

# Other Regarding Preferences - CES

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## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Budget

$$p = \frac{p_x}{p_y} = \frac{m_y}{m_x}; m_y = \frac{M}{p_y}; m_x = \frac{M}{p_x} \text{ (if } m_y = m_x \text{ we denote both by } m).$$

### 1.2 CES Preferences

$$u(x, y) = [\alpha \times x^\rho + (1 - \alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \text{ where } \alpha \in [0, 1].^1$$

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<sup>1</sup>The definition of elasticity of substitution is  $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{\frac{\Delta \frac{x}{y}}{\frac{x}{y}}}{\frac{\Delta \frac{p_x}{p_y}}{\frac{p_x}{p_y}}}$ . If the DM maximizes utility and the chosen bundle is interior then at this bundle the price ratio equals the MRS. Therefore,  $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{\frac{\Delta \frac{x}{y}}{\frac{x}{y}}}{\frac{\Delta \frac{u_x}{u_y}}{\frac{u_x}{u_y}}}$ . Next, we take advantage of the equality  $d \ln(f(x)) = \frac{df(x)}{f(x)}$  and we write  $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{d \ln(\frac{x}{y})}{d \ln(\frac{u_x}{u_y})} = -\frac{d \ln(\frac{x}{y})}{d \ln(MRS_{xy})}$ . For an interior optimal choice in a standard case ( $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ,  $x > 0$ ,  $y > 0$ ,  $\rho \notin \{-\infty, 0, 1, \infty\}$ ):  $MRS_{xy} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^{\rho-1}$ . Now, denote  $MRS_{xy} = \theta$ . Then,  $\theta = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^{\rho-1}$  and therefore  $\frac{x}{y} = (\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}$ . By the expression we found above,  $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{d \ln((\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}})}{d \ln(\theta)}$ . Hence, we get,  $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{\frac{d((\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}})}{d \theta}}{\frac{1}{\theta}} = -\frac{\frac{d((\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}})}{d \theta} \times \theta}{(\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}} = -\frac{1}{\rho-1} \times (\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}-1} \times \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \times \frac{\theta}{(\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}} = \frac{1}{1-\rho}$ . Hence, the elasticity of substitution is constant since it does not depend on the chosen bundle. As  $\rho$  increases ( $\rho \leq 1$ ) the elasticity of substitution increases, meaning that the DM is more sensitive to changes in the relative price.

## 2 Utility Maximization Problem

**Case 1** (Extreme Altruism).  $\alpha = 0$  means that  $u(x, y) = y$  and the chosen bundle is  $(0, m_y)$ .

**Case 2** (Extreme Selfishness).  $\alpha = 1$  means that  $u(x, y) = x$  and the chosen bundle is  $(m_x, 0)$ .

**Case 3** ( $\sigma_{xy} = 0$ ).  $\rho \rightarrow -\infty$  means that  $u(x, y) = \min\{x, y\}$  and the chosen bundle is  $(\frac{m_y}{1+p}, \frac{m_y}{1+p})$ .<sup>2</sup>

**Case 4** ( $\sigma_{xy} = 1$ ).  $\rho = 0$  means that the DM has Cobb-Douglas preferences,  $u(x, y) = x^\alpha \times y^{1-\alpha}$  and the chosen bundle is  $(\alpha m_x, (1-\alpha)m_y)$ .<sup>3</sup>

**Case 5** ( $\sigma_{xy} \rightarrow \infty$ ).  $\rho = 1$  means that  $u(x, y) = \alpha \times x + (1-\alpha) \times y$ . Therefore, the indifference curves are linear with the slope  $\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ . Thus, the chosen bundle is,

$$\begin{cases} (0, m_y) & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} < p \\ \{(x, y) | p_x x + p_y y = M\} & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} = p \\ (m_x, 0) & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} > p \end{cases}$$

**Case 6.** If  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\rho \in (-\infty, 1)$  and  $\rho \neq 0$ , the CES utility function represents monotonic<sup>4</sup> and convex<sup>5</sup> preferences. Therefore, the chosen bundle

<sup>2</sup>The Leontief function is due to the fact that the lower quantity is the dominant quantity when raised to the power of minus infinity.

<sup>3</sup>When  $\rho = 0$  the value of the utility cannot be determined. To recover the utility function consider,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} u(x, y) &= \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} [\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} = \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} e^{\ln[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \\ &= e^{\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \ln[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} = e^{\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\ln[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]}{\rho}} \end{aligned}$$

By L'Hopital rule,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\ln[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]}{\rho} &= \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\frac{\alpha \times x^\rho \times \ln x + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho \times \ln y}{\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho}}{1} \\ &= \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\alpha \times x^\rho \times \ln x + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho \times \ln y}{\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho} \\ &= \alpha \times \ln x + (1-\alpha) \times \ln y \end{aligned}$$

Hence,  $\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} u(x, y) = e^{\alpha \times \ln x + (1-\alpha) \times \ln y} = x^\alpha \times y^{1-\alpha}$ .

<sup>4</sup>Consider the case where  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  and  $\rho \in (-\infty, \infty)$  and  $\rho \notin \{0, 1\}$ . Then,  $u_x = \alpha[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}-1} x^{\rho-1} \geq 0$  and  $u_y = (1-\alpha)[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}-1} y^{\rho-1} \geq 0$ . Hence, the CES preferences are monotonic.

<sup>5</sup>Consider the case where  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  and  $\rho \in (-\infty, \infty)$  and  $\rho \notin \{0, 1\}$ . Then,  $MRS_{xy} =$

is interior and it satisfies  $MRS_{xy} = p$  and  $p_x x + p_y y = M$ . Hence, the chosen bundle is  $(\frac{m_y}{p + [p \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}}, \frac{m_y}{[p \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}})$ .

**Case 7.** If  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\rho \in (1, \infty)$ , the CES utility function represents monotonic and concave preferences. Therefore, the chosen bundle is

$$\begin{cases} (0, m_y) & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} < p \\ \{(0, m_y), (m_x, 0)\} & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} = p \\ (m_x, 0) & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} > p \end{cases}$$

**Remark 1.** Cases 6 and 7 demonstrate that when  $\rho \geq 1$ ,  $\rho$  cannot be identified. Cases 1 and 2 demonstrate that when  $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $\rho$  also cannot be identified. Therefore,  $\rho$  is identified only when  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  and  $\rho < 1$

### 3 Expenditure Minimization Problem

**Case 8** (Extreme Altruism).  $\alpha = 0 : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) = p_y \times y_0$ .

**Case 9** (Extreme Selfishness).  $\alpha = 1 : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) = p_x \times x_0$ .

**Case 10** ( $\sigma_{xy} = 0$ ).  $\rho \rightarrow -\infty : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) = (p_x + p_y) \times \min\{x_0, y_0\}$ .

**Case 11** ( $\sigma_{xy} = 1$ ).  $\rho = 0 : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) = [\frac{p_x x_0}{\alpha}]^\alpha \times [\frac{p_y y_0}{1-\alpha}]^{1-\alpha}$ .

**Case 12** ( $\sigma_{xy} \rightarrow \infty$ ).  $\rho = 1 : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) =$

$$\begin{cases} p_y \times (y_0 + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} x_0) & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} < p \\ p_x \times x_0 + p_y \times y_0 & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} = p \\ p_x \times (x_0 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} y_0) & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} > p \end{cases}$$

**Case 13.**  $\rho < 1, \rho \neq 0, \alpha \in (0, 1) : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) =$

$$u(x_0, y_0) \times \left[ \frac{p_x}{[\alpha + \frac{\alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}}{(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} p^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}}]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} + \frac{p_y}{[(1-\alpha) + \frac{(1-\alpha)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} p^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}}{\alpha^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}}]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right]$$

$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^{\rho-1}$ . If  $\rho < 1$  then when  $\frac{x}{y}$  increases the MRS decreases while if  $\rho > 1$  then when  $\frac{x}{y}$  increases the MRS increases. Since the the CES preferences are monotonic, when  $\rho < 1$  the CES preferences are convex while when  $\rho > 1$  the CES preferences are concave.

**Case 14.** If  $\alpha \in (0, 1), \rho \in (1, \infty) : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) =$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{p_y}{1-\alpha} [\alpha \times x_0^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y_0^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} &\quad \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \leq p \\ \frac{p_x}{\alpha} [\alpha \times x_0^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y_0^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} &\quad \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} > p \end{aligned}$$