6.5620 (6.875), Fall 2022

Homework # 2 **Due: XXX 2022, 11:59:59pm ET**

- **Typsetting:** You are encouraged to use LaTeX to typeset your solutions. You can use the following template.
- **Submissions:** Solutions should be submitted to Gradescope.
- **Reference your sources:** If you use material outside the class, please reference your sources (including papers, websites, wikipedia).
- **Acknowledge your collaborators:** Collaboration is permitted and encouraged in small groups of at most three. You must write up your solutions entirely on your own and acknowledge your collaborators.

Problems:

1. *(4 points)* **PRF or not?** Let $\mathcal{F} = \{F_K : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{K\in\{0,1\}^k}$ be a family of pseudorandom functions. For which of the following constructions is $\mathcal{F}_c$ necessarily a family of pseudorandom functions? If $\mathcal{F}_c$ is a family of pseudorandom functions, give a proof; otherwise, show a counterexample.

   (a) *(2 points)* $\mathcal{F}_0 = \{F_K^{(0)} : \{0,1\}^{n-1} \to \{0,1\}^{2n}\}_{K\in\{0,1\}^k}$, where

   $$F_K^{(0)}(x) := F_K(0||x)\|F_K(1||x) \ .$$

   (b) *(2 points)* $\mathcal{F}_1 = \{F_K^{(1)} : \{0,1\}^{n-1} \to \{0,1\}^{2n}\}_{K\in\{0,1\}^k}$, where

   $$F_K^{(1)}(x) := F_K(0||x)\|F_K(x||1) \ .$$

2. *(9 points)* **Faster GGM.** Let $\mathcal{F} = \{F_s : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{s\in\{0,1\}^n}$ be a family of PRFs (taking m bits to n bits, with n-bit keys) obtained by applying the GGM construction to any family of PRGs. We noted in class that the GGM construction is *highly sequential*: in order to evaluate $F_s(x)$ on any input x, it is necessary to do m sequential evaluations of a PRG taking n bits to n bits. In this question, we will explore how to get a PRF family with the same input-output parameters (m-bit inputs, n-bit outputs) for which $F_s(x)$ can be evaluated in only $\log^2 m$ PRG evaluations, at the expense of some (tolerable) loss in security.

   In this question, you may assume that m, n are both at least linear in some security parameter λ.

(a) *(4 points)* Let $\mathcal{H} = \{H_k : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^{\log^2 m}\}_{k \in \{0,1\}^{p(m)}}$ be a family of functions[1], for some $p(m) = \text{poly}(m)$. Note that any given H_k compresses m bits into $\log^2 m$ bits. We say $\mathcal{H}$ is *collision resistant* if no PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can win the following game with more than negligible probability:

i. The challenger samples a key $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{p(m)}$ uniformly at random, and gives it to $\mathcal{A}$. (The assumption, as with PRFs, is that anybody can evaluate H_k efficiently if they have k.)

ii. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs two distinct strings, $x_0 \neq x_1$. It wins if and only if $H_k(x_0) = H_k(x_1)$.

Informally, collision resistant functions have the property that it is hard to find two inputs which evaluate to ('hash to') the same output under the function.

Assume that 1) secure length-doubling PRGs exist, and 2) collision resistant function families exist. Construct a PRF family $\mathcal{F} = \{F_s : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ taking m bits to n bits such that, for any x and any s, $F_s(x)$ can be evaluated in only $\log^2 m$ evaluations of the PRG and one evaluation of the collision-resistant function. (Your keys can be as long as you like, except that their length should be polynomial in m and n.) Show that your candidate construction is a secure PRF family. (Hint: you may find it easier to work with GGM as a black box during the security proof than to think about the paths explicitly.)

(b) *(3 points)* Unfortunately, it is not known how to construct collision-resistant hash functions from PRGs. We would like to do without the extra assumption—and, fortunately, we can!

As before, let $\mathcal{H} = \{H_k : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^{\log^2 m}\}_{k \in \{0,1\}^{p(m)}}$ be a family of functions. We use the notation $x \leftarrow_R \mathcal{S}$ to denote that x is sampled uniformly from the set $\mathcal{S}$. We say that $\mathcal{H}$ is *pairwise independent* if, for any $x, x' \in \{0,1\}^m$, $x \neq x'$, $x \neq 0^m$, $x' \neq 0^m$, and any $y, y' \in \{0,1\}^{\log^2 m}$,

$$\Pr_{k \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}^{p(m)}}[H_k(x) = y \text{ and } H_k(x') = y'] = \left(\frac{1}{2^{\log^2 m}}\right)^2.$$

We could also define the pairwise independence of $\mathcal{H}$ in terms of a game, if a slightly trivial one:

i. The adversary submits a tuple (x, x', y, y') to the challenger such that $x, x' \in \{0,1\}^m$, $y, y' \in \{0,1\}^{\log^2 m}$, $x \neq x'$, $x \neq 0^m$, $x' \neq 0^m$.

ii. The challenger samples $k \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}^{p(m)}$ uniformly at random.

We say that $\mathcal{H}$ is pairwise independent if the probability over the choice of k in step 2 that $H_k(x) = y$ and $H_k(x') = y'$ is *exactly* $\left(\frac{1}{2^{\log^2 m}}\right)^2$, no matter what (x, x', y, y') the adversary chose in the first step.

[1] Not necessarily a family of PRFs.

Define the family $\mathcal{H}$ as follows: the key is a $(\log^2 m) \times m$ matrix M, drawn uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^{(\log^2 m)\times m}$, and we define the hash function as $H_M(x) = Mx$, where the matrix multiplication is performed over the field $\mathbb{F}_2$. Show that this family $\mathcal{H}$ is pairwise independent.

(c) *(2 points)* Assume that secure length-doubling PRGs exist. Define a candidate construction for a PRF family $\mathcal{F} = \{F_s : \{0,1\}^m \backslash \{0^m\} \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{s\in\mathcal{S}}$ taking m bits to n bits such that, for any x and any s, $F_s(x)$ can be evaluated in only $\log^2 m$ PRG evaluations. Show that your candidate construction is a secure PRF family.

3. *(9 points)* **Let's Encrypt and Authenticate!** Let $(\mathsf{Gen}_{\mathsf{Enc}}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be an IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption scheme, and let $(\mathsf{Gen}_{\mathsf{MAC}}, \mathsf{Mac}, \mathsf{Ver})$ be an EUF-CMA secure message authentication scheme. *You may assume in this problem that* $\mathsf{Gen}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$ *has perfect correctness.*

   Suppose Alice and Bob share keys $k_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$ and $k_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}_{\mathsf{MAC}}$, and they hope to transmit messages to each other in a *private* and *authenticated* way. Towards this end, they define a new algorithm $\mathsf{Transmit}$ which takes two keys, k_1 and k_2, along with a message m, and purports to output an authenticated encryption of m. For each of the following definitions of $\mathsf{Transmit}$:

   - Construct algorithms Dec' and Ver' so that $\mathcal{E}_1 = (\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Transmit}, \mathsf{Dec}')$ is a correct encryption scheme, and $\mathcal{E}_2 = (\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Transmit}, \mathsf{Ver}')$ is a correct authentication scheme.
   - Either prove $\mathcal{E}_1$ is IND-CPA secure and $\mathcal{E}_2$ is EUF-CMA secure via reductions, or provide an attack on at least one of the two.

   For notational convenience, you may assume in this problem that:

   - the length of the messages m accepted by $\mathsf{Transmit}$ is n,
   - the length of ciphertexts output by Enc on messages of length n is ℓ_1,
   - the length of MACs output by Mac on messages of length n is ℓ_2,
   - and the length of MACs output by Mac on messages of length ℓ_1 is ℓ_3.

   (a) *(3 points)* $\mathsf{Transmit}(k_1, k_2, m) = (\mathsf{Enc}(k_1, (m, \mathsf{Mac}(k_2, m))))$.

   (b) *(3 points)* $\mathsf{Transmit}(k_1, k_2, m) = (\mathsf{Enc}(k_1, m), \mathsf{Mac}(k_2, m))$.

   (c) *(3 points)* $\mathsf{Transmit}(k_1, k_2, m) = (c := \mathsf{Enc}(k_1, m), \mathsf{Mac}(k_2, c))$.

4. *(9 points)* **One-way (function) or another?** Let f be a length-preserving one-way function. For which of the following is f' necessarily a one-way function? If f' is a one-way function, give a proof; otherwise, show a counterexample. Your counterexamples must rely only on the existence of one-way functions.

(a) *(2 points)* $f_0(x) = f(f(x))$.

(b) *(2 points)* $f_1(x, y) := f(x) \| f(x \oplus y)$, where $|x| = |y|$.

(c) *(2 points)* $f_2(x) := f(x) || x_{[1:\log |x|]}$, where the notation $y_{[1:\ell]}$ denotes the string y restricted to its first ℓ bits.

(d) *(3 points)* $f_3(x) := f(x)_{[1:|x|-1]}$.

5. *(7 points)* **This is a Bit Hard(core).**

(a) *Universally hardcore (3 points).* Assume the existence of one-way functions. A polynomial time-computable predicate $b : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ is said to be *universal* if for every one-way function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$, b is hardcore. Prove that there is no universal hardcore predicate.

(Note that the Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate $\mathsf{GL}(x, r) = \langle x, r \rangle \bmod 2$ from class is not universal since it is randomized. Equivalently, it only shows that for every one-way function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$, there is another one-way function $f' : \{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^m$ for which GL is a hardcore predicate.)

(b) *Not one bit hardcore (4 points).* Assuming the existence of one-way functions, show that there exists a one-way function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ for which $b_i(x) = x_i$ is not hardcore for any $i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$. Here, x_i denotes the i-th bit of the string $x \in \{0,1\}^n$.