Syntax
A Journal of Theoretical, Experimental and Interdisciplinary Research

Syntax 17:3, September 2014, 189–234 DOI: 10.1111/synt.12018

Contrast and Island Sensitivity in Clausal Ellipsis

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Abstract. This paper offers a comprehensive and uniform theory of island repair in clausal ellipsis (sluicing and fragments). We show that the correct generalization defines the repairing and the nonrepairing types of TP ellipsis in terms of *contrastivity*: TP ellipsis with *contrastive* remnants does not repair islands, whereas TP ellipsis with *noncontrastive* remnants does. Contrary to the influential account of Merchant (2004), we base our explanation for the island sensitivity of contrastive fragments entirely on the notion of Parallelism. The island insensitivity of noncontrastive remnants, on the other hand, follows from the island node being deleted at PF. With this we simplify the theory of islands, and, by treating the different types of clausal ellipsis on a par, we move away from the construction-specific study of ellipsis that has characterized syntactic theorizing for the last forty years.

1. Introduction: Clausal Ellipsis and Island Repair

Clausal ellipsis is ellipsis of a clause to the exception of a single constituent. Clausal ellipsis comes in many flavors, the two most often studied types being sluicing and fragments. These are defined according to the type of constituent that survives deletion: *sluicing* is ellipsis of clausal material in a constituent question to the exclusion of a *wh*-phrase, while *fragments* are usually considered to be answers to questions and contain ellipsis of clausal material to the exclusion of a lexical constituent that corresponds to new information (Merchant 2004, van Craenenbroeck & Merchant 2013).

(1) a. John met someone, but I don't know *who*. Sluicing
b. A: Who did John meet last night? Fragment answer
B: *Bill*.

Since both types of elliptical utterances are syntactically uniform with respect to the elided material (i.e., the TP), and since they are both fragmentary, we will refer to them uniformly as *fragments*. The missing TP expresses the same propositional content in both: an open proposition 'John met *x*'. We subscribe to the view that this missing TP is syntactically represented in the structure of the sentence, following the

We hereby express our gratitude to Enrico Boone, Marcel den Dikken, István Kenesei, Andrés Saab, Radek Simik, and two anonymous reviewers for discussions on island repair and comments on earlier versions of this paper. We also thank the audiences of the syntax seminar group at Groningen University, and the Islands in Contemporary Linguistic Theory 2011 conference in Vitoria, the Basque Country. We acknowledge the financial support of the European Research Council (first author) and that of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO; second author) in this research. Finally, we are grateful to the following informants for their grammaticality judgments: Lisa Cheng, Yiya Chen (Chinese); Crit Cremers, Marcel den Dikken, Marlies Kluck, Erik Schoorlemmer, Mario Ganzeboom (Dutch); Irene Franco, Sara Lusini (Italian); Tamás Bíró, Judit Gervain, Adrienn Jánosi, Vera Hegedűs (Hungarian); Jaklin Kornfilt, Güliz Güneş (Turkish); Leticia Pablos Robles, Andrés Saab (Spanish). All errors and shortcomings are our own.

PF-deletion approach that treats ellipsis as PF deletion operating on fully-fledged syntactic structures (see, among others, Merchant 2001). According to this approach, the elliptical sentences in (2) contain fully projected clauses, the TP portion of which receive no pronunciation ("deletion") at PF. The remnants *who* and *Bill* escape ellipsis by moving above the elided TP into what appears to be the left periphery of the clause (the CP domain).[1]

(2) a. John met someone, but I don't know who$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~John met t_1~~].
b. A: Who did John meet?
B: Bill$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~John met t_1~~].

Evidence in favor of postulating an abstract syntactic structure for these constructions comes from various sources. One stems from the observation that remnants in ellipsis take part in dependencies akin to their equivalents in nonelliptical utterances: one finds connectivity effects of all types between the remnant and the missing TP, for instance: the remnant can be bound by elements inside the elided TP, can be scoped over by elements inside the TP, and the remnant is always case-marked by material inside the elided TP (Merchant 2001). Another stems from the fact that in preposition-stranding languages DP remnants contained within PPs may strand their preposition in exactly the same way A′-moved DPs may in nonelliptical clauses. Each of these observations indicates that the fragment is base-generated in a fully projected clause.

1.1. Merchant's Theory of Island Repair (Merchant 2004, 2008)

The PF-deletion approach makes ellipsis a fertile ground for research on other PF phenomena such as strong islands and strong island repair. According to an influential strand of accounts originating from Lasnik (2001) and Merchant (2001) (who update suggestions in Chomsky 1972), strong island violations result from pronounced syntactic structures; more specifically, every island node is rendered PF-uninterpretable (and gets assigned a *-marker of ill-formedness) when crossed by a movement operation. In normal circumstances, the PF interface cannot parse the

[1] It is important to note that the movement of the sluiced remnant to the initial position of the sentence is a legitimate step in the derivation of nonelliptical constituent questions.

(i) John met someone, but I don't know [$_{CP}$ who$_1$ [$_{TP}$ John met t_1]].

The movement of the remnant in fragments, however, is often not the most natural answer in full answers.

(ii) A: Who did John meet?
B: a. ?Bill$_1$, John met t_1.
b. Bill.

That (iiBa) is marked while (iiBb) is not is due to the *repair effect* of ellipsis (e.g., Lasnik 2001, Kennedy & Merchant 2000, Merchant 2001), a phenomenon to which we return in section 4. In short: PF deletion permits obviation of a constraint that operates solely at PF and which, when violated in nonelliptical contexts (typically by movement of some kind), results in the degradation in acceptability of an utterance. In such cases where this constraint may be obviated, such as (iiBb), violatory movement is permitted and no degradation in acceptability ensues.

crossed island node and the derivation crashes. However, if the PF-uninterpretable island node is deleted at PF, convergence may ensue. On such occasions, ellipsis is said to "repair" the island violation.

The most well-known case of ellipsis that can repair islands is sluicing in English (Ross 1967; Merchant 2001, 2004), cf. (3):

(3) John wants to hire someone who fixes cars with something, but I don't know what$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~John wants to hire someone who fixes cars with t_1~~].

If the bracketed TP in (3) is fully pronounced, the sentence is unacceptable due to a strong island violation. With the TP elided, the sentence is fine.

In contrast to sluicing, fragment answers are unable to repair islands—at least according to the received opinion dominated by Merchant 2004 (see also Temmerman 2013).

(4) A: Does John want to hire someone who fixes cars with a HAMMER?
B: *No, a MONKEY-WRENCH$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~John wants to hire someone who fixes cars with t_1~~].

In order to explain the observed difference between sluicing and fragments, Merchant (2004, 2008) proposes a novel theory of PF-island repair.[2] His theory relies upon PF uninterpretability (just like the theory of Lasnik 2001 and Merchant 2001), but in his account island sensitivity is due to the presence of PF-uninterpretable copies of the subjacency-violating moving item, and not to a PF-uninterpretable island node. In Merchant's view, moving items adjoin to all intermediate projections, and all copies of the violatory chain of movement besides the topmost copy are uninterpretable at PF. If any of these copies survive at PF, an island violation is yielded.

Furthermore, Merchant proposes that English fragment answers differ from sluices with respect to the landing site of the remnant, but they do not differ in the size of the elided constituent (a TP is elided in both cases). While the *wh*-remnant in sluicing targets Spec,CP, the remnant in fragment answers requires an additional movement step in the CP domain, to a position dubbed *FP*. In the case of sluicing, TP ellipsis removes all PF-uninterpretable traces and the end result will be a repaired island.

[2] Merchant's theory of island repair is designed to handle not only the difference between sluicing and fragments, but also the difference between sluicing and VP ellipsis—something that we do not discuss in this work. Just like in fragments, VP ellipsis does not repair islands:

(i) *Abby DOES want to hire someone who speaks a certain Balkan language, but I do not remember what kind of language she DOES NOT.

(5) SLUICING deletes TP: no **t* remains → island repair



wants to hire [$_{DP}$ someone [$_{CP}$ who fixes cars with *t*]]

In the case of fragments, the extra step of movement that is required to place the remnant above the CP leaves a (nonelided) defective trace, resulting in island sensitivity.

(6) FRAGMENT deletes TP: one **t* remains → no repair



wants to hire [$_{DP}$ someone [$_{CP}$ who fixes cars with *t*]]

The lack of island repair in fragments is thus the result of more structure surviving ellipsis: the FP and the CP layers both survive and the latter has a PF-uninterpretable trace adjoined to it.

In sum, Merchant's theory is built on three premises: (i) the PF interpretability of traces, (ii) the difference in the structural position between sluicing and fragment remnants, and (iii) the assumption that both types of ellipsis are an instance of TP-deletion.

1.2. Problems with Merchant's Theory of Island Repair

Merchant's theory of island repair, and the specifics of the above analysis of sluicing vs. fragment answer formation, is problematic both with respect to the empirical and theoretical claims it makes.

Starting with the empirical claims, we show that the generalization Merchant proposes—namely that sluicing does but fragments do not repair strong islands in English—cannot capture the entire spectrum of sluicing and fragment answer data.

That sluicing does not repair islands in all contexts has been noticed time and again in the literature. Merchant (2001) already mentioned that "contrast sluicing"—i.e.,

sluicing in which the *wh*-phrase contains contrastive material—is island-sensitive. See also Merchant 2008, Gengel 2007, and Winkler 2013 among others for the same point.[3]

(7) *Abby wants to hire someone who speaks GREEK, but I don't remember what OTHER languages.

That fragments do show island repair in some contexts, too, is not a novel claim either. Island-insensitive fragments can be found in Hoji & Fukaya 2001; Culicover & Jackendoff 2005:273; Casielles 2006; Stainton 2006; Valmala 2007; Merchant, to appear; İnce 2009, 2012. See for illustration the fragment answer in (8) and the declarative fragment in (9):

(8) A: Does Abby speak the same Balkan language that someone in your syntax class speaks?
B: Yeah, *Charlie*.

(9) A: I imagine John wants a detailed list.
B: I'm afraid he does. *Very detailed*.

Close examination of the differences between the island-sensitive and -insensitive fragment types reveals that the correct generalization makes reference not to the lexical type of remnants (*wh*-phrase vs. lexical phrase), but to their interpretation. The key property is *contrast*: noncontrastive remnants repair islands and contrastive ones do not. Section 2 below will provide more evidence for this statement and will examine the differences between the two types of fragments in detail.

There are also conceptual problems with the theoretical framework on which Merchant builds his account. First and foremost, his assumption that sluicing and fragments exhibit distinct syntactic representations lacks empirical motivation. Placing fragments above the CP and hypothesizing an additional step of movement is driven purely by the need to create an extra *-marked trace that will explain island sensitivity. Merchant (2004) mentions that the additional movement step might be motivated if English fragment answers are similar to Clitic Left Dislocation structures (of the kind found in Romance languages). At the same time he himself invalidates this proposal by pointing out—correctly—that the fragment is not topic-like, as a CLLD placement would require, but focal in nature. The focal nature of the fragment is beyond any doubt since the fragment provides the solely novel information in an answer. Fragment answers are in fact often used in the syntactic and semantic literature as the very definition of focus. The so-called *question–answer test* identifies

[3] Cases of *sprouting*, that is, when the *wh*-remnant has no antecedent, are also island-sensitive (Chung, Ladusaw & McCloskey 1995):

(i) *Sandy was trying to work out which student would speak, but she refused to say to whom.

the single constituent that answers a *wh*-question as the focus (Erteschik-Shir 1997, Büring 2007). The single constituent that answers a *wh*-question is what is known as a *fragment answer* in the ellipsis literature.[4]

That the mechanics of Merchant's (2004) theory of island repair is incorrect can easily be shown by examining languages where both the remnant of sluicing and the remnant of fragment answers are known to target the same functional projection in the left periphery. Merchant's analysis predicts that in these languages sluicing and fragments should not exhibit differences with respect to island sensitivity. We will show in the remainder of this section that this prediction is not borne out.

An exemplary language on which the predictive force of Merchant's (2004) account can be tested is Hungarian. As is well known, (contrastive) focus and *wh*-items occupy identical positions in Hungarian (see Horvath 1986, Kiss and 1987, Bródy 1995, Szabolcsi 1997, and many works since)—a left-peripheral slot that since Bródy 1995 has been referred to as *FocP*. The existence of this position is evidenced by the observation that both *wh*-questions and focus constructions have the same word order, most notably the *wh*-phrase and the focal item always occur left-adjacent to the verbal head, triggering the separation of the preverb from the verb to result in a marked verb–preverb word order, similar to a V2 effect that can be found in Germanic languages:

(10) A: Tegnap kit hívott meg Mari?
yesterday who.A invited PV Mari
'Who did Mari invite yesterday?'
B: Tegnap PÉTERT hívta meg Mari.
yesterday Péter.A invited PV Mari
'Mari invited PÉTER yesterday.'

The abovementioned syntactic literature also contains ample evidence that the position *wh*-phrases and lexical foci occupy is reached by A′-movement and corresponds to a low position in the clausal left periphery which is below functional projections that may host (multiple) topics and universal quantifiers, and which in embedded clauses is preceded by complementizers.

[4] Alongside focus, question–answer congruence also plays an important role in the formal semantic approaches to questions. Specific accounts, however, might differ in what is understood as the paradigmatic form of an "answer." While Hamblin (1973) and Karttunen (1977) take nonelliptical, "long" answers as the primary form of answers, Hausser (1983) takes fragments (which he refers to as "short" answers) as primary answers. In Hausser's semantics, a question denotes a function, and the corresponding fragment answer denotes a possible argument for that function. If the answer is a true answer, the question meaning applied to the answer meaning results in a true proposition (which corresponds to the nonelliptical answer).

(11)



The fact that both *wh*-movement and focus fronting is overt in Hungarian makes deducing the position of *wh*- and focus remnants in ellipsis relatively straightforward: since the syntactic position of *wh*-phrases and lexical foci is the same in nonelliptical clauses in Hungarian, the most restrictive hypothesis one can entertain is that this position is identical in elliptical clauses as well.[5] That is, both the sluicing remnant in (12) and the fragment remnant in (13) occupy an identical position.

(12) A: Valakit meghívott Mari.
someone.a PV.invited Mari
'Mari invited someone.'
B: Kit [$_{TP}$ ~~hívott meg Mari~~]?
who.a invited PV Mari
'Who?'

(13) A: Kit hívott meg Mari?
Who.a invited PV Mari
'Who did Mari invite?'
B: PÉTERT [$_{TP}$ ~~hívta meg Mari~~].
Péter.a invited PV Mari
'Mari invited PÉTER.'

Evidence that this zero assumption must be correct comes from the distribution of topics and quantifiers, which can occur in elliptical clauses (provided they express new information), and when they do, precede the remnants in the order expected by the structure in (11). This possibility is illustrated both in the case of sluicing and in the case of fragments in the following examples. Example (14) illustrates this for sluicing,[6] (15)

[5] Recall from footnote 1 that this is not true for English: the fact that English focal material in nonelliptical answers tends not to undergo movement in overt syntax complicates the analysis of elliptical fragments and leaves space for speculations with regards to their exact position.

[6] Quantifiers cannot be tested in the case of sluicing for the independent reason that these cannot precede a *wh*-phrase in questions (see an analysis of this fact in terms of an intervention effect in Lipták 2001). Note also that not all speakers of Hungarian allow for multiple remnants in sluicing. Those who do not allow multiple sluices judge (14) to be degraded.

for a matrix fragment as an answer to a yes–no question, and (16) for an embedded declarative fragment.[7]

(14) Tudom, hogy Mari ebédre és vacsorára is meghívott valakit
know that Mari lunch.FOR and dinner.FOR also PV.invited someone.A
de nem emlékszem, hogy **vacsorára** kit.
but not remember COMP dinner.FOR who.A
'I know that Mari invited people to her place for dinner and for lunch, but I don't remember who she invited for dinner.'

(15) A: Mari BÉLÁT hívta meg magához enni?
Mari Béla.A invited PV herself.TO eat.INF
'Did Mari invite BÉLA to eat?'
B: Nem, **vacsorára mindig** PÉTERT.
no dinner.FOR always Péter.A
'No, for dinner she always invited PÉTER.'

(16) Tudom, hogy Mari sokszor meghívott valakit magához enni,
know that Mari often PV.invited someone.A herself.TO eat.INF
azt hiszem, hogy **vacsorára mindig** PÉTERT.
that.A believe COMP dinner.FOR always Péter.A
'I know that Mari often invited people to her place, I believe that for dinner she always invited PÉTER.'

Having shown that Hungarian is a language where *wh*-remnants and fragments occupy identical syntactic positions (i.e., FocP), the prediction of Merchant's account can now be checked for the availability of island repair in cases of TP ellipsis. Deletion of the complement of Foc (the TP node) results in completely identical configurations in both cases: in neither case one finds a single *-marked trace, and thus the expectation is that both sluicing and fragments repair islands.

(17) FocP Sluicing/fragments delete TP: no **t* remains → island repair



This prediction is not borne out, however. In Hungarian, if we construct the equivalents of (3) and (4) in English, it appears that sluicing does repair islands,

[7] It is important to note that (16) cannot be analyzed as an instance of gapping. Evidence for this comes from the fact that remnants in gapping must contrast with material in the antecedent, and *valaki* 'someone' in (16) cannot be construed as contrastive, cf. the ungrammatical English gapping in (i):

(i) *Mary invited someone and Susan Peter.

but fragments do not. That is, in these cases Hungarian and English pattern identically.

(18) Keresnek valakit aki beszél egy bizonyos szláv nyelvet
search.PL somebody.A REL speaks a certain Slavic language.A
de nem tudom, melyiket.
but not know which.A
'They are looking for someone who speaks a certain Slavic language but I don't know which one.'

(19) A: OLYAN KUTATÓT keresnek, aki az OROSZT beszéli?
such researcher.A search.PL REL the Russian.A speaks
'Are they looking for a researcher who speaks RUSSIAN?'
B: *Nem, a KÍNAIT.
no the Chinese.A
'No, Chinese.'

This contradicts Merchant's theory of island repair in fragments, since the expectation is that identical structural configurations in sluicing and fragments should result in identical island sensitivity. The experiment undertaken with Hungarian can also be repeated with the exact same result in languages like Italian and Spanish, both of which have been argued to resemble Hungarian in fronting *wh-* and focus phrases to identical positions in the left periphery (see Rizzi 1997 for Italian and Zubizarreta 1998 for Spanish):

(20) a. Gianni conosce il professore che bocciò una certa Italian
Gianni knows the professor who reproved a certain
persona, però non so chi.
person but not know.1SG who
'Gianni knows the professor who reproved someone, but I don't know who.'
b. A. Gianni conosce il professore che ha bocciato
Gianni knows the professor who has reproved
ANNA ieri, all' esame.
Anna yesterday at.the exam
B. *No, MARIA.
'No, Maria.'

(21) a. Juan conoce al profesor que desaprobó a cierta persona, Spanish
Juan knows A.the professor that reproved A certain person
pero no sé a qué persona.
but not know.1SG A which person
'Juan knows the professor who reproved someone, but I don't know who.'

b. A: Juan conoce al profesor que desaprobó a ANA durante el
Juan knows A.the professor who reproved A Ana during the
curso de sintaxis.
course of syntax
'Juan knows the professor who reproved Ana in the syntax course.'
B: *No, a MARIA.
'No, MARIA.'

The evidence from Hungarian, Italian, and Spanish weighs heavily against any account that attempts to derive the observed differences between sluicing and fragments based on structural distinctions between the two constructions alone.

Beginning in the next section, we put forward a novel theory of island repair in clausal ellipsis that makes no reference to structural positions in the left periphery, but instead appeals to differences in the interpretation of the remnant and the kind of antecedent it requires. We will show that our theory is better equipped than Merchant's account to explain patterns of island repair in clausal ellipsis both in Hungarian-type languages and in English.

We proceed in the following manner. In section 2 we establish that fragments can be contrastive and noncontrastive, and that (non)contrastivity determines sensitivity to islands. Section 3 shows that scopal Parallelism obtains in both types of fragments, and is the sole determining factor of island sensitivity in the case of contrastive fragments: contrastive fragments are confined to stay inside islands because their focal correlates are island-sensitive. This derives not only the facts of island sensitivity but gives an elegant account of the "minimal size" of the fragment being the island itself. In the last part of section 3 we turn to the mechanism of island repair in noncontrastive fragments. Section 4 details the consequences of our account for the derivation of fragments, and points out some of the reparative effects of ellipsis in licensing otherwise impossible focus movements. This section also refutes the core arguments put forward against a movement account of fragments in Valmala 2007. Section 5 is the summary.

2. Clausal Ellipsis and Island Repair: The Role of Contrast

2.1 Contrastive and Noncontrastive Fragments in Clausal Ellipsis

We start our discussion by establishing that there are two types of clausal ellipsis, *contrastive* and *noncontrastive*. Merchant (2001) first mentioned that such a distinction can be made in the realm of sluicing. In this section we show that the same distinction can and, importantly, should also be made in the domain of fragments of various types (corrective, affirmatory, elaborative). Examples (22) and (23) show the difference between the two:[8]

[8] We use SMALL CAPS to indicate contrastive focus material. New-information focus is not marked.

(22) a. A: Did John eat a PIZZA for dinner? Contrastive fragments
B: No, a SALAD.
b. A: John ate a PIZZA for dinner.
B: No, a SALAD.

(23) a. A: What did John eat for dinner? Noncontrastive fragments
B: A salad.
b. A: John ate something for dinner.
B: Indeed, a salad.
c. A: John ate a pizza for dinner.
B: Yes, and also a salad.

As these examples show, in the case of contrastive ellipsis, there is an explicit relation of *contrast between the elliptical remnant and its correlate in the antecedent clause*. In cases of noncontrastive ellipsis, the elliptical remnant does not stand in contrast with any element in the antecedent clause; rather it provides new information, more specific information, or adds to a contextually relevant set of elements to which the antecedent belongs (in the case of (23c), this is the set of foodstuffs John ate for dinner).

As these examples also show, the contrastive or noncontrastive nature of the remnant is not tied to the discourse properties or speech act types of the fragments themselves. Contrastive fragments can be answers or can be responses to declaratives —as is the case in corrections. Noncontrastive fragments can similarly either serve as answers or elaborate on a previous declarative.

Considering their information structural status, noncontrastive fragments typically represent new-information focus—the kind of focus that expresses new, nonpresupposed information:

(24) a. A: What did John eat for dinner? Noncontrastive ellipsis
B: [$_{\text{IFoc}}$ A salad].
b. A: John ate something for dinner.
B: Indeed, [$_{\text{IFoc}}$ a salad].

Noncontrastive fragments, however, can also represent a case of contrastive focus, recalling alternatives that are provided by the context, or made explicit:

(25) a. A: What did John eat for dinner? Noncontrastive ellipsis
B: [$_{\text{CFoc}}$ A SALAD],—and not A STEAK, his favorite food.

Yet in this case the fragment does not contrast with the correlate in its antecedent clause (*what*), and thus is defined in our typology as noncontrastive. This shows very clearly that the contrastive–noncontrastive split among fragments that we are introducing is not a reflection of the information structural status of the fragments in their elliptical clause, but rather a *relational* notion that is defined with respect to the

correlate in the antecedent clause. In this paper, we adhere to the view that focus can be either contrastive or new-information focus (following among others É. Kiss 1998; see also Repp 2010). These two types differ in their semantics and their syntax and languages often mark the distinction between them prosodically as well (see Katz & Selkirk 2011 for English). As for the precise distinction between the two we capitalize on the availability of alternatives in the context in the former but not in the latter. We define the two types of focus as follows:

(26) a. Definition of contrastive focus
Contrastive focus represents a subset of contextually or situationally "given" alternative elements for which the predicate phrase can potentially hold, and spells out this subset as the one for which the predicate actually holds.
b. Definition of new-information focus
New-information focus conveys discourse-new information, not "given" in the sense of Schwarzschild (1999).

In the case of contrastive fragments, a contrastive relation with a correlate of course does determine the discourse status of the fragment itself: contrastive fragments always represent an instance of contrastive focus, since—by definition—they have an overt alternative, namely their correlate:

(27) a. A: Did John eat a PIZZA for dinner? Contrastive ellipsis
B: No, [$_{CFoc}$ a SALAD].
b. A: John eat a PIZZA for dinner.
B: No, [$_{CFoc}$ a SALAD].

The important role the correlate plays in the definition of contrastive fragments can also been seen in a particular—and to us it seems almost completely unnoticed—condition on the syntactic realization of contrastive ellipsis, namely that the correlate does not only have to provide a suitable alternative for contrast to apply in the semantics, it also has to be marked for contrastive focus in the syntax. First, though, one needs to consider nonelliptical versions of contrastive utterances, like the full corrections in (28).

(28) A: John ate a pizza for dinner.
B: No, he ate a SALAD for dinner.

Full corrections, just like contrastive fragments, contain a contrastively focused constituent (the corrective phrase *a salad*) in our example. The contrastive nature of this expression follows from the very semantics of corrections, which involves denial and incompatibility between the corrective proposition and the alternative proposition expressed in the antecedent clause (van Leusen 2004). In (28) this means that B's utterance denies that the proposition *John ate a pizza for dinner* is true and replaces it with the correct proposition that *John ate a salad for dinner*. The corrective *a* SALAD phrase is in exclusive opposition to the corrected constituent (*the pizza*), the two

forming an overt pair of alternatives that the obligatorily contrastive focus on the corrective lives on.

Importantly, although the corrective phrase in full corrections is thus necessarily contrastively focused, its *correlate*, the corrected constituent, does not need to have any specific discourse status in its clause, it can be new or given, contrastive, or noncontrastive. A's utterance in (28) can be uttered in various ways: *a pizza* can be given information, new information, or contrastive focus as well.

Elliptical corrections, on the other hand, differ from nonelliptical corrections in that they require that their correlate be an instance of contrastive focus, too.[9] This is what we indicated in (22) by using CAPITALS: the correlate needs to be stressed and assigned a contrastive focus interpretation in order to be correctable.

(29) a. A: John eat a PIZZA for dinner.
B: No, a SALAD.

Contrastive fragments cannot be used if their correlates are noncontrastive, for example, because they instantiate new-information focus (cf. (30)) or are part of the background (cf. (31)). As the fully pronounced corrections in B′ show, this effect is not present in full corrections, indicating that we are dealing with a restriction that is solely due to ellipsis.

(30) A: John was very tired and hungry. You know what he did? He [$_{\text{IFoc}}$ left the office at three and he had a pizza in his favorite restaurant on his way home].
B: *No, a SALAD$_1$ [$_{\text{TP}}$ ~~he had t_1 in his favorite restaurant on his way home~~].
B′: No, a SALAD he had in his favorite restaurant on his way home.

(31) A: Of all the hungry men it was [$_{\text{CFoc}}$ JOHN] who had a pizza in his favorite restaurant on his way home.
B: *No, a SALAD$_1$ [$_{\text{TP}}$ ~~he had t_1 in his favorite restaurant on his way home~~].
B′: No, a SALAD he had in his favorite restaurant on his way home.

[9] Fully pronounced corrections also differ from elliptical corrections in another respect. Full corrections can correct propositions that are not asserted but entailed, presupposed or implicated. To illustrate, consider (i), where the correction denies an entailment of the antecedent clause.

(i) A: John stole the bike.
B: No, he isn't a thief.

Elliptical corrections cannot correct entailments, presuppositions or implications, due to the fact that their elided TP must be *e-Given*, defined as (ii) in Merchant 2001:

(ii) An expression E is e-Given iff:
E has a salient antecedent A and, modulo existential type-shifting, A entails F-clo(E), and E entails F-clo(A).

As the reader can check, a context such as (i) cannot give rise to TP ellipsis, since entailment is unidirectional: although 'stealing a bike' entails 'being a thief', 'being a thief' does not entail 'stealing a bike'.

The only way a contrastive fragment is felicitous is if it has a correlate that is the sole contrastive focus of the antecedent clause:[10]

(32) A: Of all the things he likes, John decided that he will eat [$_{\text{CFoc}}$ a PIZZA] in his favorite restaurant on his way home.
B: No, a SALAD$_1$ [$_{\text{TP}}$ ~~he had t_1 in his favorite restaurant on his way home~~].

To capture this requirement on the realization of the correlate of contrastive fragments, we advance the following felicity condition.[11]

(33) Felicity condition on contrastive fragments
Contrastive fragments are only felicitous if their correlate is contrastively focused.

It is important to stress that (33) is a condition specific to contrastiveness: it characterizes ellipsis with contrastive remnants only. Noncontrastive fragments do

[10] Note that all the cases we construct here for illustration involve correlates that are not sentence-final. This is because sentence-final constituents can be corrected, *regardless* of their discourse status:

(i) A: John was very tired and hungry. He left the office at three and he had a pizza in his favorite restaurant.
B: No, in the canteen.

Sentence-final constituents are therefore exceptional in that they do not need a contrastive correlate. We believe this is because sentence-final correction involves a strategy that is distinct from our cases of contrastive fragments. For another type of exceptional fragments that do not comply with (33), see footnote 28.

[11] Although this condition has never been explicitly stated in the syntactic literature with reference to the data discussed here, we have found two mentions of a similar condition in the literature. The closest is Schlangen 2003, which states that "there is a constraint that the corrected element must be in focus," with reference to (i) and (ii), which indicate that a nonfocal constituent can only be corrected in full clauses:

(i) A: Peter loves [$_{\text{F}}$ Sandy].
B: No, Carl. =#No, Carl loves Sandy.

(ii) A: Peter loves [$_{\text{F}}$ Sandy].
B: No, [$_{\text{F}}$ Carl] loves Sandy.

Szendrői (2010) also notices that contrastive remnants require a contrastive correlate. She subsequently concludes that ellipsis can only affect a TP if the antecedent of the TP has been marked as backgrounded. This definition may be extended to contrastive fragments if one adopts the view that contrastive focus forces an existential presupposition on the rest of its clause (Geurts & van der Sandt 2004), but it clearly cannot be stated as a condition on ellipsis in general. In ellipsis that does not exhibit contrastive remnants the elided material can correspond to an entirely new antecedent TP, see (34)–(38) in the main text.

not have to comply with this condition.[12] Consider the following types of noncontrastive fragments: interrogative fragments without contrastive material, elaborative fragments, fragment answers and tags in split questions (Arregi 2010).

(34) A: John ate something for dinner.
B: What?

(35) A: John ate something for dinner.
B: Indeed, a pizza.

(36) A: Did John have anything at all for dinner?
B: Yes, a pizza.

(37) A: What did John eat?
B: A pizza.

(38) What did John eat, a pizza?

In (34) to (36), the correlates are indefinites or weak quantifiers (*something* or *anything*), in (37) and (38), the correlates are *wh*-indefinites—none of these *can* be construed contrastively, let alone *must* be construed that way.

It is equally important to stress that the felicity condition we introduced above only holds in cases of ellipsis in which the contrastive focus constituent is the only

[12] It seems to us that (33) straightforwardly applies to other types of ellipsis that exhibit more than one contrastive remnant, namely gapping and pseudogapping. Both require contrastive correlates that are parallel to the elliptical remnants both in discourse function and in syntactic position. For example, consider gapping, where the first remnant is a contrastive topic and the second is an instance of contrastive focus (Jayaseelan 1990, Gengel 2007). Languages like Hungarian show that the discourse status of the correlates must have the exact same order and discourse role:

(i) a. János KEDDEN érkezett meg, Mari pedig SZERDÁN.
János Tuesday.on arrived PV Mari PRT Wednesday.on
b. *János megérkezett kedden, Mari pedig SZERDÁN.
János PV.arrived Tuesday.on Mari PRT Wednesday.on
'János arrived on Tuesday, Mari on Wednesday.'

Extending our felicity condition to also cover gapping and pseudogapping, it is clear that the condition should actually be understood not so much as a condition on contrastive focusing per se, but rather on parallelism in the discourse function of contrastive material, as recognized in pioneering work by Susanne Winkler (2005, 2013; Molnár & Winkler 2010). The proper definition of (33) should thus rather be given as (ii):

(ii) Felicity condition on contrastive remnants (updated version)
Contrastive remnants are only felicitous if their correlate is contrastive and has a discourse function identical to their own.

Depiante & Vicente (2009) arrive at a similar conclusion in their study of negative fragments. By stating our felicity condition as (ii) we depart from the construction-specific view of ellipsis and move towards recognizing only two types of elliptical construction: contrastive or noncontrastive ones, in the footsteps of Winkler, although we do this in a format different from hers (see fn. 20).

constituent left behind—that is, in fragments. In case the contrastive material is not a fragment but is followed by VP ellipsis, the restriction is not present:

(39) A: The pizza was COLD.
B: *No, the STEAK.
B′: No, the STEAK was.

The felicity condition we identified is thus a constraint specifically on fragments, that is, ellipsis where the contrastive phrase is the *only* constituent surviving the ellipsis.

This section has shown that fragments come in two flavors when it comes to their interpretation with respect to a correlate: they can be contrastive or noncontrastive compared to their correlate. Contrastive fragments are themselves contrastively focused and they require a contrastively focused antecedent as well. Noncontrastive fragments can represent either new-information or contrastive focus and have an antecedent with which they do not contrast. Table 1 summarizes these facts and lists some constructions for both types, including elaborative and corrective fragments. Although we only provided data for the above distinction from English, we do this for reasons of space. We believe the distinction is universal and that (33) can be observed in all languages. We provide evidence for this felicity condition from Hungarian in section 3.2.

2.2 The Role of Contrastivity in Island Repair

Having distinguished between the two types of fragments under consideration, we now analyze their syntactic behavior. Interestingly, contrastive and noncontrastive fragments differ starkly in an important respect: island (in)sensitivity. Contrastive fragments do not repair islands, but noncontrastive fragments do. In this section we illustrate this observation, using primarily English data, together with some key data from Chinese and Turkish.

We start by discussing our claim for English noncontrastive fragments, looking at five strong islands (subject islands, left-branch extractions, CSC violations, CNPC, and adjunct islands) and two types of noncontrastive fragments: elaborative non-

Table 1. Properties of contrastive and noncontrastive fragments.

	Contrastive fragments	**Noncontrastive fragments**
IS status of fragment	Contrastive focus	New-information focus or contrastive focus
Correlate	Lexical focus	*Wh*-phrase or indefinite
Example	• Corrective fragments • Answers to alternative questions with contrastive correlate • Sluicing (with contrast)	• Elaborative fragments • Answers to *wh*-questions • Tags in split questions • Sluicing (without contrast)

wh-fragments (in B's utterance) and *wh*-fragments (sluicing) without any contrastive material (in B′'s utterance).[13]

(40) Derived-position islands
A: I heard that a biography of one of the Marx brothers is going to be published this year.
B: Yeah, of Groucho.
B′: Excellent. Of which/whom?

(41) Left-branch extractions
A: I imagine John wants a detailed list.
B: I'm afraid he does. Very detailed.
B′: How detailed?

(42) CSC
A: I heard that Irv and a certain someone from your syntax class were dancing together last night.
B: Yeah, Bill.
B′: Really? Who?

(43) CNPC with relative clauses
A: I heard they hired someone who speaks a Balkan language fluently.
B: Yeah, Serbo-Croatian.
B′: Really? Which?

(44) Adjunct island

[13] The extent to which English fragment constructions obviate islands is heavily influenced by the discourse prominence of the weak quantifier (an existential quantifier or an indefinite XP) in the prior discourse to which the remnant of sluicing refers (Frazier & Clifton 2005, 2006; Baker 2007; Kim 2010). It appears that the more discourse-salient the antecedent quantifier, the more acceptable the fragment. As an example of the reparative effect of discourse-linking, consider (i), which Lasnik (2005) judges to be unacceptable. For our informants, the marginally acceptable construction presented in (i) becomes fully acceptable when the weak quantifier is rendered more prominent in the discourse by being made more specific and being made into the topic of the discourse (cf. ii).

(i) *John wants to hire [someone who fixes cars {in a certain way/for a certain reason}], but I don't know why. (Lasnik 2005, cited in Nakao & Yoshida 2006)

(ii) A: I always had my lunch fixed by my wife at one o'clock.
B: That late? I had mine fixed at noon!
C: I knew this guy that for years dated someone who fixed his lunch at the same time every day, but he was so stupid he never worked out when.

In the following discussion of island sensitivity in fragments we control for the muddying influence of discourse prominence by providing examples in which the antecedent quantifier is as prominent in the discourse as possible.

A: I hear that Abby is likely to get mad if Ben speaks to one of the guys from your syntax class.
B: Yeah, John.
B′: Really? Who?

Constructing the same examples with contrastive fragments, consider first corrective fragments. They do not show island repair.

(45) A: I heard that a biography of the YOUNGEST Marx brothers is going to be published this year.
B: *No, of the OLDEST.

(46) A: I imagine John wants a SHORT list.
B: *No, LONG.

(47) A: I heard that Irv and JOHN were dancing together last night.
B: *No, BILL.

(48) A: I heard they hired someone who speaks BULGARIAN fluently.
B: *No, SERBO-CROATIAN.

(49) A: I hear that Abby is likely to get mad if BEN speaks to Mary.
B: *No, BILL.

Answers to alternative questions with contrastive correlates do not show island repair, either.

(50) A: Is the biography of the YOUNGEST Marx brothers going to be published this year?
B: *No, of the OLDEST.

(51) A: Does John want a SHORT list?
B: *No, LONG.

(52) A: Were Irv and a JOHN dancing together last night?
B: *No, BILL.

(53) A: Did they hire someone who speaks BULGARIAN fluently?
B: *No, SERBO-CROATIAN.

(54) A: Is Abby likely to get mad if BEN speaks to Mary?
B: *No, SUSAN.

Sluicing, which has a contrastive and a noncontrastive type, shows island repair as a function of its contrastivity: it repairs islands when the *wh*-phrase is noncontrastive, but not otherwise (Merchant 2008).

(55) Abby wants to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language, but I don't remember which.

(56) *Abby wants to hire someone who speaks GREEK fluently, but I don't remember what OTHER language.

As the reader can check, we have exhausted the entire range of fragments in Table 1 with the exception of answers to *wh*-questions and split questions, for which island insensitivity cannot be tested in English, due to the independent property of English syntax that it cannot place *wh*-phrases in islands (see below). The data that we could check, however, all unambiguously point to the following generalization:

(57) Generalization on island repair
Contrastive fragments cannot repair islands. Noncontrastive fragments can potentially repair islands.

To arrive at this generalization on English, one has to consider more types of fragments than just correctives and *wh*-fragments, the two types that the literature almost without exception[14] capitalizes on, and it is crucial to differentiate between contrastive and noncontrastive fragments when considering the behavior of fragments in island contexts. This is crucial since some types of fragments cannot be tested when it comes to island sensitivity. As Merchant (2004) shows, fragment answers to *wh*-questions cannot be straightforwardly tested, due to the fact that *wh*-phrases in English cannot occur inside islands in ordinary questions.[15] The intended island context cannot be cued, since A's question is ill-formed:

(58) A: *Abby speaks the same Balkan language that who speaks?
B: [Ben.]

[14] Exceptions are Hoji & Fukaya (2001), who mention that elaborative fragments do not show island sensitivity, and Merchant (2004:709), who mentions the same for certain types of elaborative, confirmatory (as well as corrective) fragments, which he sets aside as possible cases of metalinguistic conjunctions.

[15] As the previous footnote has already mentioned, *wh*-phrases in echo questions can be placed in islands. The same holds for quiz questions, which accordingly can receive island-insensitive fragment answers:

(i) A: John F. Kennedy was killed in the city that which baseball team calls home?
B: The Texas Rangers.

The availability of island-insensitive fragments is predicted by our theory, since the answers in these contexts is never contrastive.

To overcome this limitation, Merchant uses an alternative strategy for testing fragments, by asking a yes–no question with contrastive intonation on a particular constituent, like the following:[16]

(59) A: Does Abby speak the same Balkan language that BEN speaks?
B: *No, CHARLIE.

The idea is that the fragment answer in this case provides an answer both to the yes–no question (in uttering the particle *no*) and to the implicitly salient *wh*-question *Who is the person who also speaks the Balkan language that Abby does*? With the latter, we can thus indirectly test fragments to a *wh*-question, and we manage to place the correlate of the fragment into an island. Although this strategy is valid, it is crucial to keep in mind that the first context, that in (58), tests island repair with noncontrastive fragments, whereas the alternative strategy in (59) tests the behavior of contrastive ones. The conclusion based on the latter thus cannot be superimposed onto the former (contrary to Merchant 2004). Island sensitivity in (59) is indication that *contrastive* fragments do not repair islands,[17] but says nothing about noncontrastive fragments. The latter can only be tested using elaborative fragments of the type we showed in (40)–(44). And these tests indicate that noncontrastive fragments repair islands.

The validity of our generalization in (57) receives straightforward confirmation from *wh*-in-situ languages like Turkish or Chinese that may form questions like (58) in which a *wh*-phrase is contained within an island. In these languages noncontrastive fragment responses to *wh*-questions in island contexts systematically repair islands (the islands are bracketed in the examples below for ease of exposition):

(60) Turkish (İnce 2009, 2012; Jaklin Kornfilt, Güliz Güneş, p.c.)
A: Hasan [**kim**-i göreceğiz diye] bir ekmek daha almış?
Hasan who-A will.see for one bread more bought
Lit. 'Hasan bought another loaf of bread because he will see who?'

[16] Merchant (2004) also uses another strategy to test fragments in island contexts: multiple *wh*-questions with the second *wh*-phrase in an island. Fragmentary answers to these questions are also ungrammatical (see (i)), but island-free contexts give an acceptable result (see (ii)).

(i) A: Which committee member wants to hire someone who speaks which language?
B: *Abby Greek, and Ben Albanian.

(ii) A: Which lawyer said he was representing which war criminal?
B: Cochran Milosevic, and Dershowitz Sharon.

As İnce (2009, 2012:fn. 14) points out, this test is most likely ill suited: it is not clear if the answer in (ii) actually contains an embedded clause. Native-speaker intuitions reveal that the fragment rather corresponds to 'Cochran was representing Milosevic, and Dershowitz was representing Sharon.' For this reason, the ungrammaticality of (iB) need not follow from an island violation but rather from the fact that the first remnant cannot be construed as a clausemate of the second.

[17] İnce (2009, 2012) recognizes that island sensitivity in examples like (59) is not a property of fragment answers but rather of contrastive elements in general. However, İnce does not recognize them as a separate class of noncontrastive fragments but instead considers them distinct from contrastive ones because they are what he calls "bare fragment answers," corresponding to *wh*-correlates.

B: Mehmed-i.
Mehmed-A
'MEHMED.'

(61) Chinese (Lisa Cheng, Yiya Chen, p.c.)[18]
A: Ni renshi [yi-ge jiang **shenme wen** de ren]?
you know one-CL speak what language *DE* person
Lit. 'You know someone who speaks what language?'
B: E-wen.
Russian
'RUSSIAN.'

Contrastive fragments like (59) fail to repair islands in Turkish or Chinese, just like they fail to repair islands in English. We illustrate this using the same kind of island as above, a CNPC violation:

(62) A: Hasan [MEHMED-i göreceğiz diye] mi bir ekmek daha almış?
Hasan Mehmed-A will.see for Q one bread more bought
Lit. 'Hasan bought another loaf of bread because he will see MEHMED?'
B: ?*Hayır, ALİ-Yİ.
No Ali-A
'No, ALİ.'

(63) A: Ta renshi [yi-ge jiang E-WEN de ren].
he know one-CL speak Russian *DE* person
'He knows someone who speaks Russian.'
B: *Bushi, RI-WEN.
not.be Japanese
'No, JAPANESE.'

These contrastive fragments in Turkish and Chinese thus show a stark difference in island repair when compared to the island insensitivity of their noncontrastive equivalents. This provides convincing evidence against accounts of island sensitivity like Merchant's, which can only account for island-sensitive fragment answers. *Wh*-in-situ languages unambiguously demonstrate that the correct characterization of island sensitivity should examine the meaning of the fragments along the lines we

[18] Here we construct examples that involve only argument *wh*-phrases. Chinese *wh*-phrases cannot be interpreted outside the island when they are adjuncts:

(i) Botong xihuan shei xie de shu?
Botong like who write *DE* book
'For which *x*, *x* a person, Botong likes the book that *x* wrote?'

(ii) Qiaofeng xihuan Botong weishenme xie de shu?
Qiaofeng like Botong why write *DE* book
*'For what reason *x*, Qiaofeng likes the book that Botong wrote for *x*?'

Table 2. Properties of contrastive and noncontrastive fragments, updated

	Contrastive fragments	**Noncontrastive fragments**
IS status of the fragment	Contrastive focus	New-information focus or contrastive focus
Correlate	Lexical focus	*Wh*-phrase or indefinite
Example	• Corrective fragments • Answers to alternative questions with contrastive correlate • Sluicing (with contrast)	• Elaborative fragments • Answers to *wh*-questions • Tags in split questions • Sluicing (without contrast)
Island sensitivity	Yes	No

have sketched in the previous section: contrastive fragments exhibit island sensitivity, while noncontrastive ones exhibit island insensitivity. We add this property to our characterization of the two types of fragments in Table 2.

3. The Role of Parallelism in Island Repair

To explain the role of contrast in island repair we begin where the previous section left off: with the observation that noncontrastive fragments repair islands in languages where their antecedent (an in-situ *wh*-phrase) scopes out of the island. As is known from the literature on these languages, in these contexts the *wh*-phrase in the question undergoes movement at LF to the beginning of the matrix clause (Huang 1982 and Aoun, Hornstein & Sportiche 1981[19]). The fragment in these discourses also occupies the initial position in its clause, which means that the configuration under examination can be represented schematically as follows:

(64) A: $[_{CP}\ wh_i \ldots \quad [_{\text{island node}} \ldots t_i \ldots]]?$ LF representation
B: $[_{CP}\ \text{fragment}_i \ldots \ \cancel{[_{\text{island node}} \ldots t_i \ldots]]}$

Based on the similar scopal position the *wh*-phrase and the fragment occupy in (64), we now advance what we believe is a key ingredient behind island repair: the need for *parallelism* between the fragment and the correlate. The important role parallelism plays in ellipsis has been known since at least Fiengo & May 1994, Fox 2000, Merchant 2001, Fox & Lasnik 2003, Fox & Takahashi 2005, and Winkler 2005. The kind of scopal parallelism that fragments require can be stated as follows (following Fox & Lasnik 2003):

(65) Scopal Parallelism in ellipsis
Variables in the antecedent and the elided clause are bound from parallel positions.

[19] But contra Pesetsky (1987), who argues for an unselective-binding approach to *wh*-in-situ (see Heim 1982), and Reinhart (1998), who adopts a choice-functional-binding approach, and others.

In this section we show that Parallelism is a necessary condition on the well-formedness of both types of fragments, and as such it is a necessary condition for successful island repair as well. Island repair can only obtain in constructions where the fragment and the correlate are parallel. We will show that Parallelism is always satisfied in noncontrastive fragments, giving rise to successful island repair in these cases. Parallelism, however, as we will argue, following Winkler 2013, is never satisfied in island-violating contrastive fragments, thus ruling out island repair in this type.

3.1 Parallelism in Noncontrastive Fragments

Our account of noncontrastive fragments follows Merchant's (2001) analysis, who noted that scopal parallelism is required by sluicing. In this section we simply extend Merchant's account to all types of noncontrastive fragments.

In noncontrastive fragments, Parallelism is trivially satisfied because, as we have noted in section 2 above, the remnant's correlate is always a specific indefinite, and these are known to take sentential scope. Thus, the weak quantifier raises to a position external to TP at LF (May 1985), leaving a variable in the base-generated position. This variable is then bound by a TP-adjoined λ-operator (Heim & Kratzer 1998). The remnant itself, regardless of whether a *wh*-phrase or a lexical phrase, also takes sentential scope, and consequently the variable left by quantifier-raising is bound from a parallel TP-adjoined position:[20]

(66) A: Mary kissed someone last night.
B: Who$_1$ <Mary kissed t_1 last night>?
B′: Yeah, Bill$_1$ <Mary kissed t_1 last night>.

(67) A: [someone$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ Mary kissed x_1 last night]) LF representation
B: [who$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ Mary kissed x_1 last night])
B′: [Bill$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ Mary kissed x_1 last night])

Island-repairing instances of fragments also comply with scopal Parallelism. In these cases, too, the indefinite has highest matrix scope and thus mirrors the matrix scope of the remnant. Consider the following example from Merchant 2001 to illustrate the point.

(68) They want to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language.

[20] An anonymous reviewer raises the point about whether the same kind of parallelism also obtains in cases where the sluiced *wh*-phrase has an invisible correlate that modifies a nonspecific indefinite:

(i) John wants to buy some books, but I don't know what kind.

We believe the account carries over to these cases, too, and corresponds to the intuition that (i) presupposes that John has specific types of books in mind that he is looking for.

(69) a. They want to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language, but I don't remember which.
b. A: They want to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language.
B: Yeah, Bulgarian.

Taken in isolation, the indefinite *a Balkan language* in (68) may, in principle, scope above or below *want* in the nonelliptical clause. When it is succeeded by a sluice as in (69a) or an elaborative noncontrastive fragment as in (69b), only the reading in which the indefinite scopes above *want* survives. The reading in which the indefinite scopes below *want* is unattainable because scopal parallelism between the indefinite in the antecedent clause and the sluice/fragment can never be achieved.

(70) [a Balkan language$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ they want to hire someone who speaks x_1])
[which$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ they want to hire someone who speaks x_1])
[Bulgarian$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ they want to hire someone who speaks x_1])

(71) [$_{TP}$ they want [a Balkan language$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ to hire someone who speaks x_1])
[which$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ they want to hire someone who speaks x_1])
[Bulgarian$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ they want to hire someone who speaks x_1])

The requirement for scopal parallelism explains the island-sensitive nature of sprouting as well (again see Merchant 2001 for a discussion of sprouting). As we have indicated in footnote 3, sprouting (i.e., sluicing with implicit arguments) does not repair islands, as illustrated below for both sluicing (72) and the elaborative fragments (73).

(72) *Sandy was trying to work out which student would speak, but she refused to say to whom.

(73) A: Sandy was trying to work out which student would speak.
B: *Yeah, to the director.

Island repair is impossible in (72) and (73) because the implicit argument in the antecedent clause that is made overt in the fragments can only take low scope in the antecedent (Fodor & Fodor 1980, Mittwoch 1982). Because the low scope of the implicit argument in the antecedent clause does not mirror the high scope of the remnant in the fragments, scopal Parallelism cannot be achieved. Scopal parallelism is thus a restriction on noncontrastive fragments and is satisfied in all examples which successfully repair islands.

3.2 Parallelism in Contrastive Fragments

In this section we demonstrate that Parallelism also needs to be satisfied in contrastive fragments. This will follow from the observation that contrastive fragments must have a contrastively focused antecedent, and the idea, adapted from Winkler 2013, that

these contrastive constituents must have the same size as focus phrases (in the sense of Krifka 2006). Particularly clear empirical evidence will be provided for this from Hungarian.

Recall from section 2.1 that contrastive fragments must comply with the felicity condition that we advanced in (33), repeated in (74).

(74) Felicity condition on contrastive fragments
Contrastive fragments are only felicitous if their correlate is contrastively focused.

Like English, Hungarian shows evidence for the existence of this felicity condition: contrastive fragments must have contrastively focused correlates, which, according to the grammar of Hungarian, must be overtly fronted to FocP in the left periphery (see sect. 1). Consider the following two examples, which show the correct use of corrective fragments:

(75) A: Mari belebotlott a főnökébe a piacon.
Mari PV.bumped the boss.POSS3SG.INTO the market.ON
'Mari bumped into her boss at the market.'
B: *Nem, BEA.
no Bea
B′: Nem, BEA botlott bele a főnökébe a piacon.
no Bea bumped PV the boss.POSS3SG.INTO the market.ON
'No, BEA bumped into her boss at the market.'

(76) A: MARI botlott bele a főnökébe a piacon.
Mari bumped PV the boss.POSS3SG.INTO the market.ON
'MARI bumped into her boss at the market.'
B: Nem, BEA.
no Bea
B′: Nem, BEA botlott bele a főnökébe a piacon.
no Bea bumped PV the boss.POSS3SG.INTO the market.ON
'No, BEA bumped into her boss at the market.'

In (75), the antecedent sentence is neutral: it contains SVO word order and has no contrastively focused constituent in it (which can be observed from the canonical word order exhibited by the preverb *bele* 'into' and the verb *botlott* 'bumped'). To such a sentence, correction can only take the form of a full sentence but not an elliptical one: the contrastive fragment in (75B) is ruled out, but the full correction in (75B′) is perfect. Note that the full correction features the corrective phrase *Bea* in focus position, as required by the nature of correction. In (76), we have changed the antecedent clause such that we placed the corrected *Mari* into the contrastive focus position (triggering the inverted word order between the preverb and the verb), and in such a context, the elliptical fragmentary correction is perfectly fine. The behavior of Hungarian thus obeys our felicity condition in (33). In Hungarian, just as in English,

contrastive fragments must have contrastively focused correlates, and these correlates furthermore need to undergo overt fronting, as all contrastively focused phrases do in Hungarian.

Given that focus fronting fixes the scope of focus items and reflects their semantic scope (É. Kiss and 1987, Bródy 1995, Szabolcsi 1997), the resulting structure in turn represents the LF structure of the antecedent and the fragment:

(77) [$_{FocP}$ [MARI] [$_{TP}$ botlott bele a főnökébe a piacon]] LF representation
(Nem,) [$_{FocP}$ [BEA] [$_{TP}$ ~~botlott bele a főnökébe a piacon~~]]

As this shows, correlate and fragment are completely parallel in scope, indicating that contrastive fragments comply with the requirement of scopal Parallelism in Hungarian, too.[21]

Having refreshed our memory of Parallelism, let us move on to examples that contain islands. What is the prediction of Parallelism for these cases?

The first point to note is that contrastive fragments have contrastively focused correlates and unlike weak quantifiers that scope out of islands, contrastively focused phrases are island-sensitive both in languages that move focus in overt syntax (É. Kiss 1987) and in languages where focus moves only at LF. The scope of contrastively focused items is known to be upper-bound by syntactic islands (Drubig 1994, Rooth 1997, Krifka 2006). Consequently, the contrastively focused phrase must pied-pipe the island in which it is contained at LF to the relevant scope position.

[21] The parallelism effect identified in contrastive fragments in Hungarian characterizes not only fragments, but gapping and stripping as well (see Bánréti 2002, 2007 for the latter two).

(i) a. MARI vásárolt tegnap a piacon, és BEA.
Mari shopped yesterday the market.ON and Bea
'MARI was doing shopping yesterday at the market, and Bea, too.'
b. MARI vásárolt tegnap a piacon, és nem BEA.
Mari shopped yesterday the market.ON and not Bea
'MARI was doing shopping yesterday at the market, and not BEA.'

In all these cases ellipsis is an instance of TP ellipsis, evidenced by the fact that neither type of ellipsis allows for tense-mismatches between the antecedent clause and the elliptical clause (Bartos 2001, Bánréti 2007). This follows straightforwardly if tense specification (located in the TP) does not survive ellipsis in these cases.

(ii) *Mari TEGNAP vásárolt a piacon, és nem HOLNAP.
Mari yesterday shopped the market.ON and not tomorrow
'Mari was shopping at the market YESTERDAY, and not TOMORROW.'

(iii) *Mari TEGNAP vásárolt a piacon, én pedig HOLNAP.
Mari yesterday shopped the market.ON I PRT tomorrow
'Mari was shopping at the market YESTERDAY, and I TOMORROW.'

(iv) A: Mari TEGNAP vásárolt a piacon?
Mari yesterday shopped the market.ON
'Was Mari shopping at the market YESTERDAY?'
B: *Nem, HOLNAP.
no tomorrow
'No, TOMORROW.'

On Krifka's account, the correct LF derivation for (78) is (78a), and not the island-violating (78b).[22]

(78) John only introduced the man that JILL admires to Sue.
Interpretation: 'There is a set of men that various people admire (man α is admired by Jill; man β is admired by Mary; etc.), and John only introduced one of these men to Sue.'
a. LF: John only [[the man that Jill admires]$_1$ λx ([$_{vP}$ introduced x_1])] to Sue.
b. LF: John only [Jill$_1$ λx ([$_{vP}$ introduced the man that x_1 admires])] to Sue.

Overt-focus-movement languages like Hungarian exemplify the correctness of Krifka's account; as the same pattern of acceptability observed at LF in English in (78a) and (78b) is observed in overt syntax. The exact equivalent of (78a) is only well-formed if next to the contrastively focused embedded item (*Juli* in the following examples), *the island as a whole* is marked for contrastive focus. There are two ways the entire island can be marked for focus. One is to pied-pipe the whole island into the matrix focus position (cf. (79)).

(79) János (csak) AZT A FÉRFIT [$_{RC}$ akit JULI csodál] mutatta be
János only that.A the man.A REL.who.A Juli admires introduced PV
Zsuzsának.
Zsuzsa.DAT
'János only introduced the man who JULI admires to Zsuzsa.'

The other strategy can be used in cases where the island has an associate in the syntax, and it involves partial fronting: fronting the associate of the island to the focus position and stranding the island in situ. In the case of the relative clause island in our current example it means that the lexical head of the relative clause—which in almost

[22] Note that Krifka's (2006) account of contrastive focus island sensitivity provides an explanation for the apparent LF-island-violating constructions (e.g., (ia)) which, among other reasons, prevented Merchant (2008) from adopting a similar proposal to ours. Another reason Merchant (2008) retains his (2004) analysis of island-sensitivity in ellipsis is to account for the unacceptability of constructions such as (ii); a VP-ellipsis construction in which *wh*-movement occurs. Under Merchant's (2004) account (ii)'s unacceptability is explained by appeal to the fact that PF-interpretable traces escape elision. Although the current proposal remains agnostic as to how to account for (ii), the reader is directed to Thoms 2011 for a possible alternative to Merchant 2008.

(i) a. I only played a song RINGO wrote because you did.
b. LF: I only [[a song that RINGO wrote]$_1$ λ x ([play x])] because
you did [[a song that RINGO wrote]$_1$ λ x ([play x])]

(ii) *Abby DOES want to hire someone who speaks GREEK, but I don't remember [$_{CP}$ what kind of language]$_1$ [$_{TP}$ t_1* [$_{TP}$ she DOESN'T [$_{VP}$ t_1* [$_{VP}$ ~~want to hire someone who speaks t_1~~].

all cases in Hungarian is a demonstrative phrase—is fronted to focus alone (see (80)):[23]

(80) János (csak) AZT A FÉRFIT mutatta be Zsuzsának, [$_{RC}$ akit
János only that.A the man.A introduced PV Zsuzsa.DAT REL.who.A
Juli csodál].
Juli admires
'János only introduced the man who Juli admires to Zsusza.'

Importantly, when the entire associate+island complex is left in situ, or when the embedded focus *Juli* is fronted into the matrix focus position across the island node, the result is ill-formed:

(81) *János (csak) bemutatta Zsuzsának AZT A FÉRFIT [$_{RC}$ akit
János only PV.introduced Zsuzsa.DAT that.A the man.A REL.who.A
Juli csodál].
Juli admires

(82) *János (csak) Juli$_i$ mutatta be Zsuzsának AZT A FÉRFIT
János only Juli introduced PV Zsuzsa.DAT that.A the man.A
[$_{RC}$ akit t_i csodál].
REL.who.A admires
'János only introduced the man who Juli admires to Zsuzsa.'

It is immediately clear why the latter example is ruled out: (82) contains a violation of subjacency: focal A′-movement cannot cross an island node. More relevant for us is (81) in comparison with (79) and (80): what these three examples show is that Hungarian does in overt syntax what English does at LF in (78), namely it places the entire island into its scope position in overt syntax, in line with the language's general rule to mark the scope of every contrastive focus constituent overtly.[24] Granting this, Hungarian can be taken to provide illustration for the fact that Krifka's theory is correct.

Having established the island sensitivity of (LF) focus movement, we can now move back to the domain of fragments and consider the derivation of contrastive

[23] The choice between the two strategies is by and large a question of how "heavy" the island is at PF. The longer the island in the preverbal focus position, the less acceptable the utterance. The focus position forces special prosody on the focus item that is often incompatible with the prosody of clausal material. In the theory of Kenesei (1984), the precise problem is that the focal clause does not bear the right type of stress that is necessary to remove the stress on postfocal material. Individual variation in the acceptance of pied-piping and partial fronting is extensive: some speakers almost always use partial fronting, while others freely allow pied-piping (especially that of headless relatives). We ignore such variation for ease of exposition.

[24] Some important issues we ignore due to space constraints concern the mechanism of focal marking of islands. A specific issue concerns what the exact relation is between the embedded focal item and the island node, and whether it can be considered to be an instance of viewed as focus percolation. See van Craenenbroeck & Lipták 2006 for a more detailed description of this phenomenon.

fragments in an attempt to show how Parallelism is at work in these, following the basic insight of Winkler 2013.[25]

For ease of exposition, we start with English again, where contrastive focus is in situ and takes scope at LF. In contrastive fragments the remnant requires a contrastively focused correlate. This correlate has to obey syntactic islands at LF, with the result that the only way an island-internal contrastively focused correlate may move to a scope position external to TP at LF is by pied-piping the island that contains it. Using our current example as illustration this means that the question in A's utterance has the LF representation in (84):

(83) A: Did John introduce the man that JILL admires to Sue?
LF: [[the man that JILL admires]$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ John introduce x_1 to Sue])]
B: *No, HEATHER.
B′: No, the man that HEATHER admires.

With the assumption that any fragmentary response to A's question must exhibit a parallel structure at LF, we now understand why the short answer in B is ruled out: this response is not parallel, as in these cases the contrastively focused remnant strands the island in the narrow syntax, making it impossible to pied-pipe the island at LF. The only possible fragmentary response is the long answer in B′, where the narrow syntax structure mirrors the LF structure, and Parallelism with the question is achieved automatically. The following two representations spell out both the syntax and the semantics of the answers:

(84) B: *No, [HEATHER$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~John introduced the man that t_1~~ ~~admires to Sue~~]].
LF: [HEATHER$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ John introduced the man that x_1 admires to Sue])]

(85) B′: No, [[the man that HEATHER admires]$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~John introduced t_1~~ ~~to~~ ~~Sue~~]].
LF: [[the man that HEATHER admires]$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ John introduced x_1 to Sue])]

It is important to stress that what the starred (83B) is not ungrammatical in the absolute sense, rather, it is ungrammatical *with respect to the reading it is intended to represent*, namely when it is understood in contrast to the island-internal correlate

[25] Winkler (2013) puts forward a theory in which what she refers to as "Contrastive Ellipsis" (all instances of sluicing, stripping, gapping, and psedugogapping) observes parallelism, in that the elliptical clause receives the same semantic and information structural interpretation (*modulo* focused constituents) as its antecedent. She couches the effect of parallelism between the remnant and the antecedent in the framework of Krifka 2006, which we adopt in our discussion to follow. At the same time, we do not agree with the all-encompassing nature of her approach to all the phenomena she attempts to account for and the specifics of her theory of focus which considers all instances of focus in elliptical constructions to be equal. First, we believe that it is incorrect to classify sluicing—a classification that can be extended to fragments—as inherently contrastive. As we showed in section 2, sluicing and fragments can be either contrastive or noncontrastive, depending on their relationship with their antecedent. In our view, this differentiation must be the centerpiece of any explanation for island repair and is rooted in a view of focus which in turn differentiates between contrastive and noncontrastive focus to be distinct phenomena. A theory of focus that does *not* differentiate between these two types necessarily over-generates when it comes to the phenomena at hand (just like Winkler's approach).

Jill. It is perfectly fine when *Heather* is understood to contrast with *the man that Jill admires*, that is, the entire island, since in this case parallelism is satisfied.

The assumption that scopal parallelism is a requirement in contrastive fragments thus not only derives the illicit nature of short answers (cf. the answers in B) but neatly explains the well-formedness of long answers as well (cf. the answers in B′).

Unsurprisingly, Hungarian patterns identically with respect to the availability of the long fragment and the unavailability of the short fragment in island contexts. The only acceptable answer to (86) is the one that spells out the entire island, that is, the long answer in B′.[26]

(86) A: János AZT A FÉRFIT mutatta be Zsuzsának, [$_{RC}$ akit JULI
János that.A the man.A introduced PV Zsuzsa.DAT REL.who.A Juli
csodál]?
admires
'Did János introduce the man who JULI admires to Sue?'
B: *Nem, HANGA.
no Hanga
B′: Nem, AZT (A FÉRFIT), [$_{RC}$ akit HANGA (csodál)].
no that.A the man.A REL.who.A Hanga admires
'No, the man that HANGA admires.'

(87) B: *Nem, [HANGA$_1$ <[$_{TP}$ János bemutatta azt a férfit akit t_1 csodál Zsuzsának]>.
PF/LF: [HANGA$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ János bemutatta azt a férfit akit x_1 csodál Zsuzsának])]

(88) B′: Nem, [[azt a férfit, akit HANGA csodál]$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~János bemutatta *t*$_1$~~ ~~Zsuzsának~~]].
PF/LF: [[Azt a férfit, akit HANGA csodál]$_1$ λx ([$_{TP}$ János bemutatta x_1 Zsuzsának)]

This evidences the Parallelism requirement between the antecedent sentence and the fragmentary one very palpably, since one can observe the requirement for contrastively focusing the entire island in A's question as well pronouncing the entire island in B's answer.

So far we have shown the role of Parallelism in prohibiting short fragments and permitting long fragments in contrastive ellipsis with only CNPC islands. Other types of islands follow the pattern in exactly the same way, as these English examples show:

[26] As the answer in B′ shows, the long answer can be optionally further reduced by additional ellipsis operations, which we indicate by the bracketing above. Inside the island, ellipsis can apply to the TP (see van Craenenbroeck & Lipták 2006 for the specifics of this type of clausal ellipsis). NP ellipsis can also apply to the lexical head of the island *azt a férfit* 'that.A the man.A', such that only the demonstrative remains overt and *a férfit* is elided. Note also that the derivation of the long answer necessitates a view on which the entire associate + island complex is pied-piped into the matrix focus position, followed by nonpronunciation of the TP complement of FocP that hosts the island. PF reservations on the size of the pied-piped material that characterize nonelliptical utterances do not appear in this case as ellipsis of the TP removes the cause of the PF clash between the focused island and what follows it. This provides the interesting evidence for Kenesei's account that we mentioned in footnote 18.

(89) A: Is the biography of the YOUNGEST Marx brothers going to be published this year?
B: *No, of the OLDEST.
B′: No, the biography of the OLDEST one.

(90) A: Does John want a SHORT list?
B: *No, LONG.
B′: No, a LONG one.

(91) A: Were Irv and a JOHN dancing together last night?
B: *No, BILL.
B′: No, Irv and BILL.

(92) A: Did they hire someone who speaks BULGARIAN fluently?
B: *No, SERBO-CROATIAN.
B′: No, someone who speaks SERBO-CROATIAN.

(93) A: Is Abby likely to get mad if BEN speaks to Mary?
B: *No, BILL.
B′: No, if BILL speaks to Mary.

The equivalent Hungarian examples show the same pattern (not shown for reasons of space), as do Turkish and Chinese. Recall from section 2.2 that the latter two languages were used to show that the exact same fragment is well-formed in island contexts if it corresponds to a *wh*-correlate and ill-formed if it corresponds to a contrastive one. Returning to those facts, we can observe that although short fragments are ruled out as stated, fragments corresponding to the entire island are well-formed:

(94) A: Hasan [MEHMED-i göreceğiz diye] mi bir ekmek daha almış?
Hasan Mehmed-A will.see for Q one bread more bought
Lit. 'Hasan bought another loaf of bread because he will see MEHMED?'
B: ?*Hayır, ALİ-Yİ.
no Ali-A
'No, ALİ.'
B′: Hayır, ALİ-Yİ göreceğiz diye.
no Ali-A will.see for
'No, because he will see ALİ.'

(95) A: Ta renshi [yi-ge jiang E-WEN de ren].
he know one-CL speak Russian *DE* person
'He knows someone who speaks Russian.'
B: *Bushi, RI-WEN.
not.be Japanese
'No, JAPANESE.'

B′: Bushi, (yi-ge) jiang RI-WEN de.
not.be one-CL speak Japanese *DE*
'No, who speaks JAPANESE.'

We propose that it is universally the case that contrastive fragments responding to island contexts have to *minimally spell out the island itself*, and we claim that this follows from the restriction on Parallelism.

We have shown in this section that the fragment and its correlate need to be bound from parallel positions. Coupled with the observation that contrastive-focus movement is island-sensitive, and islands are pied-piped at the latest at LF, this rules out any fragmentary material that is smaller than the island itself. Long fragments are the only available type in this context.

(96) Short answers: Parallelism violated → island repair does not obtain
A: $[[_{\text{island node}} \ldots \text{correlate}]_i \; [\ldots t_i \ldots]]$ LF
B: *$[\text{fragment}_i \ldots \quad [_{\text{island node}} \ldots \sout{t_i} \ldots]]$

(97) Long answers: Parallelism satisfied
A: $[[_{\text{island node}} \ldots \text{correlate}]_i \; [\ldots t_i \ldots]]$ LF
B: $[[_{\text{island node}} \ldots \text{fragment}]_i \; [\ldots \sout{t_i} \ldots]]$

And this in turn means that island sensitivity of contrastive fragments derives *entirely* from Parallelism. No syntactic consideration or structural condition other than that presented in this section—namely the island sensitivity of contrastive focus—is necessary to rule out island repair in contrastive fragments. This makes our theory the most restricted theory of which we are aware, something that we consider a great advantage over syntactically oriented approaches to fragments such as Merchant 2004 or Temmerman 2013.

Our approach in terms of Parallelism is reminiscent, but not identical, to the account of contrast sluices in Merchant 2008. In this work, Merchant derives the island-sensitive nature of contrast sluices by assuming scopal Parallelism, as we do, but he couples it with the proposal that focus movement is island-*in*sensitive but can only take place up to the level of the VP and not any higher. We differ from Merchant in that we take focus movement to be island-sensitive. We believe that the latter move gives a more intuitive account of the obligatory use of long answers in island contexts.[27]

[27] The main reason why Merchant (2008) did not adopt the view that focus is island-sensitive has to do with examples involving VP ellipsis like the following (Kratzer 1991):

(i) I only [[talked to the woman who chaired the ZONING BOARD] because you did].
'The only x such that I talked to the woman that chaired x because you talked to the woman who chaired x is the zoning board.'

Kratzer mentions that the reading paraphrased here necessitates island-violating scoping of the focused element *zoning board* in order to allow the bound reading in the elided VP. However, the same effect can be achieved in the hybrid theory of focus by Krifka (2006) in which alternative sets are of the size of the island but are based on supplying alternatives to the island-internal focused item. We leave the specifics of this solution for further research.

Before closing this section, a final note on crosslinguistic variation. In case our approach is on the right track and as long as contrastive focus is island-sensitive universally, it should universally be the case that contrastive fragments cannot repair islands. At this point, we are not aware of any language where contrastive fragments are able to repair islands.[28]

[28] Temmerman 2013 might at first sight seem to disqualify our statement. Temmerman shows that Dutch has a type of embedded fragment that can be contrastive and can repair islands. She provides the following two pieces of data for her claim:

(i) a. A: Willen ze iemand aannemen die GRIEKS spreekt?
want they someone hire that Greek speaks
'Do they want to hire someone who speaks GREEK?'
B: Nee, ik zou denken ALBAANS.
no I would think Albanian
'No, I would think ALBANIAN.'

b. A: Is Jack gekomen omdat hij MARIN wil versieren?
is Jack come because he Marin wants seduce
'Has Jack come because he wants to seduce MARIN?'
B: Nee, ik had gedacht/zou denken LYNN.
no I had thought would think Lynn
'No, I would think LYNN.'

Further investigation, however, reveals that this pattern does not pertain across the board: although the above object fragments are indeed fine, subjects and adjuncts are systematically ruled out for the three (Northern) Dutch speakers among our informants who can accept short answers in island contexts to begin with (two other informants reject them wholesale and allow for short answers only in contexts that do not contain islands):

(ii) A: Hebben ze studenten aangenomen die CRIT heeft aanbevolen?
Have they students taken who Crit has recommended
'Did they hire students who CRIT recommended?'
B: *Nee, ik zou denken MAARTEN.
No I would think Maarten
'No, I would think (the students who) MAARTEN (recommended).'

(iii) A: Heeft iemand gesolliciteerd die in LEIDEN heeft gestudeerd?
has someone applied who in Leiden has studied
'Did someone apply who studied in LEIDEN?'
B: *Nee, ik dacht in GRONINGEN.
no I thought in Groningen
'No, I thought in GRONINGEN.'

Of the three informants that consider object fragments fine, there is a further factor that determines acceptability: the position of the object. Island repair is only possible if the object is immediately preverbal. Adding a modifier after the object results in ungrammaticality:

(iv) A: Willen ze iemand aannemen die GRIEKS met zijn collega's spreekt?
want they someone hire that Greek with his colleagues speaks
'Do they want to hire someone who speaks GREEK with his colleagues?'
B: *Nee, ik zou denken ALBAANS.
no I would think Albanian
'No, I would think ALBANIAN.'

3.3. The Mechanism of Island Repair in Noncontrastive Fragments

Showing that island sensitivity in fragments is solely determined by Parallelism and not by the structural position a fragment occupies permits us to abandon Merchant's (2004) theory of island sensitivity in fragments, which relies upon the distribution of copies of A′-movement within a derivation to determine island sensitivity (see sect. 1.1).

We reject the idea adopted by Merchant (2004, 2008) that successive-cyclic movement adjoins to every maximal projection (although we are aware that there might be other, independent reasons to assume these; see Agüero-Bautista 2007). Because Parallelism alone determines island sensitivity in fragments, we see no reason to stipulate additional copies of movement beyond those that are conceptually necessary.

Consequently, we propose that Chomsky 1972, which states that unacceptability arises when two bounding nodes—TP and DP in English—are crossed by one instance of movement, provides an adequate description of Subjacency:[29]

(98) *[XP_1 [$_{BN}$ … YP … [$_{BN}$ … t_1 …]]

In line with recent research (Uriagereka 1999, Lasnik 2001, Hornstein, Lasnik & Uriagereka 2007) we assume that Subjacency is a PF constraint. Regarding whether Subjacency as described by (98) is an epiphenomenon of the linearization procedure that takes place at PF (as Hornstein, Lasnik & Uriagereka 2007 suggests) or an independent principle of the PF interface (as Lasnik 2001 suggests), we remain silent. It is sufficient for our purposes merely to state that a configuration like the one

It seems to us that that the crucial factor we are dealing with is ability of the fragment to carry sentential stress: objects, when they are most embedded constituents in their clause, carry sentential stress in Dutch (cf. Cinque 1993). Elements that do not carry the main accent of a clause do not license island repair. This makes us think that the Dutch facts Temmerman discovered instantiate an exceptional strategy, which can be called *stress-licensed fragments* and stress-licensed island repair, a type *distinct* from ordinary contrastive fragments we are looking at in this paper. Note that stressed-based fragments are exceptional also in the respect that they do not pose any restriction on the discourse status of their correlate: *Grieks* and *Marin* are not necessarily contrastively interpreted in (ia) and (ib), which indicates that stress-licensed fragments do not comply with the felicity condition on contrastive fragments that require the correlate to be contrastively focused (cf. (33) above), either.

In fact it is possible to consider stress-based fragments as fragments that lack contrastive focus themselves, and which spell out contrastive focus *on the whole island* (i.e., contrast between *someone who speaks Greek* and *someone who speaks Albanian* in (i) for example). If this way of thinking is correct, it is expected in our theory that the fragment can escape the island because it is noncontrastive with respect to its correlate. What is unexpected, however, is that the island can be reduced in size in the answer, as the entire island should correspond to the focused item at LF. We leave the specific mechanism of this exceptional stress-licensed island repair and its crosslinguistic availability for further research.

[29] Note that (98) is only a *description* of Subjacency. We do not claim that the term *bounding node* has any true theoretical status. As the following main body text makes clear, we assume that "Subjacency" is merely epiphenomenal of some more global PF constraint. How this should be phrased in terms of Phase Theory (Chomsky 2000 and subsequent works) and the *Phase Invisibility Condition* is tangential to our purposes. We believe that formulation of Subjacency along these lines is possible, but requires us to endorse Phasal spell-out to the PF interface alone (as Parallelism is a global constraint, and LF must be nonphasal)—which is a possibility (see Shiobara 2004)—the existence of edge features, and the other theoretical apparatus which accompanies Phases. For simplicity's sake we avoid this.

represented in (98) violates a PF -constraint that can be obviated if PF deletion renders the bounding nodes crossed by violatory movement unpronounced.

If the above-sketched conception of Subjacency is correct, then explaining the island insensitivity of noncontrastive fragments becomes straightforward. PF deletion permits the Subjacency-violating A′-movement chain created by fronting the noncontrastive fragment to persist in the derivation by rendering the bounding nodes movement crosses unpronounced. Consequently a PF crash is avoided. Because noncontrastive fragments always satisfy Parallelism LF crashes are also avoided and resultantly noncontrastive fragments converge at both interfaces.

Note that PF deletion also permits Subjacency-violating contrastive fragments to converge at the PF interface. Yet they are unacceptable because contrastive fragments never converge at the LF interface (i.e., because they never satisfy Parallelism). This observation accords with the conclusion of the previous sections. Long contrastive fragments, on the other hand, satisfy both parallelism and Subjacency, since they do not involve movement that crosses an island boundary. The only movement step they involve is that of the entire island itself, but that is completely legitimate as it does not cross two bounding nodes.

4. Consequences for the Derivation of Remnants

Our account relies on the assumption that all acceptable fragments, regardless of whether they are interrogative or declarative, must occupy a derived position in the left periphery of a full-fledged clause before spell out that corresponds to the position they occupy at LF.

That fragments occupy a left-peripheral position before spell out is uncontroversial in the case of English interrogative fragments and Hungarian fragments, as fronting of a potential fragment (i.e., a *wh*-phrase or focal element) occurs before spell-out regardless of whether deletion applies at PF (see (10) for Hungarian examples).

However, that potential declarative fragments in English occupy a derived position in the left-periphery before spell out is harder to justify. This is because focus fronting in English is either optional (99), or prohibited in contexts where an equivalent fragmentary response is acceptable (100). Taking (99) and (100) below into consideration, it is not immediately evident how remnants of declarative clausal ellipsis escape the ellipsis site to left-peripheral position before spell out. This is a potential problem for our proposal.

(99) A: What kind of food does he like?
B: He likes beans.
B′: ?Beans$_1$ he likes t_1.
B″: [Beans$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~he likes t_1~~]].

(100) A: Was he upset?
B: He was very upset.
B′: *Very$_1$ he was t_1 upset.
B″: [Very$_1$ [$_{TP}$ ~~he was t_1~~ ~~upset~~]]. (Valmala 2007:8)

To motivate remnant fronting in cases like (99) and (100), previous researchers (e.g., Hartman & Ai 2009) have introduced an "ellipsis-specific" mechanism (e.g., a *sui generis* uninterpretable feature dubbed *[uF]* in (101)) to render focus movement obligatory in elliptical contexts.

(101) Using an ellipsis-specific feature "[uF*]" to derive (99B″):
  a. $[_{FP}$ very$_1$ ~~[•uF*]~~ $[_{F^0}$ ~~[•uF*]~~ $[_{TP}$ he was t_1 upset]]
     [uF*] forces overt fronting in an elliptical environment
  b. *$[_{FP}$ very$_1$ $[_{F^0}$ $[_{TP}$ he was t_1 upset]]
     Fronting is unmotivated and hence prohibited in a nonelliptical environment

However, if deriving English declarative fragments requires an additional "ellipsis feature," while deriving English interrogative fragments and Hungarian fragments does not, then one must concede that fragments are not derived in a uniform manner. Because this runs contrary to our proposal—namely, that only Parallelism and the repair effects of PF deletion govern how fragments are derived—we do not wish to make such a concession. Thus, in the first part of this section (sect. 4.1), we present an alternative approach to deriving English declarative fragments which makes no recourse to an ellipsis feature but relies instead in the following generalization:

(102) Generalization on English focus fronting
  (i) A constraint α prohibits focus fronting in English
      and
  (ii) α is a constraint that operates solely at the PF interface.[30]

In the section 4.2, we turn our attention to the internal makeup of the elided TP. The reader may have noted that, because our proposal minimally requires that Parallelism pertains between the remnant of ellipsis and its correlate in the antecedent clause, it does *not* require that syntactic isomorphism pertains between the elided clause and its antecedent clause. We provide evidence to show that syntactic isomorphism cannot pertain, and that paraphrases of the antecedent clause must underlie English declarative fragments of certain types.

[30] That focus fronting in English is constrained solely by PF constraints is not unmotivated. Chomsky (2001) has argued that all "stylistic movement" (e.g., movement which has no interpretative effect and is subject to reconstruction effects, such as focus fronting, extraposition and T-to-C movement) is movement at the PF interface. The same conclusion is reached for extraposition by Göbbel (2006), for CLLD by Aoun & Benmamoun (1998), and partially for focus fronting by Wurmbrand (2000). Not wishing to entertain the idea of post-(narrow-)syntactic movement (contrary to Embick & Noyer 2001), we interpret this research as providing sufficient evidence to show that PF constraints alone determine whether focus fronting is acceptable in a particular construction or not. Importantly, we do not suggest that a constraint *specific* to focus fronting prohibits fronting; we suggest that focus fronting is subject to more general PF constraints (e.g., Subjacency, which constrains *wh*-movement, too).

4.1 Deriving English Declarative Fragments

Following Chomsky (2005, 2007), we assume that a derivation constructed in the narrow syntax is acceptable if it converges at the PF and LF interfaces. Aside from global economy conditions, only constraints that operate at the PF and LF interfaces prevent all possible derivations from converging.

In the case of the examples in (103), although an LF constraint requires the focal element to be fronted at some point in the derivation (see sect. 3), no PF constraint requires that it be fronted before spell out in English (unlike in Hungarian, where such a PF constraint exists). Because only one instance of "costly" movement—either overt or covert—occurs in both (103B) and (103B′), either is acceptable.[31]

Because PF deletion may only target "Given" TPs, that is, TPs which do not contain any new-information-bearing or "F-marked" material before spell-out (Schwarzschild 1999, Merchant 2001), only constructions which front focal material overtly can be subject to clausal ellipsis (cf. (103B)). If focal material is fronted covertly, the TP remains not Given at PF and consequently PF deletion may not apply (cf. (103B′)).

(103) A: What kind of food does he like?
At PF:
B: $[[_{\text{F-marked}}$ beans$]_1$ $[_{\text{TP}}$ he likes $t_1]]$ TP is Given: PF deletion may apply
B′: $[_{\text{TP}}$ he likes $[_{\text{F-marked}}$ beans$]]$ TP is not Given: PF deletion may not apply

Thus, that an ellipsis-specific mechanism is required to render optional fronting obligatory is an illusion. It is simply the case that PF deletion can only apply to one of the two convergent derivations created by optional fronting. Consequently, no additional mechanism needs to be stipulated which forces overt fronting in constructions where it is usually optional.

Nor is an additional mechanism required to force overt fronting in environments in which it is usually prohibited. By invoking the generalization in (102), we make recourse to the fact that PF deletion repairs PF constraints—a fact for which abundant evidence was provided in the case of Subjacency (see sect. 3)—and propose that PF deletion permits obviation of whatever PF constraints prohibit fronting in constructions such as (100B′). This proposal is immediately validated in the case of (100B′), as here a Subjacency violation (specifically, an LBC violation) is repaired by PF deletion, resulting in an acceptable declarative fragment (i.e., (100B″)).[32]

[31] We ignore the complexities of how intonational focus is assigned in the in situ example for reasons of space. The interested reader is directed to Selkirk 1995 and references therein.

[32] Evidence that PF deletion renders inactive other PF constraints aside from Subjacency already exists in the literature. It appears that Chomsky's (1995:253) Chain Uniformity Condition can be obviated if all copies of a nonuniform chain aside the topmost is deleted at PF (Hartman & Ai 2009; van Craenenbroeck 2004, 2010b); the EPP condition (i.e., that subjects raise from a VP-internal position to Spec,TP in English) need not be satisfied if TP is elided (Merchant 2001, van Craenenbroeck & den Dikken 2006); and negation-raising over subject NPIs need not occur if the NPI subject is contained within an elided TP (van Craenenbroeck & Temmerman 2010). Thus, we predict that if one of the abovementioned constraints prevents focus fronting in nonelliptical constructions, that constraint can be obviated by PF deletion to derive an acceptable declarative fragment.

We have shown in this subsection that one need not appeal to additional fragments. English declarative fragments are derived in precisely the same manner as all other fragments crosslinguistically. Moreover, the PF-deletion approach to ellipsis allows us to explain why English fronting constructions—which superficially differ from constituent questions in English with respect to whether fronting is obligatory or optional—exhibit the same island-obviating/obeying behavior as constituent questions in clausal ellipsis environments.

4.2 The Absence of Syntactic Isomorphism between the Ellipsis Site and Its Antecedent Clause

Merchant (2001) first noted that syntactic isomorphism need not pertain between a site of clausal ellipsis and its antecedent clause. To be licensed, only mutual entailment must pertain. Rodrigues, Nevins & Vicente (2009), Szczegielniak (2008), and van Craenenbroeck (2004, 2010a, 2010b) have since provided convincing evidence that constructions which paraphrase the antecedent clause, such as *it* clefts and copula sentences, may underlie interrogative fragments as a Last Resort mechanism.

Our proposal, like Merchant's, does not require syntactic isomorphism to pertain between the site of clausal ellipsis and its antecedent clause. However, our proposal makes an additional claim: that the constraints which prohibit focus fronting can be obviated by PF deletion (see (102)). We see no reason to prevent such obviation from occurring across-the-board; and consequently we predict that PF deletion also renders focus fronting in copula sentences and clefts acceptable. Thus, we predict that clefts and copula sentences may not only underlie interrogative fragments but also declarative fragments. Below we provide evidence to show that this prediction is indeed borne out.

First consider (104), in which the negative quantifier that constitutes the acceptable fragment in (104B) is interpreted as having wide scope. The same interpretation is unavailable in its nonelliptical counterpart (104B′).

(104) A: Who does every syntactician admire?
B: Nobody.
B′: *Nobody$_1$ does every syntactician admire t_1.[33] (Valmala 2007)

Importantly in this case, one cannot stipulate that PF deletion repairs the unacceptable (104B′) to create the acceptable (104B) as the unacceptability of (104B′) is due to an *interpretative* effect: the violation of a constraint that operates at LF, not PF. This is

[33] Valmala's original example for B′ is *Nobody every syntactician admires*, which could be deemed unacceptable for the trivial reason that topicalized negative quantifiers trigger obligatory negative inversion in English. However, it appears that even when negative inversion is accounted for, (104B′) remains unacceptable. This suggests that some independent constraint rules out topicalizing bare negative quantifiers, as topicalized phrases containing negative quantified elements are permitted (i). Thanks to Marcel den Dikken for pointing this out.

(i) No young girl's participation in the game can they permit. (Horvath 2005)

evidenced by (105)—the nonfronting equivalent of (104B′)—in which no potentially repairable PF constraint is violated (as only vacuous movement occurs) but the interpretative effect observed in (104B′) remains. Thus, neither (104B′) nor (105) can underlie (104B).

(105) *Every syntactician admires nobody. (Valmala 2007)

Therefore, in this example, a copula construction like (106) must underlie (104B), as the wide scope interpretation of *nobody* in (104B) follows naturally from the fact that *nobody* receives wide scope in a copula construction like (107).

(106) Nobody$_1$ ~~there is t_1 that every syntactician admires~~.

(107) There is nobody that every syntactician admires.
(i.e., there is not anybody that every syntactician admires).

The same reasoning applies to the set of constructions in (108), where the focus particle *even* repairs the Weak Crossover effect created by moving the *wh*-phrase *which lawyer* over a pronoun with which *which lawyer* co-refers (Postal 1993).

(108) A: Which lawyer$_i$ did even his$_i$ clients hate?
B: Bob Anderson$_i$
B′: *Bob Anderson$_i$ even his$_i$ clients hated.
B″: #Even his$_i$ clients hated Bob Anderson$_i$. (Valmala 2007:11)

The fragment answer in (108B) cannot be derived from its equivalent focus-fronting construction in (108B′) or from its equivalent nonfronting construction in (108B″). Consequently, because the nonfronting construction is also unacceptable, the reparative effect of PF deletion cannot be responsible for (108B)'s acceptability.

Thus, an *it* cleft like (109) must underlie (108B), as the acceptability of (108B) only follows if it is derived from an acceptable *it* cleft like (109).[34]

(109) It's Bob Anderson$_i$ that even his$_i$ clients hate.

Note that permitting clefts as possible underlying derivations for declarative fragments does not weaken our claim about island obviation propounded in (57) (repeated below in (110)), as contrastively focused remnants derived from underlying

[34] Marcel den Dikken (p.c.) highlights that an alternative explanation may be available for (108B): one which does not require it to be derived from an *it* cleft. Chomsky (1977) explains weak crossover effects by appealing to the *Leftness Condition*, which prohibits pronouns from co-referring with a variable linearly to their right. In the case of (108B″), the Leftness Condition is violated, which may well result in the unacceptability of (108B″). As it is a linearity constraint, one can assume that the Leftness Condition (or whatever underlies the Leftness Condition) is a constraint that applies at the PF interface (as linearity is irrelevant at LF). In accordance with the generalization in (102), PF deletion should permit obviation of the Leftness Condition. If this is indeed true, that the acceptable fragment in (108B) is derived from the unacceptable topicalization construction in (108B″) is to be expected.

clefts and copula constructions are island-sensitive and consequently must obey Parallelism. Example (111) below shows the possible acceptable and unacceptable fragmentary responses available if the fragment is derived from either a typical declarative such as (112a) or an *it* cleft such as (112b). As the corresponding LF representations in (113) and (114) show, the acceptable contrastive responses are those which obey Parallelism regardless of whether they are derived from an underlying cleft or not.

(110) Generalization on island repair
Contrastive fragments cannot repair islands. Noncontrastive fragments can potentially repair islands.

(111) A: Is the book that RINGO wrote on sale now?
B: *No, LENNON.
B′: *No, it is LENNON.
B‴: No, the book that LENNON wrote.
B⁗: No, it's the book that LENNON wrote.

(112) a. No, the book that LENNON wrote is on sale now.
b. No, it's the book that LENNON wrote that's on sale now.

(113) LF representations of (112):
A: [[the book that Lennon wrote]$_1$ λx ([x_1 is on sale now])]

(114) Not parallel:
B: *No, [[Lennon]$_1$ λx ([[the book that x_1 wrote] is on sale now])].
B′: *No, [Lennon]$_1$ λx ([it is x_1 that wrote the book that is on sale now])].
Parallel:
B″: No, [[the book that Lennon wrote]$_1$ λx ([x_1 is on sale now])].
B‴: No, [[the book that Lennon wrote]$_1$ λx [it is x_1 that is on sale now].

For completeness, (115) to (117) show that Parallelism must be obeyed by contrastive fragments derived from underlying clefts in all island environments:

(115) A: Did they hire someone who speaks BULGARIAN fluently?
B: *No, RUSSIAN.
B′: *No, it is RUSSIAN.
B″: No, it is RUSSIAN that this person speaks.

(116) A: Is Abby likely to get mad if BEN speaks to Mary?
B: *No, BILL.
B′: *No, it is BILL.
B″: No, it is BILL that will make Abby mad if he speaks to Mary.

(117) A: Does John want a SHORT list?
B: *No, LONG.
B′: *No, it is LONG.
B″: No, it is a LONG list that he wants.

Our proposal provides additional evidence that interrogative fragments and declarative fragments are derived via the same mechanism, as both types of fragment may, we believe as Last Resort, be derived from underlying TPs which are *e*-Given paraphrases of their antecedent clause.

In summary, the hypothesis that fragments of all types are derived from the same mechanism—remnant fronting + PF deletion—may be maintained. In section 4.1 it was shown that no type of fragment is derived from fronting motivated by "ellipsis-specific" constraints. It was shown that in all cases acceptable fragments are derived from unacceptable underlying constructions only when PF deletion removes an obstacle to convergence. In section 4.2, to account for apparent interpretative incongruities between certain declarative fragments and their underlying clauses, we showed that, on these occasions, elided TPs must be paraphrases of their antecedent clause, in line with similar conclusions reached regarding the underlying derivations of certain interrogative fragments.

5. Summary

In this paper we argued that island sensitivity in fragments is not determined by a fragment's underlying syntactic structure but by whether or not a fragment contrasts with its correlate in the antecedent clause. We advanced the universal generalization that contrastive fragments of all types are sensitive to islands, whereas noncontrastive fragments of all types are not. We accounted for this distinction by appealing to Parallelism; an LF constraint which requires that fragments and their correlates occupy a parallel left-peripheral position at LF. We showed that noncontrastive fragments always satisfy Parallelism, while contrastive fragments never satisfy it. Having shown that Parallelism is the sole determining factor of island sensitivity in fragments, we proposed that Subjacency is a PF constraint that is obviated by all fragments.

We also proposed that fragments of all types are derived in an identical manner, and that deriving them from their nonelliptical counterpart requires no theory-internal stipulations (aside from the generally accepted assumption that PF deletion exists). Taking all these modifications of the PF-deletion approach to ellipsis as a whole, we have advanced the most parsimonious account of clausal ellipsis to date.

By treating sluicing and fragments as one type of clausal ellipsis we are making significant headway in moving away from the construction-specific treatment of ellipsis that has been dominating the literature ever since Ross 1967. We believe that there is no theoretical status to the distinct "types" of ellipsis (gapping, sluicing, VP ellipsis) other than what follows from the nature of their remnants, the relation of these remnants with respect to their correlates and the nature of the gap (PF deletion or empty *pro*). We believe that we have successfully shown that, in the domain of

clausal ellipsis, our construction-free approach to ellipsis is feasible and that the syntactic differences in this domain solely pertain to the contrastiveness of the remnant. With this, we hope to contribute to, and refine, the line of research that attributes a crucial role to contrast in ellipsis, championed by Susanne Winkler in various publications.

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