Online Appendix for "Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entreprenerus"

A Other Figures and Tables Referenced In Main Text

Figure OA1: Funding raised by companies founded by sampling frame and by respondents.

(a) Missing Data Dropped



(b) Missing Data Recoded to Zero



Figure OA2: Amount donated by partisan donor survey respondents and by entire sampling frame.



Figure OA3: Technology Entrepreneurs Welcome the Decline of Labor Unions' Influence



B Marginals on Every Item

Figure OA4: Globalism Item Marginals

Figure OA5: Redistribution Item Marginals

Increase federal spending on the poor.



Support programs benefiting only poorest Americans.



Increase taxes on those making >$250k per year.



Increase taxes on those making >$1MM per year.



Support for universal healthcare, even if means raising taxes.



Figure OA6: Social Issues Item Marginals

Figure OA7: Regulation Item Marginals

(a)

(b)


Regulations on drones should...
Democrats (Mass Sample)
College−Ed. Dems (Mass Sample)
Democratic Donors
Republicans (Mass Sample)
Republican Donors
Technology Entrepreneurs
60%
40%
20%
0%
Increase
Stay the same
Decrease
Regulations on self−driving cars should...
Democrats (Mass Sample)
College−Ed. Dems (Mass Sample)
Democratic Donors
Republicans (Mass Sample)
Republican Donors
Technology Entrepreneurs
60%
40%
20%
0%
Increase
Stay the same
Decrease
Regulatons on how internet companies store data should...
Democrats (Mass Sample)
College−Ed. Dems (Mass Sample)
Democratic Donors
Republicans (Mass Sample)
Republican Donors
Technology Entrepreneurs
60%
40%
20%
0%
Increase
Stay the same
Decrease

Table OA1: Comparing Undergraduates with Technology Entrepreneurs and Democrats – Policy Indicies

	Social Index	Globalism Index	Redistribution Index	Opposition to Regulation Index
Democratic Donors	0.08***	-0.01	0.13***	-0.29***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College-Educated	-0.13***	-0.14***	0.03	-0.26***
Democrats	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Biology Majors	0.03	0.05	0.09***	-0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Comp. Sci. Majors	0.04**	0.07***	0.05**	-0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant (Base Category =	0.83***	0.62***	0.78***	0.60***
Tech. Entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,656	1,656	1,684	1,755
R-squared	0.12	0.05	0.11	0.29

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

Table OA2: Computer Science Majors Also Support Redistribution but Oppose Regulation

	Do Regulate and Do Redistribute	**Don't Regulate and Do Redistribute**	Don't Regulate and Don't Redistribute	Do Regulate and Don't Redistribute	Do Regulate
Democratic	0.45***	-0.25***	-0.18***	-0.02	0.43***
Donors	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
College-Educated	0.40***	-0.26***	-0.16***	0.02	0.42***
Democrats	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Biology	0.34***	-0.21**	-0.13***	0.00	0.34***
Majors	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Comp. Sci.	0.17***	-0.03	-0.13***	-0.01	0.16***
Majors	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Constant (Base	0.18***	0.60***	0.19***	0.03**	0.21***
Category = Tech.	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Entrepreneurs)					
Observations	1,604	1,604	1,604	1,604	1,604
R-squared	0.14	0.05	0.08	0.01	0.13

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

C Regression Tables

C.1 Formal Tests of Hypotheses

We present two sets of regressions of each area, in accordance with our pre-analysis plan, so that we can compare technology entrepreneurs with both citizens within each party and citizens within each party who are educated. This helps establish that technology entrepreneurs' views are not epiphenominal to their high educational attainment.

In all regressions, the base category is technology entrepreneurs. This means the constant can be interpreted as the mean for technology entrepreneurs and the other coefficients can be interpreted as the differences between technology entrepreneurs and other groups.

For the regressions, the variables are coded such that we hypothesize the technology entrepreneurs have more positive values. For the policy scales, this means that larger values on the regulation scale correspond to more conservative beliefs but that larger values on the redistribution, globalism, and social issues scales correspond with more liberal beliefs.

Table OA3: Formal Test of Differences in Policy Preferences Across Groups

(a) Separating Mass Public by Party

	Opposition to Regulation	Support for Redistribution	Globalism	Liberalism on Social Issues
Democratic Donors	-0.29***	0.13***	-0.01	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican Donors	0.05**	-0.30***	-0.30***	-0.51***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democratic Citizens	-0.24***	0.02	-0.17***	-0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican Citizens	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.34***	-0.48***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Independent Citizens	-0.19***	-0.09***	-0.25***	-0.32***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant (Base Category =	0.60***	0.78***	0.62***	0.83***
Technology Entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	3,193	3,083	3,049	3,042
R-squared	0.25	0.35	0.27	0.53

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

(b) Separating Mass Public by Party and Education

	Opposition to Regulation	Support for Redistribution	Globalism	Liberalism on Social Issues
Democratic Donors	-0.29***	0.13***	-0.01	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican Donors	0.05**	-0.30***	-0.30***	-0.51***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College-Educated Democratic Citizens	-0.26***	0.03	-0.14***	-0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College-Educated Republican Citizens	-0.12***	-0.17***	-0.29***	-0.44***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College-Educated Independent Citizens	-0.23***	-0.14**	-0.26***	-0.30***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
No College Democratic Citizens	-0.24***	0.01	-0.18***	-0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
No College Republican Citizens	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.36***	-0.49***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
No College Independent Citizens	-0.19***	-0.06*	-0.26***	-0.34***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant (Base Category =	0.60***	0.78***	0.62***	0.83***
Technology Entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	3,080	3,005	2,978	2,979
R-squared	0.26	0.35	0.28	0.54

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

Table OA4: Formal Test of Differences In Predispositions and Values Across Groups

(a) Separating Mass Public by Party

	Value of Entepreneurs	Racial Resentment (Reverse Coded)	Cosmopolitanism	Authoritarianism
Democratic Donors	-0.14***	0.12***	0.08***	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Republican Donors	0.02	-0.35***	-0.01	-0.28***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democratic Citizens	-0.25***	-0.11***	-0.22***	-0.40***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican Citizens	-0.25***	-0.38***	-0.27***	-0.50***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent Citizens	-0.22***	-0.23***	-0.28***	-0.46***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant (Base Category =	0.60***	0.72***	0.59***	0.88***
Technology Entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	3,139	2,991	3,382	3,018
R-squared	0.13	0.39	0.19	0.35

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

(b) Separating Mass Public by Party and Education

	Value of Entepreneurs	Racial Resentment (Reverse Coded)	Cosmopolitanism	Authoritarianism
Democratic Donors	-0.14***	0.12***	0.08***	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Republican Donors	0.02	-0.35***	-0.01	-0.28***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College-Educated Democratic Citizens	-0.20***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.31***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College-Educated Republican Citizens	-0.21***	-0.37***	-0.14***	-0.49***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College-Educated Independent Citizens	-0.25***	-0.28***	-0.11*	-0.34***
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
No College Democratic Citizens	-0.27***	-0.12***	-0.24***	-0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
No College Republican Citizens	-0.28***	-0.39***	-0.30***	-0.51***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
No College Independent Citizens	-0.23***	-0.21***	-0.34***	-0.50***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Constant (Base Category =	0.60***	0.72***	0.59***	0.88***
Technology Entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	3,034	2,933	3,244	2,955
R-squared	0.14	0.39	0.20	0.35

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

C.2 Relationships Between Predispositions and Policy Preferences Among the Mass Public

Table OA5: Replication of Relationships Between Policy Preferences and Predispositions Documented in Other Studies — Mass Public Only

	Support for Redistribution	Globalism	Liberalism on Social Issues	Opposition to Regulation
Racial Resentment	0.10***			
	(0.02)			
Cosmopolitanism		0.25***		
		(0.02)		
Authoritarianism			0.26***	
			(0.03)	
Value of Entrepreneurship				0.25***
				(0.02)
Constant	0.37***	0.59***	0.28***	0.40***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,602	1,552	1,567	1,558
R-squared	0.02	0.14	0.06	0.09

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

C.3 Weighted Regressions

We constructed weights for all three of our main samples using entropy balancing with the `ebalance` package in Stata (Hainmueller (2012)), weighting on all the variables listed for each sample (in particular, all the variables available in the sampling frames given in Tables OA10, OA11, and OA12). For the mass public sample, we weighted to the 2015 American Community Survey except for race and ethnicity, where we used the 2016 ANES because the ACS race and ethnicity questions do not separate non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics in the same way as our surveys. The other two samples weighted to their sampling frames.

Table OA6: Attitudes Towards Markets and Entrepreneurs Predict Opposition to Regulation Among the Mass Public

	Dependent Variable = Opposition to Regulation (0-1)		
Preferences for Private	0.21***		
Sector to Deliver Services (0-1)	(0.03)		
Government Does Good Job		-0.12***	
Running Social Programs (0-1)		(0.02)	
Entrepreneurs Get			-0.10***
Too Much Credit (0-1)			(0.02)
Constant	0.29***	0.93***	0.89***
	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Observations	1,560	1,554	1,602
R-squared	0.04	0.03	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

Table OA7 shows a weighted version of the regressions in Table OA3. We find that the results are nearly identical in the presence of these weights.

Table OA7: Formal Test of Differences in Policy Preferences Across Groups - Weighted Regressions

(a) Separating Mass Public by Party

	Opposition to Regulation	Support for Redistribution	Globalism	Liberalism on Social Issues
Democratic Donors	-0.28***	0.13***	0.03	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Republican Donors	0.07*	-0.44***	-0.27***	-0.49***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Democratic Citizens	-0.24***	0.02	-0.15***	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican Citizens	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.33***	-0.49***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent Citizens	-0.18***	-0.09**	-0.20***	-0.34***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant (Base Category =	0.60***	0.78***	0.60***	0.83***
Technology entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	3,080	3,005	2,978	2,979
R-squared	0.25	0.38	0.26	0.47

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

(b) Separating Mass Public by Party and Education

	Opposition to Regulation	Support for Redistribution	Globalism	Liberalism on Social Issues
Democratic Donors	-0.28***	0.13***	0.03	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Republican Donors	0.07*	-0.44***	-0.27***	-0.49***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
College-Educated Democratic Citizens	-0.26***	0.03	-0.13***	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College-Educated Republican Citizens	-0.11***	-0.18***	-0.29***	-0.45***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College-Educated Independent Citizens	-0.22***	-0.14**	-0.25***	-0.29***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
No College Democratic Citizens	-0.24***	0.01	-0.16***	-0.22***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
No College Republican Citizens	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.35***	-0.50***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
No College Independent Citizens	-0.17***	-0.07	-0.18***	-0.35***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant (Base Category =	0.60***	0.78***	0.60***	0.83***
Technology entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	3,080	3,005	2,978	2,979
R-squared	0.25	0.38	0.27	0.48

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

C.4 Ruling out Demographics and Geography

To triangulate the mechanism responsible for technology entrepreneuers' greater opposition to regulation, we also test implications of two obvious alternative explanations for technology entrepreneurs' opposition to regulation: a simple demographic explanation, for which we find no evidence; and geography, for which we find no evidence.

Demographics. First, are technology entrepreneurs' views on regulation simply epiphenomenal to their high wealth or education? In Figure OA8, we show that, on most issues, technology entrepreneurs are similarly liberal to college-educated Democrats, Democratic citizens who report having over $1 million in personal assets, and Democratic donors who report having over $1 million in personal assets. However, these Democratic groups are also liberal on regulatory policies, whereas technology entrepreneurs are conservative (differences between 0.24-0.29 scale points, $p < 0.01$). It is therefore not the case that wealthy or highly educated liberals are generally hostile to regulation; something is different about technology entrepreneurs.

We next present present regressions that control for education, gender, age, and income and still find the same differences between our samples even conditional on these traits. In partiuclar, we present versions of our main regressions that contain controls for education, gender, age, and income, meaning that the coefficients capture differences between technology entrepreneurs and other groups who have similar education, gender, age, and income backgrounds. In these regressions, we include dummy variables for every category of education, gender, and income, and use a linear term for age. We set the base category to white male individuals with a graduate degree who are the age of the average technology entrepreneur, meaning that the constant term captures the expected value of the dependent variable for white male technology entrepreneurs with a graduate degree and of average age (42 years old). To conserve space, we do not report the coefficients on all of the demographic dummies.[35]

Recall that, for our regressions, all our scales are oriented such that we expect technology

[35]These analyses were not pre-registered, but were conceived on the basis of a comment from a peer reviewer.

Figure OA8: Comparing Technology Entrepreneurs to Educated and Wealthy Democrats



entrepreneurs to have relatively high means (e.g., the regulation policy scale is coded so that respondents more opposed to regulations get higher scores).

Table OA8a presents differences between the samples on each of the four policy scales conditional on demographics. We find very similar results as in Table OA3. Most importantly, the Democratic groups are consistently less opposed to regulation than technology entrepreneurs, while independent citizen and Republicans are far more conservative than technology entrepreneurs in the remaining policy domains.

Table OA8b presents differences between the samples on each of the four predisposition scales conditional on demographics. We find very similar results as in Table OA4. Technology entrepreneurs are more likely than anyone but Republican donors to say that entrepreneurs do not get too much credit, whereas they are less racially resentful, more cosmopolitan, and less

authoritarian than almost all the other samples.

Geography. The unique pattern of views held by the wealthy from the technology industry also does not appear attributable to where they tend to live, such as Northern California. When introducing zip code fixed effects to only compare technology entrepreneurs and Democrats who live in the same zip code, the difference between their views on regulation remains the same size and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) (see Table OA9).

Table OA8: Main Results with Demographic Controls

(a) Formal Test of Differences in Policy Preferences Across Groups – With Demographic Controls

	Opposition to Regulation	Support for Redistribution	Globalism	Liberalism on Social Issues
Democratic Donors	-0.23***	0.10***	0.05**	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Republican Donors	0.09***	-0.31***	-0.24***	-0.48***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democratic Citizens	-0.20***	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican Citizens	-0.10***	-0.18***	-0.23***	-0.41***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent Citizens	-0.16***	-0.12***	-0.16***	-0.26***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Education Dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender Dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Control?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income Dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.61***	0.80***	0.67***	0.86***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	2,825	2,824	2,824	2,825
R-squared	0.26	0.36	0.31	0.56

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

(b) Formal Test of Differences in Predispositions Across Groups – With Demographic Controls

	Entrepreneurs Get Too Much Credit	Racial Resentment (Reverse Coded)	Cosmopolitanism	Authoritarianism
Democratic Donors	-0.11***	0.13***	-0.10***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Republican Donors	0.05	-0.31***	-0.21***	-0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democratic Citizens	-0.18***	-0.11***	-0.28***	-0.31***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican Citizens	-0.18***	-0.37***	-0.34***	-0.41***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent Citizens	-0.16***	-0.23***	-0.35***	-0.36***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Education Dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender Dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Control?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income Dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.61***	0.74***	0.97***	0.91***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	2,818	2,810	2,825	2,807
R-squared	0.15	0.41	0.57	0.37

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed)

Table OA9: Geography Does Not Explain Technology Entrepreneurs' Regulation Views

	DV = Opposition to Regulation Index	
Democrats in Mass Public	-0.25***	-0.25***
	(0.01)	(0.05)
Republicans in Mass Public	-0.15***	-0.19**
	(0.01)	(0.06)
Independents in Mass Public	-0.20***	-0.30**
	(0.03)	(0.11)
Constant	0.60***	-
	(0.01)	-
Zip Code Fixed Effects?	**No**	**Yes**
Observations	1,813	1,813
R-squared	0.16	0.89

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

Notes: Regression is run among individuals for whom we have a zip code only. Introducing zip code fixed effects does not change the differences observed, indicating that technology entrepreneurs and members of the other groups in the table who live in the same zip codes still exhibit similar differences.

D Discussion of Existing Data in the Literature

The little existing data on the political attitudes of American economic elites takes one of three forms.

First, most research relies on the few individuals in mass public surveys who indicate their income is high. This literature reaches contrasting conclusions about whether relatively wealthy Americans exert outsized political influence. On the one hand, some scholars find that policy changes can be better predicted by the wealthy's political views than by the political views of the middle class or the poor, such as Gilens (2012) and Gilens and Page (2014). On the other hand, there is an emerging body of literature, especially from the "public mood" research tradition, that argues that the preferences of different income groups is not dramatically different, such as Soroka and Wlezien (2008) and Ura and Ellis (2008), and that policymaking is not biased toward the preferences of the rich, (see Enns (2015), Branham, Soroka and Wlezien (2017), and Ura and Ellis (2008)). Rhodes, Schaffner et al. (2017) and Grossmann and Isaac (2017) argue that it is primarily Republican politicians that disproportionately overweight the interests of the wealthy and business interests groups, particularly on economic as opposed to social issues (see also Rigby and Maks-Solomon (2017)). Rigby and Maks-Solomon (2017) also show that the wealthy are not reliably conservative, especially on social issues; Branham, Soroka and Wlezien (2017) likewise show that the wealthy's policy "wins" are not always changing policy in a conservative direction.

Our paper takes no position on these debates. However, we note that the highest category in income questions on mass surveys rarely allows researchers to identify politically influential wealthy individuals. For example, Gilens and Page (2014) count American families as wealthy if they make over $146,000 per year. Although this income would put people in the top 12% of income earners, this is not normally who we think of in terms of economic elites' political influence. There are also typically relatively few such individuals in any mass public survey, limiting our ability to understand heterogeneity among economic elites.

A second, smaller set of research has analyzed surveys of political donors (see Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower (2017); Hill and Huber (2017)). However, this work has primarily focused on other research questions (such as whether policy agreement between donors and legislators influences their likelihood of giving) and has not gathered the issue-specific data necessary to test our hypotheses.

A third approach is to sample individuals who live in wealthy neighborhoods; using this approach, Page, Bartels and Seawright (2013) interviewed 83 wealthy individuals in greater Chicago and found that they were generally very conservative.

The data we collected is therefore unique in terms of the types and numbers of individuals—both in a specific, politically influential industry and among the donor class generally—that we surveyed.

A different source of existing data comes from campaign contributions: consistent with our argument, Figure 7 in Bonica (2014) also presents data showing large heterogeneity at the industry level in the partisan breakdown of political giving. Individuals working in technology, entertainment, and academia give overwhelmingly to Democrats whereas those in the mining, construction, banking, agriculture, and energy industries give overwhelmingly to Republicans. However, Bonica (2014) only notes these patterns as worthy of future research.

E Additional Detail on Surveys

In this section we describe the response rates and representativeness of our technology entrepreneur, partisan donor, and mass public samples.

Online Appendix Section J gives the full survey instrument.

E.1 Survey Response Rates

The response rates to our technology entrepreneur survey (16%) and donor survey (7%) compare favorably to high-quality surveys of the mass public. For example, Pew's response rates to their phone surveys are 9%; see "What Low Response Rates Mean for Telephone Surveys," *Pew*, http://www.pewresearch.org/2017/05/15/what-low-response-rates-mean-for-telephone-surveys/#fn-291178-1. Other response rates, such as to the *Washington Post*'s telephone polls, are even lower. And cumulative response rates—taking into account all stages of the sampling process—of high-quality Internet panels such as the GfK Knowledge Panel can be below 1% (Callegaro and DiSogra (2008)). Our donor survey was conducted by mail, and its response rate compares favorably to response rates of mass public surveys conducted by mail (Broockman, Kalla and Sekhon (2017)).

E.2 Survey Representativeness

Online Appendix Section C.3 shows versions of our main analyses that weight all respondents on the characteristics described below to adjust for the minor differences we do find between our samples and the underlying populations of interest. We report in that section that our results do not change in the presence of these weights.

E.2.1 Technology Entrepreneur Survey

To appraise survey respondents' representativeness of the sampling frame and for an objective measure of their companies' importance, we also gathered data from Crunchbase on the amount of venture capital funding these individuals' companies had raised. We were able to locate these data for 91.2% of the sampling frame and for 89.1% of the respondents.

Table OA10 gives averages and illustrates the representativeness of our sample on this and several other dimensions. The one dimension on which our sample is not closely representative is whether the company shut down because it went out of business or was acquired. We suspect this is because the email addresses we found were likely to be out of date in such cases. However, this would likely bias us toward interviewing more successful and influential elites.

Figure OA1 also shows that the full distribution of venture funding raised by the companies in the entire sampling frame also appears similar to those founded by survey respondents.

Table OA10: Characteristics of survey respondents and entire sampling frame.

(a) Attributes of Individuals' Companies

	Mean Funding Raised	Mean log(Funding Raised + $1)	Mean # Funding Rounds	Exit (IPO or Acquired)	Shut Down	Missing Funding Data	N
Whole Frame	$19.0 million	5.69	2.39	16.0%	9.5%	8.8%	8,499*
Respondents	$25.7 million	6.08	2.82	5.4%	2.3%	10.9%	691
US Respondents	$28.3 million	6.15	2.92	5.2%	2.2%	10.3%	603

(b) Attriutes of Individuals

	White**	Asian**	Male**	In California	N
Whole Frame	79%	14%	89%	31%	8,499*
Respondents	79%	15%	87%	32%	691
US Respondents	77%	16%	87%	35%	603

**The sampling frame contained 8,499 individuals. For the survey data gathered for this paper, we emailed a random sample of 4,245 and received 691 responses, a response rate of over 16%. The data in this table compares the respondents to the entire sampling frame. ** Race and gender are estimated from last and first names, respectively, by matching respondents' last names with US Census data on the racial composition of last names and with data from the US Social Security Administration on the gender composition of first names, following Broockman and Soltas (2017). The white category refers to non-Hispanic whites.*

The sampling frame included the founders of companies with a US presence but founded by

non-US citizens who live in foreign countries.[36] We only analyze US citizens and residents in our analyses. As a result, Table OA10 also provides these quantities just for the US citizen and resident responses, whose data we analyze.

E.2.2 Partisan Donor Survey

Table OA11 compares the donor sampling frame and survey respondents on observable characteristics. Race and gender are estimated as above. Unsurprisingly, the largest donors were slightly less likely to respond to our survey, but our oversample recruited in anticipation of this meant that we still have hundreds of super-elite donors in each party in our data. Online Appendix Figure OA2 shows the distribution of donation amounts by party among respondents and in the sampling frame. In total, the respondents to our survey have donated over $17.6 million to the political parties since 2008. A majority identified as millionaires.

Table OA11: Characteristics of partisan donors who responded to survey and in sampling frame.

	Donated Since 2008 (mean)	# Donations Since 2008 (mean)	Top 1% of Donors by Amount	Self-Reported Age (mean)	Self-Reported Millionaire?	White*	Male*	N
Whole Frame (With Oversample)	$19,002	32.8	50%	Unknown	Unknown	93%	59%	16,400
Respondents	$14,967	55.0	43%	63	52%	94%	61%	1,152

** Race and gender is estimated from last and first names, respectively, as described in Table OA10. The white category refers to non-Hispanic whites.*

E.2.3 Mass Public Survey

Table OA12 presents information on the representativeness of this sample, which is generally comparable to the US Census and the American National Election Study (ANES).

[36] The frame did not identify them as such.

Table OA12: Descriptive Statistics of SSI Sample, American Community Survey, and American National Election Study

	SSI	2015 ACS	2016 ANES
Education			
Less than High School	3.9%	12.9%	9.0%
High School/Some College/Associate's	68.3	59.0	55.2
Bachelor's Degree	16.8	17.9	22.6
Graduate Degree	11.0	10.1	13.3
Gender			
Male	47.1%	49.4%	47.5%
Female	52.9	50.6	52.5
Race			
White	69.3%	73.1%	67.6%
Black	11.9	12.7	10.2
Hispanic	10.6	—	14.4
Asian	5.7	5.4	2.6
Other	2.5	8.9	5.3
Age			
18-29	24.9%	21.7	16.7%
30-49	36.9	33.6	32.2
50-64	23.4	25.4	26.0
65+	14.8	19.2	25.0

Note: Education categories collapsed for comparability across surveys. 2015 ACS considers Hispanic to be separate variable from race/ethnicity.

E.3 Details of Partisan Donor Survey

We defined our donor sampling frame as follows. We began with data from Bonica (2014) on the names and addresses of all disclosed political donors in the US, updated for giving in the 2016 cycle. We then limited our sampling frame to all individuals who, since 2008, had given a disclosed donation to a candidate or committee affiliated with one party but, at any time since 1978, had never given a disclosed donation to a candidate or committee affiliated with the other party. Among this group, we computed the total amount each individual had donated and took a random sample of 4,100 individuals who had given in the top 1% in terms of this amount. We repeated this process for each party, for a total of 8,200 large donors sampled, split by party. The average donor in this strata gave $37,447 in disclosed donations during 2008–2016. We also took

a random sample of 4,100 within each party who were in the remaining 99% of donors in terms of disclosed amounts donated.

To recruit these donors to our survey, we sent them a letter in the mail at the address associated with their donations in the FEC data. The letter directed donors to a website where they could enter a unique identifying code and record their responses.

E.4 Details of Undergraduate Survey

Computer science and biology are among the most popular majors at this university, allowing us to capture sufficient sample sizes. To gather the computer science sample, we secured a list of all undergraduate majors in computer science at the university and emailed a random sample of 325 of them. We received 158 responses, for a response rate of 49%. We were unable to secure a list of all biology undergraduates, but the biology department sent a link to the survey to all of its majors. The biology department indicated that approximately 150 biology majors received the invitation. We received 76 responses, for a response rate of approximately 51%. The incentive for both majors was a $10 Amazon.com gift card.

Unfortunately, we do not have access to any data about the sampling frame of all biology or all computer science undergraduates, so cannot characterize how representative the samples are. However, the high response rates should help assuage representativeness concerns.

E.4.1 Additional Results from Undergraduate Survey

The findings presented in the main text suggest that predispositions evident even before individuals enter the workforce are partly responsible for the unique pattern of views technology entrepreneurs hold. With that said, our theory would not necessarily predict that computer science undergraduates would appear identical to technology entrepreneurs in every way because other factors that might lead technology entrepreneurs to have distinctive views, such as their experiences working in the industry or their economic interests, have not yet manifested for

undergraduates. One would therefore expect computer science undergraduates to resemble technology elites more on matters of underlying principle and less for issues where economic interests or experience working in the industry is likely to color technology entrepreneurs' views. Table OA13 shows differences on individual items between undergraduate computer science majors, the technology sample, and the other samples that are broadly consistent with that expectation. The base category is technology entrepreneurs, meaning that the constant gives the mean for the technology sample. On issues like whether it is fair for entrepreneurs to raise prices—be they florists or a growing company like Uber—the computer science majors are indistinguishable from technology entrepreneurs and quite distinct from both biology majors and other Democratic groups. On the question of having a preference for private sector management of redistribution and whether government does a good job running social programs, computer science majors are in the middle of these two groups. But finally, when it comes to labor unions—an issue on which we would not expect undergraduates to have much direct experience—computer science majors look like other Democrats.

Table OA13: Comparing Technology Entrepreneurs with Undergraduates – Individual Items

	Regulate Uber Like Taxis	Fair For Florists To Raise Prices	Fair For Uber To Raise Prices	Preference for Private Sector	Gov't Does Good Job Running Social Programs	Reduce Influence of Private Sector Unions
Democratic Donors	-0.30***	-0.17***	-0.30***	-1.73***	0.64***	-0.60***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.04)
College-Educated	-0.33***	-0.48***	-0.46***	-0.78***	0.35***	-0.37***
Democrats	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Biology Majors	-0.28***	-0.15*	-0.22**	-0.67**	-0.12	-0.56***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Comp. Sci. Majors	-0.09	-0.02	-0.01	-0.36*	-0.16*	-0.50***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Constant (Base Category =	0.70***	0.96***	0.94***	0.44***	2.19***	0.76***
Tech. Entrepreneurs)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Observations	1,743	852	857	1,644	1,629	823
R-squared	0.08	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.27

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

F Comparing Technology Entrepreneurs and Millionaires in the Mass Public

As discussed in the main text, to document that technology entrepreneurs are distinctive from the wealthy more generally, we follow the existing research on the political views of wealthy elites by examining self-identified wealthy individuals in our mass public sample. In our case, we compare technology elites to self-identified millionaires.

To do so, in Tables OA14 and OA15 we stack the technology sample with just the respondents to the mass public survey who identify as millionaires and conduct similar regressions as we did above. (We place these Tables in a separate section to emphasize that they were not part of our original pre-analysis plan.)

Table OA14 compares the entire technology sample to the millionaires in the mass public. Table OA15 compares just the technology entrepreneurs who are millionaires to the millionaires in the mass public.

Consistent with our findings with regard to the mass public more generally, we find that technology entrepreneurs are more liberal than millionaires in the mass public on issues of redistribution, globalism, and social issues, but more conservative in the regulation domain (i.e., are more opposed to regulation). As Table OA15, this is true even when we compare technology entrepreneur millionaires to millionaires in the mass public. (Recall that, for the purposes of our regressions, the regulation variable is coded such that higher values are more conservative, but that the other variables are coded such that higher values are more liberal. We therefore predict that technology entrepreneurs have higher values on all the scales, as they do.)

Table OA14: Comparing Technology Entrepreneurs and Millionaires in the Mass Public

	Opposition to Regulation	Redistribution	Globalism	Social Issues
Millionaire in	-0.20***	-0.11***	-0.18***	-0.25***
Mass Public	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant (Base Category =	0.60***	0.78***	0.62***	0.83***
Technology Entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	538	483	463	455
R-squared	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.14

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

Table OA15: Comparing Technology Entrepreneurs Who Are Millionaires and Millionaires in the Mass Public

	Opposition to Regulation	Redistribution	Globalism	Social Issues
Millionaire in	-0.20***	-0.11***	-0.17***	-0.25***
Mass Public	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant (Base Category = **Millionaire**	0.60***	0.78***	0.61***	0.82***
Technology Entrepreneurs)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	277	277	277	277
R-squared	0.14	0.04	0.09	0.16

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

G Issue Importance Question on Pilot Survey

On one of our pilot surveys, we asked the mass public and technology entrepreneurs to "Please select up to three issues below that are extremely important to you personally. (If none are extremely important to you personally, you can select none.)" The issues and the percent of each sample that selected each is given below. This was a relatively small pilot survey, with $N = 371$ for all citizens, $N = 182$ for Democratic citizens, $N = 119$ for Republican citizens, and $N = 53$ for technology entrepreneurs. This means that for technology entrepreneurs the typical standard error for the items below is approximately 5%. The Table is sorted in descending order of importance for technology entrepreneurs.

Issue	Mass Public	Democrats	Republicans	Technology Entrepreneurs
Education	30%	36%	30%	45%
Environment/Climate Change	15%	19%	8%	38%
Health care	33%	41%	24%	34%
Guns	16%	14%	19%	24%
Gap between the rich and poor	14%	19%	8%	21%
Infrastructure	6%	6%	7%	17%
Federal budget deficit	13%	7%	20%	15%
Taxes	16%	17%	18%	13%
Net neutrality	2%	3%	1%	13%
Immigration	19%	13%	30%	9%
Unemployment	13%	12%	8%	8%
Race relations	10%	10%	10%	8%
Government transparency	9%	6%	10%	8%
Terrorism	28%	18%	44%	6%
Crime	15%	15%	17%	6%
Foreign Affairs	2%	4%	0%	6%
Abortion	11%	9%	15%	6%
LGBT rights	8%	10%	5%	6%
Poverty	14%	13%	8%	6%
Wars in the Middle East	4%	2%	8%	4%
Oil and fuel prices	7%	8%	4%	2%

H Comparing Democratic Technology Entrepreneurs to Other Groups

One implication of our argument is that technology entrepreneurs may begin to influence the direction of the Democratic Party, especially on matters of regulation. Consistent with this, we showed in Figure 2 that elite Democratic donors see technology entrepreneurs as the group in the party least likely to lose influence and second most likely to gain influence. However, this influence may primarily stem from *technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats'*, whereas technology entrepreneurs who do not identify as Democrats may not influence the Party as much. Where, then, do technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats stand on matters of regulation and in terms of their predispositions relevant to regulation?

We note that we did not pre-register these comparisons; they were suggested to us on the basis of a discussion draft of the paper.

Figure OA9 replicates the comparisons to groups of Democrats in Figure 4 but including a group of just technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats. It is not surprising that technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats are slightly more liberal than the group as a whole. The key finding is that technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats remain less supportive of regulation than existing Democratic constituencies.

Next, Table OA16 replicates Table 7 in the text, but limiting the technology sample to technology entrepreneurs who identity as Democrats. Relative to Democratic donors, we still find that technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats are more supportive of running social programs privately, less likely to think government does a good job running social programs, less likely to think entrepreneurs get too much credit, and more likely to prefer growth over equality.

Finally, Table OA17 replicates Figure 7 from the text (Uber vs. florists survey experiment), showing that Democratic technology entrepreneurs are similarly indifferent as the entire technology entrepreneur sample to whether the industry at hand is a tech company or not. They

Figure OA9: Comparing Democratic-Identifying Technology Entrepreneurs to Other Groups



are similarly likely to agree rising prices is fair in both cases.

Table OA16: Relative to Democrats, Technology Entrepreneurs *Who Identify As Democrats* Prefer Private to Public Sector Management Generally

	Approval of Privately Run Programs (1-5) Minus Approval of Gov't Run Social Programs (1-5)	Gov't Does Good Job Running Social Programs (1-4)	Entrepreneurs Get Too Much Credit (1-4)	Prefer Growth Over Equality (0-1)
Democratic Donors	-1.32***	0.36***	0.40***	-0.39***
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Democrats (Mass Public)	-0.21	-0.11	0.73***	-0.32***
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Republican Donors	1.57***	-1.17***	-0.08	0.21***
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Republicans (Mass Public)	0.37**	-0.43***	0.73***	-0.05
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Constant (Base Category = *Democratic* Tech. Entrepreneurs)	0.03	2.48***	2.23***	0.77***
	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Observations	2,742	2,744	2,801	2,680
R-squared	0.23	0.23	0.11	0.16

Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

Table OA17: Uber vs. Florists Survey Experiment - Including Democratic Technology Entrepreneurs

	Raising Prices Is Fair For...	
	Uber	Florists
Republican Citizens	51%	42%
Republican Donors	79%	95%
Democratic Citizens	43%	38%
Democratic Donors	65%	79%
All Technology Entrepreneurs	94%	96%
Democratic Technology Entrepreneurs	91%	95%

I Forbes 400 Individuals Coded as In Technology

In Figure 1a in the main text, we show the share of the top 400 wealthiest Americans each year who made their money primarily in the technology industry has increased over time. The Forbes 400 data was shared with us by Adam Bonica, and is described in Bonica and Rosenthal (2015). We coded whether each member of the Forbes 400's primary source of wealth was a technology company or not. The list of Forbes 400 individuals coded as technology entrepreneurs and their source of wealth is below, as noted in Footnote 3. Note that this is **not** a list of the respondents to our survey; it is a list of Forbes 400 individuals we coded as having made their money primarily in the technology industry (Bonica and Rosenthal (2015)).

Table OA18: Forbes 400 Individuals Coded as In Technology

Name	Source
Richard L Adams	Uunet
Paul Gardner Allen	Microsoft
Alan Ashton	Wordperfect
Steven Anthony Ballmer	Microsoft
Bruce Bastian	Wordperfect
Andreas Von Bechtolsheim	Google
Marc Benioff	Salesforce.Com
Jeffrey P Bezos	Amazon.Com
Michael Birck	Tellabs Inc.
Sergey Brin	Google
Gary Burrell	Navigation Equipment
Steve Case	America Online
Jomei Chang	Software
Pehong Chen	Broadvision
Aubrey Chernick	Software
James H Clark	Netscape
Mark Cuban	Broadcast.Com
Weili Dai	Semiconductors
Jack Dangermond	Mapping Software
Robert Davidson	Software
Michael Dell	Computers
Bharat Desai	Syntel
Robert J Desantis	Ariba
Jack Dorsey	Square, Twitter

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Table OA19: Forbes 400 Individuals Coded as In Technology, Continued

David M Doyle	Quest Software
David A Duffield	Peoplesoft Inc.
Fred Farhad Ebrahimi	Quark Inc.
Lawrence J Ellison	Oracle Corp.
Marcy Ewing	Internet
David Filo	Yahoo! Inc.
Louis Jr Gerstner	Ibm
Tim Gill	Quark Inc.
Robert D Glaser	Realnetworks
James Goodnight	Software
Norman Hascoe	Semiconductor Materials
Bill Harris Hayden	Compuadd
William R Hewlett	Hewlett-Packard Co.
Reid Hoffman	Linkedin
Irwin Mark Jacobs	Qualcomm
Naveen Jain	Microsoft
Steven P Jobs	Apple Computer
Min Kao	Navigation Equipment
Peter Jr Karmanos	Compuware
Jeong H Kim	Yurie Systems
Timothy Koogle	Yahoo! Inc.
Omid Kordestani	Google
Keith J Krach	Ariba
Scott Kriens	Juniper Networks
Raymond J Lane	Oracle Corp.
Eric Lefkofsky	Groupon
Ted Leonsis	America Online
Robert Levine	Cabletron Systems
John Little	Portal Software
Pamela M Lopker	Software
Roger M Marino	Data Storage
Paul A Maritz	Microsoft
Armas Clifford Jr Markkula	Apple Computer
Andrew Mckelvey	Monster.Com
Scott G Mcnealy	Sun Microsystems
C Edward Mcvaney	J.D. Edwards & Co.
Thomas J Meredith	Dell Computer
Robert N Miner	Oracle Corp.
John Jay Moores	Software
John P Morgridge	Cisco Systems Inc.
Dustin Moskovitz	Facebook
Elon Musk	Tesla Motors
Nathan Myhrvold	Microsoft
William Neukom	Microsoft
Henry T Nicholas	Broadcom
Raymond J Noorda	Novell, Inc.

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Table OA20: Forbes 400 Individuals Coded as In Technology, Continued

Robert N Noyce	Intel Corp., Investments
Scott Oki	Microsoft
Kenneth Harry Olsen	Digital Equipment Corp.
Pierre Omidyar	Ebay
David Packard	Hewlett-Packard Co.
Larry E Page	Google
Max Martin Palevsky	Computers
Bob Parsons	Web Hosting
Neal Patterson	Health It
Ross H Perot	Electronic Data Systems
Robert Pittman	America Online
Barry Porter	Global Crossing
Laurene Powell Jobs	Apple, Disney
Frank Pritt	Attachmate Corp.
Jeffrey Raikes	Msft
Kavitark Ram Shriram	Venture Capital, Google
Gregory Reyes	Brocade Communications
John Sall	Software
Henry Samuel	Broadcom
Eduardo Saverin	Facebook
Michael Saylor	Software
Eric Schmidt	Google
Thomas Secunda	Bloomberg Lp
Jon Shirley	Microsoft
Kavitark Ram Shriram	Google
Sanjiv Sidhu	Software
Thomas M Siebel	Siebel Systems Inc.
Charles Simonyi	Microsoft
Pradeep Sindhu	Juniper Networks
Jeffrey Skoll	Ebay
David Sun	Kingston Technology
Sehat Sutardja	Semiconductors
Sirjang Lal Tandon	Tandon Corp.
Peter Thiel	Facebook
Alan N Trefler	Pegasystems, Inc.
John Tu	Kingston Technology
Romesh T Wadhwani	Software
Todd Wagner	Broadcast.Com
Theodore W Waitt	Gateway 2000
Lorraine C Wang	Wang Laboratories
Graham Weston	Web Hosting
Margaret Whitman	Ebay
Jerry Yang	Yahoo
Robert F Young	Internet
Charles Zegar	Bloomberg Lp
Mark Zuckerberg	Facebook
Monte Zweben	Bluemartini.Com (Internet Software)

J Pre-Analysis Plan and Questionnaire

We developed our hypotheses based on pilot surveys we conducted of our sampling frame, described below, containing early versions of our questionnaire and open-ended, qualitative questions we used to refine our hypotheses. We then formally declared these hypotheses and the survey items we would use to test them in a pre-analysis plan. The pre-analysis plan was posted available at https://osf.io/87vyd/. This pre-analysis plan can also be found below, including our full survey questionnaire. We tested these hypotheses on an independent sample of technology elites randomly drawn from the same sampling frame but whom we had not previously interviewed. This procedure allowed us to base our hypotheses on qualitative responses from our population of interest (in the "exploratory" stage of our research) while also precluding us from defining hypotheses or statistical tests *post hoc* (i.e., after collecting the dataset we used to test them, in the "confirmatory" stage of our research). There were two main goals of our pre-analysis plan. First, we wanted to *a priori* categorize the dependent variables instead of assigning them to scales *post hoc* to the collection of our confirmatory dataset. Second, we wanted to register *ex ante* predictions (e.g., that technology entrepreneurs would be highly non-authoritarian) before the dataset we used to test those predictions was available.

The subsequent pages contain our pre-analysis plan and the survey questionnaire.

Pre-Analysis Plan for "The Political Preferences of the Technology Elite"

Introduction

This pre-analysis plan will be filed before the collection of the mass and elite survey samples for our paper that will analyze the political preferences of the technology elite. This pre-analysis plan describes our predictions about the political preferences of the US technology elite and how we will test these predictions.

Before writing this pre-analysis plan we have already conducted several preliminary surveys with a variety of closed-ended and open-ended questions, which were themselves informed by a series of preliminary qualitative interviews. We used these to form our hypotheses. We are now

filing this PAP prior to the collection of our main survey sample, which we will use to test our hypotheses.

We have access to a sampling frame of technology elites. To collect the preliminary open-ended and closed-ended surveys, we took random samples of names from our sampling frame. For the paper we will take another random sample from this same frame, excluding the people we have sampled previously. This ensures that the data presented in the paper to validate our hypotheses is statistically independent from the data we have collected to form our hypotheses.

We are describing our predictions in advance in this PAP to indicate that the arguments we plan to make in the paper will not be post hoc but were indeed ex ante specified. That is, we wish to indicate that our theory was not developed in order to explain spurious patterns in the data we have not yet collected. (It is possible we will make other ex post exploratory arguments in the paper based on inductive learning from the data, but we will indicate when we are doing so. We wanted to note in advance which of our arguments were indeed developed ex ante.) As shown below, our theoretical argument essentially places various survey variables into buckets, and this PAP pre-commits us to placing certain variables in certain buckets, and making directional predictions about how various subpopulations will respond to items within those buckets.

Theoretical Predictions

In this section we describe the theoretical arguments we plan to make in the paper.

One motivation for our paper is that we believe the influence and power of the US technology elite in US politics is likely to grow dramatically. In the paper we will present some data (not described in this PAP) about why we believe this is likely to be the case. We further expect that much of this influence will manifest within the Democratic party, by shaping who wins Democratic nominations and to whom existing Democratic elected officials are responsive. As a result, many of our predictions concern how liberal or conservative we believe technology elites are within particular issue areas *relative to* the existing groups that especially constrain Democratic party officials: Democratic voters and college-educated Democratic voters.

We have four main predictions about the political preferences of the technology elite.

First, we expect that US technology elites are more hostile to regulation of technology companies and of the labor market than Democrats. We believe self-interest, ideology, and attitudes towards entrepreneurs help explain their preferences. Ideologically, technology elites are more likely to ideologically believe in the benefits of free markets. Relatedly, they are more likely to credit entrepreneurs for the success of the country. These beliefs may arise from being especially likely to witness the benefits of free markets and entrepreneurship and being less likely to witness the costs. Last, they have a self-interest in less regulation of their industry, although self-interest alone does not explain their views in this area.

Second, we expect that US technology elites are more supportive of redistribution and especially of taxation than Republican voters; this is part of why we do not expect them to become a core Republican constituency. However, they are less supportive of government-run programs and would prefer that the government fund programs run by the private sector. This puts them at odds with core Democratic constituencies. We argue that their racial liberalism partly explains their support for taxation and redistribution; unlike many Americans, they are not averse to government aid to minorities, and therefore look more like educated people in other countries than typical Americans on taxation and redistribution (see Alesina and Glaeser 2001). Their lack of racial resentment may stem from their high levels of education and exposure to diversity. However, their belief in free markets leads them to be more supportive of private administration of government-funded programs.

Third, we expect US technology elites to more supportive than Democrats of "neoliberal" economic policies (i.e., policies that promote globalization) that are often perceived as transferring wealth from middle class Americans to the wider world: free trade, immigration, and American involvement in the world. This is another reason why they are unlikely to become a core Republican constituency. We argue that US technology elites support these policies because they are highly cosmopolitan; they identify with people beyond US borders and give weight to their wellbeing. We plan to draw on work by Vavreck and Appiah in defining cosmopolitanism.

Fourth, we expect that US technology elites are highly socially liberal, another reason why they are unlikely to become a Republican constituency. They are socially liberal because they are not authoritarian. We speculate that they are low in authoritarianism because non-authoritarians would be more likely to select into the technology industry (being more curious, etc.).

In summary, our theory predicts that the kind of individuals who self-select into the technology industry and the experiences they have in the industry once there lead them to be more likely to have certain political predispositions and policy preferences. These preferences are not libertarian; rather, they typically align with the Democratic party. Given that the technology elite also largely lives in Democratic areas, it is therefore likely that they will seek and gain more influence in the Democratic party than the Republican party. However, they differ from many Democrats in several important areas: they are more hostile to regulation of labor markets and of government administration of social programs; they are strong supporters of neoliberal policies; and, they may want to move the Democratic party even further to the left on social issues. As a result, the stage is set for high-profile disagreement between the technology elite and core Democratic constituencies.

Statistical Predictions

In this section we specify how to map our theoretical predictions above into empirical predictions about the survey questions we have written, which are provided into the appendix.

This section is organized into five main categories within which we place the survey questions. Within each we make two kinds of predictions/plan to conduct two kinds of analyses:

The first type of analysis in each category corresponds to our descriptive claims. For these analyses we will compare the mean values of survey items and indicies across subgroups. This analysis type lays out predictions for the average responses by subgroup to our "dependent variables." We will divide respondents into subgroups in two ways: First, we classify respondents into four subgroups: (1) technology elites; (2) Democrats in the mass sample; (3) Republicans in the mass sample; (4) Independents in the mass sample. Second, in the second classification scheme, we classify respondents into seven subgroups: (1) technology elites; (2) college-educated (a four year degree or more) Democrats in the mass sample; (3) non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample; (4) college-educated Republicans in the mass sample; (5) non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample; (6) college-educated Independents in the mass sample; (7) non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample. The goal of this second classification is to show that technology elites are distinct from Democrats for whom they share SES status. We always set technology elites as a baseline category so we can compare the other groups to them.

The second type of analysis corresponds to our explanations for these descriptive patterns. This analysis type lays out predictions for the relationship between general dispositions and specific policy attitudes, which will be estimated among the mass sample. We call these general predispositions "independent variables" below. Specifically, we have four main predictions: (1) views on the value of entrepreneurs should predict attitudes about government regulation; (2) racial resentment should predict attitudes on taxes, spending, and redistribution; (3) cosmopolitanism should predict attitudes on neoliberal economic policies such as trade and immigration; (4) authoritarianism should predict attitudes on social issues. Linking to the first set of analyses, we predict technology elites will be high on perceiving value of entrepreneurs and cosmopolitanism, and be low on racial resentment and authoritarianism. Together, our claims that these independent variables predict the dependent variables above and that technologists have distinctive values of these independent variables will support our theories about why technologists have the distinctive values of the dependent variables.

For all survey items, we plan on recoding them to lie between 0 and 1 and analyze them as continuous variables. We will code variables such that 1 indicates support for the type of policy consistent with the theoretical construct (support for regulation, support for redistribution, support for neoliberal economic policies, liberal responses on social issues).

When we analyze the data, we will stack responses from two separate datasets: (1) the technology elite sample; and (2) a mass sample.

Although we present regression specifications below, the main body of the final paper may present the data in the form of graphs, tables, or other formats that make the conclusions more

easily accessible to readers. However, we will still conduct these regressions as our formal tests of our hypotheses and report them in an Appendix if we make the claims they correspond to.

We may also in the future collect a sample of Democratic party donors. If we do so, Democratic Party donors will be considered an equivalent group to "college-educated Democrats" in the analyses above.

Regulation

Outcome Variables

A. We asked 7 questions about regulation where we expect 1) technology elites to look similar to (or more conservative than) Republicans with respect to their distaste of regulation and 2) more conservative than Democrats (included college-educated Democrats): q2.2, q2.3, q2.4, q2.5.4 (drones), q2.5.6 (self-driving cars), q2.5.8 (how internet companies handle people's data), q2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9. We also plan to construct an additive scale of the items except 2.9.
B. We also asked 8 questions about regulation of non-tech industries. We do not have strong predictions for these questions: all items in q2.5 except for those mentioned above.

Independent Variables

C. We asked one question about attitudes towards the value of entrepreneurs: q2.9.

Statistical Predictions

1. We will estimate two OLS regression models with robust standard errors:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 R_i + \beta_3 I_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is an indicator for Democrats in the mass sample, R_i is an indicator for Republicans in the mass sample, and I_i is an indicator for Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than Democrats on the regulation items in sections A, B, and C listed above: $\beta_1 < 0$.

2. In addition, we will estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CD_i + \beta_2 NCD_i + \beta_3 CR_i + \beta_4 NCR_i + \beta_5 CI_i + \beta_6 NCI_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, CD_i is an indicator for college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, NCD_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, CR_i is an indicator for college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, NCR_i is an indicator for

non-college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, CI_i is an indicator for college-educated Independents in the mass sample, and NCI_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than college-educated Democrats on regulation items in sections A, B, and C listed above: $\beta_1 < 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than non-college-educated Democrats on regulation items in sections A, B, and C listed above: $\beta_2 < 0$.

3. We predict that in the mass sample that attitudes about the value of entrepreneurship are positively related to regulation attitudes.

We will estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 E_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents a pro-regulation attitude, and E_i is a pro-entrepreneurship attitude. We predict that $\beta_1 > 0$ in the main sample. Since technology elites are high on E_i, this can help explain their anti-regulation attitudes.

Redistribution

Outcome Variables

A. We asked 11 questions about spending where we expect technology elites to look fairly similar to Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) with respect to their preference for spending (particularly on the poor) and more liberal than Republicans: q3.1.1, q3.1.2, q3.1.3, q3.1.4, q3.1.5, q3.1.6, q3.1.7, q3.1.8, q3.1.10, q3.2.1, q3.2.2. We also plan on constructing an additive index of these 11 items.
B. We also asked 4 questions about spending on categories that might not be strongly supported by tech elites: defense spending and farm subsidies. We do not have strong predictions for these questions and serve to test whether respondents are not just straight lining responses: q3.1.9, q3.1.11, q3.2.3, q3.5
C. We also predict that tech elites will be more likely than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) to support spending programs where the private sector and not the government administers to program: q3.3.2, q3.6
D. We also predict that tech elites will be less likely than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) to support spending programs where the government administers the program: q3.3.1
E. We do not have strong predictions on the tax base preferences of these groups but believe the results will be descriptively interesting: q3.4 questions.

Independent Variables
F. We predict that on the racial resentment items (which we will combine into an additive scale), technology elites should provide as resentfulor less resentful responses than Democrats and less resentful answers than Republicans: q3.8.1, q3.8.2

Statistical Predictions
1. We estimate an OLS regression model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 R_i + \beta_3 I_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is an indicator for Democrats in the mass sample, R_i is an indicator for Republicans in the mass sample, and I_i is an indicator for Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than Republicans on the spending items in sections A listed above: $\beta_2 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than Democrats on the spending items in section C: $\beta_1 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than Democrats on the spending items in section D: $\beta_1 < 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than Republicans on the items in section F listed above: $\beta_2 > 0$.

2. In addition, we will estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CD_i + \beta_2 NCD_i + \beta_3 CR_i + \beta_4 NCR_i + \beta_5 CI_i + \beta_6 NCI_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, CD_i is an indicator for college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, NCD_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, CR_i is an indicator for college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, NCR_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, CI_i is an indicator for college-educated Independents in the mass sample, and NCI_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than college-educated Republicans on spending items in sections A listed above: $\beta_3 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than non-college-educated Republicans on spending items in sections A listed above: $\beta_4 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than college-educated Republicans on items in sections F listed above: $\beta_3 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than non-college-educated Republicans on items in sections F listed above: $\beta_4 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than college-educated Democrats on the spending items in section C: $\beta_1 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than college-educated Democrats on the spending items in section D: $\beta_1 < 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than non-college-educated Democrats on the spending items in section C: $\beta_2 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than non-college-educated Democrats on the spending items in section D: $\beta_2 < 0$

3. We predict that in the mass sample that racial resentment is negatively related to redistribution attitudes.

We estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 RR_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents a pro-redistribution attitude, and RR_i is an attitude indicating racial resentment. We predict that $\beta_1 < 0$ in the main sample. Since technology elites are low on RR_i, this can help explain their pro-redistribution attitudes.

Neoliberal Policies

Outcome Variables

We asked 4 questions about neo-liberal economic attitudes related to globalization where we expect technology elites to look more neo-liberal than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) and Republicans (and college-educated Republicans): q4.1, q4.2, q4.3, q4.4. We plan on combining these 4 questions into an additive index.

Independent Variables
We asked 7 questions about people's levels of cosmopolitanism, which we will convert into an additive scale: q4.6, q4.7.1, q4.7.2, q4.7.3, q4.7.4, q4.7.5, q70. We expect technology elites to be more cosmopolitan than than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) and Republicans (and college-educated Republicans).

Statistical Predictions
1. We estimate the OLS regression model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 R_i + \beta_3 I_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is an indicator for Democrats in the mass sample, R_i is an indicator for Republicans in the mass sample, and I_i is an indicator for Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be express more neo-liberal economic attitudes than Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 > 0$

2. We predict that technology elites will be more cosmopolitan than Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 > 0$

3. We also estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CD_i + \beta_2 NCD_i + \beta_3 CR_i + \beta_4 NCR_i + \beta_5 CI_i + \beta_6 NCI_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, CD_i is an indicator for college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, NCD_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, CR_i is an indicator for college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, NCR_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, CI_i is an indicator for college-educated Independents in the mass sample, and NCI_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be express more neo-liberal economic attitudes than college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_3 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be express more neo-liberal economic attitudes than non-college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta_4 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more cosmopolitan than college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_3 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more cosmopolitan than neo-liberal economic attitudes than non-college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta_4 > 0$

4. We predict that in the mass sample that support for neo-liberal economic attitudes are positively related to cosmopolitanism.

We estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 C_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents a neo-liberal economic attitude, and C_i is the cosmopolitanism scale. We predict that $\beta_1 > 0$ in the main sample. Since technology elites are high on C_i, this can help explain their neo-liberal attitudes.

Social Issues

Outcome Variables

We asked 4 questions about social issues where we expect technology elites to be more liberal than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) and Republicans (and college-educated Republicans): q5.1, q5.2, q5.3, q5.4. We plan on combining these 4 questions into an additive index.

Independent Variables

We asked 4 questions about people's levels of authoritarianism, which we will convert into an additive scale: q5.5.1, q5.5.2, q5.5.3, q5.5.4. We expect technology elites to be less authoritarian than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) and Republicans (and college-educated Republicans).

Statistical Predictions

1. We will estimate the following model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 R_i + \beta_3 I_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is an indicator for Democrats in the mass sample, R_i is an indicator for Republicans in the mass sample, and I_i is an indicator for Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be express more socially liberal attitudes than Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be less authoritarian than Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 > 0$

2. We also estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CD_i + \beta_2 NCD_i + \beta_3 CR_i + \beta_4 NCR_i + \beta_5 CI_i + \beta_6 NCI_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, CD_i is an indicator for college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, NCD_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, CR_i is an indicator for college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, NCR_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, CI_i is an indicator for college-educated Independents in the mass sample, and NCI_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be express socially liberal attitudes than college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_3 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be express more socially liberal attitudes than non-college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta_4 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be less authoritarian than college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 < 0$ and $\beta_3 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be less authoritarian than non-college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_2 < 0$ and $\beta_4 < 0$

3. We predict that in the mass sample that social attitudes are negatively related to authoritarianism.

We estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 A_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents an attitude on a social issue, and A_i represents authoritarianism. We predict that $\beta_1 < 0$ in the main sample, or that authoritarianism is negatively correlated with socially liberal attitudes. Since technology elites are low on A_i, this can help explain their anti-regulation attitudes.

Misc.

We also have other items in which we expect certain patterns of responses for technology elites compared to Democrats and Republicans (as well as college and non-college-educated partisans).

These items broadly fall within the redistribution and regulation categories and we intend to marshal to support the ideas above but using different analytic strategies than above.

- Respondents will only be shown one of q2.7 and 2.8. We plan to show that technology elites respond similarly to this question about the fairness of sellers raising prices in response to demand regardless of whether Uber or a non-technology seller is listed as the example. We will use this to argue that self-interest or group identification with other technology elites alone cannot explain their views towards regulation.
- By contrast, q6.8 is a question wording experiment where we will sometimes insert a technology company and sometimes insert a non-technology company. We expect to find technology elites are more friendly toward tax breaks for technology companies. We expect this to show that self-interest and/or group identification with the technology industry does explain *some* of the technology elites' views.
- Likewise, on q2.9, we will randomly assign whether technology elites are asked about regulation of "business" "the technology business" "the pharmaceutical business" or "the financial business (such as banks)". We expect them to both a) be generally less supportive of regulation than Democrats and also b) among the tech elite, especially unsupportive of regulation of the technology business.
- On q3.7, our other predictions lead us to predict that technology elites will be more likely than members of any group in the mass public to accept inequality.
- On q6.1, we predict that technology elites should uniquely answer that "The government should NOT tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs." In contrast, Democrats and both college and non-college-educated democrats should answer: "The government should tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs." Conversely, Republicans and both college and non-college-educated Republicans should answer: "The government should NOT tightly regulate business, and should NOT tax the wealthy to fund social programs."
- On q6.2 and q6.3, technology elites should look more similar to Republicans (both education groups) on attitudes toward labor unions than Democrats (both education groups).
- On q6.6, we expect technology elites to not agree with the statement (i.e., not simply be libertarians).

Appendix: Survey Items

The survey items appear below. Note that the coded values were generated automatically by Qualtrics and do not indicate how we will code the values for analysis. See above for details on how we will code the values for analysis.

Q2.2 Some cities are currently debating how to best regulate ride-hailing services like Uber or Lyft. Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- ❍ These services should be required to follow the same rules and regulations as taxis--it is important that everyone follow the same rules when it comes to things like pricing, insurance, and disability access (1)
- ❍ These services should not be required to follow the same rules and regulations as taxis--it is important to let companies be innovative (2)

Q2.3 Some technology companies allow workers to set their own hours and do as few or many jobs as they want -- so-called “gig” workers. However, the companies do not provide workers the benefits or protections of traditional jobs. These "gig" workers often do odd jobs like delivering groceries or putting together furniture on demand.Supporters of this "gig" model say people should be able to set their own hours and work as many as they need, and that flexibility in hiring helps the economy. Opponents say this model exploits workers, and that it’s better when people should have a set schedule, a predictable number of hours, and the benefits and protections associated with being a full-time worker. Some opponents want to pass laws that would require companies to treat “gig” workers like traditional workers.Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- ❍ Companies should be allowed to hire workers for “gig” jobs with flexible hours but no benefits (1)
- ❍ Companies should be required to treat “gig” workers just like regular workers, and give them benefits if they work enough hours (2)

Q2.4 Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- ❍ It's too easy to fire workers; the government should be more involved because people need job security. (2)
- ❍ It's too hard to fire workers; the government should get out of the way so that money isn't wasted. (1)

Q2.5 Do you think government regulation of business should increase, stay the same, or decrease in the following areas?

	Increase (1)	Stay the same (2)	Decrease (3)
Drones (small remote-controlled flying aircraft) (1)	❍	❍	❍
New medicines and medical devices (2)	❍	❍	❍
Self-driving cars (3)	❍	❍	❍
Wall Street and big investment banks (4)	❍	❍	❍
How internet companies handle people's data (5)	❍	❍	❍
Health insurance companies (6)	❍	❍	❍
Oil and gas drilling and refining (7)	❍	❍	❍
Commercial air travel (8)	❍	❍	❍
Restaurants and food safety (9)	❍	❍	❍
Tobacco and cigarettes (10)	❍	❍	❍
e-cigarettes and "vape" devices (11)	❍	❍	❍

Note: Questions 7-11 were not asked on the survey; they appear here in error.

Q2.6 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Government regulation of ${e://Field/businessrand} usually does more harm than good."

❍ Strongly agree (1)
❍ Somewhat agree (2)
❍ Somewhat disagree (3)
❍ Strongly disagree (4)

Display This Question:

If uberqrand Is Equal to flowers

Q2.7 On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, sellers usually increase their prices. Do you think it is fair for them to raise their prices like this?

❍ Yes, it is fair (1)
❍ No, it is not fair (2)

Display This Question:

If uberqrand Is Equal to uber

Q2.8 On a holiday, when there is a great demand for Uber rides, Uber usually increases the price of a ride. Do you think it is fair for them to raise their prices like this?

❍ Yes, it is fair (1)

❍ No, it is not fair (2)

Q2.9 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Entrepreneurs and other people with new ideas get too much credit these days; ordinary people who work hard are the backbone of this country."

❍ Strongly Agree (1)

❍ Somewhat Agree (2)

❍ Somewhat Disagree (3)

❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q2.11 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices in this section, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q3.1 Do you think federal government spending on each of the below should be increased, decreased, or stay the same?

	Increased (1)	Stay the same (2)	Decreased (3)
Aid to the poor (1)	❍	❍	❍
Improving public infrastructure (2)	❍	❍	❍
Scientific research (3)	❍	❍	❍
Aid to education (4)	❍	❍	❍
Job programs (5)	❍	❍	❍
Environmental protection (6)	❍	❍	❍
Food Stamps (7)	❍	❍	❍
Social security (8)	❍	❍	❍
Defense spending (9)	❍	❍	❍
Economic aid to other nations (10)	❍	❍	❍
Farm subsidies (11)	❍	❍	❍

Note: Questions 3-9 were not asked on the survey; they appear here in error.

Q3.2 The federal government collects tax money and spends it on many different types of programs. How much do you support spending money on government programs that...

	A great deal (11)	A lot (12)	A moderate amount (13)	A little (14)	Not at all (15)
Benefit all Americans (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Benefit only the poorest Americans (2)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Benefit certain groups of Americans that the government chooses like farmers, veterans, etc. (3)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Q3.3 The federal government collects tax money and spends it on many different types of programs. How much do you support spending money on government programs…

	A great deal (11)	A lot (12)	A moderate amount (13)	A little (14)	Not at all (15)
Where the government spends the money and runs the program (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Where the government spends the money but the private sector runs the program (2)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Q3.4 The federal government collects tax money from many different sources. How much do you support raising tax money through...

	A great deal (11)	A lot (12)	A moderate amount (13)	A little (14)	Not at all (15)
Income taxes on people who earn over $1 million per year (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Income taxes on people who earn over $250,000 per year (2)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Income taxes everyone making over $40,000 pays, but where the wealthy still pay more as a percentage (3)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Sales tax everyone pays - including the poor - when they buy goods and services (4)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Q3.5 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "The government should make sure that every American has health care coverage, even if it means raising taxes to pay for it."

- ❍ Strongly agree (11)
- ❍ Somewhat agree (12)
- ❍ Somewhat disagree (14)
- ❍ Strongly disagree (15)

Q3.6 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government generally does a good job of running social programs meant to help poor people."

- ❍ Strongly agree (1)
- ❍ Somewhat agree (2)
- ❍ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly disagree (4)

Q3.7 Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- ❍ People's income should be as equal as possible even if it slows down economic growth (1)
- ❍ Wide income disparities are acceptable if it means the economy grows faster (2)

Q3.8 Do you agree or disagree with the statements below?

	Strongly agree (11)	Somewhat agree (12)	Somewhat disagree (14)	Strongly disagree (15)
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if black people would only try harder they could be just as well-off as whites. (2)	❍	❍	❍	❍

Q3.9 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices in this section, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q4.1 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "We should pay less attention to the problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home."

- ❍ Strongly agree (11)
- ❍ Somewhat agree (12)
- ❍ Somewhat disagree (14)
- ❍ Strongly disagree (15)

Q4.2 Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- ❍ We should protect American jobs even if it means reducing the standard of living of people living overseas. (1)
- ❍ We should improve the standard of living of people living overseas even if it means losing some American jobs. (2)

Q4.3 In general, do you think that free trade agreements like NAFTA and the policies of the World Trade Organization have been a good thing or a bad thing?

- ❍ Good thing (1)
- ❍ Bad thing (2)

Q4.4 When it comes to people from less-developed countries immigrating to the United States, which one of the following do you think the government should do?

- ❍ Let anyone come who wants to (1)
- ❍ Let more people come than we do today, but not everyone (2)
- ❍ Keep letting in the same number of people as we do today (5)
- ❍ Let fewer people come than we do today (3)
- ❍ Prohibit people coming here from other countries (4)

Q4.5 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices in this section, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q70 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I consider myself a citizen of the world."

- ❍ Strongly agree (11)
- ❍ Somewhat agree (12)
- ❍ Somewhat disagree (14)
- ❍ Strongly disagree (15)

Q4.6 Do you currently hold a passport?

- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Q4.7 We are interested in the kinds of things people do for recreation. In the last 10 years, have you... (check all that apply)

- ❑ Been to Europe? (1)
- ❑ Been to Canada or Mexico? (2)
- ❑ Been to Asia, Africa, or South America? (3)
- ❑ Gone to an Indian restaurant? (4)
- ❑ Eaten Sushi? (5)

Q5.1 Do you support or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?

- ❍ Strongly support (1)
- ❍ Somewhat support (2)
- ❍ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ❍ Strongly oppose (4)

Q5.2 Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?

- ❍ In favor (1)
- ❍ Not in favor (2)

Q5.3 What do you think is more important--to protect the right of Americans to own guns, or to control gun ownership?

- ❍ Protect the right of Americans to own guns (1)
- ❍ Control gun ownership (2)

Q5.4 There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?

- ❍ By law, abortion should never be permitted. (4)
- ❍ The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. (5)
- ❍ The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. (6)
- ❍ By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. (8)

Q5.5 Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. These are pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have:

	1 (1)	2 (2)
Independence:Respect for Elders (1)	❍	❍
Obedience:Self-Reliance (2)	❍	❍
Curiosity:Good Manners (3)	❍	❍
Being Considerate:Well Behaved (4)	❍	❍

Q5.6 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q6.1 Which of these statements comes closest to your own views?

- ❍ The government should tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs (1)
- ❍ The government should NOT tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs (2)
- ❍ The government should tightly regulate business, and should NOT tax the wealthy to fund social programs (3)
- ❍ The government should NOT tightly regulate business, and should NOT tax the wealthy to fund social programs (4)

Display This Question:

If laborqrand Is Equal to private

Q6.2 Would you, personally, like to see private sector labor unions (unions of employees of private companies) in the United States have more influence than they do today or have less influence than they do today?

- ❍ More influence (1)
- ❍ Less influence (3)

Display This Question:

If laborqrand Is Equal to public

Q6.3 Would you, personally, like to see public sector labor unions (unions of employees of government workers) in the United States have more influence than they do today or have less influence than they do today?

- ❍ More influence (1)
- ❍ Less influence (3)

Q6.6 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I would like to live in a society where government does nothing except provide national defense and police protection, so that people could be left alone to earn whatever they could."

- ❍ Strongly agree (1)
- ❍ Somewhat agree (2)
- ❍ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly disagree (4)

Q6.7 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If all police were forced to use body cameras to videotape their interactions with citizens, then nearly all of the racial issues with policing would go away."

- ❍ Strongly agree (1)
- ❍ Somewhat agree (2)
- ❍ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly disagree (4)

Q6.8 Some people support tax breaks for ${e://Field/taxbreakrand}, arguing that it would stimulate economic growth and innovation. Others believe these these tax breaks would just help the wealthy get wealthier. Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- ❍ Reduce taxes for ${e://Field/taxbreakrand} so they can create jobs and products that help society (4)
- ❍ Do not give ${e://Field/taxbreakrand} special tax treatment (5)

Q6.9 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q7.2 Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or something else?

- ❍ Democrat (1)
- ❍ Republican (2)
- ❍ Something else (3)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or something else? Democrat Is Selected

Q7.3 Do you consider yourself to be a strong Democrat or a not strong Democrat?

- ❍ Strong Democrat (1)
- ❍ Not strong Democrat (2)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or something else? Republican Is Selected

Q7.4 Do you consider yourself to be a strong Republican or a not strong Republican?

- ❍ Strong Republican (1)
- ❍ Not strong Republican (2)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or something else? Something else Is Selected

Q7.5 Do you lean closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

- ❍ Democratic Party (1)
- ❍ Republican Party (2)
- ❍ Neither / Independent (3)
- ❍ Another party (4) _____

Q7.6 We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- ❍ Extremely liberal (1)
- ❍ Somewhat liberal (2)
- ❍ Slightly liberal (3)
- ❍ Moderate; Middle-of-the-road (4)
- ❍ Slightly conservative (5)
- ❍ Somewhat conservative (6)
- ❍ Extremely conservative (7)
- ❍ I don't think of myself in those terms (8)

Display This Question:

If ideo7 I don't think of myself in those terms Is Selected

Q7.7 What word would you use to describe your political ideology?

Q7.8 If the Presidential election were held today between Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican Donald Trump, for whom would you vote?

- ❍ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ❍ Donald Trump (2)
- ❍ Other: (3) _____
- ❍ I would not vote (4)

Q7.9 Do you happen to recall for how many years a United States Senator is elected? That is, how many years are there in one full term for a U.S. Senator?

Q8.1 Have you previously started or run a business?
- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (3)

Q8.2 Are you a member of a labor union?
- ❍ Yes, a labor union at a private company (1)
- ❍ Yes, a labor union for government employees (2)
- ❍ No (3)

Q8.3 Do you work or have you worked in the technology industry?
- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Q8.4 In your career so far, what is the maximum number of people who have worked under you?
- ❍ 1 - 10 (1)
- ❍ 11 - 100 (2)
- ❍ 101 - 1000 (3)
- ❍ 1000+ (4)

Q8.5 Do you work as an independent contractor (and not a salaried employee) for a technology company?
- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Q8.6 What is the most senior position you have held before or hold now?
- ❍ CEO / Founder (1)
- ❍ Top-level executive (e.g., CFO, COO, CTO) (2)
- ❍ Vice president (3)
- ❍ Manager (4)
- ❍ Entry Level (5)

Q9.1 Finally, we have some questions about your background.

Q9.2 Are you a United States citizen?

- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Display This Question:

If Are you an American citizen? No Is Selected

Q9.3 Do you live in the United States?

- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Q9.4 Which of the following best describes your race/ethnicity?

- ❍ White (1)
- ❍ Asian (2)
- ❍ Black (3)
- ❍ Hispanic or Latino/a (4)
- ❍ Other (5)

Q9.5 What year were you born in?

- ❍ 1999 (4)
- ❍ 1998 (5)
- ❍ 1997 (6)
- ❍ 1996 (7)
- ❍ 1995 (8)
- ❍ 1994 (9)
- ❍ 1993 (10)
- ❍ 1992 (11)
- ❍ 1991 (12)
- ❍ 1990 (13)
- ❍ 1989 (14)
- ❍ 1988 (15)
- ❍ 1987 (16)
- ❍ 1986 (17)
- ❍ 1985 (18)
- ❍ 1984 (19)
- ❍ 1983 (20)
- ❍ 1982 (21)
- ❍ 1981 (22)
- ❍ 1980 (23)
- ❍ 1979 (24)
- ❍ 1978 (25)
- ❍ 1977 (26)
- ❍ 1976 (27)
- ❍ 1975 (28)
- ❍ 1974 (29)
- ❍ 1973 (30)
- ❍ 1972 (31)
- ❍ 1971 (32)
- ❍ 1970 (33)
- ❍ 1969 (34)
- ❍ 1968 (35)
- ❍ 1967 (36)
- ❍ 1966 (37)
- ❍ 1965 (38)
- ❍ 1964 (39)
- ❍ 1963 (40)
- ❍ 1962 (41)
- ❍ 1961 (42)

- ❍ 1960 (43)
- ❍ 1959 (44)
- ❍ 1958 (45)
- ❍ 1957 (46)
- ❍ 1956 (47)
- ❍ 1955 (48)
- ❍ 1954 (49)
- ❍ 1953 (50)
- ❍ 1952 (51)
- ❍ 1951 (52)
- ❍ 1950 (53)
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- ❍ 1945 (58)
- ❍ 1944 (59)
- ❍ 1943 (60)
- ❍ 1942 (61)
- ❍ 1941 (62)
- ❍ 1940 (63)
- ❍ 1939 (64)
- ❍ 1938 (65)
- ❍ 1937 (66)
- ❍ 1936 (67)
- ❍ 1935 (68)
- ❍ 1934 (69)
- ❍ 1933 (70)
- ❍ 1932 (71)
- ❍ 1931 (72)
- ❍ 1930 (73)
- ❍ 1929 (74)
- ❍ 1928 (75)
- ❍ 1927 (76)
- ❍ 1926 (77)
- ❍ 1925 (78)
- ❍ 1924 (79)
- ❍ 1923 (80)
- ❍ 1922 (81)
- ❍ 1921 (82)

- ❍ 1920 (83)
- ❍ 1919 (84)
- ❍ 1918 (85)
- ❍ 1917 (86)
- ❍ 1916 (87)
- ❍ 1915 (88)

Q9.6 What is your gender?
- ❍ Male (1)
- ❍ Female (2)
- ❍ Other (3)

Q9.7 What is your 5-digit zip code?

Q9.8 What was your household income in 2015?
- ❍ Less than $25,000 (1)
- ❍ $25,000-$49,999 (2)
- ❍ $50,000-$74,999 (3)
- ❍ $75,000-$99,999 (4)
- ❍ $100,000-$249,000 (5)
- ❍ $250,000-$1 million (6)
- ❍ More than $1 million (7)

Q9.9 Are you a millionaire? That is, is your net worth over $1,000,000?
- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Q9.10 What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
- ❍ Less than high school (1)
- ❍ High school diploma (2)
- ❍ Associates degree (3)
- ❍ Bachelors degree (4)
- ❍ Graduate degree (5)

Display This Question:

If What is the highest level of education that you have completed? Bachelors degree Is Selected

Or What is the highest level of education that you have completed? Associates degree Is Selected

Or What is the highest level of education that you have completed? Graduate degree Is Selected

Q9.11 Please type the name of the college you attended in the box below:

Q9.12 Please type any comments about the survey here. (optional)

Q104 Consider the issue of immigration and American values. Which ofthese statements best reflects your opinion?

- ❍ A growing number of newcomers from Mexico THREATENS American values (1)
- ❍ A growing number of newcomers from Mexico STRENGTHENS American values (2)

Q105 Now consider what kind of influence American immigration would haveon Mexican culture. Do you think American immigration into Mexicowould threaten or strengthen the values that Mexicans cherish?

- ❍ American immigration into Mexico would THREATEN their culture (1)
- ❍ American immigration into Mexico would STRENGTHEN their culture (2)

Q71 In your opinion, how important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?

- ❍ Extremely important (11)
- ❍ Very important (12)
- ❍ Moderately important (13)
- ❍ Slightly important (14)
- ❍ Not at all important (15)

Q72 How important is being white to your identity?

- ❍ Extremely important (11)
- ❍ Very important (12)
- ❍ Moderately important (13)
- ❍ Slightly important (14)
- ❍ Not at all important (15)

Q107 Over the next 20 years, which of these groups do you think is going to have more influence with Democratic elected officials, less influence with them, or about the same amount of influence with them?

	More influence (1)	About the same amount of influnece (2)	Less influence (3)
Technology entrepreneurs (4)	❍	❍	❍
Small businesses (5)	❍	❍	❍
Big businesses (6)	❍	❍	❍
Labor unions (7)	❍	❍	❍
LGBT people and organizations (8)	❍	❍	❍
Big banks (9)	❍	❍	❍
Civil rights organizations (3)	❍	❍	❍
African-Americans (2)	❍	❍	❍
Latinos (1)	❍	❍	❍

K References for Appendices

References for Appendices

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