



# **THE ROLE OF POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION ON IRANIAN EMIGRATION RATE**

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## **Abstract**

Iran has a long history of human rights abuse and political repression, which has contributed to significant levels of emigration. This research paper explores the role of human rights abuse and political dissatisfaction in driving Iranians to leave the country and immigrate. The paper uses data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iran migration observatory website and other sources to examine if there are a correlation between major political events, exchange rates and political dissatisfaction and the increase or decrease of emigration. The paper argues that political dissatisfaction, including the widespread protests and demonstrations have played a significant role in driving Iranians to leave the country. The paper also discusses the implications of these findings for understanding Iranian immigration motivations as well as the obstacles that prevents them from doing it.

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## **1. Introduction**

Iran's political system is founded on the 1979 revolution and the Shariah constitution that resulted from the foundation of the Islamic Republic government. The executive branch is led by the president, who is elected by universal adult suffrage and must be an Iranian Shi'i by birth. Until July 1989, when a countrywide referendum approved a constitutional reform that removed the job of prime minister and gave the president more authority, this position was primarily ceremonial. According to the 1979 constitution, all judges must base their judgements on Sharia law (Islamic law). In 1982, the Supreme Court overturned any component of the ousted monarchy's legal laws. The chief judge and prosecutor general must be Shi'i canon law experts (Afary, J. et al, 2023).

Since 1979, Iran has faced diplomatic and economic isolation. The accumulation of several rounds of US and United Nations sanctions are having a significant impact on the Iranian economy. Iran's attempt to overtures towards other regional or rising powers such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, Sudan and Venezuela have not improved its overall position (Association for Iranian Studies (AIS), n.d).

Furthermore, a quick inventory of human rights violations committed by governments that include some transgressions, mostly of civil and political rights, occur on a daily basis resulting in a massive migratory wave of people seeking access to greater options, opportunities, and freedom. The deprivation of the right to life; the right to be free from torture or cruel and degrading punishment; the right to liberty and security of person, as well as freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; the right to a fair trial; the right to freedom of conscience, thought, and religion; and the right to freedom of opinion, expression, and the press are examples of non-cultural abuses. (Afshari, 2001) According to the current literature, the political, demographic, socio-economic and environmental situations are the major drivers of migration (Castelli, 2018). The article will illustrate the major political events which were accrued as a result of above-mentioned human right abuses and also economic factors that rolled as drivers of nation-wide protests in Iran. In addition, it will investigate if there is correlation between these political dissatisfactions and the increase or decrease of the migration rate to verify the previously made statement for the case study of Iran. This is particularly important to understand that all the mentioned factors are intertwined with the political system and mode of governance of a country. If the country is losing the population and is facing brain drain (Azadi et al., 2020), it would be safe to assume that the political system has failed because political disengagement is a reflection of a broken political system and culture, not a deficiency in the populace (Lou McDonald, 2014). This work is an attempt to prove the obvious -the failure of a theocratic totalitarian dictatorship- in a support of people of Iran with their fight for freedom and democracy.

## **2. Methodology**

The aim of the research is to find a meaningful positive correlation between political dissatisfaction and increase of emigration rate.

Personal dissatisfaction and grievances, drive political engagement, particularly protest behaviour according to grievance theory. Grievances are "feelings of dissatisfaction" with key areas of life (Bassoli & Monticelli, 2018) This article will use this theory as a pre-condition that political dissatisfaction will lead to nation-wide protests. Investigating the possible correlation between major protests followed by violent actions in Iran and increasing rate of emigration, this report then will try to find out whether political dissatisfaction is a driver of emigration from the country.

This study is retrospective or "after-the-fact" research, a type of quasi-experiment where the naturally-occurring phenomenon and is unable to control the assignment of participants to groups. However, because the groups have not been formed specifically for the study, it can be more difficult to establish causality in the relationship between the independent and dependent variables due to the number of external factors that will be described in following sections using deductive approach.

While political events are considered as a factor that effects emigration with a positive correlation, increasing exchange rates are also have been included in the calculations to have a positive or negative weight on ability to emigrate.

Using Excel software, data has been analysed using multiple regression with the “total weight” of political and economic factors as independent and migrated population with a 2-year lag time as the dependant variable.

### 3. Empirical Analysis: Political Dissatisfaction in Iran

To understand the current state of Iranian immigration, it is important to first consider the historical context of the country. Prior to the 1979 revolution, Iran experienced relatively low levels of immigration compared to other countries in the region. However, the revolution and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic Republic fundamentally transformed the political and social landscape of the country, leading to significant changes in immigration patterns.(Azadi et al., 2020)

In this section, the paper will try to elaborate some important factors that causes the people to be dissatisfied with the ruling regime of Iran. Usually, these dissatisfactions break out by nationwide public protests and result with violent measures from the government. Both factors and major protests in Islamic Republic regime’s history has been discussed in this part to elaborate the causes, factors, consequences and the growing trend of the emigration.

#### 3.1.Factors contributing to the political dissatisfaction in Iran

Factors such as “Human rights abuses”, “Economic challenges”, “Political repression and lack of democratic reforms”, “Access to opportunities” and “Decay of the law, accountability and quality of life” are the indicated categories that are triggering the political dissatisfaction in Iran. Table 3.1 1: Political Dissatisfaction factors in Iran in Annex summarizes and explains the current political environment of Iran.

#### 3.2.Major Political Events and Protests in Iran

In order to understand how the actions of Islamic Regime in Iran are causing the dissatisfactions among people, it is crucial to follow the most important nationwide events and protests by different groups in Iran. Table 3.2 1: Major political events which caused protest outbreaks in Iran lists the main uprisings against the government actions in past 44 years, since the beginning of the current regime.

**Table 3.2 1: Major political events which caused protest outbreaks in Iran**

Major political events	Years
-Iran Iraq war and academic cleaning program (formally cultural revolution).	1980-
-Former Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh and more than 1,000 others were arrested for plotting to assassinate Ayatollah Khomeini.	1988
-Mass execution of political prisoners of conscience in Iran, over 30.000 people were hanged at once without trials (Amnesty International, 2019)	
After Ayatollah Khomeini died, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was appointed as the next supreme leader. The role of prime minister was abolished under a rewritten constitution, and the Expediency Discernment Council was established permanent. The supreme leader's authority was increased.	1989
For the first time, the Guardian Council thoroughly investigated candidates in the fourth parliamentary elections, disqualifying 30 incumbents. Two-thirds of the seats were gained by the conservative Society of Combatant Clergy.	1992
Students demonstrated at Tehran University after reformist Salaam newspaper was closed by the judiciary. Protests continued for six days. More than 1,000 students were arrested.	1999
The judiciary has banned 16 reformist journals, extending its attack on the rising independent press.	2000
Students led protests against raising university fees and privatization of universities that grew into wider pro-democracy demands	2003
Protests erupted after the government-imposed fuel rationing.	2007

Major political events	Years
Ahmadinejad won re-election. The defeated candidates and many others claimed massive voting fraud. Thousands of pro-government forces rallied in response to opposition protests. Many people died thousands were arrested	2009
The first mass anti-government demonstrations in a year took place following uprisings throughout the Arab world. Violent clashes with security forces reportedly left two dead. Opposition groups reported that 1,500 people were detained.	2011
Riot police in Iran broke up protests at a major market in Tehran. Protesters blamed President Ahmadinejad for the rial's depreciation. Due to the protests, the market was closed for three days. Iran has put a ban on more than 70 different categories of international luxury goods.	2012
Hassan Rouhani close to reformists, won the presidential election with 18.6 million votes	2013
-The Girls of Revolution Street protest movement against the mandatory hijab began. Female protesters recorded videos of themselves without a hijab, or waving their hijabs on street corners and other public places. -On December 28, 2017, protests broke out in Mashhad, Iran's second largest city, over economic hardships, corruption, and rising food and fuel prices. The protests quickly morphed into anti-government demonstrations that spread to more than 80 cities. At least 20 people were killed and more than 3,000 arrested.	2017
-Protests shut down Tehran's Grand Bazaar. Thousands of people marched to voice economic grievances. Riot police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. -Gunmen attacked a military parade in the southwestern Iranian city of Ahvaz. The attackers killed at least 29 people and wounded 70, including IRGC soldiers and civilians.	2018
People started protesting against fuel price increase and quickly it turned once again, to the anti-governmental protests. The regime shot down the internet and killed more than 1500 people many un-identified and more than 7500 people were arrested in total silence. On 11 January, the Iranian IRGC shot down the aircraft as a revenge plan from the US for killing general Qasem Soleymani in Iraq resulted in death of 176 passengers mostly Iranian-Canadian. The announcement triggered another wave of Iranian anti-government protests (part of the larger 2019–2020 Iranian protests), with many Iranians calling for the removal or overthrow of Ali Khamenei. ( <i>Reuters, 2020</i> )	2019-2020
Starting on May 23, several major cities, including Tehran, were hit by rolling power blackouts caused by soaring temperatures and rising demand on crumbling infrastructure. Meanwhile, over 300 cities—nearly a fourth of all municipalities—faced water shortages caused by a drought that produced one of the driest years since 1971. The twin crises triggered protests in major cities and the provinces across several days. Many people brutally murdered by the armed forces during the protests.	2021
The biggest and the most widespread protests of Iranians living inside or outside the country in response to Mahsa Amini's murder at the custody for not having a proper hijab. More than 500 people lost their lives during the protests and many were executed after being accused of false crimes without having fair trials and access to attorneys. ( <i>Loft P, 2022.</i> )	2022-2023

Source : (*Timeline of Iran's Political Events, 2021*)

### 3.3.The impact of political dissatisfaction on Iranian immigration in history

After discussing the reasons of political dissatisfaction and the most known related protests against government, the paper will investigate if these factors are in fact a driver for migration or not by seeking a meaningful correlation between major events and prior migration trends. It is also important to know that many political events in Iran also have adverse effect on exchange rates and elimination of possibility of international mobility and migration for the people. Therefore, the higher the dissatisfactions become, the harder would be to migrate for the middle-class citizens. This section will discuss the immigration patterns of Iranians in pre and post revolution periods and also elaborate the current trends of immigration between Iranians. The limitation to access detailed data on

emigration of Iranians by year however, resulted in using the Net Migration rate in the calculation of correlation analysis.

The 1979 revolution in Iran, like many other historical revolts, gave rise to ideological divisions and internal conflicts within the nation. The revolution marked a significant shift in the political, social, and cultural landscape of the country, leading to conflicts and tensions between various groups and factions (Shams, 2021).

The "The Triumph of Broken Promises," book argues that this instability was exacerbated by Iran, the world's second-largest oil producer, halting its oil exports in December 1978. The resulting social unrest and economic uncertainty had a major effect on global oil markets and contributed to the global political climate followed by isolation of the country of naturally more people desire to leave the country (Bartel, 2017).

The third phase of Iranian immigration, which began in 1995 and continues to the present day, has seen the arrival of both elderly, middle-class Iranians and younger men and women seeking advanced education or professional opportunities. These immigrants have helped to build and strengthen the Iranian American community, and have used their growing economic and political influence to advocate for the rights and interests of their community. They have persevered and made a home for themselves in their new country despite facing challenges and obstacles (Porritt, 2012).

According to Iran Migration Outlook (2021), Iran is ranked 54 out of 232 countries regarding its migrant stock in the world with the estimated total population of 4.04 million, however, based on international sources, the number is 1.8 million (2020) which equals to 2.23% of the country population. The number of Iranians who migrated from the country had an increase of 2.2 times over the past 30 years. Share of Iranian migrates abroad in total international migration rate is 44.1%.

In terms of the number of international students, Iran's global rank rose from 29 in 2003 to 11 in 2012, which is the most dramatic jump in Iran's ranking in terms of sending international students during the last two decades.

The population of migrant Iranian students was set at 50,000 students between 2012 and 2018. Iran was rated 19 in terms of the number of migrant students as a result of such minor adjustments. (*Iran Migration Outlook 2021 Iran Migration Observatory*, n.d.)

According to the data, Iranian's migration rate has been increasing significantly after 2010. The paper will try to investigate the possible connection between these trends and the major political events in the country.

### **3.4.External factors effecting the migration rates of Iranians**

Although many people are eager to leave Iran every day for the reasons explained in previous sections, there are lots of barriers that comes along the way and many of them cannot go through the process. These external factors could influence the real migration data compared to what would the data show if everyone could leave the country when they wanted to. Some of the most important barriers for Iranians to migrate such as "Weak Passport" (Passport of Iran, n.d.), Visa Issues" (Hossein Hormazi, 2016), "Limited international opportunities" (*Iran International Newsroom*, 2022), "Financial capability and exchange rate" (*Dagres*, 2020), "Family and social bonds" (Iranian Culture - Family, 2016), "Military Service"(*Bijan K.*, 2015), "Release of educational diplomas"(*Shelby L. Cearley & Maria Mason*, n.d.), "Father-Husband permission requirement for women" (*Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada* (2003 - 2005). For detailed description please see

Table 3.4.1 in annex.

## **4. Discussion on the Findings**

### **Hypothesis:**

H0: There is no positive correlation between political dissatisfaction and increasing rate of emigration in Iran  
H1: There is a positive correlation between political dissatisfaction and increasing rate of emigration in Iran

### Calculation:

For the statistics, data from different sources has been used and all are mentioned in the resources. Political events and Exchange rate are two effective variables which will be weighted separately according to their importance and influence on people's decision and ability to emigrate from Iran. The total weight has been acquired then by summing up the two previously mentioned weights to have the independent variable while the Emigrated population is the dependent variable. Considering the fact that people usually need a long time from the day they decide to migrate to the day they succeed to do it, for preparing, saving, planning and organizing their jobs and studies, a 2-year period as "time-leg" has been given to each event to be resulted as emigration rate. To be able to include this 2-year period into the calculation, each population number has been assigned to the dates of 2 years ago from its actual correspondent date. A multiple regression analysis has been applied to see the correlation between two variables of "Total Weight" and the population with the "2-year time leg". The complete table is available in the Annex as Table 3.5. 1.

### Results:

Multiple regression applied to the dataset which was explained in previous section and the results can be found in Table 4. 1 and Figure 4. 1: **Prediction of emigrant growth by increasing political dissatisfaction.**

Table 4. 1: Analysis

SUMMARY OUTPUT								
<i>Regression Statistics</i>								
Multiple R	0.321985							
R Square	0.103674							
Adjusted R Square	0.080691							
Standard Error	327698.7							
Observations	41							
ANOVA								
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>			
Regression	1	4.84E+11	4.84E+11	4.510963	0.040074			
Residual	39	4.19E+12	1.07E+11					
Total	40	4.67E+12						
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	131288.5	79491.89	1.651596	0.106648	-29499.1	292076	-29499.1	292076
X Variable 1	40743.95	19183.53	2.123903	0.040074	1941.602	79546.29	1941.602	79546.29






Figure 4. 1: Prediction of emigrant growth by increasing political dissatisfaction

This summary output is from a multiple linear regression analysis. The model being used has one predictor variable which represents the combination of effects of political events and exchange rate as an indicator of political dissatisfaction (referred to as "Total Weight") and one outcome variable which represents emigrant population.

The multiple R value of 0.321984745 indicates a moderate positive correlation between the predictor variable (total weight) and the outcome variable (emigrant population).

The R-squared value of 0.103674176 suggests that about 10.37% of the variation in the outcome variable is explained by the predictor variable.

The ANOVA (analysis of variance) table shows the results of a statistical test to determine whether there is a significant relationship between the predictor variable and the outcome variable. The F-value of 4.510963267 and the significance level of 0.040074473 suggest that there is a significant relationship between the predictor variable and the outcome variable.

The coefficients table shows the estimated slope of the regression line (40743.94648) and the y-intercept (131288.4809) of the line. The t-statistic and P-value for the predictor variable suggest that it is a statistically significant predictor of the outcome variable. The 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients provide a range of plausible values for the true population coefficients with a 95% probability.

With the P-value of 0.4, we can reject the H0 hypothesis and accept H1. Therefore, the results show that after Iran's revolution in 1979, political dissatisfaction which has been defined by two indicators of "political events" and "exchange rate" is a significant driver for Iranians to emigrate and there is a strong relationship between these events and people's desire to leave the country in a 2-year period. It's also important to consider the obstacles that act as a push back of people's migration as the political isolation gets stronger in the country as explained before.

## 5. Conclusion

Iran has a long history of human rights violations and political persecution, which has resulted in substantial emigration. This research study investigated the role of political dissatisfaction in causing Iranians to flee the nation and immigrate. The paper examined whether there is a correlation between major political events and exchange rates as the indicators of political dissatisfaction and the increase

or decrease in emigration using quantitative data and analysing them with multiple regression using excel software tools.

Analysis showed that there is in fact a significant positive correlation between these factors and emigration rates. To summarize, we can conclude that Islamic Republic of Iran has been trying to isolate the country for past 44 years and that has been causing of several political and economic sanctions on the country and people. High inflation rates and poverty are acting as a driver of emigration for those who still have small financial means to support themselves to start a new life in other countries while at the same time, plays a very significant role as a limit for those of lower economic power along with many other growing obstacles.

Therefore, while the paper shows that as political dissatisfaction grows, the emigrant population also increases, the real numbers would be much higher if people didn't face so much obstacles. It is obvious that the regime has been failed to provide a liveable condition for its people and now is losing its brightest minds, skilful people and future human capital.

Considering difficulty of access to data from outside of Iran and the complication of the situation, I would suggest to future researches who have access to more updated and accurate data, to go deeper into each indicator of political dissatisfaction whether positive or negative, to study each one's importance in emigration rates. Another useful method would be providing Iranian's abroad with surveys to know their main motivation and reason to leave their country which was primarily the planned method of this paper but the recent uprising in Iran and difficulty to access people made it impossible to reach an acceptable number of surveys.

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Table 3.1 1: Political Dissatisfaction factors in Iran

Factors	Description
<b>Human rights abuses</b>	<p>The Islamic Republic of Iran has been criticized for its human rights abuses and being "anti-women," as it has implemented laws and policies that discriminate against women and limit their rights by the Islamic Constitutional Law (<i>Porritt, 2012</i>). Its lack of protection for basic human rights, including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion had particularly negative consequences for ethnic and religious minorities in the country (<i>Roth &amp; Fukuyama, 1993</i>) and the lack of protection for civil liberties in Iran can be characterized as "illiberal."</p> <p>Human Rights Watch's World Report highlights the ongoing suppression of civil society and the persecution of human rights defenders in Iran. In 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran's judiciary implemented measures that increased the penalties for peaceful dissent. This crackdown was carried out by repressive domestic security agencies, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (<i>Human Rights Watch, 2019</i>).</p>
<b>Economic challenges</b>	<p>High unemployment, inflation, and financial insecurity have all been longstanding issues in Iran. The implementation of economic sanctions and the country's isolation on the world stage has contributed to a sense of discontent. In conjunction with the implementation of international sanctions on Iran, the United States also imposed its own domestic sanctions on the country (<i>Portela, 2019</i>).</p> <p>Most importantly, the regime is economically corrupted by regular massive embezzlements as well as the expenditure and investments in region countries instead of Iran (<i>Farzanegan &amp; Zamani, 2022</i>) which makes people feel they have no value for the ruling regime and their money and resources are being consumed by the rulers or neighbour countries.</p>
<b>Political repression and lack of democratic reforms</b>	<p>The Islamic Republic of Iran is widely recognized as a theocratic regime, in which ultimate political power is granted to the Shiite religious institution. This organization functions as a supreme leader and holds the influence over the country's government and policies (<i>Byrd, 1997</i>). The theocratic nature of the Iranian government and lack of opposition parties have been a source of controversy and have contributed to political dissatisfaction within the country (<i>Mazama, 1995</i>). Despite the long-rooted efforts, however, the government has been resistant to any democratic reforms. (<i>Afshari, 2011</i>).</p>
<b>Access to opportunities</b>	<p>Social mobilization, which refers to a cluster of changes in reproductive behaviour, education, urbanization, and labour mobility that typically occur around the same time for each nation, is another important predisposing factor that has slowly but fundamentally changed the migration landscape in Iran. As with the concept of capital investment, increased per-child expenditure on education and training, as the most important investments in human capital, has led the current generation of Iranian students to pursue further education outside of Iran. (<i>Azadi et al., 2020</i>)</p>
<b>Decay of the law, accountability and quality of life</b>	<p>Since the early 2000s, there has been a progressive loss of governmental capacity of providing quality health education system, legitimacy, as well as the rise of corruption and the eroding of social capital, culminating in a feeling of pessimism pervasive in Iranian society today. Critical and chronic environmental challenges, such as high air pollution in metropolitan areas and water shortages, might possibly be factored into the equation when individuals weigh the risks and rewards of migration. (<i>Azadi et al., 2020</i>)</p>

**Table 3.4.1: Obstacles and barriers of migration for Iranians**

<b>Issues</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Weak Passport</b>	According to Passport Index 2023, Iranian passport ranks 89 <sup>th</sup> amongst 198 countries. It has a 27% world reach and access to only 10 countries with a visa-free entry and to 40 countries though visa-on-arrival and 3 countries though E-visa while it requires the visa for 145 countries ( <i>Passport of Iran, n.d.</i> )
<b>Visa Issues</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-The corrupted system of Visa appointment in embassies and selling them for unrealistically expensive prices</li> <li>-The numerous documents and proofs required by the embassies and extreme strict measures for issuing the visa and high number of rejections due to non-procedural reasons (<i>Hosseini Hormazi, 2016</i>)</li> <li>-Additionally, some countries only issue single entry visas which means people will not be able to travel to Iran in any circumstances and this situation would put out many opportunities out of Iranian's list.</li> </ul>
<b>Limited international opportunities</b>	While many countries have bilateral agreements, supports and funds for their citizens to travel and move to other countries for work, study, exploring the world or living permanently, Iranians usually are deprived from international opportunities specific for them and the government only provides some grants and opportunities for government prone personnel and not for the general public. Additionally, many countries are sceptical for accepting people with Iranian passport in their mobility and working programs because of unclear and long processes and lack of trust or traceability of the people's background. ( <i>Iran International Newsroom, 2022</i> )
<b>Financial capability and exchange rate</b>	Moving abroad within the scope of any immigration program, requires financial capabilities. This can refer to relatively minor expenses such as language tests and document translation and legalisation to the financial support proof for visa application, school tuition or investment in the host country. The main issue here is the always increasing exchange rate which in some cases make the investment quite high and unaffordable. Even the smallest expenses could be a big financial burden and barrier for the applicant. According to World Bank data, 1USD was 655.7 Rials in early 90s and in 2022 the rates increased to 420.000 Rials which shows the drastic increase rate of 640% which make it very difficult for people to plan for their savings or invest in relatively long time ( <i>Dagres, 2020</i> )
<b>Family and social bonds</b>	People in Iran are particularly devoted to their families since they live in a collectivist culture. The interests of the family might take precedence over the requirements of a single person. This allegiance implies that family honour and dishonour are shared by all family members. ( <i>Iranian Culture - Family, 2016</i> ) Having such powerful emotional bonds makes it very challenging for many people to get the support of their family or social group to leave the country.
<b>Military Service</b>	Iran has a mandatory military service for male population in which requires them to attend 2 years of unpaid service in military camps or other facilities before being able to acquire a passport and leave the country unless they have an admission from a higher education institution inside or outside the country within the less than 1 year gap from their graduation date. Even in that case, they have to pay a heavy buy-out fee which lets them to go back to Iran to visit their families for the limited period and times. ( <i>Bijan K., 2015</i> )

Issues	Description
<b>Release of educational diplomas</b>	The release of the original university degree for people who have studied full-time in public universities is only required for the purpose of continuing their education or employment abroad, because temporary encyclopaedias for higher education and employment in all public and private organizations within the country are valid under Ministry of Science laws. According to the Ministry of Science's executive directives, students who get free education are required to serve the country for the number of years of their study. They have to pay a relatively high fee to release their original diplomas. ( <i>Shelby L. Cearley &amp; Maria Mason, n.d.</i> ) This could be very long and frustrating and, in many cases, people miss their deadlines because of the release, translation and legalization process of their diplomas.
<b>Father-Husband permission requirement for women</b>	Passport procedures for women; including the issuance of passports and exit permits for unaccompanied Iranian women and children, obligates the requirements for consent by the husband/father or other male relative ( <i>Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2003 - 2005)</i> ) and this situation prevents many women from traditional families to leave Iran.

**Table 3.5. 1: Collected data, Source:** (*Iran Migration Outlook 2021 Iran Migration Observatory, n.d.*), (*Official Exchange Rate (LCU per US\$, Period Average) - Iran, Islamic Rep. | Data, n.d.*)

Date	Exchange rate	Difference Percentage	Exchange rate weight	Political event Weight	Total weight	Emigrant population	2-year time-leg
1979	100		5	5	10	27930	778695
1980	140	28.57%	2	4	6	40597	45640
1981	200	30.00%	2	2	4	778695	58936
1982	270	25.93%	2	2	4	45640	54047
1983	350	22.86%	2	2	4	58936	65908
1984	450	22.22%	2	2	4	54047	64366
1985	580	22.41%	2	2	4	65908	91328
1986	610	4.92%	3	2	5	64366	59299
1987	740	17.57%	2	2	4	91328	55937
1988	966	23.40%	1	5	6	59299	1291689
1989	1207	19.97%	2	3	5	55937	183109
1990	413	-192.25%	5	1	6	1291689	215782
1991	1420	70.92%	3	1	4	183109	1693094
1992	1498	5.21%	3	2	5	215782	209512
1993	1803	16.92%	1	1	2	1693094	127426
1994	2668	32.42%	-1	1	0	209512	7258
1995	4078	34.58%	-1	1	0	127426	183125
1996	4444	8.24%	3	1	4	7258	267100
1997	4785	7.13%	3	1	4	183125	256926
1998	6460	25.93%	1	1	2	267100	364700
1999	8632	25.16%	1	2	3	256926	363538
2000	8190	-5.40%	1	3	4	364700	611757
2001	8009	-2.26%	-1	1	0	363538	343736
2002	8019	0.12%	-1	1	0	611757	342796
2003	8325	3.68%	1	2	3	343736	301042
2004	8748	4.84%	-1	1	0	342796	235458
2005	9042	3.25%	-1	1	0	301042	134197
2006	9226	1.99%	-1	1	0	235458	90455

<b>Date</b>	<b>Exchange rate</b>	<b>Difference Percentage</b>	<b>Exchange rate weight</b>	<b>Political event Weight</b>	<b>Total weight</b>	<b>Emigrant population</b>	<b>2-year time-leg</b>
2007	9358	1.41%	1	2	3	134197	97723
2008	9667	3.20%	-1	1	0	90455	127509
2009	9979	3.13%	4	5	9	97723	162693
2010	10442	4.43%	-1	1	0	127509	24506
2011	12047	13.32%	-2	2	0	162693	26327
2012	26078	53.80%	2	3	5	24506	613915
2013	31838	18.09%	1	3	4	26327	596677
2014	32257	1.30%	-1	1	0	613915	22814
2015	33460	3.60%	-1	1	0	596677	3505
2016	34570	3.21%	-1	1	0	22814	67382
2017	37560	7.96%	3	3	6	3505	80437
2018	49540	24.18%	3	5	8	67382	352622
2019	130960	62.17%	-2	4	2	80437	6575
2020	155480	15.77%	3	1	4	352622	
2021	249940	37.79%	-2	1	-1	6575	
2022	263800	5.25%	1	5	6		
2023	450000	41.38%	2	5	7		