
6.033 Spring 2017

Lecture #20

- Introduction to security
 - Threat models, policy
 - Guard model



RISK ASSESSMENT -

Yahoo says half a billion accounts breached by nation-sponsored hackers

One of the biggest compromises ever exposes names, e-mail addresses, and much more.

DAN GOODIN - 9/22/2016, 4:21 PM







BUSINESS CULTURE

WIRED

DESIGN

GEAR


SCIENCE

SECURITY

TRANSPORTATION


LILY HAY NEWMAN SECURITY 04.18.17 7:00 AM

SNEAKY EXPLOIT ALLOWS PHISHING ATTACKS FROM SITES THAT LOOK SECURE



Phishing with Unicode Domains

Posted by Xudong Zheng on April 14, 2017



Before I explain the details of the vulnerability, you should take a look at the proof-of-concept.

Punycode makes it possible to register domains with foreign characters. It works by converting individual domain label to an alternative format using only ASCII characters. For example, the domain "xn--s7y.co" is equivalent to "短.co".

From a security perspective, Unicode domains can be problematic because many Unicode characters are difficult to distinguish from common ASCII characters. It is possible to register domains such as "xn--pple-



RISK ASSESSMENT -


BrickerBot, the permanent denialof-service botnet, is back with a vengeance


New botnet squadrons wage fiercer, more intense attacks on unsecured IoT devices.

DAN GOODIN - 4/24/2017, 4:43 PM









what makes computer security special?

why is security difficult?


steps towards building a more secure system:

- 1. be clear about goals (policy)
- 2. be clear about assumptions (threat model)

guard model of security

provides **complete mediation**. systems that use this model avoid common pitfalls

complete mediation: every request for resource goes through the guard



authentication: is the principal who they claim to be?

authorization: does principal have access to perform request on resource?

what can go wrong with the guard model?

sql injection demo

```
username | email | public?
melva | melva@mit.edu | yes
peter | psz@mit.edu | yes
katrina | lacurts@mit.edu | no
```

```
SELECT username, email FROM users WHERE
username='<username>' AND public='yes'
```

Let <username> = katrina' OR username='

sql injection demo

| username | email | public? |
|----------|-----------------|---------|
| melva | melva@mit.edu | yes |
| peter | psz@mit.edu | yes |
| katrina | lacurts@mit.edu | no |

```
SELECT username, email FROM users WHERE
username='katrina' OR username='' AND
public='yes'
```

what can go wrong with the guard model?

- Adversarial attacks are different from "normal" failures.
 They're targeted, rarely random, and rarely independent.
 Just one successful attack can bring down a system.
- Securing a system starts by specifying our goals (policy) and assumptions (threat model).
- The **guard model** provides **complete mediation**. Even though things can still go wrong, systems that use this model avoid common pitfalls.