

The SMACCPilot Project

A High Assurance Software Research Project

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What is SMACCPilot

A Project by Galois:

- We Create Trustworthiness in Critical Systems
- Computer Science research using expertise in language design and formal methods.
- 14 years and 40 employees in Portland, Oregon.
- Named after Évariste Galois (1811-1832), genius mathematician



What is SMACCM Pilot



- Secure
- Mathematically-
- Assured
- Composition of
- Control
- Models

Why High Assurance?

What if we built software like we built bridges?



Why High Assurance?



- Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure
 - Failed converting 64 bit float to 16 bit integer
- Intel P5 Pentium FDIV bug
 - 1 in 9 billion computations were wrong
 - \$475 Million to fix

What is High Assurance Software

"Testing shows the presence, not the absence, of bugs."

- E.W. Dijkstra

- Testing can't possibly cover the whole state space of complex systems
- Attack model isn't probabilistic: assume that adversaries are hard at work to discover vulnerabilities.

Properties to Assure

We're focusing on safety and security properties of embedded systems.

- Functional Correctness: a program always implements a given relation of inputs and outputs
- Memory Safety: each read and write to memory only accesses locations the programmer has explicitly allowed
- Timing Safety: real-time deadlines are always met, for any set of inputs

Correct by Construction

- Methods exist for proving properties of existing programs - but they're often not complete or difficult to use
- Memory and type safety is very hard to prove about an existing program
- We made a new *Domain Specific Language* language where these properties are guaranteed *correct by construction*

Domain Specific Language

What is a Domain Specific Language (DSL)?

- sed, awk: classic DSLs for text manipulation
- MATLAB: a DSL for matrix math
- Simulink: a DSL for composing MATLAB programs with streams

The Ivory Language

Ivory is a Domain Specific Language

- Provable Memory and Type Safety
- Appropriate for embedded systems programming
- Interacts with legacy C

Avoid the memory safety pitfalls of C:

- Unbounded array access
- Stack protection & allocation
- Null pointers
- Untyped pointers
- Heap allocation

The Ivory Language

A restricted C is hard to program with.

- Hey, C is hard enough already!
- In C, the language does not provide good *abstraction*.
- End up using C's safety holes (untyped pointers, null pointers, unbounded arrays) to implement run-time behaviors.
- The C preprocessor is very limited for implementing compile-time abstractions.

The Ivory Language

Ivory uses a full-featured programming language as a *macro language*

- Commonly called an *embedded domain-specific language* (EDSL).

We've embedded Ivory in the Haskell programming language

- Pure functional language
- Powerful type system
- General purpose



Why Embedded Language?

Haskell

Ivory Language


```
import Ivory.Language
```

Ivory Compiler

```
import Ivory.Backend.C
```

- Building a programming language is hard!
- Get your programming language features for free:
 - Syntax & Parser
 - Lexical Scope
 - Type Checker
 - Macro Language
- Macro Language is Type Safe and Turing Complete

Compiling and Running Ivory




```
arrayExample :: Def(' [ Ref s (Array 4 (Stored UInt8))  
                      , UInt8] :-> ())  
arrayExample = proc "arrayExample" $  
  \ arr x -> body $ do  
    arrayMap $ \ ix -> do  
      v <- deref (arr ! ix)  
      store (arr ! ix) (v + x)
```

- Array length determines loop bound
- Limited loop combinators guarantee correct behavior

Types, Structures, Arrays

```
struct foo
{
  bar :: Stored IBool
  baz :: Stored IFloat
  qux :: Array 42 (Stored UInt32)
}
```

More Ivory Features

Built in features to enable and encourage safety:


- No implicit casting: `safeCast`, `castWith`, `castDefault`.
- Special facilities for dealing with bit data (e.g. memory-mapped peripherals)
- Automatic checks for bad behavior like divide by zero; user annotations with `assert` and `assume`.

Program Composition

- Translating a “block diagram” program architecture into code is a classic software engineering problem.
 - How many LOC for ArduCopter’s global state?
- RTOS facilities are tricky to use correctly
- Want guarantees about data flow, timing of our resulting composition

Framework for composing Ivory programs with real-time tasks.

- Primitives are *global state* and *communication channels*
- Enforce memory and timing safety between tasks
- Generate safe glue code, graphs, and output for tools



At last: SMACMPilot

- Simple “stabilize mode” PID loops, RC control only
- MAVLink telemetry, parameters
- Uses the ArduPilot AP_AHRS library to run sensors and sensor fusion.
- PX4FMU 1.7 + PX4IOAR

At last: SMACCMPIlot

- Application is 2400 lines of Ivory code
 - ArduCopter subdir is 10k lines
- 5000 lines of Ivory generated for MAVLink
- 200 lines of Tower describe 9 tasks, 11 channels
- Under 9 man-months of effort

SMACCMPIlot System Diagram

(jump to pdf)

At last: SMACCMPIlot

Coming soon:

- Hardware Drivers
- Control Systems
- Networking

Ivory, Tower, and SMACCMPIlot are open source.

`smacccmpilot.org`

Questions?

