#### **MIT 6.875**

# Foundations of Cryptography Lecture 12

### **RECAP from L11**

# **Digital Signatures: Definition**

A triple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Sign, Verify) s.t.


- $(vk, sk) \leftarrow Gen(1^n)$ .  $\sigma \leftarrow Sign(sk, m)$ .
- $Acc(1)/Rej(0) \leftarrow Verify(vk, m, \sigma)$ .

*Correctness:* For all vk, sk, m:

Verify(vk, m, Sign(sk, m)) = accept.

# **EUF-CMA Security**

(Existentially Unforgeable against a Chosen Message Attack)



Eve wins if  $Verify(vk, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1$  and  $m^* \notin \{m_1, m_2, ...\}$ . The signature scheme is EUF-CMA-secure if no PPT Eve can win with probability better than negl(n).

# Lamport (One-time) Signatures

#### How to sign n bits

Verification Key 
$$VK$$
:  $\begin{bmatrix} y_{1,0} & y_{2,0} & y_{n,0} \\ y_{1,1} & y_{2,1} & y_{n,1} \end{bmatrix}$ 

where 
$$y_{i,c} = f(x_{i,c})$$
.

Signing an n-bit message  $(m_1, ..., m_n)$ : The signature is  $(x_{1,m_1}, ..., x_{n,m_n})$ .

Claim: Assuming f is a OWF, no PPT adv can produce a signature of m given a signature of a single  $m' \neq m$ .

<u>Claim</u>: Can forge signature on any message given the signatures on (some) two messages.

# **TODAY: Digital Signatures, Continued**

# **Constructing a Signature Scheme**

Step 0. Still one-time, but arbitrarily long messages.

Step 1. Many-time: Stateful, Growing Signatures.

Step 2. How to Shrink the signatures.

Step 3. How to Shrink Alice's storage.

Step 4. How to make Alice stateless.

Step 5 (*optional*). How to make Alice stateless and deterministic.

## **Step 0: How to Sign Polynomially Many Bits**

(with a fixed verification key)

#### **Detour: Collision-Resistant Hash Functions**

A compressing family of functions  $\mathcal{H} = \{h: \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n\}$  (where m > n) for which it is computationally hard to find collisions.

**Def**:  $\mathcal{H}$  is collision-resistant if for every PPT algorithm A, there is a negligible function  $\mu$  s.t.

$$\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[A(1^n, h) = (x, y) : x \neq y, h(x) = h(y)] = \mu(n)$$

#### Do CRHFs exist?

- Theoretical Constructions: assuming discrete logarithms (as well as under several other numbertheoretic assumptions)
- Practical Constructions: SHA3.
- **Domain Extension Theorem**: If there exist hash functions compressing n+1 bits to n bits, then there are hash functions that compress any poly(n) bits into n bits.

# **How to Sign Polynomially Many Bits**

(with a fixed verification key)

Idea: Hash the message into n bits and sign the hash.

Signing Key 
$$SK$$
: 
$$\begin{bmatrix} x_{1,0} & x_{2,0} & x_{n,0} \\ x_{1,1} & x_{2,1} & x_{n,1} \end{bmatrix}$$

Verification Key 
$$VK$$
: 
$$\begin{bmatrix} y_{1,0} & y_{2,0} & y_{n,0} \\ y_{1,1} & y_{2,1} & y_{n,1} \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}.$$

Signing an n-bit message m: Compute the hash z = h(m). The signature is  $(x_{1,z_1}, ..., x_{n,z_n})$ .

Verifying  $(m, \sigma)$ : Recompute the hash z = h(m). Check if  $\forall i$ :  $f(\sigma_i) = y_{i,z_i}$ 

# **How to Sign Polynomially Many Bits**

(with a fixed verification key)

Claim: Assuming f is a OWF and  $\mathcal{H}$  is a collision-resistant family, no PPT adv can produce a signature of m given a signature of a single  $m' \neq m$ .

#### **Proof Idea:**

Either the adversary picked m' s.t. h(m') = h(m), in which case she violated collision-resistance of  $\mathcal{H}$ .

(or)

She produced a Lamport signature on a "message"  $z' \neq z$ , in which case she violated one-time security of Lamport, and therefore the one-wayness of f.

# So far, only one-time security...

# **Constructing a Signature Scheme**

**Theorem** [Naor-Yung'89, Rompel'90] (EUF-CMA-secure) Signature schemes exist assuming that one-way functions exist.

#### TODAY:

(EUF-CMA-secure) Signature schemes exist assuming that collision-resistant hash functions exist.

# (Many-time) Signature Scheme

In four+ steps

Step 1. Stateful, Growing Signatures. Idea: Signature Chains

Step 2. How to Shrink the signatures. Idea: Signature *Trees* 

Step 3. How to Shrink Alice's storage.

Idea: **Pseudorandom Trees** 


Step 4. How to make Alice stateless.

Idea: Randomization

Step 5 (*optional*). How to make Alice stateless and deterministic. Idea: *PRFs*.

**Idea: Signature Chains.** 

Alice starts with a secret signing Key  $SK_0$ .



When signing a message  $m_1$ :

Generate a new pair  $(VK_1, SK_1)$ .

Produce signature  $\sigma_1 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_0, m_1 || VK_1)$ 

Output  $VK_1||\sigma_1$ .


Remember  $VK_1||m_1||\sigma_1$  as well as  $SK_1$ .

To verify a signature  $VK_1||\sigma_1$  for message  $m_1$ :

Run Verify $(VK_0, m_1 || VK_1, \sigma_1)$ 

Idea: Signature Chains.

Alice starts with a secret signing Key  $SK_0$ .



When signing a message  $m_1$ :

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
Output  $VK_1||\sigma_1$ .

Remember  $VK_1||m_1||\sigma_1$  as well as  $SK_1$ .

$$VK_0 \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} VK_1$$

Idea: Signature Chains.

Alice starts with a secret signing Key  $SK_0$ .



When signing the next message  $m_2$ :

Generate a new pair  $(VK_2, SK_2)$ .


Produce signature  $\sigma_2 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_1, m_2 || VK_2)$ 

Output  $VK_2 || \sigma_2 ? ?$ 

$$VK_0 \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} VK_1$$

Idea: Signature Chains.

Alice starts with a secret signing Key  $SK_0$ .



When signing the next message  $m_2$ :

Generate a new pair  $(VK_2, SK_2)$ .

Produce signature  $\sigma_2 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_1, m_2 || VK_2)$ 

Output  $VK_1 ||VK_2|| \sigma_2$ ??

$$VK_0 \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} VK_1$$

Idea: Signature Chains.

Alice starts with a secret signing Key  $SK_0$ .

Alice VK<sub>0</sub>

When signing the next message  $m_2$ :

Generate a new pair  $(VK_2, SK_2)$ .


Produce signature  $\sigma_2 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_1, m_2 || VK_2)$ 

Output  $VK_1 || m_1 || \sigma_1 || VK_2 || \sigma_2$ .

$$VK_0 \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} VK_1 \xrightarrow{\sigma_2} VK_2 \xrightarrow{\sigma_3} VK_3 \xrightarrow{\sigma_4} VK_4 \cdots$$

Idea: Signature Chains.

Alice starts with a secret signing Key  $SK_0$ .



When signing the next message  $m_2$ :

Generate a new pair  $(VK_2, SK_2)$ .

Produce signature  $\sigma_2 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_1, m_2 || VK_2)$ 

Output  $VK_1 || m_1 || \sigma_1 || VK_2 || \sigma_2$ .

(additionally) remember  $VK_2||m_2||\sigma_2$  as well as  $SK_2$ 

$$VK_0 \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} VK_1 \xrightarrow{\sigma_2} VK_2 \xrightarrow{\sigma_3} VK_3 \xrightarrow{\sigma_4} VK_4 \cdots$$

Idea: Signature Chains.

An optimization: Need to remember only the past verification keys, not the past messages.

Use (part of)  $VK_i$  to sign  $m_{i+1}$  and the rest to sign  $VK_{i+1}$ .

$$VK_0 \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} VK_1 \xrightarrow{\sigma_2} VK_2 \xrightarrow{\sigma_3} VK_3 \xrightarrow{\sigma_4} VK_4 \cdots$$

Idea: Signature Chains.

Two major problems:

- 1. Alice is *stateful*: Alice needs to remember a whole lot of things, O(T) information after T steps.
- 2. The *signatures grow*: Length of the signature of the T-th message is O(T).

$$VK_0 \xrightarrow{\tau_1} VK_1 \xrightarrow{\tau_2} VK_2 \xrightarrow{\tau_3} W_3 \xrightarrow{\tau_4} W_4 \cdots$$

$$VK_0 \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} VK_1 \xrightarrow{\sigma_2} VK_2 \xrightarrow{\sigma_3} VK_3 \xrightarrow{\sigma_4} VK_4 \cdots$$

# (Many-time) Signature Scheme

In four+ steps


Step 1. Stateful, Growing Signatures. Idea: Signature *Chains* 

Step 2. How to Shrink the signatures. Idea: Signature *Trees* 

Alice	$VK_{\epsilon}$


# **Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.

 $VK_{\epsilon}$ 



Alice (the *stateful* signer) computes many (VK, SK) pairs and arranges them in a tree of depth = sec. param.  $\lambda$ 

**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.




#### Signature of the first message $m_0$ :

Use  $VK_{000}$  to sign  $m_0$ .

"Authenticate"  $VK_{000}$  using the "signature path".


**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.




#### Signature of the first message $m_0$ :

$$(\sigma_{\epsilon} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_{\epsilon}, VK_{0}||VK_{1}), \sigma_{0} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_{0}, VK_{00}||VK_{01}), \sigma_{0} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_{00}, VK_{000}||VK_{001}), \tau_{0} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_{000}, m_{0}))$$

**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.




**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.



#### Signature of the first message $m_0$ :

(Authentication path for  $VK_{000}$ ,  $\tau_0 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_{000}, m_0)$ )


**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.



#### Signature of the second message $m_1$ :

(Authentication path for  $VK_{001}$ ,  $\tau_0 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_{001}, m_1)$ )


**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.



#### Signature of the third message $m_2$ :

(Authentication path for  $VK_{010}$ ,  $\tau_2 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(SK_{010}, m_2)$ )


**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.



#### **GOOD NEWS:**

Each verification key (incl. at the leaves) is used only once, so one-time security suffices!


**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.



### **GOOD NEWS:**

Signatures consist of  $\lambda$  one-time signatures and do now grow with time!

**Step 2.** How to Shrink the signatures.



Signer generates and keeps the entire ( $\approx 2^{\lambda}$ -size) signature tree in memory!

# (Many-time) Signature Scheme

In four+ steps


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Step 2. How to Shrink the signatures. Idea: Signature *Trees* 

Step 3. How to Shrink Alice's storage.

Idea: **Pseudorandom Trees** 

## **Step 3.** Pseudorandom Signature Trees.




#### Tree of pseudorandom values:

The signing key is a PRF key K.

Populate the nodes with  $r_x = PRF(K, x)$ .

Use  $r_x$  to derive the keys  $(VK_x, SK_x) \leftarrow Gen(1^{\lambda}; r_x)$ .

# **Step 3.** Pseudorandom Signature Trees.




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
## **Step 3.** Pseudorandom Signature Trees.



# GOOD NEWS:

Short signatures and small storage for the signer

**Step 3.** Pseudorandom Signature Trees.



#### **BAD NEWS:**



Signer needs to keep a counter indicating which *leaf* (which tells her which secret key) to use next.

# (Many-time) Signature Scheme

#### In four+ steps

Step 1. Stateful, Growing Signatures. Idea: Signature Chains

Step 2. How to Shrink the signatures. Idea: Signature *Trees* 


Step 3. How to Shrink Alice's storage.

Idea: **Pseudorandom Trees** 

Step 4. How to make Alice stateless.

Idea: Randomization

### Step 4. Statelessness via Randomization




#### Signature of a message m:

Pick a random leaf r. Use  $VK_r$  to sign m.

$$\sigma_r \leftarrow \operatorname{Sign}(SK_r, m)$$

Output  $(r, \sigma_r)$ , authentication path for  $VK_r$ )


#### Step 4. Statelessness via Randomization





No need to keep state.

#### Step 4. Statelessness via Randomization



#### **Key Idea:**

If the signer produces q signatures, the probability she picks the same leaf twice is  $\leq q^2/2^{\lambda}$ .

# (Many-time) Signature Scheme

In four+ steps

Step 1. Stateful, Growing Signatures. Idea: Signature Chains

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Step 3. How to Shrink Alice's storage.


Idea: **Pseudorandom Trees** 

Step 4. How to make Alice stateless.

Idea: Randomization

Step 5 (*optional*). How to make Alice stateless and deterministic. Idea: *PRFs*.

#### **Step 5.** Making the Signer Deterministic.



#### **Key Idea:**

Generate *r* pseudo-randomly.

Have another PRF key K' and let  $r = PRF(K', \blacksquare)$ 

# That's it for the construction. (If time permits) Proof Sketch on the board.