Executive Summary

This summary reports on the findings that came from a pentest conducted on the ACME box located within the Netlabs Virtual Machine. Testing on the ACME machine began on 11/28/2022 and was terminated on 12/5/2022. Tests were conducted against the security controls that are currently in place on the machine. Methods used for testing follow the standard testing protocol for a black box machine-no information was provided to the tester. Testing was done in a safe manner (in an offline environment) that did not put any employees or data at risk.

The findings from the report place the system in high severity of risk. Exploitations on the system were found that could cause elevated privileges, loss of data, or system being halted. A main issue found was access to the database or framework which houses the information and structure of data on the system. Login info, credentials, and emails sent to the system were uncovered with basic reconnaissance techniques. Access into critical servers was also another outcome of the penetration test. The implications of these found vulnerabilities is that attackers will be able to infiltrate the system and elevate their access to obtain access to unauthorized data with the ability to modify it. All tests were done within the scope of the Netlabs Ubuntu Environment. Immediate action is recommended for the remediation and repair of access controls in the environment. Suggestions and best practices to follow for securing the machine will be discussed at the end of this report. Below, the findings will be explained in greater detail.

Initial Recon Findings and Intel Gathering

Using nmap to find open ports, versions, os versions, and script data.

The first step in this pentest was gathering data on what ports and services are open and vulnerable to get a better understanding of steps and strategies for the rest of the test. *Nmap -O 192.168.122.7* was used to find the open ports of the acme box. The findings are shown below.


```
File Actions Edit View Help

-$ nmap -0 192.168.122.7
TCP/IP fingerprinting (for OS scan) requires root privileges.
QUITTING:

(kali@ kali2022)-[~/Desktop]
-$ sudo nmap -0 192.168.122.7
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-11-30 13:44 CST
Nmap scan report for acme (192.168.122.7)
Host is up (0.000138 latency).
Not shown: 990 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
22/tcp open smtp
80/tcp open mtp
80/tcp open http
110/tcp open pop3
111/tcp open pop3
111/tcp open nebios-ssn
143/tcp open netios-ssn
143/tcp open microsoft-ds
2049/tcp open mfs
MAC Address: 52:54:00:EA:FB:BC (QEMU virtual NIC)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 3.14.x
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4
OS details: Linux 3.2 - 4.9
Network Distance: 1 hop

OS detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.
```

Next, command *nmap -sV 192.168.122.7* was used to get a deeper look into what versions the servers are running on the open ports from above. This data is a crucial step in setting up what ports will be tested for vulnerabilities in the coming tests. The finding of this command is listed below.



Valuable information that can be taken away from the data above the versions of each of those services as well as the OS type: Linux.

Nmap -sC 192.168.122.7 was used to run the basic set of scripts and find anything important that stands out. Anonymous login is allowed which is a little flag and allows remote users to gain info on the system. The ssh hostkeys are also found but are not yet useful for anything yet. The results of the scan are below.

```
kali@kali2022: ~/Desktop
 File Actions Edit View Help
(kali⊕ kali2022)-[~/Desktop]
*** sudo mmap -sC 192.168.122.7

Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-11-30 13:56 CST Nmap scan report for acme (192.168.122.7)

Host is up (0.00025s latency).
Not shown: 990 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
  ftp-syst:
         Connected to 192.168.122.44
          Logged in as ftp
         No session bandwidth limit
Session timeout in seconds is 300
         Control connection is plain text
Data connections will be plain text
At session startup, client count was 3
          vsFTPd 3.0.3 - secure, fast, stable
 _End of status
  _ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
22/tcp open ssh
  2048 03:ff:1c:d9:5f:2b:5c:ee:9f:e7:8c:45:08:d4:50:11 (RSA)
     256 05:b8:84:4c:1b:82:c9:d2:c3:c9:74:34:b1:fd:aa:c8 (ECDSA)
256 cc:cf:9b:eb:6c:68:80:56:78:e2:e3:f7:bd:f9:21:0c (ED25519)
|_smtp-commands: acme.localdomain.local, PIPELINING, SIZE 10240000, VRFY, ETRN, ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES, 8BITMIME, DSN, SMTPUTF8
```

After gathering that information, I decided I would begin with the ftp port and work my way down till I could get everything from the other valuable ports: ssh, http, netbios, smb, and nfs.


Testing Outcomes

(Highest risk)

Access into ftp server method 2: Using legion tool


Access into the fpt server was found through running a hardmode legion scan on the IP 192.168.122.7 (ACME BOX)

Legion was able to obtain the ftp username: anonymous and password: anonymous from the integrated password brute force hydra.



Access of ftp server method 1: nmap scans and nmap scripts

Another method that granted me ftp server access was through running nmap scripts. I went through the series of nmap scripts located at usr/share/nmap/ and that contained the string ftp. After running the ftp bruteforce script I was able to obtain the login credentials. Username: user and Password: user. This output can be seen below.




The next step after finding this was to log into the ftp server. I used the following commands ftp->open->192.168.122.7->dir->. This led me to find a Mail file as well as a login for the database. Database name:my_wiki and password: password. **This find signifies that the ftp server is vulnerable and able to be accessed to find sensitive data.** In this case I was able to find the credentials for the login which will be used later. This is a high risk vulnerability because of the access it gives to the database on the server.

```
~/Desktop/LocalSettings.php - Mousepad
                                                                          File Edit Search View Document Help
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       CB.
                                          Ů
                                                Q &
                                                                               83
                           Þ
                              ¢
                                  × 🗅
44 $wgEnableEmail = true;
45 $wgEnableUserEmail = true; # UPO
46
47 \sqEmergencyContact = "apache@acme.localdomain.local";
48 $wgPasswordSender = "apache@acme.localdomain.local";
49
50 $wgEnotifUserTalk = false; # UPO
     gEnotifWatchlist = false; # UPO
51 $
52 $wgEmailAuthentication = true;
53
54 ## Database settings
55 $wgDBtype = "mysql";
56 $wgDBserver = "localhost";
56 $V
      DBname = "my_wiki";
57
58 $wgDBuser = "mediawiki";
59 $wgDBpassword = "password";
60
61 # MySQL specific settings
62 $wgDBprefix = "";
63
64 # MySQL table options to use during installation or update
65 $wgDBTableOptions = "ENGINE=InnoDB, DEFAULT CHARSET=binary";
```

PHP login credential from files on ftp server

Finding and logging into the php server

Because the http server is open, the next test was on the http port. I used the tool *dirbuster* to find any web applications that could be linked to the acme server. I ran dirbuster on the http://192.168.122.7:80 domain to find if there are any pages that can be accessed.




Dirbuster output

The result of this test was ability to find php versions which is a low to mild threat because by knowing the version, attackers can access a vulnerability for that version and gain access through it. I was also able to find the pages that I can access (ones with a response message of 200). I then navigated to http://192.168.122.7/phpmyadmin which led to me the php login page.

Unauthorized access into php login and database access (severe risk)

From the credential found above in the ftp server files, I used the login *username: my_wiki* password: password to access the database. This is considered a vulnerability because of the ability to see the rest of the users and edit user access. The image below shows the ability for attackers to remove or add users as they like.




In the database the following sensitive data was found (No application of this data thus far):


- Username:41646d696e
- password : hashed password
 pbkdf2:sha512:30000:64:iHkfLaJBXzORWfwf3mH1Ww==:aKlrjsPW2uxVtVyMCwD04
 qIFAANBHi4R440wGKrmG6zl1gSFfzentBM7Uw/GnpN8Sg+WQMAJqWrJDnPDLc4AC
 g==

SSH and SMB client login

The next avenue that was tested was the ssh login. First metasploit was used to scan for all possible usernames that can be used for ssh login the result found over 50 logins shown below. This was done using the username enumeration scanner. From this valid usernames such as admin, root, tech, guest, and user were found



The next step after was trying to find the password for the login. Because I already knew the ssh version from the initial recon: OpenSSH 7.2p2 I ran metasploit to find ssh exploits. Most of them applied to other versions but I was able to run a couple shown below.



SSH exploits

None of these exploits resulted in any keys so I decided to move onto testing ports 139 and 445 SMB clients.

The first step taken was finding the SMB version by running an nmap script for port 445 and 139 the result of this scan were possible version of the SMB client for both ports and are shown below:

```
kali@kali2022:/usr/share/nmap/scripts

File Actions Edit View Help

Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-12-05 19:31 CST
Nmap scan report for acme (192.168.122.7)
Host is up (0.00024s latency).

PORT STATE SERVICE
445/tcp open microsoft-ds

Host script results:
| smb-protocols:
| dialects:
| NT LM 0.12 (SMBv1) [dangerous, but default]
| 2.0.2
| 2.1
| 3.0
| 3.0.2
| 3.1
```

msf6 auxiliary(se

The potential username for the SMB client was found using the metasploit scanner for enumerating smb users. The result was finding a user: ACME with a password length of at least

```
5 characters:

msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_enumusers) > set rhosts 192.168.122.7
rhosts ⇒ 192.168.122.7
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_enumusers) > exploit


[+] 192.168.122.7:139 - ACME [ ] ( LockoutTries=0 PasswordMin=5 )
[*] 192.168.122.7: - Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
```

[*] Auxiliary module execution completed

This finding could have been used more extensively to try to obtain the SMB login.

Additional finds:

• Emails in ftp server



Final Summary

This report shed light on the vulnerabilities and ways that attackers might try to breach the system. Implications of breaches were outlined with possible data loss, access control, or loss of server functionality that can come from these vulnerabilities.

To remediate these issues the fpt server can be strengthened using an encrypted ftp server or FTPS. To secure the database and access into the php server, the php version should be updated constantly and sanitization should be used in the login to prevent sql injection. Cross site scripting should also be mitigate by not allowing remote code execution