
ĐSignal: A decentralized privacy-enhanced Signal protocol

Goal: enhance Peerster with security and privacy features and build a decentralized messaging protocol with state-of-the-art approaches

- Signal protocol: add confidentiality and security
- Whisper protocol: enhance privacy and metadata protection
- Secure decentralized storage: safely store messages, files and keys that are required by the above protocols in a decentralized network



Secure Decentralized Persistent Storage

Introduction

Based on Kademlia

- Small chunks for efficient transportation
- Persistence through replication
- Standard file encryption before storing

Splitting File into Chunks


Large files are split into small chunks

Chunks are stored in DHT indexed by their hashes

Hashes concatenated to create a metafile

Metafile hash is the key for the whole file

Where To Store?



Where To Store?

Hash: 01001

Data:

 $00100 \oplus 01011 = 01111$

 $01001 \oplus 01011 = 00010$

 $10010 \oplus 01011 = 11001$

10111⊕ 01011 = 11100

Where To Store?

Hash: 01001

Data:

$$00100 \oplus 01011 = 01111$$

01001
$$\oplus$$
 01011 = **00010**

$$10010 \oplus 01011 = 11001$$

Routing Table

- For each prefix of a Node's ID, there is a bucket.
- Bucket i stores up to k other Nodes whose IDs are equal to the Node's ID up to the i-th bit and are different from Node's ID in (i+1)-th bit.
- Table is updated each time a message is received.
- Each bucket employs LRU eviction policy. But least recently seen entry is only evicted if it is not alive. Use Ping to check.

Finding k Closest Nodes

- Given an ID, create a short list of k closest nodes in the node's routing table.
- Ask some nodes in the short list to find the k closest nodes in their routing tables.
- Add the nodes in the responses to the short list.
- Repeat the process until the k closest nodes in the short list do not change.

Challenges and Solutions

 Handling arbitrarily large files through multiple levels of meta hashing.

```
Type of chunk | Type of hash function | Hash of the chunk (1 byte) | (28 to 64 bytes)
```

 Handling multiple parallel RPCs using dedicated response channels and unique RPC identifiers.



A decentralized privacy-preserving messaging protocol

What is Whisper?



- Part of the P2P Ethereum suite
- Can be considered an Hybrid DHT and messaging system
- Designed to guarantee "darkness", i.e. metadata protection and plausible deniability at high cost of bandwidth and computational costs (configurable efficiency-privacy tradeoff)
- Ensures sender and receiver anonymity by forwarding all messages

Why Whisper for messaging?

- Goal: decentralized private messaging (currently only status.im 🕝)
- Protect communication from third parties and meta-information leakage (all major messaging apps don't have such a feature)
- Naturally extend Peerster with security and privacy capabilities
- Built as a library on top of Homework 1 features (Gossip protocol)


Whisper main features

Implemented Whisper protocol version 6 with very few changes. The main aspects of the protocol are:

- end-to-end encryption support, both symmetric (AES-GCM) and asymmetric (ECIES with SECP-256k1) encryption
- probabilistic message forwarding (topic-based bloom filters)
- incentive compatibility for peers to punish malicious nodes (blacklisting and DoS prevention with Proof-of-Work)

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Architecture: envelope packet



Architecture: status packet

Aggregation of interested topics




Bloom filter

PoW

Status packet

- Nodes use the underlying rumor-mongering protocol to gossip their status at start, upon any change and periodically
- Nodes decide how "dark" they want to be by revealing a more or less accurate bloom filter
- Nodes keep track of all the requirements they receive from each peer in a routing table
- Peers only forward messages to you that match the aggregated filter, violators are blacklisted

Architecture: message forwarding



- Nodes spend PoW to send a message (spam prevention)
- Messages are forwarded periodically and cached until their TTL expire
- Nodes notify the client upon receiving a message that matches any of the installed filters AND can be decrypted
- Peers generally can't tell if a neighbour peer is the message originator

Architecture: API

- NewWhisperMessage(NewMessage): create a message with arbitrary payload and topic and other parameters
- NewMessageFilter(FilterOptions): create a new filter (subscriber) with desired topics for incoming messages and other options
- **GetFilterMessages(string)**: retrieve all messages filtered by the filter with specified ID from the last time the method was called
- **Identity management**: create, add, delete symmetric/private/public keys
- Setting and modifying Whisper parameters directly (PoW required, BloomFilter, MaxMessageSize, timeouts etc.)

Main challenges in development

Make up for the absence of underlying ĐΞV-p2p ethereum backend

- Provides ability to "rate" and steer the set of peers according to the utility delivered
- Overcomed with ad-hoc blacklisting and routing table forwarding

Efficiency-privacy tradeoff

- Broadcast all messages or filter them only based on the next hop was not feasible
- Improved the protocol with aggregated-status routing and status gossiping



Sergio Roldán





- Signal is a non-federated cryptographic protocol that can be used to provide end-to-end encryption to instant messaging conversations
- The protocol combines Double Ratchet algorithm, prekeys, a triple Elliptic Curve DH (X3DH) handshake, AES in CBC mode and HMAC
- The protocol provides confidentiality, integrity, participant consistency, forward secrecy, future secrecy...


Why use Signal?

- Goal: lifelessness secure messaging (used in □, ⑤, ⊘ ...)
- Protect the communication against passive and active attacks and provide both future and forward secrecy in case of compromised keys
- Naturally extend Peerster with a strong security capability
- Built as a library on top of Homework 1 features (Gossip protocol). We rely on the network to distribute and store messages and keys


Signal main features

Implemented Signal as in signal.org/docs/ with slight modifications:

- Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman using the NIST P-256 Elliptic Curve, ECDSA, SHA-256 and HKDF
- Double Ratchet without header encryption using the same Curve, HKDF + plain HMAC, SHA-256 and AEAD encryption using AES-256 in CBC mode with HMAC
- Sesame was out of the scope of this project




Extended Triple DH





Extended Triple DH


- X3DH provides forward secrecy and cryptographic deniability
- Supports asynchronous configuration
- DH1 and DH2 provide mutual authentication
- DH3 and DH4 provide forward secrecy
- SPK is updated periodically and OPK is used only once




https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/







- Combines DH Ratchet with Symmetric Ratchet to provide forward and future secrecy
- Messages are protected using AEAD deriving keys from the Ratchet
- All keys should be deleted once the Ratched as derived them



Signal library

The library includes:

- adsAEAD: AEAD encryption/decryption
- adsDoubleRatchet: Double Ratchet Protocol
- adsX3DH: Extended Triple DH
- adsElliptic: Helper for operation over Elliptic Curves
- adsKDF: HMAC and HKDF KDF operations
- adsECDSA: Signature helper
- adsECDH: Diffie-Hellman operations
- signalhandler: X3DH protocol and Double Ratchet message exchange

Main development challenge: Integrate the different protocols with diverse data structures