication safety*
- With *honest builder same-slot publication safety*
- This is pretty much the model today with mev-boost
- Low-Carb Crusader was so effective because it was a *same-slot* unbundling


Payload-Timeliness Committee

Sketch



Payload-Timeliness Committee


Sketch



- Consensus-layer block is produced *without* any transactions
- Consensus-layer attestations remain the same
- Builder reveals the payload (list of transactions)
- Payload-Timeliness Committee votes on if the payload was published

Payload-Timeliness Committee


Case 1



- PTC is split
- Boost gives N+1 sufficient weight to win the fork

Payload-Timeliness Committee


Case 2



- PTC is in agreement
- N+1 proposer differs, and gets orphaned as a result


Payload-Timeliness Committee

Case 3



- PTC is split
- Results in a tie (worst case)
- Hard to get the proposer to disagree with that much of the PTC

Proposer initiated splitting



- Proposer can grief the builder into a bad decision
 - ▶ Publish and run the risk of your block not becoming canonical
 - ▶ Do not publish and run the risk of paying for nothing
- ... but this is worse today in mev-boost

Juxtaposition

How do these all relate?

- Sub-slot mechanics
 - ▶ Smaller PTC avoids the need for aggregation but weakens the security model slightly
 - ▶ Pipeline next block header publishing
 - ▶ Care needed to avoid giving too much power to the current builder
- Builder fork-choice
 - ▶ Two-slot gives full "proposer-like" privileges to the builder
 - ▶ PTC gives "slot-bounded" fork-choice weight, and is only used to differentiate between empty and full blocks
- PEPC
 - ▶ Gives block-validity enforcement guarantees for the builder
 - ▶ Builder still needs some protection from equivocation