

FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS

B.A. PHILOSOPHY

V SEMESTER

CORE COURSE

(2019 ADMISSION ONWARDS)



UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

Calicut University, P.O. Malappuram, Kerala, India-673 635

19509

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

B.A. PHILOSOPHY

(2019 ADMISSION ONWARDS)

V SEMESTER

CORE COURSE : **PHL5 B09**

FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS

Prepared by:

Dr. Smitha. T.M.
Dept. of Philosophy
Maharaja's College,
Ernakulam

Scrutinized by

Dr. V. Prabhakaran (Co-ordinator)
Sree Visakh,
Thekkegramam Road
Sastha Nagar, Chittur
Palakkad

CONTENTS	PAGES
Unit - 1	4 - 9
Unit - II	10 - 17
Unit - III	18 - 32
Unit - IV	33 -40
TEXT & REFERECNE	41

Unit I

Introduction

Objectives:-

1. To introduce the very definition of ethics
2. To introduce subject matter of ethics
3. To explain nature of ethics
4. To describe normative science
5. To distinguish normative from positive science
6. To analyse the scope ethics

I Definition and nature of ethics

Definition:-

Ethics is the science of conduct. It considers the actions of human beings with reference to their rightness or wrongness. The word "ethics" is derived from the Greek word *ethos*, which means "character" and from the Latin word *mores*, which means customs. Mackenzie defines ethics as "the study of what is right or good in human conduct" or "the science of the ideal involved in conduct". So, it is clear that ethics is the study which determines rightness or wrongness of actions. Ethics then, we may say, discusses men's habits or customs, or in other words their characters, the principles on which the habitually act and considers what it is that constitutes the rightness or wrongness of these principles, the good or evil of these habits. These terms however, "Right" and "Good", seems to require a little explanation.

- a. Right:- The term Right is derived from the Latin *rectus*, meaning 'straight' or 'according to rule'. When we say, then, that conduct is right, we mean primarily that it is according to rule.
- b. Good:- The term Good is connected with the German *gut*. A thing is generally said to be good when it is valuable for some end. Thus, a particular kind of medicine are said to be good for this or that complaint. Similarly, when we speak of conduct as good, we may mean that it is serviceable for the end we have in view.

Thus, we can say that the science of ethics is concerned with the rightness or goodness of human conduct.

Nature:-

Ethics is a normative science. Ethics is a normative science. It is concerned with what ought to be done rather than what is the case. It differs from positive science. A positive science, natural science or descriptive science is concerned with what is. It deals with facts and explains them by their causes. In positive science there is no question of judging its objects in any way. But ethics does not deal with fact. Rather it deals with value. Therefore, it is clear that ethics is concerned with

judgments of value, while positive science deals with judgments of facts. That is why ethics is not a positive science but a normative science. Normative ethics deals with standards or norms by which we can judge human actions to be right or wrong. For example, logic, aesthetics are also considered as normative sciences, because logic and aesthetics are concerned with truth and beauty. So, truth, beauty and value are the three ideals of logic, aesthetics and ethics respectively. Aesthetics, for example, deals systematically with the standards by which we judge objects of perception, commonly sights and sounds, to be beautiful or ugly. Logic deals with the standards by which we judge statements to be true or false, and ethics deals with the standards by which we judge human actions to be right or wrong. The normative sciences differ from positive sciences in one more way; they do not merely describe the standards by which we judge; they are also concerned with the validity or truth of these standards. In ethics for example it is not enough to describe the rules by which men have tested their conduct, such as the Ten Commandments of the Hebrews; we also ask in ethics why these rules are valid or on what grounds we ought to observe them.

Ethics- Not a practical science- Ethics cannot properly be described as practical. It must content itself with understanding the nature of the ideal, and must not hope to formulate rules for its attainment. Hence most writers on ethics have preferred to treat it as a purely speculative, rather than as a practical science. At any rate, it is important to observe that the description of Ethics as 'normative' does not involve the view that it has any direct bearing on practice. It is the business of a normative science to define an ideal, not to lay down rules for its attainment. Aesthetics, for instance, is a normative science, concerned with the standard of beauty; but it is no part of its business to inquire how beauty is produced. So with ethics, it discusses the ideal of goodness or rightness, and is not directly concerned with the means by which this ideal may be realised.

Ethics-Not an Art- If ethics is not strictly to be classed as practical sciences, it ought to still less to be described as an art. Yet the question has sometimes been raised, with regard both to logic and to ethics. Logic has sometimes been called the art of thinking, and though ethics has perhaps never been described as art of conduct. Now, it may be questioned whether it is quite correct to speak an art of thinking or of an art of conduct at all. It is generally recognised that it is best to treat both logic and ethics having no direct bearing upon these arts. Ethics is not an art. Ethics does not teach us an art as to how to lead a moral life. Rather it helps us to justify rightness or goodness which can lead to the supreme goal of human life that is to realize the *summum bonum* of human life. So, ethics is not a means to the highest ideal of human life. But, like the practical science, art is also a means for obtaining a goal. So, ethics is neither a practical science nor an art. Again the question is, is there any art of conduct? The reply is, in case of morality this is not true. Art especially deals with acquisition of skill to produce objects, while morality deals with motive, intention, purpose and choice which are considered right or wrong in the light of goodness. Therefore, morality consists of goodness, which is really an intrinsic end.

II. The relation of Ethics with other sciences

Ethics is to be regarded as a part of philosophy. Philosophy is the study of the nature of experience as a whole. Philosophy seeks to understand the whole in the light of its central principles. Truth, Beauty, and Goodness are considered as the principles of philosophy. The study of the ideals forms

the subject matter of the three sciences of Logic, Aesthetics, and Ethics. Ethics stands along with Logic and Aesthetics and there is a very close connection between Ethics and each of these two subjects.

Further consideration, however, reveals a variety of other subjects to which ethics is closely related. On some it is dependent for materials, to others it supplies assistance.

Psychology and Ethics:- The relation of Psychology to ethics is much closer and more important. At the same time, the dependence of the one upon the other ought not to be exaggerated. As logic deals with the correctness of thought, Ethics deals with the correctness of conduct. Neither of them is directly concerned with the process by which we come to think or to act correctly. Still, the processes of feeling, willing, and desiring cannot be ignored by the student of Ethics; any more than the processes of generalising, judging, and reasoning can be ignored by the student of Logic; and the consideration of all these falls within the province of psychologist. Psychology, in fact, leads to up to ethics, as it leads up to Logic and Aesthetics.

In this connection, there is another important point to be noticed, to which reference has not yet been made. Human conduct, as we shall find more and more, has social reference. Most of our actions derive their moral significance very largely from our relations to our fellow- men. Now psychology as commonly studied has but little bearing on this. Psychology, as rule, deals mainly with the growth of the individual consciousness, and only refers indirectly to the facts of social relationship. It is possible, however, to study the process of mental development from a more social point of view. The study of language, for instance, the study of the customs of savage peoples, the study of the growth of institutions etc., throw light upon the gradual development of the human mind in relation to its social environment. The term Sociology has been used to denote, in a comprehensive way, the study of such social phenomena; and, from the point of view of Ethics, this study of facts of mind in relation to society has a more direct interest than purely individual Psychology.

Logic, Aesthetics and Ethics:- These three sciences, are essentially cognate. They all are normative, not positive: they are concerned, that is to say, not with the investigation of facts and relation between facts but with the discussion of standards. Logic studies the standard of truth. It is concerned with the validity of various process of thought. Aesthetics and ethics again may be said to be concerned with the value or worth. Aesthetics considers the standard of Beauty, or as we may perhaps say, worth or feeling. Ethics considers the standard of goodness, i.e. value or worth from the point of view of action-valour, as we might put it. Validity, Value, Valour, might almost be said to be the subjects of the three sciences; but this of course is something of a play on words. At any rate they are very closely related to each other. Ethics might almost be described as the Logic of conduct- i. e. it considers the conditions of the consistency of conduct with the ideal involved in it, just as Logic considers the conditions of the consistency of thought with the standards that it implies. Again the study of the Good is also closely related to the study of the Beautiful. The phrase 'beauty of holiness' also in Hebrew literature; and in modern times we sometimes meet with such

expressions as 'beautiful soul', 'a beautiful life' and the like- though these expressions generally refer rather to religious piety than to purely moral excellence, and even in that reference strike us perhaps as savouring a little cant. When we regard morality as involving a struggle of the will, it can scarcely impress us as beautiful. In the religious sense also, when we speak of the beauty of holiness, beautiful souls, and beautiful lives, we are generally thinking of the person referred to say if they 'flourished' rather than active producers. Still, it cannot be denied that the contemplation of life of eminent virtue yields us a certain aesthetic satisfaction; and from certain points of view it is tempting, even for modern writer to regard virtue as a kind of beauty.

III Scope of Ethics

Ethics is primarily a part of the quest for truth and the motives for studying it are desirable for knowledge. It enquires into the nature of the springs of actions, motives, intentions, voluntary actions and so on. It determines rightness or wrongness of human actions. It does not enquire into the origin and growth of human conduct. As a science of morality ethics discusses the contents of moral consciousness and the various problems of moral consciousness.

Ethics is concerned with the highest good or absolute good. It investigates the nature of its fundamental notions i.e. right, duty and good. Moral judgments passed on our voluntary actions are also included within the scope of ethics. In discussing the moral judgment it has also to concern with the nature, object, faculty and standard of moral judgment. Moral sentiments and feelings are arising in our mind when we contemplate about the moral judgment and therefore, ethics has to discuss the nature of moral sentiments to moral judgment.

The scope of ethics includes whatever has reference to free human acts, whether as principle or cause of action, or as effect or circumstance of action. Ethics discusses the nature of human freedom. Ethics investigates what constitutes good or bad, just or unjust. It also inquires into-what are virtue, law, conscience and duty? What obligations are common to all? What is the good in all good acts? These questions lie within the scope of ethics. The sense of duty, or moral obligation and the responsibility for actions are also included within the range of ethics.

The particular aspect under which ethics considers free acts is that of their moral goodness or the rectitude of order involved in them as human acts. A man may be a good artist or orator and at the same time a morally bad man or, conversely, a morally good man may be a poor artist or technician. Ethics has merely to do with the order which relates to man as man and which makes of him a good man. Thus we find that although Ethics is not a guidebook of moral rules as a branch of philosophy Ethics seeks clarification of terms used in moral language. The 'meta-ethical' problems fall within the scope of philosophical aspect of Ethics. There is other 'meta ethical discussions related to the nature of moral judgments, the logical basis of ethical evaluation etc.

The applied dimension of Ethics is known as "Applied Ethics' that falls within the broad field of Ethics. These comprise the areas of situational Ethics while Meta Ethics deals with logical and semantic questions like 'What do we mean by "freedom" and "determinism" etc. Ethics is essentially related to all other branches of knowledge like sociology, political science, jurisprudence, law and legal study, psychology, anthropology, culture study, ecology and environmental study,

economics, religion, aesthetics and other similar areas. Ethics is concerned with political, sociological, cultural, psychical, economic, environmental, religious problems in pursuit of highest good. So these problems have an additional place in the scope of ethics. With the emergence of new technology there is scope for widening the scope of ethics to address new issues.

Model Questions

Part A

(Each answer not to exceed 50 words, each question carries 1 weightage)

1. Define Ethics

Ethics is the science of conduct. It considers the actions of human beings with reference to their rightness or wrongness. The word "ethics" is derived from the Greek word *ethos*, which means "character" and from the Latin word *mores*, which means customs. Mackenzie defines ethics as "the study of what is right or good in human conduct" or "the science of the ideal involved in conduct". So, it is clear that ethics is the study which determines rightness or wrongness of actions.

2. Define good

The term Good is connected with the German gut. A thing is generally said to be good when it is valuable for some end. Thus, a particular kind of medicine are said to be good for this or that complaint. Similarly, when we speak of conduct as good, we may mean that it is serviceable for the end we have in view.

3. Define right

The term Right is derived from the Latin rectus, meaning 'straight' or 'according to rule'. When we say, then, that conduct is right, we mean primarily that it is according to rule.

Part B

(Each answer not to exceed 150 words, each question carries 2 weightages)

4 Explain ethics is a normative science.

Ethics is a normative science. It is concerned with what ought to be done rather than what is the case. It differs from positive science. A positive science, natural science or descriptive science is concerned with what is. It deals with facts and explains them by their causes. In positive science there is no question of judging its objects in any way. But ethics does not deal with fact. Rather it deals with value. Therefore, it is clear that ethics is concerned with judgments of value, while positive science deals with judgments of facts. That is why ethics is not a positive science but a normative science. Normative ethics deals with standards or norms by which we can judge human actions to be right or wrong. For example, logic, aesthetics are also considered as normative sciences, because logic and aesthetics are concerned with truth and beauty. So, truth, beauty and value are the three ideals of logic, aesthetics and ethics respectively. Aesthetics, for example, deals systematically with the standards by which we judge objects of perception, commonly sights and

sounds, to be beautiful or ugly. Logic deals with the standards by which we judge statements to be true or false, and ethics deals with the standards by which we judge human actions to be right or wrong. The normative sciences differ from positive sciences in one more way; they do not merely describe the standards by which we judge; they are also concerned with the validity or truth of these standards. In ethics for example it is not enough to describe the rules by which men have tested their conduct, such as the Ten Commandments of the Hebrews; we also ask in ethics why these rules are valid or on what grounds we ought to observe them.

Part C

(Each answer not to exceed 300 words, each question carries 4 weightages)

5. Ethics is a normative science- explain the nature and scope of ethics

Unit II

Psychological Basis of Ethics

Objectives:-

1. To introduce ethical concepts like conduct, desire, motive and intention
2. To explain the notion of freedom of will
3. To distinguish desire from wish
4. To describe the relation between motive and intention
5. To explain the features of intention
6. To evaluate ethical concerns of human conduct

Introduction:

The questions that concern us in this chapter are essentially psychological; and most of the points on which we have to touch will be found treated. It seems necessary here to bring out their ethical significance. Our chief concern in this chapter is to bring the nature of those activities which are described by the terms Conduct, Will, Desire, and Motive, and the relation of these to that general condition of conscious life which is described as 'Character'. But in order to understand these it is necessary also to say something about the relationship between Desire and Will, Motive and Intention and it is to that point that the present chapter is to be devoted.

Conduct

Ethics has been defined as the normative science of conduct, and conduct is a collective name for voluntary actions. Mathew Arnold has said that "Conduct is three-fourths of life;" but of course, from the point of view of purposive activity, conduct is the whole of life. Mackenzie's explained the term conduct in this way, 'The term conduct is sometimes used in a loose sense to include all sorts of vital activities, or at any rate all vital activities which are directed to an end. The term conduct is not an act that merely adjusted to ends, but definitely willed. A person's conduct, then, is the complete system of such acts, corresponding to his character'. Conduct does not include those human activities like the circulation of the blood over which most normal people have no control, but it includes all voluntary actions. A voluntary action is an action that a man could have done differently if he had so chosen. Voluntary action includes all willed or volitional actions in which there is conscious process of willing like the action of a student matriculating the university. Voluntary actions also include certain actions, where there may be no conscious process of willing at all, provided that the doer could have prevented or changed the action by choosing to do so. A habitual action like a child's sucking of his thumb or even a reflex action like blinking in a strong light may be voluntary although the doer of these actions may not be thinking about them at all. The doer, by attempting to them and choosing, could have done these actions differently or refrained from doing them at all, and so they must be regarded as voluntary. Sometimes people try to excuse the wrong Actions by saying that these actions were not deliberately willed or chosen, as when a man continues a dishonest business practise of his predecessors without thinking about it. The

question for ethics is not whether such an action was deliberately willed, but whether the doer could have prevented it, the action can certainly be judged to be a right or wrong action; although we may admit that its degree of rightness or wrongness may be affected by its deliberateness. Conduct may include inward activities like motives and desires as well as outward activities like speech and movements of the doer's limbs, and so these also will fall within the sphere of ethics.

Our provisional definition has limited the conduct with which we deal in ethics in two ways. We deal with human actions and not with the actions of the lower animals. It may be admitted that there is something like human goodness about a dog's loyalty to its master, but psychologists are so far from agreeing as to whether any of the actions of the lower animals are voluntary, that it would be unwise to add to our complications by including animal activities within the limits of our subject. A more arbitrary limitation is that of confining ethics to the study of the conduct of human beings living in societies. Aristotle expressed by saying 'He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god'. Robinson Crusoe's conduct in the solitude of his desert island may be still judged good or bad, but, according to his view, these terms would obtain their meaning from the social environment in which Crusoe had lived before he found himself in an uninhabited island, and to which there was always a hope that he might return. It may be for some purpose convenient to include in a single normative science standards by which we judge all human activities including those that appear to have no effects on other people or relation with them, and it is difficult to think of another name than ethics for such a science.

There seems to be in our mind four types of mental process determining our conduct, and two of these are more important than the others for ethics (a) there is a tendency in some ideas, perhaps in all ideas, to produce movements directly or automatically, and this is called the ideo-motor tendency. The thought of the cold wind blowing in at the door of my study may make me rise automatically and move towards the door in order to shut it, without there being any conscious desire in my mind to do so. Indeed, the moment that I realise what I am doing, I may stop moving towards the door because I am now aware that I really desire fresh air more strongly than I desire greater warmth. (b) We act most commonly because of our desires. We are hungry and desire food and so we eat; we are curious and desire knowledge and so we study. Desire is itself a developed mental process and, in view of its importance in moral action, it will be more fully considered in the next section.

Desire

Oxford dictionary defined desire as a strong feeling of wanting to have something or wishing for something to happen. Desire is a sense of longing for a person or object or hoping for an outcome. The same sense is expressed by emotions such as "craving" or "hankering". When a person desires something or someone, their sense of longing is excited by the enjoyment or the thought of the item or person, and they want to take actions to obtain their goal. The motivational aspect of desire has long been noted by philosophers; Hobbes asserted that human desire is the fundamental motivation of all human action.

Desire depends on certain tendencies of our human nature which may be classified as (a) organic needs, (b) instincts and (c) general innate tendencies.

- (a) Organic needs or wants are those human tendencies which are necessary for the continued existence and normal development of the body. We human beings share such needs with the lower animals and even with plants, for plants need food, moisture and air just as we do. In the case of plants and of at least the lower forms of animal life, such needs are probably unconscious, and there are some cases where a need may be unconscious in human being. In a state of illness the body may be in need of nourishment, but the patient may not feel hungry and so may be unaware that he really needs food. Consciousness of such an organic need is called an appetite. In an appetite, as contrasted with the desire which is the normal development of an appetite in human beings, the craving is vague and not directed to any particular objects. The most prominent feature of consciousness in an appetite is the strong unpleasantness of the appetite remaining unsatisfied and the pleasantness accompanying its satisfaction. The word appetite like so many other psychological terms is used ambiguously in common speech. Sometimes it merely points to the organic sensations which accompany an organic need, without implying any co native tendency to satisfy the need; when we refer to hunger and thirst as appetites we sometimes merely refer to their organic sensations. Sometimes the word appetite is used for desires that are fully conscious and for desires which are based on instincts as well as those based on organic need; we refer to the sexual appetite, although this is based on an instinct rather than organic need, as it has just been defined.
- (b) McDougall defines an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive and to pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality on perceiving such an object and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, at least to experience an impulse to such action. The instinct of flight may be taken as an example; a man or one of the higher animals tends to perceive and to pay attention to a strange loud noise, to experience the emotion of fear on hearing it, and to run away from it or at least to feel an impulse to do so. The inherited disposition to act in a certain fixed way would be enough to make the action instinctive. In our human instinctive action, there is probably always some consciousness of what we are doing, although this consciousness may vary from a dim craving very like that of an appetite to a clear purpose. McDougall arranges the principal human instincts in this way: (i) the instinct of flight, (ii) the instinct of repulsion, (iii) the instinct of curiosity, (iv) the instinct of pugnacity, (v) the instinct of self-assertion and self-abasement, (vi) the parental instinct, (vii) the sex instinct, (viii) the gregarious instinct, (ix) the instinct of acquisition and (x) the instinct of construction. What is certain is that these instincts are inborn in our human nature. Certain tendency to actions of different types, which appear either at birth or at a later stage of normal development. These instincts probably all serve to preserve and protect the human organism or at least the human race, but in experiencing an instinctive tendency, the individual is generally quite unconscious of these services. Instincts are not mental process

or bodily activity which we can observe; they are dispositions to actions, and the only way we can know of them is through the actions they produce.

- (c) The general innate tendencies differ from the instinct in not being characterised by one particular feeling state or by a tendency to one particular mode of action. The kinds of action in which one general innate tendency may express itself are indefinitely variable. According to McDougall, these include sympathy or the tendency to share the emotions of which we observe the expressions in others, suggestibility or the tendency to accept beliefs from others in the absence of logically adequate grounds for their acceptance, and imitation or the tendency of one individual to copy the movements and activities of another. Other general innate tendencies are the tendency to play and the tendency to form habits. From the point of view of ethics, there are no important differences between the general innate tendencies and the instincts; the first three which we have mentioned, sympathy, suggestibility, and imitation are all bound up with the gregarious instincts.

In human beings at any rate there may be a less or greater consciousness of any one of these tendencies, appetites, instincts, and general innate tendencies, and of the activity in which it will find satisfaction. We call this consciousness impulse or desire, and the word 'desire' implies a more definite consciousness than the word 'impulse'. Desires are not commonly isolated but tend to be affected by other desires, while impulses remain more or less isolated conscious tendencies to action.

Desire and Wish

The terms 'desire' and 'wish' are frequently used as synonymous; but there is a slight difference in the usage of the terms, and it seems desirable to employ them in ethics in distinct senses. We may say briefly that a wish is an ineffective desire. The meaning of this will be more apparent when it is considered in relation to what has just been said with regard to universe of desire and the conflict between them. When such conflicts occur, certain desires predominate over others; some are subordinated or sink into abeyance. Now it may be convenient to limit the term 'wish' to those desires that predominate or continue to be effective. A desire, then, which has become ineffective, is not to be described as a wish.

Motive and Intention

Motive

A motive may be defined as a conscious mental process which moves a man to act in a particular way, and which the possible exception done from sense of duty, actions done with a conscious process of willing have their motive desires. It is my desire to eat food that moves me to go into a restaurant and order a meal. The desire itself however there appear to be two aspects, on the one hand the instinctive craving or urge impelling a man to action, and on the other hand the end or object at which he is aiming which is said to induce him to action. Mackenzie's definition for motive is that, "The motive means, of course, what moves us or causes us to act in a particular way. A motive may be understood to mean either that which impels or that which induces us to act in a particular way." The motive which impels a father to send his son to school may be from one aspect

it is his aim of giving his son an education that will secure his full development and enable him to earn his living that induces the father to do so. There may be lower levels of action where a man is carried away by feeling and acts blindly without considering the end or result of his action. Such actions are called impulsive actions, and they come into the sphere of ethics because by thinking of the consequences we could have acted differently.

Intention

The consciousness of the consequences of an action varies from a vague awareness of some object, as when a child runs from some strange animal towards his mother, to a well-thought-out plan or policy where a man has a scheme of action covering a number of years and thinks of all the possible consequence of his plan, as when a man accepts an appointment from a number of years in a foreign country. This whole willed scheme of action, as anticipated by the doer of it, is called his intention. Mackenzie explained intention as, 'The term intention corresponds pretty closely to the term purpose. Indeed, they are sometimes used as synonymous. But purpose seems to refer rather to the mental activity and intention to the end towards which the mental activity is directed. Intention understood in the sense, means anything which we purpose to bring about. Now what we thus purpose is often a very complicated result, and sometimes it is not at all easy to determine how much is really included in our intention'

A man's intention refers to the outside world, the world of anticipated results as they are foreseen by the agent; the motive refers to the state of the agent's own mind, the spirit in which the action is done rather than the consequences of the action, although a fully conscious motive has an aim which indicates the spirit of action. The intention, as foreseen scheme of action, is capable of almost indefinite elaboration, varying with the imagination of the agent and his knowledge of probable circumstances. Some of the distinctions made by Mackenzie among the different parts of intention have their main use in showing the elaborate nature of intention.

In the first place, we may distinguish between the immediate and the remote intentions of an act. Thus two men may both have the immediate intention of saving a third from drowning; but the one may wish to save him from drowning simply in order that his life may be preserved, whereas the other may wish save him from drowning in order that he may be reserved for hanging. In this case, while the immediate intentions are the same, the remote intentions are very different. The remote intention of an act is sometimes called motive; but this use of the term is open to serious objection.

In the second place, we may distinguish between the outer and the inner intention of act. This may be illustrated by the familiar story of Abraham Lincoln and the pig that he helped out of a ditch. On being praised for his action, Lincoln is said to have replied that he did it, not for the sake of pig, but rather on his own account, in order to his mind of the outer intention was to rescue the animal's distress. Here the outer intention was to rescue the animal, while the inner intention was to remove an uncomfortable feeling from the mind.

In the third place, we may distinguish between the direct and the indirect intention of an act. If a Nihilist seeks to blow up the train containing an Emperor and others, his direct intention may be simply the destruction of the emperor, but indirectly also he intends the destruction of the others

who are in the train, since he is aware that their destruction will be necessarily included along with that of the Emperor.

In the fourth place, we may distinguish between the conscious and the unconscious intention of an act. To what extent any intention can be unconscious, is a question for psychology. By an unconscious intention is here understood simply an intention which the agent does not definitely avow to himself. A man's conduct is often in reality profoundly influenced by such intentions. Thus the intention which he avows to himself may be that of promoting the well-being of mankind, while in reality he may be much more strongly influenced by that of advancing his own reputation.

In the fifth place, we may distinguish between the formal and the material intention of an act. The material intention means the particular result as a realised fact; the formal intention means the principle embodied in fact. Two men may both aim at the overthrow of a particular government. The material intentions are in that case the same. But one may aim at its overthrow because he thinks it too progressive, the other because he thinks it too conservative. The intentions of these two men are in this case very different formally, though their actions may be materially the same.

These distinctions are given here, not as being an exhaustive list, but simply with the view of bringing out the complications that may be involved in a purpose. It is important to bring them out, since, otherwise, the relation between motive and intention can hardly be explained.

Summing up, then, we may say that an intention, in the broadest sense of the term, means any aim that is definitely adopted as an object of will; and that such intentions may be of various distinct kinds.

The relation between motive and intention

The relation between motive and intentions is a very close one. The motive of our act is that which induces us to perform it. Now it is evident that this must be included in the intention, in the broadest sense of that term, but need not be, and generally will not be, identical with the whole of it. What induces us to perform an act is always something that we hope to achieve by it which would not serve as an inducement to its performance, and which might even serve as an inducement not to perform it.

The motive of an act, then, is part of the intention, in the broadest sense of that term, but does not necessarily include the whole of the intention. Adopting the distinctions between intentions made by Mackenzie, we may say that the motive generally includes the greater part of the remote intention, but frequently does not include much of the immediate intention; that it generally includes the direct intention; but not the indirect; that it is nearly always includes the formal intention, but often not much of the material intention; and that it may be either outer or inner, conscious or unconscious.

The Freedom of the Will

We are now in a position to consider what is meant by human freedom, in so far as this has ethical significance.

Some view on this point may almost immediately be ruled out of court. Thus it has been argued that there is no real freedom, since men are determined by circumstances. This was the doctrine, for instance, of Robert Owen, the socialist. Accordingly, he made it his great aim in life to improve men's external conditions. But we have seen that mere external conditions are not circumstances in any sense that is ethically important. Before setting ourselves to improve men's conditions, we should ask ourselves how far there conditions are there real circumstances to them, and what sort of circumstances they are. To ask this is at the same time to ask what sort of people they are. It is a complete mistake to suppose that men are determined by conditions that are in any true sense external to them.

Again freedom is sometimes understood to mean the power of affecting without motives. But this is also an absurdity. To act without motives i.e., without reference to anything that may reasonably serve as an inducement to action, would be to act from blind impulse, as some of the lower animals may be supposed to do. But this is evidently that the very reverse of what we understand by freedom.

In order to avoid such crude misconceptions as these, it is important to consider in what sense the idea of freedom is ethically significant.

Freedom essential to morals- there is involved in the moral consciousness the conviction that we ought to act in one way rather than in another, that one manner of action is good or right, and another bad or evil. Now, as Kant urged, there would be no meaning in an 'ought' if it were not accompanied by a 'can'. It does not follow, however, that the 'can' refers to an immediate possibility. A man ought to be wise, for instance; but wisdom is a quality that can only be gradually developed. What can be done at once is only to put ourselves in the way of acquiring it. Similarly, we ought to love our neighbours. But love is a feeling that cannot be produced at will. We can only put ourselves in the way of cultivating kindly affections. But it would be absurd to say that a man ought to add a cubit to his stature or to live for 20 years. He cannot even put himself in the way of attaining these ends, and they cannot therefore form any part of his duty. Now if a man's will were absolutely determined by his circumstances, it would be strictly impossible for him to become anything but that which he does become, and consequently it would be impossible that he ought to be anything different. There would thus be no 'ought' at all. Moral imperatives would cease to have any meaning. If, then, there is to be any meaning in the moral imperative, the will must not be absolutely determined by circumstances, but must in some sense be free. This is true also even if we do not, like Kant, think of the moral end as of the nature of an imperative, but rather as a Good or Ideal to be attained.

Model Questions

Part A

(Each answer not to exceed 50 words ,each question carries 1 weightage)

1. Define conduct

Mackenzie's explained the term conduct in this way, ' The term conduct is sometimes used in a loose sense to include all sorts of vital activities, or at any rate all vital activities which are directed

to an end. The term conduct is not an act that merely adjusted to ends, but definitely willed. A person's conduct, then, is the complete system of such acts, corresponding to his character'

2. Explain the concept of Desire

Oxford dictionary defined desire as a strong feeling of wanting to have something or wishing for something to happen. Desire is a sense of longing for a person or object or hoping for an outcome. The same sense is expressed by emotions such as "craving" or "hankering". When a person desires something or someone, their sense of longing is excited by the enjoyment or the thought of the item or person, and they want to take actions to obtain their goal.

Part B

(Each answer not to exceed 150 words , each question carries 2 weightages)

3. Freedom essential to morals- justify

There is involved in the moral consciousness the conviction that we ought to act in one way rather than in another, that one manner of action is good or right, and another bad or evil. Now, as Kant urged, there would be no meaning in an 'ought' if it were not accompanied by a 'can'. It does not follow, however, that the 'can' refers to an immediate possibility. A man ought to be wise, for instance; but wisdom is a quality that can only be gradually developed. What can be done at once is only to put ourselves in the way of acquiring it. Similarly, we ought to love our neighbours. But love is a feeling that cannot be produced at will. We can only put ourselves in the way of cultivating kindly affections. But it would be absurd to say that a man ought to add a cubit to his stature or to live for 20 years. He cannot even put himself in the way of attaining these ends, and they cannot therefore form any part of his duty. Now if a man's will were absolutely determined by his circumstances, it would be strictly impossible for him to become anything but that which he does become, and consequently it would be impossible that he ought to be anything different. There would thus be no 'ought' at all. Moral imperatives would cease to have any meaning. If, then, there is to be any meaning in the moral imperative, the will must not be absolutely determined by circumstances, but must in some sense be free. This is true also even if we do not, like Kant, think of the moral end as of the nature of an imperative, but rather as a Good or Ideal to be attained.

Part C

(Each answer not to exceed 300 words , each question carries 4 weightages)

4. Give a detailed account on psychological notions of ethics

Unit III

Ethical Theories

1. To introduce the different kinds of ethical theories
2. To explain the terms like Hedonism, Utilitarianism, Eudemonism etc.
3. To analyse utilitarianism of J.S. Mill and Bentham To describe normative science
4. To distinguish qualitative and quantitative utilitarianism
5. To bring out the notions like, hedonistic calculus, categorical imperative, formalism etc.
6. To evaluate evolutionary theories of Spencer and T.H. Green
7. To analyse moral concepts like rights and duties, virtue and classification virtues etc.

Standard as pleasure

Any mental process may have the quality either of pleasantness or of unpleasantness. But it has always other qualities as well. Pleasantness seems to occur in the mind under various conditions; (a) as a normal quality of certain sensations and perceptions such as the sensation of sweetness and the perception of beautiful objects; (b) as an accompaniment of any activity either bodily or mental, provided that the activity is not imposed on its agent from outside or impeded by fatigue or some other impeding factor; (c) as an accompaniment of the successful completion of any activity; (d) as an accompaniment of the attainment of a desire which is, of course, a special case of the successful completion of an activity, but which is such an important source of pleasantness, that it worth mentioning specially. When a desire attains the end to which it is directed, the desire is satisfied; and this satisfaction is attended by an agreeable feeling of pleasure, enjoyment, or happiness. On the other hand, when he end of a desire is not attained, we have a disagreeable feeling—a feeling of pain, misery, or unhappiness. Now it seems plausible to say that, since what we aim at is the satisfaction of our desires, the best aim is that which will bring the greatest number of pleasure and the smallest number of pains. The highest universe, in fact, would be that which is constituted by the consideration of our greatest happiness throughout life; or, if consider others as well as ourselves, by the consideration of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This leads us to the consideration of Hedonism.

Hedonism

Hedonism is the general term for those theories that regards happiness or pleasure as the supreme end of life. Hedonism the term derives from the Greek word *hēdonē*, which means "delight". Hedonism is a school of thought that argues that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. In very simple terms, a hedonist strives to maximize net pleasure and minus pain. These theories have taken many different forms. According to the nature of seeking pleasure hedonism can be divided broadly in to two: Psychological Hedonism and Ethical Hedonism.

(a) Psychological Hedonism:- It has been held by some that men always do seek pleasure. i. e. that pleasure in some form is always ultimate object of desire. This theory holds that this is not the way people ought to be; this is the way people actually are—they **naturally seek pleasure**. Prof. Sidgwick

called this position as psychological hedonism, because it simply affirms the seeking of pleasure as a psychological fact.

(b) **Ethical Hedonism:-** whether or not people pursue pleasure, they should or **ought to do so**. A right action is productive of pleasure; a wrong action is productive of pain. Ethical hedonism is the idea that all people have the right to do everything in their power to achieve the greatest amount of pleasure possible to them.

Most of the earlier ethical hedonists were also psychological hedonists; but this latter view has now been almost universally abandoned. Psychological hedonism is simply a statement of fact; whereas Ethical hedonism is a theory of value, a theory of the ground upon which one form of action ought to be preferred to others.

Ethical Hedonism:-

Again, ethical hedonism can be divided into two according to their nature of seeking pleasure: some have held that what each man seeks, or ought to seek, is his own pleasure; while others hold that what each seeks or ought to seek, is the pleasure of all human beings, or even all sentient creatures. Prof. Sidgwick has called the former of these views **Egoistic Ethical Hedonism**; the latter, **Universalistic Ethical Hedonism** or **Utilitarianism**.

I. Egoistic Ethical hedonism:- Is the theory that we ought, morally speaking, to do whatever makes us happiest – that is whatever provides us with the most net pleasure after pain is subtracted. The most repugnant feature of this theory is that one never has to ascribe any value whatsoever to the consequences for anyone other than oneself. For example, a Hedonistic Egoist who did not feel saddened by theft would be morally required to steal, even from needy orphans.

II. Universalistic Ethical Hedonism or Utilitarianism:- Is the theory that the right action is the one that produces the greatest net happiness for all concerned. Hedonistic Utilitarianism is often considered fairer than Hedonistic Egoism because the happiness of everyone involved is taken into account and given equal weight. Utilitarianism, then, tend to advocate not stealing from needy orphans because to do so would usually leave the orphan far less happy and the thief only slightly happier. Some more modern writers such as Bentham and Mill- did not clearly distinguish between egoistic and universalistic hedonism and consequently, though in the main supporting the Utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes the overall "good" of the society. The most influential contributors to this theory are considered to be Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill. The 18th and 19th-century British philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill defended the ethical theory of utilitarianism, according to which we should perform whichever action maximizes the aggregate good. The term 'utilitarianism', gives emphasis on utility or usefulness rather than on pleasure. The utilitarian school had also the advantage of a good slogan, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', a slogan which emphasized the wide distribution of human pleasure as well as its maximisation. A purely

hedonistic theory would not care whether human pleasure were distributed among many or confined to a few, provided that the greatest possible amount of pleasure was achieved. Conjoining hedonism, as a view as to what is good for people, to utilitarianism has the result that all action should be directed toward achieving the greatest total amount of happiness (Hedonic Calculus). Though consistent in their pursuit of happiness, Bentham and Mill's versions of hedonism differ. There are two somewhat basic schools of thought on hedonism.

Bentham- Quantitative Utilitarianism

Bentham argued that happiness was the ultimate good and that happiness was pleasure and the absence of pain. He acknowledged the egoistic and hedonistic nature of peoples' motivation, but argued that the maximization of collective happiness was the correct criterion for moral behaviour. Bentham's greatest happiness principle states that actions are immoral if they are not the action that appears to maximise the happiness of all the people likely to be affected; only the action that appears to maximise the happiness of all the people likely to be affected is the morally right action.

Bentham devised the greatest happiness principle to justify the legal reforms he also argued for. He understood that he could not conclusively prove that the principle was the correct criterion for morally right action, but also thought that it should be accepted because it was fair and better than existing criteria for evaluating actions and legislation. Bentham thought that his Hedonic Calculus could be applied to situations to see what should, morally speaking, be done in a situation. The Hedonic Calculus is a method of counting the amount of pleasure and pain that would likely be caused by different actions. The Hedonic Calculus required a methodology for measuring pleasure, which in turn required an understanding of the nature of pleasure and specifically what aspects of pleasure were valuable for us.

Bentham's Hedonic Calculus identifies several aspects of pleasure that contribute to its value, including certainty, propinquity, extent, intensity, and duration. The Hedonic Calculus also makes use of two future-pleasure-or-pain-related aspects of actions – fecundity and purity. Certainty refers to the likelihood that the pleasure or pain will occur. Propinquity refers to how long away (in terms of time) the pleasure or pain is. Fecundity refers to the likelihood of the pleasure or pain leading to more of the same sensation. Purity refers to the likelihood of the pleasure or pain leading to some of the opposite sensation. Extent refers to the number of people the pleasure or pain is likely to affect. Intensity refers to the felt strength of the pleasure or pain. Duration refers to how long the pleasure or pain are felt for. It should be noted that only intensity and duration have intrinsic value for an individual. Certainty, propinquity, fecundity, and purity are all instrumentally valuable for an individual because they affect the likelihood of an individual feeling future pleasure and pain. Extent is not directly valuable for an individual's well-being because it refers to the likelihood of other people experiencing pleasure or pain.

By the inclusion of fecundity, and purity in the Hedonic Calculus Bentham modified his hedonist calculus as seven point calculus.

Bentham's modified seven points Hedonistic Calculus:-

1. Intensity: How strong is the pleasure?

2. Duration: How long will the pleasure last?
3. Certainty or uncertainty: How likely or unlikely is it that the pleasure will occur?
4. Propinquity or remoteness: How soon will the pleasure occur?
5. Fecundity: The probability that the action will be followed by sensations of the same kind.
6. Purity: The probability that it will not be followed by sensations of the opposite kind.
7. Extent: How many people will be affected?

Most importantly for Bentham's Hedonic Calculus, the pleasure from different sources is always measured against these criteria in the same way, that is to say that no additional value is afforded to pleasures from particularly moral, clean, or culturally-sophisticated sources. For example, Bentham held that pleasure from the parlour game push-pin was just as valuable for us as pleasure from music and poetry. Since Bentham's theory of Universal Hedonism focuses on the quantity of the pleasure, rather than the source-derived quality of it, it is best described as a type of Quantitative Hedonism.

J.S. Mill- Qualitative Utilitarianism

Mill's major contribution to utilitarianism is his argument for the qualitative separation of pleasures. Bentham treats all forms of happiness as equal, whereas Mill argues that intellectual and moral pleasures (higher pleasures) are superior to more physical forms of pleasure (lower pleasures). Mill distinguishes between happiness and contentment, claiming that the former is of higher value than the latter, a belief wittily encapsulated in the statement that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. Mill also thought happiness, defined as pleasure and the avoidance of pain, was the highest good. Where Mill's hedonism differs from Bentham's is in his understanding of the nature of pleasure. Mill argued that pleasures could vary in quality, being either higher or lower pleasures. Lower pleasures are those associated with the body, which we share with other animals, such as pleasure from quenching thirst or having sex. Higher pleasures are those associated with the mind, which were thought to be unique to humans, such as pleasure from listening to opera, acting virtuously, and philosophising. Mill justified this distinction by arguing that those who have experienced both types of pleasure realise that higher pleasures are much more valuable. He dismissed challenges to this claim by asserting that those who disagreed lacked either the experience of higher pleasures or the capacity for such experiences. For Mill, higher pleasures were not different from lower pleasures by mere degree; they were different in kind. Since Mill's theory of Hedonism focuses on the quality of the pleasure, rather than the amount of it, it is best described as a type of Qualitative Hedonism.

Mill's account of utilitarianism may be summarised in the following five statements:

- (a) Pleasure is the only thing that is desirable.
- (b) The only proof that a thing is desirable is the fact that people do actually desire it.
- (c) Each person's own pleasure or happiness is a good that person, so the general happiness is good to everybody.

- (d) Men do desire other objects, but they desire them as a means to pleasure.
- (e) If one of two pleasures is preferred by those who are competently acquainted with both we are justified in saying that this preferred pleasure is superior in quality to the other.

Standard as Law

In dealing with the different types of ethical theory, it seems most convenient to start with those that take as their fundamental conception the idea of Duty, Right, Law, and Obligation. Morality presents itself as obedience to the Law of duty. A good deal of confusion has been caused in the study of ethics, as well as in that of some other subjects, by a certain ambiguity in the word Law. In order to avoid this ambiguity Mackenzie tries to distinguish different kinds of laws as (1) changeable or unchangeable, (2) violable or inviolable. Adopting these two principles, we might evidently have four different classes of laws- (1) Those that can be changed and violated, (2) those that can be changed but cannot be violated, (3) those that can be violated but cannot be changed, those that can neither be changed nor violated.

According to Mackenzie the laws of ethics, however, must on the whole be regarded as belonging to the third class. They cannot be changed, but they may be violated. It is true that the particular rules of morals may vary with different conditions of life; but the basic principles remain always the same, and are applicable not only to all kinds of men, but to all rational beings. These laws are unchangeable. Immanuel Kant agrees with this position by his conception of moral law as an unconditional command.

Immanuel Kant

We are now in a position to understand the important conception which was introduced by Kant with reference to the moral law. Kant regards conscience as practical reason. It imposes the moral law upon itself. The moral law is known intuitively. It is a priori – not empirical. It is self evident. Maxims of morality are deduced by Kant from the moral law. They also are self evident. The rightness or wrongness of particular actions is inferred from their agreement or disagreement with the moral law. The moral quality of an action is not determined by any end or its consequences, but the purity of its motive. Intuitionism does not give any philosophical justification of the moral principles. But Kant tries to give a philosophical foundation of the moral law. It regards moral laws or the internal law of conscience as the moral standards. Kant is an advocate of Jural ethics as distinguished from teleological ethics. Conscience is moral or practical reason.

Categorical Imperative- According to Kant, the internal law of conscience or practical reason is the ultimate moral standard. The moral law is a categorical imperative. It is an 'imperative' or command as opposed to an assertion of facts. A natural law is assertorial. Matter attracts matter. It is an assertion of fact. A psychological law also is assertorial. All persons act to relieve a feeling of want-it is an assertion of fact. But the moral law is not assertorial, but imperative. It is '**categorical**' or unconditional. It is a priori and not derived from experience; it is free from empirical facts, and ought to be done under all circumstances, it is known in advance of a particular situation. It is not 'hypothetical imperative', which takes such a form: if we seek to realise an end, we must act in a particular way in order to realise it. The laws which are means to other ends are of the nature of

hypothetical imperatives. The economic laws are conducive to wealth. So they are hypothetical imperative. If we want to acquire wealth, we must observe the economic laws. But the moral law which is imposed by practical reason up on itself is a categorical imperative. We ought to obey it not for the sake of any other end; it demands unconditional obedience; it is not a means to a higher end; it is an end in itself. It is no absolute unconditional command which admits no questions. What we ought to do we ought to do. It cannot be set aside by any higher law. The Categorical Imperative or the moral law has no reference to any external ends, but simply to the right direction of the will itself. The Categorical Imperative is the universal moral law it applies to all persons. It is common to all mankind.

Postulates of Morality

- 1 **Freedom of the will** is the fundamental postulate of morality. By a postulate of morality Kant means a necessary condition at the fulfilment of morality. “Thou *ougest*; there for thou *canst*”. Freewill is implied by morality. If the freewill is not free, morality becomes impossible. The denial of freedom of the will spas the very foundation of morality. We are directly conscious of our duty or moral obligation. Freedom is pre supposed by moral obligation. Kant reconciled freedom and necessity in this way. The self as nominal is above causality and consequently free. The self as empirical, i. e, a series of mental state, subject to necessity, determination or causal law. There is no contradiction in this view according to him.
- 2 **Immortality of soul** is another postulate of morality. Morality consists in overcoming the perpetual conflict of desire with duty. Desire cannot be eliminated in this finite life. It will require infinite life during which sensibility or desire will be gradually eliminated.
- 3 **The existence of God** is another postulate of morality. Virtue is the supreme good. But virtue and happiness constitute the complete good. The virtuous are seldom found to be happy. But they should be happy. Our moral consciousness demands it. If the virtuous are not happy in this world, they will be rewarded by God with happiness in the next world. God is the controller of the realm of nature and the realm of spirits.

He will harmonize virtue with happiness and bring about the complete good. Thus the freedom of the will, immortality of soul, and the existence of God are postulates of morality.

Kant’s ethical doctrine is called formalism. It gives us the pure form of morality- the Categorical Imperative, but does not recognise the importance of the matter or content of morality which is supplied by feeling and desire. Kant’s point of view is ‘deontological’, which regards duty as the fundamental concept of ethics. It is not teleological, which regards end or purpose as the fundamental concept of ethics. Kant lays stress on the sense of duty as unique moral motive. Kant assumes that duty and self-interest are the only two motives of actions. Therefore all actions which are not motivated by the sense of duty are motivated by self-interest. The sense of duty is the only morally good motive. Kant further assumes that if an action is done from inclination or self interest, then it is done in order to satisfy this inclination. Kant for the first time makes deontological concepts central in ethics in an emphatic way.

Criticisms

1. Psychological dualism- Kant's view is based on psychological dualism of reason and sensibility. He sets up an antagonism between reason and sensibility or desire. The mind is an organic unity of both the elements. Sensibility is the matter of moral life, which should be subjected to the reason. Feeling gives the matter to desire; desire gives rise to activity. There is no action without sensibility. The moral life is an active life. Action implies feeling and desire. Thus the moral life implies sensibility as a necessary element in it.
2. Asceticism- Kant advocates an ascetic view of morality. At least, asceticism is the dominant note in Kant's ethical system. He considered that sensibility is necessarily irrational and that morality consists in the total extirpation of sensibility, because sensibility has its proper place and function in the nature of the self, and because virtue truly consists in the matter of moral life. They should be regulated by reason which supplies the form or moral law.
3. Formalism- If we dismiss feeling and desires, we lose the entire content of morality, and what is left is only its empty form. Kant's ethical doctrine is formalistic in the sense that separates the form from the matter of morality. Reason gives the form or the categorical imperative. But what gives us the matter to which the form is applied? The will willing itself is an absurdity; it leads to sheer formalism; sensibility is the matter to which the form is applied. In other words, sensibility must be regulated and transformed by reason according to the moral law. Jacobi rightly describes the pure will of Kant, devoid of particular content, as "a will that wills *nothing*."

Standard as Perfection

According to perfectionism perfection or self- realisation is the highest good. Perfection is the perfection of character or rational control of feelings, emotions, and desires in accordance with the virtue or the moral excellence. It is also the perfection of humanity or development of a perfect type of character in humanity. It implies the conscious pursuit of this ideal by every person in human society. Perfectionism is also called Eudemonism. The Greeks used the term *eudemonia* in the sense of 'happiness' or 'prosperity'. But Aristotle used it in the sense of moral well-being or realisation of a person's capacities in accordance with virtue. Aristotle says, "The Good Man comes to be able 'a working of the soul in the way of excellence' or if excellence admits of degrees, in the way of the best and the most perfect Excellence." Perfection gives permanent happiness. The well-being of the self arises from the subordination of feelings and desires brought about by reason. This doctrine is also called the ethics of personality or the ethics of self realisation.

F. H. Bradley (1846-1924)

F. H. Bradley's conception of 'My station and its Duties' makes the meaning of self realization clear. He holds that each person has a place and function in the human society in accordance with his talents, for example as teacher or as farmer or as labourer, and the most important part of his moral life consists in carrying out the duties of this particular station. He has a definite station in society, and should perform his duties appropriate to it. He is a member of the social

whole; he has a particular place in it; his duties are appropriate to his station in society. This will lead to his self-realization. Each person is born with particular aptitudes. He has a place and function in society; his duties relate to his station in life. By performing his duties appropriate to his station in the society, he can achieve self-realisation. He can attain happiness by fulfilling his proper function in an organised community. Society is amoral organism.

Bradley says, "What is the end? The end is self-realization. The 'individual' apart from the community is an abstraction. I am myself by sharing with others, by including in my essence relations to them, the relations of the social state. I am to realize myself in 'my station and its duties'. In short, man is a social being; he is real only because it is as social and can realise himself only because he is as social that he realizes himself." The society is a moral organism of interdependent members. Each member has a particular station in society determined by his peculiar talent; his duties are determined by his station in society. He can realize his self only by performing his duties relating to his station in society.

Different individuals are organs of the moral organism. Just as the organs of an organism have specific functions by performing which properly they can effectively contribute to its general well being, so the different members of the social or moral organism contribute to its common good by performing their specific duties appropriate to their station in society. There is heterogeneity of functions of the individual members in the moral organism with homogeneity of its common good. There is homogeneity as well as heterogeneity in the moral organism. The highest personal good is in harmony with the highest social or common good.

The general will of the moral organism is embodied in social institutions. The different members of the moral organism should perform their specific duties in conformity with the Ethos of the people, which is partly expressed in social institutions. Thus they can harmonize their personal will with the general will of the community. Self-realization is never possible apart from society. Personal morality apart from social morality is an abstraction. Bradley exaggerates the importance of Ethos. He maintains that a person who seeks to transcend the Ethos of the people is on the threshold of immorality.

Bradley means by self-realization, realization of the infinite self. It consists in the complete transformation of the sentient nature of man by his reason through his ever increasing identification with family, community, nation, and humanity. Self-realization is not possible apart from society. Morality is not subjective but objective. A person rises above his narrow individuality, when he throws himself heart and soul into social service. The more he loses himself in objective interests or social good, the more he realizes his ideal self.

Evolutionary Hedonism of Herbert Spencer

Evolution applied to morals. The hedonism of Herbert Spencer is called Evolutionary Hedonism. Spencer propounded his doctrine in his *Data of Ethics*, and applied, for the first time, the doctrine of Evolution to morals. Morality has evolved from the non-moral conduct of animals. It is subject to growth and development. Evolutionists explain it by reference to its beginning and hence they apply the historical method. Idealists, on the other hand, explain it by reference to

the end or ideal. They apply the teleological method. Herbert Spencer traces the origin of morality to the conduct animals.

Herbert Spencer deduces moral laws from biological laws. Bentham and J.S. Mill derive moral laws from inductions from experience of pleasure and pain. They are advocates of empirical hedonism. But Spencer deduces hedonism from the law of biological evolution. His hedonism is called evolutionary or deductive hedonism. "The business of moral science", says Spencer, is to deduce from the laws of life what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds tend to produce unhappiness. Its deductions are to be recognised as laws of conduct, and are to be confirmed irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery". Spencer's hedonism is said to be scientific. Morality is a product of evolution. It cannot be understood except in the light of evolution.

Conduct- Spencer defines conduct as the adjustment of acts to ends. Conduct means the activities which adjust the organism to the environment. The essence of life consists in "the continues adjustment of internal relation to external relation", i. e., the constant effort of the organism to adapt itself to its environment. All conduct tends either to promote or to hinder such adaptation. In so far as it tends to promote it, it is good; in so far as it tends to hinder it, it is bad.

Good Conduct- Good conduct produces pleasure, because it brings the organism into harmony with its environment. Bad conduct produces pain, because it fails to adapt the organism to the environment. Nearly all conduct is partly good and partly bad. Perfectly good conduct as an action which produces pleasure alone with no pain. But conduct is relatively good when it produces a more perfect adjustment of the organism to the environment. Conduct is relatively bad when it produces a more imperfect adjustment of the organism to the environment. Thus good conduct promotes life, and bad conduct hinders life. Conduct is good or bad accordingly.

Pleasure and pain- Spencer bases hedonism on a biological basis. Pleasure, according to him, in an index of increase of life; pain is an index of decrease of life. "It is an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of Evolution, says Spencer, "that pains are correlatives or actions conductive to its welfare. Pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining; pain-giving acts are life-destroying. Sentient existence depends on this law. Animals naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain. Now, if pleasure had decreased life and pain increased life, then animals would long ago have brought about their own destruction, because they naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain. But animal life does continue. So, for Spencer, pleasure is a correlate of furtherance of life, and pain, of hindrance of life. Thus pleasure is both biologically and ethically good.

The supreme end and the proximate ends- Actions are good or bad according as they are well or ill adapted to achieve self-preservation and race-preservation. Ultimately their goodness or badness is determined by the measure in which all minor ends are merged in the grand end of self-preservation and race-preservation. Spencer assumes that the nature aims at the preservation of the type rather than of the individual. Hence the individual has often to sacrifice his good for the sake of community. Evolution tends to reconcile egoism with altruism. The proximate goal of life is the increase of life in length and breadth of both. Length is duration of life. Breadth is volume or complexity of life. Self-preservation and race- preservation are the

ultimate ends of biological evolution. And length and breadth of life are the proximate ends of morality. The increase of the totality of life, in the individual and race, in length and breadth of life are the proximate ends of morality. The supreme moral end of the individual is happiness, but that is best attained, by keeping it in the background and fixing attention upon its conditions.

Moral consciousness- In seeking to trace the genesis of the moral consciousness Spencer finds that the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings. He holds that for the better preservation of life, some external form of pleasure must be brought to bear upon human nature. The external pressures are called by him, political, religious, and social control, which is internal, and calls it moral control.

Moral obligation- The sentiment of duty or feeling of moral obligation consists of two elements, viz., (1) the element of authoritativeness and (2) the element of coerciveness. It is found that the later evolved, more compound, and more representative feelings serving to adjust the conduct to more distant and general ends have all along had an authority over the earlier and simpler representative feelings e.g. self-interest. Spencer holds the view that the sense of moral obligation is not a permanent trait of moral consciousness. He says, "The sense of duty moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases. While at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any consciousness that it ought to be done, may eventually cease to have any such accompanying consciousness".

Egoism and altruism- The conflict between the interest of the society and those of the individual, which gives rise to the feeling of moral obligation, is not absolute and permanent. Egoism and Altruism both have their rights. Self preservation and self- sacrifice are equally innate in human nature. In the evolution of the race altruism has been evolving simultaneously with egoism. "From the dawn of life", says Spencer, "egoism has been dependent upon altruism, as altruism has dependent upon egoism; and in the course of evolution, and the reciprocal services of the two have been increasing. Thus pure egoism and pure altruism are both illegitimate".

Absolute Ethics and Relative Ethics- Spencer distinguishes between Absolute ethics and Relative ethics. Absolute ethics prescribes duties which are conducive to life in a perfect society, in which there is perfect adaptation of the individual to his social environment. Relative ethics prescribes duties which are necessary for life of an individual in an imperfect society, in which there is imperfect adaptation of the individual to the society. Relative ethics deals with relative morality in an imperfect society absolute ethics deals with the absolute morality in a perfect society. Relative ethics supplies the moral standards by which we ought to live in an imperfect society. Absolute ethics indicates the ultimate nature of right by reference to which all relative right should be measured.

T.H. Green

T. H. Green holds that there is a spiritual principle in nature. It is the principle of eternal and universal consciousness. Finite spirits are finite reproductions of the eternal spirit. Their highest good consists in realising their infinitude and community with the eternal spirit through

identification with the richer and wider life of humanity. Moral life consists in the constant endeavour to make the universal principle in the human self more and more explicit to bring out more and more completely its rational, self-conscious, spiritual nature by transforming the animal life of appetites and desires. To realise the completely rational universe is to realize the true self.

Self-realization is the highest personal good and social good. Good is that which satisfies desire. Moral good is that which satisfies a moral agent. The finite self is rational. So moral good should be a rational good, and satisfy the rational nature of man. It cannot be pleasure which satisfies the sentient nature of the finite self. It cannot be mere virtue, good will, rational will, or pure will, devoid of all content. Moral good is the realization of the ideal self or self-realization. It is perfection of the self. It is reproduction of the perfection of the infinite and eternal spirit or God in man. Man's intellectual activity and moral activity imply the reproduction in him of eternal consciousness. A divine principle realizes itself in man. The ideal self is the divine principle in him. It is the higher, rational, and social self. It is not the lower, sentient, and individual self. The ideal of self can be realized in and through society. Self-realization is possible in a society, a nation and humanity. It consists in the realization of infinite capacities of the self for knowledge, love and service in fellowship with humanity. Perfection is realized by the man in the progress of humanity towards a perfect society. Self-realization or perfection cannot be attained by an individual apart from his nation. A nation or national spirit also in an abstraction apart from persons in whom it exists. Progress of humanity means progress of impersonal character to personal character. Moral progress in humanity means progress of humanity to a perfect society, in which personality of persons will not be extinguished or persons will never be treated as means. Moral progress consists in the fulfilment of personality in persons in society. The capacities which are realized in time in a person are already fully realised in God or the eternal Spirit. Moral progress is the gradual reproduction of divine perfection in man. Different members of a society have different capacities and different functions which fit in which their capacities. They all contribute to the moral progress of the society. They produce divine perfection in different ways. But the exact nature of perfection or self realization of man cannot be exactly defined until a person has actually realized that state.

Intuitionism

Intuitionism is the very theory that conscience immediately and intuitively perceives the rightness or wrongness of particular actions without reference to their ends and consequences. Rightness and wrongness are inherent qualities of actions. Conscience immediately apprehends rightness or wrongness of particular actions irrespective of any ends and their consequences. Intuitionism refers moral judgements to the tribunal of conscience, which admits of no question or appeal.

Butler's Intuitionism

Bishop Butler regarded conscience as the highest principle in human nature superior to self-love and benevolence. Particular propulsions or impulses giving rise to desires seek their objects. Desires do not seek for pleasure, but certain objects which fulfil them. They are either egoistic or altruistic. Egoistic impulses mainly benefit the agent. Altruistic impulses mainly benefit other

people. Self-love regulates egoistic impulses, co-ordinates them with one another and maximizes one's total happiness. Benevolence regulates altruistic impulses and maximizes other people's happiness. Both self-love and benevolence are rational calculating principles. Conscience is superior to self-love and benevolence. It is moral reason- a principle of reflection upon the law of rightness. Self-love and benevolence are superior to particular impulses, and determine when and how far each should be gratified. Particular egoistic impulses should be regulated by self love. Particular altruistic impulses should be regulated by benevolence. Both self-love and benevolence should be regulated by conscience. Conscience is categorical or unconditionally obligatory. It is authoritative in human constitution. It is the rational principle by which we approve or disapprove, and order and regulate, our impulses. It judges, directs and superintends the egoistic and the altruistic impulses. "Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world". Self-love seeks the good of the agent. Benevolence seeks the good of others without self-interest. Conscience urges men to private good as much as to public good we ought to obey conscience. "Man is a law to himself".

Moral obligation is imposed from within, and not from without. Butler regards human nature as a system, like Plato. He regards society also an organic whole, and not as an artificial creation of human contrast as Hobbes holds. Rogers calls Butler's doctrine, Autonomic intuitionism. No particular impulse is intrinsically evil. The excessive or inappropriate functioning of a principle of action is wrong. Its proper functioning, in its right degree, in its proper place, is right. Virtue consists in acting against it. Virtue includes self- loving and benevolent conduct. It leads inevitably to happiness, alike for the individual and for the society. This is the element of eudemonism in Butler's ethics.

Criticism

Butler is right in regarding conscience as the supreme principle in human nature. He considers it to be a principle of reflection on the law of rightness. Hence he regards it as moral reason which immediately apprehends the moral law, though he does not distinctly describe it as such. Butler is also right in regarding it as superior to self- love and benevolence which regulates egoistic and altruistic impulses respectively.

But Butler is wrong in regarding the moral law as inexplicable. It is a means to the realization of the ideal or rational self. It is a means to the realisation of the values implied in self-realization. It is not a law unto itself, but a means to a supreme end. Butler cannot reconcile the conflict between self-love and benevolence, and between self-love and conscience.

Henry Sidgwick

Henry Sidgwick is an exponent of Intuitionist or Rational Utilitarianism. He holds that pleasure is the only intrinsic value, which is good in itself. Pleasure is ultimately desirable. It is the only rational object of desire. Pleasure is the only reasonable object of desire. It is a deliverance of conscience or moral reason. He identifies conscience with practical reason, like Kant. Practical reason dictates that pleasure is the end that ought to be pursued. Knowledge, beauty, virtue, etc., are means to pleasure. They have extrinsic or instrumental value. Sidgwick does not

distinguish between pleasure and happiness. The ultimate good is pleasure or happiness. Sidgwick says, "Pleasure or happiness is the ultimate good. Knowledge, beauty, and other objects which are considered by some to have intrinsic value are only means of happiness". They have no value apart from happiness produced by them "Several cultivated people do habitually judge that knowledge, art, etc., are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them". Yet if we ask for a final criterion of the comparative value of the different objects of men's enthusiastic pursuit, we shall none the less conceive it to depend on the degree in which they respectively conduce to happiness". So far Sidgwick agrees with J.S. Mill. But, unlike J.S. Mill, he bases his hedonism on the authority of conscience or practical reason.

Sidgwick rejects psychological hedonism and advocates ethical hedonism. For him, pleasure is not the normal object of desire, but the proper and rational object of desire. It is the ultimate good; it is the only thing that has an intrinsic value. All other goods are subordinate to it. Sidgwick says, "When we sit down in a cool hour we perceive at there is nothing which it is reasonable to seek-i.e., nothing which is desirable in itself- except pleasure". He does not argue, like Mill, that pleasure is desirable because it is desired by men. He argues that reason tell us that pleasure is the highest good which is desirable in itself. It is an intuition of reason.

Rationalism- Sidgwick holds that it is an intuition of conscience or practical reason that pleasure or happiness is the highest good. It is a deliverance of practical reason. This is an element of Intuitionism or Rationalism in Sidgwick's doctrine. Conscience gives us intuition not only of the ultimate good, but also supplies us with the principles of its distribution viz., prudence, benevolence, and justice. These are the principles of distribution of happiness. The highest good, according to Sidgwick, is sentient in nature; it consists in desirable state of consciousness called pleasure or happiness. But the knowledge of it is given by rational intuition, and not by experience. And the principles of its organisations also are supplied by practical reason. Thus Sidgwick advocates Rational Utilitarianism as distinguished from Bentham and J.S. Mill's empirical utilitarianism.

Sidgwick is an intuitionist or Rationalist in so far as the motive or moral action is concerned. He is a hedonist in his view of the nature of the highest Good. He recognises that morality is based on rational and a *priors* judgement of value. Induction cannot give the ultimate end of moral action. No accumulation of observed facts of experience can prove what ought to be. It is given by reason. He gives rationalistic theory of duty and a hedonistic conception of the true good of man.

To sum up: Sidgwick rejects psychological hedonism and holds that desires are primarily directed towards objects and not towards pleasure, and that desires presuppose impulses. He advocates ethical hedonism, but does not base it on psychological hedonism. He bases it on the intuitions of practical reason, which supply us with three axioms of prudence, benevolence and justice. He regards 'pleasure' as 'good', and 'universal happiness' as 'universal good'.

Model Questions

Part A

(Each answer not to exceed 50 words , each question carries 1 weightage)

1. Define Hedonism

Hedonism is the general term for those theories that regards happiness or pleasure as the supreme end of life. Hedonism the term derives from the Greek word *hēdonē*, which means "delight". Hedonism is a school of thought that argues that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. In very simple terms, a hedonist strives to maximize net pleasure and minus pain. These theories have taken many different forms. According to the nature of seeking pleasure hedonism can be divided broadly in to two: Psychological Hedonism and Ethical Hedonism.

2. Explain Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes the overall "good" of the society. The most influential contributors to this theory are considered to be Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill. The 18th and 19th-century British philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill defended the ethical theory of utilitarianism, according to which we should perform whichever action maximizes the aggregate good. The term 'utilitarianism', gives emphasis on utility or usefulness rather than on pleasure. The utilitarian school had also the advantage of a good slogan, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', a slogan which emphasized the wide distribution of human pleasure as well as its maximisation.

Part B

(Each answer not to exceed 150 words, each question carries 2 weightages)

3. Briefly describe Kantian notion of Categorical Imperative

According to Kant, the internal law of conscience or practical reason is the ultimate moral standard. The moral law is a categorical imperative. It is an 'imperative' or command as opposed to an assertion of facts. A natural law is assertorial. Matter attracts matter. It is an assertion of fact. A psychological law also is assertorial. All persons act to relieve a feeling of want-it is an assertion of fact. But the moral law is not assertorial, but imperative. It is '**categorical**' or unconditional. It is a priori and not derived from experience; it is free from empirical facts, and ought to be done under all circumstances, it is known in advance of a particular situation. It is not 'hypothetical imperative', which takes such a form: if we seek to realise an end, we must act in a particular way in order to realise it. The laws which are means to other ends are of the nature of hypothetical imperatives. The economic laws are conducive to wealth. So they are hypothetical imperative. If we want to acquire wealth, we must observe the economic laws. But the moral law which is imposed by practical reason up on itself is a categorical imperative. We ought to obey it not for the sake of any other end; it demands unconditional obedience; it is not a means to a higher end; it is an end in itself. It is no absolute unconditional command which admits no questions. What we ought to do we ought to do. It cannot be set aside by any higher law. The Categorical Imperative or the moral law has no

reference to any external ends, but simply to the right direction of the will itself. The Categorical Imperative is the universal moral law it applies to all persons. It is common to all mankind.

There is involved in the moral consciousness the conviction that we ought to act in one way rather than in another, that one manner of action is good or right, and another bad or evil. Now, as Kant urged, there would be no meaning in an 'ought' if it were not accompanied by a 'can'. It does not follow, however, that the 'can' refers to an immediate possibility. A man ought to be wise, for instance; but wisdom is a quality that can only be gradually developed. What can be done at once is only to put ourselves in the way of acquiring it. Similarly, we ought to love our neighbours. There would thus be no 'ought' at all. Moral imperatives would cease to have any meaning. If, then, there is to be any meaning in the moral imperative, the will must not be absolutely determined by circumstances, but must in some sense be free. This is true also even if we do not, like Kant, think of the moral end as of the nature of an imperative, but rather as a Good or Ideal to be attained.

Part C

(Each answer not to exceed 300 words each question carries 4 weightages)

4. Critically analyse Herbert Spencer's ethical theory of Evolutionary Hedonism

Unit- IV

Rights and Duties

Objectives:-

1. To introduce the terms right and duties
2. To explain the significance of the terms, right and duties in ethics
3. To elaborate the fundamental duties
4. To describe the fundamental rights
5. To analyse the concept virtue
6. To explain Plato's concept of 'Cardinal Virtues'.
7. To evaluate Aristotle's notion of virtue
8. To discuss theories of punishment

Rights and Duties

Rights are moral claims of individuals recognised by society. Duties are moral debts or obligations of individuals recognised by society. According to the Oxford Dictionary, 'a right is a justifiable claim on legal or moral grounds to have or obtain something or to act in a certain way'. Rights reside in some individuals; they have rights to certain things which are necessary for their self realisation. Duties are moral obligations, on the part of other individuals, to respect those rights. The individuals also having certain rights are under moral obligation to use them well for the common good. Rights and duties are ultimately based upon the same moral laws and relations. The society grants certain rights to its individual members for their own good and the good of the society. A man has no right to anything by himself. The society concedes certain rights to him, which are conducive to the social good. A person cannot claim anything for himself alone apart from the society. Moral rights of the individuals are protected by social conscience or public opinion. They are not necessarily enforced by the state like legal rights. Moral rights are conceded to individuals by the society for their self-realisation. They are indispensable for the realization of the highest good and common good.

Rights and duties are correlative to each other. Duties are moral obligations. Every right brings an obligation with it. When one man has a right, other men are under moral obligation to respect it, and he himself is under moral obligation to use it for the common good. Moral obligation is different from legal obligation. The former cannot be enforced by the state, while the latter can. Moral obligation depends upon the approval of public opinion. Take, for instance, the right of property. An individual has been granted this right for the common good. So not only other persons are under moral obligation to respect his right, but he himself is under moral obligation to use it for the common good. Thus rights and duties are correlative to each other. We have a right to the means that are necessary for our self-realization and for the highest good of the society of which we are members. We are under moral obligation to use them in the best way for the highest good of the society.

Rights and duties are correlative to each other, because they are reciprocal relation between individuals in a changing society. A society changes in different times under different conditions. So rights and duties also change. New occasions create new rights and duties.

Fundamental rights of man

1. Right to live- The first right of man is the right to live. Self-realisation is the highest good, which requires the continuance of life for its realisation. The right to live is the primary right. The sacredness of life should be recognised.

The right to life brings a moral obligation to treat our own life and that of others as a sacred thing. We should not hinder or destroy our own life. We should not take the life of any other person. We should further our own life and that of others. He who takes the life of another may legitimately be deprived of his own life. But capital punishment is condemned at present.

2. Right of freedom- The next right is that of freedom. Self-realisation is the highest good. It is realised by a person's will. So he should be free to exercise his will in order to realise his supreme end. He should not be coerced by anybody. He should not be a slave to anybody. Freedom means restricted freedom. Absolute and unrestricted freedom amounts to licence. In a well ordered community an individual should be allowed to realise his supreme end by the free exercise of his will in so far as it is consistent with the maintenance of social order.
3. Right of property- The right of property necessarily follows from the right of freedom. Self-realisation is the highest good. It can be realised by a person if he is allowed to love, work, and freely exercise his will. Freedom of the will can be effectively exercised by an individual, if he is allowed to use some property earned by him freely. Personality and property go together. Hence personality can be realised only through the free use of some property. The state is the custodian of the 'personal' rights and the 'real' rights of the individual. Real rights are rights of property. Property is the expression of personality. Rights of property are essentially personal. That is Hegel's view.
4. Right to work- the right to work or employment follows from the right to live. If a person does not get employment, he cannot earn his livelihood. A modern welfare state should ensure the full employment of every citizen, because unemployment or under-employment deprives him of the opportunity for self-realisation. Right to employment should be recognised by every welfare state.
5. Right of education- the next right is the right of education. Here right and obligation are closely connected with each other. Every person has a right to have the best education he is capable of receiving. He is under moral obligation to receive the best education according to his capacity. In a well-developed society person ought to be given the maximum opportunity to unfold his potentialities to the best advantage and contribute his share to the general good.
6. Right of contract- the right to enter into a contract and fulfil it is another important right. The right of property gives rise to the right of contract. A person has the control over his property; his free will created it; it is a part of him. Hence it follows that he can possess it, use or exchange it as he thinks it proper. Thus the right of contract necessarily arises out of the right of property.

Duties

Definite rights bring definite obligations along with them. Such moral obligations or duties may be expressed in the form of commandments. Just as there is a right corresponding to every duty, so there is a duty corresponding to every right. Rights and duties are correlative to each other. All duties may be deduced from the fundamental duty that every person ought to realise his rational self. The following duties should be observed by every individual.

1. Respect for life- Our first duty is to respect life in ourselves and in others. We should not commit suicide or kill others. "Thou shall not kill". This is the first commandment. We should

take care of our own life. We should take care of our own life. We should not injure the life or physical well being of other persons.

2. Respect for freedom and personality- Our second duty is to respect the freedom of ourselves and others. We should not interfere with the freedom of other person. This duty may be expressed in the forms: "Treat every human being as a person or an end, and never as means". Hegel's moral maxim is: "Be a person and respect others as persons".
3. Respect for property- The next commandment is: "Thou shalt not steal". We should not appropriate the property of others, and we should not misuse our own property. We should respect the right of property; we should have regard for our own property and that of others.
4. Respect for truth- We should speak the truth. We should keep our promises and fulfil our contracts. We should say what we mean. We should confirm our actions to our words: and we should confirm our words to our thoughts. Truth means harmony between thoughts and words, and harmony between words and actions.
5. Respect for the society and the state- We should have respect for social institutions. The stability of the social order is an indispensable condition of the moral progress of individual. So we should not unnecessarily interfere with any social institution. For instance e should not try to destroy the family or disturb and disintegrate the society. We should maintain the social system to which we belong. We should not revolt against the State and produce chaos.
6. Respect for world harmony- we should cherish faith in harmony and human unity. We should cultivate fellow feelings and brotherhood for all persons as members of the human society irrespective of colour, race, religion, nation or sex. We should have faith in human progress, and try our best to contribute to it to the best of our unity.

Virtues

Virtue the term have a Latin root '*vir*', means a man or hero. The term virtue is employed to denote a good habit or character which is distinguished from duty. Some duties of perfect obligation are called duties. They can be exacted from an individual by the state. But duties of imperfect obligation are called virtues. They cannot be exacted from an individual by the state. The habitual performance of duties leads to virtues disposition. Duties are turned into virtues by habit. Virtues refer to acquired dispositions of mind. The virtues man is one who has acquired a fixed habit of performing duties. Virtue denotes a good character. Duty denotes a particular action that we ought to perform. Virtue is the excellence of character, which is the result of the habitual performance of duties.

Virtue is the habit of deliberate choice of right actions. Vice is the habit of deliberate choice of wrong actions. Virtue is the habit of controlling instincts and impulses and realizing the good of the self as whole. Vice is the habit of yielding to instincts and impulses and realising the partial good of their satisfaction to the detriment of the self as whole. Virtue is an excellence of character. Vice is the taint of character. Virtue is expressed in the performance of duties. Vice is expressed in the commission of sins.

Virtue is not good nature. It is not an innate good disposition which is natural. It is an acquired disposition due to the habit of controlling and regulation impulses and instincts by reason. Duty leads to virtue through habit.

The nature of virtue:- ‘Virtue’, says Aristotle, “is a permanent state of mind, formed with the concurrence of the will and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life- an ideal fixed by reason” virtue is permanent acquired disposition in harmony with the moral law. It is settled habit of willing in conformity with the moral law. It consists in living habitually in the universe of right actions. It is a quality of character, determined by the idea of the highest good of the self as a whole. Excellence of character is expressed in the performance of particular acts which are duties. Virtue lives in the performance of duties. Thus virtue and duty are two aspects of the same thing. Virtue is the excellence of the inner character; duty is the external expression of good character.

Socrates

For Socrates, “virtue is knowledge”. If a person fully understood the nature of the good; he could not fail to pursue it. On the other hand, if person did not fully understand the nature of the good, he could not be moral except by accident. Knowledge is virtue. Ignorance is vice. To be temperate without knowledge is to be by a kind of intemperance. To be courageous without knowledge is to be courageous by a kind of cowardice. Thus knowledge constitutes the essence of virtue according to Socrates. A person never knowingly commits wrong. This view is wrong. First, if virtue consists in the knowledge of the good, and if vice consists in the ignorance of it, then a person is not accountable for his wrong actions, because they are due to his ignorance, and because only voluntary actions involving the knowledge of the good are objects of moral judgement.

Secondly, a person often knows what is right and yet does what is wrong. Knowledge of the good does not always lead to the choice of the good. Knowledge and action are very often a variance with each other. The will may go against reason under the inducement of pleasure. Thus it is wrong to hold that no person commits a wrong action voluntarily or knowingly. Therefore, knowledge does not constitute virtue, though it is an indispensable element of it. Virtue depends upon the knowledge of the good and a habit of willing the good.

Plato: Cardinal Virtues

Cardinal virtues are the fundamental virtues on which the other virtues are based. Plato recognised four cardinal virtues: Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice.

1. Wisdom is the special virtue of the ruling class. It is deliberative and directive and indispensable for wise government. Wisdom is the virtue of the rational part of the soul. Wisdom is an all-embracing virtue. It is moral insight into our duties in a concrete situation and performing them. It is practical wisdom or prudence in a wider sense, which is implied in all moral actions.
2. Courage or fortitude is the power of resisting the fear of pain and the temptation of pleasure. It is the special virtue of the fighting class. Courage is the virtue of the emotional part of the soul. Courage is a self-regarding virtue, which bears directly on the life of an individual. It is the power of the will to resist the fear or pain.
3. Temperance or moderation is the special virtue of the traders. Temperance is the obedience of the desires to reason. It is also a self-regarding virtue. Temperance is the power of the will

to resist the allurements of pleasure. It is self-restraint or self-control. It is steadfastness of will in choosing higher values and rejecting lower bodily values.

4. Justice includes them all. It is realised when the rules govern wisely, the soldiers fight bravely, and the craftsmen and traders work with energy and thrift. Justice is impartiality to all in the face of personal prejudice, preference or self-interest. It comprehends all social virtues.

These are all of the cardinal virtues of an individual according to Plato. Plato's cardinal virtue may be accepted as the basis and adapted to the requirements of the modern society. This is Mackenzie's view. The cardinal virtues may be taken in a wider sense. Wisdom should include care, foresight, prudence and decisiveness of choice. Courage should include both valour and fortitude. Valour is active courage which forgoes ahead and braves danger and pain. Fortitude is passive courage which endures inevitable sufferings without wavering. Temperance includes the resistance to the allurements of pleasures-sensual or intellectual-which interfere with course our chosen career. Justice is the performance of social duties. It should include honesty, fidelity, benevolence, love, courtesy, cheerfulness, and good humour. Impartiality precedes benevolence. These are the social virtues. All virtues are the form of practical wisdom. Thus Mackenzie shows how Plato's cardinal virtues can be adapted to the requirements of the modern society.

Aristotle's classification of virtues

"Virtue", says Aristotle, "is the habit of choosing the relative mean, as it is determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine it." Aristotle recognises two classes of virtues viz., (1) intellectual virtue and (2) moral virtue. The former belongs to the rational soul, and includes theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. The latter belongs to the irrational but conscious part of the soul, and consists in subordinating emotions and desires to reason. Temperance is a moral virtue, and consists in control of desire for pleasure by reason. Courage also is a moral virtue and consists in control of the emotion of fear by reason. Moral virtues are habits of deliberated choice for the realisation of the good. They are the mean between two extremes.

Aristotle takes the four cardinal virtues in a narrower sense than Plato did. By temperance he means moderation in bodily pleasures, a mean between licentiousness and apathy. By courage he means a mean between rashness and cowardice, control of fear by reason. It is limited to physical dangers, here as Plato includes moral courage in it. Aristotle confines justice to personal property, and divides it into (1) distributive justice; and (2) corrective justice. The former includes two principles. A man ought to receive profit in proportionate to what he contributes. He ought to contribute to public expenses in proportion to his property. The latter deals with infringements of the law of the State. The penalty ought to be proportionate to the degree of the injury irrespective of circumstances. Corrective justice is rigorous retributive justice. Justice unrelated to the State is fairness of mind. Aristotle recognizes three forms of friendship based on utility, pleasure, and goodness of character. The first two forms are transient while the last is permanent. Friendship is essential to well being. True self-love is rational. It should be along with

rational love of others. Socrates identified virtue with knowledge. Plato preferred contemplative life to active life, and regarded wisdom as the highest virtue. Aristotle regards virtue as knowledge and habit both, and virtues and practical insight as inseparable. He regards moral virtues as due to the control of emotions and desires by reason. The highest good consists in a perfect activity of reason.

Theories of punishment

Three principle theories have been put forward to justify punishment. They are known as the Deterrent or preventive theory, the Reformatory or educative theory, and the Retributive theory.

1. **The Deterrent or preventive theory-** According to this theory, the aim of punishment is to prevent or deter others from committing similar offences. A criminal is punished to be made an example of to prevent others from committing the same crime. This theory justifies capital punishment as an extreme form of punishment because of its deterrent effect. A man has taken the life of another man. So he ought to be deprived of his life.

But a man is an end in himself. He is person, and not a thing. He should not be used as a means for the good of any other persons. It is unjust to inflict pain on one man merely for the benefit of others. A person should not be treated as a thing, as a mere means for the good of others. A person should not punish to prevent others from committing the crime. He should not be made an example of for the benefit of others. It is not just that one man should suffer pain not for his own benefit, but for that of others. But it may be said in defence of the deterrent theory that sometimes punishment of a criminal has a deterrent effect on the criminal himself, so that he is not treated as a mere means for the good of the others.

2. **Reformatory theory-** According to this theory, the aim of punishment is to educate or reform the offender himself. Punishment is inflicted on a criminal in order to reform or educate him. This theory is commonly accepted at the present time, because it is in harmony with the humanitarian sentiments of the age. This theory does not involve treating a person as a thing. A criminal is punished for his own good-not merely for the good of others. Reformation or education of the criminal is the aim of punishment.

The Reformatory theory is supported by criminology. Criminology regards every crime as a pathological phenomenon a mild form of insanity, an innate or acquired physiological defect. Therefore the criminal ought to be cured, rather than punished. They ought to be treated in hospitals, asylums, and reformatories. Thus, according to criminology, crimes are not deliberate violations of the moral law. They are due to psychological defects. Constitutional defects compel criminals to commit crimes. For example, in kleptomania a criminal is compelled to steal. Punishment, therefore, should take the form of detention in asylums and reformatories, or treatment in hospitals. The supporters of this view are called criminal anthropologists.

The reformatory theory is supported also by criminal sociology. It regards crimes as outcomes of unfavourable social circumstances. Crimes are due to social inequalities, maladjustments, and

corruptions. Crimes can be prevented only if the human society is reconstructed on the basis of justice and equity. The supporters of this view are called criminal sociologists.

If punishment can reform the offender, it serves its purpose well. But punishment does not always reform an offender; sometimes it hardens a criminal in criminal habits. A kind treatment may sometimes produce a better effect than punishment; it may be more favourable to the reformation of the offender. Sometimes forgiveness may bring home to the criminal his guilt and lead him to repentance and reformation. Forgiveness by the offended persons sometimes melts the heart of the criminal, and transforms his nature. It is evident that the reformatory theory cannot justify *capital punishment*, because the hanged man cannot be reformed.

3. **The Retributive Theory-** According to this theory, punishment is an act of justice. "Punishment is an end in itself, not a means to any end beyond itself". The prime aim of punishment is retribution. The aim of punishment is to defend the supremacy and authority of the Moral Law and to do justice to a criminal. The moral law is voluntarily broken by a criminal and justice demands that he should be punished, and that the authority of the moral law should be established. The moral law is supreme and authoritative. It is broken by a person, he ought to be punished. Punishment is inflicted on the offender neither for his good nor for that of others. It is demanded by the sense of justice. The retributive theory justifies capital punishment under exceptional circumstances. Rights to life are the fundamental right. If a person takes away the life of another, justice demands that he should be deprived of his life. But capital punishment is generally condemned at the present time.

The retributive theory assumes two forms: (1) Regoristic and (2) Mollified. According to its Regoristic form, punishment is inflicted according to the character of the offence. If the offence is severe, the punishment should be severe; and if the offence is light, the punishment should be light, irrespective of other circumstances. 'Eye for an eye', - 'tooth for a tooth', - is motto of this view. In inflicting punishment attended circumstances should not be taken into account. For example, a man killed a person; therefore he should be hanged irrespective of any other circumstances. According mollified form, punishment should be inflicted according to the character of the offence under particular circumstances. Here the extenuating circumstances, e. g., the age of the criminal, his intention. Provoking circumstances, etc., should be taken into account.

Capital punishment- According to the Deterrent theory, a person who deliberately commits murder should be give capital punishment. He has deprived a person of his life, and so should be hanged to prevent others from committing the heinous crime. He should be made an example of. According to Retributive theory also a murders should be given capital punishment. He has taken away life of a person in cold blood. So justice demands that he be deprived of his life. There is nothing unjust in this act of justice. The rigorous form of the Retributive theory does not make any concession. But the mollified form of it recommends taking into consideration the criminal's age, provocation, education, and other extenuating circumstances in softening the rigour of justice. In the contemporary age of humanitarian sentiments the trend of enlightened public opinion is against capital punishment and for replacing it by transportation for life.

Model Questions

Part A

(Each answer not to exceed 50 words , each question carries 1 weightage)

1. Rights and Duties

Rights are moral claims of individuals recognised by society. Duties are moral debts or obligations of individuals recognised by society. According to the Oxford Dictionary, 'a right is a justifiable claim on legal or moral grounds to have or obtain something or to act in a certain way'. Rights reside in some individuals; they have rights to certain things which are necessary for their self realisation. Duties are moral obligations, on the part of other individuals, to respect those rights.

Define Virtue

Virtue the term have a Latin root '*vir*', means a man or hero. The term virtue is employed to denote a good habit or character which is distinguished from duty. Some duties of perfect obligation are called duties. They can be exacted from an individual by the state. But duties of imperfect obligation are called virtues. They cannot be exacted from an individual by the state.

Part B

(Each answer not to exceed 150 words , each question carries 2 weightages)

2. "virtue is knowledge"- Discuss.

For Socrates, "virtue is knowledge". If a person fully understood the nature of the good; he could not fail to pursue it. On the other hand, if person did not fully understand the nature of the good, he could not be moral except by accident. Knowledge is virtue. Ignorance is vice. To be temperate without knowledge is to be by a kind of intemperance. To be courageous without knowledge is to be courageous by a kind of cowardice. Thus knowledge constitutes the essence of virtue according to Socrates. A person never knowingly commits wrong. This view is wrong. First, if virtue consists in the knowledge of the good, and if vice consists in the ignorance of it, then a person is not accountable for his wrong actions, because they are due to his ignorance, and because only voluntary actions involving the knowledge of the good are objects of moral judgement.

Part C

(Each answer not to exceed 300 words , each question carries 4 weightages)

3. Critically evaluate different Theories of punishment

Text Book

- (1) William Lilly, *An Introduction to Ethics*
 Allied Publishers, New Delhi
- (2) Mackenzi, *Manual of Ethics*
 Central Book Depot, Allahabad

Reference Books

- (1) W. Frankena, *Ethics*
 Printice Hall
- (2) J. D. Mabbot, *Introduction to Ethics*
- (3) Philippa Roof (Ed), *Theories of Ethics*
 Oxford University Press, New York.