Milestone 6

Michelle Gao April 3, 2020

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
0.1 Paper

Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs 1

0.2 Overview

0.3 Appendix

Figure 1: Technology Entrepreneurs' Wealth Is Growing, and They Increasingly Contribute It to Democrats



 $^{^1\}mathrm{All}$ analysis for this paper is available at
 https://github.com/michgao87/gov1006-milestone6

Figure 2: Democratic Donors' Forecasts of Groups
That Will Gain and Lose Influence in the Party






Figure 3: Self-Reported Respondent Characteristics: Technology Entrepreneur Survey





Liberalism on Social Issues Support for Globalism 0.6 0.75 0.4 0.50 0.2 0.25 DemocraticRepublicansRepublican Technology Donors (Mass Donors Entrepreneurs Sample) DemocraticRepublicansRepublican Technology Donors (Mass Donors Entrepreneurs Sample) Democrats (Mass Sample) Democrats (Mass College-Educated General Public College-Educated Liberalism Sample) Democrats Democrats (Mass Support for Redistribution Support for Regulation 0.6 0.75 0.4 0.50 0.2 0.25 0.00 College-Educated Democrats (Mass College- DemocraticRepublicansRepublican Technology DemocraticRepublicansRepublican Technology Democrats General Public Democrats Educated Donors (Mass Donors (Mass Sample) Democrats (Mass Sample)

Figure 4: Average of Policy Indices by Area

Table 2: Technology Entrepreneurs Do Not Agree with Libertarian Philosophy


	Survey Respondents				
	Tech	Dem Donor	Rep Donor	Dem Public	Rep Public
Agree with Libertarian Philosophy	22.4%	5.1%	68.4%	43.8%	62.5%

Note: Data are from our technology entrepreneur donor, and mass public surveys. The surveys asked whether individuals agreed or disagreed with the statement "I would like to live in a society where government does nothing except provide national defense and police protection, so that people could be left alone to earn whatever they could." This question wording is from Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013). Cell probabilities above give the percent of respondents who either somewhat or strongly agreed.


Table 3: Technology Entrepreneurs Uniquely Support Redistribution But Oppose Regulation

	Tech	Dem Donors	Rep Donors	Dem (Public)	Rep (Public)	Millionaires (Public)
Do Reg, Do Redist	17.9%	62.6%	2.8%	53.8%	28.8%	31.8%
Don't Reg, Do Redist	60.1%	34.7%	20.9%	36.3%	34.5%	30.3%
Do Reg, Don't Redist	2.8%	1.2%	1.6%	6.0%	9.3%	9.1%
Don't Reg, Don't Redist	19.3%	1.5%	74.7%	3.9%	27.4%	28.8%

Figure 5: Technology Entrepreneurs' Distinctive Set of Economic Views



Note: Each point shows the mean of each sample's scores on the redistribution and regulation scales on the x-s y-axes, respectively. The blue line shows the line of best fit for samples other than the technology sample.








Figure 7: Uber versus Florists Survey Experiment

Uber Surge Pricing Fair



Florists' Raising Prices on Holidays Fair



```
## Warning: attributes are not identical across measure variables;
## they will be dropped
##
## Call:
## lm(formula = value ~ tech * tech_policy, data = survey)
## Residuals:
                1Q Median
                                30
                                      Max
## -0.6965 -0.5069 -0.2004 0.3035
                                  1.4931
##
## Coefficients:
##
                   Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept)
                   0.200420
                               0.007526 26.631 < 2e-16 ***
## tech
                   0.082599
                               0.016446
                                         5.023 5.17e-07 ***
## tech_policy
                    1.306479
                               0.010644 122.746 < 2e-16 ***
## tech:tech_policy 0.107038
                               0.023247
                                          4.604 4.18e-06 ***
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Residual standard error: 0.5323 on 12652 degrees of freedom
     (1288 observations deleted due to missingness)
## Multiple R-squared: 0.6111, Adjusted R-squared: 0.611
## F-statistic: 6628 on 3 and 12652 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
```

Table 5: Technology Entrepreneurs More Likely to Oppose Regulation of Technology, and Less Likely to Oppose of Other Industries, But So Are Other Democrats

	DV = "Government regulation of [CATEGORY] does more harm than good." (1–4 scale)			
	Technology Entrepreneurs	Democratic Donors	Democratic Partisans	All Three Groups
Treatments "the technology industry"	0.28** (0.11)	0.46*** (0.07)	0.19** (0.09)	0.28** (0.11)
"the financial industry	,	,	,	,
(such as banks)"	-0.50***	-0.32***	-0.20**	-0.50***
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.12)
"the pharmaceutical industry"	-0.37***	-0.08	-0.10	-0.37^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Sample Dummies (Technology				
Entrepeneurs = Base Category)				
Democratic Donors				-0.94***
				(0.10)
Democrats (Mass Public)				-0.03
				(0.10)
Treatment x Sample Interactions				
Technology \times Democratic Donors				0.18
				(0.14)
Technology \times Democrats (Mass Public)				-0.09
				(0.14)
Finance \times Democratic Donors				0.19
				(0.14)
Finance \times Democrats (Mass Public)				0.30^{**}
				(0.14)
Pharmaceuticals \times Democratic Donors				0.29^{**}
				(0.14)
Pharmaceuticals \times Democrats (Mass Public)				0.27^{*}
				(0.14)
Constant (Base Category $=$ Tech.				
Entrepeneurs' Responses				
When No Industry Is Specified)	2.61***	1.67^{***}	2.58***	2.61^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Observations	439	846	817	2,102
\mathbb{R}^2	0.13	0.12	0.02	0.25

Standard errors are in parentheses.

***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 (two-tailed).

Note:

Table 6: Technology Entrepreneurs No More Likely to Oppose Regulating Technology Products Than Democratic Groups

	DV = "Opposition to regulation of particular products and services" (0-1 scale)
Technology Elites	0.083^{***}
	(0.016)
Tech Product/Service	1.306***
,	(0.011)
Technology Elites x	,
Tech Product/Service	0.107^{***}
,	(0.023)
Constant (Base Category =	,
Democratic Samples)	0.200^{***}
1 /	(0.008)
Observations	12,656
R^2	0.611

Data are stacked at the respondent-by-product/service level. Only technology elites, Democratic donors, and Democratic partisans in the public are included in this regression. Robust standard errors are clustered by respondent in parentheses

**p < .01, *p < .05 (two-tailed).

Note:

Table 7: Relative to Democrats, Technology Entrepreneurs Prefer Private- to Public-Sector Management Generally

	Approval of Privately Run Programs (1–5) Minus Approval of Govt-Run Social Programs (1–5)	Govt Does Good Job Running Social Programs (1–4)	Entrepreneurs Get Too Much Credit (1–4)
Dem. Donors	-1.73***	0.64***	0.43***
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Dem. (Mass Public)	-0.62^{***}	0.17***	0.76***
,	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Rep. Donors	1.16****	-0.89^{***}	-0.06
_	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Rep. (Mass Public)	-0.05	-0.15^{***}	0.76***
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.44***	2.19***	2.20***
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	$2,95\overset{\circ}{2}$	2,940	3,069
\mathbb{R}^2	0.22	0.21	0.13

Standard errors are in parentheses.

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 (two-tailed).

Figure 8: Comparing Democrats, Technology Entrepreneurs, and Undergraduates: Policy Views

