Eliciting Temptation and Self-Control through Menu Choices: A Lab Experiment Séverine Toussaert

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Outline

Introduction

Theory

Strategy and Question

Motivation

- ► Time-inconsistency doesn't allow for self-control
- Gul-Pesendorfer does
- Empirical relevance of the two models
- ► Importance for policy: quantity vs. price controls
- ► Empirical challenge: what people say vs. what they do.
- Solution: elicit preferences over menus. Then randomly assign menus.

Results

- ► 23%-36% can be classified as self-control types according to their menu preferences.
- Consistent with the GP model, self-control types expect to resist the temptation to learn the story.
- Perceived and actual self-control almost entirely coincide: self-control types indeed resist temptation.
- ► Yet, facing the choice is associated with a lower productivity, suggesting the presence of self-control costs.

[:] Thanks to the author for posting her slides

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▶ The additional axiom: set betweeness

$$A \succsim_1 B \Rightarrow A \succsim_1 A \cup B \succsim_1 B$$

Let $\{a\} \succ_1 \{b\}$.

- ▶ Standard: $\{a\} \sim_1 \{a,b\} \succ \{b\}$
- ▶ Resistible Temptation: $\{a\} \succ_1 \{a,b\} \sim \{b\}$
- ▶ Overwhelming Temptation: $\{a\} \succ_1 \{a,b\} \succ \{b\}$
- ► Expressing resistible temptation ≡ self-control type.
- ► Recall the representation:

$$V(A) \equiv \max_{x \in A} [u(x) + v(x)] - \max_{x \in A} v(y)$$

- ▶ u is commitment utility: $V(\{a\}) = u(a)$.
- ▶ v is temptation utility: u(a) > u(b) and v(b) > v(a), then $V(\{a\}) > V(\{a,b\})$.

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Complications

- ▶ Observing $\{a\} \succ_1 \{a,b\} \succ \{b\}$ generally distinguishes self-control from dynamic inconsistency (no room for self-control: only can rationalize overwhelming temptation; doesn't depend on set). Not true if probability of succumbing is random. *Need expectations*.
- Sophistication:

$$A \cup \{x\} \succ_1 A \Rightarrow x \succ_2 y$$

necessary for representation. Partial naïveté:

$$\{a\} \succsim_1 \{a,b\} \succ \{b\} \text{ and } b \succ_2 a$$

(person weakly *thinks* she won't be tempted, but is). Have to distinguish between perceived and actual self-control.

► Cannot capture *guilt* ($\{a\} \succ_1 \{b\} \succ_1 \{a,b\}$) and *preference for flexibility* ($\{a,b\} \succ_1 \{a\},\{b\}$)



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Experiment

- ► Story selection
- ► Task description
- ► Menu ranking
- ► Belief elicitation
- ► Attention task
- ► Exit survey

Questions

- ► Incentive compatibility
- ► Probability of menu a function of ranking
- ► Willingness to pay
- ► Instrument for testing priors