Title: Targeting Civil War: Foreign Aid and the Opportunity Cost of Intra-state Conflict

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Abstract: The targeted development framework holds that industrialized countries promote development in poor countries as a security-maximizing strategy in the face of spillovers of developing country problems. Ongoing civil wars pose a unique challenge under this strategy. While conflict may produce diffuse spillovers, allocating resources to civil war states comes with costs. In the face of such costs, I argue that industrialized countries prioritize states experiencing civil war on the basis of the spillover threat a civil war poses. To test this expectation, I analyze dyadic panel data from 1995 to 2008 on DAC country aid commitments. I use bilateral migrant stock and bilateral trade as proxies for spillover threat, which I interact with a binary measure of civil war, as explanatory variables of bilateral aid commitments. Results support the view that industrialized countries strategically allocate foreign aid to civil war states conditional on the spillover threat the conflict poses.

Keywords: targeted development, civil war, foreign aid, migration, trade

1 Introduction

Recent work suggests that industrialized powers follow a policy of "targeted development," allocating bilateral foreign aid and other resources to developing countries when and where these countries' problems pose the greatest security challenge (Bermeo 2017; Bermeo 2018). However, civil war's role as a determinant of targeted development responses by industrialized countries remains underexplored and undertheorized. This omission is both puzzling and unfortunate—puzzling because so many scholars seem concerned with the impact of aid on civil war outcomes (see Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2006; Nielsen et al. 2011; Savun 2012; Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014); unfortunate because a better understanding of why donors target aid to civil war states would offer valuable insight into when and where we can expect foreign aid to have desirable effects.

Aside from the above reasons, allocation of foreign aid to states experiencing civil war constitutes an interesting puzzle in its own right—especially in the context of donor interests as defined by the targeted development framework. Indeed, at a time when economic underdevelopment and its attendant consequences increasingly threaten industrialized countries, civil war, so-called "development in reverse" (Stojek and Tir 2014), is perhaps one of the more important threats these countries face. But more than a serious threat, civil war has no easy fix. A development response to civil war must contend with the dual challenges of danger and rent: allocating foreign aid risks the lives of aid workers and opens scarce development resources to the threat of rebel confiscation (Nunn and Qian 2014; Narang and Stanton 2017). Although Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have committed billions of dollars to states experiencing civil war, little is known about how industrialized countries navigate the

unique tradeoffs of promoting development in civil war states. Industrialized countries must balance, on the one hand, the potential benefit of resource allocation with, on the other hand, the loss, misuse, and inefficiency of valuable development resources in the uncertain climate of intra-state conflict.

Building from the targeted development framework, and this particular characterization of the opportunity cost of allocating aid to civil war states, I argue that when and where the potential negative externality of ongoing civil war is high, industrialized countries target *more* development resources than they would otherwise. Conversely, when and where the potential negative externality of ongoing civil war is low, I argue that industrialized countries target *less* development resources than they would otherwise. These conclusions follow from a consideration of donor preferences defined in terms of maximizing the expected benefit of development promotion across developing countries. In cases where an ongoing civil war in a developing country poses minimal threat to an industrialized country, the anticipated benefit of development promotion will be minimal, and the efficiency of resources in producing development diminished. All else equal, the marginal utility of allocating resources to a developing country experiencing civil war will be less than the marginal utility of allocating resources to an otherwise similar developing country experiencing peace. However, in cases where an ongoing civil war in a developing country poses an appreciable threat to an industrialized country, the anticipated benefit of development promotion will be substantial, marginalizing concern about efficiency costs. All else equal, the marginal utility of allocating resources to a developing country experiencing civil war will be more than the marginal utility of allocating resources to an otherwise similar developing country experiencing peace.

Testing these claims requires identifying plausible measures of the potential spillover threat posed by ongoing civil war. In this study, I rely on two reasonable

proxies: (1) the size of the bilateral migrant stock from a given developing country residing in an industrialized country and (2) the level of bilateral trade between a developing country and an industrialized country. Using a dyadic panel dataset on the bilateral aid commitments of more than 20 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to nearly 160 foreign aid recipients from 1995 to 2008, I estimate the association between ongoing civil war and bilateral foreign aid, interacted with the measures of spillover threat highlighted above.

Results from the empirical analysis are largely consistent with the logic of self-interested development promotion in the context of intra-state conflict. Civil war is associated with significantly and substantially more bilateral aid from donors given moderate to high levels of bilateral migrants residing in a donor and given moderate to high levels of bilateral trade. At low levels of bilateral migrant stock, the marginal effect of civil war is null, and at low levels of bilateral trade the marginal effect of civil war is negative and statistically significant.

These findings not only support a *realpolitik* view of industrialized country strategy with respect to the developing world, but also, they shed new light on a previously overlooked dimension of industrialized country foreign policy. This paper therefore both contributes to a reframing of current understanding of industrialized country interest (as initiated by Bermeo and Leblang 2015; Bermeo 2017; and Bermeo 2018), and breaks ground in territory infrequently trod by civil war and foreign aid scholars.

The paper proceeds as follows. I begin with a brief discussion of existing literature on third-party intervention in civil war, and then move on to a theoretical discussion of the implications of civil war for industrialized countries' development policies. I then describe the data and methods used for analysis before discussing results. I then conclude with a summary of the findings, their implications, and suggestions for future

work.

2 Industrialized Country Strategy and Civil Conflict Abroad: What We (Don't) Know

Fearon and Laitin (2004) and Snyder (2011) argue that after the Cold War, and as globalization emerged as a powerful integrating force in the international system, major powers adopted a strategy of military and humanitarian intervention in other countries' internal conflicts as a means of protecting themselves from the increasingly difficult to ignore fallout of intra-state violence. The "targeted development" model advanced by Bermeo (2018) argues in similar fashion that such rationalist, self-help, considerations inform developed countries' foreign aid policies. As she contends, in an interconnected world where domestic problems have transnational reverberations, promoting development in impoverished areas of the world constitutes a rational, security-maximizing strategy, and foreign aid a powerful tool in pursuit of this goal. But even more, targeted development implies that industrialized countries pursue development not only because it is in their self-interest, but also when and where it is in their self interest (Bermeo 2018, 5). As Bermeo (2018) notes "countries where development will provide the largest benefit to the policymaking state receive the most attention under this strategy" (4).

Of course, foreign aid is not the only policy tool at the disposal of industrialized countries interested in promoting development, nor is targeted development the only strategy pursued by states to fight the contemporary problems they face. However, vis-à-vis externalities rooted in poverty, targeted development should be far from a marginal strategy, and foreign aid far from a marginal policy tool used in service of this

strategy. While foreign aid may complement other policy tools, or occasionally such tools may substitute for foreign aid, foreign aid is a critically important manifestation of states pursuing their (self-)interests (James Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998).

Unfortunately, where responses to ongoing civil war are concerned, the relevance of foreign aid as a tool used in service of industrialized countries' security interests is not well reflected in the literature. While a large and ever growing body of work centers on questions related to motivations for direct and indirect *military* intervention in violent intra-state conflicts (Findley and Marineau 2015), the application of foreign aid as an alternative foreign policy tool has gone largely overlooked. The military intervention literature has considered explanations ranging from humanitarian motivations (Carment and Rowlands 1998; P Regan 2000; Finnemore 2003), to realpolitik accounts based on, for example, U.S. and Soviet interventions during the Cold War (P Regan 2000; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008). The list of documented determinants of and incentives behind military intervention is expansive and includes factors such as protection of interests, colonial past, alliances, prospects for success, expected spillovers, and electoral consequences (Peceny 1999; Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Enterline, Garrison, and Aubone 2009; Kathman 2010; J Meernik 1994; Pearson and Baumann 1977; Pickering 2001; PM Regan 2002; Yoon 1997). Some early (Odell 1974) and more recent (Aydin 2008) studies additionally demonstrate the importance of economic interests such as trade and foreign direct investment. A body of work of comparable breadth and depth that examines foreign aid allocations in response to civil war is nowhere to be found.

Doing little to resolve this imbalance in the literature, the analyses on foreign aid and civil war that do exist center almost exclusively on the impact of the latter on the former (for examples see Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2006; Nielsen et al. 2011; Savun 2012; Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014). Among the few studies

that do consider industrialized country strategy with respect to conflict, Kang and Meernik (2004) consider determinants of *post*-conflict economic assistance, but not responses to ongoing conflict. Further, a study by Balla and Reinhardt (2008), while assessing the effect of conflict within, and in a neighboring, state on donor targeting of aid, consider only the period from 1960 to 1997—an era when donor interests may have been predominantly oriented toward containment of communism (prior to 1990) and when the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a reduction in the utility of foreign aid allocation in subsequent years (see Brautigam and Knack 2004). And, while cognizant of the tradeoffs that attend allocation of aid in the face of conflict, Balla and Reinhardt (2008) offer mixed findings across individual donors and only estimate average marginal effects, leaving unexplored factors that may influence how donors weigh the costs and benefits of aid allocation. This leaves unaddressed the significance of civil war as a determinant of aid allocation in the twenty-first century, and does little to deepen understanding of how industrialized countries navigate the opportunity cost of aid allocation to civil war states in an era defined by increased sensitivity to diffuse spillovers.

In short, though the significance of targeted development as a strategy industrialized countries pursue to promote their self-interest (and foreign aid as a tool thereof) should be clear, little work to date has explored how how this strategy manifests with respect foreign aid allocation to states experiencing civil war, and much less is known about how donors balance development goals with costs that include putting aid workers in harms way (Narang and Stanton 2017) and the possibility that rebels will siphon off aid funds for their own use (Nunn and Qian 2014).

The matter of how to approach the issue of foreign aid responses to civil war is the subject of the following section. I draw on the targeted development framework to shed light on this often overlooked dimension of industrialized country strategy. I will

argue that industrialized countries weigh the costs and benefits of allocating foreign aid as a part of a broader strategy of targeted development to states experiencing civil war in reference to the magnitude of the threat a civil war in a developing country poses to the donor. This discussion generates predictions about when and where ongoing civil war either leads industrialized countries to target more foreign aid, or less foreign aid, to a developing country relative to countries not experiencing internal conflict.

3 Targeted Development and Civil War: A Delicate Balancing Act

While violent intra-state conflict has significant international consequences in today's globalized world, as the studies by Narang and Stanton (2017) and Nunn and Qian (2014) show, allocating foreign aid to civil war states comes with costs. Because of these costs, intra-state conflict demands a much different pattern of response compared to, say, poverty, a natural disaster, or immigration. Consequently, although industrialized countries have numerous incentives to be concerned about, intervene in, and address the root causes of civil wars that occur in developing countries, they also have reason to steer clear. How intervening states navigate the opportunity cost of targeting development resources to civil war states remains unknown. While industrialized countries may view development as an antidote to conflict, the presence of conflict makes promoting development difficult.

These cross-cutting incentives may explain, in part, why studies that rely on civil war as a control variable in analyses of foreign aid allocation find a null association between civil war and bilateral aid (for example, Bermeo 2017; Bermeo 2018). How-

ever, examining only the average marginal effect of civil war could obscure a more complicated conditional effect that hinges on variability in the threat a civil war poses to a donor. Not all civil wars are equal in the eyes of industrialized states. While policymakers may eschew giving aid in the face of some civil wars, other conflicts may pose threats too serious to ignore. A targeted development response implies that policymakers prioritize civil war when and where spillovers from the conflict impend complications for the donor.

To make this logic, and its implications, more explicit, it is useful to consider the value industrialized countries attribute to development in poor countries in terms of two overarching factors: (1) development technology and (2) spillover threat (see chapter 3 in Bermeo 2018 for a formalized description of these concepts and their implications). The first captures how efficiently development inputs translate into development outputs. The second captures the extent to which development outputs stand to be of benefit to an industrialized country.

Civil war is unique among many determinants of development interest in that it acts as an input to both development technology and spillover threat. With respect to the former, civil war may lead to the misuse or destruction of development resources, thereby leading to an overall reduction in how efficiently development resources translate into development outcomes. With respect to the latter, civil war has the potential to generate diffuse unwanted spillovers, giving industrialized countries more to gain from promoting development. However, unlike its deleterious impact on development technology—which one may usefully (if perhaps naively) treat as constant—the effect of civil war on spillover threat is conditional. The threat of ongoing civil war should vary as a function of factors that make industrialized countries particularly sensitive to the spillovers civil war produces. That is, it is not ongoing civil war in and of itself, but rather the potential of civil war to extend beyond

the borders of the affected country and to threaten the populations of industrialized states that makes development beneficial (at least from the donors' perspective).

The interaction of civil war's impact on development technology, on the one hand, with spillover threat, on the other, has the unique implication that when and where civil war poses minimal spillover threat, the marginal utility of allocating resources to a civil war state will be less than that of allocating resources to an otherwise similar state experiencing peace. However, while the negative impact of civil war on development technology remains constant, if one were to increase the externality posed by civil war, the comparative statics implied by this discussion indicate that the marginal utility of development increases such that, given sufficiently high spillover threat posed by the conflict, the marginal utility of promoting development in the civil war state will be greater than that of promoting development in an otherwise similar state experiencing peace.

The theoretical relevance and implications of spillover threat in the context of civil war should be clear by now. Testing this theory, however, will require identifying factors that condition the spillover threat of civil war. It is to this subject that I turn in the following sub-sections. I underline two factors in particular: (1) migration and (2) trade.

3.1 Civil War and Migration

That industrialized states have an interest in mitigating unwanted migration is uncontroversial. Prior work has shown that industrialized countries target foreign aid toward migrant sending countries as a strategy for mitigating demand for future immigration (Bermeo and Leblang 2015), and anecdotal evidence of this strategy abounds in the comments of several leading politicians in industrialized countries. For example, U.S.

President Donald Trump noted in a 2018 address to the U.N. General Assembly that the best long-term solution to large scale international migration is to "Make [migrants'] countries great again" ("Full Text: Trump's 2018 U.N. Speech" 2018). Former U.K. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg made comments to similar effect in 2010, urging countries to increase their level of foreign aid spending as a means to mitigate problems of poverty and violence to prevent people from "moving across continents and coming to settle in Europe" ("Clegg to Push Aid Goal at U.N. Summit" 2010). Japan has also made note of such justifications in its Official Development Assistance Charter (*Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter* 2003).

Civil war may create problems for industrialized states by exacerbating levels of immigration. Consider, for instance, the flight of some one hundred thousand refugees from Sri Lanka's 26 year long civil war to Australia (Betts and Higgins 2017) or the forced displacement of a large segment of the population in Colombia as a result of internal conflict (Ibanez 2008). The flow of persons from civil wars may additionally plant the seeds of future problems that aggravate demand for migration in the future. For example, evidence suggests that mass flows of refugees have negative consequences for the welfare of those who stay in the sending country (Ibanez 2008), which may incentivize even more individuals to relocate to either more stable neighboring countries or to developed countries where the promise of a better life seems appealing enough to offset the costs of migration.

Furthermore, the flight of migrants from war zones can generate obvious logistical and political problems for host countries—the Syrian refugee crisis is a notable example. Due to developed countries' aversion to admitting migrants en mass, policymakers have incentives to take steps to protect their countries from such unwanted spillovers. If these considerations inform donor responses to civil war, then it seems plausible that industrialized states will leverage foreign aid as a tool for mitigating inflows of

migrants from these conflicts.

An empirical implication of the above discussion is that the marginal effect of civil war should be conditioned by the size of the threat of bilateral immigration from the civil war state to an industrialized country. One useful proxy of migration threat is historical immigration patterns captured in the size of the bilateral migrant stock from a developing country in an industrialized country (Bermeo and Leblang 2015)—that is the sum of first-generation migrants by origin residing in a given destination country. Migrant stocks are a good predictor of future migrant flows (Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets 2014), and so policymakers may reason that if a civil war occurs in a country that historically has been a major source of immigrants, they can expect a substantial ballooning in migrant inflows from that country. For example, such an uptick was observed in migration from Indonesia to Japan when the former was embroiled in a spate of civil unrest and violence in the late 1990s and early 2000s.[1]

Within the broader framework of targeted development, and in the face of the tradeoffs of allocating aid to countries experiencing civil war, migration threat (captured by bilateral migrant stock) thus acts as a salient bilateral link that raises the potential spillover threat a civil war poses to an industrialized state. The logic of the two-input effect of civil war on the utility of development discussed in the previous section leads to the following two hypotheses:

> H_{m1}: *When the size of the bilateral migrant stock residing in a donor is small, the marginal effect of civil war on bilateral aid should be negative*, ceteris paribus.
>
> H_{m2}: *When the size of the bilateral migrant stock residing in a donor is large, the marginal effect of civil war on bilateral aid should be positive*, ceteris paribus.

3.2 Civil War and Trade

In addition to migrant ties between industrialized countries and developing countries, the density of trade ties also denotes a plausible link between states that makes industrialized countries sensitive to the consequences of civil war abroad. However, while migration captures security incentives, trade captures material (e.g., economic) incentives. When an industrialized country is a stakeholder in the economic viability of a developing country, civil war threatens the material gain to be had from trading, while at the same time the existing relationship also gives industrialized countries much more to gain by taking steps to bring the conflict to conclusion. That is, the level of bilateral trade between industrialized countries and developing countries captures both the threat an ongoing conflict poses to existing material benefits enjoyed by the industrialized country, and the anticipated benefits that will accrue to the industrialized country from future economic exchange.

The argument that trade motivates intervention more generally in civil wars is certainly not new. For instance, Stojek and Tir (2014) argue that "[e]xtant trade ties offer not just the promise, but also material evidence, of the ability to further enhance the volume of trade" upon cessation of hostilities (358). In support of this argument, these authors find that trade with the five permanent veto members of the Security Council is associated with greater U.N. peacekeeping assistance for the purpose of preventing the recurrence of civil war.

The case of U.N. peacekeeping assistance to El Salvador at the end of a more than decade long civil war in 1992 demonstrates this logic of material self-interest quite well. In the latter years of the war, total trade between El Salvador and the P5 members of the Security Council totaled 500 million U.S.D. But, in the year immediately subsequent to the conclusion of the war, trade jumped to nearly 1.1

billion U.S.D., and mostly in the form of exports from P5 countries (Stojek and Tir 2014). The material incentives to preserve peace in El Salvador clearly shine through. Compare this with the case of Guinea Bissau, whose 1998-1999 conflict resulted in the death of thousands and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. In the face of several ceasefires, the U.N. failed to provide peacekeeping assistance. Though hard to confirm, the relatively meager 26 million U.S.D. in trade between Guinea Bissau and the P5 countries may explain, in part, the lack of support (Stojek and Tir 2014).

Trade, therefore, seems to serve as another important tie between industrialized countries and developing countries that increases the expected benefit of development in the face of intra-state conflict. As with migration, within the broader framework of targeted development, and in the face of the tradeoffs of allocating aid to countries experiencing civil war, bilateral trade acts as an important bilateral link that raises the material stakes an industrialized country has in an ongoing civil war. Hence, the same logic of the two-input effect of civil war on the utility of development discussed in the context of migration leads to a similar pair of hypotheses:

> H_{t1}: *When the volume of bilateral trade between an industrialized country and a developing country is minimal, the marginal effect of civil war on bilateral aid should be negative*, ceteris paribus.
>
> H_{t2}: *When the volume of bilateral trade between an industrialized country and a developing country is large, the marginal effect of civil war on bilateral aid should be positive*, ceteris paribus.

4 Data

The theoretical discussion in the preceding section generated four testable hypotheses for how industrialized countries should target foreign aid in the face of ongoing civil war

in developing countries. To test these hypotheses, I rely on the dyadic panel dataset created by Bermeo and Leblang (2015), which contains information on the bilateral aid commitments of 22 OECD member states to up to 163 foreign aid recipients. This dataset is particularly useful because of its comprehensive coverage of the bilateral aid giving of prominent members of the OECD, and its inclusion of key variables relevant for testing the hypotheses proposed in this study. Below, I discuss in more detail the outcome variable and the explanatory variables of interest. I also briefly describe and justify the control variables I include in the analysis.

4.1 The Outcome Variable: Yearly Bilateral Aid Commitments

I operationalize the outcome variable as the natural log of (one plus) the bilateral foreign aid commitments in 2008 U.S. dollars from a given donor country to a given recipient in a given year. I rely on the sum of ODA (Official Development Assistance) plus OA (Official Aid) commitments, which are written promises of a certain dollar amount donors commit to a given recipient. I use commitments instead of actual disbursements for two reasons. First, historically, reporting on commitments is more reliable than for disbursements. Second, disbursements can sometimes lag years behind actual changes in donor aid policy. Commitments, therefore, are a more reliable and up-to-date measure of donor policy relative to aid disbursements.

4.2 Explanatory Variables of Interest

Below, I describe each of the explanatory variables of interest. Unless otherwise specified, all are lagged by one year to adjust for possible endogeneity with the outcome variable. Aid commitments are usually made at the beginning of the fiscal

year, and so the level of aid donors commit to giving to recipients often is informed by the events of the previous year.

4.2.1 Civil War

To measure the instance of civil war in a recipient country, I rely on a binary measure, coded 1 if there is an ongoing civil war in a recipient in a given year and 0 otherwise. This measure is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which codes a civil war as taking place when at least 25 annual battle deaths occur in a "contested incompatibility" between two parties (at least one party must be the government) where the conflict is over territory and/or government control (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

4.2.2 Migration

Bilateral migration is measured as the natural log of (one plus) the size (*stock*) of the bilateral migrant population from a given recipient residing in a given donor at year $t-1$. This measure originates from Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets (2014), who collected data from national statistical offices to generate a measure of bilateral migrant stocks in 22 OECD countries.

4.2.3 Trade

Yearly bilateral trade between a given donor and a given recipient is operationalized as the natural log of (one plus) the sum of donor exports to, and imports from, a given recipient measured in constant U.S. dollars. This measure is originally drawn from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics.

4.3 Control Variables

I control for a number of variables, each lagged by one time period, that may confound the relationship between the explanatory variables of interest and the outcome variable. The first is recipient country GDP per capita, logged, which I use as a proxy for average income in a given recipient in a given year. If donors prioritize poorer countries—countries that also may tend to have a higher likelihood of experiencing political instability (such as civil war)—then we would expect donor giving to civil war states to be partially driven by lower levels of average GDP per capita. Migrants may also have greater incentive to leave their homelands when economic opportunities are lacking.

I also control for recipient country population, logged, since country population size may be correlated with bilateral aid, migrant outflows, trade flows, and civil war. Donors may consider the needs of larger developing countries as more pertinent. At the same time, large populations make for a more sizable stock of potential migrants while also affecting the political and material incentives and costs of engaging in civil war (see James D. and Laitin 2003 for a discussion). Countries with larger populations may also make for attractive trade partners as they contain more potential consumers for industrialized country exports.

To adjust for preferences donors may have to allocate aid to former colonies, as well as the social ties between former colonial powers and their wards that may facilitate greater migration, I include a binary indicator, coded as 1 (0 otherwise), when a recipient country is a former colony of a donor.

Bilateral distance between donors and recipients is likely an additional confounding variable for both of the conditioning variables. Donors may prioritize proximate countries, while at the same time migrants may face fewer costs emigrating to closer destinations. Additionally, bilateral distance may further correlate with the intensity

of bilateral trade between countries, as trade with neighbors is likely more convenient that trade with distant countries. I therefore include the log of the bilateral distance between donors and recipients (in kilometers) as a control variable.

I further rely on the Freedom House measure of yearly average civil liberties and political rights in a recipient country as a proxie for democracy to control for preferences donors may have for allocating aid to democratic states. Democracies should also be less prone to civil war and further share affinities with donors that make them attractive trade partners and preferred sources of migrants. Though some question the objectivity of the Freedom House measure, for the purpose of this study it is not necessary to have a reliable and valid measure of democracy per se, but a reliable and valid mesure of donor country perceptions of democracy. Criticisms about measures such as Freedom House often center on democracy as an explanatory variable of outcomes like economic development (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010), but an outcome like aid commitments is qualitatively different. While assessing the effect of democracy in the first case requires a valid measure of the concept of democracy, in the second case (where aid commitments are the outcome) a measure that approximates industrialized country evaluations of the strength of democracy is more apt as evaluations of democracy are more likely to inform targeting of aid than is democracy in and of itself. Freedom House should work perfectly well in the latter scenario.

Finally, I control for the occurrence and severity of a natural disaster in a given recipient in a given year using the natural log of the number of individuals affected or killed as a result of a natural disaster. Such events may lead to greater out-migration from the affected country and potentially precipitate unrest, thus leading to greater demand for aid.

In addition to the above controls, I include donor fixed effects to adjust for unobserved donor specific factors associated with bilateral aid and the key explanatory variables. Including donor fixed effects further ensures that model estimates reflect within-donor variation in the outcome variable, which is of greatest relevance in testing individual donor decisions about the level of aid to be targeted among different recipients. To further adjust for unobserved time-varying shocks, I include a set of year fixed effects.

5 Methods

Using the data I describe above, I rely on multilevel Tobit regression to test hypotheses 1 and 2. Because the outcome variable is left-censored at zero (the natural log of aid commitments plus $1 \geq 0$), Tobit regression is a natural choice of estimator. The censored nature of the outcome portends bias in intercept and slope estimates with OLS, but Tobit overcomes this limitation by modeling the outcome as a *latent*, uncensored response variable. This is an appropriate choice if zero values are regarded as "corner solutions," in economic parlance. That is, Tobit is appropriate if the data generating process for zero values is the same as that for positive values. This certainly seems plausible as the choice to allocate any aid to a recipient must also be intimately linked with decisions about the level of aid policymakers decide to commit. The advantage of Tobit is that it allows for joint estimation of the selection of aid recipients and the level of aid given.

A multilevel modeling approach is further appropriate given the dyadic-panel structure of the data. Classic Tobit imposes restrictive i.i.d. assumptions, which are likely violated by within dyad dependence and between dyad heterogeneity in the observations. This represents a likely challenge not only to accurate statistical

inference, but also to accurate parameter estimates given that Tobit is estimated via maximum likelihood. To counteract the first problem, robust standard errors clustered by dyad are commonly applied in the foreign aid literature. However, this solution leaves unaddressed potential bias in the parameter estimates themselves. If one takes the data generating process implied by Tobit seriously, within dyad dependence should be explicitly modeled via a multilevel framework. As it is useful check against bias induced by dyadic heterogeneity, I use multilevel Tobit regression with dyadic random effects.

The main analysis centers on three models as specified below, where the first is a "baseline" model with no interaction between civil war and either of the measures of spillover threat, the second a model that includes an interaction between civil war and migrant stock, the third a model that includes an interaction between civil war and bilateral trade. I estimate interactions in separate models to facilitate easier interpretation of marginal effects. These models are specified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\ln(a_{ijt}) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 c_{jt-1} + \beta_2 \ln(m_{ijt-1}) + \beta_3 \ln(v_{ijt-1}) \qquad (1)\\
&\quad + \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mathbf{D}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \mathbf{Y}\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \sigma_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijt},\\
\ln(a_{ijt}) &= \eta_0 + \eta_1 c_{jt-1} + \eta_2 \ln(m_{ijt-1}) + \eta_3 \ln(v_{ijt-1}) + \eta_4 c_{jt-1} \cdot \ln(m_{ijt-1}) \qquad (2)\\
&\quad + \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mathbf{D}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \mathbf{Y}\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \sigma_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt},\\
\ln(a_{ijt}) &= \zeta_0 + \zeta_1 c_{jt-1} + \zeta_2 \ln(m_{ijt-1}) + \zeta_3 \ln(v_{ijt-1}) + \zeta_4 c_{jt-1} \cdot \ln(v_{ijt-1}) \qquad (3)\\
&\quad + \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mathbf{D}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \mathbf{Y}\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \sigma_{ij} + \upsilon_{ijt},
\end{aligned}$$

where a_{ijt} denotes bilateral aid commitments from industrialized country i to developing country j at year t, c_{jt-1} is the civil war dummy for developing country j at $t-1$, m_{ijt-1} is the size of the bilateral migrant stock in i from j at $t-1$, and v_{ijt-1} is bilateral trade between i and j at $t-1$. $\mathbf{X}$ is a matrix of control variables as specified

in the previous section. **D** is a matrix of donor indicator variables (minus a reference category). **Y** is a matrix of year indicators (minus a reference category).[2] The term σ_{ij} denotes dyad specific random intercepts. Each model includes an error term assumed to be independently and normally distributed.

In the following section I describe results from model estimation.

6 Results

Models were estimated for 3,129 unique dyads for a total of 29,817 dyad-years. The average coverage for a single dyad was 9.3 years, with a range of 1 to 14 years. A civil war is coded as 1 for approximately 17.4 percent of dyad-year observations with 29.5 percent of all dyad pairs being between a donor and a recipient that experiences a civil war for at least one year over the coverage period of the data. 34.4 percent of recipient countries are coded as experiencing a civil war at some point over the data's coverage period, with 100 percent of donors committing aid to a civil war state. Summary statistics are given in Table 1.

Figure 1 shows coefficient estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals for parameters of interest in addition to control variables. Results from each of the three main specifications are shown. To save space, estimates for donor and year indicators have been excluded. If confidence intervals intersect with the vertical line at zero, estimates fail to reach statistical significance at the $p = 0.05$ level. Since these are Tobit estimates, they may be interpreted as either the expected change in the *latent* outcome variable (a version of aid commitments unbounded at zero) or the expected change in the outcome weighted by the probability of the outcome being greater than zero. For brevity's sake, from here on I will describe estimates as reflecting the expected change in the outcome, but note that this is in reference to the latent,

not observed outcome. Further, as each of the models includes donor indicators, the estimates reflect within donor variation in aid committed among developing countries. That is, estimates reflect the expected difference in the aid committed by a donor between recipients, all else equal.

I begin by summarizing estimates from the baseline model. Consistent with prior research, estimates for each of the control variables runs in the expected direction and is statistically significant. Colonial past has by far the largest estimate. This is consistent with studies that show colonial history is not only a significant determinant of foreign aid giving, but also a substantial one (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Estimates for two of the variables of interest, bilateral trade and bilateral migration, also run in the expected direction. Consistent with Bermeo and Leblang (2015), bilateral migrant stock has a positive association with bilateral aid. Though the magnitude of the estimate from the baseline specification is modest—one percent greater stock of migrants from one recipient relative to another is associated with 0.088 percent greater aid—it is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$. Bilateral trade also has a positive association with aid. Again, however, the magnitude of the association is quite modest. One percent greater bilateral trade with one recipient relative to another is associated with 0.027 percent greater bilateral aid. Though small, the estimate is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$.

Turning to the association between bilateral aid and civil war in the baseline model, surprisingly, I find a positive and statistically significant association between the instance of civil war and aid. All else equal, civil war in one recipient is associated with 10.83 percent more bilateral foreign aid from a given donor relative to a recipient not experiencing civil war.[3] This result runs counter to Bermeo (2017) and Bermeo (2018), who fail to find a significant association between civil war and bilateral aid. This discrepancy likely arises due to differences in methods—whereas these studies

rely on classic Tobit, I rely on multilevel Tobit to explicitly adjust for within dyad heterogeneity and dependence.

Estimates for the control variables in each of the interaction models are little different from those provided by the baseline specification. However, estimates do differ for the interacted variables of interest. But, as these coefficients cannot be interpreted directly, it is useful to instead examine marginal effects.

6.1 Civil War and Migration

Figure 2 shows variation in the marginal association between civil war and bilateral aid conditional on bilateral migrant stock (ln). The marginal association is adjusted to reflect the percent difference in giving between recipients given the presence of ongoing civil war. Consistent with expectations, higher migration threat, as proxied with the number of bilateral migrants already residing in a donor, positively conditions the marginal effect of civil war. Holding migrant stock at zero, civil war has a null association with bilateral aid. However, at larger levels of bilateral migrant stock one can clearly see a change in how industrialized countries respond to civil war in developing countries. Once the number of bilateral migrants living in a donor exceeds approximately 53,000, civil war is associated with over 5 percent greater aid. At the mean level of migrant stock (log-transformed), equivalent to more than 22 million, civil war is associated with 17.5 percent greater aid. These results point clearly in the direction that migration threat influences the calculus associated with targeting development resources to civil war states. At low levels of migration threat, civil war does not prompt greater aid from industrialized countries. But, when and where migration threat is moderate to high, donors seem to weigh the expected benefit of a targeted aid response as greater than the potential cost.

6.2 Civil War and Trade

A similar pattern holds for the interaction of bilateral trade and civil war. Figure 3 shows variation in the marginal association between civil war and bilateral aid conditional on bilateral trade (ln). Estimates suggest that the economic interests of industrialized countries influence their decision to target aid to civil war states in a manner consistent with hypothesis 2. Indeed, when and where the U.S.D. amount of trade is zero, civil war is associated with nearly 25 percent less aid. But, at higher levels of trade, this association changes. When bilateral trade is greater than 1.2 million U.S.D. the marginal association between civil war and aid is not only positive, but also statistically significant. At the mean level of bilateral trade (equivalent to 25 million U.S.D.), civil war is associated with more than 6 percent greater aid. At the maximum level of trade, more than 381 billion U.S.D., civil war is associated with more than 30 percent greater bilateral aid. Just as the magnitude of migration threat tilts the opportunity cost of giving resources to civil war states, so does the economic interest of industrialized countries. When and where civil war impends a more substantial economic loss to industrialized powers, they are more likely to respond with greater aid.

6.3 Variation by Donor

Results up to this point are consistent with expectations. However, not all donors may be equal in their determinations about the costs of giving aid to civil war states. To determine whether differences exist among donor strategies I estimate 44 multilevel Tobit models with random recipient intercepts. Half are specified like equation 2, save that donor indicators are dropped. The remaining half are specified like equation 3, with the same caveat that donor indicators are excluded.

A summary of so many models is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is sufficient to say that variation in donor strategy is apparent in the results. The interaction term for civil war and migration runs in the expected direction for only 12 of the 22 donors included in the analysis. This set includes Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.S. Less variation in strategy is apparent when civil war is interacted with trade. Here, the interaction term runs in the expected direction for 17 donors: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.

That the interaction term runs in the expected direction for these donors is not random. Simple bivariate correlations show that the sign on the interaction of civil war and migration is positively correlated with the size of the overall migrant population residing in a donor. Moreover, the sign on the interaction of civil war and trade is positively correlated with the grand total of trade conducted by a donor. The strength of these correlations is nontrivial, with $\rho = 0.45$ for the former and $\rho = 0.53$ for the latter. It seems, therefore, that the industrialized countries most attractive to migrants and with the most to gain in terms of trade drive the pattern of targeted development revealed by the main analysis.

6.4 Examples

While examination of broad patterns is useful, considering some specific examples can help to make the implications of these findings more concrete. To this end, I briefly highlight two examples.[4]

First, consider Japanese aid to the Philippines vis-a-vis Somalia. The former aid recipient has experienced resistance from a handful of armed insurgents. Over

the period considered in this study (1995 to 2008), the government in Manilahad to contend with ethnic Moros in its southern territory in the form of the Moro National Liberation Front and a breakaway faction, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Even more, the Pilippines government also has faced a decades long threat from Maoist communist insurgents, which historically conducted operations throughout the country. As these conflicts have been waged, the Philippines has represented a major source of migrants to Japan. From 1995 to 2008, the stock of Philippines migrants residing in Japan averaged more than 140,000 people, and trade between the two countries averaged 15.9 billion U.S.D. in value. Perhaps motivated by these factors, over this same period, Japan committed a yearly average of nearly 680 million U.S.D. in foreign aid to the Philippines.

Compare this level of giving to Japan's aid commitments to another country experiencing conflict, Somalia. Somalia has long suffered from economic underdevelopment, bad governance, civil conflict, and poor humanitarian conditions. Moreover, it is second only to Syria and Afghanistan in terms of total refugees it produces yearly. However, despite the diffuse spillovers Somalia portends, Japan committed only a fraction of the amount of foreign aid to Somalia that it did to the Philippines during the time period considered in this study: 15.5 million U.S.D. While still a sizeable amount of aid, this is only 2 percent of the aid Japan committed on average to the Philippines. Though Japan's prioritization of the Philippines over and above Somalia may be the result of a variety of factors, it is perhaps no coincidence that the number of Somali born residents in Japan was negligable during this period, while total trade between the two countries averaged around 1.1 million U.S.D. (much less than the billions of dollars in trade between Japan and the Philippines).

Consider a second example, U.K. aid to two of its former colonies, India and Pakistan. India has been home to a number of seperatist movements, Maoist and

Islamist inspired. Such contestations between New Delhi and insurgents have recurred in India for decades, with thousands of associated casualities. Pakistan similarly has been engaged in decades long armed disputes with insurgent groups, which often have attacked both government targets and civilians.

In the case of India, from 1995 to 2008, the average number of Indian born residents in the U.K. averaged more than 200 thousand, 1.25 times more than the average 160 thousand Pakistani born residents in the U.K. over the same period. Further, trade between the U.K. and India averaged nearly 730 million U.S.D. over this time frame, which is more than 4.5 times the average volume of trade between the U.K. and Pakistan: a little more than 160 million U.S.D. The pattern of U.K. aid to both countries is exactly as one would expect given these differences in migration and trade. The U.K. committed a yearly average of 413 million U.S.D. in foreign aid to India from 1995 to 2008, several times more than the yearly average of 157 million U.S.D. it committed to Pakistan.

While these examples certainly do not represent perfect one-to-one comparisons (India has a larger population than Pakistan, Somalia is farther from Japan than is the Philippines), they do align with the logic of targeted development in the face of civil conflict. Faced with the choice between civil war states, Japan and the U.K. appear to prioritize conflicts in the way theory predicts by committing more foreign aid to civil war states when the conflict poses a more substantial externality. One would not need to dig much more into the behavior of other industrialized countries such the U.S. or Germany to find similar examples.

7 Conclusion

Much like the U.S. saw rebuilding Europe following World War II as vital to its own security and economic interests, today industrialized countries view the promotion of peace and economic prosperity in developing countries as pivotal to the furtherance of these same goals. This study offers support for this view by examining industrialized states' responses to the incidence of civil war in developing countries. Building on the *targeted development* framework (Bermeo 2017; Bermeo 2018), I generate a novel prediction for developed country responses to civil war via bilateral foreign aid. Targeted development holds that industrialized countries self-interestedly promote development in impoverished areas of the world, specifically targeting resources where problems associated with underdevelopment pose the gravest threat to donor security. Civil war surely constitutes a sizable threat to industrialized states, and so we should expect policymakers in wealthy countries to initiate a targeted development response in the face of intra-state conflict. However, the opportunity cost associated with intervention in civil war is unique among conditions that motivate allocation of aid. Giving resources to civil war states is wrought with uncertainty, endangering aid workers and risking rebel confiscation of goods. Any expected benefit from promoting development must outweigh the potential costs.

A straightforward, and as yet untested, prediction follows from the above: the presence of civil war in developing countries should draw greater aid from industrialized countries *when* and *where* the conflict poses externalities that the latter wishes to avoid. To test this prediction I analyze dyadic panel data from 1995 to 2008. With this data, I estimate multilevel Tobit models specified with an interaction between a binary measure of civil war with two measures that capture the unique threat a civil war poses to an industrialized country: (1) bilateral migrant stock and (2) bilateral

trade. The former captures the migration threat of a civil war. As the size of the bilateral migrant population residing in another country is a good predictor of future migration flows, policymakers may worry that a civil war in a historic migrant sender will impend large flows of migrants fleeing the conflict. Meanwhile, bilateral trade captures the strength of economic ties between countries and, thus, the material interest a donor has in seeing conflict resolution. Trade ties therefore serve as a useful measure of the economic cost civil war in a developing country imposes on a wealthy trade partner. When and where internal conflict threatens a lucrative relationship between countries, we should expect industrialized powers to respond with aid as a means to maintain that relationship vis-à-vis ongoing civil war.

Results from the analysis align well with hypothesized expectations, highlighting the realpolitik calculations that attend foreign aid allocation in the face of ongoing civil war. Of course, these findings do not negate humanitarian motivations, which may exist side-by-side with realpolitik considerations. Nevertheless, the fact that states respond to civil wars with greater (less) foreign aid when doing so most (least) benefits themselves hints that self-interest should not go ignored. Though it bears mentioning that this pattern is not consistent across *all* donors, it aligns with the behavior of many of the most prominent and largest members of the OECD, particularly those that engage in large volumes of trade and are historically popular migrant destinations.

Much, of course, remains to be done. Future work should consider additional implications of greater interconnections between the industrialized and developing world, particularly in the context of intra-state violence. Alternative measures of civil war and donor insecurity might be considered. Furthermore, analyses that factor in the post-conflict reverberations of intra-state violence would make a welcome extension to the findings presented here, as would analyses that consider responses to conflict in states neighboring an aid recipient.

Additionally, studies that examine expressed donor motivations for targeting aid to particular civil-war-stricken countries would help to confirm that the self-interested considerations argued to influence donor decisions here are the mechanisms that underlie patterns in bilateral aid giving. The theory as presented in this study is admittedly statist in its assumptions, leaving unaddressed the role of domestic pressure and mobilization in shaping donors' development priorities. On this point, it would be worth asking whether donor preference for civil wars in migrant sending countries is driven by anti-immigration sentiment, or else domestic mobilization on the part of first-generation migrant populations in donors who lobby the government of their country of residence to support their homeland when embroiled in civil war.

Future work might also consider other types of self-interested intervention. The U.S., for example, commits a great deal of military aid across countries. It would be interesting to see whether patterns in military aid giving follow suit with those observed here. Further, given the U.S.'s hegemonic status (or at least its purported hegemonic status), scholars might assess whether other major industrialized countries complement U.S. military aid to civil war states with their own foreign aid allocations. Such U.S. leadership in the realm of aid giving would make the finding that the U.S. self-interestedly targets military resources all-the-more pertinent. It would mean that the development efforts of the donor community, if not wholly influenced by, are bent in the direction of U.S. preferences.

Finally, for those interested in the effects of foreign aid on civil war onset and outcomes, the targeted nature of donor responses to civil war suggested by this study merit further consideration. That prominent donors target aid to countries experiencing civil war when doing so is in their own interest may suggest that many civil wars receive disproportionate attention and resource intervention relative to others. If a requisite for aid is that a civil war must pose a threat to a developed

country, some wars may go un(der)addressed by the international donor community. Whether this has implications for civil war outcomes is beyond the scope of this study but merits future consideration.

Notes

[1]Based on variation in the size of the stock of Indonesia migrants residing in Japan over the course of 1995 to 2008.

[2]Year-specific donor intercepts might also be appropriate in lieu of separate donor and year indicators. However, the inclusion of donor-year indicators substantially increases estimation time, and the results for covariates of interest differ little from those obtained with separate donor and year intercepts. I therefore opt for the simpler (and faster) option.

[3]Estimate based on the following calculation: $100 \cdot (e^{\beta_{\text{civil war}}} - 1)$.

[4]Details about cases were obtained from the *CIA Factbook*.

Table and Figures

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
AID	1.274	0.438	1.602	0.000	9.268
CIVIL WAR	0.174	0.000	0.379	0.000	1.000
COLONY	0.033	0.000	0.179	0.000	1.000
DEMOCRACY	4.099	4.000	1.817	1.000	7.000
DISASTER	6.044	6.858	5.649	0.000	19.650
DISTANCE	8.205	8.388	0.713	3.584	9.388
INCOME	8.371	8.480	1.019	5.033	11.021
MIGRANTS	5.862	5.919	3.326	0.000	16.287
POPULATION	8.743	8.915	2.010	2.970	14.095
TRADE	17.047	17.383	3.623	0.000	26.667

[a] N = 29,817; Dyads = 3,129; Donors = 22; Recipients = 157
[b] All variables aside from CIVIL WAR, COLONY, and DEMOCRACY are log-transformed.



Figure 1: Multilevel Tobit estimates. Results estimated with $n = 29,817$ dyad-year observations. Donor and year fixed effects not shown. Models were estimated with random dyad effects.



Figure 2: Multilevel Tobit estimates for the marginal association between ongoing civil war and bilateral aid commitments, given variation in the size of the bilateral migrant population of a recipient residing in a donor country. The marginal association has been adjusted to reflect the percent change in the expected value of the latent outcome variable.



Figure 3: Multilevel Tobit estimates for the marginal association between ongoing civil war and bilateral aid commitments, given variation in the level of bilateral trade between a donor and a recipient. The marginal association has been adjusted to reflect the percent change in the expected value of the latent outcome variable.

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