

# The Reversal of the Mission: The Influence of Religious Leaders on Sociopolitical Attitudes

Miguel Alquézar-Yus\*

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## Abstract

*This paper explores how religious leaders influence their communities' religious and political attitudes. To do this, I rely on novel data containing the universe of Catholic priests appointed to their parishes in rural Spain between 2000 and 2019. I leverage the natural experiment by which foreign-born priests are allocated to Spanish parishes and use a staggered difference-in-differences design to identify their influence on their communities. I show that foreign-born priests, whom I find more devoted to their cause, are effective at revitalizing local religiosity, measured by an increase in Catholic marriages and fertility. They also influence local political attitudes towards Catholic positions. However, such extra influence prevents parishioners from challenging the old status quo, measured by the higher maintenance of dictatorial honors, limiting social progress. These findings highlight that religious leaders have a considerable impact on sociopolitical attitudes.*

**Keywords:** Catholic Church, Political Influence, Missionaries, Religious Revival

**JEL Classification:** D64, D72, J61, O43, Z12, Z13

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\*Department of Economics, European University Institute, Via delle Fontanelle, 18, 50014 Fiesole, Italy, [miguel.alquezar@eui.eu](mailto:miguel.alquezar@eui.eu). I wish to thank Sule Alan, Josep Amer-Mestre, Michèle Belot, Elisa Failache, Alejandro Martínez-Marquina, Andrea Mattozzi, Guadalupe Tuñón, together with seminar participants at AYEW Spring 2022, ASREC 2022, SMYE 2022, EPSA 2022, FES Conference 2022, 2022 ASREC Europe Conference, and EUI, for their helpful comments. A special thanks goes to the staff at the Spanish Episcopal Conference for their support throughout the process. I also thank Íñigo Ena Sanjuán, Julià Gómez Reig, and Ismael Moreno Martinez for excellent research assistance. Financial support from the Salvador Madariaga-EUI scholarship is gratefully acknowledged. All errors remain my own.

# 1 Introduction

Religion is an integral part of the lives of many, constituting one of the dominant identity structures. This social prevalence has been achieved throughout history by promoting in-group pro-social behavior (Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Oviedo, 2016), out-group discrimination (Xia et al., 2021), and more cohesive societies (Schnabel and Groetsch, 2014). In fact, as of 2015, 78% of the world’s population reported following a denomination (Brown and James, 2019). Given its importance, social sciences have sought to understand how religious institutions transmit their social values to their members.

The prominent figure in charge of that transmission is the religious leader. These individuals act as intermediaries between their institution and laypeople, providing their supporters with moral teachings and rules of behavior, offering advice on practical and spiritual matters, and holding a venerated position within the local community (Richerson and Christiansen, 2013). Indeed, as of 2018, 62% of the world’s population reported completely trusting their religious leaders (GfK Verein, 2018). However, little is known about religious leaders shape their supporters’ views.

Over the past decades, the Western World has increasingly challenged this predominance. These countries have undergone an extensive secularization process resulting in decreasing social support for religious practices, i.e., from 62% in the 1980s to 53% in 2018 (EVS, 2021), and lower enrollment in the priesthood. As a consequence, Western Christian churches have resorted to attracting foreign-born religious leaders to overcome the lack of native leaders, what has been coined as “the reversal of the mission”. The extent to which these foreign-born priests, mainly characterized by their missionary drive, can overcome secularization and transmit their social values is central to understanding religious persistence.

In this paper, I investigate whether the arrival of foreign priests to rural Spanish parishes has shaped local religious and political attitudes. During the period of study, the Spanish Catholic priesthood suffered a significant compositional change, from completely native in 2000 to up to 13.5% of foreign-born priests in 2019. I provide novel evidence that the arrival of foreign-born priests has revived local religiosity and influenced political opinions toward Catholic-aligned positions. These findings have important implications for policymaking as they highlight that the composition of the priesthood has a real impact on today’s sociopolitical attitudes and demographics.

To estimate the influence foreign religious leaders have on their local communities, I conduct a rigorous data collection. First, I collect data on the universe of appointments of priests to parishes in rural Spain between 2000 and 2019. I extract this information from the diocesan periodical bulletins, available at the Spanish Episcopal Conference’s

archive. Second, I use the yearbook of each diocese to obtain detailed information on the priests' demographics, including their country of birth, order, age, tenure, and education. I complement these data with a phone survey asking priests for their political opinions and work habits. Finally, I merge the previous sets of information with the universe of Spanish parishes to identify those municipalities that had a change of religious leader, allowing us to trace the influence of foreign-born priests on natives' preferences.

I leverage the plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of the arrival of foreign-born priests to local Spanish parishes to identify their differential impact on their community. To do this, I use a staggered difference-in-differences approach. This strategy allows me to account for time-invariant municipality characteristics and seasonality confounders. Following the recent developments in the literature on staggered two-way fixed effects, I implement the stacking approach proposed by [Cengiz et al. \(2019\)](#) to ensure that the treatment effects are estimated using only clean comparisons of units. In this setting, I define a municipality as treated if it has or had in the past a foreign-born priest in charge of its local parish and a municipality as control if it does not have or had one. In my sample, all municipalities have at least one religious leader assigned.

I perform three crucial exercises to check the validity of my empirical strategy. First, I show visually that the parallel trends assumption is not violated for the main religious and political outcomes studied in the analysis. In our setting, this translates into foreign-born priests not being appointed to parishes with a differential trend in religiosity or sociopolitical attitudes. Moreover, I test whether pre-treatment outcome realizations can predict the arrival of a foreign-born priest, finding no major evidence in that respect. In other words, bishops do not internalize individuals' attitudes when appointing foreign-born priests to a new parish. Second, I check whether there are underlying differences between those municipalities that never had a foreign priest and those that had at least one between 2000 and 2019, finding some significant differences across municipality types. For that reason, I replicate the main analysis using a subsample of matched municipalities based on their 2001 Census characteristics, obtaining comparable results. Third, I check for endogenous self-selection into treatment. For this, I restrict the sample used in all analyses to those municipalities with a single population center and parish. This restriction avoids any within-municipality self-selection into parishes. I further test whether the arrival of a foreign priest triggered a migration shock, which could change the local composition. I find no evidence in that respect. These patterns are consistent with the evidence presented in Section 2, according to which the replacement of priests is mainly determined by supply-side factors, such as the number of recently ordained priests and the death or retirement of a previous priest. Overall, my robustness checks confirm that my identification strategy is sound and effect estimates are internally valid.

First, I document that foreign-born priests are younger, more devoted, and mission-oriented than their local counterparts. I do not find any significant differences in their political ideology and work habits.

I find that foreign-born priests are more effective than their local counterparts in convincing people into two of the main pillars of the Catholic Church, namely marriage and family creation. Only one year after the arrival of a foreign priest, the local community experiences 0.1 more Catholic weddings, representing a 6% increase in the mean number of Catholic weddings held in the sample. As time passes, such influence exacerbates. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest to the community, there are 21% more Catholic weddings than in municipalities with local priests. That increase comes at the expense of civil-only weddings, which suffer a 12.75% drop. Similarly, I find that six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the community experiences an average increase of 0.65 new births per year, representing a 10% increase in the average number of births. Overall, these results suggest foreign-born priests are regaining natives' religiosity back to Catholicism.

While religious leaders might influence their parishioners back to the church, their leadership might not reach other religiously-relevant outcomes. For this, I look at local political preferences. I show that the arrival of a foreign priest to the community changes its voting behavior towards more traditionally conservative positions. Six years after the arrival, municipalities with a foreign pastor cast 1.4% more votes in favor of conservative parties (i.e., Catholic-aligned parties), representing a 3.5% average increase in the conservative spectrum. This increase comes at the expense of left-leaning parties, which favor the separation between the Spanish state and the Catholic Church, and radical right parties, which are openly antagonistic towards minorities. Overall, this evidence has important implications for policymaking as foreign religious leaders might act as a deterrent to xenophobic position-taking, thus favoring the integration of religiously aligned migrants.

I also consider other types of political influences. Specifically, I look at the maintenance of street names honoring Franco's dictatorship. I use this variation in street naming as it proxies the social desire to bring back the old ways. As of 2019, 3.5% of all the municipalities in my sample still had at least a street honoring the old dictatorship.<sup>1</sup> More importantly, this dictatorship had a symbiotic relationship with the Spanish church, shaping each other's ideologies, but it is presumably orthogonal to foreign-born priests. I find that those municipalities with foreign-born priests keep honoring the old dictatorship more often than those municipalities with local priests. Overall, this result suggests that while foreign priests do not necessarily convey a pro-Francoist speech, their ability

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<sup>1</sup>In comparison, as of 2000, 20.2% of the municipalities analyzed were honoring the old dictatorship.

to mobilize people towards more conservative and religious positions makes it easier for people to long for an old status quo.

In terms of heterogeneity in impact, I first show that the ethnic composition of the municipalities matters. I find the influence exerted by foreign priests is more intense in ethnically diverse municipalities, where they bring their parishioners back to Catholicism. That stronger influence does not come, however, from the immigrant population, but from the native one, which reinforces the idea that foreign-born religious leaders are effective at promoting in-group cohesion among the native population, irrespective of the cultural proximity to local immigrants. I further show that foreign-born priests effectively bring their parishioners closer to Catholic-aligned positions at the expense of liberal parties in their historical strongholds and radical right parties in traditionally conservative parishes.

Finally, I investigate which priests' characteristics help at explaining the results. I find suggestive evidence that priests' age, tenure, country of study, and origin, do not play a differential role vis-à-vis foreign-born religious leaders' influence. These results suggest that the influence foreign-born priests have on their communities comes from unobserved characteristics, common to all foreign-born priests, such as their inherently higher motivation and devotion, rather than from cultural and language proximity to the local communities.

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study providing causal evidence of the influence local religious leaders have on their local communities. I show that foreign-born religious leaders revive local religiosity and influence political opinions toward Catholic-aligned positions. My results support the hypothesis that these leaders are effective traditional community builders.

This paper contributes to and builds on three different strands of the literature. First, this work contributes to the literature on the determinants of leaders' influential behavior, which harks back to [Carlyle \(1840\)](#). Previous research has focused on explaining how politicians' identity characteristics, such as gender ([Broockman, 2014](#); [Bhalotra et al., 2018](#); [Ladam et al., 2018](#); [Baskaran and Hessami, 2018](#)), ethnicity ([Burgess et al., 2015](#); [Sakong, 2021](#)), religiosity ([Bhalotra et al., 2014, 2021](#)), charisma ([Assouad, 2020](#)), and political views ([Broockman and Butler, 2017](#); [Butler and Hassell, 2018](#)), shape their constituents' preferences and behavior. I focus on an often overlooked authority figure, religious leaders. Religious leaders differ from those previously studied as they are appointed following a top-down process, in which parishioners have no involvement. Two notable exceptions are [Engelberg et al. \(2016\)](#), which shows that high-performing Methodist pastors are key in explaining church attendance; and [Tuñón \(2017\)](#), which shows that left-leaning Brazilian bishops were able to mobilize their network towards economically liberal but socially conservative positions. I contribute to the literature by showing that the arrival

of foreign priests, characterized by being more religious and socially active than their local counterparts, increases local religiosity, social care, and support for Catholic-aligned political movements. Since religious leaders mediate in the transmission of values and the persistence of the local culture, this paper also relates to the literature on cultural transmission (Bisin et al., 2004; Alesina et al., 2013; Guiso et al., 2016).

Second, my paper relates to the broader literature on the societal impacts of religiosity, which goes back to Weber (1922). Some recent studies have provided compelling evidence that religious practices have long-lasting implications on individual outcomes and behaviors, such as economic outcomes (Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015; Montero and Yang, 2020; Heldring et al., 2020; Bryan et al., 2021), human capital (Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Calvi et al., 2020), and pro-social behaviors (Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Schulz et al., 2019; Gagliarducci and Tabellini, 2022).<sup>2</sup> This paper looks at religiosity from a yet unexplored angle, that one of its religious leaders. I contribute to this literature by studying how changes in the current composition of the local priesthood can lead to religious awakenings and changes in the parishioner's sociopolitical views.

Finally, I contribute to the study of the consequences of secularization. Previous literature has found mixed evidence on the relationship between socioeconomic prosperity and a country's secularization (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Lozano, 2017; Andersen and Bentzen, 2022). I contribute to the literature by examining how the "reversal of the mission", a direct consequence of Europe's secularization, revitalizes local religiosity and cohesion. Since most foreign religious leaders arriving in Europe share a missionary trait, this paper also relates to the literature on the long-lasting effects of exposure to missionaries (Bai and Kung, 2015; Waldinger, 2017; Valencia Caicedo, 2019; Calvi et al., 2020; Becker and Won, 2021).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the Spanish religious background and how dioceses manage their own resources. Section 3 presents and describes the data. Section 4 exposes the empirical strategy followed. Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 explores the mechanisms at play. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

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<sup>2</sup>For more detailed literature reviews, see Iannaccone (1998); Iyer (2016); Becker et al. (2021).

## 2 Institutional setting

### 2.1 Spanish religious context

In Spain, Catholicism has traditionally been considered a state religion.<sup>3</sup> However, in recent years, a rapid process of secularization has challenged such scenario. Figure 1 reports the evolution of religiosity between 2000 and 2019. Figure 1a shows that the proportion of Spaniards who self-identify as Catholic has slowly decreased from 82% in 2000 to 63% in 2019. Moreover, that proportion may include many culturally religious but not practicing individuals. Figure 1b shows the evolution of church attendance between 2000 and 2019. It depicts that, while a large majority of Spanish people are self-identified as Catholics, as of 2019, only 35% of them frequently attend church (i.e., 22% of the whole population). Such a drop in religiosity is largest among the younger generations. While in the 2000s, 25% of all young people reported attending church, in 2019, only 6% attend often.

The evolution of the Spanish priesthood has taken a similar route. At its peak in 1961, the Spanish church was composed of more than 35,000 priests, which represented the 10% of all priests worldwide, and had around 900 new priests ordained every year.<sup>4</sup> This environment favored the missionary outflow of more than 25,000 individuals, which represented, at that time, the 25% of all Spanish clergy (Fernández et al., 1991). However, since then, religious calling has been steadily decreasing.<sup>5</sup> Figure 2 displays how the ordainment of priests has evolved during recent years, showing that Spanish seminaries have been continuously losing vocations over the period of study (from 227 priests ordained in 2001 to 124 in 2019). Such limited religious calling has led to the need of attracting foreign-born priests, resorting to what has been coined as the “reversal of the mission” (Ojo, 2007).<sup>6</sup> In fact, as of 2019, 20% of all new seminarians were foreign-born. This situation has created a unique scenario, especially in Spanish rural areas, characterized by their aged population, high religiosity, and high ethnic homogeneity.

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<sup>3</sup>The creation of the Spanish nation-state was heavily influenced by the historical power the Catholic Church had in the Spanish territories. Such influence has shaped our current understanding of Spanish society, culture, and politics (Suárez Cortina, 2014).

<sup>4</sup>These values have been calculated using the 1956-1965 Pontifical Yearbooks.

<sup>5</sup>Numerous reasons have been stressed for having promoted the decay in religious callings, such as the increasing secularization of the Spanish state, the rigid and antagonistic positioning of the Spanish bishops to church modernization following the II Vatican Council, and the decreasing fertility rates (Menéndez Pidal, 1996).

<sup>6</sup>The process of attraction of non-Western missionaries to the West has been recently documented in several countries, such as Germany (Währisch-Oblau, 2009), the Netherlands (Koning, 2011), the United Kingdom (Catto, 2008; Burgess, 2019), and the United States (Kim, 2015).

## 2.2 Diocese management

The Spanish Catholic Church is characterized by a decentralized structure, with all decisions taken at the diocese level. A diocese is an administrative unit, similar in size to a civil province, that manages all the religious activities held in its territory, ranging from the appointment and ordainment of priests to how collected funds are allocated. Each diocese is guided by a bishop. As of 2019, there are 69 territorial dioceses, coordinated by the Spanish Episcopal Conference, and comprise around 23.000 parishes and 17.000 priests.<sup>7</sup>

Dioceses manage their resources following an autocratic approach. Every diocese has its own seminary, where future priests study. The process to become a priest, homogeneous to all dioceses, takes around 8-9 years, and includes the study of Philosophy and Theology and the pastoral training. Upon finishing their studies, priests are ordained by their diocesan bishop, forming a perpetual relationship with the ordaining diocese.<sup>8</sup> These bonds help dioceses maintain a loyal number of vocations in the territory.

Bishops are the actors in charge of allocating priests to their corresponding parishes. The process works as follows. First, preceding religious leaders are moved out of their parish in the event of death, retirement ([Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 537](#)), or by forza maggiore, always after a long stay in the parish.<sup>9</sup> When assigning a new priest, bishops take into account the parish demographic and religious characteristics and the priest's pastoral and religious attributes.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the process, religious leaders have de facto no power to object to a bishop's decision ([Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 1748](#)).<sup>11</sup> Once at the parish, priests have full discretion on their engagement with the local community ([Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 530](#)).

In the event of missing vocations, dioceses can opt for two different formulas. First, dioceses could choose to aggregate parishes, providing multiple parishes to a unique priest, called "administrator", or many parishes to several priests, called "in solidum". While the former strategy gets used as a temporary solution in the process of finding a permanent priest ([Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 539-540](#)), the latter approach has become a prevalent

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<sup>7</sup>For an updated figure, see <https://www.conferenciaepiscopal.es/iglesia-en-espana>.

<sup>8</sup>A popular saying among Spanish deacons exemplifies such commitment: "If in God you trust, there will be no regret" (in Spanish, *Si en Dios confias, no hay arrepentimiento*).

<sup>9</sup>Spanish dioceses are requested to promote the continuity of priests in their corresponding parishes for at least six years. See Art. 4 of the C.E.E Official Bulletin - July 1984, inspired in [Code of Canon Law \(1983\)](#), § 522.

<sup>10</sup>Anecdotal evidence from various talks with priests and bishops suggests that the main factors influencing priests' appointments are the parish's demographic characteristics. No noticeable attention is paid to other sociopolitical factors at the local level. In the analysis, I control for population and the number of previous priests appointed to a given parish to account for its desirability.

<sup>11</sup>Qualitative evidence, collected via a phone survey, shows that priests have little say in their own appointment process.

strategy, especially in rural dioceses. Between 2000 and 2019, 16% of all municipalities in my sample have had at least a priest “in solidum”. This approach is particularly used in parishes governed by foreign-born priests (23%) when compared to those led by local priests (10%). In my analysis, I control whether a given municipality has a priest “in solidum” to account for such difference.

Second, bishops could also work on attracting priests from other dioceses to attend their local seminaries and preach in their territory. These contacts between demanding dioceses and supplying dioceses are conceived as a long-standing relationship by the two dioceses, nurtured by the established presence of Spanish missionaries in the offering dioceses. Spanish dioceses leverage these connections to overcome their decreasing native religious calling. In practice, local bishops contact their foreign counterparts asking for vocations. Then, foreign bishops proceed by contacting those religious members in their dioceses interested in becoming missionaries. Finally, these members decide whether to accept the pastoral call, and if so, move to Spain. Upon arrival, they are treated as equals to nationals, having to attend the local seminary, if they are not yet ordained, and subsequently preaching under their new diocese. Additionally, foreign-born priests once in Spain hold no formal obligations towards their home diocese. According to [Lara \(2021\)](#), the main reason that motivates foreign-born priests arriving in Spain is to help under provisioned dioceses.

## 3 Data

The main analysis of this paper uses matched priest-municipality data that spans the period January 1st, 2000, to December 31st, 2019. I complement this with information from a priest survey and administrative data on municipalities’ characteristics. This section describes sources and methods of data collection.

### 3.1 Priests’ appointments

I use a novel collected dataset containing the universe of priests’ appointments to parishes in rural Spain between January 1st, 2000, and December 31st, 2019. My dataset contains parish-month level information on all 8533 priest appointments that occurred in 4020 municipalities for those 20 years. The final sample includes all those municipalities with a single population center and parish to avoid any within-municipality self-selection into parishes. This sample comprehends 72% of all parishes and 93% of all municipalities of the target dioceses.

This data was collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference’s archive (hereafter,

SEC). The data gathering worked as follows. First, I use the periodical bulletins published by each diocese (in Spanish, Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico) and regularly submitted to the SEC. These bulletins, which aim at providing a complete screenshot of the diocese, include information ranging from the events in which the bishop participated to detailed parish-level information. I extract from each monthly bulletin information on the priests' appointment process, including the priests' names, the exact working positions, the date when those appointments occur, and the parishes they are assigned. Then, I scrape the list of parishes each diocese has from the SEC's website and aggregate it at the municipality level using the catalog of population entities available at the Spanish Statistical Office. Lastly, I merge the dataset containing all priests' appointments with the universe of Spanish parishes to identify which municipalities had a change of religious leader and when that change happened. Table A1 shows the total number of parishes and municipalities each diocese has and those included in our final sample.

## 3.2 Priests' characteristics

### 3.2.1 Priest demographics

I collect detailed priests' demographic characteristics using multiple sources from the Spanish Episcopal Conference's archive. First, I collect information on the priests' country of origin and religious order. This data is scattered over different sources ranging from the dioceses' yearbooks to interviews conducted by the national newspaper, Ecclesia. I use the full name of each priest to accurately identify them over the multiple sources available. I find a 1.4% and 5.4% error rate in the coding of nationality and religious order, when compared to survey responses, respectively.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the priests' nationality. While the average priest is of Spanish origin, 13.3% of the priests in my sample were not born in Spain. Among those other countries of birth, Colombia is the largest supplier, with 5.7% of all priests, followed by Mexico with 1.6%. However, their distribution in the territory is far from homogeneous. Figure 3 maps all municipalities used in the study, identifying those that ever had, and never had, a foreign priest. We can observe how the distribution of foreign priests is not homogeneous across the Spanish geography, being highly influenced by the dioceses' pool of native religious calling. Table A2 puts into numbers such heterogeneity, showing that some dioceses never had a foreign priest, such as Osma-Soria, while others use this formula more intensively, such as Tarazona. Finally, Table 2 provides the summary statistics on the differences between those municipalities that received at least a foreign priest after January 2000 and those that never received one. For instance, ever-treated municipalities have on average fewer young people and singles, fewer temporal

workers, and a higher share of immigrants than never treated municipalities.

Second, I collect information on the priests' education from each dioceses' periodical bulletins. Using these books, I extract the flow of religious celebrations that took place in each diocesan seminary at any point in time between 2000 and 2019. I use the full name of each foreign priest to identify whether they studied in a Spanish seminary before preaching. I use this information to identify which foreign priests took part in local seminaries as a proxy of partial cultural assimilation.

Finally, I collect the information on the priest's birthdate and ordainment. In particular, I use the ordainment date to construct a measure of working tenure, as religious members, once ordained, are considered priests in full responsibility, and most cases, entrusted with leading a new parish. This information was retrieved from the diocese's yearbooks and websites. Unfortunately, not all dioceses provided this information to the Spanish Episcopal Conference. Table A3 shows that those dioceses providing such data have fewer foreign priests, fewer members of religious orders, and more priests educated in a local seminary.

### 3.2.2 Priest survey

I collect a survey on individual priests working at the dioceses under study. This survey aims at understanding which characteristics define the current Spanish priesthood. In particular, we are interested in learning which personal, sociopolitical, and work-related traits foreign and local priests differ.

The data gathering worked as follows.<sup>12</sup> Before the survey release, I manually collected the personal contact details of all priests present on each diocese's website and diocesan yearbooks. I use all information available on these sources as of April 2022. The sample of potential priests was 1288 priests. The survey release followed a two-stage process. First, phone numbers are contacted based on a random rank.<sup>13</sup> Individuals in the sample were contacted up to five times, at different times and with multiple phone numbers, both from mobile and landline devices. The phone survey was collected from May to June 2022. Then, and once the phone survey was over, I sent an email survey with the same questionnaire to all those priests for whom I had their contact details but could not reach via phone call. This online survey took place from early July to mid-August 2022. Weekly reminders were sent throughout the process. A total of 257 individuals completed the survey, of which, 87% did it by phone. Table A4 shows for each diocese

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<sup>12</sup>Each survey takes an average of 8.6 minutes to complete. Phone surveys were conducted by the principal investigator together with the assistance of three research assistants. The survey received ethical approval from the Ethics Committee at the European University Institute (available upon request).

<sup>13</sup>In the event of not finding the person indicated in the phone book but another person, we attempt to obtain updated contact details for the priest in our sample.

the distribution of all priests, potential priests, and surveyed priests, differentiating by their foreigner status. The survey had a 20% response rate. Table A5 compares surveyed priests to all other priests, showing that the surveyed priests are less likely to belong to a religious order and more likely to have studied in a local seminary. Similarly, they are younger and less tenured than non-surveyed priests. I find no significant differences regarding the priests' country of birth.

The survey is composed of three blocks of questions. The first block includes questions on the priests' personal characteristics, such as age, ordainment year, nationality, reasons to come to Spain, and working experience abroad. The second block adds the political views of priests. I elicit individuals' political opinions by using a list of politically relevant and highly polarized statements and ask the participants to state how much they agree or disagree with them. Then, I summarize those scores into two broad categories measuring individuals' social and economic conservatism. I further identify those priests that prefer not to question the Pope's ruling. To do so, I follow [L.A. Times Archives \(2002\)](#) and ask participants about their opinion on the moral views of both Pope Francis and Benedict XVI. In the last block, I ask priests about their working habits, including questions on church attendance, hours spent preaching, and the level of local involvement. At the end of the survey, I pose an open question to participants to understand which other challenges they face in their parishes. Qualitative evidence shows little to no local repudiation based on the priest's country of birth.<sup>14</sup> Section C in the Appendix includes all the questions administered.

Table 3 describes all the characteristics collected for our sample of priests. In Panel A, we can observe that 13% of the overall sample of priests are foreign-born, 90% are diocesan, and 89% studied in a Spanish seminary. Panel B shows the information contained in each diocese's yearbooks. We can see that the average priest is 63 years old and has 36 years of working experience. Panel C presents the information collected in the survey. We can observe that 20% of the priests working in Spain as of 2022 have had previous missionary experience, ranging from short stays to long-standing missionary expeditions. The average priest reports to be slightly more socially and economically conservative than average, to discuss often political issues with his parishioners, but does not question the moral views of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, priests estimate that around 23% of their parishioners regularly attend the Sunday sermon, spending 10 hours a week officiating masses. Priests play a central role in their communities, participating in numerous projects, with special emphasis on social care and family planning activities, and maintaining a good relationship with the local governments.

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<sup>14</sup>Only one of all foreign priests surveyed admitted having faced racism during the first year he spent in Spain. Even in such a situation, his bishop did not change his working parish, reinforcing the idea that bishops do not entirely internalize local circumstances when deciding the allocation of priests.

Comparing foreign priests to their local counterparts, we can observe how foreign-born priests are 13 years younger and have a higher probability of being part of a religious order and of being missionaries. Furthermore, foreign-born priests are more optimistic about the current economic situation both when compared to Spanish-born priests and to the general population.<sup>15</sup> No differences are found concerning their political ideology and working habits.

### 3.3 Outcomes of interest

#### 3.3.1 Religious attitudes

I measure (social) religiosity by using one of the most important events couples have, their wedding. More precisely, I use data provided by the Spanish Statistical Office containing the number of weddings celebrated by the residents of a given municipality and year. This source allows me to classify weddings by the rite followed, namely whether they are civil-only weddings, they follow the Catholic rite, or they follow a non-Catholic rite. Figure 4a displays their evolution over the period of study. It depicts the Spanish secularization process, with a decrease in the number of religious encounters, from 80% of all weddings in 2000 to a mere 20% in 2019.

However, marrying by the Catholic rite might be partially influenced by the inherent traits of the officiant priest. To provide further evidence on the role foreign priests have in bringing people closer to Christianity, I look at fertility. This measure is a relevant proxy for religiosity given the long-standing support of the Catholic Church to family-driven and natalist policies (McKeown, 2014). In fact, according to the 2018 Spanish Fertility Survey, practicing Catholics have an average of 1.33 children, non-practicing Catholics have 1.07 children, and non-believers have 0.68 children. More precisely, I use a database provided by the Spanish Statistical Office containing the number of births in a given municipality and year. Figure 4b displays the distribution of births per capita over the study time. It clearly shows how during the period pre-2008 financial crisis, the number of births per municipality was smoothly increasing. However, since then, it has been steadily decreasing, reaching its lowest level at the end of the period of study.

#### 3.3.2 Political behavior

I use voting data for all national and European elections held in Spain between 2000 and 2019. More specifically, my sample contains the national elections held in 2000, March

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<sup>15</sup>Question 19 is also asked in the Spanish monthly political polls, collected by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (CIS). Individuals surveyed as of May 2022 ranked their economic situation to be 3.665, comparable to the valuation of the local priests.

2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016, and April and November 2019, and the European elections held in June 2004, 2009, 2014, and May 2019. This information was retrieved from the Spanish Interior Ministry database and has been aggregated at the municipality level.<sup>16</sup>

I first classify all political parties that ever run for the national or European parliament into two broad categories: right-wing and left-wing parties. To do so, I use the information reported in their public register and online sources. I follow this bipartisan approach as it represents the predominant political culture in the period of study. Additionally, such categorization exemplifies the support of the Catholic Church. On the one hand, right-wing parties advocate for the preservation of the status quo, with Catholicism having an active role in society. On the other hand, left-wing parties advocate the real separation between the Spanish state and the Catholic Church. Figure 4c illustrates the evolution of these categories over time. It highlights that the area of study is consistently more right-wing leaning. Table A6 in the Appendix exemplifies the main political parties considered in each category.

I then proceed by sub-classifying those parties in the right-wing sphere, differentiating those belonging to the conservative aisle from those on the radical right aisle. These two ideologies differ primarily in their approach toward minorities. While conservative parties take a status quo approach, embracing prevalent covert intolerance, radical right parties follow an antagonist approach, publicly displaying minorities as a threat to Spanish traditions ([Olivas Osuna, 2021](#)). Figure 4d illustrates the evolution of these subcategories over time, showing how radical right parties have gained political power in recent years at the expense of conservative parties. Table A7 in the Appendix exemplifies the main political parties considered in each category.

### 3.3.3 Dictatorial honors

I use data from the Electoral Census Street Map available at the Spanish Statistical Office to classify municipalities based on their street names. This database contains information on the street names on a biannual frequency since 2001. Following [Oto-Peralías \(2018\)](#), I measure, for each municipality, the percentage of streets using a Francoist name. I interpret the fact of maintaining names from the dictatorship as a sign of social stagnation.

The relevance of street names in the Spanish political agenda is paramount. Since the passing of the Historical Memory Law in December 2007, all public institutions had to eliminate any recognition of the Francoist dictatorship that was in power in Spain from 1936 to 1975, among which is street naming.<sup>17</sup> While all municipalities had to

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<sup>16</sup>I focus only on national and European elections, while not on the regional and local administrations, to avoid cross-municipality differences in candidates.

<sup>17</sup>See Law 52/2007 Article 15.

eliminate any Francoist reminiscent, when such a change was supposed to happen was not regulated. This reform provides a unique scenario as local governments had to rename those streets, using the speed of such change as a proxy for social change desirability. Figure 4e identifies the evolution of Francoist street naming in Spain. We can see how progressively municipalities have moved away from street names honoring public figures of the Spanish dictatorship and civil war. However, still, 0.2% of all streets evoke such a historical period. Table A8 in the Appendix displays the keywords used to identify Francoist streets.

## 4 Empirical strategy

In the first empirical exercise, I examine the extent to which the arrival of a foreign priest to a given parish influences his constituents' sociopolitical and religious attitudes using the following model:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta Foreign_{it} + \gamma_i + \omega_t + \Psi X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y$  identifies the outcome of interest, as described in Section 3, for a municipality  $i$  and a year-month  $t$ . The key independent variable  $Foreign$  identifies whether a given municipality has or had in the past a foreign-born religious leader. I control for municipality characteristics,  $X_{it}$ , such as population, the number of previous priest appointments, and whether the current priest is sharing his office with other priests (in solidum). As explained in Section 2, I use these controls as bishops use them in deciding the priest-to-parish allocation process. I include municipality fixed effects,  $\gamma_i$ , which allows us to account for time-invariant variation across municipalities; and year-month fixed effects,  $\omega_t$ , which mitigate that results are confounded by secularization (e.g. periods in which people have lower religiosity levels may also lead to lower native religious calling, thus a higher propensity of having a foreign religious leader). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Under conventional two-way fixed effects assumptions,  $\beta$  measures the average effect of having a foreign priest in a municipality in a given year-month when compared to municipalities with a local priest. However, as recent developments in the estimation of staggered difference-in-differences designs have shown, the average treatment on the treated is a weighted sum of different ATTs, with potentially even negative weights (De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021). To overcome such limitation, I use the stacked difference-in-difference approach proposed

by Cengiz et al. (2019).<sup>18</sup> This approach transforms my staggered setting into a two-group by two-period design, aligning observations relative to the time of the event. I estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{i,t}(\mu) = \sum_{\mu} \beta_{\mu} Foreign_{\mu} + \gamma_i + \omega_t + \Psi X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad \text{for } \mu \in \{-Q, \dots, +P\} \quad (2)$$

where  $i$  refers to municipality,  $t$  to time, and  $\mu$  to the relative time-to-event.  $Q$  and  $P$  refer to any arbitrary time window to and since the event, respectively. Outcomes are normalized to  $Y_{i,t}(\mu) - Y_{i,t}(-1)$ , using the year prior to the arrival of foreign-born priests as comparison baseline.

As in the conventional difference-in-differences framework, the main identification assumption is that in the absence of a foreign priest's arrival, both treated and control municipalities would have had a similar outcome. The main concern is then whether there exists self-selection into treatment, leading to differential pre-trends between treated and control municipalities. As shown in Section 2, the timing of the treatment should be uncorrelated to the evolution of outcomes over time in treated and untreated municipalities given that bishops do not strategically select priests based on the municipality's sociopolitical leanings. Furthermore, the top-down nature of the decision prevents parishes from easily voicing their preferences, thus facilitating that priest assignment to be uncorrelated with municipality characteristics.

The identification relies on the assumption those municipalities that have received a foreign priest experienced similar trends as municipalities that have not. To check this assumption, I perform a placebo test comparing the change in a given outcome variable from  $\mu = -2$  to  $\mu = -1$  in those treated municipalities, in our case those receiving a foreign priest, and those municipalities not treated during that period. Table 4 shows that none of the main outcomes used in this paper, except the vote share of radical right parties, is significant, which indicates that in the absence of the arrival of a foreign priest, both treated and control municipalities would have followed similar trends.

To further prove that in the event of no treatment, both control and treated municipalities would have behaved similarly, I perform the same analysis using a matching-on-observables approach. This method allows me to account for the fact that treated and control municipalities may be structurally different at baseline. I use a propensity score matching algorithm with two neighbors and no replacement on a list of municipality characteristics available in the 2001 Spanish Census. Section D in the Appendix includes a detailed description of the propensity score matching procedure, together with

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<sup>18</sup>For completeness, Section B in the Appendix compares the influence of foreign-born religious leaders depending on the estimation method used. Using alternative estimation methods, I obtain similar results to my main specification.

the replication of all baseline results only using the sample of matched municipalities. No significant differences are found between using the full sample and only matched municipalities.

A second issue relates to the stable unit treatment value assumption. This assumption implies that the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality does not influence its control municipalities' potential outcomes. In this setting, we would violate this assumption if the arrival of the foreign-born priest would motivate individuals from other parishes to attend the foreign-born priest's masses. To tackle this concern, I use only municipalities with a single population center and parish, as to avoid any within-municipality self-selection into parishes. However, individuals could still be commute between municipalities to attend a foreign priest's mass. This concern is minimized by the Spanish population density structure, which is defined as highly concentrated. This means that individuals are not widely spread over the territory, but live only at core population centers, which were built around a parish.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, we would violate the SUTVA assumption if the arrival of a foreign priest would influence individuals' decision to migrate to the municipality. I directly test whether those municipalities with a newly arrived foreign priest enjoyed a differential migration pattern. Figure A1 shows that the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality does not influence individuals' migration decisions.<sup>20</sup>

A third issue pertains to any other plausible interpretation of our main variable of interest, *Foreign*. While *Foreign* identifies whether a religious leader was foreign-born, it might also be capturing how important the arrival of a new priest is in the community. Table 5 tests that hypothesis, showing that only foreign-born new priests are able to exert a significant influence on their communities. In fact, the replacement of religious leaders by other local priests is found to be detrimental to religious-spread. This is in line with the characteristics defining local priesthood, as seen in Section 3. In this study, I focus on the arrival of foreign-born priests, which could be interpreted as a lower-bound effect, given that the change of religious leaders worsens religious attendance.

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<sup>19</sup>In fact, if we were to divide Spanish geography into  $1\text{km}^2$  cells, only 12.5% of these cells would be inhabited, as compared with 68% in France, and 57% in Italy. These ratios are computed using the 2011 GEOSTAT  $1\text{km}^2$  population grid dataset.

<sup>20</sup>For completeness, Figure A2 shows that foreign-born priests when working in dioceses with a higher presence of foreign-born priests do not influence their communities more than when working in dioceses with a lower presence of foreign-born priests.

## 5 Main results

### 5.1 Influence on religiosity

We start by looking at whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a given municipality changes its local religiosity. As explained in Section 3, I measure social religiosity by using the number of Catholic weddings and the number of births.

Whether and how foreign priests are able to shape social religiosity is far from trivial. On the one hand, we could expect that the arrival of a foreign priest to a community might deter individuals from following the Church’s directives. In fact, the decision to move into and out of a religious group might be more influenced by the need for belonging, than believing itself (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). In our case, this would mean that locals, when deciding their type of wedding, might factor in positively having as officiant priest the local one they grew up with. In turn, this would result in a lesser number of Catholic weddings performed in those municipalities led by a foreign priest. On the other hand, foreign priests might be inherently more effective than local priests in conveying Catholic teachings. In fact, foreign priests in our sample are two times more likely to be missionaries than their local counterparts. In our case, this would imply that parishioners would relate to their church more intensely, possibly overcoming the “loss” of their old-standing local priest, and resulting in more Catholic celebrations.

Figure 5 displays the evolution of weddings at the local level following the arrival of a foreign religious leader. Important to notice is that weddings, especially in municipalities with few residents, might be considered a rare event given the demographic dynamics. On average, the municipalities used in the sample have on average 2.8 weddings per year, but more than 50% of the municipalities do not have any weddings in a given year. Subfigure 5a highlights that the arrival of a foreign-born priest to the municipality leads to an increase in the number of weddings following the Catholic rite. Six years after a foreign priest’s arrival, treated municipalities have significantly 0.35 more Catholic weddings than other municipalities with local priests. This represents a 21% increase in the average number of Catholic weddings. Such an increase comes at the expense of civil-only weddings. Subfigure 5b shows how, six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the municipality holds 0.17 fewer civil-only weddings, which represents a 12.75% decrease in the average number of civil-only weddings. No significant influence is observed on the overall number of weddings celebrated (see subfigure 5c) nor on those weddings following other religious denominations (see subfigure 5d).

However, marrying by the Catholic rite could still be entirely influenced by the inherent traits of the officiant priest, and not so much by local religiosity. To provide further evidence on this matter, I look at local fertility. As explained in Section 3, fertility is

a good proxy for social religiosity given the strong emphasis the Catholic Church puts on traditional family creation. Figure 6 shows how upon arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality the number of local births starts growing. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the village experiences an average increase of 0.65 new births per year, which represents a 10% increase in the average number of births. While small in magnitude, such figure has a really important economic significance for the municipalities analysed, as they are characterized by their aging population and progressive economic decline.

Overall, these results suggest that foreign priests are indeed more effective than their local counterparts in convincing people into two of the main pillars of the Catholic Church, namely marriage and family creation. However, whether and how foreign priests influence their parishioners on non-religious matters is still under question.

## 5.2 Influence on electoral outcomes

In this section, I study whether the arrival of a foreign priest changes the political behavior of its parishioners. As explained in Section 3, I first focus on the right-left dimension as it divides parties into church supporters and detractors, respectively.<sup>21</sup>

Whether and how foreign priests are able to shape local political preferences is far from trivial. On the one hand, one could expect that the arrival of a foreign-born priest would help the community to realize that foreigners can be part of the “local elite”, and become a bridge between immigrants and natives in the municipality as theorized in Allport et al. (1954). In such a case, we would observe that those pro-immigration parties, identified more prominently in the sample as left-leaning (Volkens et al., 2021), would benefit from the arrival of a foreign priest. On the other hand, foreign priests might be inherently more religious and charismatic than their local counterparts, which could lead to a higher vote share for right-wing parties, given their Church-friendly positions. A third viable option is that religious leaders no longer have societal relevance, given the increasing secularization as shown in Section 2, which would ultimately imply that their demographic attributes would no longer play an active role in shaping natives’ political behavior.

Figure 7 displays the political evolution of left and right-leaning parties following the arrival of a foreign priest to the community. Subfigure 7a presents the vote share for left-wing parties and shows how the appointment of a foreign priest slowly changes individual political preferences away from the left. Six years after the arrival of the foreign priest,<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>For completeness, Figures A3, A4, A5, and A6 in the Appendix show that foreign-born priests do not have a significantly effect on the spending preferences and economic prosperity of their communities.

<sup>22</sup>Given that elections are held on average every 18 months, the 6 years window corresponds to four elections after arrival, including its contemporaneous one.

treated municipalities are 1.4% less likely to vote for left-wing parties, representing a 3.5% decrease in the average voting share for the left. Such decrease is captured by right-wing parties, which see a significant increase in their voting share of 1% (See Figure 7b).

However, such influence towards traditionalist parties might actually be hiding a compositional effect, in which minority integration could play a role. To explore that dimension, I subdivide the right aisle into conservative and radical right parties. Figure 8 shows how upon arrival, parishioners slowly move towards conservative positions, and away from radical right ones. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the village votes 1.5% more to conservative parties, representing a 3% increase in the average voting share for conservative parties. Contrarily, the arrival of a foreign priest to the parish mobilizes his parishioners away from extreme positions, and decreases the voting share of these parties by 0.6%, representing a 23% decrease in the average voting share for radical rights parties.

A secondary channel explaining such electoral shift would be the change in the voters composition. On the one hand, we could expect that foreign-born priests, given the stronger religious influence they have in their communities, might move their parishioners to rely more on the Church, as opposed to the state. Thus, deciding not to participate in the elections. On the other hand, the presence of these priests might have the opposite effect, as their influence might increase their communities cohesion and political-positioning. Thus, increasing their voting participation. Figure 9 corroborates the latter argument. It shows that indeed foreign-born religious leaders consistently mobilize their communities into electoral participation.

Overall, these findings are in line with the duality defining foreign priests, their religiousness, and nationality. They show that foreign priests are successful in bringing their parishioners closer to Church-friendly positions, represented politically in Spain by the conservative parties, and away from openly xenophobic positions, represented politically by radical right parties.

### 5.3 Influence on social values

In the previous sections, we saw that when a foreign priest is present in a municipality, its people move towards more conservative and religious positions. These religious leaders seem to be more effective than their local counterparts in guiding people, but is such guidance also helping the Spanish Church push its own political agenda?

To answer this question, I look at a political regime that has heavily influenced the ideology of the Spanish church, but is presumably orthogonal to that of foreign-born priests, Franco's dictatorship. As explained in Section 3, I measure for each municipality the level of Francoist support, using the share of streets using dictatorial names. I

interpret the fact of maintaining names from the dictatorship as a sign of social stagnation.

Whether and how foreign priests influence their parishioners for maintaining old dictatorial honors is far from trivial. On the one hand, one could expect that the arrival of a foreign priest might be beneficial for removing these honors, as the previous local priest might have played the role of gatekeeper, preventing such changes. In such event, we would observe that upon arrival, the community would decide to remove all Francoist-sounding street names. On the other hand, given the high influence that foreign priests have on their parishioners, we could expect a second-order effect by which given that individuals get closer to the Church, they start to pay less attention to the Francoist past. While foreign priests might not necessarily be convincing their parishioners on anything related to Franco's dictatorship, the fact of creating a closer community, around Catholicism, might trigger a higher conformism in the community, which would result in preserving dictatorial honors, among other measures. A third viable option is that religious leaders, and the Spanish church by extension, might no longer have a positive opinion, whether public or private, about that political regime. In such case, we would expect to find no effect on the arrival of a foreign priest, as parishioners would not associate in any way the church with the dictatorship.

Figure 10 presents the evolution of Francoist street naming following the arrival of a foreign priest to the community. One year after the arrival, treated municipalities have 0.07% more streets with a Francoist name, representing a 7.7% increase in the average number of Francoist streets. As time passes, such differences deepen. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, treated municipalities have 0.19% more Francoist streets than comparable villages with no foreign-born priest, representing an increase of 21.7% on the unconditional mean. As shown in Section 3, the percentage of streets honoring the Francoist dictatorship has steadily decreased over the period of study, going from 1.56% in 2001 to 0.2% in 2019. This, in turn, means that the sole exposure to a foreign priest delays social change by up to 3 years.

Overall, this result highlights that while foreign priests do not necessarily convey a pro-Francoist speech, their ability to mobilize people towards more conservative and religious positions makes it easier for these people to accept an old status quo.

## 6 What is driving such effect?

### 6.1 Municipality heterogeneous effects

In this section, I explore how municipal characteristics act as modulators of the influence foreign-born religious leaders have on their parishioners.<sup>23</sup>

I begin by investigating whether local immigration plays a role in the influence of foreign priests. To do so, I use the 2001 Spanish Census to identify those municipalities with an above and below median number of foreign-born individuals. This allows me to differentiate between those municipalities with frequent contact with immigrants from those with little to no contact. On the one hand, we could expect that municipalities with a long tradition of immigration might be more receptive to foreign-born priests, as prior to his arrival, other immigrants might have already eased the contact. Moreover, the immigrant population in these communities might act as the initial stepping stone into the parish, allowing the priest to reach the whole community. On the other hand, natives might not necessarily see foreigners positively, reject the arrival of a foreign priest, and move away from the church. This could be both happening in high immigration municipalities, where natives might feel that their own culture is challenged, and in low immigration municipalities, where locals might hold stereotypical prejudices toward foreigners.

Figure 11 shows how the arrival of a foreign-born priest affects their parishioners depending on the community's local immigration status.<sup>24</sup> We can see how foreign-born religious leaders are more effective in guiding more ethnically diverse municipalities, especially in bringing these parishioners back to the church. However, foreign priests do not differentially influence individuals' political ideology, especially regarding radical right parties. These results suggest that while foreign-born priests only bring new parishioners to the Church when in diverse municipalities, they influence their communities political views irrespectively of the local composition. Thus, not supporting the contact hypothesis theory (Allport et al., 1954).

The previous results highlighted that foreign priests were more effective in more diverse communities. However, whether foreign priests could be an effective tool in helping minorities integrate into their communities is still under question. To provide evidence on that respect, I use the 2001 Spanish Census and identify those municipalities that in 2001

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<sup>23</sup>For completeness, Figures A7 and A8 in the Appendix show that foreign priests do not differentially influence their parishioners along the presence of local religious grass-root movements, and local education. On the contrary, Figure A9 shows that foreign-born priests are specially effective in bringing people to the church when placed in more demographically vibrant municipalities.

<sup>24</sup>Throughout all heterogeneous effects, I look at the influence six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, as the Spanish church's policy is to maintain religious leaders in their parishes for at least that duration.

had Latin American and Maghrebi communities. I focus on those two subgroups as they constitute the largest subgroups of immigrants, amounting to 0.39% and 0.25% of the Spanish population in 2001, respectively. Furthermore, while Latin American immigrants are culturally and religiously close to Spanish-born people, Maghrebi immigrants are not, having been historically portrayed as the “others” ([Martin Corrales, 2002](#)). Figure 12 displays the influence of foreign-born priests on those municipalities with long traditions with Latin American and Maghrebi populations. We can observe how foreign-born priests are equally effective at influencing those communities with a long tradition of Latin American and Maghrebi communities. These results suggest that foreign-born priests effectively mobilize their native followers towards closer communities around traditional values in ethnically diverse parishes but do not differentially accommodate culturally and religiously similar immigrants.

I then look at whether foreign priests influence their parishioners differently depending on the local political background. To that end, I identify which municipalities have a historically conservative profile and which ones do not. I use voting data for all national and European elections between 1975 and 1999 and classify municipalities as conservative when they voted more for right-wing parties and non-conservatives when they voted more for left-wing parties. Figure 13 shows how the presence of a foreign priest in a community affects its parishioners along the community’s political background. We can see that local political ideology does not affect the religious influence of foreign priests. However, that is not the case when it comes to political matters. First, we can see that foreign priests guide towards more conservative positions those parishioners in municipalities that were historically liberal. Second, we can also observe that such political influence is reverted when it comes to the extreme right. Foreign-born priests influence their parishioners away from radical-right positions, especially in those historically conservative municipalities. Lastly, while traditionally conservative parishes deviate from radical-right positions, with the arrival of foreign priests, they also stop questioning the old status quo, shown by the higher maintenance of streets honoring Franco’s dictatorship. Taking all results together, they suggest that foreign priests effectively gain votes for the conservative parties, mainly at the expense of left-leaning parties in liberal strongholds.

Finally, I examine whether the local economic situation influences how foreign-born priests interact with their communities. To do so, I use the 2001 Spanish Census to identify those municipalities with above and below median unemployment rate. This classification is important as religion could be perceived as a good of last resort, specially appealing in municipalities with worse economic outcomes. Figure 14 shows that foreign-born priests are more effective than their local counterparts in bringing people to the church, specially in those municipalities that have more economic needs. These results

suggest that foreign religious leaders are better at promoting the social support of the Catholic church.

Overall, these results shed light on which parish characteristics are crucial in understanding the effective influence of foreign-born priests. In this section, we have shown that foreign-born religious leaders are especially effective in ethnically diverse municipalities, promoting closer communities around traditional values; and promoting a conservative, and traditional mindset, away from liberal and extreme-right positions.

## 6.2 Priest heterogeneous effects

In this section, I explore which of the priests' characteristics act as modulators of the influence exerted by foreign-born religious leaders.<sup>25</sup>

I first examine whether foreign-born religious leaders differentially influence their communities depending on whether they were ordained in a Spanish seminary. We could expect that studying in a Spanish seminary teaches priests, not only certain theological approaches, but also Spanish cultural idiosyncrasy, which could lead to some partial cultural assimilation. Whether such assimilation is positive or not for the priest's endeavors is far from trivial. On the one hand, the know-how of the local culture could be beneficial to access the whole community, thus promoting more effectively Catholic teachings. On the other hand, a full adaptation of the foreign priest to the local culture could also prove to be detrimental as it could ultimately lead to the loss of the religious drive that brought them to Spain. Figure 15 shows whether the presence of a foreign priest in a community affects its parishioners depending on whether the priest studied in a Spanish seminary. No significant differences are found in any of the outcomes of interest, suggesting that studying in a Spanish seminary, as opposed to studying in a foreign seminary, is only used more as a decoy to attract foreign priests, but has no significant impact on their role as religious leaders.

I further look at whether the nationality of foreign priests matters. To that end, I differentiate foreign priests between those born in a Latin American country, and those born elsewhere. I follow this dichotomous approach for a couple of reasons. While Latin Americans share with Spaniards the language together with rich cultural, religious, and historical similarities, those priests born elsewhere will likely only share the religious aspect. This fact might help Latin American priests integrate more effectively into the local communities as opposed to those coming from other countries, which in turn, could

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<sup>25</sup>For completeness, Figures A10 and A11 in the Appendix show that the religious leader's tenure and age do not play a determinant role in explaining foreign priests' influence. On the contrary, Figure A12 shows that foreign-born priests belonging to a religious order are more effective at revitalizing religiosity than comparable local order members.

result in a deeper influence on the community. Figure 16 shows how priests born in Latin America and elsewhere influence Spanish parishioners, respectively, as opposed to having a local priest. We can see that, in fact, foreign-born priests do not differentially influence their communities with regard to their country of birth.<sup>26</sup>

Overall, I show that having similar cultural and language traits to the local population are not the key determinants to explain foreign-born priests' effective influence. I further find no evidence that priests' age and tenure are good predictors of foreign-born priests' influence. These results suggest that the influence foreign-born priests have on their communities come from unobserved characteristics, common to all foreign-born priests, such as their inherently higher motivation and devotion. These results are in line with recent sociological research, which describes the role of the Ghanaian Adventist Church in the Netherlands ([Koning, 2011](#)) and of Korean protestants in the United States ([Kim, 2015](#)).

## 7 Conclusion

This paper provides novel evidence on the relevance religious leaders have in shaping religious and sociopolitical attitudes. To do so, I follow a twofold approach. First, I collect a unique dataset containing the universe of Catholic priest appointments taking place in rural Spain at any point in time between 2000 and 2019, and including detailed information on the priests' inherent traits, such as country of birth, order, age, tenure, and education. I further complement such data with a novel phone survey covering the priests' political opinions and working habits. Second, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the assignment of foreign-born priests to Spanish parishes to provide a causal interpretation of how these religious leaders shape the native's sociopolitical attitudes. I document that 13.3% of all the priests in the sample were not born in Spain, arriving primarily from Latin American countries, and with a missionary vocation.

I find that foreign-born priests are effective traditional community builders. I show that upon arrival, foreign-born religious leaders influence their communities towards higher religious practice, measured by the number of Catholic weddings and births. Similarly, foreign priests are effective in bringing their parishioners' political opinions closer to Catholic-aligned positions, at the expense of left-leaning and radical right parties. However, such extra influence comes at a price, as the stronger relevance of the Spanish Catholic church prevents parishioners from challenging an old status quo, such as the Francoist legacy, limiting social progress.

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<sup>26</sup>For completeness, Figure A13, and Figure A14 show suggestive evidence that priests' ideology, and hierarchy-leanings, are important in explaining foreign-born religious leaders' influence, respectively. However, these estimates come from the priest's survey, which might suffer from small power considerations.

I further find evidence that foreign-born religious leaders have a significant influence ethnically diverse municipalities, suggesting that a contact hypothesis story is not at play. Such stronger influence does not come, however, from the immigrant population, but from the native one, which reinforces the idea that foreign-born religious leaders are effective at creating strong in-group cohesion among the native population, while not affecting minorities. Additional evidence highlights that cultural or linguistic distance to the local community are not relevant factors at explaining the stronger influence of foreign-born priests, further suggesting that my results are driven by unobserved characteristics, common to all foreign-born priests, such as their inherently higher motivation and devotion.

To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first study that looks at how local religious leaders influence their parishioners' sociopolitical attitudes. I do it in a context in which religious leaders are one of the main community pillars, having an important influence on people's beliefs. More generally, it focuses on an overlooked process, the change in the composition of the Catholic priesthood, highlighting that the arrival of foreign-born religious, with their inherent missionary devotion, might lead to a setback in the process of secularization.

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# Tables and Figures

Table 1: Descriptives - Priests' country of birth

Country of Origin	Share	N
Spanish	0.867	2243
Colombian	0.057	150
Other Latin American	0.024	64
Other nationalities	0.022	58
Mexican	0.016	43
Polish	0.011	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2587</b>

Note: The table provides descriptive evidence of the nationality of those priests working in my sample of analysis. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

Table 2: Summary Statistics (at baseline)

	Never Foreign-Led	Ever Foreign-Led	p-value
Population	762.422	641.897	0.042
Youth share	0.127	0.122	0.046
Retired share	0.325	0.334	0.041
Uneducated share	0.212	0.212	0.918
Technical education share	0.717	0.719	0.727
Singles share	0.378	0.365	0.000
Divorced share	0.004	0.004	0.123
Immigrants share	0.013	0.019	0.000
Labor participation (Male)	0.575	0.562	0.002
Labor participation (Female)	0.269	0.274	0.231
Unemployed share	0.106	0.100	0.059
Self-employed share	0.298	0.297	0.931
Temporal workers share	0.222	0.213	0.064
Farmers share	0.287	0.281	0.403
Share Right-wing	0.406	0.390	0.001
Grassroot Catholicism	0.074	0.058	0.119

Note: The table provides a comparison of the baseline characteristics between municipalities that had a foreign priest between 2000 and 2019 (ever foreign-led) and those that did not (never foreign-led). The information at the municipal level is extracted from the 2001 Census. The share of votes to right-leaning parties was calculated using all national and European elections held between 1975 and 2000. Grassroot Catholicism identifies whether there existed in 2001 any grassroot Catholic initiative in the municipality.

Table 3: Priests' Characteristics - Foreign vs. Local

	Baseline	Foreign Priests		Local Priests		p-value
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
<b>Panel A: Full Sample Characteristics</b>						
Foreign		0.134				
Religious Order	0.100	0.150	0.358	0.092	0.290	(0.004)
Spanish Educated	0.891	0.223	0.417	1.000	0.000	(0.000)
Observations	2587	346		2241	2587	
<b>Panel B: Individual Characteristics (from Annual Directories)</b>						
Age (in years)	63.531	51.250	11.680	64.659	14.645	(0.000)
Tenure (in years)	36.431	20.647	11.757	37.884	15.887	(0.000)
Observations	808	68		740	808	
<b>Panel C: Individual Characteristics (from Survey)</b>						
<i>C.1) Missionary Status</i>						
Missionary	0.292	0.667	0.480	0.248	0.433	(0.000)
Missionary (in years)	1.905	4.963	4.701	1.546	4.668	(0.001)
<i>C.2) Political Ideology</i>						
Social Conservative	6.056	6.467	1.854	6.006	1.794	(0.230)
Economic Liberal	5.593	4.720	3.127	5.701	2.306	(0.125)
Church is Right	0.665	0.520	0.510	0.683	0.467	(0.139)
Discuss Political Issues	2.210	2.074	1.072	2.226	0.916	(0.485)
Economic Situation	3.567	2.926	0.958	3.645	0.783	(0.001)
<i>C.3) Working Habits</i>						
Church Attendance (%)	23.706	21.462	21.967	23.975	19.212	(0.581)
Mass Hours (weekly)	9.769	9.704	5.485	9.777	5.167	(0.948)
Family Planning	0.537	0.500	0.508	0.542	0.499	(0.665)
Minorities Integration	0.337	0.375	0.492	0.332	0.472	(0.643)
Social Care	0.667	0.719	0.457	0.660	0.475	(0.499)
Village Participation	0.375	0.438	0.504	0.368	0.483	(0.462)
Num. Activities	2.868	3.074	1.466	2.843	1.815	(0.457)
Parish-Local Council Relation	2.400	2.259	1.347	2.417	1.186	(0.564)
Open Question (length)	133.809	136.519	114.324	133.491	109.194	(0.897)
Observations	257	27		230	257	

Note: This table shows the distribution of priests' characteristics as follows: Baseline (Col. 1); Foreign priests (Col. 2-3); Local Priests (Col. 4-5). The p-value of the difference between Foreign and Local priests is reported in Column 6. Missionary is an indicator variable that identifies if a priest has ever worked/is working as missionary (See 6.2 and 7 in Section C). Missionary (in years) measures the cumulative time that an individual has ever worked as missionary. Social Conservative is a weighted sum of Questions 11-16 in Section C. Economic Liberal is a weighted sum of Questions 9 and 10, as exposed in Section C in the Appendix. Both Social Conservative and Economic Liberal have a distribution that go from 0 to 10. Church is Right is an indicator variable that identifies if a priest does not question the Pope's political views (See Questions 17 and 18). Discuss Political Issues corresponds to Question 23 in the survey and measures how much a priest talks with his parishioners about political issues. Economic Situation corresponds to Question 19 and measures how bad the priesthood sees the current economic situation. Church attendance measures the percentage of the priest's parishioners that attend frequently the Sunday mass (See Question 20). Mass Hours is a variable that measures the hours a priest employs directly officiating masses (See Question 21). Family Planning, Minorities Integration, Social Care, and Village Participation are indicator variables that identify if a given priest participates in any related activity (See Question 24). Num Activities is a discrete variable that identifies in how many activities a given priest participates (See Question 24). Parish-Local Council Relation is a discrete variable that identifies the level of disagreement between local council and parish (See Question 25). Open Question is a continuous variable that measures the length of Open Question 26. All other information is self-explanatory.

Table 4: Placebo test - Influence of foreign priests on sociopolitical attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Cath	Civil	Birth	Right	Left	Cons	Rad. Right	Francoist
Foreign	0.0406 (0.0554)	-0.00850 (0.0611)	0.153 (0.1376)	0.00450 (0.0028)	-0.00330 (0.0026)	0.00340 (0.0029)	0.0010** (0.0005)	0.0293 (0.0374)
Observations	71079	71079	71039	44568	44568	44568	44568	109741


Note: This table tests whether the evolution of an outcome variable from  $t - 2$  to  $t - 1$ , differs between municipalities treated at  $t$  from those not treated. Cath identifies the number of Catholic weddings performed in a municipality, and Civil the number of civil-only weddings. Birth measures the number of births taking place in the municipality. Right, Left, Cons, and Rad. Right are variables that measure the share of the votes in a municipality that were earned by Right, Left, Conservative, and Radical Right parties, respectively. Francoist is a variable measuring the share of streets in a municipality that are honoring Francoist regime. All regressions include municipality and time fixed effects, and control by row population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the current priest is in solidum. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level.

Table 5: Effect of a new priest's arrival vs. new foreign priest's arrival

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Cath	Civil	Birth	Right	Left	Cons	Rad. Right	Francoist
New Priest	-0.1961*** (0.0708)	0.1182*** (0.0322)	-0.1494 (0.1064)	-0.0013 (0.0017)	-0.0006 (0.0016)	0.0003 (0.0017)	-0.0016** (0.0007)	0.0557 (0.0440)
New Foreign Priest	0.3772*** (0.0811)	-0.1428*** (0.0443)	0.5521*** (0.1311)	-0.0003 (0.0029)	-0.0038 (0.0028)	0.0047 (0.0030)	-0.0050*** (0.0015)	0.1177* (0.0619)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	78651	78651	78596	46454	46454	46454	46454	121059
Joint p-value	0.0532	0.617	0.00521	0.617	0.150	0.132	8.31e-05	0.0186
Dep. Var. Mean	1.587	1.286	6.506	0.568	0.408	0.539	0.0299	0.868


Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a new foreign-born priest to a municipality affects a series of outcomes. Cath and Civil identifies the number of catholic and civil-only weddings, respectively. Right, Left, Cons, and Rad. Right identify the voting share to Right, Left, Conservative, and Radical Right parties, respectively. Francoist measures the percentage of the street in a given municipality that honor Franco's dictatorship. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Figure 1: Religiosity evolution (2000-2019)




Note: The figure reports how self-reported religiosity has evolved over time. I use collapsed information at the yearly level from the monthly public opinion surveys conducted by the Spanish Center of Sociological Research (CIS). Subfigure 1a displays the overall evolution by religious practice, and Subfigure 1b shows the evolution by church attendance, for those individuals reporting following a denomination.

Figure 2: Ordainment evolution (2001-2019)




Note: The figure displays the number of ordained priests per year in Spanish seminaries. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

Figure 3: Distribution by municipalities




Note: The figure displays the relationship of municipalities used in the analysis. The municipalities in dark green represent those in which at any point in time between 2000 and 2019, a foreign priest was present in the municipality. The municipalities in olive green represent all those other municipalities used in the analysis, which never had a foreign priest. Municipalities in light green represent those municipalities not used in the study, as they are composed by several population centers and/or parishes. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

Figure 4: Outcome evolution (2000-2019)




Note: The figure reports how a series of outcomes have evolved over time. Subfigure 4a shows the evolution of the relative share of Catholic, non-Catholic, and civil weddings. 4b displays the average number of births per municipality in the sample of study. 4c shows the evolution of the voting share of right and left-leaning parties, while 4d displays the evolution of the voting share of conservative and radical right parties. 4e reports the percentage of streets in the sample of study having a Francoist name.

Figure 5: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on religious outcomes




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects the probability of getting married, by wedding ritual. Subfigures 5a displays how it affects Catholic weddings, 5b studies how it affects civil-only weddings, 5c whether it affects the total number of weddings carried out in a given municipality, and 5d whether it affects the wedding probability in other denominations. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A9 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 6: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on fertility




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of births in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A9 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 7: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes - Left vs. Right




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigures 7a shows how it affects the voting share of left-wing parties and Subfigure 7b displays how it affect the voting share of right-wing parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A10 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 8: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes  
Conservative vs. Rad. Right




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigures 8a displays how it affect the voting share of conservative parties and Subfigure 8b how it affects the voting share of radical right parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A10 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 9: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on voting absenteeism




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on its electoral participation. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A10 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 10: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Francoist street naming




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on the number of streets in the municipality with a Francoist name. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A11 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 11: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Immigration




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates the change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, in green, and those with a below median number of foreign-born individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A12 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 12: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Immigration  
Latin American vs. Maghrebi




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates the change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, baseline, with an above median number of Latin American individuals, in green, and those with an above median number of Maghrebi individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A13 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 13: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Conservatism




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with a historically conservative voting behavior (i.e., above median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), in green, and those with a historically liberal voting behavior (i.e., below median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), in blue. Municipalities are classified using data on all national and European elections that took place between 1975 and 1999, available at the Spanish Interior Ministry. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A14 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 14: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Unemployment




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median unemployment rate, in green, and those with a below median unemployment rate, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A15 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 15: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Study



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who studied in a Spanish seminary, in green, and those who did not, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A16 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 16: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Origin




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates foreign priests by those who were born in Latin America, in green, and those who were born anywhere else in the world, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A17 displays numerically this figure.

# Appendix - For Online Publication


## A Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on migration




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the arrival of new incoming population. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A18 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A2: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by foreign-born priests density




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those dioceses that belong to the ecclesiastical province of Zaragoza (characterized by the extensive use of foreign-born priests), in green, and those located elsewhere, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A19 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A3: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on social spending




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality shapes preferences toward social projects. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A20 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A4: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on business-related spending




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality shapes preferences toward business-related projects. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A20 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A5: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on unemployment rates




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality leads to changes in unemployment rates. The unemployment rates are measured per capita instead of per working age population due to missing data. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A21 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A6: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on contracting rates




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality promotes the creation of new labor contracts. The contracting rates are measured per capita instead of per working age population due to missing data. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A21 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A7: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Catholic Movements




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities who had registered as of the year 2000 at least a Catholic organization, in green, and those who did not have any organization registered, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from Directory of Religious Entities, provided by the Spanish Ministry of Justice. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A22 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A8: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Uneducatedness




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number in individuals with no formal education, in green, and those with a below median number in individuals with no formal education, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A23 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A9: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Demographic Structure




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of young individuals, in green, and those with a below median number of young individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A24 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A10: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Tenure




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests whose tenure is above the median, in green, and those whose tenure is below the median, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A25 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A11: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Age




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests whose age is above the median, in green, and those whose age is below the median, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A26 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A12: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Order




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are part of a religious orders, in green, and those who are diocesan, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A27 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A13: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Ideology



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests holding more conservative views, in green, and those who do not, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A28 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A14: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Hierarchy-Leaning



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between religious leaders that do not challenge the pope's rulings, in green, and those that challenge them, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units.  $p$ -values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A29 displays numerically this figure.

Table A1: Distribution of municipalities and parishes per diocese

Diocese	Municipalities			Parishes		
	Used	Not Used	Total	Used	Not Used	Total
Albacete	61	25	86	61	115	176
Ávila	216	4	220	216	15	231
Barbastro-Monzón	91	10	101	91	34	125
Burgos	328	40	368	328	359	687
Calahorra y La Calzada - Logroño	166	8	174	166	49	215
Ciudad Real	89	13	102	89	48	137
Ciudad Rodrigo	79	3	82	79	11	90
Coria-Cáceres	102	6	108	102	25	127
Cuenca	223	14	237	223	55	278
Huesca	61	11	72	61	45	106
Jaca	54	6	60	54	20	74
Osma-Soria	172	8	180	172	33	205
Palencia	177	13	190	177	53	230
Plasencia	132	10	142	132	32	164
Salamanca	243	13	256	243	53	296
Segovia	206	3	209	206	21	227
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	281	6	287	281	31	312
Tarazona	119	2	121	119	10	129
Teruel y Albarracín	191	3	194	191	14	205
Toledo	210	11	221	210	47	257
Valencia	274	52	326	274	326	600
Valladolid	204	17	221	204	92	296
Zamora	163	6	169	163	33	196
Zaragoza	178	2	180	178	71	249
Total	4020	286	4306	4020	1592	5612

Note: The table displays in Columns 1-3 those municipalities used and not used in the analysis. Column 4-6 display the equivalence in terms of parishes used and not used. I use in the analysis all those municipalities with a single population center and parish (Columns 1 and 4). I do not use those municipalities with multiple population centers or multiple parishes.

Table A2: Distribution of priest by country of birth and diocese

Diocese	Foreign Priests	Local Priests	Sh. Foreign	Total
Albacete	5	34	0.13	39
Ávila	2	74	0.03	76
Barbastro-Monzón	35	89	0.28	124
Burgos	6	177	0.03	183
Calahorra y La Calzada-Logroño	9	74	0.11	83
Ciudad Real	10	86	0.10	96
Ciudad Rodrigo	2	31	0.06	33
Coria-Cáceres	9	84	0.10	93
Cuenca	5	104	0.05	109
Huesca	12	40	0.23	52
Jaca	5	23	0.18	28
Osma-Soria	0	78	0	78
Palencia	1	92	0.01	93
Plasencia	34	71	0.32	105
Salamanca	3	73	0.04	76
Segovia	10	68	0.13	78
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	7	135	0.05	142
Tarazona	32	50	0.39	82
Teruel y Albarracín	32	65	0.33	97
Toledo	20	257	0.07	277
Valencia	16	264	0.06	280
Valladolid	4	109	0.04	113
Zamora	1	45	0.02	46
Zaragoza	86	118	0.42	204
Total	346	2241	0.13	2587

Note: The table displays in Column 1 the list of dioceses covered in the analysis. Column 2 displays the distribution of foreign-born priests per diocese. Column 3 shows the distribution of Spanish-born priest per diocese. Column 4 presents the share of priest in a given diocese that are foreign-born. Column 5 reports the total number of priests per diocese.

Table A3: Sample Comparison: Birth Data vs. No Birth Data

	Birth Data		No Birth Data		p-value
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Foreign	0.084	0.278	0.156	0.363	(0.000)
Order Member	0.047	0.212	0.124	0.330	(0.000)
Spanish Educated	0.948	0.222	0.861	0.346	(0.000)
In Solidum	0.256	0.387	0.199	0.362	(0.000)
Observations	808		1779		2587

Note: This table compares how the sample of priest for which birth data was found (Col. 1 and 2) compares with those for which no birth data was found (Col.3 and 4). The p-value of the difference between both groups is presented in Column 5. Foreign is a dummy variable identifying if the priest was not born in Spain. Order Member is a variable identifying whether a priest is part of a religious order or not. Spanish Educated is a dummy variable identifying whether a given priest studied in a Spanish seminary. In Solidum identifies the share of positions held by a given priest that are shared with other priests (in solidum).

Table A4: Distribution of priest by country of birth and diocese - Survey Sample

Diocese	All Priests	Potential	Surveyed	Foreign	Local
Albacete	39	0	0	0	0
Ávila	76	47	10	0	10
Barbastro-Monzón	124	48	22	7	15
Burgos	183	38	5	0	5
Calahorra y La Calzada - Logroño	83	48	11	0	11
Ciudad Real	96	85	12	0	12
Ciudad Rodrigo	33	0	0	0	0
Coria-Cáceres	93	56	6	0	6
Cuenca	109	106	21	0	21
Huesca	52	28	11	2	9
Jaca	28	16	5	1	4
Osma-Soria	78	73	18	0	18
Palencia	93	0	0	0	0
Plasencia	105	48	3	0	3
Salamanca	76	57	18	0	18
Segovia	78	73	10	0	10
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	142	141	14	2	12
Tarazona	82	56	9	1	8
Teruel y Albarracín	97	41	14	4	10
Toledo	277	138	20	0	20
Valencia	280	0	0	0	0
Valladolid	113	51	14	0	14
Zamora	46	45	8	0	8
Zaragoza	204	93	26	10	16
Total	2587	1288	257	27	230

Note: The table displays in Column 1 the distribution of all priests per diocese. In Column 2, it shows the distribution of all priests per diocese for which the personal contact information was available. In Column 3, it shows the distribution per diocese of those priests that have been surveyed. In Column 4, it shows the distribution per diocese of foreign-born priests, and in Column 5, it shows the distribution of Spanish-born priests.

Table A5: Sample Comparison: Survey vs. No Survey

	Survey Data		No Survey Data		p-value
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Foreign	0.105	0.307	0.137	0.344	(0.120)
Order Member	0.047	0.211	0.106	0.308	(0.000)
Spanish Educated	0.949	0.220	0.884	0.320	(0.000)
In Solidum	0.305	0.402	0.207	0.366	(0.000)
Observations	257		2330		2587
Age	58.545	13.988	65.864	14.746	(0.000)
Tenure	31.358	15.269	38.802	16.232	(0.000)
Observations	257		550		807

Note: This table compares how the sample of priest for which survey data was collected (Col. 1 and 2) compares with those for which no survey data was collected (Col.3 and 4). The p-value of the difference between both groups is presented in Column 5. Foreign is a dummy variable identifying if the priest was not born in Spain. Order Member is a variable identifying whether a priest is part of a religious order or not. Spanish Educated is a dummy variable identifying whether a given priest studied in a Spanish seminary. In Solidum identifies the share of positions held by a given priest that are shared with other priests (in solidum). All other variables are self-explanatory.

Table A6: Left-Right Political Spectrum

### Panel A: Left-wing parties

AR, CEUS, CHA, EQUO, En Marea, ERC, ERPV, EUPV-EV, FRONT, IU, Los Verdes, Mas País, Més Compromís, PCPE, Podemos, PH, POSI, Primavera Europea, PR+, PSOE, PUM+J, Recortes Cero

### Panel B: Right-wing parties

ADN, AES, AN, AUN, CDES, Cs, CVA, DN, España 2000, FA, FE, FEdelasJONS, FN, La Falange, MAS, MSR, PADE, PDN, PAR, PFyV, PLD, PP, PPSO, PRGU, UDCA, VOX

Note: The initials for the left-wing parties relate to the following parties. AR: Acción Republicana; CEUS: Coalición por una Europa Solidaria; CHA: Chunta Aragonesista; ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; ERPV: Esquerra Republicana del País Valencià; EUPV-EV: Esquerra Unida del País Valencià; FRONT: Front per País Valencià; IU: Izquierda Unida; PCPE: Partido Comunista del Pueblo Español; PH: Partido Humanista; POSI: Partido Obrero Socialista Internacionalista; PR+: Partido Riojano; PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PUM+J: Por Un Mundo Más Justo. The initials for the right-wing parties relate to the following parties. ADN: ADN Identidad Española; AES: Alternativa Española; AN: Alianza Nacional; AUN: Alianza por la Unidad Nacional; CDES: Centro Democrático Español; Cs: Ciudadanos; CVA: Coalición Valenciana; DN: Democracia Nacional; FA: Falange Auténtica; FE: Frente Español; FEdelasJONS: Falange Española de las JONS; FN: Fuerza Nueva; MAS: Movimiento Social Aragonés; MSR: Movimiento Social Republicà; PADE: Partido Demócrata Español; PDN: Partido Demócrata Nacional de España; PFyV: Familia y Vida; PLD: Partido Liberal de Derechas; PP: Partido Popular; PPSO: Plataforma del Pueblo Soriano; PRGU: Partido Regionalista de Guadalajara; UDCA: Unidad Castellana

Table A7: Conservative - Far Right Political Spectrum

**Panel A: Conservative Parties**

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CDES, Cs, PADE, PAR, PDN, PFyV, PLD, PP, PPSO, PRGU, UDCA

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**Panel B: Far-Right Parties**

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ADÑ, AES, AN, AUN, CVA, DN, España 2000, FA, FE, FEdelasJONS, FN, La Falange, MAS, MSR, VOX

---

Note: The initials for the conservative parties relate to the following parties. CDES: Centro Democrático Español; Cs: Ciudadanos; PADE: Partido Demócrata Español; PDN: Partido Demócrata Nacional de España; PFyV: Familia y Vida; PLD: Partido Liberal de Derechas; PP: Partido Popular; PPSO: Plataforma del Pueblo Soriano; PRGU: Partido Regionalista de Guadalajara; UDCA: Unidad Castellana. The initials for the far-right parties refer to the following parties. ADÑ: ADÑ Identidad Española; AES: Alternativa Española; AN: Alianza Nacional; AUN: Alianza por la Unidad Nacional; CVA: Coalición Valenciana; DN: Democracia Nacional; FA: Falange Auténtica; FE: Frente Español; FEdelasJONS: Falange Española de las JONS; FN: Fuerza Nueva; MAS: Movimiento Social Aragonés; MSR: Moviment Social Republicà

Table A8: Francoist street names

**Francoist keywords**

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18 de julio, 18 julio, alzamiento, caudillo, dieciocho de julio, dieciocho julio, division azul, emilio mola, francisco franco, general aranda, general franco, general mola, general moral, general moscardo, general sagardia, general sanjurjo, general valera, general varela, general yague, generalisimo, jose calvo sotelo, jose enrique varela, jose moscardo, jose sanjurjo, los caidos, millan astray, onesimo redondo, primo de rivera, queipo de llano, ramiro ledesma, ruiz de alda, salas pombo, xeneral aranda, xeneral franco, xeneral mola, xeneral moral, xeneral moscardo, xeneral sagardia, xeneral sanjurjo, xeneral valera, xeneral varela, xeneral yague, xeneralisimo

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Note: This table presents the list of ASCII-style keywords used to identify Francoist street names, following [Oto-Peralías \(2018\)](#).

Table A9: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on religious outcomes and fertility

	(1) Cath. W.	(2) Civil W.	(3) Total W.	(4) Other W.	(5) Births
<b>Pre-treatment</b>					
Years from treatment: -5	-0.0634 (0.0754)	-0.0278 (0.0650)	-0.0935 (0.0925)	-0.00240 (0.0057)	-0.0002 (0.1977)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0162 (0.0631)	0.0115 (0.0641)	0.0230 (0.0891)	-0.00480 (0.0054)	-0.181 (0.1491)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0114 (0.0476)	-0.00240 (0.0549)	0.00770 (0.0766)	-0.00110 (0.0043)	-0.0698 (0.1394)
Years from treatment: -2	0.0406 (0.0555)	-0.00860 (0.0610)	0.0284 (0.0821)	-0.00370 (0.0041)	0.153 (0.1376)
<b>Post-treatment</b>					
Years from treatment: 0	0.0412 (0.0494)	-0.00680 (0.0593)	0.0361 (0.0864)	0.00160 (0.0040)	0.0860 (0.1500)
Years from treatment: 1	0.1076* (0.0560)	-0.0548 (0.0579)	0.0513 (0.0837)	-0.00140 (0.0040)	0.3294*** (0.1401)
Years from treatment: 2	0.1833*** (0.0553)	-0.1084** (0.0485)	0.0723 (0.0715)	-0.00240 (0.0038)	0.4819*** (0.1395)
Years from treatment: 3	0.2025*** (0.0597)	-0.0425 (0.0617)	0.1577** (0.0797)	-0.00220 (0.0038)	0.3513*** (0.1468)
Years from treatment: 4	0.2452*** (0.0892)	-0.1049* (0.0581)	0.142 (0.0997)	0.00200 (0.0046)	0.6568*** (0.1727)
Years from treatment: 5	0.3555*** (0.1111)	-0.1700*** (0.0694)	0.182 (0.1274)	-0.00380 (0.0034)	0.6553*** (0.1981)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.4579	0.9846	0.4867	0.8058	0.1058
Mean Dep Var	1.630	1.301	2.937	0.00660	6.607
Observations	74503	74503	74503	74503	74503

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of Civil-only weddings. Column 3 looks at the number of weddings following a non-Catholic denomination. Column 4 explores the total number of weddings performed. Column 5 focuses on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A10: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes

	(1) Right	(2) Left	(3) Cons	(4) Rad Right	(5) Abstention
<u>Pre-treatment</u>					
Elections from treatment: -5	0.00460 (0.0044)	-0.00650 (0.0041)	0.00270 (0.0044)	0.0017*** (0.0006)	-0.00440 (0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -4	0.00310 (0.0038)	-0.0060* (0.0034)	0.00140 (0.0038)	0.0018*** (0.0006)	-0.0077** (0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -3	0.000700 (0.0035)	-0.00190 (0.0031)	-0.00120 (0.0035)	0.0020** (0.001)	-0.00340 (0.0029)
Elections from treatment: -2	0.00460 (0.0029)	-0.00330 (0.0026)	0.00350 (0.0029)	0.0011** (0.0005)	-0.0060** (0.0031)
<u>Post-treatment</u>					
Elections from treatment: 0	0.00350 (0.0033)	-0.00330 (0.0029)	0.0060* (0.0034)	-0.0024* (0.0014)	-0.0071*** (0.003)
Elections from treatment: 1	0.0060* (0.0031)	-0.0059* (0.0033)	0.0070** (0.0034)	-0.000900 (0.0013)	-0.0068*** (0.0029)
Elections from treatment: 2	0.0068* (0.0035)	-0.0108*** (0.0031)	0.0125*** (0.0038)	-0.0057*** (0.0020)	-0.0133*** (0.0033)
Elections from treatment: 3	0.0099*** (0.0038)	-0.0140*** (0.0038)	0.0159*** (0.0040)	-0.0059*** (0.0018)	-0.0194*** (0.0035)
Elections from treatment: 4	0.0108*** (0.0044)	-0.0209*** (0.0043)	0.0199*** (0.0041)	-0.0092*** (0.0024)	-0.0209*** (0.0037)
Elections from treatment: 5	0.00680 (0.0049)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.0273*** (0.0040)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.4412	0.3546	0.4646	0.0328	0.2505
Mean Dep Var	0.570	0.407	0.540	0.0299	0.280
Observations	44764	44764	44764	44764	44764

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Column 1 uses as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties and Column 2 the share of votes to right-leaning parties. Column 3 looks at the share of votes to conservative parties, and Column 4 focuses on the share of votes to radical right parties. Column 5 reports the abstention rates. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A11: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Francoist street naming

	(1)
	% Francoist Streets
<u>Pre-treatment</u>	
Half-years from treatment: -6	-0.0177 (0.0509)
Half-years from treatment: -5	-0.0190 (0.0447)
Half-years from treatment: -4	-0.00600 (0.0419)
Half-years from treatment: -3	0.00430 (0.0388)
Half-years from treatment: -2	0.0294 (0.0373)
<u>Post-treatment</u>	
Half-years from treatment: 0	0.0529*** (0.0066)
Half-years from treatment: 1	0.0768*** (0.0126)
Half-years from treatment: 2	0.0706*** (0.0240)
Half-years from treatment: 3	0.0769** (0.0362)
Half-years from treatment: 4	0.0729* (0.0438)
Half-years from treatment: 5	0.0908* (0.0469)
Half-years from treatment: 6	0.1266*** (0.0476)
Half-years from treatment: 7	0.1599*** (0.0421)
Half-years from treatment: 8	0.2000*** (0.0430)
Half-years from treatment: 9	0.2127*** (0.0428)
Half-years from treatment: 10	0.1900*** (0.0692)
Half-years from treatment: 11	0.1984*** (0.0745)
Half-years from treatment: 12	0.2228*** (0.0763)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.0636
Mean Dep. Var.	0.884
Observations	115501

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on the number of streets in the municipality with a Francoist name. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A12: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Immigration

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693*** (0.0217)	0.1115*** (0.0377)	0.0152* (0.0092)	0.3619*** (0.1133)	0.7792*** (0.2630)	0.0255* (0.0154)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384*** (0.0157)	-0.0533** (0.0261)	-0.0205* (0.0125)	-0.1717*** (0.0702)	-0.3228** (0.1581)	-0.0204* (0.0124)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Births	0.0348*** (0.0104)	0.0566*** (0.0179)	0.00380 (0.0068)	0.6613*** (0.1999)	1.4436*** (0.4580)	0.0174 (0.0313)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Sh. Cons.	0.0979*** (0.0315)	0.1247*** (0.0381)	0.0527 (0.0518)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	0.0174*** (0.0052)	0.00870 (0.0086)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
Sh. Left	-0.1861*** (0.0346)	-0.1097*** (0.0406)	-0.2703*** (0.0584)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	-0.0142*** (0.0052)	-0.0427*** (0.0092)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1383*** (0.0549)	-0.108 (0.0666)	-0.1791** (0.0887)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.00660 (0.0041)	-0.0109** (0.0054)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
% Francoist Streets	0.0590*** (0.0226)	0.0627*** (0.0107)	0.0657 (0.0487)	0.2035*** (0.0780)	0.1372*** (0.0233)	0.284 (0.2107)
Observations	115501	57822	57679	115501	57822	57679

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, and those with a below median number of foreign-born individuals. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A13: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Immigration  
Latin American vs. Maghrebi

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Latam	(3) Maghrebi	(4) Baseline	(5) Latam	(6) Maghrebi
Cath. Weddings	0.1115*** (0.0377)	0.1536*** (0.0524)	0.1039* (0.0621)	0.7792*** (0.2630)	1.2137*** (0.4144)	0.9674* (0.5781)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0533** (0.0261)	-0.0922*** (0.0346)	-0.1463*** (0.0526)	-0.3228** (0.1581)	-0.6277*** (0.2361)	-1.1829*** (0.4257)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Births	0.0566*** (0.0179)	0.0733*** (0.0250)	0.0679* (0.0390)	1.4436*** (0.4580)	2.0871*** (0.7124)	2.2815* (1.3135)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Sh. Cons.	0.1247*** (0.0381)	0.1928*** (0.0425)	0.1796*** (0.0548)	0.0174*** (0.0052)	0.0244*** (0.0054)	0.0218*** (0.0066)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
Sh. Left	-0.1097*** (0.0406)	-0.1500*** (0.0478)	-0.1535*** (0.0577)	-0.0142*** (0.0052)	-0.0173*** (0.0055)	-0.0170*** (0.0063)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
Sh. Rad Right	-0.108 (0.0666)	-0.1938*** (0.0649)	-0.1632** (0.0769)	-0.00660 (0.0041)	-0.0119*** (0.0040)	-0.0103** (0.0048)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
% Francoist Streets	0.0504*** (0.0110)	0.0566*** (0.0121)	0.0738*** (0.0156)	0.1102*** (0.0242)	0.1058*** (0.0227)	0.1222*** (0.0259)
Observations	57822	44138	27327	57822	44138	27327

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, baseline, with an above median number of Latin American individuals (Latam), and those with an above median number of Maghrebi individuals (Maghrebi). Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A14: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Conservatism

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Conservative	(3) Liberal	(4) Baseline	(5) Conservative	(6) Liberal
Cath. Weddings	0.0693*** (0.0217)	0.0179* (0.0098)	0.1335*** (0.0384)	0.3619*** (0.1133)	0.0452* (0.0247)	0.9056*** (0.2606)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384*** (0.0157)	-0.00490 (0.0142)	-0.0816*** (0.0259)	-0.1717*** (0.0702)	-0.0114 (0.0326)	-0.4715*** (0.1492)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Births	0.0348*** (0.0104)	0.0203*** (0.0066)	0.0562*** (0.0183)	0.6613*** (0.1999)	0.1888*** (0.0617)	1.3811*** (0.4481)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Sh. Cons.	0.0979*** (0.0315)	-0.0247 (0.0522)	0.1847*** (0.0348)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	-0.00350 (0.0077)	0.0219*** (0.0041)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
Sh. Left	-0.1861*** (0.0346)	-0.0910* (0.0520)	-0.2518*** (0.0450)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	-0.0119* (0.0068)	-0.0280*** (0.0049)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1383*** (0.0549)	-0.118 (0.0966)	-0.1331** (0.0592)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.00770 (0.0063)	-0.0076** (0.0034)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
% Francoist Streets	0.0581*** (0.0218)	0.1334*** (0.0197)	-0.0228 (0.0357)	0.2002*** (0.0751)	0.5491*** (0.0815)	-0.0590 (0.0926)
Observations	115501	57746	57601	115501	57746	57601

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with a historically conservative voting behavior (i.e., above median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), and those with a historically liberal voting behavior (i.e., below median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999). Municipalities are classified using data on all national and European elections that took place between 1975 and 1999, available at the Spanish Interior Ministry. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A15: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Unemployment

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693*** (0.0217)	0.1111*** (0.0399)	0.0370* (0.0208)	0.3619*** (0.1133)	0.6226*** (0.2243)	0.1776* (0.0996)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384*** (0.0157)	-0.0469* (0.0261)	-0.0295 (0.0192)	-0.1717*** (0.0702)	-0.2358* (0.1310)	-0.112 (0.0728)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Births	0.0348*** (0.0104)	0.0627*** (0.0153)	0.0136 (0.0142)	0.6613*** (0.1999)	1.2941*** (0.3167)	0.234 (0.2462)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Sh. Cons.	0.0979*** (0.0315)	0.0810* (0.0421)	0.1102*** (0.0454)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	0.0121* (0.0063)	0.0176*** (0.0073)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
Sh. Left	-0.1861*** (0.0346)	-0.1159*** (0.0489)	-0.2421*** (0.0480)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	-0.0164*** (0.0070)	-0.0362*** (0.0071)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1383*** (0.0549)	-0.1569** (0.0724)	-0.128 (0.0790)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.0094** (0.0044)	-0.00800 (0.0049)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
% Francoist Streets	0.0590*** (0.0226)	0.0724*** (0.0236)	0.0691*** (0.0164)	0.2035*** (0.0780)	0.2770*** (0.0903)	0.2081*** (0.0493)
Observations	115501	57765	57736	115501	57765	57736

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median unemployment rate, and those with a below median unemployment rate. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A16: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Study

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Spanish E.	(3) No Spanish E.	(4) Baseline	(5) Spanish E.	(6) No Spanish E.
Cath. Weddings	0.0769*** (0.0227)	0.0744** (0.0364)	0.0710*** (0.0197)	0.4018*** (0.1185)	0.4061** (0.1994)	0.3856*** (0.1071)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0406*** (0.0164)	-0.0115 (0.0241)	-0.0476*** (0.0164)	-0.1808*** (0.0731)	-0.0540 (0.1123)	-0.2199*** (0.0762)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Births	0.0430*** (0.0109)	0.0419*** (0.0176)	0.0419*** (0.0116)	0.8158*** (0.2091)	0.8361*** (0.3517)	0.8253*** (0.2308)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Sh. Cons.	0.1315*** (0.0326)	0.1494*** (0.0421)	0.1246*** (0.0350)	0.0206*** (0.0051)	0.0232*** (0.0066)	0.0194*** (0.0055)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
Sh. Left	-0.2054*** (0.0359)	-0.2145*** (0.0489)	-0.2006*** (0.0397)	-0.0302*** (0.0052)	-0.0313*** (0.0071)	-0.0293*** (0.0057)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1825*** (0.0568)	-0.1752** (0.0843)	-0.2245*** (0.0582)	-0.0111*** (0.0035)	-0.0109** (0.0052)	-0.0138*** (0.0035)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
% Francoist Streets	0.0276 (0.0233)	0.0324 (0.0274)	0.0218 (0.0260)	0.0952 (0.0807)	0.109 (0.0923)	0.0727 (0.0868)
Observations	115501	97681	100164	115501	97681	100164

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who studies in a Spanish seminary, and those who did not. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A17: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Origin

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Latam	(3) Non Latam	(4) Baseline	(5) Latam	(6) Non Latam
Cath. Weddings	0.0693*** (0.0217)	0.0529*** (0.0206)	0.0762*** (0.0307)	0.3619*** (0.1133)	0.2773*** (0.1080)	0.4018*** (0.1622)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384*** (0.0157)	-0.0283 (0.0176)	-0.0408** (0.0200)	-0.1717*** (0.0702)	-0.127 (0.0790)	-0.1824** (0.0898)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Births	0.0348*** (0.0104)	0.0329*** (0.0116)	0.0335** (0.0154)	0.6613*** (0.1999)	0.6270*** (0.2239)	0.6413** (0.2960)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Sh. Cons.	0.0979*** (0.0315)	0.0829*** (0.0348)	0.1207*** (0.0386)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	0.0130*** (0.0054)	0.0187*** (0.0060)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
Sh. Left	-0.1861*** (0.0346)	-0.1817*** (0.0395)	-0.1862*** (0.0445)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	-0.0266*** (0.0057)	-0.0274*** (0.0065)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1383*** (0.0549)	-0.1400** (0.0626)	-0.1711*** (0.0701)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.0086** (0.0038)	-0.0104*** (0.0043)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
% Francoist Streets	0.0590*** (0.0226)	0.0511* (0.0276)	0.0675*** (0.0220)	0.2035*** (0.0780)	0.1761* (0.0954)	0.2360*** (0.0772)
Observations	115501	113477	110962	115501	113477	110962

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates foreign priests by those who were born in Latin America, and those were born anywhere else in the world. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A18: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on migration

	(1)
	All Inflow Migrants
<b><u>Pre-treatment</u></b>	
Years from treatment: -5	-1.484 (2.0204)
Years from treatment: -4	-1.887 (1.5808)
Years from treatment: -3	-0.369 (1.7251)
Years from treatment: -2	-1.6996** (0.7968)
<b><u>Post-treatment</u></b>	
Years from treatment: 0	0.779 (0.6802)
Years from treatment: 1	1.192 (1.1347)
Years from treatment: 2	-2.283 (1.9808)
Years from treatment: 3	1.573 (1.3387)
Years from treatment: 4	1.500 (1.4128)
Years from treatment: 5	2.567 (1.6565)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.0708
Mean Dep Var	43.97
Observations	66267

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the arrival of new settlers. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A19: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by foreign-born priests density

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High Density	(3) Low Density	(4) Baseline	(5) High Density	(6) Low Density
Cath. Weddings	0.0693*** (0.0217)	0.0263 (0.0282)	0.1130*** (0.0381)	0.3619*** (0.1133)	0.133 (0.1424)	0.5925*** (0.2000)
Observations	74503	10633	63870	74503	10633	63870
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384*** (0.0157)	-0.0395 (0.0242)	-0.0340 (0.0231)	-0.1717*** (0.0702)	-0.165 (0.1017)	-0.153 (0.1041)
Observations	74503	10633	63870	74503	10633	63870
Births	0.0348*** (0.0104)	0.0307* (0.0186)	0.0436*** (0.0147)	0.6613*** (0.1999)	0.6079* (0.3675)	0.8231*** (0.2770)
Observations	74503	10633	63870	74503	10633	63870
Sh. Cons.	0.0979*** (0.0315)	0.0443 (0.0493)	0.0206 (0.0419)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	0.00680 (0.0076)	0.00310 (0.0065)
Observations	44764	6831	37933	44764	6831	37933
Sh. Left	-0.1861*** (0.0346)	-0.0406 (0.0496)	0.0107 (0.0436)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	-0.00590 (0.0073)	0.00160 (0.0063)
Observations	44764	6831	37933	44764	6831	37933
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1383*** (0.0549)	-0.2175*** (0.0769)	-0.0120 (0.0857)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.0131*** (0.0046)	-0.000700 (0.0052)
Observations	44764	6831	37933	44764	6831	37933
% Francoist Streets	0.0590*** (0.0226)	0.1044*** (0.0182)	0.0192 (0.0502)	0.2035*** (0.0780)	0.1905*** (0.0331)	0.0700 (0.1831)
Observations	115501	16955	98546	115501	16955	98546

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those dioceses that belong to the ecclesiastical province of Zaragoza (characterized by a high density of extensive use of foreign-born priests), so-called High Density, and those located elsewhere, so-called Low Density. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A20: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on local budget allocations

	(1) Social Budget	(2) Business Budget
<u>Pre-treatment</u>		
Years from treatment: -5	-3196 (18294)	-30157* (16074)
Years from treatment: -4	514 (14468)	-16071 (13598)
Years from treatment: -3	4457 (11652)	-6842 (10292)
Years from treatment: -2	-11825 (10337)	1219 (10076)
<u>Post-treatment</u>		
Years from treatment: 0	-8493 (8200)	9768 (9768)
Years from treatment: 1	-17187** (8698)	6368 (9327)
Years from treatment: 2	-2814 (16284)	-4500 (14005)
Years from treatment: 3	-8491 (14039)	-16704 (18020)
Years from treatment: 4	-9802 (13303)	-10149 (18867)
Years from treatment: 5	-11834 (14544)	-9387 (20229)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.5537	0.4033
Mean Dep Var	250832	93385
Observations	42975	42975

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects how local budget is spent, differentiating between social (Column 1) and business-related item (Column 2). Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A21: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on local economic conditions

	(1) Unemployment	(2) Contracts
<u>Pre-treatment</u>		
Years from treatment: -5	0.0007 (0.001)	0.0017 (0.0011)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0013 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.0011)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0014* (0.0008)	0.0011 (0.0014)
Years from treatment: -2	-0.0004 (0.0007)	-0.0006 (0.0011)
<u>Post-treatment</u>		
Years from treatment: 0	0.0003 (0.0007)	-0.0005 (0.0012)
Years from treatment: 1	-0.0007 (0.0009)	0.0017 (0.0015)
Years from treatment: 2	-0.0005 (0.001)	0.0012 (0.0017)
Years from treatment: 3	-0.003*** (0.0011)	0.0014 (0.0019)
Years from treatment: 4	-0.0013 (0.0012)	0.0004 (0.0016)
Years from treatment: 5	-0.0012 (0.0013)	-0.0006 (0.0017)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.0778	0.1780
Mean Dep. Var.	0.0500	0.0154
Observations	55009	55009

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influence local economic outcomes. Column 1 looks at the unemployment per capita and Column 2 displays the effect on the number of contracts per capita. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A22: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Catholic Movements

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Present	(3) Not Present	(4) Baseline	(5) Present	(6) Not Present
Cath. Weddings	0.0693*** (0.0217)	-0.163 (0.2587)	0.0652*** (0.0175)	0.3619*** (0.1133)	-2.094 (3.3269)	0.2296*** (0.0615)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384*** (0.0157)	-0.179 (0.1733)	-0.0232* (0.0133)	-0.1717*** (0.0702)	-1.902 (1.8372)	-0.0751* (0.0432)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Births	0.0348*** (0.0104)	0.1764* (0.0949)	0.0237*** (0.0098)	0.6613*** (0.1999)	7.9801* (4.2983)	0.3048*** (0.1277)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Sh. Cons.	0.0979*** (0.0315)	0.0571 (0.0940)	0.1022*** (0.0328)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	0.00680 (0.0111)	0.0162*** (0.0052)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
Sh. Left	-0.1861*** (0.0346)	-0.0887 (0.1001)	-0.1935*** (0.0361)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	-0.00930 (0.0105)	-0.0289*** (0.0054)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1383*** (0.0549)	-0.0149 (0.1332)	-0.1421*** (0.0568)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.000900 (0.0080)	-0.0088*** (0.0035)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
% Francoist Streets	0.0590*** (0.0226)	0.0868*** (0.0320)	0.0592*** (0.0237)	0.2035*** (0.0780)	0.1370*** (0.0505)	0.2101*** (0.0841)
Observations	115501	8416	107085	115501	8416	107085

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities who had registered as of the year 2000 at least a Catholic organization, so-called Present, and those who did not have any organization registered (Not Present). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A23: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Uneducatedness

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693*** (0.0217)	0.0447*** (0.0178)	0.0956*** (0.0357)	0.3619*** (0.1133)	0.2232*** (0.0892)	0.5188*** (0.1944)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384*** (0.0157)	-0.0458** (0.0220)	-0.0308 (0.0225)	-0.1717*** (0.0702)	-0.1594** (0.0768)	-0.162 (0.1177)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Births	0.0348*** (0.0104)	0.0227** (0.0111)	0.0496*** (0.0176)	0.6613*** (0.1999)	0.3950** (0.1957)	1.0125*** (0.3621)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Sh. Cons.	0.0979*** (0.0315)	0.0714* (0.0432)	0.1280*** (0.0452)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	0.0110* (0.0066)	0.0199*** (0.0071)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
Sh. Left	-0.1861*** (0.0346)	-0.2114*** (0.0489)	-0.1650*** (0.0491)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	-0.0311*** (0.0071)	-0.0239*** (0.0071)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1383*** (0.0549)	-0.0860 (0.0865)	-0.1897*** (0.0650)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.00550 (0.0055)	-0.0113*** (0.0038)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
% Francoist Streets	0.0590*** (0.0226)	0.0505** (0.0230)	0.0579*** (0.0197)	0.2035*** (0.0780)	0.1744** (0.0797)	0.1996*** (0.0684)
Observations	115501	57797	57704	115501	57797	57704

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median number of individuals with no formal education, and those with a below median number of individuals with no formal education. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A24: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Local Demographic Structure

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Many Youth	(3) Few Youth	(4) Baseline	(5) Many Youth	(6) Few Youth
Cath. Weddings	0.0693*** (0.0217)	0.1377*** (0.0425)	0.000200 (0.0048)	0.3619*** (0.1133)	0.9710*** (0.3007)	0.000100 (0.0024)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384*** (0.0157)	-0.0819*** (0.0297)	0.00160 (0.0088)	-0.1717*** (0.0702)	-0.4959*** (0.1805)	0.000900 (0.0049)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Births	0.0348*** (0.0104)	0.0553*** (0.0206)	0.0074* (0.0044)	0.6613*** (0.1999)	1.4048*** (0.5225)	0.0118* (0.0070)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Sh. Cons.	0.0979*** (0.0315)	0.0923*** (0.0375)	0.0970* (0.0502)	0.0153*** (0.0049)	0.0125*** (0.0051)	0.0162* (0.0083)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
Sh. Left	-0.1861*** (0.0346)	-0.0904** (0.0427)	-0.2754*** (0.0544)	-0.0274*** (0.0051)	-0.0115** (0.0054)	-0.0432*** (0.0086)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1383*** (0.0549)	-0.1465*** (0.0601)	-0.131 (0.0903)	-0.0085*** (0.0034)	-0.0089*** (0.0037)	-0.00810 (0.0055)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
% Francoist Streets	0.0590*** (0.0226)	0.0498** (0.0234)	0.0333 (0.0419)	0.2035*** (0.0780)	0.1309** (0.0619)	0.137 (0.1720)
Observations	115501	57796	57705	115501	57796	57705

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median youth share, and those with a below median youth share. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A25: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Tenure

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Senior	(3) Junior	(4) Baseline	(5) Senior	(6) Junior
Cath. Weddings	-0.0234 (0.0265)	-0.0241 (0.0727)	-0.0303 (0.0272)	-0.0737 (0.0833)	-0.0577 (0.1744)	-0.113 (0.1008)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0491 (0.0377)	0.118 (0.1403)	0.0482 (0.0447)	0.167 (0.1277)	0.360 (0.4282)	0.178 (0.1650)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Births	0.0182 (0.0307)	0.268 (0.1993)	-0.0285 (0.0220)	0.261 (0.4415)	3.265 (2.4323)	-0.464 (0.3580)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Sh. Cons.	0.0555 (0.0531)	0.123 (0.0921)	0.0813 (0.0700)	0.00910 (0.0087)	0.0205 (0.0153)	0.0130 (0.0111)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Left	-0.1526*** (0.0588)	-0.2421** (0.1103)	-0.1732** (0.0762)	-0.0234*** (0.0091)	-0.0377** (0.0172)	-0.0262** (0.0115)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2694*** (0.1103)	-0.3862* (0.2337)	-0.2694*** (0.1155)	-0.0195*** (0.0080)	-0.0285* (0.0172)	-0.0189** (0.0082)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
% Francoist Streets	0.0187 (0.0263)	0.0287** (0.0142)	-0.0428 (0.0395)	0.0546 (0.0760)	0.0944** (0.0463)	-0.107 (0.0984)
Observations	33378	15937	17441	33378	15937	17441

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who have a tenure above the median tenure (Senior), and those who have a tenure below the median (Junior). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A26: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Age

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Old	(3) Young	(4) Baseline	(5) Old	(6) Young
Cath. Weddings	-0.0241 (0.0265)	-0.0125 (0.0645)	-0.0130 (0.0295)	-0.0754 (0.0832)	-0.0399 (0.2055)	-0.0399 (0.0908)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0496 (0.0377)	0.104 (0.0904)	0.0135 (0.0454)	0.168 (0.1275)	0.378 (0.3285)	0.0421 (0.1424)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Births	0.0178 (0.0307)	0.165 (0.1150)	-0.0265 (0.0240)	0.257 (0.4411)	2.555 (1.7811)	-0.351 (0.3161)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Sh. Cons.	0.0573 (0.0531)	0.111 (0.0987)	0.0816 (0.0811)	0.00930 (0.0087)	0.0177 (0.0157)	0.0136 (0.0135)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Left	-0.1552*** (0.0588)	-0.146 (0.0998)	-0.2964*** (0.0773)	-0.0239*** (0.0091)	-0.0221 (0.0152)	-0.0458*** (0.0120)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2691*** (0.1103)	-0.257 (0.2470)	-0.2220* (0.1255)	-0.0194*** (0.0080)	-0.0178 (0.0172)	-0.0164* (0.0093)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
% Francoist Streets	0.0133 (0.0248)	0.0309*** (0.0105)	-0.0557 (0.0452)	0.0386 (0.0718)	0.0742*** (0.0254)	-0.184 (0.1492)
Observations	33430	16441	16989	33430	16441	16989

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are above the median age (Old), and those that are below the median age (Young). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A27: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Order

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Religious Order	(3) Diocesan	(4) Baseline	(5) Religious Order	(6) Diocesan
Cath. Weddings	0.0627*** (0.0249)	0.4675*** (0.1576)	0.0329 (0.0212)	0.3021*** (0.1200)	2.2204*** (0.7481)	0.159 (0.1027)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0342** (0.0170)	-0.1763*** (0.0559)	-0.0212 (0.0186)	-0.1759** (0.0877)	-0.6812*** (0.2159)	-0.112 (0.0974)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Births	0.0408*** (0.0115)	0.1172*** (0.0467)	0.0361*** (0.0120)	0.8404*** (0.2371)	2.0713*** (0.8245)	0.7481*** (0.2511)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Sh. Cons.	0.1026*** (0.0329)	-0.143 (0.1203)	0.1178*** (0.0346)	0.0164*** (0.0052)	-0.0238 (0.0199)	0.0187*** (0.0055)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
Sh. Left	-0.2152*** (0.0366)	-0.0817 (0.1600)	-0.2243*** (0.0373)	-0.0320*** (0.0055)	-0.0129 (0.0252)	-0.0333*** (0.0055)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1779*** (0.0582)	-0.0815 (0.1315)	-0.2064*** (0.0645)	-0.0122*** (0.0040)	-0.00550 (0.0089)	-0.0142*** (0.0044)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
% Francoist Streets	0.0706*** (0.0195)	-0.0285 (0.1015)	0.0830*** (0.0167)	0.2322*** (0.0641)	-0.108 (0.3873)	0.2703*** (0.0544)
Observations	71645	4945	66700	71645	4945	66700

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are part of a religious orders, and those who are diocesan. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A28: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Ideology

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Conservative	(3) Progressive	(4) Baseline	(5) Conservative	(6) Progressive
Cath. Weddings	-0.184 (0.1322)	-0.1869* (0.1049)	-0.101 (0.0767)	-0.642 (0.4609)	-0.6833* (0.3837)	-0.339 (0.2578)
Observations	6556	2717	3839	6556	2717	3839
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0480 (0.0577)	-0.00200 (0.0824)	0.0930 (0.1098)	0.176 (0.2114)	-0.00820 (0.3352)	0.311 (0.3666)
Observations	6556	2717	3839	6556	2717	3839
Births	-0.0724 (0.0483)	-0.1737*** (0.0449)	0.0103 (0.0522)	-1.173 (0.7818)	-2.9230*** (0.7551)	0.162 (0.8226)
Observations	6556	2717	3839	6556	2717	3839
Sh. Cons.	0.2003** (0.0998)	0.6154** (0.2779)	0.127 (0.1420)	0.0331** (0.0164)	0.1027** (0.0463)	0.0208 (0.0232)
Observations	4289	1800	2489	4289	1800	2489
Sh. Left	-0.3474*** (0.1326)	-0.7506*** (0.1299)	-0.3330* (0.1735)	-0.0540*** (0.0206)	-0.1180*** (0.0204)	-0.0513* (0.0267)
Observations	4289	1800	2489	4289	1800	2489
Sh. Rad Right	-0.7006*** (0.1423)	-0.518 (0.3282)	-0.7138*** (0.2246)	-0.0537*** (0.0109)	-0.0401 (0.0253)	-0.0544*** (0.0171)
Observations	4289	1800	2489	4289	1800	2489
% Francoist Streets	0.1004*** (0.0329)	0.2344*** (0.0671)	0.1089*** (0.0467)	0.3257*** (0.1066)	0.6172*** (0.1770)	0.3946*** (0.1691)
Observations	11576	4892	6684	11576	4892	6684

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between religious leaders with Conservative political views, and those with more progressive political views. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A29: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival by Religious Leader's Hierarchy-Leanings

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Hierarchical	(3) Not Hierarchical	(4) Baseline	(5) Hierarchical	(6) Not Hierarchical
Cath. Weddings	-0.0637 (0.0634)	0.0183 (0.0654)	0.5279*** (0.1277)	-0.224 (0.2224)	0.0786 (0.2815)	0.8133*** (0.1967)
Observations	5955	3618	1959	5955	3618	1959
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0183 (0.0575)	-0.0394 (0.0808)	0.0129 (0.1005)	0.0689 (0.2169)	-0.178 (0.3650)	0.0276 (0.2155)
Observations	5955	3618	1959	5955	3618	1959
Births	-0.0592 (0.0502)	-0.127 (0.0922)	0.2973*** (0.0586)	-0.970 (0.8241)	-2.479 (1.7961)	2.9186*** (0.5756)
Observations	5955	3618	1959	5955	3618	1959
Sh. Cons.	0.159 (0.1002)	0.4291*** (0.1634)	-0.162 (0.2720)	0.0260 (0.0164)	0.0687*** (0.0262)	-0.0274 (0.0460)
Observations	3889	2329	1319	3889	2329	1319
Sh. Left	-0.2872** (0.1312)	-0.5622*** (0.1851)	-0.3953* (0.2318)	-0.0443** (0.0201)	-0.0848*** (0.0278)	-0.0630* (0.0368)
Observations	3889	2329	1319	3889	2329	1319
Sh. Rad Right	-0.6931*** (0.1388)	-0.6553*** (0.2554)	-0.273 (0.2143)	-0.0524*** (0.0104)	-0.0505*** (0.0197)	-0.0206 (0.0162)
Observations	3889	2329	1319	3889	2329	1319
% Francois Streets	0.1010*** (0.0373)	0.0918** (0.0432)	0.2161*** (0.0798)	0.3368*** (0.1247)	0.1977** (0.0930)	1.0219*** (0.3779)
Observations	10475	6316	3470	10475	6316	3470

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between religious leaders that do not challenge the pope's decisions (i.e., Hierarchical), and those with their own opinion (i.e., Not Hierarchical). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

## B Alternative Difference-in-Difference estimators

In this section, I look at the influence that foreign religious leaders have on their communities, using alternative estimation methods. For each main outcome, I provide the results obtained using the approaches proposed by [De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille \(2020\)](#); [Sun and Abraham \(2021\)](#); [Gardner \(2022\)](#); [Cengiz et al. \(2019\)](#), together with the canonical two-way fixed effect model. All figures report the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B1: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Catholic weddings - Alt. Estimators




Figure B2: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Civil-only weddings  
Alt. Estimators




Figure B3: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Fertility - Alt. Estimators




Figure B4: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Left-leaning votes - Alt. Estimators




Figure B5: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Right-leaning votes  
Alt. Estimators




Figure B6: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Conservative votes - Alt. Estimators




Figure B7: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Rad. Right votes - Alt. Estimators




Figure B8: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on voting absenteeism - Alt. Estimators





Figure B9: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Francoist street naming  
Alt. Estimators



## C Priests' Survey - List of Questions

In this section, I outline the questions used in the survey administered to those priests for which we could access their contact details. For each question, I detail the statement, together with the options provided to the interviewee. The same questions were used in both phone and email surveys. The questions were asked in Spanish (available upon request), and followed the ordering shown below:

- 1) In which diocese are you currently living?**
- 2) How old are you?**
- 3) When were you ordained priest?**
- 4) In which seminary did you study to become a priest?**
- 5) Are you a diocesan priest or are you a member of a religious order?**
  - Diocesan priest
  - Member of a religious order (Please specify)
- 6) In which country were you born?**
  - 6.1) (If not born in Spain) How long have you been living in Spain?**
  - 6.2) (If not born in Spain) Which one was your main motivation for coming to Spain?**
    - Work as missionary
    - Study
    - Express petition by a Spanish bishop
    - Other (Please specify)
- 7) Have you ever worked as priest abroad? (Please specify each project and country).**
  - 7.1) (If you worked abroad) How long have you worked as a priest abroad?**
- 8) How do you identify yourself?**
  - White
  - Mestizo

- Indigenous
- Black
- Other (Please specify)

Mark from 0 to 10, how much do you agree with the following statements (0=Nothing, 10=Completely):

- 9) Nationalizing strategic industries is necessary to protect citizenry**
- 10) Those who become rich, do so always by exploiting the work of the many**
- 11) In Spain, there exist real equality between man and woman**
- 12) We need to look at what unites us instead of dwelling on the past**
- 13) Immigrants receive more social protection than nationals**
- 14) Minorities should adapt their customs and traditions to the Spanish ones**
- 15) The new lifestyles are contributing to today's social rupture**
- 16) Spain would have far less problems if more emphasis would be set in traditional families**

For the next two questions, choose one of the following three options:

- 17) In your opinion, how are Pope Francisco's views on moral issues?**
  - Conservative
  - About right
  - Liberal
- 18) In your opinion, how were Pope Benedict XVI's views on moral issues?**
  - Conservative
  - About right
  - Liberal
- 19) According to your own experience, how would you describe today's Spanish economic situation?**

- Very good
- Good
- Regular
- Bad
- Very bad

**20) Which percentage of your parishioners attends frequently the Sunday sermon?**

**21) How many hours per week do you spend officiating masses?**

**22) How many hours per week do you spend in direct contact with your parishioners (but not in masses)?**

**23) How frequently do you discuss current sociopolitical events with your parishioners?**

- Always
- Often
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

**24) In which other projects/activities, not directly linked to your priestly work, do you participate in?**

- Helping with the integration of foreign families
- Helping in the local Caritas/Food Bank
- Participating in sport-related activities
- Preparing new events, such as talks
- Nothing (Only for the interviewer)
- Other (Please specify)

**25) How frequently do you collaborate with the local administration in the promotion of religious activities? (e.g., the mass, catechism, religious pilgrimages, etc.)**

- Always

- Often
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

**26) Have you found any new challenge at your parishes? Which ones? (Open question).**

## D Propensity Score Matching

In this section, I use a matching-on-observables approach, in the tradition of Heckman et al. (1997), to account for the fact that treated and control municipalities may be structurally different at baseline. Using this method, I implicitly assume that unobservable characteristics are time-invariant, being eliminated with the introduction of municipality fixed effects.


I use a propensity score matching algorithm (PSM) with two neighbors and no replacement on a list of municipality characteristics available at the 2001 Spanish Census. The variables used to matched those municipalities that ever had a foreign priest with their corresponding controls are: population, share of young people, share of retirees, share of people with no formal diploma, share of people with technical education, share of singles, share of divorcees, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, self-employment rate, share of temporal workers, share of farmers, and male and female labor force participation. Table D1 shows the covariate means in control and treatment groups after matching, as well as the p-value of the mean difference between treatment and control groups. For reference, Table 2 shows the mean comparison when no propensity score matching is used.

Table D1: Summary Statistics (at baseline) - Matched sample

	Never Foreign-Led	Ever Foreign-Led	p-value
Population	720.267	640.358	0.221
Youth share	0.124	0.122	0.367
Uneducated share	0.208	0.213	0.552
Technical education share	0.725	0.719	0.487
Divorced share	0.004	0.004	0.196
Immigrants share	0.015	0.018	0.043
Labor participation (Male)	0.566	0.561	0.390
Labor participation (Female)	0.275	0.274	0.869
Unemployed share	0.103	0.100	0.458
Temporal workers share	0.216	0.214	0.717
Farmers share	0.283	0.282	0.873
Share Right-wing parties	0.391	0.390	0.919
Grass-root Catholicism	0.055	0.057	0.854
% Francoist Streets	1.254	1.304	0.802


Note: The table provides a comparison of the baseline characteristics between municipalities that had a foreign priest between 2000 and 2019 (ever foreign-led) and those that did not (never foreign-led). The control group is composed by matched municipalities. I use a propensity score matching, with 2 neighbours, no replacement and a caliper of 0.1. The information at the municipal level is extracted from the 2001 Census. The share of votes to right-leaning parties was calculated using all national and European elections held between 1975 and 2000. Grassroot Catholicism identifies whether there existed in 2001 any grassroot Catholic initiative in the municipality. The percentage of Francoist streets is calculated using the 2001 Spanish Street Map Census.

Figure D1: Kernel Densities - Common Support




Using the previously explained matching method, Figure D2 reproduces the main findings from Figure 5, Figure D3 those from Figure 6, Figure D4 those from Figure 7, and Figure D5 those from Figure 8. I find no significant difference between using only matched municipalities when compared to using the full sample.

Figure D2: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on religious outcomes  
Matched sample




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects the probability of getting married, by wedding ritual. Subfigure D2a displays how it affects Catholic weddings, subfigure D2b shows how it affects civil-only weddings, subfigure D2c whether it affects the total number of weddings carried out, and subfigure D2d whether it affects the wedding probability in other denominations. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D3: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on fertility - Matched sample




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of births in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D4: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes  
Left vs. Right - Matched sample




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigure D4a displays how it affect the voting share of right-wing parties and subfigure D4b how it affects the voting share of left-wing parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D5: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes  
 Conservative vs. Rad. Right - Matched sample




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigure D5a displays how it affect the voting share of conservative parties and subfigure D5b how it affects the voting share of radical right parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D6: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on voting absenteeism - Matched sample



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on its electoral participation. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D7: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on Francoist street naming  
 Matched sample



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality leads to a change in the local street name composition away from Francoist street naming. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.