

Introduction
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Abstract : Imposters are 3SG DPs that are used to refer to the speaker or addressee. Some examples are given below with the imposter DPs in italics.

- (i) *Your humble servant* finds the time before our next encounter very long.
- (ii) *This reporter* thinks that the current developments are extraordinary.
- (iii) *Daddy* will be back before too long.
- (iv) *The present author* finds the logic of the reply faulty.

This volume explores verbal and pronominal agreement with imposters from a cross-linguistic perspective. The central questions for any given language are: (a) How do singular and plural imposters agree with the verb? (b) When a pronoun has an imposter antecedent, what are the phi-features of the pronoun? The volume reveals a remarkable degree of variation in the answers to these questions, but also reveals some underlying generalizations.

Sections 1-7 review the basic concepts needed to analyze imposters from Collins and Postal 2012. Sections 8-13 summarize the paper, highlighting areas for future research.

Key words : imposters, camouflage, pronominal agreement, sources, person feature, author, addressee

1. Data

The primary data studied in Collins and Postal (2012) represent alternations in pronominal phi-feature values (person, number, gender) that do not correlate with any truth conditional differences. Some examples are given below :

- (1) a. In this reply, [the present authors]₁ (= the writers of the reply) attempt to defend ourselves₁/themselves₁ against the scurrilous charges which have been made.
- b. [This reporter₁ (= speaker) and his₁ son]₂ are proud of ourselves₂/themselves₂.
- c. Your₁ Majesty should praise yourself₁/herself₁.
- d. [Every one of us]₁ thinks we₁/they₁ are intelligent.
- e. I am a teacher who₁ takes care of myself₁/himself₁.
- f. Would [your₁/her₁ (= addressee) Majesty]₁ like her tea on the veranda?

In (1a), the reflexive can either be 3PL, agreeing in phi-feature values with the antecedent *the present authors*, or 1PL. In (1b), the reflexive can be either 3PL, agreeing with the antecedent [*This reporter and his son*] or 1PL. In (1c), the reflexive can either be 3SG, agreeing in phi-feature values with the antecedent *Your Majesty*, or 2SG. In (1d), the pronominal subject of the embedded clause can be 1PL or 3PL (if there are only males in the domain of quantification 3M.SG is also possible). In (1e), the reflexive can be either 3SG, agreeing with the relative pronoun antecedent *who*, or 1SG. In (1f), the possessive pronoun can be either 3SG or 2SG, in both cases denoting the addressee.

The remarkable property of these alternations is that they do not seem to correlate

with differences in meaning. For example, the truth conditions of the two variants of (1a) are identical.

With the exception of Kratzer 2009, whose analysis of fake indexicals overlaps with the account that Collins and Postal 2012 give of examples like (1e), I know of no other linguistic work that treats the facts above. In particular, there is no existing semantic treatment of these facts which can be compared to the account given in Collins and Postal 2012.

Corbett (2006: 217) discusses a large amount of data that he classifies under the rubrics syntactic agreement and semantic agreement. For example, consider the use of *committee* in British English:

- (2) a. The committee has decided.
- b. The committee have decided.

Corbett (2006: 155) describes this data as follows: “I shall use the well-established terms syntactic and semantic agreement. In the most straightforward cases syntactic agreement (sometimes called ‘agreement *ad formam*’, ‘formal agreement’ or ‘grammatical agreement’) is agreement consistent with the form of the controller (*the committee has decided*). Semantic agreement (or ‘agreement *ad sensum*’, ‘notional agreement’, ‘logical agreement’ or ‘synesis’) is agreement consistent with the meaning (*the committee have decided*).”

In the framework of Collins and Postal (2012) all the pronominal agreement options described in (1) are cases of syntactic agreement, as we shall see below. There is no semantic agreement distinct from syntactic agreement. In fact, a purely syntactic account of the data in (2) can also be given (see Den Dikken 2001).

2. Pronominal Agreement Condition

Syntacticians have recognized that pronouns agree with antecedents. Some quotes illustrating this are given below:

- (3) a. Sag, Wasow and Bender (2003, p. 208)
The Pronominal Agreement Condition (PAC)
Coindexed NPs agree.
- b. Lasnik and Uriagereka (1988, p. 47)
An anaphor must agree in syntactic features with its antecedent.
- c. Carnie (2007, p. 11)
An anaphor must agree in person, gender and number with its antecedent.
- d. Payne and Huddleston (2002, p. 486)
Personal pronouns agree with their antecedent in person and number; in the 3rd person singular, they also agree in gender.

None of these conditions can handle the facts in (1). For example, consider (1a). Carnie’s formulation successfully predicts that the 3PL reflexive *themselves* should be acceptable, since its antecedent is 3PL. But without some further assumption it is not

clear how to allow the 1PL *ourselves*. Collins and Postal (2012) assume that there is a null DP called AUTHOR in the left periphery of the clause (see section 3). On this assumption, we can successfully capture the facts in (1a) if we assume that the reflexive has two different antecedents (*the present authors* and AUTHOR), and that the reflexive can agree with either one of them. Crucially, we must modify Carnie’s formulation to allow agreement with one of several antecedents. So instead of saying “with its antecedent”, we need to say “with some antecedent.”

Given this issue, and many others that come up in the analysis of the sentences of (1), Collins and Postal (2012) propose the following condition to replace the conditions in (3):

- (4) Pronominal Agreement Condition
 If P is a non-expletive pronominal, then for all phi-features F of P
 for which P is not inherently valued, P agrees in F with some source.

This condition incorporates a number of innovations over earlier proposals. First, putting aside expletive pronouns and a few minor cases (singular-*they* and Nurse-*we*) where pronouns seem to have inherent feature values, all pronominal phi-features values are due to agreement.

Second, pronouns can agree with any one of their antecedents, as in the example in (1a), or with some other source. A source is any DP that a pronoun can agree with in terms of phi-feature values. We give a full definition in section 5 below, where we show that there are a number of alternative (non-antecedent) sources from which a pronoun can obtain phi-feature values. To understand (3), it is crucial to note that all antecedents are sources, but not all sources are antecedents.

Third, a single pronoun can agree with several different sources. Hence, the NUM feature of a pronoun P can be valued by one source, and the PERSON feature of the same pronoun P can be valued by a different source. In both cases, P agrees in F with some source, but there is not a single source which provides all the features that P agrees with. For reasons of space, I do not discuss this third innovation here (see Collins and Postal 2012: Chapter 14 for much more discussion of so-called “split agreement”).

3. Theoretical Preliminaries

Before showing how to account for the data in (1) in the system of Collins and Postal (2012), I will discuss a few background notions.

First, there is a relation of antecedence between DP nodes. Antecedence roughly corresponds to co-indexation in standard Principles and Parameters theory, the most important difference is that antecedence is asymmetric (X antecedes Y, but not vice versa). Antecedence does not require a c-command relation (just like co-indexing does not require a c-command relation), and hence antecedence is not the same relation as binding (c-command plus co-indexation).

When a pronoun has several antecedents, there are two that are of special importance: the immediate antecedent and the ultimate antecedent. For example, in the following sentence, the immediate antecedent of the reflexive is *he* and the ultimate antecedent is *John*.

- (5) John₁ said that he₁ likes himself₁

Second, all non-expletive pronouns have antecedents. The assumption that all pronouns have antecedents sharply distinguishes the system of Collins and Postal 2012 from all mainstream approaches in syntax and semantics which assume that some (non-expletive) pronouns do not have antecedents (as in Lasnik's famous example of an unpopular man leaving a party, and somebody saying "Well, he's left.>").

Third, there are null DPs AUTHOR and ADDRESSEE in the left periphery of the clause encoding indexical information about the context in which the sentence is used. The relevant structure is illustrated below:


- (6) [[DP AUTHOR]₁ [DP ADDRESSEE]₂ [Mary hates me₁.]]

Note that even though there are no second person pronouns in (6), ADDRESSEE is still present, since ADDRESSEE is the syntactic way of encoding the fact that the sentence is addressed to someone.

AUTHOR is either 1SG or 1PL and ADDRESSEE is either 2SG or 2PL. Neither AUTHOR nor ADDRESSEE are pronouns, and hence do not obtain their phi-features values by agreement.


The structure in (6) is underspecified. There are two ways in principle that the details could be filled out: an approach based on an expanded left periphery, and an approach based on a null performative verb.

In the first approach, there would be special functional projections (Prt1 = author participant, Prt2 = addressee participant) in the left periphery of the clause containing AUTHOR and ADDRESSEE. The projection introducing AUTHOR is Prt1P, and the projection introducing ADDRESSEE is Prt2P. The hierarchical relation of these projections to ForceP, TopP, FocP and FinP is unclear (on the expanded left periphery see Rizzi 1997). In other words, it is unclear whether PrtP dominates ForceP, or vice versa. This approach is sketched below:



An alternative, based on Ross 1970, is that the DPs AUTHOR and ADDRESSEE are arguments of a covert performative clause. The main verb of such a clause is V_{PERF}.

The ADDRESSEE argument is introduced by APPLP, and the AUTHOR argument is introduced by vP.



Many details of this structure remain unresolved. For example, what is the nature of the null verb in (8)? Should it be *say* or something more general? Also, are there functional projections dominating the performative vP (e.g., TP or CP)? I will not attempt to answer these questions here.

4. Imposters and Camouflage DPs

Some third person DPs such as *Daddy*, *yours truly*, *the undersigned*, *the present authors*, *this reporter* can be used to refer to the speaker. Similarly, some third person DPs such as *Madam*, *the General*, *little Johnnie* can be used to refer to the addressee. These DPs are referred to as imposters:

- (9) An imposter is a notionally n person DP which is grammatically m person, $n \neq m$.

The importance of imposters for the study of pronominal agreement is that when they are antecedents they often give rise to the kinds of pronominal phi-feature alternations seen in (1) (as in (1a)). Collins and Postal propose that such ambivalent behavior with respect to pronominal agreement should be understood in terms of a null indexical pronoun contained within the imposter.

- (10) An imposter contains a covert indexical pronoun.

So an imposter like *the present author* will have embedded within it a null 1SG pronoun (see (13) below).

Camouflage DPs are similar to imposters in terms of pronominal agreement, but are defined by the presence of an overt pronominal possessor. Camouflage DPs such as

your honor, your majesty, your grumpiness are third person DPs that are used to refer the addressee. Forms such as *my honor, my majesty* and *my grumpiness* with a first person possessor are impossible with these camouflage DPs. The ACC (Ass-Camouflage Construction, see Collins, Moody, Postal 2002) is possible with a wider range of possessors, including non-pronominal possessors: *my ass, your ass, Putin ass*. The form *my lady* is an imposter, not a camouflage DP, since the reference is to the addressee, but the possessor is first person.

An imposter such as *the present author* takes AUTHOR as its antecedent, precisely because it contains a null first person indexical pronoun. Similarly, a camouflage DP such as *your majesty* takes ADDRESSEE as its antecedent.

Collins and Postal (2012) claim that imposters share characteristics with pronouns modified by appositive DPs, which they dub precursors:


- (11) a. I, Nixon, am going to get even.
- b. We, the present writers, disagree with the following points.
- c. We, the undersigned, propose a number of improvements.
- d. I, your faithful correspondent, should write more often.
- e. You, Madam, should not try to deceive us.
- f. You, my lord, can certainly win the tournament.

Such precursors are parallel in interpretation to imposters:

- (12) a. Nixon is going to get even.
- b. The present writers disagree with the following points.
- c. The undersigned propose a number of improvements.
- d. Your faithful correspondent will hereafter write more often.
- e. Madam should not try to deceive us.
- f. My lord can certainly win the tournament.

In general, precursor structures appear to provide the correct semantics for imposters. That is, imposters have non-third person denotations and corresponding precursors have visible pronominal components with the right non-third person denotations. So each imposter in (12) is equivalent in denotation to its corresponding precursor in (11). Moreover, imposters have a third person lexical component which matches the predicate nominal of the corresponding precursor. And the nonrestrictive meaning provided by the precursor predicate nominal seems to represent as well the meaning of the third person component of an imposter.

Given the parallelism between imposters and precursors, Collins and Postal develop and account where imposters are derived from underlying precursor structures. The analysis is shown below for the imposter *Nixon* which is derived from the precursor *I, Nixon*:



In this fully binary branching structure, the appositive DP₃ moves up to the specifier of a higher DP₄. A DP is moved up and not just an NP, because possessed DPs like *my lady* can serve as imposters. From its raised position, the appositive DP₃ determines the phi-feature values of the whole imposter (DP₄). There are two ways that determination could work. First, via Spec-Head agreement, the moved secondary DP₃ agrees with the head D₄. Then, since D₄ is the head of DP₄, DP₄ inherits the phi-feature values of D₄. Second, it might simply be that since DP₃ is the highest DP in the structure with specified phi-feature values, the phi-features of DP₃ are the only ones available internal to DP₄.

In the remainder of this introduction, we will refer to DP₂ as the core or notional component of the imposter and DP₄ as the shell of the imposter.

5. Sources

As mentioned above, a pronoun can agree with an antecedent or some other source. A major claim of Collins and Postal (2012) is that in some cases a pronoun may agree with non-antecedent DPs. The list of sources argued for in Collins and Postal (2012) (no doubt to be expanded in later work) is given below in (14) and (18). The role that these sources play in determining pronominal agreement will be discussed in detail in the next section.

In order to define the notion of *source*, we first define *primary source*, and then give a recursive definition of *source*. The recursive definition will allow us to account for the fact that there can be a long chain of source relations, where the pronoun agrees with any of the elements in that chain.

A primary source is a direct source of phi-features values of a pronoun. For example, an immediate antecedent is a primary source. In the example in (5) the immediate antecedent of the reflexive is *he*, and the reflexive agrees directly with its immediate antecedent. The immediate antecedent is a primary source for the reflexive.

(14) Definition: *primary source*

A is a *primary source* for B if and only if:

- a. A immediately antecedes B or:
- b. A is a key conjunct of B; or:
- c. A shares a lexical basis with B.

(14a) represents the prototypical case of pronominal agreement with an immediate antecedent. (14b) is used when calculating the phi-feature values of a coordinate structure. Consider the following example:

(15) John and I saw ourselves in the mirror

The 1SG pronoun *I* is the key conjunct of the coordinate structure, and hence the pronoun is a primary source for the coordinate structure. Intuitively, the key conjunct is the conjunct with the highest person feature value of all the conjuncts. Crucially, imposters such as *Daddy* and *yours truly* count as having 1SG feature values for the purpose of determining the key conjunct (see Collins and Postal 2012 chapter 9 for precise definitions).

(14c) is used in the case of relative clauses and also to account for pronominal agreement with camouflage DPs (e.g., *your majesty*). Consider the following examples:

- (16) a. The man who I saw
b. your majesty

In (16a), the DP headed by *the* and the relative pronoun *who* share a lexical basis (the noun *man*). In (16b), the pronoun *your* and the DP *your majesty* share a lexical basis (the noun part of the DP *your*, see Collins and Postal 2012: 85). The intuition in both cases is that there is a single noun that is being shared by two functional projections (see Collins and Postal 2012: 59 for a precise definition).

A secondary source is any kind of source that is not a primary source.

(17) Definition *secondary source*.

A is a *secondary source* of B if and only if A is a source of B and not a primary source of B.

A secondary source is an indirect source of phi-feature values of a pronoun, since secondary sources are defined in terms of primary sources. Secondary sources can transmit phi-features to a pronoun via an intermediate primary source. In the definition below sources are defined recursively in terms of primary source (the base case (18a)) and the chaining together of the various source relations (the recursive case (18b)).

(18) Definition: *source*

A is a *source* for B if and only if:

- a. A is a primary source for B or:
- b. there is a C which is a source for B and:
 - (i) A is a primary source for C; or
 - (ii) C is a predicate nominal and A is C's subject; or:

(iii) C is a partitive DP and A is C's set DP.

(18bi) allows the chaining together of immediate antecedent relations. In example (5), *he* is the immediate antecedent of *himself*, and *John* is the immediate antecedent of *he*, so *John* is a (secondary) source for *himself*.

(18bii) says that if a predicate nominal is a source of a pronoun, the subject of the predicate nominal is also a source for the pronoun. Consider the following example from Collins and Postal 2012: 166:

(19) If you were a shirt, it/you wouldn't sell for very much.

The immediate antecedent of the main clause subject pronoun *it/you* is the DP *a shirt*. The pronoun can agree in phi-features with the immediate antecedent (3SG), or with the subject of the predicate nominal (2SG).


(18bii) says that if a partitive DP (such as *every one of us*) is a source of a pronoun, the set DP of the partitive (*us* in this case) is a source for the pronoun (see illustrations below).

6. Some Examples

In this section, I will show how the system applies to the examples in (1). Consider first (1a), shortened and repeated below:

(20) The present authors₁ (=the writers of the reply) attempt to defend
ourselves₁/themselves₁

A structural representation of this sentence is given in (21). I follow the expanded left periphery approach outlined in section 3 above. In the framework of Collins and Postal (2012) every sentence will have both AUTHOR and ADDRESSE, but for the sake of brevity, I only include AUTHOR in the representation in (21). Also, for the sake of brevity, I do not include the vP/VP distinction, nor do I indicate vP internal subjects. In addition, the full structure of the imposter is not given (see (13)).




In this example, the immediate antecedent of the reflexive is PRO, and the immediate antecedent of PRO is *the present authors*. The immediate antecedent of the *present authors* is AUTHOR (which is plural). Therefore, there is a chain of DPs linked by antecedence relations: <AUTHOR, the present authors, PRO, ourselves/themselves>. Since AUTHOR itself has no antecedent, we call AUTHOR the ultimate antecedent of the reflexive. Note that the reflexive has three different antecedents, one of which is the immediate antecedent (PRO) and one of which is the ultimate antecedent (AUTHOR).

The immediate antecedent of the reflexive is a primary source by (14a). The ultimate antecedent is a source by the recursive clause in (18bi). Since both the immediate antecedent and ultimate antecedent are sources, the Pronominal Agreement Condition in (4) allows agreement with either, accounting for the pronominal agreement alternation in (20).

In the following example, repeated from (1b), the subject is a coordinate structure:

- (22) [this reporter₁ (=speaker) and his son₁]₂ are proud of ourselves₂/themselves₂.

The structure of (22) is given below in (23). I do not represent the internal structure of DP coordination.




One important feature of this example is that *this reporter* simultaneously determines 3SG agreement on the possessor pronoun *his* and plays the role of a conjunct in a coordinate structure which is the immediate antecedent of a 1PL reflexive. So *this reporter* has truly ambivalent behavior, determining in the same sentence first person and third person pronominal agreement.

Since *this reporter* is the key conjunct of the coordinate structure, it is a primary source of the coordinate structure by (14b). Since *AUTHOR* is the immediate antecedent of *this reporter*, it is also a source for coordinate structure. The coordinate structure is plural, but can agree in person with either *this reporter* (third person) or *AUTHOR* (first person). Therefore, the coordinate structure can either be 1PL or 3PL, determining the two possibilities for the reflexive.

Consider now (1c), repeated in (24), an example with a camouflage DP. The structure is given in (25). I do not represent the internal structure of the camouflage DP. Also, note that (25), like all sentences, will have both an *AUTHOR* and *ADDRESSEE*. Only *ADDRESSEE* is represented for brevity sake.


(24) [Your₁ Majesty]₁ should praise yourself₁/herself₁



In this example, the immediate antecedent of the reflexive is *Your Majesty* and the ultimate antecedent is **ADDRESSEE**. Since the immediate and ultimate antecedent are sources, by condition (4) pronominal agreement with either is allowed.

According to definition (18biii), the set **DP** of a partitive **DP** can define a secondary source. This case is illustrated in (1d), repeated in (26), with the structure shown in (27).

(26) [Every one of us]₁ thinks we₁/they₁ are intelligent.




V	AdjP
be	intelligent

The DP *every one of us* is both the ultimate antecedent and immediate antecedent of the embedded clause subject pronoun *we/they*. In this case, AUTHOR is not the ultimate antecedent of the subject pronoun. If AUTHOR were the ultimate antecedent, then the pronoun would not have a bound variable interpretation, rather it would simply refer to the people that AUTHOR refers to. Similarly, the set DP *us* is not the antecedent of the embedded clause subject pronoun *we/they*. If the set DP were the antecedent, once again there would be no bound variable interpretation.

Crucially, even though the set DP *us* of the partitive DP is not an antecedent of the embedded clause subject pronoun, it counts as a source for the pronoun by (18biii) since the set DP is a source for any pronoun that the partitive DP is a source for. Therefore, the pronoun can agree with either *every one of us* (yielding *he*, if all the people in the denotation of *we* are male), or the set DP (yielding *we*). In the case of singular-*they*, the third person feature value comes from the DP *every one of us* and the plural feature value from the set DP *us* (a case of split agreement allowed by (4)).

In the relative clause case of (1d), repeated in (28), the immediate and ultimate antecedent of the reflexive is the relative pronoun *who*, which is 3SG (as shown by the form of the verb *takes*, compare to *I take*)

(28) I am a teacher who₁ takes care of myself₁/himself₁.




According to Collins and Postal 2012, *who* and [*a teacher who...*] share a lexical basis, which makes [*a teacher who...*] a primary source for *who* (see Collins and Postal 2012 for specific analyses of relative clauses consistent with this assumption). Therefore by (18bi), the DP [*a teacher who*] (3SG) is also a source for the reflexive. Lastly, the DP *I* is the subject of the predicate nominal. Hence by (18bii), *I* (1SG) is also a source for the reflexive. Therefore, by (4) the reflexive can agree with any of these sources (in addition to *AUTHOR* which is the immediate antecedent of the subject *I*), accounting for the pronoun alternation.

Of these sources, only *who* is an antecedent of the reflexive. In particular, *AUTHOR* is not an antecedent of the reflexive. Semantically, the reflexive is a bound variable in a predicate modifying the head noun of the relative clause. There is no reason to think that there is an antecedence relation between the reflexive and *AUTHOR*.

In the last example (1f), repeated in (30), the immediate antecedent of *your/her* is *ADDRESSEE*, which is 2SG. So there is a real mystery as to why *her* is also possible.

- (30) Would [your₁/her₁ (= addressee) Majesty]₁ like her tea on the veranda?

In the representation, I leave out inessential issues like subject-aux inversion.



Collins and Postal 2012 propose that the possessor DP *your/her* and the containing camouflage DP *your/her majesty* share a lexical basis (which is the nominal part of the pronoun *your/her*). Therefore, by (14c) the containing DP *your/her majesty* (3SG) is a primary source for the possessor DP. The other source is the immediate antecedent ADDRESSEE (2SG). Hence the possessor can agree with either of these sources.

7. Summary

From these examples it is easy to see that the conditions in (3) are factually inadequate. The two biggest problems are that (a) they do not allow agreement with one of several different antecedents (when there is more than one antecedent and those antecedents differ in phi-feature values), and (b) they only allow agreement with antecedents (and not other sources). As the examples in (1) show, it is often possible for a pronoun to agree with one of several sources, and these sources do not necessarily have to be antecedents.

8. Summary of Contributions

The papers in this volume provide a rich set of cross-linguistic data, illustrating how verbal and pronominal agreement works with imposters (and in the other constructions listed in (1) above). The papers also provide insightful syntactic alternatives to the syntactic proposals of Collins and Postal 2012, paving the way for fruitful

discussion and hypothesis testing in future years. In this section, I will highlight the empirical and/or theoretical contributions of each paper. In later sections, I will show how the data described in these papers fits into a cross-linguistic typology of pronominal agreement.

The papers in this volume were written by my students and colleagues, who were mostly NYU students or visitors to NYU. No attempt has been made to seek out a cross-linguistically balanced set of languages for this volume. For example, a contribution on Japanese or Korean, or on the agreement rich Bantu languages would have been quite useful. There are also questions that arise about what would happen with pronominal agreement with imposters in a language with indexical shift (see Collins and Postal 2012: 256-257). All these studies must await the interest of future scholars.

Satarupa Das investigates imposters in Bangla. Her main conclusion is that both verbal and pronominal agreement are always determined by the third person imposter shell. She gives an explanation of this fact by appealing to the Homogeneity Principle of Collins and Postal (2012: 145). Her claim is that subject-verb agreement is subject to the Homogeneity Principle, just as pronouns are.

Rachel Dudley investigates imposters in Spanish. She obtained her rich data set using a questionnaire with 68 sentences administered to five Spanish speakers from various dialects. Her main empirical conclusion is that plural imposters in Spanish freely allow 1PL subject-verb agreement. In this way, Spanish differs from Italian and Bellinzonese, which do not allow 1PL verbal agreement with plural imposter subjects.

Dalina Kalluli's contribution shows that in Albanian singular imposters can trigger 1SG subject-verb agreement. Albanian is the only language in our sample with this property. Kalluli's contribution is the only one to take up the interaction of imposters with epithets. As Collins and Postal (2012: 137) show, imposters cannot be the antecedents of epithets. Surprisingly, this constraint does not hold (under certain conditions) in Albanian.

Daniel Kaufman discusses the syntax of imposters in Indonesian. He focuses on the parallelism between imposters and first and second person pronouns with respect to word order in the patient voice. As Kaufman notes, in the patient voice first and second person pronouns are proclitics on the verb: 1/2=V. Surprisingly, imposters also appear preceding the verb in the patient voice. From this, Kaufman concludes that imposters provide a strong argument for the syntactic view of imposters over a notional view (for a discussion of the notional view, see Collins and Postal 2012: chapter 2). If imposters were simply third person DPs that happened to refer to the speaker or addressee, it is unclear why they would pattern syntactically like first and second person pronouns with respect to word order in the patient voice.

Emilio Servidio gives an overview of verbal and pronominal agreement with imposters in Italian. One of his important conclusions is that the imposters *il sottoscritto* "the undersigned" and *il qui presente* "the here present" behave differently from the others in terms of verbal and pronominal agreement. A coordinate structure with one of these two imposters as a conjunct admits 1PL subject-verb agreement. He dubs these deep imposters, since "they display agreement with the most deeply embedded layer of the structure." The special behavior of "the undersigned" is a recurrent theme in this volume, showing up in Wood and Sigurðsson's contribution on Icelandic as well. Curiously,

camouflage DPs (“your majesty”) behave like deep imposters in Italian, a fact which Servidio explains in his paper.

Gabriela Soare gives a fine grained comparison of French and Romanian. One of her discoveries is that while 1PL subject-verb agreement is general impossible with a plural imposter in both French and Romanian, it becomes much better if the subject is modified by the expression “here present” (“The authors here present have decided to get together.”). She also documents widespread matching effects between verbal agreement and pronominal agreement, operative in both languages.

Violeta Vázquez Rojas discusses a case of an indefinite imposter in Spanish. She then gives an account of why such indefinite imposters are exceptional. Imposters are almost always definite in form (e.g., having a definite article or demonstrative).

Arthur Wang discusses pronominal agreement with imposters in Mandarin. His main empirical contribution is that “...the pronominal agreement is never 3rd person with Mandarin imposters. In other words, the agreement is always in accordance with the notional person.” Wang explains this difference from English in terms of the structure of imposters. In Mandarin, according to Wang, imposters are complex DPs where a first or second person pronoun occupies D, and the third person expression (e.g., “teacher”) occupies Spec DP. This structure explains why Mandarin imposters can only antecede non-third person pronouns. Wang provides strong support for his analysis from the distribution of overt first and second person pronouns occurring (optionally) immediately to the right of expressions like “teacher” when they are used as imposters: [teacher I]. Wang points out that the variation that one finds between Mandarin and English is natural on the syntactic view of imposters. Different syntactic structures give rise to different patterns of pronominal agreement. On a notional view of imposters, where they are simply regular third person DPs with the semantic/pragmatic property of referring to the speaker or addressee, it is less clear what could account for such cross-linguistic variation.

Jim Wood and Einar Freyr Sigurðsson discuss imposters in Icelandic. Given the rich system of subject-verb agreement in Icelandic, their primary goal “...is to refine our understanding of the role of verbal agreement in pronoun/reflexive antecedent relations.” The authors give a careful summary of the interaction between subject-verb agreement and pronominal agreement, discussing pronominal agreement in ECM constructions and cases of syncretism in subject-verb agreement. One of their many empirical discoveries about Icelandic is that when subject-verb agreement is first person, then the subject can only antecede a first person pronoun. When subject-verb agreement is third person, then in certain cases, the subject can antecede either first or third person pronouns.

9. A Preliminary Typology of Imposters

The above discussion of (1) has revealed previously unexplored dimensions to the analysis of pronominal agreement in English. The ingredients of that analysis include the Pronominal Agreement Condition in (4), primary sources (antecedents, key conjuncts, DPs with a shared lexical basis), secondary sources (subjects of predicate nominals, set DPs), imposters, and camouflage DPs. A natural question is whether the Pronominal Agreement Condition stands up cross-linguistically. In other words, can the system of Collins and Postal 2012 shed light on interesting patterns of cross-linguistic variation?

And conversely, can cross-linguistic variation in pronominal agreement support or lead us to modify the main assumptions of Collins and Postal 2012? This volume is devoted to answering these questions.

In the remaining part of this chapter, I will summarize some results from the contributions to this volume. Based on these results, I will propose a tentative typology of pronominal agreement systems. I will also point out some recurrent issues that deserve further investigation.

In Arthur Wang's contribution on Mandarin, it is shown that pronominal agreement with an imposter is always with the notional component, no matter whether the imposter is singular, plural or coordinated. Mandarin does not have subject-verb agreement.

- (32) Laoshi₁ kuai yao shiqu { *ta₁ / wo₁ } de naixing le
 teacher almost going.to lose s/he I POSS patience ASP
 'Teacher₁ (= I) is going to lose { *his₁/ *her₁ / my₁ } patience.'

Indonesian, as discussed by Daniel Kaufman, shows a similar pattern, where pronominal agreement is only with the notional component. Once again, Indonesian does not have subject-verb agreement.

- (33) bapak mau mem-baca buku-ku dulu
 father want AV-read book-1SG.GEN first
 'Father wants to read his book first.'

In Satarupa Das' contribution on Bengali, it is shown that both subject-verb agreement and pronominal agreement with an imposter is always with the third person shell, no matter whether the imposter is singular, plural or coordinated.

- (34) ei sharma tar/*amar dhoirjya hara-te cholech-e
 this guy his/my patience lose-INF go-3
 'This guy is about to lose his patience'

These three languages are strict languages, where agreement (pronominal agreement or subject-verb agreement) does not alternate between the notional and grammatical features of the imposter. The rest of the languages have a more ambivalent behavior, in that both subject-verb agreement and pronominal agreement can vary. Hence we have the initial typology, first suggested in Collins and Postal (2012: 225)

- (35) *The Pronominal Agreement Parameter*

If an imposter A immediately antecedes a pronominal P, then:

- a. P agrees only with A.
(Bengali)
- b. P agrees only with A's ultimate antecedent.
(Mandarin and Indonesian)
- c. P agrees with A or A's ultimate antecedent.
(English, Spanish, French, Romanian, Albania, Italian, Icelandic,

We will refine this typology in the next sections, showing that the class of languages in (35c) can be further subdivided. Data of both Das on Bangla and Kaufman on Indonesian show that the formulation in (35) is not sufficiently general, since it only refers to immediate/ultimate antecedents, and not secondary sources more generally. A possible generalization is given below:

- (36) The Pronominal Agreement Parameter
If third person A immediately antecedes a pronominal P,
and P has a non-third person secondary source S, then:
- a. P agrees only with A.
 - b. P agrees only with S
 - c. P agrees with A or S.

Much more cross-linguistic data on a wide range of structures involving secondary sources will be needed to show whether (36) holds.

10. *The Undersigned*

A recurring theme in the papers of this volume is the status of imposter corresponding to the English imposter *the undersigned*. In other languages, *the undersigned* has special properties, often determining first person agreement where other imposters do not.

As pointed out by Emilio Servidio for Italian, even though coordinate DPs with an imposter conjunct cannot generally give rise to first person subject-verb agreement, when the imposter is *the undersigned*, such first person subject-verb agreement is possible.

- (37) ?Maria e il sottoscritto cercheremo di difendere noi stessi
Mari and the undersigned attempt.FUT.1PL of defend our selves
“Maria and the undersigned will attempt to defend ourselves.”

Servidio analyzes *the undersigned* as [the undersigned INDIVIDUAL], and proposes that imposters with a null head noun have a different syntax (with respect to pronominal agreement) than the other imposters.

The special status of *the undersigned* is also discussed in Wood and Sigurðsson, who note that in Icelandic there is a difference between coordinate DPs based on *the undersigned* and those based on other imposters. They analyze the unique behavior of *the undersigned* in terms of its participial nature. A very interesting theoretical question is to resolve which of the two explanations is correct (Servidio’s based on null head nouns, or Wood and Sigurðsson’s based on participles).

Cattaneo (2009) for Bellinzone and Lima (2010) for Brazilian Portuguese also find differences between *the undersigned* and other imposters.

11. Singular/Plural Asymmetry

While the the typology in (35) classifies languages according to pronominal agreement with imposters, there are many other differences that emerge from the present volume. In particular, of all the languages in category (35c), only Albanian allows either 1SG or 3SG subject-verb agreement with a singular imposter (see Kalluli (this volume)):

- (38) Mami shko-n/shko-j tani
 Mommy go-3SG/go-1SG now
 “Mommy is going away now.”

In none of the other languages is 1SG subject-verb agreement possible with a singular imposter. However, 1PL subject-verb agreement is often possible with a plural imposter and/or a coordinate DP with an imposter conjunct.

The clearest case is Spanish, as discussed by Rachel Dudley. Dudley shows that a singular imposter can never give rise to first person subject-verb agreement, but a plural imposter can:

- (39) los abajo firmantes pensábamos en vender la casa
 the.PL under signed.PL thought.1PL about to.sell the house
 “The undersigned were thinking about selling the house.”

Of course, a plural imposter can also give rise to 3PL subject-verb agreement, and a coordinate DP with an imposter conjunct can give rise to either 1PL or 3PL subject-verb agreement.

A similar contrast exists in French and Romanian, as discussed by Gabriela Soare. In French, as Soare shows, 1PL subject-verb agreement is possible with a coordinate DP that has an imposter conjunct. Furthermore, 1PL subject-verb agreement is possible with a plural imposter if modified by an indexical modifier, as shown below.

- (40) ?Les auteurs ci-présents sommes fier-s de nous-mêmes.
 The authors here present.M.PL are.1PL proud-PL of our-selves
 ‘The authors here present are happy with ourselves.’

Similarly, as discussed by Jim Wood and Einar Freyr Sigurðsson, a singular imposter can never give rise to first person subject-verb agreement, but a plural imposter (as well as a coordinate DP with an imposter conjunct) can:

- (41) Undirritaðir { hafa/ ?höfum } haldið þessu fram.
 undersigned.M.PL { have.3PL / ?1PL } held this forth
 ‘The undersigned (plural) have claimed this.’

In Italian, as discussed by Emilio Servidio, a singular imposter never gives rise to 1SG subject verb agreement, nor can a plural imposter but a coordinated DP with an imposter conjunct can (if the imposter is *the undersigned*).

- (42) ?Maria e il sottoscritto cercheremo di difendere noi stessi
 Mari and the undersigned attempt.FUT.1PL of defend our selves
 “Maria and the undersigned will attempt to defend ourselves.”

A table summarizing the data on subject-verb agreement across all the languages in group (35c) is given below:

(43)	Singular	Plural	Coordinate
Albanian	3SG/1SG	3PL/1PL	3PL/1PL
Spanish	3SG/*1SG	3PL/1PL	3PL/1PL
Italian	3SG/*1SG	3PL/*1PL	3PL/1PL
Bellinzonese	3SG/*1SG	3PL/*1PL	3PL/1PL
Icelandic	3SG/*1SG	3PL/1PL	3PL/1PL
French	3SG/*1SG	3PL/1PL	3PL/1PL
Romanian	3SG/*1SG	3PL/1PL	3PL/1PL
Brazilian Portuguese	3SG/*1SG	3PL/1PL	3PL/1PL

So there is a robust asymmetry between singular and plural imposters. If a language has first person subject-verb agreement with a singular imposter, it will also have first person subject-verb agreement with a plural imposter (as in Albanian).

There is also a less robust asymmetry between plural imposters and coordinate DPs with an imposter conjunct (on a possible explanation see Collins and Postal 2012:127). If a language has first person subject-verb agreement with a plural imposter, it will also have first person subject-verb agreement with a coordinate DP.

(43) glosses over many relevant details concerning when 1PL subject-verb agreement is licensed (e.g., the role of “the undersigned”, modification by “here present” and topicalization). Putting these details aside, we have the following preliminary cross-linguistic implicational universals, which need to be tested in many more languages:

- (44) Hierarchy of DPs for First Person Subject-Verb Agreement
- a. Singular Imposter → Plural Imposter
 - b. Plural Imposter → Coordinate Structure with Imposter Conjunct

The basic asymmetry between singular imposters and plural/coordinate imposters seen in (43) also shows up in English with respect to pronominal agreement (plural subject-verb agreement does not show person distinctions). Although a plural imposter

can be the antecedent of a 1PL pronoun (see (1a)), a singular imposter generally cannot (singular camouflage DPs are not so constrained, see Collins and Postal 2012: 90):

- (45)
- a. Daddy is enjoying himself/*myself.
 - b. Yours truly will only vote for himself/*myself.
 - c. This reporter sees himself/*myself as managing editor in the future.
 - d. This reporter will never himself/*myself agree to that.
 - e. This reporter has never perjured himself/*myself.
 - f. The baroness should take better care of herself/*yourself.

Although Collins and Postal 2012:94 note this asymmetry, they were unable to account for it. This singular/plural asymmetry may be related to other singular/plural asymmetries in pronominal agreement, represented in conditions (46) and (47) from Collins and Postal (2012: chapter 14).

- (46) Number Attraction (second and final version)
If the ultimate antecedent of a pronominal P is singular and a plural DP A is a secondary source for P, then if P agrees with A in person or gender, P is plural.
- (47) The Ultimate-Antecedent Plurality Condition
If the ultimate antecedent of a pronominal P is plural, then P is plural.

These two conditions give a very asymmetric view of singular/plural. They say that if the ultimate antecedent of a pronoun is plural, the pronoun must be plural. But if the ultimate antecedent of the pronoun is singular, the pronoun does not necessarily have to be singular. It is as if the singular value of the NUM feature is being ignored or overridden. An example illustrating (46) is given below:

- (48) a. [Every one of us]₁ thinks we₁/*I₁ are/am a genius. (see (1d))

In (48), the ultimate antecedent of *we* is *every one of us*, which is singular (as shown by subject-verb agreement), but the bound pronoun *we* is plural (agreeing with the set DP of the partitive DP as a secondary source). In fact, the singular *I* is not even possible with a bound variable reading. Since the subject pronoun agrees with the set DP *us* in person (first person) it must also agree in number (plural). In effect, the singular value of the ultimate antecedent is being bypassed.

An example illustrating (47) is given below:

- (49) AUTHOR [Daddy and Jerrome]₁ are enjoying ourselves₁/*myself₁ at the beach.

AUTHOR is a source of *ourselves* (in fact, *ourselves* agrees in person with AUTHOR). However, since the ultimate antecedent of the reflexive is [Daddy and Jerrome] (a plural DP) the reflexive must be plural not singular.

Based on facts such as this (and many others discussed in Collins and Postal 2012, chapter 14), I make the following claim:

- (50) The singular feature value of number is unrepresented syntactically.

There are two ways to implement this analysis technically. Either the NUM feature could be wholly absent from singular DPs, or the NUM feature could lack a value in the case of singular DPs. For concreteness, I will assume the latter.

Nevins 2011:944, based on certain person/number asymmetries, claims that: “person values are always fully specified in the syntax using binary features [+/- participant] and [+/- author], but number features are privative, meaning that [plural] is syntactically specified but that singular arguments are not.” Using this assumption, Nevins 2011 derives the fact that while some languages have a Person Case Constraint, no languages seem to have a Number Case Constraint. Also, while some languages have Omnivorous Number Effects, no languages seem to have Omnivorous Person Effects. I take Nevins 2011 conclusions to support my claim that the singular feature value of number is unrepresented syntactically.

Returning to (50), Wood and Sigurðsson also claim that the singular value of the number feature is unrepresented syntactically. Using this assumption, they consider how finite T with unvalued phi-features probes for the features of the imposter. They show that under a certain set of assumptions, only the plural imposter “the undersigned” will allow both 1PL and 3PL subject verb-agreement. Basically, only for the plural imposter “the undersigned” will the uNUM (unvalued NUM feature) of T be able to probe the 1PL core of the imposter (giving rise to 1PL subject-verb agreement). All singular imposters, and all other plural imposters will only allow third person subject-verb agreement.

Since their account is specific to the plural imposter “the undersigned” and its special properties as a participle with gender and number phi-features, it is unclear how their account could be used to account for the singular/plural distinction found in English between examples like (45) and examples with a plural imposter. Also, it is unclear how it would account for the general singular plural/asymmetry illustrated in (43). So the singular/plural distinction with imposters remains a mystery, and accounting for it is one of the greatest challenges for future work.

12. Person Mismatches

As several contributors noted (Das, Dudley, Soare), when an imposter is a subject and the antecedent of a pronoun, the subject-verb agreement and pronominal agreement must match. Both Das and Dudley give accounts of this restriction in terms of the Homogeneity Principle (Collins and Postal 2012: chapter 12). A French example from Collins and Postal is given below:

- (51) a. *Votre serviteur et quelques amis sommes fiers d’eux-mêmes.
your servant and a.few friends are.1pl proud of themselves
‘Your servant and a few friends are proud of themselves.’
b. *Votre serviteur et quelques amis sont fiers de nous-mêmes.
your servant and a.few friends are.3pl proud of ourselves
‘Your servant and a few friends are proud of ourselves.’

In (51a), the verb has 1PL agreement, but the pronoun is 3PL. In (51b), the verb has 3PL agreement, but the pronoun is 1PL. Both cases are ungrammatical.

However, several authors (Wood and Sigurðsson, Kallulli, Dudley) report exceptions to this generalization, and the exceptions are always when the subject-verb agreement is third person, as in (52b):

- | | | | |
|------|----|---------|-----------|
| (52) | a. | Verb-3 | Pronoun-3 |
| | b. | Verb-3 | Pronoun-1 |
| | c. | *Verb-1 | Pronoun-3 |
| | d. | Verb-1 | Pronoun-1 |

Even in English, where subject-verb agreement is impoverished, it is possible to find some cases of mismatch, and they are always of the form of (52b). Two such cases are the following from Collins and Postal (2012: 212, 157):

- | | | |
|------|----|--|
| (53) | a. | Your Lordship likes to enjoy yourself on the beach. |
| | b. | I am an experienced teacher who takes care of myself |

In (53a), there is 3SG subject-verb agreement, but the reflexive is 2SG. In (53b), there is 3SG subject-verb agreement on the verb in the relative clause, but the reflexive is 1SG. So in both cases, there is a mismatch between the subject-verb agreement and the phi-features of the pronoun.

Given these cases, I suggest the following generalization:

- (54) For subject S and pronoun P which has S as an antecedent,
if subject-verb agreement with S is first person, then P is first person.

This asymmetry between third person and first person is reminiscent of the asymmetry between singular and plural. Just like singular can be ignored in certain cases, third person can also be ignored in certain cases. In particular, in languages that allow (52b), third person subject-verb agreement is ignored for the purposes of the Homogeneity Principle. The implications of such asymmetries for the syntactic representation of person have yet to be explored.

One fact about English that makes it harder to analyze than Icelandic is that 1PL subject verb agreement is identical to 3PL subject verb agreement.

- | | | |
|------|----|------------------------------------|
| (55) | a. | They attempt to defend themselves. |
| | b. | We attempt to defend ourselves. |

There is no difference in morphological shape between the verb in (55a) and (55b). So in an example like (1) above (repeated in (56)), one does not know if there is 1PL or 3PL subject-verb agreement:

- (56) [the present authors]₁ (= the writers of the reply) attempt to
defend ourselves₁/themselves₁

Collins and Postal 2012:127 assumed that the form of the subject-verb agreement in (56) is 3PL (and the imposter DP *the present authors* is 3PL). However, given that some of the languages in (43) freely allow 1PL subject-verb agreement with plural imposters, we need to reconsider this assumption. Consider the following four representations, where we assume that there is homophonous 1PL and 3PL subject verb agreement:

- (57) a. The present authors attempt-1PL to defend ourselves.
- b. The present authors attempt-1PL to defend themselves.
- c. The present authors attempt-3PL to defend ourselves.
- d. The present authors attempt-3PL to defend themselves.

Assuming in each case that the subject is an imposter, only (57b) would be ruled out by the condition in (54). Therefore, in English, the presence of a 1PL reflexive would be consistent with both of the representations in (57a) and (57c).

The representations in (57) make the assumption that the imposter *the present authors* is 3PL. Another possibility is that (56) involves an appositive structure with a covert pronominal head, as in the following:

- (58) a. [WE, the present authors] attempt-1PL to defend ourselves.
- b. The present authors attempt-3PL to defend ourselves.

On this approach, we still need to explain why singular imposters do not have a representation like that in (58a) (with a covert 1SG pronominal head). Moreover, Collins and Postal (2012: 97) present arguments against the representation of imposters as appositives involving a covert pronominal head, as in (58a). They show that an imposter DP such as *the present authors*, can trigger both 1PL and 3PL pronominal agreement in the same sentence, which is not consistent with a representation like that of (58a).

13. Conclusion

The cross linguistic work in this volume supports the basic framework of Collins and Postal 2012. Part of the cross-linguistic variation can be easily defined in terms of the different source types (immediate antecedent vs. ultimate antecedent). It remains to be seen if a semantic account (see discussion in Collins and Postal 2012: chapter 20) would also be capable of accounting for this data.

The papers in this volume give rise to a vast number of research questions, both of a theoretical and empirical nature. I hope the the papers in this volume will trigger cross-linguistic research into the little studied areas of imposters and pronominal agreement.

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