

Teeny-Tiny Multivariate Polynomial Public Key (MPPK)

Work in Progress

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```
clear;
```

Reference:

Randy Kuang, Michel Barbeau and Maria Perepechaenko, A New Quantum Safe Multivariate Public-key Cryptosystem Over Large Prime Galois Fields, October 2021.

Security Parameters

```
% Galois Field characteristic
p = 7;
% number of noise variables
m = 2;
% degree of base polynomial
n = 2;
```

Key Pair Construction

Base Polynomial $f(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_m)$

```
% degree of multiplier polynomials
lambda = 1; % linear
% upper limits
ell = [ 1 1 ];
% randomly generate coefficients for f()
c = randi([0 p-1], n+1, ell(1)+1, ell(2)+1);
```

$c_{000}, c_{001}, c_{010}$ and c_{011}

```
disp([c(1,1,1) c(1,1,2) c(1,2,1) c(1,2,2)]);
      4      3      6      5
```

$c_{100}, c_{101}, c_{110}$ and c_{011}

```
disp([c(2,1,1) c(2,1,2) c(2,2,1) c(2,2,2)]);
      0      6      6      5
```

$c_{200}, c_{201}, c_{210}$ and c_{211}

```
disp([c(3,1,1) c(3,1,2) c(3,2,1) c(3,2,2)]);
      0      1      0      4
```

Multiplier polynomials $g(x_0)$ and $h(x_0)$

```
% randomly generate coefficients of g()
g = randi([0 p-1], 1, lambda+1);
```

g_0 and g_1

```
disp(g)
```

0 2

```
% randomly generate coefficients of h()
h = randi([0 p-1], 1, lambda+1);
```

h_0 and h_1

```
disp(h)
```

6 4

Product polynomials $\phi(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_m)$ and $\psi(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_m)$

```
% init \phi to zeros
phi = zeros(n+lambda+1, ell(1)+1, ell(2)+1);
for i=0:n+lambda
    % \phi(i)
    for j=(i-lambda):i
        if j>=0 && j<=n
            phi(i+1, :, :) = phi(i+1, :, :) + c(j+1, :, :).*g((i-j)+1);
        end
    end
end
phi = mod(phi, p);
```

$\phi_{000}, \phi_{001}, \phi_{010}$ and ϕ_{011}

```
disp([phi(1,1,1) phi(1,1,2) phi(1,2,1) phi(1,2,2)]);
```

0 0 0 0

$\phi_{100}, \phi_{101}, \phi_{110}$ and ϕ_{111}

```
disp([phi(2,1,1) phi(2,1,2) phi(2,2,1) phi(2,2,2)]);
```

1 6 5 3

$\phi_{200}, \phi_{201}, \phi_{210}$ and ϕ_{211}

```
disp([phi(3,1,1) phi(3,1,2) phi(3,2,1) phi(3,2,2)]);
```

0 5 5 3

$\phi_{300}, \phi_{301}, \phi_{310}$ and ϕ_{311}

```
disp([phi(4,1,1) phi(4,1,2) phi(4,2,1) phi(4,2,2)]);
```

0 2 0 1

```
% init \psi to zeros
psi = zeros(n+lambda+1, ell(1)+1, ell(2)+1);
for i=0:n+lambda
    % \psi(i)
    for j=(i-lambda):i
        if j>=0 && j<=n
            psi(i+1, :, :) = psi(i+1, :, :) + c(j+1, :, :).*h((i-j)+1);
        end
    end
end
% \psi(n+lambda)
psi = mod(psi,p);
```

$\psi_{000}, \psi_{001}, \psi_{010}$ and ψ_{011}

```
disp([psi(1,1,1) psi(1,1,2) psi(1,2,1) psi(1,2,2)]);
```

3 4 1 2

$\psi_{100}, \psi_{101}, \psi_{110}$ and ψ_{111}

```
disp([psi(2,1,1) psi(2,1,2) psi(2,2,1) psi(2,2,2)]);
```

2 6 4 1

$\psi_{200}, \psi_{201}, \psi_{210}$ and ψ_{211}

```
disp([psi(3,1,1) psi(3,1,2) psi(3,2,1) psi(3,2,2)]);
```

0 2 3 2

$\psi_{300}, \psi_{301}, \psi_{310}$ and ψ_{311}

```
disp([psi(4,1,1) psi(4,1,2) psi(4,2,1) psi(4,2,2)]);
```

0 4 0 2

Private key $g(x_0)$, $h(x_0)$, R_0 , and R_n

```
R0 = randi([1 p-1],1);
Rn = randi([1 p-1],1);
```

Public key $N_0(x_1, \dots, x_m)$ and $N_n(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_m)$

```
N0 = R0 * [c(1,1,1) c(1,1,2) c(1,2,1) c(1,2,2)];
Nn = Rn * [c(n+1,1,1) c(n+1,1,2) c(n+1,2,1) c(n+1,2,2)];
```

Encryption

Random secret s

```
s = randi([0 p-1],1);
```

Noise variables v_1, \dots, v_m

```
v = randi([0 p-1],1,m);
```

Evaluate $\Phi = \Phi(s, v_1, \dots, v_m)$, $\Psi = \Psi(s, v_1, \dots, v_m)$ and $N = N(v_1, \dots, v_m)$

```
Phi = 0;
Psi = 0;
for i=1:n+lambda-1
    for j1=0:ell(1)
        for j2=0:ell(2)
            Phi = Phi + phi(i+1,j1+1,j2+1)*v(1)^j1*v(2)^j2*s^i;
            Psi = Psi + psi(i+1,j1+1,j2+1)*v(1)^j1*v(2)^j2*s^i;
        end
    end
end
Phi = mod(Phi,p);
Psi = mod(Psi,p);
% noise
N0value = 0;
Nnvalue = 0;
for j1=0:ell(1)
    for j2=0:ell(2)
        N0value = N0value + N0(1,2*j1+j2+1)*v(1)^j1*v(2)^j2;
        Nnvalue = Nnvalue + Nn(1,2*j1+j2+1)*v(1)^j1*v(2)^j2;
    end
end
N0value = mod(N0value,p);
Nnvalue = mod(Nnvalue*s^(n+lambda),p);
%disp(Phi)
%disp(Psi)
%disp(N)
```

Decryption

Evaluate $\phi(s, v_1, \dots, v_m)$ and $\psi(s, v_1, \dots, v_m)$

```
phiEval = mod(g(1) * modinv(R0,p) * N0value + Phi + g(lambda+1) * modinv(Rn,p) * Nnvalue,p);
psiEval = mod(h(1) * modinv(R0,p) * N0value + Psi + h(lambda+1) * modinv(Rn,p) * Nnvalue,p);
if ~psiEval
    fprintf('*** Variable psiEval is null\n')
    return;
end
k = mod(phiEval * modinv(psiEval,p), p);

if ~mod(g(2) - k*h(2),p)
    fprintf('*** Denominator g(2) - k*h(2) is null\n')
    return;
end
```

```
news = (k*h(1) - g(1)) * modinv(g(2) - k*h(2), p);
fprintf('Secret is %d, Decrypted value is %d\n', s, mod(news, p));
```

Secret is 1, Decrypted value is 1

Calculation of Modular Multiplicative Inverse

Let x be an element of $GF(p)$, its multiplicative inverse x_{inv} mod p is such that $\text{mod}(x \cdot x_{inv}, p) == 1$.

```
function xinv = modinv(x,p)
%% modinv: multiplicative modular inverse of X, mod p
% usage: y = modinv(x,p)
%
% arguments: (input)
% x - integer(s) to compute the modular inverse in the field of integers
%       for some modular base b.
%
%       x may be scalar, vector or array
% p - integer modulus. SCALAR only.
%       When p is not a prime number, then some numbers will not have a
%       multiplicative inverse.
%
% arguments: (output)
% xinv - an array of the same size and shape as X, such that
%       mod(x.*xinv,p) == 1
%
%       In those cases where x does not have a multiplicative inverse in the
%       field of integers modulo p, then xinv will be returned as a NaN.
%
% Examples:
% % In the field of integers modulo 12, only 1,5,7, and 11 have a
% % multiplicative inverse. As it turns out, they are all their own inverses.
%
% xinv = modinv(0:11,12)
% xinv =
%   NaN   1   NaN   NaN   NaN     5   NaN     7   NaN   NaN   NaN    11
%
% % In the field generated by modular base 7 (which is prime) only 0 will
% % lack a modular multiplicative inverse.
%
% xinv = modinv(0:6,7)
% xinv =
%   NaN     1     4     5     2     3     6
%
% % Works for large (symbolic) integers.
%
% p = sym('12434354343545235345253')
% p =
% 12434354343545235345253
%
% modinv(2,p)
% ans =
% 6217177171772617672627
```

```

% See also: gcd, sqrtmodp
%
% Author: John D'Errico
% Creation date: 1/2/2020
    if numel(p) ~= 1
        error('p must be a scalar')
    end
    % pre-allocate xinv as NaN in case some elements of x have no inverse
    xinv = NaN(size(x));
    % if p is symbolic, then Xinv should also be symbolic.
    if isa(p, 'sym')
        xinv = sym(xinv);
    end
    % all the hard work will be done by gcd.
    [G,C] = gcd(x,p);
    % if G is not equal to 1, then no solution exists.
    k = G == 1;
    xinv(k) = mod(C(k),p);
end

```