diff --git a/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0964.patch b/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0964.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..379b7dfa4e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0964.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 89fc59935d26f32bbd6d745c2042eb4e888e1b67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Jelen +Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2025 19:16:44 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-0964 scp: Reject invalid paths received through scp + +Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider +(cherry picked from commit daa80818f89347b4d80b0c5b80659f9a9e55e8cc) +Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account +Upstream-reference: https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/patch/?id=a5e4b12090b0c939d85af4f29280e40c5b6600aa +--- + src/scp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/scp.c b/src/scp.c +index 103822c..c23b7b1 100644 +--- a/src/scp.c ++++ b/src/scp.c +@@ -848,6 +848,22 @@ int ssh_scp_pull_request(ssh_scp scp) + size = strtoull(tmp, NULL, 10); + p++; + name = strdup(p); ++ /* Catch invalid name: ++ * - empty ones ++ * - containing any forward slash -- directory traversal handled ++ * differently ++ * - special names "." and ".." referring to the current and parent ++ * directories -- they are not expected either ++ */ ++ if (name == NULL || name[0] == '\0' || strchr(name, '/') || ++ strcmp(name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(name, "..") == 0) { ++ ssh_set_error(scp->session, ++ SSH_FATAL, ++ "Received invalid filename: %s", ++ name == NULL ? "" : name); ++ SAFE_FREE(name); ++ goto error; ++ } + SAFE_FREE(scp->request_name); + scp->request_name = name; + if (buffer[0] == 'C') { +-- +2.45.4 + diff --git a/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0965.patch b/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0965.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f8127e3827d --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0965.patch @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +From 268894dd119cab18560a88dc774baa0129650be9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account + +Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2026 19:50:22 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Patch CVE-2026-0965 for libssh (applied via patch -p1) + +Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account +Upstream-reference: https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/patch/?id=bf390a042623e02abc8f421c4c5fadc0429a8a76 +--- + include/libssh/misc.h | 4 ++ + include/libssh/priv.h | 3 ++ + src/bind_config.c | 4 +- + src/config.c | 8 ++-- + src/dh-gex.c | 4 +- + src/known_hosts.c | 2 +- + src/knownhosts.c | 2 +- + src/misc.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/unittests/torture_config.c | 19 ++++++++ + 9 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/libssh/misc.h b/include/libssh/misc.h +index 0924ba7..27bdc2d 100644 +--- a/include/libssh/misc.h ++++ b/include/libssh/misc.h +@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ + #ifndef MISC_H_ + #define MISC_H_ + ++#include ++ + #ifdef __cplusplus + extern "C" { + #endif +@@ -106,6 +108,8 @@ char *ssh_strreplace(const char *src, const char *pattern, const char *repl); + + int ssh_check_hostname_syntax(const char *hostname); + ++FILE *ssh_strict_fopen(const char *filename, size_t max_file_size); ++ + #ifdef __cplusplus + } + #endif +diff --git a/include/libssh/priv.h b/include/libssh/priv.h +index 47af57f..b55df50 100644 +--- a/include/libssh/priv.h ++++ b/include/libssh/priv.h +@@ -438,6 +438,9 @@ bool is_ssh_initialized(void); + #define SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX 1024 + char *ssh_strerror(int err_num, char *buf, size_t buflen); + ++/** The default maximum file size for a configuration file */ ++#define SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE 16 * 1024 * 1024 ++ + #ifdef __cplusplus + } + #endif +diff --git a/src/bind_config.c b/src/bind_config.c +index ed42cbe..c429bce 100644 +--- a/src/bind_config.c ++++ b/src/bind_config.c +@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ local_parse_file(ssh_bind bind, + return; + } + +- f = fopen(filename, "r"); ++ f = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE); + if (f == NULL) { + SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, "Cannot find file %s to load", + filename); +@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int ssh_bind_config_parse_file(ssh_bind bind, const char *filename) + * option to be redefined later by another file. */ + uint8_t seen[BIND_CFG_MAX] = {0}; + +- f = fopen(filename, "r"); ++ f = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE); + if (f == NULL) { + return 0; + } +diff --git a/src/config.c b/src/config.c +index d4d8d41..87cdaaa 100644 +--- a/src/config.c ++++ b/src/config.c +@@ -215,10 +215,9 @@ local_parse_file(ssh_session session, + return; + } + +- f = fopen(filename, "r"); ++ f = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE); + if (f == NULL) { +- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, "Cannot find file %s to load", +- filename); ++ /* The underlying function logs the reasons */ + return; + } + +@@ -1205,8 +1204,9 @@ int ssh_config_parse_file(ssh_session session, const char *filename) + int parsing, rv; + bool global = 0; + +- f = fopen(filename, "r"); ++ f = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE); + if (f == NULL) { ++ /* The underlying function logs the reasons */ + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/src/dh-gex.c b/src/dh-gex.c +index 642a88a..aadc7c0 100644 +--- a/src/dh-gex.c ++++ b/src/dh-gex.c +@@ -520,9 +520,9 @@ static int ssh_retrieve_dhgroup(char *moduli_file, + } + + if (moduli_file != NULL) +- moduli = fopen(moduli_file, "r"); ++ moduli = ssh_strict_fopen(moduli_file, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE); + else +- moduli = fopen(MODULI_FILE, "r"); ++ moduli = ssh_strict_fopen(MODULI_FILE, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE); + + if (moduli == NULL) { + char err_msg[SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX] = {0}; +diff --git a/src/known_hosts.c b/src/known_hosts.c +index f660a6f..ba2ae4d 100644 +--- a/src/known_hosts.c ++++ b/src/known_hosts.c +@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static struct ssh_tokens_st *ssh_get_knownhost_line(FILE **file, + struct ssh_tokens_st *tokens = NULL; + + if (*file == NULL) { +- *file = fopen(filename,"r"); ++ *file = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE); + if (*file == NULL) { + return NULL; + } +diff --git a/src/knownhosts.c b/src/knownhosts.c +index 109b4f0..f0fde69 100644 +--- a/src/knownhosts.c ++++ b/src/knownhosts.c +@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int ssh_known_hosts_read_entries(const char *match, + FILE *fp = NULL; + int rc; + +- fp = fopen(filename, "r"); ++ fp = ssh_strict_fopen(filename, SSH_MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE); + if (fp == NULL) { + char err_msg[SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX] = {0}; + SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Failed to open the known_hosts file '%s': %s", +diff --git a/src/misc.c b/src/misc.c +index f371f33..d936385 100644 +--- a/src/misc.c ++++ b/src/misc.c +@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ + #endif /* _WIN32 */ + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -2074,4 +2075,77 @@ int ssh_check_hostname_syntax(const char *hostname) + return SSH_OK; + } + ++/** ++ * @internal ++ * ++ * @brief Safely open a file containing some configuration. ++ * ++ * Runs checks if the file can be used as some configuration file (is regular ++ * file and is not too large). If so, returns the opened file (for reading). ++ * Otherwise logs error and returns `NULL`. ++ * ++ * @param filename The path to the file to open. ++ * @param max_file_size Maximum file size that is accepted. ++ * ++ * @returns the opened file or `NULL` on error. ++ */ ++FILE *ssh_strict_fopen(const char *filename, size_t max_file_size) ++{ ++ FILE *f = NULL; ++ struct stat sb; ++ char err_msg[SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX] = {0}; ++ int r, fd; ++ ++ /* open first to avoid TOCTOU */ ++ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); ++ if (fd == -1) { ++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, ++ "Failed to open a file %s for reading: %s", ++ filename, ++ ssh_strerror(errno, err_msg, SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX)); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* Check the file is sensible for a configuration file */ ++ r = fstat(fd, &sb); ++ if (r != 0) { ++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, ++ "Failed to stat %s: %s", ++ filename, ++ ssh_strerror(errno, err_msg, SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX)); ++ close(fd); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if ((sb.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG) { ++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, ++ "The file %s is not a regular file: skipping", ++ filename); ++ close(fd); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if ((size_t)sb.st_size > max_file_size) { ++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, ++ "The file %s is too large (%jd MB > %zu MB): skipping", ++ filename, ++ (intmax_t)sb.st_size / 1024 / 1024, ++ max_file_size / 1024 / 1024); ++ close(fd); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ f = fdopen(fd, "r"); ++ if (f == NULL) { ++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE, ++ "Failed to open a file %s for reading: %s", ++ filename, ++ ssh_strerror(r, err_msg, SSH_ERRNO_MSG_MAX)); ++ close(fd); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* the flcose() will close also the underlying fd */ ++ return f; ++} ++ + /** @} */ +diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c +index b7c763a..b218f9e 100644 +--- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c ++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c +@@ -1850,6 +1850,22 @@ static void torture_config_make_absolute_no_sshdir(void **state) + torture_config_make_absolute_int(state, 1); + } + ++/* Invalid configuration files */ ++static void torture_config_invalid(void **state) ++{ ++ ssh_session session = *state; ++ ++ ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, "Bar"); ++ ++ /* non-regular file -- ignored (or missing on non-unix) so OK */ ++ _parse_config(session, "/dev/random", NULL, SSH_OK); ++ ++#ifndef _WIN32 ++ /* huge file -- ignored (or missing on non-unix) so OK */ ++ _parse_config(session, "/proc/kcore", NULL, SSH_OK); ++#endif ++} ++ + int torture_run_tests(void) + { + int rc; +@@ -1922,6 +1938,9 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) + setup, teardown), + cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_config_make_absolute_no_sshdir, + setup_no_sshdir, teardown), ++ cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(torture_config_invalid, ++ setup, ++ teardown), + }; + + +-- +2.45.4 + diff --git a/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0966.patch b/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0966.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d53d7d1ff4a --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0966.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 1fd7f07af7dc69d4b86dabde62dc5ecbf449cfd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Jelen +Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 12:09:50 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-0966 misc: Avoid heap buffer underflow in + ssh_get_hexa +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen +Reviewed-by: Pavol Žáčik +(cherry picked from commit 417a095e6749a1f3635e02332061edad3c6a3401) +Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account +Upstream-reference: https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/patch/?id=6ba5ff1b7b1547a59f750fbc06b89737b7456117 +--- + src/misc.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/misc.c b/src/misc.c +index d936385..e78c92b 100644 +--- a/src/misc.c ++++ b/src/misc.c +@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ char *ssh_get_hexa(const unsigned char *what, size_t len) + size_t i; + size_t hlen = len * 3; + +- if (len > (UINT_MAX - 1) / 3) { ++ if (what == NULL || len < 1 || len > (UINT_MAX - 1) / 3) { + return NULL; + } + +-- +2.45.4 + diff --git a/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0967.patch b/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0967.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..be9b9fa11a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/libssh/CVE-2026-0967.patch @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +From b0f6e53596c6ba0173ac13bff09277b1b393bfe5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Jelen +Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2025 18:48:34 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-0967 match: Avoid recursive matching (ReDoS) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +The specially crafted patterns (from configuration files) could cause +exhaustive search or timeouts. + +Previous attempts to fix this by limiting recursion to depth 16 avoided +stack overflow, but not timeouts. This is due to the backtracking, +which caused the exponential time complexity O(N^16) of existing algorithm. + +This is code comes from the same function from OpenSSH, where this code +originates from, which is not having this issue (due to not limiting the number +of recursion), but will also easily exhaust stack due to unbound recursion: + +https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/05bcd0cadf160fd4826a2284afa7cba6ec432633 + +This is an attempt to simplify the algorithm by preventing the backtracking +to previous wildcard, which should keep the same behavior for existing inputs +while reducing the complexity to linear O(N*M). + +This fixes the long-term issue we had with fuzzing as well as recently reported +security issue by Kang Yang. + +Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen +Reviewed-by: Pavol Žáčik +(cherry picked from commit a411de5ce806e3ea24d088774b2f7584d6590b5f) +Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account +Upstream-reference: https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/patch/?id=6d74aa6138895b3662bade9bd578338b0c4f8a15 +--- + src/match.c | 111 +++++++++++++---------------- + tests/unittests/torture_config.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/match.c b/src/match.c +index 3e58f73..896d87c 100644 +--- a/src/match.c ++++ b/src/match.c +@@ -43,85 +43,70 @@ + + #include "libssh/priv.h" + +-#define MAX_MATCH_RECURSION 16 +- +-/* +- * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ? +- * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match. ++/** ++ * @brief Compare a string with a pattern containing wildcards `*` and `?` ++ * ++ * This function is an iterative replacement for the previously recursive ++ * implementation to avoid exponential complexity (DoS) with specific patterns. ++ * ++ * @param[in] s The string to match. ++ * @param[in] pattern The pattern to match against. ++ * ++ * @return 1 if the pattern matches, 0 otherwise. + */ +-static int match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern, size_t limit) ++static int match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern) + { +- bool had_asterisk = false; ++ const char *s_star = NULL; /* Position in s when last `*` was met */ ++ const char *p_star = NULL; /* Position in pattern after last `*` */ + +- if (s == NULL || pattern == NULL || limit <= 0) { ++ if (s == NULL || pattern == NULL) { + return 0; + } + +- for (;;) { +- /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */ +- if (*pattern == '\0') { +- return (*s == '\0'); +- } +- +- /* Skip all the asterisks and adjacent question marks */ +- while (*pattern == '*' || (had_asterisk && *pattern == '?')) { +- if (*pattern == '*') { +- had_asterisk = true; +- } ++ while (*s) { ++ /* Case 1: Exact match or '?' wildcard */ ++ if (*pattern == *s || *pattern == '?') { ++ s++; + pattern++; ++ continue; + } + +- if (had_asterisk) { +- /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */ +- if (!*pattern) +- return 1; +- +- /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */ +- if (*pattern != '?') { +- /* +- * Look instances of the next character in +- * pattern, and try to match starting from +- * those. +- */ +- for (; *s; s++) +- if (*s == *pattern && match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1, limit - 1)) { +- return 1; +- } +- /* Failed. */ +- return 0; +- } +- /* +- * Move ahead one character at a time and try to +- * match at each position. ++ /* Case 2: '*' wildcard */ ++ if (*pattern == '*') { ++ /* Record the position of the star and the current string position. ++ * We optimistically assume * matches 0 characters first. + */ +- for (; *s; s++) { +- if (match_pattern(s, pattern, limit - 1)) { +- return 1; +- } +- } +- /* Failed. */ +- return 0; +- } +- /* +- * There must be at least one more character in the string. +- * If we are at the end, fail. +- */ +- if (!*s) { +- return 0; ++ p_star = ++pattern; ++ s_star = s; ++ continue; + } + +- /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */ +- if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s) { +- return 0; ++ /* Case 3: Mismatch */ ++ if (p_star) { ++ /* If we have seen a star previously, backtrack. ++ * We restore the pattern to just after the star, ++ * but advance the string position (consume one more char for the ++ * star). ++ * No need to backtrack to previous stars as any match of the last ++ * star could be eaten the same way by the previous star. ++ */ ++ pattern = p_star; ++ s = ++s_star; ++ continue; + } + +- /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */ +- s++; ++ /* Case 4: Mismatch and no star to backtrack to */ ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Handle trailing stars in the pattern ++ * (e.g., pattern "abc*" matching "abc") */ ++ while (*pattern == '*') { + pattern++; + } + +- /* NOTREACHED */ +- return 0; ++ /* If we reached the end of the pattern, it's a match */ ++ return (*pattern == '\0'); + } + + /* +@@ -172,7 +157,7 @@ int match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, + sub[subi] = '\0'; + + /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */ +- if (match_pattern(string, sub, MAX_MATCH_RECURSION)) { ++ if (match_pattern(string, sub)) { + if (negated) { + return -1; /* Negative */ + } else { +diff --git a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c +index 191d7c5..4a1a2e8 100644 +--- a/tests/unittests/torture_config.c ++++ b/tests/unittests/torture_config.c +@@ -1656,80 +1656,138 @@ static void torture_config_match_pattern(void **state) + (void) state; + + /* Simple test "a" matches "a" */ +- rv = match_pattern("a", "a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("a", "a"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); + + /* Simple test "a" does not match "b" */ +- rv = match_pattern("a", "b", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("a", "b"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); + + /* NULL arguments are correctly handled */ +- rv = match_pattern("a", NULL, MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("a", NULL); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); +- rv = match_pattern(NULL, "a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern(NULL, "a"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); + + /* Simple wildcard ? is handled in pattern */ +- rv = match_pattern("a", "?", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("a", "?"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("aa", "?", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("aa", "?"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); + /* Wildcard in search string */ +- rv = match_pattern("?", "a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("?", "a"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); +- rv = match_pattern("?", "?", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("?", "?"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); + + /* Simple wildcard * is handled in pattern */ +- rv = match_pattern("a", "*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("a", "*"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("aa", "*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("aa", "*"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); + /* Wildcard in search string */ +- rv = match_pattern("*", "a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("*", "a"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); +- rv = match_pattern("*", "*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("*", "*"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); + + /* More complicated patterns */ +- rv = match_pattern("a", "*a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("a", "*a"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("a", "a*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("a", "a*"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("abababc", "*abc", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("abababc", "*abc"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("ababababca", "*abc", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("ababababca", "*abc"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); +- rv = match_pattern("ababababca", "*abc*", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("ababababca", "*abc*"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); + + /* Multiple wildcards in row */ +- rv = match_pattern("aa", "??", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("aa", "??"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("bba", "??a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("bba", "??a"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("aaa", "**a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("aaa", "**a"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("bbb", "**a", MAX_MATCH_RECURSION); ++ rv = match_pattern("bbb", "**a"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); + + /* Consecutive asterisks do not make sense and do not need to recurse */ +- rv = match_pattern("hostname", "**********pattern", 5); ++ rv = match_pattern("hostname", "**********pattern"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); +- rv = match_pattern("hostname", "pattern**********", 5); ++ rv = match_pattern("hostname", "pattern**********"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); +- rv = match_pattern("pattern", "***********pattern", 5); ++ rv = match_pattern("pattern", "***********pattern"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); +- rv = match_pattern("pattern", "pattern***********", 5); ++ rv = match_pattern("pattern", "pattern***********"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 1); + +- /* Limit the maximum recursion */ +- rv = match_pattern("hostname", "*p*a*t*t*e*r*n*", 5); ++ rv = match_pattern("hostname", "*p*a*t*t*e*r*n*"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); +- /* Too much recursion */ +- rv = match_pattern("pattern", "*p*a*t*t*e*r*n*", 5); ++ rv = match_pattern("pattern", "*p*a*t*t*e*r*n*"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* Regular Expression Denial of Service */ ++ rv = match_pattern("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", ++ "*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ rv = match_pattern("ababababababababababababababababababababab", ++ "*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b*a*b"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* A lot of backtracking */ ++ rv = match_pattern("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaax", ++ "a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*ax"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* Test backtracking: *a matches first 'a', fails on 'b', must backtrack */ ++ rv = match_pattern("axaxaxb", "*a*b"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* Test greedy consumption with suffix */ ++ rv = match_pattern("foo_bar_baz_bar", "*bar"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* Test exact suffix requirement (ensure no partial match acceptance) */ ++ rv = match_pattern("foobar_extra", "*bar"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 0); ++ ++ /* Test multiple distinct wildcards */ ++ rv = match_pattern("a_very_long_string_with_a_pattern", "*long*pattern"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* ? inside a * sequence */ ++ rv = match_pattern("abcdefg", "a*c?e*g"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* Consecutive mixed wildcards */ ++ rv = match_pattern("abc", "*?c"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* ? at the very end after * */ ++ rv = match_pattern("abc", "ab?"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ rv = match_pattern("abc", "ab*?"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* Consecutive stars should be collapsed or handled gracefully */ ++ rv = match_pattern("abc", "a**c"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ rv = match_pattern("abc", "***"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ ++ /* Empty string handling */ ++ rv = match_pattern("", "*"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); ++ rv = match_pattern("", "?"); + assert_int_equal(rv, 0); ++ rv = match_pattern("", ""); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 1); + ++ /* Pattern longer than string */ ++ rv = match_pattern("short", "short_but_longer"); ++ assert_int_equal(rv, 0); + } + + /* Identity file can be specified multiple times in the configuration +-- +2.45.4 + diff --git a/SPECS/libssh/libssh.spec b/SPECS/libssh/libssh.spec index c47c25f563f..50f6ca4d9f1 100644 --- a/SPECS/libssh/libssh.spec +++ b/SPECS/libssh/libssh.spec @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Vendor: Microsoft Corporation Distribution: Azure Linux Name: libssh Version: 0.10.6 -Release: 6%{?dist} +Release: 7%{?dist} Summary: A library implementing the SSH protocol License: LGPLv2+ URL: http://www.libssh.org @@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ Patch4: CVE-2025-4878.patch Patch5: CVE-2025-8277.patch Patch6: CVE-2025-8114.patch Patch7: CVE-2026-3731.patch +Patch8: CVE-2026-0964.patch +Patch9: CVE-2026-0965.patch +Patch10: CVE-2026-0966.patch +Patch11: CVE-2026-0967.patch BuildRequires: cmake BuildRequires: gcc-c++ @@ -153,6 +157,9 @@ popd %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/libssh/libssh_server.config %changelog +* Wed Apr 01 2026 Azure Linux Security Servicing Account - 0.10.6-7 +- Patch for CVE-2026-0967, CVE-2026-0966, CVE-2026-0965, CVE-2026-0964 + * Wed Mar 11 2026 Azure Linux Security Servicing Account - 0.10.6-6 - Patch for CVE-2026-3731