*The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1988-1991:*

*Soldiers, Scholars, Statesmen and Scoundrels Speak*

**Prologue**

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**Talking Puppets: Mr. Rogers and Sweet Tatiana V**

Nov 19, 1987, Foreign Press Club, Washington, DC

*(Two years ago today, in a chateau in Geneva the Aga Khan had lent them, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan met for the first time. The two made little headway. Few observers were surprised. Whoever this Gorbachev was, he was the head of a Communist Party that possessed an exceptionally powerful military and a hostility to the United States that had only hardened in 40 years.*

*At the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, however, the two men found things to talk about, nuclear weapons chief among them. This set in train a change in the affairs of both nations that no one at that time thought possible: that by mutual agreement and following a patient, careful process, step-by-step over the next four years the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics would agree to end the Cold War.*

*An early note was struck in September 1987, when US Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, meeting in Moscow, announced they had come to an agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.*

*Another American was in Moscow at that time: Fred Rogers, he of the perpetual sweater and afternoon television’s “Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood,” working on a deal that will put him on a children's bedtime show, the first American deemed safe enough to appear on Soviet television in generations. His coup is much bruited about in the Soviet press, though given scant notice in America.*

*Today, Mr. Rogers is returning the favor and hosting the hostess of “*Spokoni Nochi, Malchiki” *(*Good Night, Little Ones*) in Washington, DC. A reporter, on his first assignment for the Service, is sent to the Foreign Press Center to report. What follows is the result.*

*Miss Tatiana Vedeneeva, the report notes, is 5'11, lithe, blonde, and twenty-six, and she is wearing a short, black, leather skirt to considerable advantage next to the aging American in his careworn cardigan. This is Tatiana’s first time in the capitalist West and she seems nervous and anxious to please.)*

**Mr. Rogers:** I had a wonderful time in Moscow this time. It gave me a chance to say to so many people I never knew: ”won’t you be my neighbor?”

We had been trying for a long time to reach out to them, but our efforts were always frustrated. The real breakthrough, the one that led to my appearance on television there, came about several months ago, and it was all due to… Daniel Striped Tiger. *(shows his puppet)*

We had been having a hard time negotiating a contract; I think it was at the Ministry of Information. Fortunately, I had Daniel with me. At one point in our discussions things had gotten a little heated, and he was the one who broke the ice.

While they were talking, I pulled him out, and he started making funny faces at them, and the next thing you know he had them all laughing. That's how Daniel Striped Tiger and I got to appear on Miss Tatiana's wonderful television show, “Good Night, Little Ones.”

By the way, Tatiana really does work "wonderfully" with puppets.

*(At this the Russian beauty smiles shyly, and slips her hand into a rabbit, which hops up and down playfully throughout the session.)*

We had a beautiful reception with Ambassador Yuri Dubinin this morning. We were so warmly welcomed at the Embassy that I felt that the whole time like I was in Moscow.

And now, I’d like to present Miss Tatiana Vedeneeva to you to say a few words.

**Tatiana Vedeneeva** *(via translator)*: I am so happy to be here today. When my little ones heard that it was Mr. Rogers who was coming on our show, “they couldn’t wait."

They wanted to “find out what the United States was like.”

"Children are really the same throughout the world” and this, being on television with Mr. Rogers, is a wonderful way to bring children together.

**Q: Could you tell us more about your show? Is it censored?**

**Vedeneeva**: There is an author, a scriptwriter, but I can make some changes, too, if I think they're necessary.

***Q:*** *(Soviet press, first in Russian, then in English)* **Could you comment further on matter of censorship? We would like to know your position.**

**Vedeneeva**: There is no censorship.

**Translator (***out loud, in English)***:** “She doesn’t really know.”

**Q: How did you get started with this? What provided the initial spark?**

**Rogers:** “It all started with Ted Koppel.” He showed a portion of Tatiana’s show on one of his reports, and he happened to say that he thought it was a little like my show.

Someone on my staff happened to see it and got in touch with the Russian embassy, and it's been amazing ever since. The people there have been so kind and neighborly.

[article tags: Mr. Rogers, Tatiana Vedeneeva, Good Night Little Ones, Spokoni Nochi, Malchiki, Yuri Dubinin]

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**Soviets Expanding Militarization of Space**

**Lt. Gen. Leonard Peroots**: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

**Gen John Piotrowsky:** Commander-in-Chief, US Space Command

**Gen. Thomas Moorman**

Nov 24, 1987, US Global Strategy Council

*(One of primary architect’s of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative – SDI — was Defense Secretary Cap Weinberger, who has just resigned after a six-and-half-year buying spree that so upset the military balance between the US and USSR that it is sometimes credited with the Soviets’ demise.*

*Once, when asked what his primary goal was for the Defense Department, Weinberger replied with the word: "more." Though scarcely mentioned by these generals here, SDI has devoured huge sums of R&D and greatly expanded the militarization of space and the development of new technologies. All in the name of defense, of course.)*

**Peroots:** Good morning. I would like to direct your attention to a new DIA publication on the Soviet Union's expanding militarization of space.

This militarization is proceeding "at an ever increasing rate" and makes use of a large family of weapons and capabilities.

Eight types of Soviet space launch vehicles are currently operational. They can make 100 launches annually compared to 20 for the United States.

"This gives them a distinct advantage in any crisis."

The SL-16 had its first trials two years ago. It was the really first new launcher they'd developed in 20 years, the first to use liquid nitrogen.

The heavy lift SLX-17, first tested in May, greatly increases the payload they can carry. Gorbachev visited the facilities in Baikonur (*in today's Kazakhstan*) to observe the launch. It is very impressive, can lift 100,000 kilos into low orbit. They may test it out for the space shuttle soon.

The new technology behind these launchers is making "profound" contributions to the USSR's military capability in space.

By the mid-1990s, we expect the Soviets to have 200 satellites in orbit: 150 military, 40 dual use, and only 10 that are civil. Their improving reconnaissance satellites can be redirected toward space as well.

They are also working on a new satellite system designed to detect ballistic missile launches, thus increasing warning times. They are technically capable of fielding such a system within a few years.

All told, the Soviet Union has launched more than 2,000 satellites; that's two-thirds of the world's total.

**Piotrowksy:** The United States has just over 100 satellites.

The "most critical" is SEWS -- the satellite early warning system -- which has detected over 500 Soviet launches.

I see a "dangerous asymmetry" between the US and Soviet satellite programs. Their systems are "real and a threat to our satellites." Without an ASAT (*anti-satellite*) program of our own, "they are free" to do what they want.

**Brig Gen Thomas Moorman**: The Soviets have many more satellites than the US for early warning. Ours last longer in orbit and are more efficient. Thus they need more launches.

"The reality is we are far ahead qualitatively" and technologically. Our National Strategy calls for an ability to deter and endure. Strategies evolve out of national capabilities and the Soviet strategy is "to surge" and launch as many of their inferior missiles as possible.

National Technical Means are useful for arms control agreements. Our SEWS continues to provide for our needs and exceed the performance of the Soviet system. The US has "deficiencies," however. To have the Space Shuttle be the sole method of space retrieval is a mistake.

The Soviets' greatest strength is anti-satellite technology. Consequently, we should lift our "unilateral ban" on ASAT (*anti-satellite)* testing. (*The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty's prohibition on strategic ballistic missiles severely constrains the ability to field a functioning ASAT system.*)

This testing ban is a problem that "undermines deterrence," and "creates instability."

Another is that some US commanders are still reluctant to use space systems. We have to educate them. And we need a "sustained commitment" to R&D and SDI (*the Strategic Defense Initiative.)*

"We need to do more."

[tags: Gen. Leonard Peroots, SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), Soviet space weapons, Soviet satellite program, Soviet rockets Gen. John Piotrowsky, Gen. Thomas Moorman, DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, SL-16, SLX-17, SEWS]

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**CHAPTER ONE: 1988**

THE WANING OF THE COLD WAR

**Gorbachev, the INF Treaty and US-Soviet Relations**

**Henry Kissinger**, Jan 14, 1988, Heritage Foundation

*(For 40 years the Cold War has frozen Washington and Moscow in fear and enmity. At home, thousands of specialists have been trained and put to the close study of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its military’s prodigious offensive capabilities, its exploitable weaknesses, its arms, armies and their movements are a constant watch and worry. Most difficult to divine are Soviet intentions and the true direction of their policy.*

*Last month, on December 8, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came to Washington to sign the Intermediate-forces Nuclear Treaty with President Reagan. While it may appear from a distance of time that such things are pre-ordained, or that their causes and larger meanings are immediately understood, such is not the case.*

*The INF Treaty, which Kissinger begrudgingly endorses below, will be the first in a remarkable series of arms control agreements the two nations hammer out over the next few years that will make the liberation of Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany possible. But no one knows yet that such things are even possible.*

*The first cautious step the American government must undertake is INF ratification. A treaty needs 67 votes in the US Senate to become law and that august body will take its time to consider the new treaty’s main questions: what are Soviet intentions and is this enemy to be trusted now? Could it be possible? Could they be trusted, or is Gorbachev just another Russian trickster, a younger, healthier Andropov, the INF Treaty a ruse to lull America to sleep?*

*As the year begins, Washington think tanks call in their experts, leading off with the oft-venerated, oft-reviled Henry Kissinger.)*

**Kissinger**: "US-Soviet relations pose a particular problem for a society which has never known disaster" and is secured from foreign danger by two great oceans.

There is a persistent "refusal" on the part of the American people to face a Soviet battle "which never ends." The logical solution would therefore be: either to seek hegemony over world affairs or a balance of power with the Russians.

But -- "we are too isolationist to do the former, too moralistic to do the latter."

The current debate over Soviet intentions hinges on whether "an act of conversion will take place." Is the Soviet leadership genuinely seeking reform?

Many liberals feel as if it has already taken place, but the conservatives believe it has yet to come.

Neither under the czars nor the commissars has it been a joy to deal with Russia.

Soviet ideology "gives a particular urgency" to their agency that "creates particular complexity in dealing with Soviet leaders."

It is the Western leaders who believe they have a special understanding with Soviet leaders who "have suffered greatest shipwreck."

"The one thing that no Soviet leader can afford to do is to return from a meeting with a capitalist, and especially an American, and report that he has just met the most charming American, that he has found swimming pools in the back yard of America and that therefore concessions ought to be considered."

Every decade the Soviets renounce world revolution. It pays to be careful. Even as astute an observer as Averill Harriman found that out, to his own regret in 1959, when he reported that Khrushchev wanted to improve Soviet economic standards and to do so via mutual arms reductions. Then a year and half later he built the Berlin Wall and two years later came the Cuban Missile Crisis.

"I was not swept away by the Gorbachev euphoria." I find him "interesting... an intelligent man." He came up through they system as a "protégé of Andropov and Suslov, the chief ideologue of Stalin."

"Those who succeed in the Soviet system have an "enormous thirst to prevail." The Soviets may not know much about economy, "but they are experts in political warfare."

Gorbachev's contribution to the Soviet system has been to correctly analyze its internal weakness, and he has correctly analyzed the internal weakness of the American system, too.

The USSR's economic problems are "almost insolvable."

"Decentralization will soon run up against the nationalist problem."

The West should not make concessions simply because Gorbachev is a new type of leader. It is particularly American to think that the Soviet economy ought to be strengthened: only a nation that has never been shipwrecked could want to see its enemy strengthened.

"Arms control is becoming almost its own end, and its relationship to strategy is not very easy to determine... I find it difficult to understand how any of the arms control treaties helped our strategy."

"I have had the gravest doubts about the INF Treaty. I must say I've been nearly alone in fighting that battle."

My concern is less with the military than in the political arena. The INF agreement has affected our relationships with Europe. It has been presented in an extraordinarily schizophrenic manner: as a historic achievement that makes no strategic difference.

The historic aspect of the treaty is said to be that it reduces two categories of weapons. That "makes sense only as a first step" toward "eliminating all categories of nuclear weapons, an objective that has now been enshrined in two summit communiques.

We are therefore in a position where a weapon on which the West has relied for 40 years has been stigmatized by the nation that has been its chief arsenal, while conventional weapons have been left to future negotiations. That, in itself, is no mean achievement for Soviet policy.

Today, I find it difficult to understand the advantage to our security in any of the agreements that have either been concluded or that are in the process of negotiation.

I cannot visualize an inspection system (for the missiles proscribed by the INF Treaty) that could adequately verify Soviet compliance. I absolutely cannot visualize how that agreement can possibly be negotiated between now and June. I cannot conceive how even one of these categories of weapons could be adequately negotiated between now and June, and I do no know how countries that depend on us can adjust to the twin shocks of the removal of our forward-based systems and a total revision of our strategic arsenal, without hearing the strategic doctrine on which that is based, or without at least a fundamental modification of our strategic forces so that the number of aiming points is reduced, so that we go to single warhead missiles, as a result of which we will not save money, but have to spend a lot more. This is a challenge to everybody in the West. Some relationship has to be established to the political issues that are the ultimate causes of political tension.

"Verification cannot make a bad agreement valuable. It can only make a good agreement enforceable."

"I believe that if you study the verification provisions of the INF agreement, for example, you will find that it may be **barely** tolerable with respect in Intermediate-range forces…

But when you get into strategic forces, it isn't enough to extol the benefits of the reductions. There has to be a careful analysis of the scale of the violation. The lower the total numbers (of nuclear weapons), the greater the possibility that an otherwise minor violation could be decisive. And there has to be some analysis of what we do when a violation is discovered."

"I personally do not believe it is either desirable or possible to get rid of all nuclear weapons. Above all, I think it is totally impossible. And if you think of the concept of this huge territory of the Soviet Union, how you would verify that they have not hidden the few dozen ICBMsthat would be needed to achieve dominance, and how you would then have to decide how many *you* would hide, not to speak of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan... Even by some miracle, if all of this happened, and a conflict broke out, you'd still have the knowledge in the minds of men, so that with some reasonable speed they could be built again. So this is not a valid objective.”

Yet I am not saying that we should not negotiate with the Soviets. We need to do it to retain cohesion with our Western allies.

As I have stated publically, I will endorse ratification of the INF agreement -- not because I see any merit in it, but because I think the damage of not ratifying it would be greater; that the damage could not be undone; that the (INF) weapons cannot be kept in Europe anymore; and that, therefore, rejecting it would be a means of enabling the Soviets to hold on to their SS-20s without achieving any real benefit for us.

But it is my view that this process must not be repeated with the 50% reduction in nuclear weapons that is now under consideration at the START negotiations. Before we proceed on so fateful a course we have to understand in what specific way it is supposed to add to anybody's security.

So far as I can tell, START does not improve the vulnerability of any of our forces. The ratio of warheads to missiles of our land-based systems will go from 3:1 to 5:1. That may not make any difference, but it isn't a great achievement either. And our (nuclear) submarines will be reduced to about 18, yet the anti-submarine forces of the Soviet Union are not part of the agreement.

[tags: Henry Kissinger, verification, INF, START, Yuri Andropov, US-Soviet relations, arms control verification measures, Gorbachev]

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**Swedes Determined This Time on Soviet Sub Violations**

**Capt. Hammerskjorld**

Jan 22, 1988

*(Soviet submarine violations of neutral Sweden's waters are in the news again. In December 1986, the Swedish Armed Forces presented a long-awaited report on violations of Swedish waters to Prime Minister Igvar Carlsson. It cites chapter and verse on several sub sightings, but names no perpetrator and fools only the willing with its omission. Observers recall the notorious Whiskey on the Rocks Incident of October 1981, when a Soviet* Whiskey-*class sub ran aground off Karlskrona and a photograph of it was published.*

*Early this month, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov paid a visit to Stockholm, the highest Soviet official to make the trip in 15 years. While the report brought the submarine violation issue out into public view, Carlsson was highly conscious of Sweden's 175-year history of neutrality, and the reasons for it, and he tred carefully with his powerful neighbor. Here a Swedish naval officer is speaking.)*

**Hammerskjorld:** "Underwater activity directed against our country during the summer of 1987 had the same character as previous years... The number of reports has been somewhat larger than the during the same period in previous years."

*How many violations were there? The papers say up to 40.*

**Hammerskjorld:** Those numbers are classified. But there are reports of sightings "from all parts of the coast, with a concentration on our eastern military coast" -- Stockholm, from Gavle to just north of Karlskrona .

"It has not been possible to ascertain the nationality of the intruder."

Things have changed, however.

“From April through September major operations with our ASW (*anti-submarine warfare*) units have been conducted on the west coast; in May/June on the Norrland; just south of Stockholm from late June to early August; and in the Oxelosund area in September, and a number of clear observations and technical indications of foreign intrusion were achieved."

For the first time in 20 years, our Parliament has voted a slight increase in defense spending. ASW is a priority.

"People are reading maritime strategy."

Prime Minister Carlsson has put it in rather drastic terms: "blood may flow... Our intention is crystal clear." Our political and military leadership have agreed.

"The rules of engagement have changed." From now on, if "we see subs inside the archipelago, where there is no reason to believe this is a navigational error, accordingly, the assumption is that it is [sic] there willfully."

Commanders have the duty to force the intruder to surface. Rather than drop their depth charges too far away, they will drop them too closely. We are using both submarines and helicopters now, transferring about 10 air force helicopters once used for search and rescue to the navy for ASW work.

The Soviet base at Murmansk has grown into one of the greatest naval concentrations in the world. "That buildup has been a major factor in our analysis of the threat fact."

Of course, the truth is "the majority of infringements are really NATO."

One was when Vice President Bush's plane was coming back from Helsinki not long ago. We even scrambled some of our jets. But we corrected the misunderstanding quickly enough and tipped our wings as he flew by.

[tags: Soviet submarine violations, violations of Swedish neutrality, Sweden searches for naval intruders, ASW]

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**Talking Soviet Strategy and the INF Treaty**

**Michael Mandelbaum, Council on Foreign Relations**

Late January, 1988

*(The INF Treaty will require the destruction of both US and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5500 kilometers. A prominent scholar ponders here the merits of the first arms control agreement with the USSR since SALT II of June 1979.)*

**Mandelbaum:** To get the Intermediate-forces Nuclear Forces Treaty, it was necessary to drop the link to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. What's behind that?

"Gorbachev has decided that he needs detente with the United States." He would have preferred to start with START, but the INF was "the one that was available... to symbolize their commitment to reducing tensions."

There's been a growing recognition since the death of Stalin in 1953 that nuclear war "is not a viable" option. But here we are.

What the treaty means for Eastern Europe is a major question. We have to see what the Russians do about conventional weapons.

The START Talks are "awfully difficult." The two biggest issues there are SDI (*the Strategic Defense Initiative*) and verification.

Verification "is a very thorny issue," so complicated that the US may have to rely on new technology. Even so, we may not have 100% verification all of the time. We have to decide if that is going to be acceptable.

[Tags: Michael Mandelbaum, Treaty verification, START, INF]

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**Generational Change in Eastern Europe, USSR**

**Dale Herspring:** January 1988

**Herspring:** There was a time when Moscow snapped its fingers and Eastern Europe jumped. No longer. The Russians can't go bashing the place around any more; they have an image in Western Europe to preserve now.

"We don't know what Gorbachev's policy is going to be." East Europeans would love to see a military cutback. The Warsaw Pact militaries are in a sorry state. They're two or three generations behind the Soviets in terms of equipment.

The East Europeans are not putting their own money into their militaries. Look at Poland's navy. The Poles have gone to incredible efforts to avoid military confrontation with anyone.

There's a good chance that Gorbachev will want to cut his forces there. East Europe would dearly love it.

East Germany is in a period of flux. The group that assumed power after WW II is giving way. A new generation of technocrats, a certain recognition that they do things better than the Soviets is cropping up.

The Soviets, too, are going through generational change. There are only a few of the old guard left in the Army. Akhromeyev, Yazov, they both fought in the World War II. Below them, at the three-star level, there is no one left from then.

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Akhromeyev has had a much greater role in arms control than any of his predecessors. The Soviets have cut back on force structure. Technologically, the military sees itself as falling farther and farther behind. Economically, the country is in a disastrous state.

Still, it is Ogarkov, whose basic principles have the most support.

Some suspect that Akhromeyev and Gorbachev have gotten together. Gorbachev wants to cut general billets in half. He's stepping on some toes. The armed forces have lost out; there's no praise for them like with Brezhnev. Gorbachev has alienated some officers. They have a reduced profile.

One of the people who's very solid on all this is Condi Rice, out at Stanford. She's absolutely solid.

[tags: Dale Hersrping, Gen. Ogarkov, Gen. Akhromeyev, Gen. Yazov, Condi Rice, USSR, Gorbachev, ]

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**Soviet Economy Doing Things Backwards**

**Ed Hewett,** Brookings Institution

Jan 26, 1988

*(Soviet scholar Ed Hewett has recently returned from a trip to the Soviet Union where he took part in an on-the-record round table on their economy.)*

**Hewett:** The current reform drive began under Yuri Andropov. It was not the first. But the impetus is always driven back. The Party leaders fear the political implications of reform.

What the Soviet economy gives people is a job, cheap housing, cheap medicine. There is no incentive to work hard. With that comes with low quality goods.

The last major reforms came from Kosygin. But they were the reforms of a prime minister, a much weaker position than a General Secretary like Gorbachev. Gorbachev is strong now; his position is comparable to Lenin's during the NEP.

The economy's poor performance has now become a threat to the country's national security. Soviet leaders fear it may cost them their superpower status.

Gorbachev has been saying that if they want to improve the economy, they are going to "have to accept the possibility" that people may lose some economic security. That is a very difficult thing for a Communist politician to say.

“He’s trying to get control of the economy, not trying to give up control." But by trying to manage too much, Soviet planners have usually managed to accomplish too little.

Nineteen eighty-seven was "a critical year for Gorbachev... an extraordinary year." In a January speech on democratization at the Party Plenum he demanded "much more competition for party posts." He's taking risks.

There's a new law on enterprises in effect this month. Ministries will have to cut staff and issue fewer decrees, perhaps analogous to the Hungarian model.

"I would say things are not going well.” They are “doing things backwards.”  
  
“Prices are still fixed." Price reforms are supposed to come next year, and enterprises are supposed to be allowed to make money, but they're based on prices sometimes 20 years old.

Soviet leaders are very conservative. The Politburo still tells enterprises what they must do. The bureaucracy has a "long and venerable tradition of resisting reform...They're doing what they've done for the last 25 years."

The real problem is that reform "simply isn't going to work." There has been no serious study or discussion of economics in the USSR for more than a generation.

What will Gorbachev do? Probably "become more radical." But he "can't get around the fact that reforms aren't fun." They are looking at the possibility of losing 16-19 million jobs by the end of the century. The best solution would be to put them into the private sector. But that idea did not make it through the political process.

So again this year all Soviet enterprises have 100% of their orders from the State. They need to "totally reform the State Price Commission." Data and statistics are so bad "that we may have lost a half century" of economic information.

American businessmen thinking about entering into joint ventures in the USSR, ought to be "very skeptical" and understand that the reform process has not gone very far. I would be "very skeptical about signing an joint venture on manufacturing... The reforms have to go a great deal further."

This may be less so for services, such as hotels. There are profits to be made on "anything serving tourists."

During my recent trip, a few Western economists asked our Soviet hosts why they don't start by reforming agriculture? Their answer: “we don't have time to wait.” Soviet economists are in a hurry. They feel they are already in crisis.

My view is that they will have to muddle through.

The US should hope it works out. We should be open to seeing whether the Soviets might join the World Bank and the IMF. Of course if they do, we might not find it an easy Soviet Union to deal with, and then "there is very little we can do about it."

In the final analysis, if the Soviet reform effort is so weak that they need US help, it's going to die anyway. Nevertheless, important change is under way. During this trip, "people were saying into the tape recorder things five years ago they wouldn't have said to me in private." Their economists have a "wider range of views than we've ever" heard.

"I think he *(Gorbachev*) is in the process now of learning a very difficult lesson... I think we're in for a year of guerrilla warfare... I don't think he's won this thing at all.

[tags: Edward Hewett, Soviet economy 1988, Gorbachev, US business in USSR 1988]

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**Senators Hear Prince of Darkness on INF Treaty Merits**

**Richard Perle, American Enterprise Institute**

Feb 4, 1988, Senate Armed Forces Committee,

*(Present are Senators John Warner, John Glenn, John McCain, Carl Levin, Sam Nunn, Dan Quayle and Strom Thurmond.)*

**Perle:** The INF Treaty would benefit from closing loopholes and tightening the verification regime. Nonetheless, the treaty is sound.

"A failure to ratify" would be "against our national security interests."

I would also caution the Senate against both "killer amendments" and "rubber-stamping it." Problems are often "the product of haste."

It would be wise to spend time clarifying problematic language now, rather than later. "Some clarifications might be as welcome to the Soviets as to us."

"The single most serious defect in the treaty" is the prohibition on ground-launched, non-nuclear, cruise missiles. The problem is: there is no practical way to distinguish nuclear from non-nuclear cruise missiles and impossible to verify a ban on them. "We ought to accept that fact."

The treaty permits air and sea-launched missiles to be tested from the ground.

"We could spend all morning on cheating issues." Our "appalling" inability to respond to Soviet treaty violations is a source of great concern. It is wrong to put "brave words" in a treaty "without the will or desire to back them up."

We dropped our insistence on on-demand inspections and have accepted that we will only inspect sites stated in the treaty. But these will not be ready until a month **after** ratification.

"The sites we can go to constitute a tiny fraction of those we cannot go to."

"An inspection regime which so limits us" would be even worse for START.

"I think it's vital" that we progress on conventional weapons, too. "Some balance has to be achieved." Recent trends have "been favoring the Warsaw Pact." Because of that we still need rely to some extent on our nuclear deterrent.

I don't think that the *Pershings* and cruise missiles that we're giving up can compensate for the conventional imbalance.

"I would not leave American troops in Europe unsupported by any nuclear weapons."

It would be foolish to compress both the INF and START negotiations just to finish them during this administration. And I wouldn't go beyond 50% reductions in our nuclear arsenal with START. It's wrong to try to create a "utopian" ideal.

The development of very accurate ground-based cruise missiles could change modern warfare. But the INF treaty closes that option in perpetuity.

[tags: Richard Perle, Pershing missiles, INF, Warsaw Pact, Senate arms control debate 1988]

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**Weak Economy Driving Soviet Military Doctrine**

James McConnell, Soviet scholar and author, winter, 1988

**McConnell:** The Soviet Union has shifted its long-term vision several times since World War II. In 1980-1, a new option for fighting conventional war in the European theater and elsewhere emerged. There began to be talk of multi-year war plans, wars that might go on for years.

Since that time, the Soviets have been introducing a lot of battlefield nuclear weapons -- SS-21s, as well as dual-capable artillery, for the first time, and replacements for their SCUDs. Their plans also include an operational tactical theater nuclear option.

Debate has intensified among conflicting schools of thought as their economy has declined over the past decade. Some want to cut conventional arms. Others, headed by Gen. Ogarkov, stress the importance of cutting social programs instead.

Behind the debate lie economic issues and the challenge posed Ronald Reagan's Star Wars -- the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Another set of reforms began when Andropov assumed power in 1983. Neither he nor Chernenko felt they could cut back on social programs, however, and Ogarkov was replaced as chief of the General Staff in 1984.

He was probably too abrasive. He was not cashiered, however, but moved to Europe to head theater operations opposite NATO, and he still has many supporters.

All this led to a change in their priorities and more emphasis being placed on machine-building and information technology, such as computers and telecommunications.

The timing of these changes suggests an outside shock: mostly likely Star Wars *(SDI)* tipped the scales in favor of reform. The only thing big enough to drive that big a change is the competition in space.

"The US is forcing them in this direction... The Soviets will do everything they can to slow it (*SDI*) down... We're going to have to keep up on our end of the competition."

If the US does slow it down, there will be very little incentive for them to make concessions.

There are two main schools of thought. This first consists of Yazov, Akhromeyev and his deputy Goreyev, the General Staff's resident intellectual. They want no unilateral conventional arms reductions.

The second is arguing that the US has less interest in arms control and thus Moscow will need to make some unilateral reductions.

"These are guys in a hurry," calling for big reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals in 1990-1, and force cuts of 25% and 500,000 troops on each side once the easier reductions of the INF Treaty are made. Such cuts could offer Moscow economies it could plow back into the next five-year plan.

Ogarkov, who is probably the most influential military officer in the country, seems willing to accept negotiated conventional reductions. The military realizes that they can't get everything.

The USSR plays a role in international affairs because of their military power. The thought that Gorbachev would throw out an "essential tool" of foreign policy by giving away too much in their arms control negotiations seems unlikely.

[tags: Sergiy Akhromeyev, Nikolai Ogarkov, Dmitri Yazov, James McConnell. Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, Soviet SS-21s]

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**Soviets Increasing Military Budget, Missiles, Navy**

**BJ Lachner,** Defense Intelligence Agency, winter 1988

The Soviets believe in having a three or four-to-one force ratio in their favor. Couple that with the fact that the quality of their equipment is almost approaching that of NATO.

The USSR spends 15-17% of its GNP on defense. Only ten percent of that goes to personnel. In the West that figure is 30-40%, so the Soviets are literally getting "more bang for their buck."

Their rate of economic growth is decreasing, yet the share devoted to the military keeps increasing. Gorbachev likely wants to keep the military's share constant, yet strengthen the economic base. Despite the talk, we haven't yet seen any military program curtailed.

The Soviet Union out-produces NATO in a "vast majority" of the 26 kinds of weapons and systems our agency studies. Some shift in their nuclear triad toward strategic bombers and submarines has been seen. Their ICBMs have stayed with SALT limits, however.

They are beginning to deploy the SS-18 follow-on. (*These intercontinental ballistic missiles can carry a 20-megaton warhead or 10 smaller warheads able to strike individual targets.)*

They are also deploying rail-mobile SS-24 with 10 MIRVed (*multiple entry targetable re-entry vehicle)* warheads on them -- those are tough to find -- as well as their SS-25 mobile missiles.

We anticipate that by the mid-1990s, the Soviets will have half their ICBMs on mobile platforms and half in hardened silos. They put money into systems on the ground.

Altogether, they have 211 divisions under arms. Their tanks are adding reactive armor and their artillery is being modernized.

The Soviet Navy has undergone a "big modernization" over the past 10 years. Almost 2,100 warheads have been added to their arsenal. Their *Typhoon-*class submarines are increasing the trend toward quietness. They tend to stay in Soviet bastions, and can carry as many nuclear missiles as ten of our *Yankee-*class submarines.

The *Akula-*class sub is almost as quiet as our *Los Angeles-*class subs. As time goes on, this will make things more difficult for us to detect and track them.

Soviet aircraft carriers will probably be able to handle full-length aircraft decks by the end of the year.

There's also been a 45% increase in nuclear-capable aircraft over the past few years. They have 700 bombers, with deep interdiction capability and new generation *Fulcrums* (*Mig-29s)* and *Flankers (SU-27s)* with look-down, shoot-down systems.

Despite the ABM treaty (*which limits ballistic missile defense to one site per nation*), the Soviets have new, large phased-array radars at Pechora **and** Krasnoyarsk.

The Soviets will be eliminating their SS-20s, however, thanks to the INF accords, "a major concession on their part."

[tags: Soviet SS-18s, SS-20s, SS-24s, SS-25s, SMIRVs, Soviet *Typhoon-*class submarines, DIA, Soviet military budget, ABM Treaty, Krasnoyarsk radar, *Akula*-class submarine]

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**Correcting the “Blank Spots” in East European History**

**Karen Dawisha, University of Maryland**

Feb-Mar, 1988, Wilson Center

*(For half a century the Communist governments in Poland covered up the truth about the Katyn Forest Massacre and persecuted all who challenged their lie. In December 1987, Gustav Husak, the man who took over the Czechoslovak Communist Party after the 1968 Soviet invasion and overthrow of Alexander Dubcek, ceded his spot to Milos Jakes. Yuri Andropov was the Soviet ambassador to Hungary during the Soviet invasion in 1956, KGB chief from 1967-82, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until his death in February 1984.)*

**Dawisha:** After years of being suppressed by their governments, history is fast becoming an issue in Eastern Europe, thanks to the underground publications that are springing up.

In May of last year, Gorbachev and Poland’s General (*Wojchiech)* Jaruzelski agreed to remove certain historical "blank spots." The most notorious of these is the massacre of 15,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest in the spring of 1940.

The Soviet Union and the post-war governments in Poland always blamed the killing spree on Nazi Germany, but few Poles or historians ever believed their claim.

Now it looks like all the old monographs will be coming out of their drawers: even the head of the Soviet Institute of History has publicly said that the question of Katyn needs to be examined.

The two countries are also talking about what happened in the 1930s, when the entire Polish Communist Party leadership disappeared during Stalin’s purges.

Hungary is now bringing up the fate of its Communist leaders who also disappeared at that time.

In Moscow, (*East German leader*) Erich Honecker brought up Rosa Luxemburg. This is "particularly interesting," as he was speaking on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. What happened to her, he asked, and to Karl Liebnecht? And he mentioned the fiery debate they had had with Lenin.

What did happen? Most historians think the two were killed in jail in Germany in the early 1920s, possibly by Bolshevik agents.

Romania "has great potential for social explosion," but the country is "beyond Soviet control." Moscow has "no direct influence" over the Romanian Communist Party or its armed forces. There is "nobody in the military who was trained in Moscow."

As for the Czechs, they are "trying desperately to get '68 back on the agenda."

Alexander Dubcek recently gave a "very interesting interview to Unita" which FBIS (*the Foreign Broadcast Information Service*) carried in full. The leader of the Prague Spring says in it that he has had no secret police tagging him since Gorbachev visited the country in April 1987.

No one has ever really fingered Jakes for his involvement in the Soviet invasion. But he was Deputy Minister of the Interior. In '69 they made him the head of the Party Control Commission. One of his jobs there was to make people turn in their identity cards and replace them with new ones. When the government re-issued them, a million and a half people lost their franchise -- "an enormous number in a country of 15 million."

Gustav Husak maybe tried to slow the process down. If so, he failed. The consequence has been to "decapitate" a whole class of people since 1968, one-third of the country. Many kids have not been allowed to go to university. Generational change is going to be very difficult as a consequence.

"Czechoslovakia is an exceedingly corrupt society." The children who are now taking up the cause of their parents are in their prime. They have their own children. But there's never been a decision to let them back into public life.

Czech bosses are relying on two pillars: Slovaks like Husak, but who were not overly involved with the Prague Spring. They have "become really important."

"The game they play is not being liberal."

The other pillar is the workers. They've really been successful at building a workers party. That may be commendable, but it means low quality goods. The Party will face problems attracting high tech into the economy. Reform is going to be "very difficult" for them.

The Slovaks see themselves as the power, the "guardians" against liberal ideas, and they are opposed to the Czechs and liberalization. They see the Prague Spring as an urban, intellectual phenomenon and as a largely Czech phenomenon.

Jakes is a Czech, however, and that puts him a good "strategic situation... capable of being in power for a decade or two."

He's in charge of a Party that is the youngest in Eastern Europe, largely Slovak, proletarian, and young.

There is reason to be "pessimistic about the one-third making a comeback." Husak solved a "generational problem by skipping it."

Soviet interest in the region varies considerably. Yuri Andropov obviously took active interest in it. But Leonid Brezhnev "lost interest in Eastern Europe after the invasion" of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Often the region isn't a major concern, except during crises.

But now that is changing again. When the Politburo’s Yegor Ligachev went to Hungary last spring, he said: "the days are finished when Moscow wields the conductor's baton in Eastern Europe."

Gorbachev is his patron, which suggests that there is no real opposition to Gorbachev about this, at least for now.

There are dark clouds. The most prominent is KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov, who gave a speech during Gorbachev's vacation that was "in the best tradition of the Brezhnev era," asserting that "imperialism had succeeded in winning over certain sectors of Soviet society," a direct reference to intellectuals and nationalists, most of whom are Gorbachev supporters.

Gorbachev is "is the dissidents' leader" in Eastern Europe. The major problem reform faces in the region stems from the local Communist Party leaders, not him.

[tags: Karen Dawisha, Viktor Chebrikov, Yegor Ligachev, Milos Jakes, Alexander Dubec, Gustav Husak, blank spots in Polish history, Katyn Forest massacre, Prague Spring]

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**Here’s a Novelty: a Frenchman Sings NATO's praises**

**Admiral Pierre Lacoste,** Foundation of National Defense,

Feb 19, 1988

*(Pierre Lacoste became chief of the French Intelligence Service in 1982. He was sacked in 1985 by Francois Mitterrand over the* Rainbow Warrior *incident after it was revealed that French agents had placed explosives on the Greenpeace ship for impeding French efforts to conduct nuclear tests on their South Pacific island of Moruroa. France withdrew from the military wing of NATO in March 1967 at the behest of Charles de Gaulle, compelling the alliance to move its headquarters from Paris to Brussels and this reporter, then a private first class, to do the same a few months later. France would not become a full member again until March 2009.*

*Noted in the margins of a reporter's book: Why are all the men old, the women blonde, and not one face black nor brown?)*

**Lacoste:** What is NATO's future? It is "troubled...at a turning point."

"What is changing? The essential ideas of European security. "

Present conditions must be looked at realistically. Europe is "the most dangerous" situation the Alliance faces. The division of Europe is "an unacceptable scar, an unacceptable division."

We are seeking a common house in Europe. That is not the peace Gorbachev is offering. "It is not enough" to sign disarmament agreements with the USSR.

"No arms control measure is possible if there is no verification."

The reality today is that the "Soviet army is very powerful. It has not altered its capabilities. "As long as these capabilities are not dismantled... there is no detente possible."

The basic criteria for this are: First, we cannot achieve war prevention "without a mix of conventional and nuclear weaponries." Basic geographic asymmetries are at the base of all Europe's problems.

There's a debate within Europe about what is the most vital. At the core is the question of the use of nuclear weapons.

"Without the presence and linkage of US forces in Europe," deterrence cannot be maintained. But “there is no European defense without a European commitment."

The Soviets are trying to use disarmament to enhance their position.

"My belief and my certitude" is that they "are able to exploit our vulnerabilities," the vulnerabilities of our democratic systems.

"How easy it is to manipulate" our opinions. There are so many "professional" ways to manipulate the West. Our societies are based on profit. Lenin exploited that with his NEP. The first factories making tanks "were done by Mr. Ford."

What is our strategy -- war fighting or war prevention? The goal should be "to put as much uncertainty as possible" in the aggressor's mind.

I am an advocate of a defensive position, but not a static one. Uncertainty must play its part.

Europeans "forget" that the United States has responsibilities the world over. They have been ignorant of America’s true motives too many times.

As for problems out-of-area, even the best allies are "not so eager" to take part in them.

"I have been struck too many times" by my countrymen's tendency to boast. The important thing is for the Allies to do things together.

That's why "I'm very happy to see" European navies in the Persian Gulf, alongside American and other allied ships.

We escaped the Third World War over the past 40 years. Yet elsewhere the landscape is not so agreeable. We have seen major Soviet advances. We didn't pay enough attention to smaller conflicts.

Our huge forces "are paralyzed giants... We have to be very careful for (of) the new detente... Who are the new colonialists and who are the new imperialists?"

I find it curious that the press is not interested in this question.

We can and should put the Soviets "in a defensive attitude… We have to be proud of our values." We can play against Soviet weakness with our assets. "It's most of all an attitude."

"The failure of the Marxist system," shows us that the Alliance has a strong future. The best measures in Europe are being taken by the AFL/CIO helping Solidarity in Poland.

"The truth is the best weapon."

"Atomic weapons are political weapons." But as long as each side has more than 10,000, we are not concerned. "We are far from" being compelled to downgrade our security now.

[tags: Admiral Pierre Lacoste, Murorua, France and NATO, NATO’s future, role of nuclear weapons in deterrence]

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**Dance of the Defense Secretaries a Delicate Pas-a-deux**

**Ron Lehman,** Asst Sec Defense for International Security Policy

March 14, 1988*,* The Pentagon

*(Meanwhile, a delicate dance is striking up between US and Soviet military leaders. At a press conference at the Pentagon, Ronald Lehman, the new assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, gives a read-out on the upcoming meeting between US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, and Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov. Later he refers to Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1977-84; and the man who replaced him, Field Marshal Sergiy Akhromeyev.)*

**Lehman:** Secretary of Defense Carlucci is going to meet Defense Minister Yazov in Bern, Switzerland, on the 15th, 16th, and 17th of this month.

This will be the first meeting at that level since 1979, when Carter was President and Harold Brown met with Dmitry Ustinov and General David Jones met with Marshal Ogarkov at the summit in Vienna.

President Reagan first proposed that the two defense secretaries meet in 1985, but it was really an exchange of letters between Secretary Weinberger and Defense Minister Yazov last year that got things on track. The idea came up and was agreed to here at the Summit in December.

Admiral Crowe will not be in Bern, but he and Marshal Akhromeyev met at the summit and are expected to meet again.

Secretary Carlucci's discussions with Yazov will involve: 1) dangerous military incidents; 2) military contacts; 3) doctrine; and 4) arms control.

"We would like to keep them very serious" discussions. We have a "fairly lengthy agenda" on dangerous military incidents. On it is the murder of Col. Nicholson in 1985 and the wounding of Staff Sergeant Berry last fall. They have apologized for Sgt. Berry but not for Colonel Nicholson. There have also been incidents in the Black Sea, such as the ramming of our ship.

Our position is clear on this: US ships have the right to innocent passage in all international waters.

There has been much public attention to the Soviets' public pronouncements on military doctrine. "We are interested to hear what they have to say... We will be asking them if this a change in their policy."

How will it be manifested? What changes are actually being made?

The Soviets are trying to persuade the West not to invest in our own defense, to look to nuclear free zones, not push too hard for arms control. They also want to talk about Afghanistan.

We will be frank. "We will present the US position... We don't see any physical indication" of a shift in their doctrine, and we want to ask them where to look for it.

As for SDI, our basic policy has not changed since President Reagan introduced it five years ago.

Secretary Carlucci is "prepared to describe the program" to the Soviets, and he expects a "detailed exchange on the programs on both sides." We hope to get a better understanding of what they're doing this way.

The Soviet situation is exceedingly complex. The US is getting more and more indication that the military budget in the new Five-Year Plan may be "even bigger" than we thought.

We hope to be able to influence them. "We have an agenda; they have an agenda; we hope to have some overlap."

We need to find out what Gorbachev's words actually mean. We'll explain that US doctrine is defensive. For now, we see no reason to change Allied doctrine.

[tags: Ron Lehman, Carlucci-Yazov meeting, US- Soviet military leaders 1988, Gorbachev, SDI]

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**Colin Powell: Q&A with the National Security Advisor**

March 1988

*(Gen. Powell is Reagan's National Security Advisor. He takes questions here from overseas. He refers below to Panama's President Eric Delvalle who tried to remove strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega, but was ousted instead on February 26 and is currently in hiding under the protection of the United States.)*

**Q: What can you tell us about Panama?**

**Powell**: "We recognize Delvalle... We do not accept the manner in which General Noriega" had him stripped of power. President Delvalle has requested the help of US institutions.

"The crisis has a very easy solution." Noriega should step aside.

"We are not examining any particular military measures... The crisis can be easily solved." General Noriega should step aside.

**Q: What about chemical weapons? Has there been any change in the President’s thinking on chemical weapons?**

A: "We are committed to a total global ban on chemical weapons, but only if it is one we have a reasonable assurance of being able to verify."

Almost any ordinary chemical plant can be converted and made to produce chemical weapons.

"We have to come up with a regime that deals with that truth." It's "one of the most difficult verifiability challenges we have."

**Q: How did the meeting between Secretary Carlucci and Soviet Defense Minister Yazov go?**

A: "It was a very significant and important meeting.” We wanted to hear about their military doctrine, more about their concept of reasonable sufficiency and their military budget. There will be other meetings, for example, with Admiral Crowe and Marshal Akhromeyev. There's an advance team in Moscow now working that one out.

**Q: How about Afghanistan? The Russians said that their pullout is completed. Does that mean the US will walk away, too? And have you been talking secretly about this with the Iranians?**

A: “We have no secret contacts with Iran.”

I can confirm that the United States government will continue to support the *mujahadeen* until we are sure that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is “irreversible.”

"We will not leave them in a position that is disadvantageous to them." And we will do our best to be "supportive" of Pakistani negotiating efforts, too.

**Q: What can you tell us about the Moscow summit? Will Reagan have to back down on SDI to get the Russians to cooperate on START?**

A: "The President is absolutely committed to the SDI program." We hope they will come to the same conclusion: that our "broad" interpretation" is fully compatible with the ABM Treaty.

[tags: General Colin Powell, Panama policy, Carlucci-Yazov meeting, Panama’s Delvalle, Noriega, SDI, Moscow Summit]

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**Pell Implores Senators to Read Up On INF Treaty**

March 23, 1988

*(At the INF “markup” at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday, there are 39 amendments. Thirty-six of them, it is reported, come from Jesse Helms, the Republican from North Carolina and the Committee’s Ranking Member. As Chairman, Claiborne Pell speaks first.)*

**Chairman Claiborne Pell:** The deadline for amendments for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty is Tuesday at 3 PM.

I hope that this will allow "some time for Senators to read, if they wish," the evidence which has been gathered for them by our distinguished colleagues in the Senate Intelligence and the Armed Services Committees.

I intend to call up "no more than four amendments," so I would request the distinguished members of the Committee to please give this fact due regard.

*(Whispered at the press table in Dirksen 419:*

*One day Mrs. Pell was reading the “New York Times” to her husband over the dinner table when she came across an article about a Winslow Homer painting that had gone missing some years ago.*

*“Hmmm,” the distinguished Senator remarked absently, "I think we may have that one up in the attic.")*

[tags: Claiborne Pell, INF Treaty at Senate]

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**Paul Nitze: INF Treaty Will Contribute to Military Balance**

Mar 29, 1988, House Foreign Affairs Committee

*(Two portraits hang above the dais in the committee room: the chairman’s own, square-faced and heavy-jowled, his figure elongated to lend a height that nature had not blessed him with, and the bespectacled, bewildered-looking William Broomfield, ranking member. Empty chairs are all around -- everybody knows the House has no business with treaties. But the committee chairman, Dante Fascell, sitting on his elevated chair beneath his portrait, is determined to get in on the INF action, an aim the ambitious New York Democrat Steve Solarz shares.*

*Our reporter has come for another reason: to see a small, wiry, old man with bright silver hair, a beautifully cut suit and sapphire eyes. It is Paul Nitze, his voice so soft, his answers so taut they are difficult to catch.)*

**Fascell:** Sir, I wonder about the language in this treaty. Might not a misinterpretation or false understanding cause troubles in the implementation phase?

**Nitze:** There is always a risk of that, Mr. Chairman. Let me give you an example of ambiguity. The Treaty puts limits on armed cruise missiles. But what does that term mean precisely? If a cruise missile has countermeasures on it, does that mean it’s armed?

**Fascell:** And if a missile doesn't have a warhead on it, is it armed or not?

**Nitze:** "That is the question." To be covered in the Treaty, missiles must fall within the INF range and be ballistic or cruise.

**Broomfield*:***I’d like to ask you, sir, about the modernization of NATO’s conventional weapons. Should our efforts be stepped up if the INF treaty goes into effect?

**Nitze:** Before we modernize, our first objective should be to have NATO prepare and agree to a unified position.

"This must be a multilateral" move. A position should not be put forward until its mandate is resolved.

Next, but at the same time, get the recommendations from the armed services chiefs.

**Steve Solarz**: Thank you, Mr. Nitze, and thank you for all your many years of outstanding service. Tell me, I worry that we might be reducing our SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) at the START talks below some necessary deterrent level. Too large a reduction in our submarine force could put the most important leg of the triad – our Navy -- in jeopardy. I don’t want to see that to happen.

**Nitze:** "We have no intention of reducing limits on submarines." I think having 20 -22 *Tridents* is "appropriate" for our deterrent requirements.

The INF Treaty "will contribute to military balance." Accordingly, I do not feel that conventional modernization is more urgent now than before the treaty. It is important to receive our senior military’s recommendations before moving ahead.

**Solarz:** I am submitting a House Resolution tomorrow supporting the INF Treaty. It has a clause in it requesting the START Treaty, should one be achieved, be submitted as an “executive agreement,” rather like SALT I. This would permit the House to vote on it. Do you see any difficulties with this approach?

**Nitze:** There is no reason an agreement could not work. SALT I was an interim agreement. It expired in 1977. But a treaty is the way to deal with issues of such enduring importance. The ABM Treaty, for example, remains valid today.

All our treaties with the USSR have withdrawal clauses, in the event of supreme national interest. Hence, it is my belief that under the right conditions, a START Treaty "would be appropriate.”

**Solarz:** Do think that, as a result of a START Treaty, the Soviets could retarget their missiles on Europe or Asia?

**Nitze:** They could as easily turn their aircraft on European targets. "They're likely to do a mix" of the two.

As to whether the Soviets might hide any SS-20s that our side never knew existed, that is certainly possible. "There isn't any precise way" to know for certain how many they’ve produced. We can never be certain.

[tags: Paul Nitze, Dante Fascell, William Broomfield, Stephen Solarz, INF, START, ABM]

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**Jackson-Vanik Deemed Vital to Soviet Jewry**

**Edgar Bronfman,** Chairman, Seagrams; President, World Jewish Congress

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East

April 1988

*(The Jackson-Vanick Amendment, in effect from 1975 until 2012, denied Most-Favored-Nation status to non-market countries that restricted emigration. In practice, it was used to pressure the Soviet Union to make reforms and permit Jewish emigration to the US and Israel.)*

**Bronfman:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Things might have been better, but the Soviet record on Jewish immigration “improved somewhat” this year.

We at the World Jewish Congress believe very strongly that religious freedom is a human right, and that this law, Jackson-Vanik, is vital to the protection of Soviet Jews and the exercise of their individual human rights.

The future of glasnost and perestroika “is in some doubt.”

In business terms, I see a number of important Joint Ventures starting up or at least being considered. "I am not sure they will work.” The bureaucracy and inconvertibility of the ruble remain big obstacles.

I’m not sure it’s in our best interests, until the Soviets behave better, to give them credits to export to the United States. That’s essentially what MFN would do. The Jackson-Vanik law should be retained.

[tags: Edgar Bronfman, World Jewish Congress, Jackson-Vanik, MFN, Soviet Jewry]

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**Bulgaria Seeks New Business, New Model of Socialism**

**Andrei Lukanov,** Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Bulgaria

Apr 25, 1988, National Press Club

**Lukanov:** Bulgaria's economic and political structures are changing.

The aim of my visit, which comes after a "long lapse of time," is to meet with Secretary of State George Schultz and also some members of the United States Congress.

I hope this visit will permit an improvement in official exchanges between our two countries and make it possible for us to "explore areas of mutual interest." This should contribute to a better understanding of Bulgarian policies.

We aim to take steps that will create a better climate for our business relations, to broaden the scope of our economic contacts.

The Bulgarian people welcome the breakthroughs between the United States and the Soviet Union and are "looking forward to further progress at the Moscow Summit." The INF agreement should make for an improvement in USSR-US relations.

Bulgaria is making a "very patient effort" to create the initial steps for better US-Bulgarian relations. There have been visits with Roz Ridgway and John Whitehead from your State Department. Our chairman, Tudor Zhivkov, shared his intention with Mr. Whitehead that we Bulgarians would "walk our share down the road."

"We are not satisfied with the state of our relations now. They are far from what they could be."

What we are after is creating a new model of Socialism in our country. This doesn't mean that we aren't satisfied with our achievements -- the country has many reasons to be proud.

But the model "has exhausted its potential." People are talking of “a new revolutionary model... deep, radical changes." The goal is to bring Bulgaria close to the level of a most developed nation, with technological sophistication, competition in world markets by the end of this century.

We intend to "develop a new degree... of democratic organization in society," expand the scope of civil liberties and education. A major change is taking place in "our perception of property." We're not going away from Socialism, just taking a more sophisticated view.

All this presupposes major political changes and a "great emphasis on self management." We “have to decentralize, permit people to feel they are owners.” This, we expect, should “greatly enhance their commitment" to higher quality production.

“Economic interests” will be our basic guide for planning, along with “greater respect for market principles.”

Are we going toward market socialism? No. "We're becoming more socialist," by going "back to basic fundamental Marxist views of what socialist society is."

[tags: Andrei Lukanov, Bulgarian economic relations with US, new model of socialism, Bulgaria 1988]

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**Powell on Reagan's Continuing Commitment to SDI**

National Security Advisor, briefing

May 4, 1988

**Powell:** I would like to respond to questions people have been raising about the President's continuing commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

We have been "faced with a flurry of allegations that SDI" is being cut back. "I have absolutely no confusion in my mind... about the President's commitment to the program."

The guidance from the President is consistent. We will accept no compromise, nothing that will cripple SDI. And we've been straightforward about that.

The President has the same vision as he had before. We have to a strategic capability for the ‘90s. For that, it’s imperative to have defensive systems.

Ronald Reagan does not want to leave a legacy based on mutual destruction. He is convinced strategic defense is the "other full partner" in careful arms reduction.

Now, there have been difficulties recently in Congress. The House is voting on SDI today -- they'll probably recommend around $3.2 billion.

"Numbers that low could be crippling." The President has said he might reject it if the "numbers are too low.”

SDI is “a prudent hedge” against Soviet activities in strategic defense*.*

It would be “intolerable” not to respond to their activities, and that would undermine Western deterrence.

President Ronald Reagan "is as committed to the program today as he was five years ago." He would have done more with more money, but we are moving ahead. We have seen progress.

We are prepared to move to the “broader interpretation” of the ABM Treaty when it becomes necessary to deploy systems. We can comply with the treaty, such as it is currently understood, until then.

"We will do what we think is required" for our research on ABM capabilities. We'll have to see how much time it takes to be operational. Look at how rapidly the technology is evolving.

I can't predict what a next administration will do. But I do know the Vice President is as committed to the program as the President is.

[tags: Colin Powell, SDI, Reagan, Bush and SDI]

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**No Détente Without Improvement in Eastern Europe**

**Seweryn Bialer,** Columbia University, Auschwitz survivor

House Foreign Affairs Europe and Middle East subcommittee

May 5, 1988

**Bialer:** "The key regional conflict" to focus on is Eastern Europe. The situation there "must radically change" or "the new detente will collapse."

We can't have detente with the Soviets without improvements in Eastern Europe.

We must acknowledge, however, that the Soviets have a "legitimate right" to defend their own borders. They've been attacked many times from the West.

The problem is not only a question of security: the Second World War "legitimized" the Soviet regime at home. Control of Eastern Europe was their "greatest achievement."

No leader who let Eastern Europe go "would last 24 hours... It holds the key to the success of perestroika."

"Perestroika is an attempt to begin the Europeanization of Soviet communism." Gorbachev is trying to bring society closer to a European vision and civil society.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 destroyed reform in the USSR and led to an era of neo-Stalinism in Czechoslovakia.

Eastern Europe is more anti-communist today than after World War II and the younger generation is even more anti-communist than their parents. Communism can only succeed when allied with nationalism. It may work in the USSR, but not in East Europe.

Hungary has been able to achieve a degree of legitimacy through Kadar's economic reforms. In Poland, Jaruzelski's reform is perhaps even more far-reaching than Hungary's. The question is: is a reconciliation between the people and these governments possible?

Changes in the international economy may be the biggest problem the region faces. The technological revolution is making it hard for Eastern Europe to compete in the world economy. The Soviet Union cannot solve that problem for them.

"The situation is becoming explosive." "It will be a miracle" if there are not uprisings. “In all probability,” Ceausescu's succession will be "an explosive situation." And "nobody knows how the military would react" to another general strike in Poland.

Hungary "has the potential" to be another Poland. Poland is the freest country in Eastern Europe and yet "the most enslaved." If a *modus vivendi* could be reached between the government and Solidarity, they should get our help.

"The Soviet Union is not establishing a Western style democracy." They are creating elements of a civil society. There are now 30,000 autonomous clubs in the USSR, not formed by the State.

(*Rep. Chris Smith asks here if there may be "reason for guarded optimism" on religious freedom in the USSR.)*

Gorbachev says about 20% of the Russians are believers. I think it's more than half. Gorbachev's policy will encourage religious feeling in Eastern Europe. It's there that we can have influence. We should be building contacts with American churches.

Gorbachev has a "flexible policy" in Eastern Europe. It pushes conservative governments like Czechoslovakia to be more liberal and liberal governments like Hungary to be more conservative. He's "buying time," hoping to have few problems in the region so as to give the Soviets a chance to develop economically.

The question is: how much help will they need?

"We have to think of something approaching the Marshall Plan." Not on that scale, perhaps, but significant economic, technical and managerial help, coordinated with Western Europe. But I fear the United States is not ready for this.

[tags: Seweryn Bialer, aid for Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, Gen. Jaruzelski, Soviet religious freedom, Eastern Europe 1988]

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**Paul Nitze: Q&A**

May 9, 1988, Worldnet

***Q****: Is it true that there is not going to be a START (Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty) agreement at the Moscow Summit? What about the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting? What is the framework?*

**Nitze**: It is not certain that a START agreement can be signed by then. There are problems of numerous and difficult detail. Our negotiators are trying hard to make it possible, but I doubt it can be done.

I would expect another Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in September, however, when the next high-level meetings are planned. If the START agreement slips beyond that, it risks getting caught up in the election in November. If we're going to get an agreement in this administration, it will have to be done before September.

There's been "a great deal of progress over the last year and a half." It started with Reykjavik's limits on warheads and the sub-limits on SLCMs (*submarine-launched cruise missiles*) and ICBMs (*intercontinental ballistic missiles*).

START would have the Soviets reduce their heavy ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missles), the most destabilizing weapons. These they've agreed to cut by about one half. The remaining issues are the sublimit on ICBM re-entry vehicles. Nothing's been put in writing on that yet.

On mobile missiles, we want a ban. They are very difficult to verify, perhaps the most difficult threats to verify.

For now, the remaining INF issues involve future applications and how to carry out inspections. "Some issues have turned up."

***Q:*** *Both Germanys are critical of short-range nuclear weapons and this irritates the White House. Could you comment?*

**Nitze:** "It was agreed at NATO not to let nuclear weapons become obsolete," to modernize the weapons each member relies upon.

Nonetheless, there is no denying the countries that live along the periphery of the Warsaw Pact face the most immediate threat. Such are the differential risks each side must deal with. We are doing our best to equalize that risk.

***Q:*** *Bonn has been arguing this point and fears it will take a long time to be worked out. When can close cooperation with West Germany on this begin?*

**Nitze**: The matter has been discussed at Montebello in 1983 and Reykjavik two years later. The Federal Republic’s Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, took exception to the order. So the matter continues to be one for discussion within the Alliance.

On chemical weapons, negotiations are being conducted within the framework of the United Nations. As such they are multilateral and the number of nations involved is quite large. The work is "absolutely essential" nonetheless.

A chemical weapon ban would have to be adhered to by all who agree to its terms and conditions. The US and Soviets have made progress on this issue and the process continues to move forward. But it must be carried out at the multi-lateral level, not the bi-lateral.

***Q****: I read that NATO has proposed the elimination of sea-launched cruise missiles.*

**Nitze**: "That is incorrect." It was only a question that NATO had raised. Many in Europe look to nuclear-armed cruise missiles as a strong deterrent. The US decision was taken in that context.

***Q:*** *Carlucci says that there's been no change in Soviet doctrine; that they have to reduce their forces in Central and Eastern Europe.*

**Nitze**: "I agree with what Carlucci said." But that doesn't have to be worked out before the Summit for it to be a success.

A radical improvement in the conventional arms balance is "what we've been looking for." There has been some progress in that direction and more openness in the Soviet press. It is possible to foresee a time of more openness between the two countries, and with less fear, a reduced need for arms.

The Soviets insist they won't agree to START if there's no agreement on defense in space. We are working on both, but not certain how they will come out.

***Q:*** *SDI was the main problem at the Washington Summit.* *Is it still a major issue?*

**Nitze**: "We can't say the progress has been dramatic." But it's "not the main problem." The main issues deal with START, how to limit and verify mobile and sea-launched missiles. But there are also problems in the defense of space.

"I am very proud of the INF Agreement... (it) indicates that one can get" agreements with the Soviets.

The Afghan accords are important too. "One should not intervene" in many regions of the world.

[tags: Paul Nitze, arms control, SLCMs, NATO, SDI]

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**Joint Ventures With the Soviets**

**Ed Hewett interview**

Brookings, May 10, 1988

**Hewett:** Relations between the US and the Soviet Union seem to be improving economically. In April there was a meeting in Moscow that Commerce Secretary William Verity attended. A lot of work was done there.

The new Soviet Joint-Venture law sets a 49% cap on foreign ownership. The only way to repatriate profits is via export profits. The new JVs are not likely to make much, however much interest there is in the United States in penetrating new markets in the Soviet Union.

The law is a step forward, but I am not expecting rapid growth in these JVs, especially with oil prices dropping.

There are some 36 Soviet joint ventures that have been set up now, 33 of them Western. That number will grow. They will find, however, that the Soviets’ is still a planned economy, and as foreigners, they'll be operating outside the system.

Another thing to know: you have to negotiate through the right ministries on both quality and quantity, and quality is variable in the Soviet Union, at best. Joint Ventures have the right to import, but funds to do so would have to come out of repatriated profits.

A major concern for the Soviet economy is balance of payments. They hope to restructure. But their greatest restrictions have always been self-imposed. Banks are lined up to lend them money.

Generally, the Soviet Union is a good risk. And now their people are "pushing trade." Borrowing has been only about $4-5 billion a year recently, mainly to cover losses in oil.

But they want to be absolutely certain the West has no leverage over their economy. They can't afford to be another Poland. Fear of being dominated like that "runs deep."

Socialist data presents a great paradox: it always shows a surplus, yet the Russians are always borrowing. One reason is that they extend credit to less developed countries to buy weapons and then get worthless paper in return.

Foreign-owned JVs can expand, but they cannot buy other operations. State orders may well crowd your JV out. Remember, the Soviet economy still runs on a planned economic system.

These first JVs are being plugged through Prime Minister Nicolai Ryzhkov's office. If you got into real trouble you could probably use his office "to break logjams."

American business can do with a few of these joint ventures, but not too many. Companies will need a formal agreement with a Soviet enterprise and obtain ministry approval. You supply and equip the machinery. Only Soviet citizens get to be the chairman; the West is the deputy manager.

So it’s best for companies to have had experience in these markets already.

I was just in Moscow this March. Everybody wants to have a joint venture. It's the latest fad. I was there in last June, too, after Gorbachev's Plenum speech. The bureaucracy "did a number" on that.

"My view is that this reform will not" succeed. But Gorbachev will try again; he'll learn from his failures. In fact, he's just beginning to learn.

Politically, he couldn't wait. He had to act. People are talking openly about unemployment, about prices going up, income distribution. He has to do something.

He should have started in April1985, after he was elevated to General Secretary, to begin on agricultural reform. Instead, they are just beginning on it now. I don't understand why he didn't. One explanation is that the political climate was just not right. It wasn't the right time for *kulaks* to start coming back. Then there is the law against speculation.

Yet Gorbachev has "political instincts matched by few" in the West. There will be a "temptation" among Western leaders to look at the situation and declare victory. It may not even be conscious.

Gorbachev is allowing, "even encouraging" a debate over the economy. That's a good sign. He hasn't shut any economists up yet.

Last year’s weak performance was "useful." Gorbachev can use it as proof of the need for real reform. That proof will be less useful to him next year if he can’t take advantage of it now, however.

The enterprise managers I met all told me that they have to retool. They want to skip generations of old technology. They may need to close their factories for a few months. But the ministries told them “no.” You have to innovate on the run. We can't sacrifice growth.

There is a problem introducing reform piecemeal. It really takes four to five years. Price reform is coming last. It should have been first.

The notion still holds that things must be run from the top. Ministers are "torn" about what to do. They're not sure what the bosses want.

"Ministry-bashing" has replaced chess as the national sport.

The deeper issue is what the Soviets' economy and political security situation will look like going forward. The people know what the social safety net is going to provide -- so little that some officials are toying with the idea of disassembling it.

But then, debate has been the most interesting aspect of the Soviet economy in 1980s. Not reforms.

[tags: Ed Hewett, Soviet economy in 1988, US Joint Ventures in USSR, Gorbachev]

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**House Hears Views on Emigration for Soviet Jews**

**Jerry Goodman**, National Conference on Soviet Jewry

**Felice Gaer,** International League of Human Rights

**Pamela Braun Cohen,** President of Union of Councils for Soviet Jews

May 11, 1988, HFAC Subcommittee on Human Rights and Int. Organizations

**Goodman:** Estimates suggest there are 20,000 to 30,000 "hard-core refuseniks" in the Soviet Union today. Twelve thousand refuseniks were identified and their names were given to the Soviets at Reykjavik. But so far only 3,000 of them have been allowed to leave.

"No one is certain" how many more Jews want to leave.

There are four barriers to emigration. The first is the notion of a first-degree relative status. They have to have an invitation. The Soviets said they would loosen this and there is some evidence that they have.

Second, families with draft age children. They can't leave before after their military service is done. Third, Jews with higher degrees: the authorities have to check for obligations to the State. And fourth: a secrecy classification.

**Gaer:** I would first like to note how much work the Congress and the committee staffs have done to promote the reintegration of Jewish families from the Soviet Union.

Freedom of movement is not a right in the USSR, "but a privilege." All told, 8,000 Jews, 4,000 Armenians, and 14,000 ethnic Germans -- this latter a record -- were allowed to emigrate in 1987.

Stranded peoples are nothing new. Thousands of Koreans, for example, were caught on Sakhalin Island after the Japanese lost in 1945. They are still stateless.

*(Rep. Gus Yatron asks the panel if there needs to be a revision to Jackson-Vanik.)*

**Cohen:** Business interests say Jackson-Vanik puts limits on US opportunities in the Soviet Union as well as on Soviet opportunities here. But for Soviet Jewry, Jackson-Vanik remains "the most priceless tool… It has enormous value to them."

Commerce Secretary Verity signaled his support for Jackson-Vanik when he was in Moscow in April. We shouldn't be discussing changes to the law until we see numbers like we saw in 1979.

"Trade does not take place in a vacuum… Jackson-Vanik should remain the law of the land."

[tags: Soviet Jewry, Jackson-Vanik, international religious freedom, refusniks]

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**Early Warning: Competing Nationalisms Roil Yugoslavia**

May 12, 1988, American Association of the Advancement of Slavic Studies

*(Tensions are rising within Yugoslavia. Yet few in Washington seem to notice. A few of those who have few speak here.)*

**Steven Burg,** Brandeis University:

There are "multiple nationalisms" emerging within Yugoslavia, both liberal and conservative

Slovenian nationalism is advancing a more liberal order as part of its agenda throughout Yugoslavia. There is a rising alliance between Slovenia and Croatia. And then there is Kosovar nationalism, which has given rise to a more authoritarian Serbian reaction.

The Serbs as a nation have been split. All the Serbs in Voivodina (*a quasi-autonomous region north of Belgrade where many ethnic Hungarians reside)* see is Belgrade’s authoritarianism.

The Macedonians fear Albanian nationalism, particularly in the west, and they feel "under threat."

Meanwhile, the Croats are "sitting smugly on their hands," because Serbs are suffering.

There's been a "highly regionalized response" to events in Kosovo. The Albanians are looking at a greater Albania in very broad geographic terms.

"There is no solution" in Kosovo, short of sending two divisions there.

These problems have "been mounting for a very long time," since the beginning of the Milosevic government. It is "not surprising."

You can't kick the Kosovo Albanians out of Yugoslavia because that would open up the whole question of who should be where, what the republics’ borders should be, and that could easily destroy Yugoslavia.

**Frank Foldvary,** State Department:

There are three ethnic groups of particular human rights concern in southeastern Europe: the Bulgarian Turks; Yugoslavia's Albanians in Kosovo; and the Hungarians in Transylvania. Each has a long history of conflict with the countries they find themselves in.

Tensions have been easing in the recent past between Serbia and Croatia. The Albanian problem has been overshadowing things.

Slovenian ethnic consciousness has shot up remarkably. It's mostly defensive. There is no serious separatist tendency.

It is different for the Albanians. Kosovo has been under a state of emergency for seven years. The Albanians want an autonomous region, if not outright separation.

Belgrade is closer to a solution than before, if you could call it that. The Serb leadership is becoming more radical, more conservative. They're purging moderates. That's "a recipe for problems down the road."

The Albanians are now having more contact with the outside world. That is going to hamper Belgrade's efforts to keep Kosovo quiet.

Bulgaria's Turks have a distinct cultural identity, but Bulgaria's position is that there are no Turks in the country. There was a devastating campaign to eliminate ethnic Turks in '84-5: the worst atrocities were between December '84 and March '85. Reportedly hundreds of Turks were killed.

Bulgaria has not heeded pressure from the Soviets and Warsaw Pact to ease the tension. Rather, the Bulgarians are making overtures to Greece against the Turks.

Hungarians in Romania are the biggest minority in Europe, 1.7 to 2.5 million people. Many people in Hungary have relatives in Transylvania.

"It's a can of worms... literally ancient history."

The two countries are not talking to each other. Kadar and Ceausescu have not met since 1977. This is practically the first time things have come to this point in the Warsaw Pact. If the influx of ethnic Hungarians continues, it could lead to conflict.

"This problem is not going away."

I do not envy Gorbachev having to try to keep things under control. The multi-ethnic Soviet Union has no interest in provoking a Hungarian-Romanian problem."

How would the Soviet leader act if he were compelled to intervene? "With great doses of caution."

[tags: ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, Milosevic, Kosovo, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Albanians, Bulgarian Turks, ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, Steven Burg, Frank Foldvary]

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**Teeing Up the Summit in Moscow**

**Amb. Rozanne Ridgway**, Asst Sec State for European Affairs

May 18, 1988, House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Europe and Middle East

*(Roz Ridgway is the first woman in the State Department to head a geographic bureau, those traditional strongholds of power, and has been closely involved with planning the US-Soviet summits since Gorbachev came to power in March 1985.)*

**Ridgway:** There’s been "progress across a broad spectrum" of activities with the Soviet Union. "The Moscow Summit is not the closing chapter in a dialogue that must continue."

While there, the President will visit the 800-year old Danilov Monastery and the Writers Union and meet with Soviet citizens. First Lady Nancy Reagan is going to visit Leningrad, but not President Reagan.

Human rights will be a the top of the discussions at the Summit, "the first item up." Although there has been a "recent downturn" in the human rights, not all is bad. I have just seen reports today that the dissident Sergei Grigoriants has been released.

The experience of negotiating the INF Agreement has been "an important lesson... in sticking to principles. I think the Alliance is in very good health."

The Middle East peace process "certainly will be on the agenda" at the Summit, too. It's been part of the dialogue with the Soviets all year.

We expect to see "progress on nuclear testing... (and) continuing progress on verification regimes," such as SLCMs (*submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles)* and mobile launchers. There will probably not be a resolution on strategic arms reductions, but progress. I would hope to see a protocol which meets our verification criteria.

We are also "pushing to sign" a joint nuclear-testing verification experiment.

On regional issues, we will want to look ahead on Afghanistan, now that the Soviet withdrawal has begun.

The Soviet leadership is making the kind of decisions "it has never made before." The best hope for other progress is on South Africa and Angola.

"NATO is doing very well" despite what some "experts" say. Looking back over the past 40 years, there is more consensus now on the importance of East-West relations. A lot of that is due to the INF process.

We are "all very desirous" that Alliance burden-sharing does not become a US vs. Europe debate. "There are some Europeans who are doing more than their share and there are some who are not." The latter include Canada, Luxembourg, and Belgium.

"We're not going to see more money" from our allies, so we need to do better with the money we have got.

In Eastern Europe, there’s been considerable change and economic reform, but without the active, public language of *perestroika* and *glasnost.* "Friction is building up... I do not predict explosions... (but) a period of tensions... There's going to have to be an adjustment... It just hasn't happened yet."

Gorbachev is "way ahead" of the other Communist leaders. The Soviets would like to see changes in Eastern Europe so that the region can supply more goods for the Soviet economy.

As for the US Embassy in Moscow, *(long known to have listening devices built into the very core of the structure)* a decision by the State Department on whether it would be cheaper to tear it down than repair it "is still pending."

[tags: Rozanne Ridgway, Gorbachev, Moscow Summit, US Embassy Moscow, NATO burden-sharing]

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**Scholars Weigh Soviet, Arms Control Questions**

**John Steinbruner,** Director, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings

**Ed Hewett,**  Brookings Institution

May 19, 1988

We are here today to talk about a new study we are releasing here at Brookings. Our purpose in conducting the study was to test the effects of various lower levels of nuclear arms on deterrence levels; the likely outcomes of first and second strikes; and to judge the likely consequences were such an event to occur. It's a way of assessing strategic balance.

Our study showed that a 50% reduction in nuclear arsenals "would not have a dramatic" effect on America's security posture. The US would still retain the capacity to cover its targets.

A fifty-percent reduction, therefore seems "perfectly safe." It wouldn't restrain the pre-emptive ability of either side. We could cut to those weapons levels in almost any way, so "there's enough capacity there."

We believe that if the two powers could negotiate a "perfectly tailored balance," they could reduce their stockpiles to 3,000 warheads each.

The discussion should now go toward single-warhead missiles. "Suitably protected," we might go as low as 2,000 targets on each side without any real peril.

**Hewett:** Gorbachev has called this "a revolution without bullets, but it won't be a revolution without casualties."

There's a battle raging at the top of the Party. Something has put Ligachev on the other side of Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev.

"They're fighting with themselves" in a way that the Party hasn't done since the 1920s."

The next major event is the Party conference this June. "Almost anything is literally possible" there. I have heard serious predictions that Gorbachev and Ligachev could lose their jobs. But I don't think that will happen.

Gorbachev has had "imperfect control over selection" of the 5,000 delegates. He probably didn't select the majority.

In January last year, he called for the democratization of the Party leadership and elections for posts up to and including to the First Secretaries of the 15 Republics. The goal is restructure the Communist Party, to make it more of a political party and try to restructure the way it thinks through the implications of perestroika.

The bureaucrats have taken to house-to-house combat in Moscow. There may be a dimming of public support. If anything, ordinary people’s supplies of food, goods and housing are worse than in 1985.

Gorbachev has to prove he can "handle the empire." He did handle Azerbaijan "fairly well." I think he'll come out of the Party Conference stronger than he went in. He will talk about his management of foreign policy, and he will argue that the country has no option to turn back.

[tags: John Steinbruner, June 1988 Communist Party Plenum, Soviet empire, Communist Party of USSR]

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**Denuclearization Would Be Height of Folly**

**Edward Luttwak,** Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 24, 1988

**Luttwak:** Two great forces impinge on NATO. The first is denuclearization. Nuclear weapons can bring security for relatively little money. Reliance on conventional weapons increases the costs; relative to nuclear weapons, they’re expensive.

For the US "to denuclearize would be the height of folly."

This new phenomenon of a Soviet government says it's changed policy. We see no reduction in military production. Their military expenditure "shows no sign of decreasing."

Perhaps Gorbachev has not had enough time yet.

"The Alliance has always been under resource pressure." There has always been a reluctance in the US to pay for conventional forces. And the fact remains that an Alliance which is in possession a strong conventional force is less likely to use nuclear weapons than one which is weak.

This is "not a time for anxiety... The Soviet Union appears today less threatening."

It is a time for decision, however, because the INF Treaty has forced people to confront our own slow denuclearization, "which had more or less proceeded unobserved." The INF Treaty "dramatizes the process."

A question now emerges for the Alliance: do we continue to denuclearize – “or is it a grave error?"

Under certain conditions, nuclear weapons may be the best answer. More warheads equal more stability. Under other conditions, however, it may make more sense to denuclearize.

Both Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger say the START process has been "unsound," that it is inadvertently taking us to a less stable environment. It has to do with the ratio of warheads to targets.

The goal of arms control is stabilization. Looking back at the last 15 years, our megatonnage has diminished dramatically, simply because our weapons are more accurate. Correspondingly, there has been an increase in stability because these newer weapons are more controllable.

A Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty might be a solution for a problem which is not so great. "The whole thing seems very imprudent."

The loss of US hegemony is "displeasing."

Clearly, for the Soviet side, American nuclear weapons have been the only serious obstacle standing in their way. They’ve deprived the Soviet Army of the world-wide domination it may have wanted.

"Soviet strategy is governed by a paradoxical logic." Because nuclear weapons have provided us security, they set about to delegitimize them.

Today, the Soviet armed forces have enough chemical artillery shells to launch 1,000 Bhopals (*site of a catastrophic chemical explosion in India in 1984*) or 200 Chernobyl nuclear plants on Western Europe.

NATO cannot launch a surprise attack. No one would support it. The Soviets can. "That is a tremendous advantage" they have.

It is hard to see how far one can safely go with equal reductions in weapons, whether nuclear or conventional. In the end, this may favor the Soviets. Unequal cuts would have to be greatly unequal in order to maintain the military balance.

Conventional reductions should precede further nuclear reductions. This idea has only recently surfaced.

At the same time, it is possible for the Soviets to cut their forces in Eastern Europe in a way that eases the threat to the United States but doesn't affect their control of Eastern Europe.

A final word on Afghanistan: "The Soviets continue to supply the Najibullah Government." As long as they do, we must make sure that the interests of the *mujahadin* are not overlooked. I am confident that the Soviets will withdraw, however.

[tag: Edward Luttwak, US strategy, role of nuclear weapons, NATO, Najibullah]

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**Sweet Smell of Detente**

*(On May 27, the US Senate ratified the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. On the 29th, Ronald Reagan traveled to the Moscow Summit, the first US president to set foot in the Soviet Union since Gerald Ford visited Vladivostok in 1974.*

*In Moscow, Reagan and Gorbachev signed a draft treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. This will be the basis for the START negotiations. It sets "ceilings" of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads on each side. The parties also agree to "subceilings" of 4,900 on the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and of 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. There are detailed counting rules for heavy bombers, an inspection protocol, and a Memorandum of Understanding on data-sharing for the verification provisions of the INF Treaty and the more demanding requirements of START. The two sides also announced an exchange of data on strategic forces, which will break new ground on air- and sea-launched cruise missiles -- ALCMs and SLCMs. Finally, the two agreed to work on a Joint Verification Experiment, as a step toward finalizing the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.)*

**Soviet Gas Minister Seeks Closer Ties to US Firms**

**Viktor Chernomyrdin,** USSR Minister of Gas Industries,

June 1988, 17th World Gas Conference & 70th annual meeting of the American Gas Association.

*(The first high-level Soviet visitor to Washington after the Moscow Summit is Viktor Chernomyrdin, guest of the US Energy Secretary, John Herrington. A career apparatchik known for his fractured phraseology, Chernomyrdin will surprise those who under-estimated him, becoming the chairman of the USSR’s first ever state-corporate enterprise, Gazprom, in 1989, in essence privatizing the country’s enormous, but aging, natural gas infrastructure and becoming fabulously wealthy in the process. In 1992, Yeltsin will appoint him prime minister, a post he will hold until 1998. Later he will serve as Vladimir Putin’s ambassador to Ukraine.)*

**Chernomyrdin:** The meeting between our two heads of state last week was an important occasion for widening the relations and joint operations between our two countries. Our task now is to implement these things with deeds. Especially in the gas and oil field.

The Soviet Union’s gas industry has great potential. Natural gas is used in all parts of the world, Europe, Asia. So we think it is normal that gas consumption will increase in the future.

Western Siberia will be a major region of gas production. We have to look at new processes and new technology. These must be developed for our Siberian fields particularly.

The new trend is for great gas complexes in West Siberia. We are interested in companies like Combustion Engineering for their expertise.

Our country's large gas reserves were established about one hundred years ago. Since the 1970s, our industry has had good relations with American companies, companies like Cooper Industries and GE.

Our main task today is "to get into normal working rhythm." Change is occurring. Direct contact with foreign companies is no longer a problem now that we have a new Joint Venture Law.

What I propose is closer relations with your gas companies, both here in the United States and in Europe.

"Our Ministry of Gas is ready to look at proposals."

[tags: Chernomyrdin, Gazprom, Soviet natural gas 1988]

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**Czech Growth Still Stunted 20 Years after Prague Spring**

**Kamil Winter**, University of Southern Illinois Edwardsville

June 7, 1988, interview

*(In December 1987, Milos Jakes has become First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, following the ouster of Gustav Husak. Lubomir Strougal is the Prime Minister. Alexander Dubcek was Party leader during the Prague Spring of 1968.)*

**Winter:** I got out of Czechoslovakia on August 27, 1968, six days after the Soviet tanks rolled into Prague and made it to the United States about a year later. Before then, I had been editor-in-chief of Czechoslovak national television news for two years and was an editor there for two years prior to that.

I graduated from the University of the 17th of November. Some liberal Party members I knew there asked me to join the Television Service in 1964. That’s how I got started.

At that time, Milos Jakes was already the head of the Control Commission, under Alexander Dubek. That’s the authority that controls personnel files, like the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover.

Jakes was one of a handful of Czech politicians who went to the Soviet Embassy following the invasion. The Russians needed to justify what they'd done. They needed some Czech faces.

The Soviet ambassador called in his "reliable" friends. Jakes was one of them. They tried, but they couldn't agree immediately on forming a workers' government. A strange interim period befell Prague after that: Dubcek was still nominally in power until April of 1969.

I found it difficult to speak out against the Government, however, even after I managed to get to London. Jakes was slowly ousting people, and finally Dubcek fell. Jakes' purge continued. He was the man of the most conservative part of the “Soviet” wing of the Party.

It took him until April of 1969 to definitively establish the Soviets' Government. That was when Gustav Husak took over.

Jakes played a leading role in replacing people. At least 30,000 people were thrown out of the Party. "Jakes had no brains, no spine, no color."

People didn't want to believe he could become the Party’s First Secretary, but now he has. The public in Czechoslovakia is generally uninformed about the splits and tensions in the Soviet Union. Even Party members are often in the dark.

Jakes has been seen in Moscow as "reliable" -- but probably not by Gorbachev. To the extent that Gorbachev wants reforms, I cannot imagine he wants Jakes. I don't believe Gorbachev wants him. It shows the strength of conservative opposition that he's survived. He's representative of the worst parts of the Brezhnev regime. After all, even some Soviets were against the invasion.

Jakes was probably a Soviet agent. Husak probably was not. He was motivated by a drive for personal power. As for Strougal, he may not last too long as Prime Minister. He's kept some kind of neutrality. I believe he is probably Gorbachev's man, however.

Czechoslovakia has a completely different history from Hungary’s. Hungarians are very anti-Russian, dating back from the 19th century, when the Czar helped put down the 1848 Revolution.

Until 1968, Czechs were the most pro-Russian of all the Eastern European peoples, with the possible exception of the Bulgarians. Czech legions, you may recall, fought with the Russians in World War I. But all that changed radically. The Russians "have replaced the Germans as the mortal enemy since August 1968."

It is unimaginable how a system can rob the people of their skills. Czechoslovakia used to be an exporting country. Not any more. This is the second generation that doesn't even know the history of the country’s democracy in the years between the two World Wars.

Czechoslovakia had no foreign troops after 1945, none until 1968. Even Novotny, a supposed Stalinist, rejected Soviet troops. But ninety percent of the people in power in Prague today were part of 1968.

If the '68 situation is going to be rectified, the withdrawal of Soviet troops will have to be an important part of it. We just can’t simply renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine. The fact is that there are 200,000 Soviet troops in the country and "everyone knows they are there." That’s more soldiers than in Poland.

Did you notice that Dubcek was recently seen in Prague? People were stopping him for autographs. But I don't think he has much significance now. No one the Party has purged has ever come back.

To be frank, "there is absolutely no reason" for the Russians to help the Czech economy. Czechoslovakia has not made any economic reforms and anything the Soviets give the country will be wasted. In fact, it probably has less importance to the Soviet Union than in earlier times.

I think the United States should support the expansion of freedom anywhere and everywhere within the Communist world. But let's not confuse that with the illusory hope that Gorbachev will institute Western democracy.

I can' t imagine what he will do, nor can any of the Eastern Europeans, as the Soviets never experienced democracy.

[tags: Kamil Winter, Milos Jakes, Gustav Husak, Alexander Dubec, Prague Spring, Lubomir Strougal, Gorbachev and Eastern Europe]

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**Heavyweights Slug START Around**

**Joseph Nye, Walter Slocombe,** **Michael Krepon**

June 9, 1988, Senate Dirksen 562, American Assoc for Advancement of Science

**Nye:** "There is less political friction" and more bipartisan support now for strategic arms reduction than was the case in past years. The question is whether any of the controversies concerning the START Treaty can be resolved in an election year.

History would suggest they cannot.

Here’s what should be easy to agree on: ALCM (*air-launched cruise missile*) counting rules. And on mobile missiles, there seems to have been progress made in Moscow.

What has been hard to reach agreement on has been SLCMs *(sea-launched cruise missiles)* and the fine details of an intrusive verification regime. But on these, there is not much agreement within our own government.

There’s been mixed progress on the Strategic Defense Initiative and the modifications to the ABM Treaty which will be required if an agreement is to reached.

I have a feeling that the next administration will be less wedded to Reagan’s March '83 vision of SDI and be more flexible than the present one.

**Slocombe**: START is not as it is usually described: a 50% cut in strategic nuclear weapons. It's more like a cut of 25-30%, although there would be some cuts at the 50% level in certain critical areas.

An agreement should get each side down from about 12,000 to 8,000-9,000 nuclear warheads. With those numbers, neither side's modernization programs is likely to be affected. The Soviets could go ahead with their SS-24s and -25s, their *Typhoon* and *Blackjack* programs.

The composition of the forces would not change much. The Soviet forces would probably shift somewhat from ICBMs toward bombers.

The United States is alert to these movements and has an alert, survivable force that should be well able to maintain deterrence.

"An agreement would allow us to retain" that fundamental element of national defense – deterrence -- and help preserve the ABM Treaty.

It would, however, "dramatize" the issue of our *Trident* missile submarines, the backbone of our deterrence forces. Protecting our position could be "a major issue for the next administration," and bring targeting policy into more open debate.

**Krepon**: There are four issues at the heart of our discussions with the Soviets: mobile missiles, cruise missiles, counting rules, and challenge inspections.

One. The Administration has “belatedly" taken a solid approach to mobiles. It's going to be "terribly important" for the two sides to work out tagging schemes.

You cannot prevent everyone from cheating. But you can increase the cost of cheating. That's why tagging is important.

Two. Our ALCM position "undermines" our SLCM position. If SLCMs are covered in the agreement, it will add several layers of complexity and the situation will lend itself to multiple controversies.

Three. We have a very cost-effective nuclear program. How can we protect our force structures at lower levels of warheads? The counting rules have to be extremely detailed; otherwise the Soviets tend to try to undercut our stance.

Four. The big question is how far we can go on challenge, short-notice, on-site inspections at suspect sites. I believe the Administration has already made a decision that START will not survive without suspect, on-site inspections.

[tags: START, SLCMs, ALCMs, Trident Missiles, Walter Slocombe, Joseph Nye, Michael Krepon, challenge inspections]

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**Troubles Mount as State Looses Power to Intimidate**

**Steve Sestanovich**: Director of Soviet Studies, CSIS

June 13, 1988, Atlantic Council

**Sestanovich:** A recent CIA report on the Soviet economy shows serious economic problems emerged last year. Growth was down in seven of the ten categories they tracked.

"Nineteen eighty-eight is going to be a tough year." The machinery sector will have to grow 20% to meets the goals the ministries have set for it.

"There's evident wariness at the top" at how the people will respond to conditions. Price reforms have been deferred until the next Five-Year Plan. Transition does bring disruption, and, at the same time, their economy is trying to do too many things at once.

Near-war can be expected at the Party Conference this month between the conservatives and reformists. There are attacks in the press on Ligachev, even on Gorbachev.

People are advocating "extreme positions.” The authorities "don't seem to be able to control the debate."

Why? The State has lost its power to intimidate. Within the leadership, there is a pessimistic view about what the future holds, and "a national loss of morale."

It may not be a coincidence that 88,000 people were convicted of producing moonshine last year.

Concomitant with that, a new dialogue is emerging in the Soviet Union, one that contains "a lot of ethnic nastiness," unprecedented levels of racism. While the causes are several, it is highly possible that *glasnost* contributed to this ethnic tension.

Nonetheless, I believe Gorbachev's "prospects for survival are pretty good." His prospects for success are not. And yet I do not believe his tenure in office is threatened.

[tags: Steve Sestanovich, Ligachev, Gorbachev, Soviet economy]

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**Brent Scowcroft: Strategy, Stability and START**

**Perhaps it is time to figure out what we want to do**

June 13, 1988

*(Retired Lt. Gen Brent Scowcroft was National Security Advisor under Gerald Ford and will hold the same position under George Bush following the November elections, where he helped guide the administration through the most significant period of achievement in international affairs since the immediate aftermath of World War II.)*

**Scowcroft:** "Our objectives for a century have been remarkably loose.”

“Arms control has carried the burden of US-Soviet relations" for years. "That is too heavy a burden."

Let us begin by acknowledging that one cannot expect to get something for nothing, and that "it is hard to produce arms control" from a policy of weakness.

START does get at SS-18s, however, which are to be cut 50%.

*(Soviet SS-18s are ICBMs each carrying 10 MIRVs --Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles).*

"The question one has to ask after all these years is what are we after?" Where do we stop our reductions between 50% and zero?

Perhaps it is time, now that we are about to enter a new administration "to figure out what it is that we are trying to do."

"Arms control cannot end the threat of nuclear war." US and Soviet antagonism "is the core of the problem."

Under any START Treaty, both nations will retain the number of warheads required to do massive damage to each other.

Arms control probably cannot save the country any money. Indeed, START will probably mean "additional" funds are necessary.

"The dialogue itself is valuable,” however. “We have a great deal of information about each other now."

What arms control can do is reduce the chances of a nuclear war which neither side wants. That means the focus of our reductions should remain on systems "which do not constitute a first strike."

The kind of systems we need are survivable. We must maintain our deterrent capability through the mobility of our systems and our ability to verify Soviet numbers.

“I come down hard" on the side of verifiability. A move toward de-MIRVing could help solve the verification problem.

“First, we must decide what we want" to do about many of these problems. I'm not sure we know.

[tags: Gen. Brent Scowcroft; US military strategy 1988, arms control, US-Soviet relations]

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**Gen. John Galvin: Push Hard for Conventional Talks**

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

June 13, 1988

**Galvin:** Next year "could be a time of the biggest challenge" facing the Allies, now that there is a general feeling that "things are getting better."

"The INF Treaty is a good idea." Giving up our *Pershing* missiles was the key to the agreement. No commander likes to give up weapons, but those "were our marching orders."

So we are "going into a time of transition" for both the Soviet Union and the United States. The real question now is: what do you do?

“Gorbachev himself admits that even he doesn’t know where *perestroika* is going.” Why do you fear us – that is the question he asks us more than any other.

Let me try to explain why. I have read his book *Perestroika* "more than once." It does say that nuclear weapons "should come out of Europe," and that the US should come out, too. If NATO goes away, then maybe the Warsaw Pact will, too.

From the military perspective, this may be new thinking, but it's the same military doctrine.

"There is no change... I would bet my life on it."

But even if this represents a change, I believe it is my duty to look not at Soviet intentions, but their capabilities.

There are seven classes of submarine being built in the Soviet Union today. The fourth *Kiev*-class carrier is going through sea trials now.

They have a new generation of tanks, too, the fourth in the past two decades. They have a three-to-one advantage in battlefield tanks. We are definitely outnumbered in armor in Europe.

We should push hard to get conventional weapons negotiations under way, and not forget the lessons of World War II.

Generals Akhromeyev and Yazov say we're becoming defensive. But the Soviet Union produces enough tanks every month to supply a division.

Our strategy is good: flexible response and forward defense. "Our defense is a forward defense. We do not intend to give up ground."

"Nuclear weapons do deter war... They are a tremendous inhibitor of war."

No less an authority than Helmut Kohl, (*West German Chancellor*) has observed that for 300 years, Germany had a war every generation. But that’s no longer true.

You have to have public consensus to support a strategy so that you can "resource it." The man on the street has to believe the threat is actually there. "We must work to make arms control a part of strategy" that he can understand.

The Soviets formed an arms control directorate in the *Stavka* (*the armed forces high command)* but we didn't do anything comparable here. As a result, we're behind the power curve. We need to seize the initiative.

"I really think we need an overall concept." We need to make clear what we want in response to Gorbachev's moves.

Still, "our strategy is good." It’s important that we work on all tracks: START, conventional and chemical weapons.

There are 128 inspections in Soviet territory coming up with the INF Treaty. The real question will be in conventional forces, however. General Akhromeyev sees the INF agreement as the first step toward the de-nuclearization of Europe. We will need some adjustments to reach parity with them.

"If the Soviets are serious," it will be clear. If they are not, then we do have to wonder what they are up to.

[tags: INF, START, Gen. John Galvin, Helmut Kohl, Gen. Akhromeyev, Yazov, nuclear deterrence, Soviet military capabilities]

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**Are We Witnessing the Waning of the Cold War?**

**Zbigniew Brzezinski,** *Columbia; National Security Advisor under Carter*

June 1988

**Brzezinski:** There are a number of "diagnostic disagreements" between the United States and members of the Alliance over the precise nature of the changes under way in the Soviet Union.

These changes are "clearly confusing” and “unprecedented.” And “a great deal hangs" on the conclusions we draw from them.

"We are all gratified" -- and surprised -- that the Soviet Union decided to pull its troops out of Afghanistan. This was not anticipated. But how significant is it?

Are they interested in creating a more solid Pakistan, "with strategic depth?" Or are they interested in "Lebanonizing" most of the country, retaining influence in the north? It remains ambiguous and may not even be clear to Moscow.

Are we seeing the waning of the Cold War? Is there an emerging common European house? Or is a much more subtle process of seduction under way?

It is not easy to give a categorical answer to these questions. It may not even be clear to the Politburo what their intentions are.

In strategic arms control, is the result going to offer us more stability? Even Shultz and Kissinger have their disagreements on that. Do the limitations the START treaty would impose alter our defense posture?

"The best we can say is that we do not know."

Are we moving to a more stable or more ambiguous era? We simply do not know.

Then there are issues concerning the countries of Eastern Europe. Is what we are seeing the beginning of reform or the beginning of their disintegration?

We find ourselves in "a classical, pre-revolutionary situation" in much of Eastern Europe -- collapsing economies and rising political instability.

There is one "fundamental, historical implication" to be taken from these divergent questions: there has been a shift in the historical balance of forces.

The Communist system is going on the defensive. Historic levels of pessimism have pervaded the Party; there’s a defensiveness of historic proportions.

In human rights, it can be sensed most of all. We are living at a time when greater education is driving peoples everywhere to demand greater rights. There has been a "historic shift in values" in Eastern Europe, a geographic shift to the West.

This should lead to greater confidence in the West.

In arms control, the next item on the agenda is conventional weapons. There is general agreement that strategic arms control can't be pushed much further without undermining our nuclear deterrence.

I agree with General Odom when he says: "We should applaud *perestroika,* not finance it."

We do not know what the Soviets spend on their military. I believe we "can safely assure they are spending 20%" of their GNP. That figure was published in a Soviet publication and was not refuted.

Recall, too, that the Soviet economy is only about 40% of ours.

I think there's a consensus not to finance the Soviet Union now, because it would help finance their military.

Eastern Europe must institute social changes, without which Western development aid would not be well spent.

But "we have to start thinking" about America’s direct involvement there, in light of our own global responsibilities and the growing ability of the West Europeans to "start closing the gap" and providing more funding themselves.

The United States has other demands, which over time will demand more attention than Europe.

I will leave you with a few more questions from our fascinating time: is Eastern Europe in the process of becoming Central Europe, and is Moscow becoming less threatening? Are they dismantling the Stalinist Empire in Eastern Europe?

We have to ask. We're entering a new age. Our strategic doctrine needs updating. Our systems, too.

But I would not expect much strategic cohesion in US policy. Anyone who would advocate spending less than 5.5% on defense is only "toying with national security."

The focus needs to be on conventional arms control now. "The best way to proceed" is to set strict limits on tanks. I favor a "thin-out zone" between the two sides to reduce the chances of *blitzkreig*, perhaps leading to tank-free zones eventually.

US troop cuts should not figure in the negotiations.

[tags: Zbigniew Brzezinski, NATO, US strategy, Soviet strategy, arms control, Eastern Europe]

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**Turkey Seeks Its Place in Europe**

**Kenan Evren,** President of Turkey

June 28, 1988

*(Kenan Evren was Chief of the Turkish Army General Staff, then came to power in the 1980 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. Demirel would return as PM in 1979 and again in 1991, where he will serve until becoming President, a position he will hold until 2000. Evren will be imprisoned in 2014 by order of the Turkish courts and reduced to private for the coup.*

*Turkey’s neighborhood is far from peaceful in June of 1988. To the south and east, the Iran-Iraq War has now reached its eighth atrocious year. Although a ceasefire may be near, no one, least of all Gen. Evren, can afford to bank on it.)*

**Evren:** Thank you. My purpose here is to express the "close links of friendship" that exist between our two great nations, Turkey and the United States.

We in Turkey see our place in the world from a unique perspective, one that is based on a geostrategic location unlike any other on this earth. We are a land bridge. We connect Europe with all parts of Asia and the Middle East. Our geography is our destiny.

Our determination to modernize our nation and succeed can be seen in our devotion to economic prosperity. This is reflected in our years of "accelerated economic growth."

Some nations have criticized us over the years for not being a so-called democracy. But further democratization will require stability.

Turkey's ambitions are peace and reconciliation, friendship and cooperation with all countries in our region. But we Turks live in a dangerous neighborhood.

From the Turkish perspective, the United States and the Soviet Union both contribute to world stability. The stability of East-West relations, upon which so much depends, rests on this balance of power.

We believe that the credibility of NATO depends in large measure on the United States and the "fulfillment by other members... (of) their burdens and risk-sharing principles." And maintaining the Alliance's credibility is critical.

I support the INF Treaty and think it is "a helpful step." But now, strengthening NATO's conventional forces is “critical” and has to be addressed.

"We should be united" on this. Our aim should be redressing the conventional imbalance. And most importantly: the Alliance should not distinguish between the Central and the Southern Flank.

Let me remind you that Turkey has the second largest army in NATO. Yet we, alone, have the responsibility to defend one-third of the NATO frontier.

"The financial burden and risks shouldered by Turkey are much greater than her fair share." Because of these shared responsibilities we need to make vital improvements in our defense forces, modernize our equipment.

President Reagan and I have talked, and we agree that Turkish-American relations are based on important common ties. The Turkish people have "genuine" feelings for the people of the United States. "We have shown time and again that Turkey is a faithful ally."

But I must confess to you here today that the Turkish people are very "sensitive" to certain attempts to insert "alien ideas" into our relations. (*This is a slap at the US House of Representatives, for considering, under pressure from Armenian-Americans, whether they should condemn Turkey for the Armenian Genocide.)*

I have three other points to make today. The first is the important role our country is playing in seeking to reconcile Islamic society with democracy and "the unique and compelling model" that Turkey offers.

Second, is that Turkey seeks to become a major economic partner with the United States. We have achieved many successes in our economy and democratic development.

And third, Turkey seeks its "rightful place" in Europe. Our application for full membership in the European Community has the support of every Turkish political party.

We emerged from the 1980 crisis with "stronger democratic institutions." Turkey proves "double guarantees" for human rights through our Constitution, which provides guarantees against torture and inhuman punishment.

I would like to point out that Turkey is unique in that we maintain relations with every nation in the region. This is just another way that our nation plays a stabilizing role and contributes to regional development.

This ability can be enhanced with some help from our friends. But it should be “less aid, more trade.”

Turkey is "an ideal country for investors." We have had policies in place since 1981 that are market-oriented to enhance investment and technological innovation. Our trade with the US has quadrupled since then.

The Turkish business community is "eager" to work with American businesses, particularly on Joint Ventures. Strengthening our economic relations will help strengthen our democratic trends.

*(In the ensuing Q&A session, Evren is asked about terrorism, the Armenian genocide, Turkey's poor human rights and Cyprus)*

Turkey is the country that has been "hit the hardest" by terrorism. We stand for effective measures against the PKK and others. Terrorism represents "a new type of war" and has to be dealt with practically.

To be effective, nations have to cooperate together. Unfortunately for us, cross-border subversion is "an unhappy reality" of the neighborhood we live in.

We have no discriminating policy against anyone, so Armenia's claims have little meaning. During World War I, the Armenians were armed by the Russian Army.

"The problem can be solved by historians."

This dialogue about human rights "never comes to an end." I would ask members of the press "not to respect such allegations."

Torture is prohibited by our Constitution. For example, between 1980 and 1986, 9,337 persons were accused of misconduct and torture. Of them, 5,602 cases went to court. Only 400 of these people were not punished.

As for Cyprus, the foundation of our position is the 1960 Agreement acknowledging the island's two communities: Greek and Turkish. In 1963 Archbishop Makarios "disrupted" that agreement. There were "massacres" in 1967. Things had gotten so bad by 1972 that we were convinced our Turkish citizens would "be adhered to Greece."

Our government asked the UK to help, but they didn't.

Our relations with Greece are "positive" now, but our troops will not be withdrawn from Cyprus until there is a federal community for our Turkish Cypriots.

"First we have to have a treaty."

[tags: Kenan Evren, Suleyman Demirel, PKK, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus]

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**The Chiefs Are Comrades Now: Crowe and Akhromeyev**

July 6, 1988

*(Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has brought his Soviet counterpart, Gen. Sergey Akhromeyev, Field Marshal of the Soviet Union and chief of the Soviet General Staff, to the Pentagon Press Room.)*

**Crowe**: It is not often you see a Soviet Field Marshal in these halls. That is the point. This is the first visit ever to the Pentagon by the Chief of the Soviet Union’s General Staff.

Marshal Akhromeyev’s visit is a sign that the dialogue between our two nations is "expanding in many dimensions."

The prospect of better understanding between our respective military services is very much on our minds, and we hope that it can make an important contribution to reducing the tensions between our nations.

I know Marshal Akhromeyevhas a keen "appreciation for the horrors and devastation of war." And I hope that after this visit he will have more appreciation for the diversity of the United States and the strength of our armed forces.

**Akhromeyev:** I am grateful to Admiral Crowe for the invitation to visit the United States and for the "very rich program" he has prepared for me and my staff.

We have three tasks here. One is to hold discussions and exchanges on objects of mutual interest. These are on very high level. I have senior officers accompanying me: Dmitriy Grinkevich of the ground forces, Konstantin Makarov of naval operations, Valentin Pankin of the air force, and Cherbov, my assistant.

Second is to visit military facilities of American Army, Navy and Air Force. And third is the chance to meet American people.

"This is going to be a very interesting experience." It has come about as a result of improving relations and some "very hard work" by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev and the recent meeting between Secretary of Defense Carlucci and General Yazov, our Minister of Defense.

We have come here with "a prepared agenda." Admiral Crowe and his colleagues asked about our recent Party Conference and I spent 35 minutes explaining my observations.

During this morning's session with Secretary Carlucci, we discussed military items, and we reached an agreement on military exchanges for the next two years. It gives us a "rather crowded" schedule.

***Q: Did you discuss the Iranian incident (the US shot down an Iranian plane over the Persian Gulf three days ago), and if so, how was it similar or dissimilar to the Korean airliner that you Soviets shot down in 1983?***

**Akhromeyev**: Admiral Crowe explained the specifics last evening.

"I didn't see fit to offer any advice," as I do not see similarities between the two incidents.

***Q: Are there going to be reciprocal visits to the Soviet Union?***

**Akhromeyev:** Yes, I have confirmed my invitation to Admiral Crowe to visit the Soviet Union, hopefully in 1989. We are planning chief of staff visits over next two years, and we are looking forward to Secretary Carlucci's visit in August.

We will also have exchange visits between ships, although it is not yet agreed upon where, as well as among military historians and athletes.

***Q: Does the Soviet Union plan to withdraw troops from the Warsaw Pact so as to reduce the conventional imbalance between the sides? The US says there is no evidence that the USSR has changed policy.***

**Akhromeyev:** Why should we do that unilaterally?

But "we hope to discuss this particular question for a number of hours" and then again in about five days. Then I will answer question better for you.

"Our military doctrine is really defensive in character and in order to prove it," we are ready to be frank and open. We will let you know at our next conference.

***Q: What are your country's concerns with SDI?***

**Akhromeyev:** Your question "invites a very lengthy answer." Let me say only that we cannot afford to increase strategic arms and strategic defense.

***Q: I would like to ask you about Vice President Bush and plans for conventional arms negotiations in the next administration. Would the Soviet Union give up its advantage in tanks and artillery if the US doesn't give up its advantage in tactical aircraft?***

**Akhromeyev:** We believe that all of these systems "can be decreased" in parallel, and I'm happy to hear that Mr. Bush is interested in possible agreements. Mr. Dukakis seems to be interested as well.

[tags: Akhromeyev, Crowe, Iran Air Flight 685, Korean Airline 007, SDI, conventional arms negotiations, US-Soviet military exchanges, US-Soviet military ties, US-Soviet Military Chiefs meet ]

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**To Reagan's Credit, He Did Take 'Yes' For an Answer**

**Spurgeon Keeney, Arms Control Association**

July 7, 1988, Women's National Democratic Club

*(Spurgeon Keeney of the Arms Control Association is a prominent writer on nuclear and arms control issues. He was a key negotiator during the SALT and Long-range Theater Nuclear Talks and served at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Carter Administration.*

*The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, cited below, entered into force in 1972. The US will withdraw from it in 2002.)*

**Spurgeon Keeney:** After seeing him in Moscow, I can only conclude that Ronald Reagan has finally "approached the mainstream."

"The Prodigal Son has returned."

Why? Well, Gorbachev has shown himself to be very interested in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. In this his government has been "extremely flexible."

Compared to eight years ago, out country is "somewhat worse off" for the arms control policies it has pursued.

The first six years Ronald Reagan produced "no accomplishments... We have essentially lost a decade."

The Strategic Defense Initiative was both a "stimulus" to a new arms race and a "formula for a new arms race."

He used SDI to destroy public confidence in the arms control process, just as he is using the radar at Krasnoyarsk to buttress his arguments about Soviet cheating.

Fortunately, Sam Nunn and his allies in the Senate have "held the line" against a “break out” of the ABM *(Anti-Ballistic Missile)* Treaty.

But it was really Gorbachev who "changed the picture." He "threw Reagan a life line." The man "showed remarkable flexibility."

"To Reagan's credit, he did take 'yes' for an answer."

The INF Treaty is "a significant development and I support it." It has had "a major, positive impact" on the Congress. It "has made arms control much more bi-partisan."

"It is a serious treaty” and “it does improve the security in Europe." It was "a treaty that had something serious in it on both sides."

And it has contributed to the slow "opening up of the Soviet Union."

For now, the prospect of an agreement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks is caught in an impasse over ballistic missile defense, which, as you know, is prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Overall, however, "the prospects for arms control are quite good," perhaps "the best they've ever been."

A framework for START clearly exists. Were a treaty made, it would be of "historic proportions."

But that will have to take time. I see "very little prospect" of a START agreement in the remainder of this administration.

"The next president is going to have an unparalleled opportunity" to reduce strategic weapons dramatically. But I don't think it will just happen by itself. It will require "a very strong commitment" from the President.

If *perestroika* fails, it will be a blow to our arms control aims. Personally, I am "rather optimistic" that Gorbachev will be there for many years.

"Clearly, the State Department has taken a much stronger role" in managing Soviet affairs in the past year and a half. The hawks are leaving. People at the White House, like Colin Powell, have been "cooperative."

The Soviets have been working on their own strategic defense initiative "for many years." That doesn't mean that they are ahead of us. I'd say we were equal in some areas and clearly ahead in others.

There is "no evidence that they are... preparing a breakout on their own" from the ABM Treaty.

"In the final analysis," I believe Republican senators will support START against the challenge from SDI. If there is enough popular support, they can put SDI back in the laboratory and keep it out of space.

Let us hope they do. The more we Americans pull away from nuclear weapons, "the stronger the case" we can make for non-proliferation in the rest of the world.

[tags: Spurgeon Keeney, ABM Treaty, ABM Breakout, Moscow Summit, SDI]

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**Akhromeyev and Admiral Crowe: Dancing with the Stars**

July 11, 1988

**Crowe:** Good day, gentlemen. Please be seated. The goal of our trip together was for Marshal Akhromeyev to get acquainted with the some of the people of our great country.

He was “a very fine guest.”

As we traveled we "reached agreement on several issues." If acted upon, these agreements can reduce the incidence and possibility of hostilities arising between our sovereign forces.

The most important aspect of trip, however, was for the Marshal "to take measure" of our soldiers, and get to know some of the fine soldiers and officers who make our specialized verification equipment work.

**Akhromeyev:** Our visit to the United States of America had three tasks. "It is my judgment that thanks to Admiral Crowe" we have carried out these three tasks "successfully."

He was “an admirable host.”

We made an "effective plan" for military contacts for the years 1988-1990. We also agreed on a joint Soviet-American working group on reducing the risk of "dangerous military activities" whenever our forces come within two miles of each other.

We spent "dozens of hours" in discussion. They were "candid" and "open." Admiral Crowe "educated" me about how "the American military mind became what it is."

"We did not engage in negotiating" outstanding military issues. We had no orders from our superiors to do so.

I had complete freedom to interview any person I wished. I met with President Reagan and "received the answers to all my questions."

The third task was "to get acquainted with the American people... I met with hundreds of Americans... It is going to be useful" for our mutual understanding.

*(Here Akhromeyev and Crowe respond to questions.)*

**Akhromeyev:** "Perestroika encompasses everything, military as well as civilian."

Soviet military doctrine "has become defensive." In the past, our military doctrine allowed for both offensive and defensive operations.

"Now, we are introducing some changes to make military doctrine more purely defensive in nature." We realized that some of our training bothered the West. "We addressed this issue."

We are beginning to introduce other changes into our defense structure and organization. "The goal is to impart a defensive nature" to our forces. But "this will take some time."

Complete realization of those changes will depend to some degree on the bilateral steps we take. We must therefore “sit at the negotiating table.”

**Crowe:** I tried to describe how the country developed and how the growth of the West influenced it. Among other things, I drew on Dan Boorstin's book, "the Americans."

**Akhromeyev:** I had no idea "how American nation had developed." For example, how farmers work. I saw the road network, the interconnecting farm roads.

This was interesting to me. We "have quite a problem" with roads in our country. Don't think that we in the military are only interested in military topics.

**Crowe:** "We did not attempt to paper over" our differences.

"I expressed some of our concerns." He told me: "keep watching."

Believe me, I am. I am watching their "exercises, deployments, and the structuring of units."

It’s because I can say that with the Marshal standing by me, here in the Pentagon itself, that I believe I can say our discussions have put us on a solid "basis for future understanding."

**Akhromeyev:** In Afghanistan "withdrawal is going according to schedule." But there are problems with Pakistan. The Pakistani command is violating the agreement. The Pakistani-Afghan border is not closed. Units continue to be shifted into Afghanistan.

"Training centers continue to operate in Pakistan."

**Q: Shouldn’t we blame the United States for that?**

**Akhromeyev:** “I am not aware of any specific actions” by the United States that would lead to that conclusion.

[tags: Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, US-Soviet military cooperation, arms control verification, JCS, US-Soviet Service Chiefs meet, Crowe & Akhromeyev 1988]

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**June Party Conference a Fabulous Event**

**Murray Feshbach,** Georgetown University

June-July 1988

*(A delightful old gentleman with a rumpled suit, a pronounced New York accent, and a vast knowledge of the Soviet Union is speaking: Murray Feshbach. With NATO in 1986-7, as first-ever Sovietologist-in-Residence, he is now a research professor at Georgetown.)*

**Feshbach:** The Party Conference in June was a "fabulous event." Gorbachev did not get everything he wanted. Who does? He took "one step back to go two steps forward."

Gorbachev understood, I think, that he needed to do many things: support the economy and the social foundations of the country, maintain the military, and sustain his foreign policy, all at the same time.

The economy has become so "weak" that he had to do something. "No question they are in very bad trouble."

But worse: all social and economic statistics from the Soviet Union prior to now must be brought into serious question. Rashidov, the former First Secretary in Uzbekistan, lied about the cotton crop for years. And then one day after this comes out in the open, both he and his doctor have “heart attacks.”

The revelations "shocked" even those of us who have long been skeptical about anything from the Uzbek SSR for what it said about the local barons, the diversion of hospital funds, and even the story about the Party lord who had his own private prison.

So Gorbachev is trying to turn things around. The question is whether he can make "sufficient progress."

Razumovskiy was appointed to head the Cadre Department about a year ago. His job is to help out with local cadres. Then last year he became a candidate member of the Central Committee. He’s Gorbachev's "point man" for his end run around the Party power brokers.

There are a lot of rumors, a lot of stories, "unheard of" accusations against Andrei Gromyko and Georgi Arbatov and so many others in Moscow. It is "absolutely fascinating." Was Gromyko set up? The idea, I am sure, is to replace him. What incredible vignettes of glasnost I witnessed.

Perestroika has enormous problems. It only really started on January first of this year. But still, people expect things. Gorbachev has to show signs of progress.

Some "fascinating" new areas of law have come to light at this conference. One is the leasing of land. Does it mean that the collective farms will disappear? Might there be property ownership?

The bureaucracy is not necessarily entirely opposed to perestroika; they are "just confused."

Will Gorbachev be in power forever? No. I think he may finish out his two five-year terms. The Party needs him. By its very own logic it does.

Let me turn to another set of concerns: the rise of nationalism and how that will affect local soviets and decentralization, and the environment: how absolutely abysmal management and environmental neglect is exacerbating tensions throughout the USSR.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, for instance, the fighting was triggered by an announcement by the Azerbaijanis that they were going to build a chemical plant near Stepanakert, essentially an Armenian town.

The Armenian Health Minister even wrote to Baku, citing the impact the plant would have on child mortality, given how much pollution it would generate. So, the Armenians are up in arms about health issues, but language and cultural issues play important roles in the conflict, too.

Another concern of mine is decentralization. The Soviet Union has something like 35 irredentist claims already against it.

In some ways, the place is still feudal. Let us have more local autonomy, most of the Republics are saying to Moscow, and we'll support you in foreign policy. We’ll even pay our taxes.

The revolt has already started. Local soviets have begun taxing all the enterprises in their territory, even all-union enterprises.

Nationality questions are becoming "enormous issues” throughout the Soviet Union. Often they are a result of, or result in, conflicts and tension. And there are enormous demographic shifts underway, which are largely reflected in the data. For example, the 1970 census showed that only19% of 18-year-old males came from the southern tier republics and oblasts. But by 2000, that could be 40%.

Take Kazakhstan. It's an enormous territory. The north is Russian and European, but the south is Kazakh. The same is true in Ukraine; the Russians are east of the Dnieper and the Ukrainians to the west.

What happens when Russians become less than 50% of Soviet territory? Maybe it won't be important if they retain 90% of the power. The figure they give is 52.4, but I think that the next census will show them to be only around 51% of the total.

Even with perestroika, the Soviets are not fully committed to this new notion of democracy. Perhaps the demographics have something to do with it.

On the other hand, the rise in religious feeling in the country is being handled "wonderfully." They're dealing with it in a much more sophisticated way than before, addressing issues. They fired the head of Komsomol. The patterns of the youths’ behavior have changed. Religion is on the rise among them.

The Soviet Union is a country of countries, all stuck in place. It is not a migratory country like the United States. There's a reason Soviet authorities are so worried about nationality issues.

In the Baltics, Latvia and Estonia have issued "an incredible statement," saying they want their troops to be stationed at home. Never since 1938 has that happened. They've always been sent to other areas. They've also called for economic independence; a new flag with their old, pre-war colors; and money that virtually says "keep the Russians out" on it.

"It's fascinating." They won't get most of those things immediately. But in a while they may get most of what they want. Just so long as they cooperate on core foreign and security policies.

There may be more flexibility with those Republics on the horizon, I would venture, but not virtual independence.

Where are things going? The Party's Nationality Plenum will attempt to calm people down, by granting them more autonomy in local issues. But can the Soviets manage the problems they will face with decentralization?

I do see a "maturing of police-population relationships." But they are going to have a lot of problems to manage.

How are you going to get Armenians and Azerbaijanis to work together in a factory -- or in the Army? The potential for disruption is incredible. There are strikes in Stepanakert and throughout Nagorno-Karabakh, "day upon day." The amount of lost production is something like 50 million rubles.

Then there's the serious problem they have with alcohol. Eighty people died at one funeral from the concoction they drank. Ten thousand died last year alone from drinking alcohol surrogates. Imagine how many were injured.

Fifty percent of the rural hospitals in the Soviet Union do not have plumbing. Only 35% of the regional hospitals have hot water. Twenty-seven percent don't have sewage systems; 17% do not have water mains.

One-third of the maternity hospitals did not meet the Soviets’ own standards last year. Infant mortality, by my calculations, is between 28 to 30 per 100,000 live births, compared to ours, which is about 10.

[tags: Murray Feshbach, Soviet health statistics, Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert, Soviet nationalities, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet alcohol consumption, Soviet hospitals, Soviet Communist Party Conference]

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**Hungarian Leader Sees Socialist Path to Reform**

**Karoly Grosz,** Gen Sec Hungarian Socialist Workers Party & PM Hungary

July 26, 1988, National Press Club

*(Karoly Grosz rose through the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party’s Agitation and Propaganda (Agit-Prop) apparatus to become Prime Minister in June 1987 and then was raised to the top spot, General Secretary on May 22 of this year, replacing Janos Kadar. He is the first Hungarian Prime Minister in over 40 years, and the first Hungarian Party chief ever to visit the US. In November he will be ousted as Premier and lose his Party leadership in October 1989.)*

**Grosz:** The purpose of my trip is to learn what Americans think about Hungary and to investigate the possibilities of deeper cooperation. I am here to call for more US investment in my country.

This is the new era. Our government in Budapest has cut subsidies and implemented a three-year austerity plan. We received a $350 million loan from the IMF. We are decentralizing and permitting more pluralism within our single party system, along with a freer press.

In fact, in my country they use the expression "grosznost" instead of "glasnost."

I am "flattered" that it's called "grosznost.”

Earlier this year, we set a new social and democratic policy and are establishing new political conditions. We are elaborating “new conditions."

The essence of our program is based on the experiences of the past four decades. Hungarian reform must spring from a Hungarian basis, but we're also trying "new, more modern" approaches in our efforts to ensure the happiness of the Hungarian people.

We would like "to build on Socialist power." We would like the State "to remove itself gradually," to make space for the economic reserves in the country to be freed. We want all Hungarians to become more interested in their own financial reserves.

Our plan will increase private property, free private capital more. It will open Hungary more for capital investment, so that we can develop more fully.

We're elaborating a new wage policy. The objective is to offer everyone the opportunity to purchase what he wants, to invest and to travel. We want to modernize our political structures.

"We want more democracy." We want political mechanisms where more divergent views can meet and individuals can represent their own ideas freely. But all this must have organizational form.

In December, we will issue guidelines. As for opening our country's borders, we will be assisted by the new passport law passed in January.

We plan to introduce legislation on nationality issues next year. And I believe that the Constitution can and will be reformed. Something will probably be introduced to Parliament in 1990. As for human rights, "we want to make them flourish."

Hungary also wants to strengthen its foreign relations. We understand the detente between the US and USSR and think that the meeting in Moscow between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev was "of historical importance."

"We have great interest" in furthering European understanding and cooperation.

*(Grosz now answers questions from the press)*

There maybe will be disturbances. There will be no danger of unemployment in the "first period" of the reforms. Those looking for jobs will get compensation during retraining -- but not alcoholics or those who do not want to work.

Our platform of socialism serves Hungary's interests.

"To have a multiparty system is not one of the first priorities," however. Still, we have no objection to divergent views. Every sort of association will be allowed to operate.

"One needs a higher level of political culture" than Hungary currently has before you can have an opposition party. One of the country's major tasks is to promote this process.

"Hungary is not a Communist state. Hungary is a Socialist state." A Communist state is a long away off in the future. Socialism lies between capitalism and communism.

Hungary could leave the Warsaw Pact if it so decided, yes. But if it were put to a referendum, I would vote against it.

Yes, I support a Central European Zone where there would be reductions in troops and weapons.

And yes, I feel secure against Gorbachev's opposition. We will have to "relearn Marxism." I believe that a major portion of Hungary supports Grasz' program. It does hurt some. There has to be some opposition.

"I trust that my arguments will be received" by those who wish us well.

Four and a half times more Hungarians traveled abroad in the first half of this year than in the first half last year. And Hungarian writers and artists who live in the US can visit Hungary -- if they are not against the Hungarian Constitution. We won't let them in if they are.

This holds true for the people who left in 1956, just as it does for any people who left. We welcome them if they want to come back to visit. We would like that relationship to become closer.

"We consider 1956 a national tragedy.” The reasons behind it must be treated as a matter of history. Experiences should be used for study and future planning.

As for alcoholism, yes, "unfortunately, these data are true." Hungary does have high rates of suicide and alcoholism. It's been true since the beginning of this century, but we have not been able to give it full scientific study.

As for ethnic Hungarians who live in Romania, we have conducted multifaceted negotiations and publicly stated our position. And we have set up funds to protect them. We've even offered to discuss these matters with the Romanian leadership.

"Within the limits of our possibilities" we will offer them a home.

At the same time, Hungary has never encouraged Romanians to leave.

*(The following day, Prime Minister Grosz took questions again at the Hungarian Embassy, this time about his involvement with the 1956 Soviet invasion and the disturbances in Timisoara, the center of Romania's ethnic Hungarians.)*

**Grosz:** The documents relating to the events of 1956 have become public years ago. There are others. I offer them to you.

I have publicly urged there be "scientific" research about those events. That is not for government to do, but for science.

"We will appoint researchers" to continue the effort. Committees will discuss the last four decades.

"October 23rd and November 4th, 1956 is a sad and very tragic moment."

Romania is another problem. There are "8,000 thousand villages that they are planning to remove." It's not only German and Hungarian villages that will be removed, but Romanian villages as well.

We do not understand. I offered to visit Romania a few weeks ago. But so far there's been no answer. "We consider" their plan incomprehensible.

[tags: Karoly Grosz, grasznost, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Hungarian reform. Hungarian Communist leadership]

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**Cyprus President Decries Turkish Occupation of North**

**George Vasiliou,** President, Republic of Cyprus

Aug 2, 1988, World Affairs Council & Foreign Policy Association

*(George Vasiliou has been President of Cyprus since Feb 28. Today he has come to the richly furnished ballrooms of the Madison Hotel to talk up his plans for his meeting with Rauf Denktash, head of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the UN's Perez de Cuellar planned for August 24.*

*Cyprus has been divided since 1974, when the Turks occupied the northern third of the island. )*

**Vasiliou:** The cultural identity of the North is being violated. It is not just Greek Cypriots who are suffering, but Turkish Cypriots too. They are "being converted" into a strategic minority in our country by the occupiers from the Turkish mainland.

We Greek Cypriots have suffered. The Turkish invasion was "completely illegitimate." The consequences "cannot be forgotten fourteen years after the event."

The occupation of the North is a "continuing violation" of international human rights. The Greek Cypriot communities live in insecurity. The Turks even use "many US-made weapons and equipment."

The "greatest threat" to the Greek Cypriots, however, is the settlers Turkey has relocated to the North, in numbers approximately equal to the Turkish population that was already established there.

Turkey and Greece "have a common country” in Cyprus. But “settlers should not be equated with immigrants." These Turkish settlers have no wish to assimilate in Cyprus.

"All of Cyprus would benefit" from ending the conflict on our island. It ought to be "in the best interests" of both Greece and Turkey. The conflict has imposed economic losses on us both. Without the distrust generated by this problem, the GNP of both countries would be 50% higher than today.

The current Turkish government has in many ways "inherited" the problem. But Turkey's "overemphasis" on strategic calculation has compounded the ills caused by their misguided foreign adventure.

"A solution for the Cyprus problem is long overdue." A genuine solution, in our opinion, would include re-establishing unity on the island, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

Until now, a solution has eluded us, mainly because Turkey has ignored the United Nations.

"Cyprus is not primarily a Greek-Turkish problem." It is primarily a Cyprus-Turkish problem. Recent attempts at Greek and Turkish rapprochement, however, have make new initiatives possible.

When the idea of a new UN initiative was raised, it was "readily accepted by us."

The proper solution to the Cyprus problem is to restore the sovereignty over the whole territory to the legitimate government and to end the suffering on the island by removing the Turkish troops and settlers.

Such a solution would be based on federation of Greek and Turkish regions, complete freedom of movement, and the right to own property anywhere on the island. We have also accepted the idea of an international peace force.

We go to the UN "with good will and the spirit of compromise." We want "to create a new Cyprus." Greeks and Turks can live in peace and contribute to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean.

*(He now responds to questions)*

Our optimism for the talks does in fact stem from the growing entente between (*Turkish PM*) Turgut Ozal and (*Greek PM)* Andreas Papandreou -- and the fact that Turkey wants to join the European Community.

The United States has not exercised its power to the fullest to solve our divided island’s problems. It does not want them "to interfere in any way" with US-Turkish relations.

Still, "regional problems are being solved faster now than ever before... the Cyprus problem cannot be left out forever."

[tags: George Vasiliou, Cyprus, TRNC, Greek Cypriots, Turkish invasion of Cyprus, UN mediation of Cyprus issue]

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**Verification in Vegas, the Joint Venture Experiment**

Aug 4, 1988, Las Vegas

*(Two months ago the US and Soviet Union agreed at the Moscow Summit to conduct a Joint Verification Experiment which would enable each side to witness and study the other's nuclear tests at the sites themselves. The Defense Department has taken reporters to Nevada on Aug. 4 to brief them on the preparations. Amb. Paul Robinson, chief US negotiator at the Nuclear Testing Talks, briefs:)*

**Robinson:** The Soviets have not yet agreed to talk publicly to the press. But we have, so welcome to you.

The first piece of news I have for you is the date for the JVE was announced today. It’s going to be August 17 – up at the Nevada Test Site. That’s where we’ll be taking you later today.

If I may begin with some background on what has happened in the past few months: Last fall the Soviets proposed that United States and the Soviet Union conduct a joint nuclear experiment, so that we might grow more confident in each other’s numbers and the way we arrive at them.

This JVE was agreed upon nine months ago in Washington, and then in the third week of January this year, 20 Soviet experts in site familiarization and a team from this country hammered out the basics. The result is the Joint Verification Experiment.

That, gentlemen, will be a historic first, two weeks from now.

Each side has some folks at the site already, "evaluating potential tools" to perform the delicate measurements.

The JVE is an experiment that will have a bearing on two treaties. The first is the TTBT (*Threshold Test Ban Treaty)* and the other is the PNET (*Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty),* which is a kind of complimentary treaty to the TTBT.

The TTBT prohibits nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons.

"Both sides have indicated that they would abide" by those limitations, even though neither has ratified either treaty.

I acknowledge that there have been charges about violations, but the fact is they've been on both sides.

We began formal negotiations with our Soviet counterparts this February, and now we have a commitment to work on completing the two treaties. It's a step-by-step process. Neither side wants to change the language of our agreement. And we both want to work up a verification regime.

The Joint Verification Experiment will consist of two explosions, one by each side. Each side is to host an event and visit the other’s site. In each case, each will make its measurements on-site -- and in sight of each other.

That means the United States will conduct two tests. First, here at the NTS, then in about four weeks, we'll be ready at their site in Semipalatinsk *(long-time Soviet nuclear test site in what is now Kazakhstan; it closed in 1991 after some 450 tests)*.

Our negotiations were in continuous session in Geneva from February until the 28th of June, when we broke up, so we could set up the JVE.

The document on the JVE agreement runs more than 200 pages in the English version. It was one of the major signings at the Moscow Summit.

There'll be about 40 people at each site, I'd guess. The agreement sets a 45-person ceiling on each side.

Technically, the JVE is going to register hydrodynamic yield measurements -- the result of equations on shock-wave theory, similar to water. The device is placed close to the fireball.

A direct, on-site yield eliminates many variables, as you might imagine. We will place sensors at the device. It will be set in a large-diameter hole with cables running down inside. Both the US and the Soviet teams will have sensors in the hole, up close.

There's a second hole, the so-called satellite, about 36 feet from the central hole. We have had "very good results" testing at that distance.

We use a CORRTEX system. The Soviets have a system that is similar, but they developed theirs on their own.

The seismic component is the second component. Typically, it is farther than 2,000 miles from the shock wave. It's a similar system to the one they use to measure earthquakes.

And then on June 28 we participated in "a very significant data exchange." They made quite a thing about it, because it hadn't been done before. They say it was the first time they’d ever released any data or any information about the hundreds of nuclear tests they’ve conducted.

But, beginning on June 28th, they provided us a lot of details about five nuclear tests -- seismic recordings -- plus information on five other tests that we hadn’t identified. They’ve never done anything like that before. "It's quite a significant act."

For our part, the United States has published the yield of some 70 to 80 tests.

This is historic. It’s the first time both sides can validate their systems and validate each other’s -- on-site, in the open, side-by-side.

But we’re not taking things for granted. We're keeping faith with President Reagan’s famous dictum: “trust but verify."

In the past, the problem with measuring nuclear explosions lay not only in drilling the hole, but where to drill it.

Soviet technology is sophisticated. "They have some rather significant things."

They required a JVE as a precursor to the TTBT Protocol. "I think it's safe to say that they haven't made up their minds" about whether to proceed afterward. We'll go back to Geneva after the JVE is concluded. There are a wide number of options to be chosen.

"We will exchange data" -- what each has taken at both tests -- within a matter of days. "That really is unprecedented."

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**Holes So Rare Our Country Keeps a Strategic Stockpile**

At Pahut Mesa, Nevada Test Site, technical briefing

Aug 4, 1988

**Chris West:** Neither side will actually get to see the other's weapon. But the device we’re going to use is no different from any other nuclear weapon. They're assembled here at the NTS.

A man from Lawrence Livermore will actually push the button. The device is set at 2,020 feet below ground and can be expected to yield 100-150 kilotons. That was agreed upon with the Russians.

Site selection was complicated. We had first to conduct a study to be sure it would not have an impact on an endangered species.

Then you get to dig the hole. It's eight feet wide by 2020 deep and dry. It has to be so straight that you can hang a plumb line and have it hit the center of the hole all the way down to the bottom.

The hole we’re going to use was drilled over a year ago, before there was an agreement.

The satellite hole is 11 meters from the main hole. It is 12 and a quarter inches wide and 2020 feet deep.

The instrumentation is already placed, cemented in. There are 11 cables, six with our CORRTEX, five for the Soviet system.

The big hole has about 40 cables, six CORRTEX, six Soviet, plus the others for monitoring.

We're going through normal procedures, all the precautions we always take to contain the radioactivity.

Cooperation with the Soviets has been "going well." They've already installed their instrumentation, put their own sensors in the hole.

This event has no other purpose than for the verification procedures each side will take, and then the data will be shared.

The measurements will be taken in the five trailers behind us. They can stand up to 40 Gs' worth of ground shock.

The Soviets have an independent trailer park for their use, so the two sides do not intrude on each other. Theirs is "protected, Soviet" property, as was agreed to in Geneva.

There are at least 20 miles of cable involved in the test, too, fewer than some other tests.

The JVE device started down the hole on July 21.

It takes several months to dig a hole, in answer to your question, and it takes several months to evaluate one.

In fact, those holes are so valuable our country keeps a stockpile. Yes, young man, our country keeps a stockpile of holes.

[tags: Nevada Test Site, Joint Verification Experiment, JVE, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, TTBT, PNET, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, CORRTEX]

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**Hydrogen Bomb’s Teller Gives Blessing to SDI**

Edward Teller, Albert Carnesale, at the Heritage Foundation

Aug 30, 1988

*(A reporter has come to the Hairy Taj on Massachusetts Avenue, NW, hard on the right of the House of Representatives, to hear the dark seer, Edward Teller, the Hungarian legend from the Manhattan Project, the Lawrence Livermore Labs, and the man behind the hydrogen bomb. He is wearing blue seersucker and has bushy eyebrows, clouded blue eyes, and striking, languid fingers, long and thick. Now 80, he sits in a wheelchair, giving little sign of listening to the speaker, the man he will debate: Harvard scholar and arms control negotiator, Albert Carnesale.)*

**Albert Carnesale**: The Strategic Defense Initiative is feasible -- in terms of being a long-term research project that a future President and Congress may want to pursue. The research is interesting.

But the technology available today simply does not support a decision to fund an SDI system. Not today.

Is it feasible? Might it be feasible someday? Does it transcend deterrence a la Ronald Reagan's vision?

Very few people believe that even now, with our current technology, we could intercept 10% of the incoming missiles in the event there were an attack.

So now the concept being pushed is that the Strategic Defense Initiative will somehow "enhance deterrence.” How does that enhance deterrence?

To put SDI in space we have to break the ABM Treaty. I hope the good people who are advocating this position will understand that this would permit the Soviet Union to do the same thing.

SDI has brought the Soviets to the table; I will grant its supporters that. They want to stop it, clearly, along with the development of the battle management systems that go with it.

SDI’s biggest problem? I’d say -- identifying targets and distinguishing them from chaff.

**Edward Teller:** I agree with many of the things Albert has said here and elsewhere about the long-term viability and value of strategic defense.

Soviet work on “precious particles” and other advanced space-based systems is raising very serious questions.

"We must find realistic ways to avoid" world war.

SDI’s “feasibility is there, without question… but at what cost?"

Yet, it is my belief that "we must deploy something now."

I have long been unhappy with the Soviets’ research on advanced space-based weapons. But I was "dubious" that they could actually develop such systems and put them into space. I thought President Reagan "was asking too much" from the technology.

Early US defense efforts were based on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Now, however, I have come to the "clear conviction that the President was right."

The time has come to put the emphasis where the President asked to put it on: non-nuclear defense.

"Early, important and inexpensive results are likely to come from non-nuclear defense."

Can the defending missile be small enough to achieve the speed and maneuverability it needs? Yes. Can the defending missile be intelligent enough to track and target? Yes.

A further advantage non-nuclear defense offers: "we are not in desperate need to keep it secret."It was *Stinger* missiles, after all, that thwarted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – and at a cost of only $100 million.

American technology is pre-eminent in the international arena. And it could be even more powerful if joined to Japanese efforts in fields like advanced computers.

What is the cost of SDI? "I don't know. Nobody knows." We won't know until we begin to deploy it.

"We have to try to do the best we can," not only in American industry, but in American bureaucracy.

"I have seen fantasies come true,” and “I have been wrong, usually, when I have said things cannot be done."

**Carnesale:** I support research on space-based defense. Research is not deployment. "It doesn't mean never."

But if you tear up the ABM Treaty, the Soviets can deploy the defensive systems they already have been working on. But we really don't have anything. That’s not to say we couldn’t in the future.

**Teller**: "I am deeply worried about treaties, treaties which try to exclude that which has not been invented."

I am not sure, but it may be best for us to abandon ABM. What we need is "a bipartisan agreement" that would permit us to abide by the ABM Treaty and deploy a space-based system.

Then we should try out what we have deployed, use all the tricks an enemy would in the test. Then study the results. At that point you will know SDI’s feasibility – “yes or no."

“The Soviet Union did win in Afghanistan.” But they could not maintain their position after we gave the mujahadin defensive weapons like *Stingers*.

Offense does not win against effective defense any more. Weapons of attack, such as aircraft, are beginning to be less effective in modern warfare.

The Soviets need to be deterred. SDI did make progress with the "Smart Pebbles" program in its KKVs (Kinetic Kill Vehicles. "They have produced in five years what I would have guessed would have taken 10 years."

**Carnesale:** A missile defense system, "working perfectly," might intercept 100 missiles. One *Poseidon*-class submarine carries 160.

**Teller:** It is understandable that the Europeans feel encouraged by the recent arms control agreements. But arms reductions are not going to be very significant, unless we can make use of defensive measures. I recommend that everyone read Tom Clancy’s new book, “the Cardinal of the Kremlin.”

**Carnesale:** I cannot imagine that if we move toward early deployment of a space-based system, the Soviets will voluntarily decrease their offensive arsenal.

**Teller:** "I can imagine that accurately aimed, sensitive, well-directed objectives (projectiles?) can shoot down rockets." I can imagine that such weapons become effective, not only against space-based targets, but against battlefield weapons.

President Reagan seized the initiative with SDI, moving the debate beyond the nuclear umbrella. But it will require cooperation to achieve viable non-nuclear defense systems, first with our allies, and then perhaps even with the Soviet Union.

I expect to see the first of this new generation of weapons within the next four years.

Technological solutions are never final. What we need is the proper leadership over the next four years.

[tags: Edward Teller, Albert Carnesale, SDI, space-based defense, ABM Treaty, Poseidon-class submarines, nuclear deterrence]

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**New NATO Chief Sees Role for Allies Outside Europe**

**Manfred Woerner**, Sep 13, 1988, Atlantic Council, at Rayburn Building

*(Manfred Woerner, for six years Defense Minister in the Federal Republic of Germany, became NATO Secretary General on July 1. He is the first German to hold the post and makes here his first speech in that role in the US.)*

**Woerner:** "I am not a follower of those who wish to see the United States withdraw from the world stage."

"In a changing world, the Alliance has to adjust, has to change." Our focus has to be constantly adjusted.

Our disagreements about “burden-sharing” must not be allowed to degenerate. That would only weaken us at a time when we need to be working for a stronger European pillar. Equitable burden-sharing, therefore, must be a "central theme" of our discussions.

We Europeans are making increasing contributions to our collective defense. But we need to be careful that we do not limit our national industrial capabilities in doing so. But neither do we want to duplicate efforts.

I believe the Allies can expand their cooperation outside NATO. They already have a global role. Our nations face "a double challenge,” and “continued US and European leadership will be the key."

"I don't doubt that the European allies have the necessary courage" to defend themselves. Polls indicate that 80% of the population in West Germany approves of NATO.

I do not minimize Dr. Kissinger's concerns that through our arms control negotiations we are giving the Soviets a veto over the modernization of our forces. But I don't think the Alliance has reached the stage where it is unable to act for its defense.

The influence of groups that oppose NATO modernization can be overcome, I believe through wise leadership and public education.

If Mikhail Gorbachev "is now forthcoming on verification and data exchange, we, of course, welcome it." To be effective, however, the new accords must include strong data and strong verification procedures.

We can only test intentions at the negotiating table.

This alliance has always been more political than military. But now, "we have to do a lot more, particularly with our younger generation" to explain our political purposes.

"Soldiers and weapons are not the causes of the tensions; they are the result."

"You cannot build your own security on the personability and intentions" of the Eastern Bloc and certain of its leaders. “You only have freedom as long as you defend it."

[tags: Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General’s first speech in US, Gorbachev, Alliance policy, burden-sharing, US troop presence in Europe]

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**Frosty French President Faces Frivolous US Press**

**Francois Mitterrand,** President of France

Sep 29, 1988

*(Surrounded by a gaggle of French reporters outside Blair House, the aloof and inscrutable French President, just re-elected to a second seven-year term in May, responds to questions from the American press with a mixture of reserve and condescension.)*

**Mitterrand:** The idea that has brought us here is a chemical weapons conference. President Reagan was generous enough to ask us if it would be possible to host such a conference in Paris.

We believe that such a conference may be organized and take place within a brief delay, possibly three months.

Yes, I imagine that Gorbachev is interested.

President Reagan merits his popularity. One can say he deserves a good rating.

I have spoken with Messieurs Dukakis and Bush and believe both "are excellent" candidates. I had a good call with the Vice President. He asked good questions.

The President had the kindness to invite me to spend part of the day with him. One topic we discussed was third-world debt. He asked me what I thought were the most pressing problems. I replied: third-world debt and Lebanon.

As for the Palestinian *intifada*, I think their revolt is a signal. It shows that the status quo is not satisfactory. The Palestinians and Israelis need to face their problems seriously.

Is this a good-bye visit with the President? No, no.

Franco-American relations are "good, friendly, and what happens is very frank."

For example, I could say to President Reagan: why do you spend so much subsidizing your agriculture?

But our real purpose is to try to put an end to the use of chemical weapons. We are calling for the prohibition of their use and manufacture.

The important thing is to get an accord. And we expect to do that in Paris.

[tags: Francois Mitterrand, President of France visits US, chemical weapons talks, Palestinian intifada]

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**France Has Shouldered Her Fair Share of the Burden**

**Jean-Pierre Chevenement,** French Defense Minister, Sept 29, 1988

*(Monsieur Chevement began as Mitterrand’s Minister of Research and Industry in 1981, then moved to Education, and since May, has been Minister of Defense, a post he will leave in January 1992 over objections to France’s participation in the Gulf War. Five years later, when Jacques Chirac is President, Chevement will join Lionel Jospin’s “cohabitation” government as Minister of the Interior.)*

**Chevenement:** I was pleased that President Reagan accepted President Francois Mitterrand's idea that the chemical weapons conference should include the manufacture as well as the use of chemical weapons.

I met with General Powell and Secretary Carlucci yesterday, as well as with Senator Nunn, Congressman Aspin, and with Senators Levin and Bradley today.

My talks with Secretary Carlucci were "very correct and cordial... Our values are growing closer."

We discussed disarmament, the new Soviet political situation and its implications, regional issues; and we discussed technical cooperation.

We examined the US Congress’ budget choices and lastly, burden-sharing.

France has done her fair share, ladies and gentlemen, let me assure you. We have bought your AWACs and C-130 *Hercules* aircraft in the past two years, and you bought our RITA system, which Thomson makes. But there was no discussion of any purchases today, although that doesn't mean there won't be in the future.

**Q: Do you think there is a real Two-Way Street?** **Do expenses get evenly shared on both sides of the Atlantic? And what next steps NATO should take to make this less vexing for trans-Atlantic relations?**

A: "We're very attached to the Two-Way Street concept."

As for next steps, conventional disarmament is the order of the day. That and chemical weapons are what we should focus on next.

The Strategic Defense Initiative is still "mal vu" in France. "We were always very skeptical about a spatial shield."

"It is in the interest of France" that an arms race does not extend to space. In purely military terms, stability is better preserved by adhering to the ABM Treaty.

And I also have my doubts that a truly tight, defensive shield can be fielded. It certainly would be costly. But there could prove to be some technological spinoffs of value.

Given the work it will demand to organize a conference on chemical weapons, it might be the beginning of next year before we begin negotiating a CW treaty. It could last several months because of all there is to do.

One hundred and eleven countries have signed up to attend, and we hope to enlist even more.

Now, turning to conventional weapons, what France wants is for no country to have more than 30% of the total of any category anywhere between the Atlantic the Urals. We want a limit on foreign forces in certain zones. We are also proposing limits on certain offensive equipment, like bridging equipment.

The Warsaw Pact has 35,000 tanks. France has 1,400. Our defense is based on "sufficiency." We can say we won't go beyond the figure we need for that.

What we term “disarmament” should lead to the slowing down or stopping of programs.

Yes, the conventional weapons talks are going to be handled by the CSCE (*Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europ*e) in Vienna. But the venue is not important.

"Our concept is dissuasion at the level of sufficiency." I don't think that will change with the negotiations. We don't want to spend more than four per cent of GNP per year on defense.

**Q: Can you comment on the sanctions the US Congress recently imposed on Iraq because of the gassing of the Kurds at Halabja?**

A: My information does not point to the use of chemical weapons there. Those I have spoken with have no proof that they were used. They have told me they were conventional weapons.

France's long friendship with Iraq permits such "frankness."

I don’t recall that the matter came up with Secretary Carlucci. We spoke a lot about Gorbachev and the Middle East, particularly cooperation on mine-sweeping in the Gulf.

[tags: Jean-Pierre Chevenement; French defense minister in US, NATO burden-sharing, Two-Way Street, French views on conventional arms talks, SDI, Iraq, defense purchases]

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**The Burdens of Burden-sharing**

**William Howard Taft, IV**, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Oct 3, 1988, USIA Worldnet

*(Long, lean, and pasty white, Will Taft IV is the great grandson of President William Howard Taft. On the morrow, he will leave for Europe to berate the NATO allies for not bearing their fair share of the costs of defending Europe. Long an irritant in allied relations, the issue poses a particular problem for Republican administrations, as it is their party’s practice to cry out loudly in Congress against Europe’s habitual free-loading. Such talk makes Taft’s task no easy burden. Here he responds to questions taken from overseas.)*

**TAFT:** We are in the middle of a process to address burden-sharing as an Alliance, and as an Alliance that has, as its principle purpose, the task of countering the Soviet threat.

The message I am bringing is that burden-sharing issues will have a "corrosive impact" on the Alliance if it is not seen that the Allies are sharing defense costs equitably.

The US public would like to see the Allies do better.

We are completing a report that is due to NATO Defense Ministers in December. I will be in Brussels tomorrow to review progress on the report. The Alliance seems to be working well putting it together.

**Q: Are you taking any new arguments to Europe?**

A: I 'm repeating the old arguments, but in "different circumstances." We are not only looking for increased resources, but we are also looking for better ways to spend those resources.

**Q: I'm calling from Spain. Most people here don't see the Russians as a threat. Why should we worry about them?**

A: There is no question but that "there has been a reduction of tensions" with the Soviet Union in recent years. But their military capability has not been diminished. On the contrary, it has grown.

The Soviets produce two new combat aircraft every day; six tanks or artillery guns every day; and every five weeks or so a new nuclear submarine.

These programs are "going on, without any slackening at all."

"Reduction in tensions did not come about in a vacuum." NATO's commitment to a strong defense has encouraged the Soviets to seek a less bellicose approach to Europe.

**Q: If the costs are so high to keep US troops in Europe are there any plans to withdraw them?**

A: No, we have no plan for any withdrawals from Europe. "We are obviously under budgetary pressure” from Congress, but we shall "adhere" to our strategy of forward-basing.

[tags: William Howard Taft IV, US troops levels in Europe, burden-sharing, NATO]

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**Bob Gates on Mikhail Gorbachev**

Dr. Robert Gates**,** Deputy Director, CIA

Oct 14, 1988

*(Robert Gates will be appointed Secretary of Defense in 2006 by President George W. Bush and remain in that post under Barak Obama, a wise and stabilizing force until his retirement in 2011.)*

**Gates:** What Mikhail Gorbachev is attempting is without parallel in a generation or more.

The focus of US analysis is typically on personalities. One man to take note of is the new director of the KGB: Vladimir Kryuchkov. Stalin would have been proud of the 44-minute session that approved him.

The appointment is a sign both of Gorbachev's power and his need for it.

I would like to put personality aside for once, however, and focus on some the genuine changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union in recent years.

First, the selection of Mr. Gorbachev "signaled the Politburo's recognition that the Soviet Union was in deep trouble." They could see the "steadily widening gap" with the West and with Japan. The Politburo was convinced that the country needed to "revitalize." They simply could not afford to go through another period of suspended animation the way they had under Leonid Brezhnev.

"Every step is a struggle" for Gorbachev, however, despite the fact that the Politburo understands the need. This puts limits on his power. There are other trends worth noting, too. For instance, Igor Ligachev and Viktor Chebrikov (*Kryuchkov's predecessor at the KGB)* remain members of the Politburo -- "although with diminished power."

"The match is far from over." But for now Gorbachev can only count on three or four Politburo members.

The senior levels in the economy ministries are also "important obstacles" to his reforms.

"The potential for instability" in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has the KGB alarmed. There have been over 600 incidents since 1985. Nine of the 15 Soviet republics have seen uprisings in just the last year.

Only the intelligentsia appears to be giving Gorbachev their whole-hearted support. That's "a weak group."

Even he has "tacitly admitted" that he’s failed to overcome resistance within the Party. Hence, the idea to strengthen the Supreme Soviet.

The man "has declared war" on his own Communist Party. "It remains to be seen" if he can succeed.

"If he cannot turn around the economy, today's supporters will become tomorrow's adversaries." His reforms "are an impressive package." Still, they "do not go far enough." The Politburo is "unwilling to let go the reins of the economy," but mere reform will not "close the gap with the West."

Soviet Gross National Product looks to be about two percent this year. But it would need to be nearly eight percent in the next two years to reach the goals of their five-year plan. That's "far beyond reach."

They are trying to reshape the Stalinist system gradually and without price reform.

"It's like trying to change the driving system" from the right to the left-hand side of the road, "trucks first, cars later."

"Perestoika cannot succeed without worker support.” Unfortunately the working population is not going to see much change soon.

"The war to change fundamentally the pillars of Stalinist" society has been lost. But important principles have been staked out, nonetheless.

I see the regime trying to move on three fronts politically. First, ideologically: They are seeking to expand their room for maneuver.

Second, democratization: this is designed to revitalize institutions. The Party Conference in June saw a freedom of debate not seen since their Revolution. That's a remarkable occurrence.

"Yet the old methods remain available" to the General Secretary.

The third area is *glasnost.* Here, I see him using a more liberalizing style to achieve his goals, criticizing his opponents and co-opting scientists and the intelligentsia to get their support.

"He believes it's best to print the news and put a spin on it." It will get out anyway.

Some members of the Politburo feel that *glasnost* has gone too far. But Gorbachev has let loose something that will be hard to keep under control.

At the same time, the worsening consumer economy spells trouble. Mr. Gorbachev is in trouble. "Popular hostility is growing."

He used this hostility to purge people at the Party conference; that helped him consolidated his power.

In the end, however, it is "doubtful" he can reform the system. "Even he now admits the struggle will take decades."

In foreign policy, Gorbachev wants to reach a "far-reaching detente" with the United States and thereby avoid the expense of large defense requirements, in turn reducing the incentive for the US to modernize its armed forces.

Yet I see "no slackening" in Soviet defense production. "Virtually all of their strategic" systems are being replaced – and will be by the mid ‘90s. Soviet strategic offensive weapons only account for 10% of their military budget.

Meanwhile, our defense budget declines and theirs continues to grow, albeit slowly. And this same Soviet military, with this same economy, sends a billion and half dollars to Angola; one billion to Nicaragua; seven billion to Cuba; and two billion to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam. But there are signs that this is changing. Witness recent peace initiatives in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola.

"This tactical flexibility reflects increasing sophistication in the Kremlin."

We can expect new initiatives, perhaps even unilateral cuts on their side, all of which will severely test the Alliance. I expect him to hold a summit with China. *(He is right: Gorbachev will visit Beijing on May 15, 1989.)*

The political benefits the Soviets derive from arms control agreements can act to weaken Western resolve, making it easier for them to attract and bring in Western technology. It makes them appear "far more attractive."

A START Treaty would, at a minimum, not diminish that attraction. Gorbachev will attempt to broaden the challenge to the United States, away from a solely military plane.

His efforts "represent a political earthquake... He is a figure in my view of enormous political significance."

Is it in our interest if he succeeds?

"There is little the United States can do to influence" events in the Soviet Union. We do seek a government, however, that is pluralist internally and non-aggressive externally.

"We should watch, wait, and evaluate." We should not base our policy on hope or pleasing personalities.

"We must establish realistic criteria" to judge the changes that are taking place within that country.

A long competition with the Soviet Union "still remains before us." And that presents "an extraordinary challenge" for the United States.

**Q: How often have you been to the USSR, sir?**

A: I have never been to the Soviet Union.

**Q: Are you concerned about a Soviet breakout attack?**

A: I am concerned about the scale of the Soviet effort in strategic defense. They use a layered approach, lots of surface-to-air missiles. It's a far-ranging program. It is the "comprehensiveness" of it which is of most concern.

The Soviets spend a full 10% of their military budget on strategic defense, about the same as on strategic offense. Their goal in negotiations is to stop both US offensive and defensive modernization. And their position opposing our Strategic Defense Initiative has not changed.

It is interesting to observe the dialogue surrounding Soviet military doctrine. That's been "an interesting one." It "tends to have civilians on one side and the military on the other."

Their military is not all that supportive of the "reasonable sufficiency" concept. In any event, the real debate is not over how to fight, but how much to spend. "At this point it is a debate over resources."

**Q: Could this be a new detente we're going through?**

A: What Gorbachev seeks is what we would call “cost avoidance. He "hasn't bitten the bullet on reducing" military expenditures yet. But he wants to avoid high tech competition going into the ‘90s. He wants to avoid an arms race.

I do think that that the General Secretary has "an interest in reducing tensions," but I also think that “the political and philosophical” competition between our two nations will continue.

Gorbachev has a personal stake in START. "He would like to see a START agreement signed" as long as it meets his minimal requirements.

Overall, I think he deserves "pretty high marks" on foreign policy. He is "not perceived as giving up anything that wasn't already lost."

**Q: (**Elizabeth Pond,Christian Science Monitor) **How long do you think Gorbachev has to change the Soviet economy? And on Eastern Europe, is the Brezhnev Doctrine still in effect?**

A: "Because of the consensus on the need to modernize the economy... I think he probably has two or three more years." He has to show at a minimum that he's stopped the decline.

What could do him in would be the perception that he had lost control of Eastern Europe, or at home.

You may have noticed that only one regional Party leader is left and that's Vladimir Shcherbytsky, and the only reason that he's there is because Ukraine might go up in flames if he left.

But to answer your question about the Brezhnev Doctrine more directly, only under "the most extraordinary circumstances" -- such as the loss of Party control or the "movement of one of those countries away from the Warsaw Pact" -- would the Soviet military move on Eastern Europe.

In Western Europe, the Soviets’ “first objective” is to remove US influence.

[tags: Robert Gates, Gates on Gorbachev, CIA Deputy Director, CIA views of Soviet Union, détente, Warsaw Pact, Soviet Communist Party, Brezhnev Doctrine]

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**Cousteau: We Are Acting Like Attila; C’est le Saccage**

**EPA Must Retain Its Independence**

Nov 17, 1988, EPA

*(The noblest Frenchmen of them all, Jacques-Yves Cousteau, explorer, writer, film maker, and father of SCUBA diving has come with his son, Jean-Michel, to the Environmental Protection Agency two weeks after the election of George HW Bush. EPA has been savaged during Reagan’s administration; now there are hopes of an environmentally responsible policy emerging. That will be confirmed some months hence with the appointment of Bill Reilly to head the agency.*

*Cousteau refers below to the Calypso, his celebrated research vessel. At the end of his talk in the bowels of the old EPA building, a reporter overhears a visibly tired Cousteau snap at his less-celebrated son: “non, Jean-Michel. Tu sais ni voyager, ni vivre.”)*

**Cousteau:** “I follow my impulses.” And the impulse that I always felt the most was this tremendous curiosity of mine.

The more I think about this impulse, the more I think it is humanity’s defining characteristic.

"The drive for exploring is built in any living thing." Sometimes it’s for curiosity, and sometimes for necessity, but the urge to explore is vital to all nature.

After a military career of 27 years, it was time for me to leave the French Navy, and start on a new journey of discovery.

But even though I am no longer in uniform, still "I am fighting to protect life."

"We have been carrying on our explorations" since 1966. We have a new mission in recent years, however: "to try to learn lessons about the deterioration and the damage done by human beings" to our seas and oceans.

I first became aware of the damage right after the Second World War, when I realized that I was witnessing the deterioration of the Mediterranean Sea, right before my eyes. It was then I realized: we have to stop this.

What I have seen since then has only confirmed my convictions ever more deeply.

In 1977, the *Calypso* went on a trip around the Mediterranean. We visited 16 of the 18 countries that enclose the sea. We took samples; interviewed a wide spectrum of individuals; we witnessed how Venice is sinking.

But when we gave our samples to our laboratory in Monaco, we could not believe what we were finding. "More and more I said: pollution cannot explain it all.”

“The drop in vitality" was too great for any natural explanation, such was the extent of the destruction.

"*C’est le saccage."*

"We are acting like Attila on the earth today." Eight percent of the total species on this earth – mostly plants -- have disappeared since 1900.

"I have given more attention to water than to air,” over the course of my journey, “but I am beginning to change my mind…the fate of humankind is intertwined in these problems."

All those problems are the direct consequences of overpopulation. For some reason, overpopulation is no longer an important part of environmental literature. Yet every 10 years the world’s population is increasing by “another China.”

It may be possible to feed a population of 15 billion. “But what kind of a life will they lead?” Is mere survival enough?

The *Calypso* recently voyaged to Mururoa (*French nuclear testing site in the South Pacific).* As in the oceans, so on land. "The number of time bombs" we have set all over the world – and we have published a list – is truly alarming.

The danger "is such that we are inclined to yell, to say 'stop it.'" We have to. We have to have public pressure, enough to force these governments to change.

I was here for the creation of EPA. You who work here have these powerful institutional tools, but "you do not make full use of them."

"This agency has to remain independent." In theory, you have independence, an authority that is bigger than any other environmental organization in the world. We are waiting and praying for you to use it.

**Q: What would recommend for an organization like EPA with limited resources?**

A: "Why limited resources? I think you have plenty of them.” It's a matter of clearly defining your priorities and your tactics.

"Our common goal is to work in the direction… of preparing a better world for future generations." Anything which helps should be on your agenda.

**Q: Could you talk more about over-population and give us your view of the efforts to clean up the Mediterranean?**

A: In the United States and Western Europe the population is stable. But in the Third World there is no social security for the old. The only way to have any security in old age is to have children. There are also religious obstacles to controlling population, competition among the religions for dominance.

"What can you and I do? Nothing. But we can preach."

"CO2 is the number one bi-product of our civilization.” And “nuclear plants, as we know, are a tremendous danger." They are so vulnerable that “even a conventional bomb on one of these plants will make a Chernobyl at least."

You asked about the Mediterranean. I can say that "the deterioration has not been reversed. It has been slowed down." The Mediterranean Pact has produced a lot of talking, lots of paper passed around.

"We must not give too much trust to those international conferences."

Another point that I need to make today: EPA has to stop the export of toxic waste to the Third World, when “by far, the bulk of the deterioration is done by the industrialized nations."

"It's a shocking crime."

**Q: There are, it might be said, two philosophies EPA needs to choose from: one is to set rules and explain them; the other is to let people make their own choices. Which do you recommend?**

A: “There is no choice. Both must be done.” I see “no conflict between these two.”

“We do need regulations, as we do need red lights at the corner of streets." They have to be written with the understanding that the current fines that are levied against big polluters are too small.

Rather than have a purification plant at the end of a river, we have to de-pollute at the source. We have to have many, many mini-purification plants.

The costs for these plants should be borne equally -- for example, one-third by the plant, one-third by the community, one-third by the federal government, because they have to unify the country around environmental protection. This way the plant is not obliged to bear the entire burden and has less inducement to cheat.

"My two great moments in my life are the Amazon and the Antarctic. There I lived my most exhilarating years."

**Q: Can you see the need for an international Environmental Protection Agency?**

A: Yes. For example, the world's interconnecting water system has to be looked at in its entirety, and done so “at the world-level."

[tags: Jean-Ives Cousteau, EPA 1988, Mururoa, environment, environmental health of the Mediterranean, pollution, environmental destruction]

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**Al Gore: Allies, Burden-Sharing, American Carelessness**

Nov 28, 1988, Institute for Foreign Policy

*(Al Gore is one of ten US Senators accredited to the strategic arms control talks in Geneva. He will be Vice President 1992-2000 and win the most votes in the 2000 presidential elections and then be denied the office on a 5-4 vote that split along strict party lines. It was the opening bell of the 21st century.)*

**Gore:** This is "an unusual period of time" for the United States. Decisions are being made hourly that affect the lives of billions of people.

"NATO is an alliance of free peoples. Contributions are "granted, not levied" on their peoples. That gives the Alliance great legitimacy; but that legitimacy depends on the belief in the necessity for our alliance and the fairness of the allied sharing mechanisms.

This is in danger of eroding and poses a greater challenge than the military threat, perhaps. The causes of this erosion include the relative decline of US economic power, rising European unity, and the popularity of perestroika.

My first point today is that the US is no longer dominant in the world. A "leveling" has taken place that reflects the success of the policies the United States has long championed.

But -- “we have also been careless of our own future." We must address the problems of our "weakness and neglect within our own society."

Two, respecting NATO: conditions make it "inevitable" that burden-sharing will shift to center stage. "We must accept it and see it for what it is."

"The defense burden has not shifted much in relative terms" from where was in the beginning, nearly 40 years ago. This is especially evident when set "in contrast to the growth of European prosperity" in those years.

Three, the prospect of a closer, more unified Europe in 1992 "is the reassertion of a dream," of a continent that is more peaceful, more effective with friend and foe. European reorganization will be more effective, though, if it’s made in conjunction with the United States.

Four: the definition of our national security is being expanded to include environmental challenges.

And five: millions in Europe see the United States and the Soviet Union as equal risks, all the while the Soviet buildup continues, and their arms control proposals aim to push us apart from our allies.

"All of us, therefore, have good reason for caution," as we proceed in our arms control negotiations. But caution may not be enough. Gorbachev is the only major leader who is interested in de-nuclearizing.

What should we do? The Soviets are calling for a withering away of alliances. That's too sweeping for us.

The changes taking place in the USSR are "very striking."

"The underlying cause of tension in Europe" is the repression "of its eastern half." The solution has to be both political and military.

If the only way to keep the Soviet Union together is through force, then the prospects of peace with the West are not great.

We need a "pro-active approach" – to venture as much as possible, but make no irrevocable moves. In conventional arms control, we must insist on reductions. "Zones are not in our interests."

Trade with the Soviet Union can be expanded, but controls must be maintained. We shouldn't be in a hurry to let them into GATT or the IMF.

*(Gore now responds to questions)*

The issue of troop cuts is increasingly being seen in terms of budget pressures. The Gramm-Rudman Bill and the pledges made in the recent campaign "are on a collision course with the defense budget." And we are not far from where that collision will take place.

“Now is a particularly bad time” to make troop cuts.

Gorbachev has obviously reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union is rapidly declining in the world. He had to come up with a strategy for change. Afghanistan is a good example. If their withdrawal is real, it will contribute to a reduction of tensions.

He is also devolving responsibility for many economic decisions to the Republics. The trouble is: "this devolution of power encourages resurgence" of nationalist tensions. That is going to be a big challenge.

[tags: Al Gore 1988, Gore’s views of Gorbachev, burden-sharing, NATO, arms control, Afghanistan]

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**Perestroika and the Cost of Empire**

**Marshall Goldman,** Wellesley College

**Dennis Ross**, National Security Council

**Dominique Moisi,** Editor of Politique Etrangere

**Peter Peterson**, West German Bundestag, CDU

Nov 29, 1988, IPFA (?)

**Goldman:** If I could begin with a plug for my new book, it’s called: "Gorbachev's Challenge: economic reform in the era of high tech."

Mikhail Gorbachev has been "good for East-West relations." But how long will he last and what will happen if he doesn't make it?

I would invite your attention to "the shrinking of empire" all along the periphery of the Soviet Union.

"Who wants an empire of losers?"

The cost of their empire has become greater than its benefits. I think Gorbachev has come to realize just how bad the situation has become. The workers are alienated. There is rationing in eight of the 15 republics. And the harvest was bad again this year.

I am convinced that we economists don't know what the Soviets' military budget consists of.

In Armenia and the Baltics, there is evidence that glasnost is making things worse. We will hear more from other Republics. For example, they say in Azerbaijan they're carrying posters of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Some economists believe that the Soviet standard of living has actually declined. There is fighting among the classes. The peasants are complaining that they’re still being treated like serfs.

Gorbachev opponents like Ligachev argue that the class struggle has not ended. The KGB is "having a series of fits."

If Gorbachev succeeds that means "the Americanization of the Soviet Union," and people more interested in themselves than their duty to the State.

So it is in our interest that he succeeds. But I think that he probably won't. Gorbachev's style is very unique. I am worried, however. "The movement may very thin."

There is a whole range of issues which divide the Soviet General Staff from Mikhail Gorbachev, such as the military budget, and the veterans returning from Afghanistan.

His dilemma is that in order to achieve what he wants, which is for the Soviet Union to become more democratic, "he has to be a czar."

**Ross:** Let me begin by saying that "Gorbachev is not in this alone." The United States has a big stake in its success.

"The debate is over the pace of reform and its extent," but not its necessity. Gorbachev is confronting the challenge of changing a system from a subject-based to a participatory system. It is not impossible to foresee certain sociological problems resulting from these changes.

Perestroika does not mean that the Soviet Union is prepared to sacrifice its foreign policy’s principal goals. If perestroika succeeds, that gives them "an ability to promote" their influence.

They are aiming to win where others have failed, to give the Soviet Union a say in every matter of importance around the world.

Still, perestroika has the potential to make the world safer and more predictable. Beyond that, "the jury's still out.”

The people responsible for this *new thinking* “are very interesting to deal with." But they are not always focused enough on what they hope to achieve. And there's a big gap between what they say they want and what they are likely to be able to do.

"I haven't seen any significant change" in Soviet military policy or force structure. But where are they going to find the capital to restructure, if they don't take it out of the military’s hide?

Our ability to help Gorbachev, however, is only on the margins. "We're on the threshold" of an interesting period.

Yuri Andropov really was an antecedent of Gorbachev. “There’s an acceptance of the principle” of reform within the Party now -- but not on how to get there.

**Moisi:** In the few minutes I have, I would like to touch on a few ideas concerning the impact of a changing Soviet Union on Western Europe and the United States of America.

"So far we are witnessing the failure of perestroika," but the success of “glasnost.” The question now is how to turn an ideological victory into political terms.

We know there will be no return to the Brezhnev days. The question is: is Gorbachev Peter the Great or Alexander II?

"We can only marginally influence" the outcome in Moscow. "We have no clear vision" of how to approach their problems or how to achieve our goals.

We fear the Soviets will emerge stronger; that glasnost will retard our own modernization plans; that our continent will be marginalized in American eyes; or that the Soviet Union might find itself saddled with a nationalist problem a la 1914.

We hope for a better and more secure world; that the Soviet Union will become a better place; and Eastern Europe will become a freer place.

With Eastern Europe we reach "the utmost of ambiguity." Eastern Europe should be the prime benefactor of the process. But -- "are we willing to pay the price" for a reunified Germany?

"Do we really want to face the consequences of our victory?”

“One does not change a winning formula."

"We should not over-estimate our capacity to influence the Soviet Union.”

The British meeting with Lech Walesa "is showing us the way." We should not leave the initiative to the Soviets in Eastern Europe. We have to engage the Soviets "constructively" on regional issues and keep up the pressure on human rights.

"What is happening in the East is both a window of opportunity and a window of risk."

As for the Soviet Union, we just don't know what the results will be. This is a country that is just beginning to come to grips with itself -- and its own history.

**Peterson:** To assess Gorbachev one needs to be an astrologer.

"We in the West tend to underestimate the powers of ideology." But I found no true believers in socialism during my recent visit to Moscow.

"I do not believe that the Communists are missionaries any more."

According to the priests I talked with there, the Renaissance never made it past Poland. Until 1917, there was only one truth. And after that, there was only one truth again. Anyone who opposed the Party was liquidated or sent to Siberia.

All that has changed now.

When I met with them, the generals said their purpose is to divide Germany from the United States. And they told me: the biggest holocausts in World War II were performed on Soviet soil. But we won't hold that against you Germans forever. You’re not like the Americans, who built a Holocaust museum on the Mall.

"Everything American is fascinating to them." That's a mistake the US has made -- to let Hollywood and Madison Avenue portray your country's image overseas.

These generals made me doubt that stability could be achieved with equal conventional force levels. Historically, conventional parity has never been a guarantee of peace.

So, all things being equal, I would much rather the United States maintain its nuclear deterrent on European soil.

[tags: Dominique Moisi, Dennis Ross, Marshall Goldman, Peter Peterson, Soviet empire in East Europe, perestroika, glasnost, changes in Soviet Union]

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**Chief Lauds Quest for Space-based Weapons**

**Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson,** Dir, Strategic Defense Initiative Office

Dec 16, 1988, Foreign Press Center

**Abrahamson:** It's been my great privilege to have spent four and a half years as the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office.

In the speech that launched the program in March of 1983, President Reagan asked the nation three simple questions.

One: isn't there a different kind of strategy we could pursue, one that has the power to protect us in case deterrence fails?

This one led to a lot of questioning, and to be frank, I think this has been the most difficult part of the program.

The second question is: how can we make nuclear weapons obsolete? How can we find the means to challenge, to alter the role that our ultimate weapons play?

And three: arms control. Arms control is "an inherent part" of the overall plan. It was an inherent part of President Reagan's speech.

SDI has been "a total challenge to the way we had been thinking" about deterrence. "We need something, in my judgment, which will be more capable" than our current dependence on nuclear deterrence.

The right context for thinking about nuclear war and peace is retaliatory response. The doctrine implies that its terror "will always overcome" a crisis. But there are many examples of nations misreading history, and when wars start it's usually the result of a breakdown.

Stability is not enhanced by having a deterrent that can destroy the earth in 30 minutes. So, I think it is "proper" that we look at new forms of deterrence. No one knows what the future brings, especially now that there are twenty-odd countries across the globe working on ballistic missiles. So we've been pursuing answers at the SDI Office.

In terms of strategy, "we have not achieved the consensus" we would have liked with our allies or the Soviets. But this has stimulated a constructive debate.

The Fletcher Commission Report, issued four years ago, concluded that ballistic missile defense was feasible, and that to prove that feasibility might cost $25 billion. Since then, about $16 billion has been appropriated, but our "true expenditure" is closer to $11 billion, with the result that we are now "much closer" to an answer about whether it will work.

The real question is: can a workable program be an affordable one?

The system we are advocating is based on a layered defense, which would intercept incoming missiles without threatening the Soviet people. "We are not pursuing point defenses," where the missiles are close to their targets.

"We need to reach around the globe" for the first layer. We're talking about a "global concept, a system of systems."

We have over 3,000 projects ongoing, and we are "putting a great deal of attention" on mature technologies. Early efforts have focused on rockets in space: rockets of 100 to 150 pounds, which would seek out incoming missiles and kill them by kinetic impact. Later we will go with lasers and particle beams.

SDI's Phase One is "making great progress on satellites" and missiles. We're getting a good handle on the cost figures, and they are coming down as we make technical progress.

Phase One is now estimated at $50-55 billion, although we have some concepts which could bring the costs down considerably from there. In the short-term, however, "we are not waiting on software" for command and control. Our philosophy is to take proto-types and make them bigger and better.

When our space-based system is in place, it will cover much of the world. Our intent is to deploy it to enhance deterrence.

I am not sure we know just how far along the Soviets are with their own program. It's probably a continuation of their old ballistic missile work. They are ahead of us in some areas. They've been at this longer than we have. But in others, we probably are ahead of them.

One example in advanced rocketry is our "Brilliant Pebbles" program. We are going to start on it soon to validate our approach.

President-elect Bush "understands the program and its potential... I think it will go forward."

[tags: Lt Gen James Abrahamson, SDI, SDIO, Strategic Defense Initiative, space-based weapons, Reagan’s SDI speech of 1983]

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