Why Bayes

June 3, 2021

Table of contents

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Motivations

Introduction

Bayesian approaches

- Typically contrasted with **frequentist** approaches
- Treat parameters as uncertain, data as fixed

Bayes' Rule

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$$p(\theta|x) = \frac{p(x|\theta)}{\substack{\text{likelihood} \\ \text{posterior}}} = \frac{p(x|\theta)}{\substack{\text{p(x)} \\ \text{evidence}}} = \frac{p(x|\theta)p(\theta)}{\int p(x|\theta)p(\theta) \, d\theta}$$

Posterior

The posterior distribution is proportional to the prior times the likelihood:

$$p(\theta|x) \propto p(x|\theta)p(\theta)$$

The posterior distribution is a distribution over θ .

Evidence

The evidence, or marginal likelihood, can be used for model comparison.

4

Motivations

Motivations

Avoiding overfitting

Maximum likelihood and overfitting

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
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Bayesian methods can correct this by treating parameters as random variables.

Bayesian estimation of batting averages

Let


- x be observed data (batting average after n at bats)
- θ be parameters (a player's 'true' batting average)



Observed data (x)


Bayesian Occam's Razor

Maximum Likelihood (ML) solutions tend to overfit. Bayesian marginalization reduces overfitting.



Models $y = f(x) + \epsilon$ of various complexity (polynomials of various order, M) were fit to 8 data points.

- Plotted are ML polynomials (least squares fits to the data under Gaussian noise) and posterior samples from a Bayesian model (which used a Gaussian prior for the coefficients, and an inverse gamma prior on the noise).
- The ML estimate can look very different from a typical sample from the posterior!




The evidence is plotted as a function of model order. Model orders M=0 to M=3 have considerably higher evidence than other model orders. We see that Bayesian marginalization has reduced overfitting. (The maximum likelihood model, the M=7 model, fits the data perfectly, but overfits wildly, predicting the function will shoot up or down between neighboring data points.)

Motivations

Estimating the probability of a rare event

References



Description of problem

- Want to estimate the prevalence of an infectious disease in a small town.
- The higher the prevalence, the more public health precautions will be recommended.
- A small random sample of 20 individuals are checked for infection.

Description of problem

- Parameter θ , the fraction of infected individuals in the city.
- Parameter space: $\Theta = [0, 1]$
- **Sample**: Y the number of infected individuals in the sample
- \bullet Sample space: $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1, ..., 20\}$

Sampling model

If the value of θ were known, a reasonable sampling model for Y would be

$$Y \mid \theta \sim \mathsf{Binomial}(20, \theta)$$




Figure 1: Binomial(20, θ) distributons for three values of θ .

Prior distribution

Other studies from various parts of the country indicate that the infection rate in comparable cities range from about 0.05 to 0.20, with an average prevalence of 0.10.

Prior distribution


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This suggests we use a prior distribution $p(\theta)$ that assigns a substantial amount of probability to the interval (0.05, 0.20).



We can encode this prior information using

$$\theta \sim \text{Beta}(2,20)$$

From prior to posterior




Fig. 1.1. Sampling model, prior and posterior distributions for the infection rate example. The plot on the left-hand side gives binomial(20, θ) distributions for three values of θ . The right-hand side gives prior (gray) and posterior (black) densities of θ .

Prior		
	Posterior	
$ heta \sim Beta(2,20)$	$\theta \mid \{Y = 0\} \sim Beta(4, 20)$	
$\mathbb{E}[\theta] = 0.09$		
$mode[\theta] = 0.05$	$\mathbb{E}[\theta \mid \{Y=0\}] = 0.048$	
	$mode[\theta \mid \{Y = 0\}] = 0.025$	
$P(\theta < 0.10) = 0.64$	$P(\theta < 0.10 \mid \{Y = 0\}) = 0.93$	
$P(0.05 < \theta < 0.20) = 0.66$	$I(0 < 0.10 \mid \{I = 0\}) = 0.93$	

Suppose we consider beliefs represented by Beta(a, b) distributions for (a, b) other than (2, 20).

If
$$\theta \sim \text{Beta}(a, b)$$
, then $\theta \mid Y = y \sim \text{Beta}(a + y, b + n - y)$.

The posterior expectation is

$$\mathbb{E}[\theta \mid Y = y] = \frac{a+y}{a+b+n}$$

$$= \frac{n}{a+b+n} \frac{y}{n} + \frac{a+b}{a+b+n} \frac{a}{a+b}$$

$$= \frac{n}{w+n} \overline{y} + \frac{w}{w+n} \theta_0$$

where $\theta_0 = a/(a+b)$ is the prior expectation of θ and w = a+b.

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where $\theta_0 = a/(a+b)$ is the prior expectation of θ and w = a+b.

So the posterior expectation is a compromise between the prior expectation θ_0 and sample mean \bar{y} . The weights on each depend on the sample size, n, and our prior confidence in this guess, w.

If someone provides us with a prior guess θ_0 and degree of confidence w, then we can approximate their prior beliefs about θ with

$$Betaigg(a=w heta_0,\quad b=w(1- heta_0)igg)$$

And their posterior beliefs are represented with

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We can compute such a posterior distribution for a wide range of θ_0 and w values to perform a *sensitivity analysis*, an exploration of how posterior information is affected by differences in prior opinion.




Fig. 1.2. Posterior quantities under different beta prior distributions. The left- and right-hand panels give contours of $\mathrm{E}[\theta|Y=0]$ and $\mathrm{Pr}(\theta<0.10|Y=0)$, respectively, for a range of prior expectations and levels of confidence.

The second plot may be of use if, e.g., city officials would like to recommend a vaccine to the general public unless they were reasonably sure the current infection rate was less than 0.10.




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A high degree of certainty (say 97.5%) is only achieved by people who already thought the infection rate was lower than the average of other cities.

A 95% confidence interval for population proportion θ is the *Wald interval*, given by

$$\bar{y} \pm 1.96 \sqrt{\bar{y}(1-\bar{y})/n}$$

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In fact, the 99.99% Wald interval also comes out to be zero.

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The "adjusted" Wald interval suggested by Agresti and Coull (1998) is given by

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While not motivated as such, the interval is clearly related to Bayesian inference: $\widehat{\theta}$ is equivalent to the posterior mean for θ under a Beta(2,2) prior, which represents weak prior information centered around $\theta=1/2$.

Compared to the post-hoc "adjustment" approach, the Bayesian formalism provides

- Reasonable conclusions which fall naturally out of the framework
- Flexibility to other choice of priors than Beta(2,2)
- Sensitivity analysis to consider the sets of conclusions that would be reached by people with different priors.
- Simultaneous access to various functionals of the posterior not just $\mathbb{E}[\theta \mid Y=y]$ but also $\mathbb{P}[\theta < 0.10 \mid Y=0]$.

Extensions: Hierarchical models