diff --git a/docs/bwrap-support/bubblewrap-backend.md b/docs/bwrap-support/bubblewrap-backend.md
index 0c2b79df4..6b069a853 100644
--- a/docs/bwrap-support/bubblewrap-backend.md
+++ b/docs/bwrap-support/bubblewrap-backend.md
@@ -163,10 +163,11 @@ Example:
 
 Bubblewrap supports two network modes:
 
-**Full block** (`defaultPolicy: "block"`, no host lists) — uses
-`--unshare-net` for complete network namespace isolation. No network stack
-is available inside the sandbox (including loopback). Runs fully
-unprivileged.
+**Full block** (`defaultPolicy: "block"`, no host lists, no `network.proxy`)
+— uses `--unshare-net` for complete network namespace isolation. The sandbox
+gets a private network stack with only its own loopback (bwrap brings `lo`
+up), so nothing outside the sandbox is reachable and nothing outside can
+reach in. Runs fully unprivileged.
 
 ```json
 {
@@ -201,6 +202,30 @@ iptables.
 **Full allow** (`defaultPolicy: "allow"`, no host lists) — the sandbox
 shares the host network namespace with no restrictions.
 
+#### `allowLocalNetwork` is not independently enforceable
+
+`network.allowLocalNetwork` controls whether the sandboxed process may
+`bind()`/`listen()` on local IPs and accept **inbound** connections. It says
+nothing about *outbound* reachability of loopback or RFC1918 addresses —
+that is governed by `defaultPolicy` / `allowedHosts` / `blockedHosts`.
+
+Bubblewrap has no inbound-only primitive. Unprivileged bwrap has no veth
+interface to scope iptables to, and seccomp cannot dereference the `sockaddr`
+passed to `bind()`, so an AF_INET-only filter is not expressible. The
+namespace choice alone decides the outcome:
+
+| `allowLocalNetwork` | Namespace | Result |
+|---------------------|-----------|--------|
+| `false` (default) | private (`--unshare-net`) | Honored at the sandbox boundary — nothing outside can reach in. `bind()`/`listen()` still succeed on the sandbox's own loopback, so its processes can talk to each other; that is already inside the caller's trust boundary |
+| `false` | shared with host | **Not honored** — the process can bind/listen on host-local addresses |
+| `true` | private (`--unshare-net`) | **Partially honored** — the listener is reachable only from inside the sandbox |
+| `true` | shared with host | Honored |
+
+Rows 2 and 3 emit a `WARNING:` line to the runner log at preflight rather
+than failing silently. Windows (AppContainer's `privateNetworkClientServer`
+capability) and macOS (Seatbelt's `(allow network-inbound (local ip))`)
+enforce the field at the syscall level; this divergence is Linux-specific.
+
 ### Process Settings
 
 Standard `process` fields work as expected:
diff --git a/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/src/bwrap_command.rs b/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/src/bwrap_command.rs
index cfafb5fef..afea89dd2 100644
--- a/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/src/bwrap_command.rs
+++ b/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/src/bwrap_command.rs
@@ -101,6 +101,63 @@ const BASELINE_RO_BIND_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
     "/mnt/wsl/resolv.conf",
 ];
 
+/// Whether the sandbox gets its own network namespace (`--unshare-net`) rather
+/// than sharing the host's.
+///
+/// Full isolation applies only when the default policy denies outbound, no
+/// per-host rules need iptables on the shared namespace, and no loopback proxy
+/// has to stay reachable.
+fn uses_private_netns(request: &ExecutionRequest, proxy_address: Option<&ProxyAddress>) -> bool {
+    request.policy.default_network_policy == NetworkPolicy::Block
+        && request.policy.allowed_hosts.is_empty()
+        && request.policy.blocked_hosts.is_empty()
+        && proxy_address.is_none()
+}
+
+/// Describe a `network.allowLocalNetwork` setting Bubblewrap cannot honor, or
+/// `None` when the sandbox's namespace already matches the request.
+///
+/// `allowLocalNetwork` governs whether the sandboxed process may bind/listen on
+/// local IPs and accept **inbound** connections (it says nothing about outbound
+/// reachability of local addresses — that is `defaultPolicy`/`allowedHosts`).
+/// Bubblewrap has no inbound-only primitive: the sandbox either gets a private
+/// network namespace or shares the host's, and neither can be narrowed further.
+/// Unprivileged bwrap has no veth to scope iptables to, and seccomp cannot
+/// dereference the `sockaddr` passed to `bind`, so an AF_INET-only filter is not
+/// expressible. The namespace choice therefore decides the outcome, and this
+/// returns the mismatch so the runner can say so out loud rather than dropping
+/// the field silently.
+///
+/// The private-namespace arm satisfies `false` only at the sandbox boundary:
+/// bwrap brings `lo` up inside the new namespace, so sandbox processes can still
+/// bind and connect to each other over their own loopback. That stays inside the
+/// caller's trust boundary — those processes already share pipes, files and the
+/// mount namespace — so it is not warned about.
+pub fn local_network_diagnostic(
+    request: &ExecutionRequest,
+    proxy_address: Option<&ProxyAddress>,
+) -> Option<&'static str> {
+    match (
+        request.policy.allow_local_network,
+        uses_private_netns(request, proxy_address),
+    ) {
+        (false, false) => Some(
+            "WARNING: Bubblewrap: network.allowLocalNetwork=false is not enforced while the \
+             sandbox shares the host network namespace (defaultPolicy='allow' or network.proxy). \
+             The sandboxed process can still bind, listen and accept on host-local addresses. For \
+             an unreachable sandbox use defaultPolicy='block' with no proxy, which applies \
+             --unshare-net.",
+        ),
+        (true, true) => Some(
+            "WARNING: Bubblewrap: network.allowLocalNetwork=true is confined to the sandbox's own \
+             network namespace. defaultPolicy='block' with no proxy applies --unshare-net, so a \
+             listener inside the sandbox is reachable only from within it, never from the host. \
+             Use defaultPolicy='allow' to share the host network namespace.",
+        ),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
 /// Build the complete `bwrap` argument list, masking **every** denied path as a
 /// directory (`--tmpfs`).
 ///
@@ -154,12 +211,7 @@ pub fn build_args_classified(
     // applies iptables rules separately. When a network proxy is active we
     // also keep the host network namespace so the sandbox can reach the
     // loopback proxy.
-    let has_host_rules =
-        !request.policy.allowed_hosts.is_empty() || !request.policy.blocked_hosts.is_empty();
-    let full_block = request.policy.default_network_policy == NetworkPolicy::Block
-        && !has_host_rules
-        && proxy_address.is_none();
-    if full_block {
+    if uses_private_netns(request, proxy_address) {
         args.push("--unshare-net".into());
     }
 
@@ -325,6 +377,56 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    // ------- allowLocalNetwork diagnostic tests -------------------------
+
+    #[test]
+    fn local_network_denied_under_private_netns_is_not_warned() {
+        // Default policy (block, no host lists, no proxy) applies
+        // --unshare-net: nothing outside can reach in, so allowLocalNetwork=false
+        // is satisfied at the sandbox boundary and needs no warning.
+        let r = base_request();
+        assert!(!r.policy.allow_local_network);
+        assert!(local_network_diagnostic(&r, None).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn local_network_denied_on_shared_netns_warns() {
+        let mut r = base_request();
+        r.policy.default_network_policy = NetworkPolicy::Allow;
+        let msg = local_network_diagnostic(&r, None).expect("shared netns cannot honor the deny");
+        assert!(msg.contains("allowLocalNetwork=false"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn local_network_denied_with_host_rules_warns() {
+        let mut r = base_request();
+        r.policy.blocked_hosts = vec!["evil.example.com".into()];
+        assert!(local_network_diagnostic(&r, None).is_some());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn local_network_denied_with_proxy_warns() {
+        let r = base_request();
+        let addr = ProxyAddress::new("127.0.0.1".into(), 8080);
+        assert!(local_network_diagnostic(&r, Some(&addr)).is_some());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn local_network_allowed_under_private_netns_warns() {
+        let mut r = base_request();
+        r.policy.allow_local_network = true;
+        let msg = local_network_diagnostic(&r, None).expect("--unshare-net isolates the listener");
+        assert!(msg.contains("allowLocalNetwork=true"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn local_network_allowed_on_shared_netns_is_honored() {
+        let mut r = base_request();
+        r.policy.allow_local_network = true;
+        r.policy.default_network_policy = NetworkPolicy::Allow;
+        assert!(local_network_diagnostic(&r, None).is_none());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn filesystem_policy_produces_correct_mounts() {
         let mut r = base_request();
diff --git a/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/src/bwrap_runner.rs b/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/src/bwrap_runner.rs
index 8b33f518e..cf1a10504 100644
--- a/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/src/bwrap_runner.rs
+++ b/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/src/bwrap_runner.rs
@@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ impl BubblewrapScriptRunner {
         // 2. Build the bwrap argument vector. `denied_files` is the file-mask
         //    subset classified during symlink resolution (see
         //    [`resolve_denied_paths`]).
+        if let Some(warning) = bwrap_command::local_network_diagnostic(request, proxy.address()) {
+            let _ = writeln!(logger, "{}", warning);
+        }
         let args = bwrap_command::build_args_classified(request, proxy.address(), denied_files);
         let _ = writeln!(
             logger,