Democracy and Dictatorship: A Comparative Case Study of Pakistan and India

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In May of 2013, Pakistan saw its first smooth change of government following a general election since it gained Independence. In contrast, India has maintained a relatively stable democracy since 1947. How did two countries, which shared a colonial heritage and a few thousand years of history before that, see such different democratic trajectories?

In this paper, I will attempt to find a plausible answer to this question.

Background

At Independence, India instituted a parliamentary democracy with a federal electoral system. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress Party, it solidified its hold on democracy. Pakistan instated the same regime type and electoral system, but its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who had been one of the major actors in establishing a Muslim nation separate from India, passed away in 1948, leaving Pakistan's dominant political group, the Muslim League, largely without direction.

India's experience with democracy went relatively smoothly, with a hitch in 1975 when Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency after being charged with electoral malpractice by the Indian judiciary. However, she lost power when her Party (the Congress) lost in the 1977 general elections, and in line with the democratic tradition, she handed power over (Desai 34). Apart from this incident, India has been lauded for being the world's largest democracy. In contrast, Pakistan's experience with democracy has been a continuous series of hitches. In its sixty-six years, Pakistan witnessed five attempted coups, three of which were successful:



Source: Bhave and Kingston

Paper Design

Reading through the expansive literature written on the diverging paths of India and Pakistan revealed several recurring themes as factors that differentiated their political outcomes – military, class (specifically the agricultural elite), and political institutions. The theories that fit the context of India and Pakistan and correlate with these themes are: Cheibub, Boix, and Reynolds, respectively. I will approach each theory by first laying out its components and then systematically checking whether the cases of India and Pakistan fit with these components. My conclusions will either lend support to or reject these theories and will also indicate which factors were most influential in shaping Pakistan and India's experiences with democracy.

Cheibub

In his book *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*, Jose Antonio Cheibub seeks to disprove the claim that presidential democracies, as opposed to parliamentary ones, are more likely to fail (and transition to authoritarian regimes) due to inherent weaknesses in the presidential democracy model. The hypothesis that he puts forth himself is that there is a confounding variable in the seemingly strong significant correlation between presidential systems and democratic breakdown. This variable is military legacy. When Cheibub controls for military legacy, he finds the relationship between type of system (presidential versus parliamentary) and democratic breakdown to be spurious (Cheibub 154). Countries that instated presidential democracies also tended to have had military legacies, and it was this legacy that later led to the failure of democracy.



Cheibub goes on to say that the positive correlation between countries with presidential systems and those with military legacies are a product of "historical accident." He points to the resilience of constitutional frameworks, particularly in countries that gained independence in the last two centuries, as an explanation of why certain systems persisted, regardless of military presence (Cheibub 155). It just so happened that in the 19th and 20th centuries, countries who had military traditions also chose to establish presidential systems in their constitutions at independence. According to this logic, countries who happened to have parliamentary systems

at their onset would maintain these systems; regardless, the factor to be examined is their military legacy. Thus follow Cheibub's simplified hypotheses:

H_0: Military legacy does not affect probability of democratic breakdown.

H_a: Military legacy does affect probability of democratic breakdown.

I will examine whether the case studies lend credence to rejecting Cheibub's null hypothesis.

At the time of partition and independence in 1947, both Pakistan and India chose to model their constitutions after the British Westminster system, where power rested in the hands of the parliament and prime minister (Desai 27). Despite this decision and the similarities from their colonial past, the two countries inherited significantly different military legacies.

In the British Indian Army, slightly over 45% of recruits were from Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, and Balochistan - the regions and populations that would later become Pakistan (Soherwordi 14). In regard to Muslim representation in the Indian Army, from 1929 up to the partition, Punjabi Muslims constituted 50-75 percent of the total Muslim population; in contrast Bengals only accounted for 4-6 percent of all Muslims (Kukreja 196).

During the partition of 1947, the Pakistan army was created from the division of the colonial Indian army. Nearly 97% of this new Pakistani army was made up of Punjabis (77%) and Pashtuns (19.5%), although they represented only 25% and 8% of the total population (Jaffrelot). This statistic was not unique to the rank-and-file members – there were striking differences in ethnic representation in the officers' corps as well. Punjabi Muslims again constituted at least 60 per cent of the officers' corps (Kukreja 196).

These figures indicate that a greater percentage of the population that became Pakistan had been involved in the military. Per capita, more Pakistanis had the knowledge, training, and

thought processes derived from military experience. Additionally, Britain used Punjab and North-West-Frontier Province (NWFP) as “militarized buffers” against other regional powers (Jaffrelot 2004). Moreover, in India, the Congress took substantial steps to decrease the army's social and political power and consolidate civilian control over the military and the state. One such step was abolishing the office of commander-in-chief of the defense forces in 1955. The leadership in Pakistan at the time, the Muslim League, took no comparable measures (Jalal 43). Thus, it follows that at partition, Pakistan inherited a stronger and more entrenched military legacy than India did.

Further evidence of this conclusion can be seen in the differences in military expenditures in the two countries immediately after partition.

Defense Expenditure of India and Pakistan During 1947-57				
		India	Pakistan	
Year	Defense Expenditure (in million Rs.)	Percentage of Total Government Expenditure	Defense Expenditure (in million Rs.)	Percentage of Total Government Expenditure
1947-48	866.3	44.5	236	65.16
1948-9	1460.5	46.9	461.5	71.32
1949-50	1488.6	46.6	625.4	73.06
1950-51	1641.2	44.1	649.9	51.32
1951-52	1709.5	45.3	792.4	54.96
1952-53	1795.2	45.5	725.7	56.68
1953-54	1998.3	44.1	633.2	58.7
1954-55	1866.6	37.1	640.5	57.5
1955-56	1722.3	38.3	917.7	64
1956-57	1921.5	37.5	800.9	60.1

Source: adapted from Veena Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia*

In the first year of partition, Pakistan was spending more than 20 percentage points more of their government budget on defense than India was.

Given this evidence and the fact that Pakistan has seen several fluctuations of regime between parliamentary democracy and dictatorship, in contrast with India's weaker military legacy and constant state of democracy, one can tentatively reject Cheibub's null hypothesis and claim that military legacy does affect the probability of democratic breakdown. However this inference is based on simple correlation. Cheibub himself does not offer a thorough explanation for the causal mechanisms that translate robust military legacy to higher probabilities of democratic breakdown. This gap prompts further examination of his hypothesis.

First, the reason that India was able to take measures against military rule involved several exogenous factors – they had a unitary central government in place and the ethnic diversity within their segment of the army weakened its strength. Furthermore, India's vast size makes the coordination of a military coup extremely difficult and highly improbable (Jalal 43).

A widely-circulated argument is that international conditions had a strong influence on both the strength of the military and the probability of democratic breakdown in countries. One such condition was the Cold War. In 1954, Pakistan's Commander-in-Chief signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States; the agreement stipulated $175 million from the US in order to modernize and equip the Pakistani military. In conjunction with this program, between 1953 and 1961, the United States under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program was training officers in the Pakistani army under a separate grant (Maniruzzaman 742). India had no program of comparable proportion.

Another external factor that allowed the military to maintain its political supremacy in Pakistan was the rivalry with India and the Kashmir issue. As Desai asserts, "long-term and comprehensive military rule can only be justified by a perceived need to address some perennial threat to the security of the state" (108). Due to their relative sizes, Pakistan's perception of the India threat was much higher than India's perception of Pakistan's.

In sum, although Cheibub's hypothesis holds up at first blush, it may be simplistic. Pakistan and India lend credence to the assertion that probabilities of democratic breakdown are related to military legacy. However, in addition to military legacy, a confluence of other factors, including international and institutional ones, should be included to further test the robustness of the hypothesis.

Boix

In his book *Democracy and Redistribution,* Carles Boix puts forth a game-theory-like model to explain the type of regime in various countries. In this model, the two primary actors, a wealthy elite and a lower class make strategic decisions given a set of conditions (inequality, asset specificity, and political resources in the hands of each class). Each generation of actors makes this decision anew. The model assumes that for economic reasons, the elite have nondemocratic preferences – they want to minimize redistributive policies. This same reasoning means that the poor prefer democracy. In deciding which regime they want, the elite must make a trade-off between two costs – the cost of repressing the lower class's demand for democracy and the cost of accepting democracy and the redistributive policies that come with it. These costs are dependent on the three aforementioned conditions. If inequality is high and the elite possess substantially more wealth than the poor, then they have an incentive to avoid

democracy. If there is a high degree of asset specificity and the rich aren't able to move their capital (outside the country and outside the grasp of the poor) with ease, then, again, they have an incentive to avoid democracy. Finally, if the poor are unable to overcome collective action problems and fail to mobilize in large numbers and an organized fashion, the costs of repression for elite remain relatively low, and they have reason to prefer an authoritarian regime. After the elite have made their decision, the poor act. If the wealthy chose to instate/keep a democratic system, the poor are satisfied. If not, the poor can choose to revolt against the authoritarian regime. They base this decision not only on the original three inputs but also on their knowledge of the strength of the wealthy. If they are believe that the cost of repression is sufficiently high for the elite, they choose to revolt. Here is a graphical illustration of Boix's hypothesis:



Note that the stronger the elite class, the lower the cost of repression (a stronger elite class implies more entrenched economic and political power and the necessary resources to deal with dissent from the lower classes).

I will now examine whether the cases of India and Pakistan fit this model. First, I will check whether the countries meet the assumptions of the model: the presence of an elite class with nondemocratic preferences and a working class with democratic preferences. I will compare the three input variables, inequality, capital specificity, and political resources in the two countries. Finally, I will check whether the actions of the actors and the resulting regimes are consistent with the predictions of the model.

The creation and entrenchment of a landed elite in both Pakistan and India extends back to the colonial period. When the East India Company came to the Indian subcontinent, it adopted different strategies in different regions. In Bengal, seen as "the gateway to the Indian empire" through the Ganges-Jumna waterway, the Company invested in and relied on bourgeois merchants (Desai 82). In central India, it created partnerships with the princes (rajs) and used them to exploit labor. It was the Indus region (the area which was to become West Pakistan), however, that saw the greatest concentration of power in the hands of few. There, the Company itself installed the feudals, a small network of landowners given vast tracts of territory, and then began to empower and use them (Desai 84). Huge irrigation projects sponsored by the company enabled the success of this new partnership. The British also introduced land revenue and tenure systems that made it difficult for the business classes to gain a foothold in the Indus region. In 1900, they passed the Punjab Land Alienation Act with

the goal of preventing moneylenders who had given loans to the landowners from using land as collateral. These measures enabled the landed elite in the Indus to acquire more and more land. Between 1866 and 1922, land prices in Punjab and other Indus provinces rose from Rs 10 to Rs 238 per acre (Desai 87). Another consequence of these policies was that in comparison to India, the Indus had a weak mercantile/business class.

So far, I have established that both India and Pakistan had landed elites, and that there was ostensibly more inequality (due to the feudal system) in the Indus region than anywhere else in India. The strength and regime preferences of the elite can be seen in their reactions to attempted land reforms. In India, the exploitative tax farming system that had been in place under British rule was removed at independence. The Indian National Congress was able to carry out this action because the landlords and princes were seen as the main perpetuators of unfair colonial policies under British rule; furthermore, the locus of the Indian elite's power was spread between large-tract landowners, medium-tract landowners, and the merchant class. Thus, a coalition of groups was able to come together under the Congress umbrella and divest power from the raj system (Harrison 36). In regard to this coalition, it is worth noting that in the two decades before partition, nearly fifty percent of the new recruits for the Congress were drawn from "prosperous proprietor classes" with land holdings of between 21 and 100 acres. These proprietors allied with urban businessmen to gain effective control of district and state Congress committees. Despite the abolition of the tax-collecting policy, Congress did not attempt to implement redistributive policies for the lower classes because of the desires of the Congress's provincial bosses (Jalal 46). The elite in India, although diversified, included a strong faction with nondemocratic preferences.

Reforms in Pakistan went much the same way in the sense that they yielded few substantial changes. Tentative attempts by the Pakistani state to bring about land reforms in the pre-1971 period were successfully circumvented by West Pakistan's big landowners. In contrast to coalition of middling landowners and businessmen that dominated the Congress in India, the Muslim League in Pakistan was completely in the hands of the bigger landlords of West Pakistan (Jalal 146). These landowners circumvented all attempts at land reforms in the pre-1971 period.

Compounding this problem was the partnership between the military, civil bureaucracy, and the dominant social classes in Pakistan. The composition of the Pakistani military was dominated by Punjabis; Punjab was also the region that benefited most from the feudal land system. When land reforms were actually enacted after 1971, the majority of the resumed land was sold at nominal prices to army and civil officials (Jalal 147). In brief, the elite in Pakistan consisted solely of large landowners who had demonstrated their nondemocratic preferences by allying with the military to resist land reforms. This partnership with the military and the unity of the elite class help make the case that the elite in Pakistan were stronger than the elite in India.

In evaluating income inequality, I considered the distribution of land holdings in Pakistan and India. Pakistan has significantly larger operational holdings than India.



Source: derived from Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*

The chart reveals that most of the land cultivated in Pakistan was owned by a small concentration of large landowners. Despite two subsequent attempts at land reform (in 1972 and 1977), almost 30 percent of the total farm area continues to be held by large landowners, with holdings of 150 acres and above (Desai 128). In contrast, "marginal and small farmers in India constitute as many as 80 per cent of the rural households and cultivate a third of the total farm area" (Jalal 148). This finding demonstrates that a greater number of assets are concentrated in a fewer number of individuals in Pakistan as compared to India, suggesting greater inequality in Pakistan and in India. Furthermore, the nature of these assets (land) precludes capital mobility, so comparatively, elites in Pakistan had less reason to maintain democracy.

Capital mobility can further be assessed by examining the contribution of agriculture versus that of industry and services to the nations' GDPs.



Source: World Bank

In the years following independence, Nehru implemented an industry-first development program in India (Harrison 67). Thus, even though India had a larger percentage of agricultural land at partition, industry contributed more and more to the economy. In Pakistan, there was also a rise in industrial output. Furthermore, both countries saw a steady decrease in agriculture and a rise in services. According to Boix, societies with economies based manufacturing industries and human capital-intensive businesses have higher capital mobility than those that rely on the exploitation of agricultural land (41). In this respect, both India and Pakistan saw rising levels of capital mobility between 1960 and 2005, implying that the elites had greater incentive over time to maintain/transition to democracy.

Thus far, there is evidence that India had more equality and capital mobility than Pakistan at partition. Next, I will consider the political mobilization of the lower classes in the two countries. Before 1970s, there the lower classes in both Pakistan and India were largely

unorganized, although there had been small-scale protests concerning economic grievances in both countries. Much of the unrest in Pakistan before 1972 was political – between the East and West branches of the Nation. Bangladesh's success in seceding from Pakistan was seen as a military defeat and created room for new leadership to emerge in Pakistan in the form of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and populist politics (Harrison 91). This leadership was a political resource for the lower classes in Pakistan in that it galvanized them and gave them a cause to rally around. One big draw of the Pakistan People's Party in the 1970 election was the promise of eradicating feudalism (Herring 520). Ultimately, Bhutto reneged on his campaign promises and adopted autocratic tendencies, but his rise to power via democratic process demonstrates that by this time, the lower classes in Pakistan were making greater demands of democracy.

In India, Indira Gandhi also came to power in the 1970s by taking advantage of populist politics. The poor voters in India had been hard hit by the food crisis and economic uncertainty of the 1960s and had become increasingly dissatisfied with the policies of the Congress. After succeeding in her 1971 election campaign, Gandhi set out to raise taxes and nationalize banks and industries. However, like Bhutto, she grew autocratic (and eventually declared the infamous Emergency) in reaction to the rise of regional political actors in various states. Local leaders with roots in the working classes like Bahuguna and Chandra Shekhar in Uttar Pradesh and Devaraj Urs in Karnataka were leveraging populist mobilization in the states and Gandhi considered them a serious threat (Jamal 75). Thus, this time was one of the poor gaining more political power, and the case of Indira Gandhi can be considered as evidence for the demand for increased democracy in India.

I have shown that at independence, costs of toleration in India were lower than they were in Pakistan due to Pakistan's unified and entrenched agricultural elite who held a large amount of concentrated wealth in the form of land, raising both inequality and asset specificity. Furthermore, the costs of repression were higher for India than they were for Pakistan. India is much vaster in territory and ethnic diversity, and its military arm was not a unified entity. In Pakistan, the homogeneity and eminence of the military means that there is "less room for maneuver between the hard choices of cooptation on the center's terms or costly anti-state defiance" (Jalal 200); it also means that the perceived cost of rebellion on part of the working classes is higher in Pakistan.

Except for one aspect, India seems to fit Boix's model and affirm his hypothesis. Each generation of leaders chose to maintain the parliamentary democracy laid out in India's original constitution. However, Boix's model predicts that a confluence of increasing equality and popular mobilization factor into the elite's decision to maintain/change the regime type. However, in India, a major impetus for popular dissatisfaction with the regime and mobilization was the blatant economic inequality the working class was facing. If Boix requires all three factors to be present and significant, then his model does needs to be adjusted. In terms of his hypothesis that elites prefer authoritarianism because they fear the costs of redistribution that are associated with democracy, the case of India, as compared to Pakistan, supports his hypothesis because India faced relatively lower costs of democracy. Indeed, the following table indicates that India has seen more redistribution than Pakistan has, and Boix would use this data to support his claim about democracies being redistributive mechanisms.

Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of gov't revenue)		
Year	**India**	**Pakistan**
1990	14.8379588	8.510153
1995	22.5055147	18.3440625
2000	27.0144953	19.0291081
2005	35.9335682	20.4911274

Source: World Bank

An analysis of the transitions to authoritarianism (military dictatorship) in Pakistan reveals that Pakistan does not fit Boix's model as well as India does. Although it had higher costs of toleration and lower costs of repression, the nation was founded as a parliamentary democracy. The first military coup was conducted by Major-General Mirza in an attempt to retain his power; Mirza was in turn ousted by General Mohammad Ayub Khan, who claimed that "the object of military rule was to return the country to sanity" (Wilcox 142). There were no major changes in the level of income equality or capital mobility in the period between 1947 and 1958. There was no uprising from the lower classes that required authoritarianism to put down. Thus, Boix's hypothesis fails to explain this particular decision of the elite. The next test of Boix's model, was the transfer of power between generals in 1969, which was instigated by violent demonstrations by students and industrial laborers in cities across Pakistan. These protestors were expressing discontent with inflation, increasing inequality, and lack of representative political processes (Stern 129). This issue along with the political dissent from East Pakistan impelled Ayub to resign as head of state in and handed over power to Commander-in-Chief Yahya Khan. Khan decided to hold elections in 1970. In this decision, popular mobilization helped contribute to rising costs of repression, so that is a point for Boix's model. However, Khan decided to transfer power to the people at a time of increasing

inequality and was not ultimately concerned about asset specificity (Bhave and Kingston 57). When it came time to the election itself, the Awami League, an Eastern Pakistani political party, ended up winning the majority vote. This outcome was unacceptable to the Western Pakistani leadership and military and when the Awami League refused to negotiate a coalition, Yahya ordered a military crackdown on East Pakistan (Bhave and Kingston 57). Ultimately, Eastern Pakistan seceded, and Western Pakistan entered a year of civilian dictatorship followed by five years of mixed democracy. This transition does not support Boix's redistributive hypothesis, as the decisions made by the elites were almost purely political and the working classes weren't a factor. Pakistan faced its next election in 1977. The results of the election were disputed, with claims that Bhutto had massively rigged the election. The transition of 1977 from democracy to authoritarianism occurred because the army took advantage of political chaos and inter-party rivalry to declare military rule (Bhave and Kingston 57). Again, the decision of the elite was not primarily influenced by concerns of redistribution; in fact, apart from the fact that there was a partnership and revolving door between the economic elite and the military officials, the decision of the elite was almost irrelevant. After the death of General Zia in 1998, the military again chose to democratize. My research did not reveal any conclusive evidence for this transition, redistribution-theory-related or otherwise. This analysis reveals that overall, the case of Pakistan does not support Boix's hypothesis. Although Pakistan displayed the necessary preconditions for a regime more prone to authoritarianism than its neighbor India, Boix's model cannot explain why the regime transitions happened when and the way they did in Pakistan.

Reynolds

In *Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World,* Andrew Reynolds argues that constitutional design, particularly the formation of inclusive institutions, is integral to a nation's democratic health, where health includes measures of democracy and stability. He highlights the importance of electoral systems and builds on consociational theory to posit the view that electoral systems with proportional representation are most strongly correlated with democratic success (Reynolds 74).



Reynolds goes on to say that first-past-the-post (FPTP) or single member plurality elections should never be used in fledgling democracies (Reynolds 81). This brings us to our case studies. As stated earlier, India and Pakistan both modeled their constitutions after the British Westminster style, meaning they modeled their electoral procedures after Britain's FPTP system. Pakistan ended up switching to a mixed system in the 1970s, and is experimenting with it again today (Reynolds 81). However, India, the more successful democracy of the two, continues to use its FPTP system; this finding seems to be at odds with Reynolds' hypothesis. I delve into the case studies to investigate this issue further.

At partition, there was significant ethnic diversity in both Pakistan and India. A study by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol placed ethnic polarization and ethnic fragmentation of India at 0.348 and 0.901, respectively; Pakistan had corresponding scores of 0.698 and 0.608. Thus even

though India had greater ethnic diversity, Pakistan faced more ethnic polarization. This data also satisfies the starting point condition for Reynolds' model – the presence of ethnic divisions.

Although Pakistan and India adopted similar electoral systems at independence, there was an important difference between their respective dominant political parties. Desai writes that "the inclusiveness of the congress party at the time of independence gave a place to all the major cleavages in Indian society" (29). Another scholar lauds the Congress for being "a unifying agent not merely in the obvious 'horizontal' sense in which it holds together a range of opinions and interests, but also in the important 'vertical' sense that it brings into contact and interpenetration all levels of politics from the most sophisticated to the most simple and traditional" (Kukreja 22). The Congress was an umbrella organization for a various diverse groups; it bridged: caste, economic power, religion, and personality. It allowed opposition to have a voice in order to offer criticism and exert pressure on itself (the Congress). The factions within the Congress heightened political competition and increased democratic participation in India. The leadership of the party was primarily composed of the Hindu upper caste but also included Muslims, Untouchables, Women, and various regional and linguistic groups. Furthermore, Nehru, aware of the ties between ethnicity and class in India, advocated class conciliation and based the legitimacy of the state on a civic notion of territoriality (Adeney 25). In order to accommodate linguistic divisions, the Congress Party reorganized its federal system along the lines of linguistic provinces in 1956.

In contrast, Pakistan's identity was based on a shared religion. Once the goal of a nation-state based on this identity was achieved, divides linguistic and cultural identity (primarily

between Bengalis and Punjabis) became an issue. The dominant party in Pakistan was the Muslim League, which saw acknowledging these divides as "antithetical to a pan-Muslim identity" (Adeney 30). The ML concentrated control of the party in a small group instead of trying to build a broader ruling coalition like the Congress did. Its leaders did not permit discussions within the party, and outside criticism of the League was equated with criticism of Pakistan (Kukreja 189). Thus Pakistan scores lower than India on executive inclusion, one of Reynolds' institutional variables.

Politics in Pakistan during the period between 1947 and 1958 was marked by non-consensus; there had been three separate (unsuccessful attempts) at drafting new constitutions and creating new institutions. When the "bureaucrats-turned-politicians" – Ghulam Mohammed, Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, and Iskander Mirza – came to power, they had did not respect the already-tenuous democratic institutions and "flouted all recognized parliamentary practices" (Kukreja 41). The failure of Pakistan to develop inclusive institutions was made strikingly clear when the East-West Pakistan conflict came to a head in 1970 and resulted in the breakup of the union (Desai 34). These events give counterfactual support for Reynolds' hypothesis because they confirm that a FPTP/majoritarian system was not suitable for developing democratic stability in Pakistan.

The argument can also be made that India has not truly achieved a high level of democracy and political competition. Representative institutions and governance in the Indian states have not "been consistent with democratic norms" (Harrison 33). Rule by ordinance is routine in state-level government in most states, precluding democratic legislative

participation. Legislatures meet very infrequently, fearing that the chief minister and government will be voted out of power should the meeting be held. This divesting of power would not be based on policy grounds but rather dissatisfaction on part of those in the majority party or coalition who have not received what they consider to be their due in the form of political patronage (Harrison 33). This information is evidence that within India, the majoritarian system has severe setbacks, and that majoritarian systems tend to be less democratic than consociational ones.

One theory that offers a different explanation for why federalism seemed to work better for India than for Pakistan is ethnofederalism. This explanation takes into account the nature of ethnic diversity in the region and finds that countries with core ethnic regions (such as Punjab in Pakistan) are less likely to have success with federalism.

	State Survival Peaceful Ethnofederation	**State Survival** Ethnofederalism Ended	**State Survival** Limited "Ethnic" Violence or Isolated Seccession	**State Collapse** Breakup	**State Collapse** Large-Scale Civil War
Has Core Ethnic Region	Belgium 1993– Tanzania 1992, 1995– *Bosnia 1995–*	Indonesia 1949–50 Pakistan 1985–99 *Cameroon 1961–72*	Serbia & Montenegro 1992, 1999–	Czechoslovaka 1990–92 Mali Federation 1960 USSR 1990–91 *Senegambia 1982–89*	Nigerian 1st Republic 1960–66 Pakistan 1970–71 Yugoslavia 1990–91
Lacks Core Ethnic Region	Canada 1867– Switzerland 1848– *Ghana 1992–* *South Africa 1994–*	Nigerian 2nd, 3rd Republics *Papua New Guinea 1977–90*	Ethiopia 1995– India 1956– Nigerian 4th Republic 1999– Russian Federation 1991– Spain 1979– *Malaysia 1957–* *Mexico 1917–*		

FIGURE 1
PATTERNS OF SURVIVAL AND COLLAPSE AMONG ETHNOFEDERAL STATES[a]

Source: Hale, "Divided We Stand"

This explanation is related to Reynolds' controls (degree of ethnic fragmentation and geographic distribution of ethnic groups).

In sum, the cases of Pakistan and India lend some support to Reynolds' hypothesis that countries that adopt more inclusive institutions fare better in terms of level of democracy and stability. Despite the fact that both India and Pakistan started out with similar FPTP systems, their paths diverged and Pakistan was impelled to modify its system. This divergence was due in part to the different approaches of the dominant political parties after independence. It may also have been rooted in inherent differences in the polarization and distribution of the elite. While Reynolds accounts for the former with his variable of executive inclusion, he fails to account for the latter, despite having controlled for it. Thus, while we can say that Pakistan lends credence to Reynolds' hypothesis that non-inclusive institutions, in particular FPTP electoral systems, we cannot confidently explain India's trajectory with his model.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this paper had to objectives: to examine how well the case studies of Pakistan and India fit theories of democracy; and to answer the question "How did two countries, which shared a colonial heritage and a few thousand years of history before that, see such different democratic trajectories?"

The first objective is summarized in the chart below:

	Cheibub	Boix	Reynolds
Pakistan	✓	✗	✓
India	✓	✓	?

The second objective can also be cautiously met. With the limited analysis I carried out in this paper, I can say that there is evidence that military legacy is a significant factor in the differing regime paths of India and Pakistan. Even though the landed elite were stronger in Pakistan and in India, ultimately, it was the military who made decisions about regime change. There was a partnership between the socioeconomic elite in Pakistan and the military elite, but the military's decisions to coup were largely a consideration of political, rather than, economic gain. India did not have the same military legacy, nor the smaller land mass and more homogenous population that Pakistan had, which eased some of its democratic pains. The evidence for Reynolds' theory suggests that had Pakistan spent greater time planning and developing inclusive political institutions, it may have seen more success with democracy. Given the fact that it is experimenting with a mixed electoral system now and has added other PR measures, perhaps the democratic regime currently in place will last longer than its predecessors.

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