Chapter 1 and Problems in hw-1

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Problem 1.Part A. Proof. Define $A = \{s \in S \mid \Pr[X = s] \geq \Pr[Y = s]\}$, so $A \subseteq S$. First, we have

$$1 = \sum_{s \in S} \Pr[X = s] = \sum_{s \in S} \Pr[Y = s],$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{s \in A} \Pr[X = s] + \sum_{s \in S \setminus A} \Pr[X = s] = \sum_{s \in A} \Pr[Y = s] + \sum_{s \in S \setminus A} \Pr[Y = s],$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{s \in A} (\Pr[X = s] - \Pr[Y = s]) = \sum_{s \in S \setminus A} (\Pr[Y = s] - \Pr[X = s]).$$

So

$$\begin{split} &\frac{1}{2}\sum_{s\in S}|\Pr[X=s]-\Pr[Y=s]|\\ &=&\frac{1}{2}\left(\sum_{s\in A}(\Pr[X=s]-\Pr[Y=s])+\sum_{s\in S\backslash A}(\Pr[Y=s]-\Pr[X=s])\right)\\ &=&\sum_{s\in A}(\Pr[X=s]-\Pr[Y=s]) \end{split}$$

And

$$\max_{T \subseteq S} (\Pr[X \in T] - \Pr[Y \in T]) = \sum_{s \in A} (\Pr[X = s] - \Pr[Y = s]),$$

SO

$$\Delta(X,Y) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{s \in S} |\operatorname{Pr}[X = s] - \operatorname{Pr}[Y = s]| = \max_{T \subseteq S} (\operatorname{Pr}[X \in T] - \operatorname{Pr}[Y \in T]).$$

Problem 1.Part B. Proof. Define $B = \{s \in S \mid D(s) = 1\}$, so $B \subseteq S$. So we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[D(X) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y) = 1] &= \sum_{s \in B} \Pr[X = s] - \sum_{s \in B} \Pr[Y = s] \\ &= \Pr[X \in B] - \Pr[Y \in B] \\ &\leq \max_{T \subseteq S} (\Pr[X \in T] - \Pr[Y \in T]) \\ &= \Delta(X, Y) \end{aligned}$$

Problem 1.Part C. *Proof.* By the definition of D and X, we have

$$\Pr[D(X) = 1] = \sum_{s \in S} \Pr[X = s] p_s.$$

So

$$\Pr[D(X) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y) = 1] = \sum_{s \in S} (\Pr[X = s] - \Pr[Y = s]) p_s$$
 (1)

First, we prove that the optimal D satisfies $p_s \in \{0,1\}$ for every $s \in S$. If not, there is some $s_0 \in S$, such that $p_{s_0} = q \in (0,1)$ for D.

- 1. If $\Pr[X = s_0] \ge \Pr[Y = s_0]$, adjust p_{s_0} to 1. Then by equation (1), the value is non-decreasing.
- 2. If $Pr[X = s_0] < Pr[Y = s_0]$, adjust p_{s_0} to 0. Then by equation (1), the value is non-decreasing.

So the optimal D satisfies $p_s \in \{0,1\}$ for every $s \in S$.

With the proof of Part B, when D is deterministic, we have

$$\Pr[D(X) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y) = 1] = \Pr[X \in B] - \Pr[Y \in B]$$

Assume $\arg \max_{T \subset S} (\Pr[X \in T] - \Pr[Y \in T]) = T_{max}$. Then define

$$D_{max}(s) = \begin{cases} 1, & s \in T_{max} \\ 0, & s \notin T_{max} \end{cases}$$

Thus,

$$Pr[D_{max}(X) = 1] - Pr[D_{max}(Y) = 1] = Pr[X \in T_{max}] - Pr[Y \in T_{max}]$$
$$= \max_{T \subseteq S} (Pr[X \in T] - Pr[Y \in T])$$
$$= \Delta(X, Y)$$

On the other hand, we have

$$\Pr[D(X) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y) = 1] \le \Delta(X, Y).$$

So

$$\max_{D}(\Pr[D(X) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y) = 1]) = \Delta(X, Y)$$

Problem 2. Given $c \in \mathcal{C}$, we can get at most $|\mathcal{K}|$ plaintexts. That is, there are at least $(|\mathcal{M}| - |\mathcal{K}|)$ plaintexts $m \in \mathcal{M}$, s.t.

$$\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m) = c] = 0.$$

Define $\mathcal{M}_c = \{m \mid \Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m) = c] = 0\}.$ On the other hand,

$$\Delta(\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0), \operatorname{Enc}_K(m_1)) = \max_{C \in \mathcal{C}} (\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0) \in C] - \Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_1) \in C])$$
$$= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \max \{\Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0) = c] - \Pr[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_1) = c], 0\}$$

Fix m_0 , compute:

$$\sum_{m_1 \in \mathcal{M}} \Delta(\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0), \operatorname{Enc}_K(m_1)) = \sum_{m_1 \in \mathcal{M}} \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \max \{ \operatorname{Pr}[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0) = c] - \operatorname{Pr}[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_1) = c], 0 \}$$

$$= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \sum_{m_1 \in \mathcal{M}} \max \{ \operatorname{Pr}[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0) = c] - \operatorname{Pr}[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_1) = c], 0 \}$$

$$\geq \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \sum_{m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_c} \max \{ \operatorname{Pr}[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0) = c] - \operatorname{Pr}[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_1) = c], 0 \}$$

$$= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \sum_{m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_c} \operatorname{Pr}[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0) = c]$$

$$\geq \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} (|\mathcal{M}| - |\mathcal{K}|) \operatorname{Pr}[\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0) = c]$$

$$= |\mathcal{M}| - |\mathcal{K}|.$$

The last inequality is because that there are at least $(|\mathcal{M}| - |\mathcal{K}|)$ items in \mathcal{M}_c . Then with Pigeonhole principle, there exists m_1^* , such that

$$\Delta(\operatorname{Enc}_K(m_0), \operatorname{Enc}_K(m_1^*)) \ge \frac{|\mathcal{M}| - |\mathcal{K}|}{|\mathcal{M}|} = 1 - \frac{|\mathcal{K}|}{|\mathcal{M}|}.$$

Problem 3. First Part. A secret-sharing scheme is a 5-tuple $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{R}, \text{Enc}, , \text{Dec})$ where \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{L} and \mathcal{R} are finite sets and where

- Enc: $\mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{R}$ is a randomized algorithm;
- Dec: $\mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{R} \to \mathcal{M}$ is a deterministic algorithm.

Moreover, we require that Dec(Enc(m)) = m for every $m \in \mathcal{M}$.

Second Part. Let $\Pi = (\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{R}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a secret-sharing scheme. Let \mathcal{L} be the distribution over L induced by the first output of Enc, write down as Enc.L. So Enc.L is a random variable of range \mathcal{L} . Similarly, Enc.R is a random variable of range \mathcal{R} .

We say that Π is perfectly secure if for every two messages $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$,

$$\Delta(\operatorname{Enc}(m_0).L, \operatorname{Enc}(m_1).L) = 0, \quad \Delta(\operatorname{Enc}(m_0).R, \operatorname{Enc}(m_1).R) = 0.$$

Problem 1.3. Assume the plaintext is in English. That is, the letter is from a to z. First, we define two functions:

• to_number: $\{a, b, \dots, z\} \rightarrow \{0, 1, \dots, 25\}$

• to_letter: $\{0, 1, \dots, 25\} \to \{A, B, \dots, Z\}$

Let $\Pi = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a Vigenere cipher encryption, where \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{C} are finite sets which represent key, plaintext and ciphertext space respectively. And

- Gen: $\{0,1\}^* \to \mathcal{K}$ is a randomized algorithm which generate a key k with its length equal to the input string.
- Enc: $\mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{C}$ is a deterministic encryption algorithm. Assume the length of k is l. Assume $m = m_1 m_2 \cdots m_n (m_i \in \{a, b, \cdots, z\}), k = k_1 k_2 \cdots k_l (k_i \in \{a, b, \cdots, z\})$, then define ciphertext $c = c_1 c_2 \cdots c_n (c_i \in \{A, B, \cdots, Z\})$ as followed:

$$\forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}, c_i = to_letter((to_number(m_i) + to_number(k_{i'})) \mod 26),$$

where $i' \equiv i \mod l$.

• Dec: $\mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{M}$ is a deterministic decryption algorithm. To get plaintext m, do: $\forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}, m_i = to_number^{-1}((to_letter^{-1}(c_i) - to_number(k_{i'})) \mod 26),$ where $i' \equiv i \mod l$.