

# Zelizer (2019) Paper Replication and Extension

Miroslav Bergam

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##	[1] "0" "-1" "1"	
##	[1] "0" "-1" "1" "2"	
##	[1] "0.0" "-1.0" "1.0" "0.-1" "-1.-1" "1.-1" "0.1" "-1.1" "1.1"	
##	[10] "0.2" "-1.2" "1.2"	

## 0.1 Introduction

This is an extension of the research conducted by Adam Zelizer at The University of Chicago in 2019, which finds that the cues that state legislators take from their peers influences their policymaking decisions. The paper also concludes that that this influence is at play late in the policymaking process, as well as that these cues complement rather than substitute other sources of information.

## 0.2 Literature Review

Studies as early as Matthews and Stimson (1975) and Kingdon (1973) find that cue-taking has a large influence on the decisions made by policy-makers. Kingdon concluded that cue-taking influences around 40% of decisions while Matthews and Stimson pinned the number a 75%. More recent observational studies like Masket (2008) found the percentage of votes influenced by cue-taking to be 10%. Masket found that information was shared primarily through deskmates, while Matthews and Stimson found that it was shared between friends. Coppock (2014) found that information was shared between ideologically-similar legislators. This paper abets the conclusion that cue-taking influences policy decisions while updating the approach and contributing a new layer of findings. It uses a large dataset from two legislative field experiments, lending it power that previous studies may have lacked, and focuses on legislators who share office suites. The paper contributes the findings that that cues complement complement rather than substitute other sources of expertise as well as that cue-making's influence occurs late in the decision-making process.

1

## 0.3 Figures

### 0.3.1 Table 3

Briefing	NO CUE-TAKING	YES CUE-TAKING
NO	10.4 ( 1127 )	19.1 ( 372 )

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<sup>1</sup>All analysis for this paper is available at <https://github.com/mirobergam/Replication-paper>

YES	20.8 ( 257 )	19.7 ( 88 )
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### 0.3.2 Table 4

```
## [1] 0.7860022
```

```
## [1] 2080
```

Value	Briefing	Cue-Taking	Combined
ITT	4.5	3.5	11.8
SE	1.8	1.6	2.9

### 0.3.3 Table 5

```
## [1] "no_vote"
```

```
## [1] "t"
```

```
## [1] "t.spill"
```

```
## [1] "t+t.spill"
```

```
## [1] "vote"
```

```
## [1] "t"
```

```
## [1] "t.spill"
```

```
## [1] "t+t.spill"
```

Condition	Bills that failed in committee	Bills that reached floor
Briefing	5.685 ( 2.018 )	3.799 ( 3.519 )
Cue-Taking	1.247 ( 1.748 )	6.38 ( 3.015 )
Combined	10.169 ( 3.152 )	10.501 ( 5.785 )

### 0.3.4 Table 6

```
##
```

```
##      0    -1     1     2 <NA>
```

```
## 1896  120  460   36     0
```

```
##
```

```
##     -1     0     1 <NA>
```

```
##    84 1680  348  400
```

```
##
```

```
##     -1     0     1 <NA>
```

```
##    96 1980  420   16
```

```
##
```

```
##     -1     0     1 <NA>
```

```
##    92 1956  416   48
```

```
## [1] "0.0"
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## [1] "0.0"
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## [1] "0.0"
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## [1] "0.0"
```

[illegible]


[illegible]

```
## [1] "0.0"  
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## [1] "0.0"  
## [1] "0.0"  
## [1] "0.0"  
## [1] "office"  
## [1] "t"  
## [1] "t.spill"  
## [1] "t+t.spill"  
## [1] "desk"  
## [1] "t"  
## [1] "t.spill"  
## [1] "t+t.spill"  
## [1] "distance"  
## [1] "t"  
## [1] "t.spill"  
## [1] "t+t.spill"  
## [1] "ideology"  
## [1] "t"  
## [1] "t.spill"  
## [1] "t+t.spill"
```

Condition	Offices	Desks	Districts	Ideology
Briefing	4.663 ( 2.163 )	2.874 ( 2.097 )	5.821 ( 2.502 )	4.031 ( 2.325 )



### 0.3.6 Figure 4



### 0.3.7 Bibliography

Hansen and Treul (2015) James Adams and Dow (2004) Jay Barth and Huffmon (2009) Bishin (2011a) Bishin (2011b)

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