

PhD Macro Core Part I:
Lecture 1 – A Simple Dynamic Exchange Economy II

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Today

- Compute Equilibrium using Social Planner's Problem
- Second Welfare Theorem
- Sequential Markets Equilibrium

Compute Equilibrium using Social Planner's Problem

- Compute for dynamic general equilibrium models would be much harder
- However, if the welfare theorem(s) hold, we have:
 - Competitive equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal (last lecture)
 - Compute all Pareto-optimal allocations by solving an appropriate social planner problem
 - Isolate those who are, in fact, competitive equilibrium allocations
- This is Negishi's (1960) method to compute equilibria

Social Planner's Problem: Setup

- For a Pareto weights $\alpha^i \geq 0$, consider the following social planner problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{(c_t^1, c_t^2)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \alpha^1 u(c^1) + \alpha^2 u(c^2) \\ &= \max_{\{(c_t^1, c_t^2)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [\alpha^1 \ln(c_t^1) + \alpha^2 \ln(c_t^2)] \\ \text{s.t. } & c_t^i \geq 0 \text{ for all } i, \text{ all } t \\ & c_t^1 + c_t^2 = e_t^1 + e_t^2 \equiv 2 \text{ for all } t \end{aligned} \tag{2.11}$$

- Optimal consumption choices are functions of $\alpha = (\alpha^1, \alpha^2)$

$$\{(c_t^1, c_t^2)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} = \{(c_t^1(\alpha), c_t^2(\alpha))\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$$

Social Planner's Problem: Properties

- **Proposition:** Any allocation $\{(c_t^1, c_t^2)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ that solves the social planners problem (2.11) for some vector of Pareto weights $\alpha > 0$ is Pareto efficient.
- **Proposition:** Conversely, any Pareto efficient allocation $\{(c_t^1, c_t^2)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is the solution to the social planners problem (2.11) for some vector of Pareto weights $\alpha \geq 0, \alpha \neq 0$.
- Proofs omitted
- So, we can characterize the set of all Pareto efficient allocations by varying the α 's
- All that matters are the relative weights α^1/α^2

Solve Social Planner's Problem: FOCs

- Solve the planner's problem for arbitrary $\alpha \geq 0$
- Attach Lagrange multipliers $\frac{\mu_t}{2}$ to the resource constraints
- The first order of necessary conditions are

$$\frac{\alpha^1 \beta^t}{c_t^1} = \frac{\mu_t}{2}$$

$$\frac{\alpha^2 \beta^t}{c_t^2} = \frac{\mu_t}{2}$$

Combining yields

$$\frac{c_t^1}{c_t^2} = \frac{\alpha^1}{\alpha^2} \tag{2.12}$$

$$c_t^1 = \frac{\alpha^1}{\alpha^2} c_t^2 \tag{2.13}$$

Solve Social Planner's Problem: Lagrange Multipliers

- Using the resource constraint in conjunction with (2.13) yields

$$c_t^1 + c_t^2 = 2$$

$$\frac{\alpha^1}{\alpha^2} c_t^2 + c_t^2 = 2$$

$$c_t^2 = 2 / (1 + \alpha^1 / \alpha^2) = c_t^2(\alpha)$$

$$c_t^1 = 2 / (1 + \alpha^2 / \alpha^1) = c_t^1(\alpha)$$

- The Lagrange multipliers are given by

$$\mu_t = (\alpha^1 + \alpha^2) \beta^t$$

- We can normalize $\alpha^1 + \alpha^2 = 1$, so the Lagrange multipliers are then

$$\mu_t = \beta^t$$

Solve Social Planner's Problem: Map to C.E.

- The set of Pareto efficient allocations is given by

$$PO = \left\{ \{ (c_t^1, c_t^2) \}_{t=0}^{\infty} : c_t^1 = 2 / (1 + \alpha^2 / \alpha^1) \text{ and } c_t^2 = 2 / (1 + \alpha^1 / \alpha^2) \right\}$$

- Compare FOCs of the competitive market and the social planner's problem:

$$\frac{\beta^t}{c_t^i} = \lambda_i p_t, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\alpha^i \beta^t}{c_t^i} = \frac{\mu_t}{2}$$

- This suggests that if we were to construct an equilibrium with allocations from the set PO :

$$p_t = \mu_t = \beta^t, \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_i = \frac{1}{2\alpha^i}$$

Solve Social Planner's Problem: Final Steps

- Define the transfer functions $t^i(\alpha)$, $i = 1, 2$ by

$$t^i(\alpha) = \sum_t \mu_t [c_t^i(\alpha) - e_t^i], \quad \text{with "right" at C.E. } t^i(\alpha) = 0$$

- Using the Lagrange multipliers before normalization, we note that

$$t^i(\alpha) = \sum_t \mu_t [c_t^i(\alpha) - e_t^i] = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\alpha^1 + \alpha^2) \beta^t [c_t^i(\alpha) - e_t^i]$$

- Fortunately, the transfer functions sum to zero for all α , since

$$\sum_{i=1}^2 t^i(\alpha) = \sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_t \mu_t [c_t^i(\alpha) - e_t^i] = \sum_t \mu_t \sum_{i=1}^2 [c_t^i(\alpha) - e_t^i] = 0$$

Solve Social Planner's Problem: Final Steps

- Doing so yields

$$\begin{aligned} t^1(\alpha) &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\alpha^1 + \alpha^2) \beta^t [c_t^1(\alpha) - e_t^1] = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [2 / (1 + \alpha^2 / \alpha^1) - e_t^1] \\ &= \frac{2}{(1 - \beta)(1 + \alpha^2 / \alpha^1)} - \frac{2}{1 - \beta^2} = 0 \end{aligned}$$

therefore,

$$\alpha^2 / \alpha^1 = \beta$$

- Finally, the corresponding consumption allocations are

$$\begin{aligned} c_t^1 &= \frac{2}{1 + \alpha^2 / \alpha^1} = \frac{2}{1 + \beta} \\ c_t^2 &= \frac{2}{1 + \alpha^1 / \alpha^2} = \frac{2\beta}{1 + \beta} \end{aligned}$$

Solve Social Planner's Problem: Remarks

1. Solve the social planner's problem for Pareto efficient allocations indexed by the Pareto weights
2. Compute transfers, indexed by α , necessary to make the efficient allocation affordable. Prices use Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraints in the planners' problem
3. Find the normalized Pareto weight(s) $\hat{\alpha}$ that makes the transfer functions 0
4. The Pareto efficient allocations corresponding to $\hat{\alpha}$ are equilibrium allocations; the supporting equilibrium prices are (multiples of) the Lagrange multipliers from the planning problem

Second Welfare Theorem

- The second welfare theorem provides a converse to the first welfare theorem.
- **Core:** Under suitable assumptions, it states that for any Pareto-optimal allocation, a price system exists such that the allocation and price system form a competitive equilibrium.
- **Assumption:**
 - All assumptions of the first theorem; in addition:
 - The preference relation is locally non-satiated and convex for each consumer
 - The production set is convex for each firm
 - For the step from price quasi-equilibrium to price equilibrium with transfers: The initial endowment of each agent is strictly positive.
- Proof omitted (from MWG)

Sequential Markets Equilibrium: Setup

- Let r_{t+1} denote the interest rate on one period bonds from period t to period $t + 1$.
- A one-period bond is a promise (contract) to pay 1 unit of the consumption good in period $t + 1$ in exchange for $\frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}}$ units of the consumption good in period t .
- We can interpret $q_t \equiv \frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}}$ as the relative price of one unit of the consumption good in period $t + 1$ in terms of the period t consumption good.
- Let a_{t+1}^i denote the amount of such bonds purchased by agent i in period t and carried over to period $t + 1$. (If $a_{t+1}^i < 0$, we can interpret this as the agent taking out a one-period loan.)
- Household i 's budget constraint in period t reads as

$$c_t^i + \frac{a_{t+1}^i}{(1 + r_{t+1})} \leq e_t^i + a_t^i \quad (2.17)$$

Sequential Markets Equilibrium: Definition

- **Definition:** A Sequential Markets equilibrium is allocations $\left\{ (\hat{c}_t^i, \hat{a}_{t+1}^i)_{i=1,2} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, interest rates (which is prices in SM equilibrium) $\{\hat{r}_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ such that

1. For $i = 1, 2$, given interest rates $\{\hat{r}_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, $\{\hat{c}_t^i, \hat{a}_{t+1}^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves

$$\max_{\{c_t^i, a_{t+1}^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln(c_t^i) \quad (2.18)$$

$$c_t^i + \frac{a_{t+1}^i}{(1 + \hat{r}_{t+1})} \leq e_t^i + a_t^i$$

$$c_t^i \geq 0 \text{ for all } t \quad (2.19)$$

$$a_{t+1}^i \geq -\bar{A}^i \quad (2.20)$$

2. For all $t \geq 0$

$$\sum_{i=1}^2 \hat{c}_t^i = \sum_{i=1}^2 e_t^i, \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{i=1}^2 \hat{a}_{t+1}^i = 0$$

Sequential Markets Equilibrium: Properties

- **Proposition:** Let allocations $\left\{ (\hat{c}_t^i)_{i=1,2} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and prices $\{\hat{p}_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ form an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium w/

$$\frac{\hat{p}_{t+1}}{\hat{p}_t} \leq \xi < 1 \text{ for all } t \quad (2.22)$$

Then: (1) there exist an S.M.E. w/ $(\bar{A}^i)_{i=1,2}$, $\left\{ (\tilde{c}_t^i, \tilde{a}_{t+1}^i)_{i=1,2} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, and $\{\tilde{r}_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ such that

$$\tilde{c}_t^i = \hat{c}_t^i \text{ for all } i, \text{ all } t$$

(2) Reversely, let $\left\{ (\hat{c}_t^i, \hat{a}_{t+1}^i)_{i=1,2} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and $\{\hat{r}_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ form an S.M.E. that satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{a}_{t+1}^i &> -\bar{A}^i \text{ for all } i, \text{ all } t \\ \hat{r}_{t+1} &\geq \varepsilon > 0 \text{ for all } t \end{aligned} \quad (2.23)$$

Then there exists a corresponding Arrow-Debreu equilibrium $\left\{ (\tilde{c}_t^i)_{i=1,2} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, $\{\tilde{p}_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ such that

$$\hat{c}_t^i = \tilde{c}_t^i \text{ for all } i, \text{ all } t$$

Sequential Markets Equilibrium: Proof Steps

- Step 1: Show that any consumption allocation that satisfies the sequence of SM budget constraints is also in the AD budget set.

From this, it fairly directly follows that **an AD equilibria can be made into SM equilibria.**

- Step 2: Make sure that we can find a large enough borrowing limit \bar{A}^i such that the asset holdings required to implement the AD consumption allocation as an S.M.E. do not violate any Ponzi constraint.
- Step 3: Argue that **an SM equilibrium can be made into an AD equilibrium.**

Dynamic Exchange Economy: Takeaways

- Introduced basic concepts of model setting
- Introduced basic concepts of markets (incomplete/complete)
- Introduced basic concepts of welfare theorems
- Introduced basic concepts of equilibrium definition & solutions
- A bit of proofs in macroeconomics

References

- [DK] Dirk Krueger, Macroeconomic Theory (2015)
 - Chapter 2: A Simple Dynamic Economy
- Please refer to the book for all other proofs