

Imposters

Chris Collins	Paul M. Postal,
New York University	New York University
cc116@nyu.edu	paul.postal@nyu.edu
Dept. of Linguistics, New York University	
726 Broadway, 7th floor, NY, NY 10003	

1. Introduction

Normally, in order to refer to himself/herself, a speaker uses singular 1 person pronominal forms, in English, *I, me, my, mine, myself*. To refer to (a single) addressee, a speaker uses 2 person singular pronominal forms, in English, *you, your, yours, yourself*. But, this is not always the case. For instance, in an interview, newscaster Dan Rather referred to himself with the phrase highlighted in (1):

- (1) At the time, CBS News and *this reporter* fully believed the documents were genuine.

<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0709/20/lkl.01.html>

In a famous 1962 news conference, then future president of the United States Richard M. Nixon referred to himself with the highlighted form:

- (2) You won't have *Nixon* to kick around any more,...¹

http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Richard_Nixon.

And there are many instances of English speakers referring to themselves as *yours truly*.²

- (3) a. Though *yours truly* has tried to present his readers with a diverse variety of viewpoints, some very different from his.

<http://www.dogandponny.org/2006/12/invitation-to-contributors.html>

- b. And of course, *yours truly* practically screamed her tonsil off.

http://ultimatecass.blogspot.com/2006_04_01_archive.html

Other English examples of the general phenomena of interest here include the highlighted forms in (4):

- (4) a. *Your humble servant* finds the time before our next encounter very long.
 b. *This reviewer* was unable to strictly follow the logic of the submission.
 c. James Patterson is represented, as is Danielle Steel, as is *your faithful correspondent*. From *Best American Short Stories*, edited by Stephen King.
 d. (*Your*) *Daddy* is going to get you an ice cream cone.
 e. A chandelier overhead scattered shards of red, yellow and blue refracted light around the bathroom as *this guest* literally soaked in the luxury. (New York Daily News, Friday Nov. 23, 2007 pg. 14, "This is what you call a bubbly bath!")
 f. Can *the general/the judge* tell this committee why so many cases have yet to be processed?
 g. Would *the baroness* like more wine?

The forms in (4a-e), *on their usages of interest here*, are like those in (1-3) in that they denote the speaker. Those in (4f,g) differ in denoting the addressee. Hereafter, we refer to these forms as *imposters*. The goal of this paper is to consider the grammatical status of imposters, that is, of usages like *this reporter* and *Nixon* in (1) and (2) as well as *yours truly* and the forms in (4).

At first glance, there seems to be clear evidence that each imposter is a 3 person DP, grammatically no different from other 3 person DPs which do not denote speaker or hearer. Many of them appear to have the syntactic form of one or another standard 3 person DP, e.g. *this reporter*, *your faithful servant*, *the general*. And more importantly, even though they denote the speaker or hearer, all imposters determine 3 person verbal agreement, as noted by Stirling and Huddleston (2002: 1464). A special case was made explicit in Curme (1931: 14) who stated: “Instead of *we* some authors employ here a noun with the third person of the verb: ‘*The author* would remark,’ etc.”

- (5) a. This reporter is/*am signing off from Madrid, Spain.
- b. Nixon is/*am not going to resign.
- c. Yours truly is/*am unhappy.
- d. Yours truly runs/*run in the morning.
- e. Is/*are Madam not feeling well?
- f. Is/*are the general going to dine in his suite?

Imposters are found in other languages besides English. For instance, we suggest that the following highlighted French forms fall into the same class. Further examples from French, Bellinzonese and Spanish will be given later in the paper.

- (6) a. *Votre serviteur* a été interviewé en septembre 2006 dans les locaux d'ARTE.
your servant has been interviewed in September 2006 at the site of ARTE
“I was interviewed in September 2006 at the site of ATRE.”
franckpoisson.blogs.com/blogapart/2007/03/exclusif_fautil.html -
- b. Comment *Madame* désire-t-elle sa fourrure?
How madam desire she her fur
“How would Madam like her fur?”
www.acusa.ch/AN/an1997/14-fourrure.html -

Previous recognition of a grammatical category corresponding to the notion imposter is limited; but the content of the idea was informally grasped in traditional work, as shown in the following quote:

(7) Jespersen (1925: 217)

“In the vast majority of cases there is complete agreement between notional and grammatical person, i.e. the pronoun “I” and the corresponding verbal forms are used where the speaker really speaks of himself, and so with the other persons...and thus we may have such third-person substitutes for “I” as *your humble servant*;... In Western Europe, with its greater self-assertion, such expressions are chiefly used in jocular speech, thus E. *yours truly* (from the subscription in letters), *this child* (vulgarly *this baby*). A distinctively self-assertive jocular substitute for “I” is *number one*. Some writers avoid the mention of “I” as much as possible by using passive constructions, etc., and when such devices are not possible, they say *the author*, *the (present) writer*, or *the reviewer*.”

Key in the description Jespersen gave was his differentiation of *notional* and *grammatical* person, evidently a traditional distinction which he felt no need to define or justify (he did neither). But it seems fairly clear. Notional person is the semantic category which distinguishes DPs according to whether their denotations involve the speaker(s), the hearer(s), or none of those entities. Grammatical person refers to various morphosyntactic properties regularly associated with specific notional person forms. Imposters show that there is not a strictly lawful connection such that a form whose notional person is *n* inevitably has those morphosyntactic features associated in a particular language with *n* person. This conclusion is also supported by the category called *camouflage* in Collins, Moody and Postal (2008) (see section 12 for a comparison of imposters with camouflage).

3 person forms typically include both a limited set of pronominals and an unbounded set of nonpronominals; notionally 1 person and 2 person forms are normally exclusively pronominal.³ But imposters clash with the view that the latter is an invariable regularity (as do camouflage cases).

Our concept of imposter initially translates into Jespersen’s terminology roughly as in:

(8) An imposter is a notionally 1 person or 2 person DP which is grammatically 3 person.

But this is likely too restricted. We believe there are cases (see section 16), where grammatically 1 or 2 person forms are notionally some distinct person. This suggests a generalization:

- (9) An imposter is a notionally n person DP which is grammatically m person, $n \neq m$.

However, while (9) in fact covers most of the imposters we will deal with in this study, in passing (see section 18) we suggest that there are instances which do not fall under (9). Moreover, the essential structural properties of our analysis of imposters are independent of person in particular (so in principle, there could be number and gender imposters).

As far as the modern syntactic literature is concerned, we can point to few works even discussing imposters. Ross (1970) noticed members of the class but had little to say about them. A fuller recognition of the scope of English imposters is provided by Stirling and Huddleston (2002: 1464-1465). Baker (2007, to appear) offers some very brief proposals.

We can briefly offer some rough indications of the scope of the class of imposters. First, the overall imposter class is open and unlistable for at least two subtypes. For the imposter type represented by *this reporter*, an unlimited number of similar examples can be formed. Just as a reporter might say (10a) referring to himself or herself, a syntactician, phonologist, semanticist, logician, priest, teacher, etc., could say one of (10b) referring to *himself* or *herself*.

- (10) a. This reporter has studied that question.
b. This syntactician/phonologist/semanticist/logician/priest/teacher has studied that question.

For the imposter type based on a proper name, there is also no way to give an exhaustive characterization. Moreover, imposters of this type can consist of first names, last names, or full names, e.g. *Jerome*, *Jones*, *Jerome (J.) Jones*. Moreover, there can be more complex instances of this type with determiners and some modifiers:

- (11) a. The present Thomas Wilson Belmont will never accept that.
b. The former Mrs. Hubert Puffington is now a free woman (said by ex-wife of Mr. Puffington).

There is no problem interpreting the subjects of (11a, b) as denoting the speaker. And the syntactic criteria advanced in what follows show that (11a, b) represent 1 person imposters just as clearly as any other case dealt with here.

It appears then that the class of imposters will (properly) include the open sets *the* + Modifier + Human Proper Name and *this* + Common Noun denoting humans, more accurately, denoting sentient beings. Other imposters include the following:

- (12) a. 1 Person Imposters
- (i) yours truly, your faithful correspondent, the (present) author(s), the present reviewer(s), the undersigned, the court, the (present) writer(s), number 1
 - (ii) members of the set of diminutive kinship terms: daddy, mommy, auntie, granny, gramps⁴
 - (iii) various nondiminutive kinship terms plus a personal name: Uncle + Name, Aunt + Name, Cousin + Name, Grampa + Name, Granma + Name⁵
- b. 2 Person Imposters
- (i) Madam, the + Common Noun denoting ranks in a military organization, the general/colonel, etc., the Holy Father, my lord, ...my baby/darling/dearest/love/sweetheart/sweetie (see (13)),⁶ the reader, the attentive listener, my colleague from South Carolina (legislative context)
 - (ii) the elements of (aii)
 - (iii) possibly with some strain, the elements of (aiii)
- (13) How is my baby/darling/dear/dearest/love/sweetie/sweetheart tonight?

2. The Notional Hypothesis

The data cited so far might well suggest that imposters are fairly regular instances of the category of 3 person DPs, *except for their meanings*. This could naturally lead to view (14) as a minimal hypothesis:

(14) The Notional Hypothesis

Imposters are syntactically regular 3 person (singular) DPs with the lexically determined *semantic* peculiarity that they denote either the speaker (in the same sense as 1 person pronouns do) or the hearer (in the same sense as 2 person pronouns do).

Were the Notional Hypothesis true, it might be assumed that these forms are simply lexically specified to have the non-3 person denotations they do. But we will argue to the contrary that imposters need to be analyzed such that their denotational equivalence to 1 person or 2 person pronominal forms is a function not of lexical stipulation but of their grammatical structure, *which is distinct from that of regular 3 person DPs*.

We will argue the perhaps surprising point that imposters interpreted as denoting 1 person and 2 person are in a clear sense syntactically 1 person and 2 person forms respectively as well as syntactically 3 person forms.

Evidently, this raises the issue of how such *seemingly* inconsistent states of affairs can obtain. The direct goal of the particular analysis we offer in sections 8-11 is to account for these apparently conflicting properties in a coherent way.

The Notional Hypothesis is by no means a straw man. For instance, it is essentially found explicitly in (15a, b):

(15) a. Stirling and Huddleston (2002: 1464)

“As so often, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between meaning or reference and grammatical form: the reference here is to speaker/writer or addressee, but the form is 3rd person. Thus 3rd person does not mean that the reference is to an entity other than speaker or addressee: *it means only that the reference is not derivable from the person feature, as it is with 1st and 2nd person.*”

b. Baker (to appear: Chapter 4: 14)

“One minor pay-off of the PLC [Person Licensing Condition: CC and PMP] is that it explains the fact that ordinary nonpronominal NPs are never first or second person, even when they refer to the speaker or hearer.”

We will argue precisely to the contrary though that the denotational properties of 1 person and 2 person imposters are due to the same structure which accounts for the denotations of 1 person and 2 person pronominals.⁷

3. Imposters as Antecedents

As indicated in section 1, English imposters of all sorts invariably determine 3 person verbal agreement, and many have the superficial morphology of 3 person DPs. It is then natural to assume, as the Notional Hypothesis would have it, that imposters are syntactically 3 person DPs tout court, just ones which have unexpected non-3 person meanings. This would basically reduce the syntax of imposters to a largely trivial instance of perfectly banal 3 person DPs.

Consider how this conclusion would interact with the existence, illustrated in (16a,b), of the syntactic relation we call *antecedence*. This relation holds between the pairs of highlighted cases, obligatorily in (16a), as one possibility in (16b):

(16) a. *Mercedes* embarrassed *herself*.

- b. *Mercedes* claimed *she* was uncomfortable.

Antecedence is of course commonly represented by co-indexing, a matter discussed in section 10. There it is observed that in imposter cases in particular, coindexing fails to correspond to antecedence in key ways.

If imposters were simply 3 person DPs, it would follow that their antecedence behavior in particular should invariably just be that of standard 3 person DPs. Well supported principles require pronominal forms to agree with their antecedents in person, number and gender features (hereafter: *phi-features*). One formulation is found in (17):

(17) The Pronominal Agreement Condition (first version)

(from Sag, Wasow and Bender, 2003: 208)

Coindexed NPs agree.

Given such a matching condition, the Notional Hypothesis, would determine that *any* pronominal form an imposter antecedes would necessarily match it in *being 3 person* and in having identical number and gender as well.

And there are innumerable instances where pronominal forms with imposter antecedents behave just as specified in (17) for a 3 person DP; see (3a,b) and (18).

- (18) a. As yours truly has volunteered herself to be an Exhibition Guide for...
kleiolee.vox.com
- b. Would the colonel₁ like to open the mail himself₁?
- c. Will Madam visit her neighbours, Mr and Mrs Gordon from Scotland, ...
www.guardian.co.uk/travel/2007/jan/27/saturday.romantictrips.shortbreaks
- d. Mommy₁ needs to have a drink before she₁ gives you your bath.

But such cases do not logically preclude the existence of others in which imposters antecede 1 person or 2 person forms. So the question is whether these also exist, clashing with the claim of the Notional Hypothesis that imposters are syntactically just 3 person forms. Consider then:

- (19) a. You should have seen yours truly when I first came from Bombay. ...
www.eslnotes.com/movies/word/Moscow-on-the-Hudson.doc
- b. The first clip features yours truly reading the text in my normal speaking voice.
<http://www.mtannoyances.com/?p=549>
- c. The house was vacuumed once in three months, and that was also done by

yours truly, while the dog growled and barked at me ...

www.indiebloggers.org/general/2007/09/10/long-long-long-ago

These examples might be taken to indicate that *yours truly* can antecede 1 person pronominal forms, *I* in (19a), *my* in (19b), and *me* in (19c). For there is no doubt *yours truly* and these pronominal forms have the same denotation. The same conclusion would hold for other imposters having 1 person meanings, for which parallels to (19) are also grammatical.

- (20) a. From the perspective of this liberal Democrat, I thought Kobach wasted a lot of time on the immigration issue which I view to be a peripheral issue at best
timothyburger.com/2004/11/why-kris-kobach-lost.html
- b. Most of these aren't at all funny to this observer, although I did find the suggestion that Hillary Clinton is an ACLU mole very amusing.
giroscope.blogspot.com/2007/04/blog-review-19-contrary.html
- c. It was intriguing for this reviewer that I, a Pisces, have a ray 1 soul and personality. I discovered much about myself, especially that my character ...
www.amazon.com/Who-You-Are-Why-Here/dp/0966108000
- d. Mommy₁ needs to have a drink before I₁ give you your bath.
- e. Should this reporter allow an old friend, who I have not seen in years, to come back into my life.

Non-3 person antecedence is also possible with 2 person imposters, as seen in:

- (21) a. Will Madam allow an old friend -- who you have perhaps forgotten even as to his name, to lay his respectful homage at your feet?
<http://www.cadytech.com/dumas/stories/anthony.php>
- b. If you₁ are sure of that, I can accompany the general₁ to the club.

However, while we pretty much also accept (21a), here and below it is important to note that some speakers are resistant to utilizing 2 person imposters as antecedents of 2 person pronouns preferring 3 person pronouns instead. Thus John Robert Ross (personal communication: 1/13/08) informs us: "I think that for me, second-person imposters are so much more formal than are first-person ones that they seem to like staying with coreferent 3rd-person proforms." We have encountered other speakers with similar judgments.

The only way to avoid the conclusion that imposters can antecede 1 person and 2 person pronominals would appear to be to deny that there *is* an antecedence connection

between *yours truly/this reporter, etc.* and the 1 person pronominal forms in (19) and (20) and between *madam/the general* and *you* in (21) and to claim more generally that imposters *never* enter into such antecedence relations with non-3 person forms. The common denotation would instead be taken as a special case of what has been called *accidental coreference*; see Lasnik (1976:12), Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993), Safir (2004:26,38,242), Kayne (2005:106,110-111,135), Fiengo and May (1994:6). Granted such a notion, it might be claimed that in e.g. (20a), *this liberal Democrat* and *I* are not coindexed, and that *this liberal Democrat* does not antecede *I*. Rather, they would be denotationally identical only because each can independently freely denote the speaker. And similarly for the other imposter/non-3 person pronominal cases.

Initial data suggests though that the view that *yours truly/this reporter, etc.*, and 1 person pronouns can jointly denote the speaker *independently of antecedence* is not tenable. Consider:

- (22) a. *Yours truly/This reporter RESPECTS me.
b. *I RESPECT yours truly/this reporter.

Here and in the following paragraphs, capitalization indicates contrastive stress. If *yours truly/this reporter* and 1 person pronouns could occur independently of each other and without any antecedence connection, we see nothing which would independently block such cases. If though *yours truly/this reporter* antecedes *my/me*, one can appeal to the same constraints on the possibility of such antecedence which block e.g. (23):

- (23) *I RESPECT me.

That is, if a direct object is anteceded by a subject of the same clause, the direct object *normally* cannot be a nonreflexive pronoun but must be a reflexive, a fact attributed to Condition B of the Binding Theory in the Principles and Parameters framework. The italicized hedge for this generalization links to the existence of fine cases like (24):

- (24) a. Yours truly/This reporter respects ME.
b. I respect YOURS TRULY/THIS REPORTER.⁸

We need not deal with the issue of why pronouns *with contrastive stress* escape the requirement of reflexivization in the environment, but (25a,) illustrates that they do independently of imposter structures.

- (25) a. I respect ME. (in response to: Who do you respect?)
b. I (contrastive stress) respect me. (in response to: Who respects you?)

That a parallelism between (24) and (25) is genuine is shown by the fact that neither case allows a sloppy reading when part of an antecedent for verb phrase ellipsis:

- (26) a. I respect ME and so does Greta.
 Strict: ‘Greta respects me’
 Sloppy: *‘Greta respects herself’
- b. I respect yours truly/this reporter and so does Greta.
 Strict: ‘Greta respects me’
 Sloppy: *‘Greta respects herself’.

We return to this property, which is general for imposters, in section 16.

But contrastive stress cannot occur both on a verb and on its object, which is why the verbs in (22b) and (23) are contrastively stressed. The bottom line then is that the (*Yours truly/This reporter*)/*me* pair in (22a, b) is subject to the same principle that the *I/me* pair is in (23), which can only reasonably involve a ban on a non-contrastive direct object when it is anteceded by a non-contrastive subject of the same clause. But this explanation presupposes that imposters like *yours truly* and *this reporter* can antecede 1 person forms.

Further arguments against the idea that imposters and non-3 person pronouns co-occurring in the same sentence need not be taken to instantiate antecedence (and are only related by accidental coreference) can potentially derive from any environment in which antecedence is arguably *required to exist independently of anything one says about imposters*.

Consider first confirmative tag questions. Imposters aside, the pronoun of a tag question must, as in (27a,b), match the phi-features of the subject of the main clause, strongly suggesting that the subject of the main clause is the antecedent for the tag question subject pronoun. Cases like (27c) where an imposter gives rise to a 1 person singular pronoun in a tag show that an imposter can antecede a 1 person singular pronoun.

- (27) a. My uncle can really play the saxophone, can’t he/*you/*I/*they?
 b. I can really play the saxophone, can’t I/*she/*you?
 c. This reporter/Daddy can really play the saxophone, can’t he/I?

In addition to the evidence from Condition B and tag questions, there is much stronger evidence for the conclusion that imposters can antecede non-3 person forms. This is represented initially by cases like (28):

- (28) a. PRO₁ to keep myself₁/himself₁ from getting sunburned,

Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion.

- b. Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion

PRO₁ to keep *myself₁/himself₁ from getting sunburned.

In (28a), either form of the reflexive in the adjunct is possible for us and many others (see survey results in (30) below). From this, we conclude that PRO, the antecedent of the reflexive object, can be either 1 or 3 person. Since the controller of PRO is the imposter DP, *Daddy*, (28a) shows that an imposter can antecede a PRO with a 1 person feature value. We return in section 11 to a precise account of how this is possible.

The conclusion that PRO in (28a) is actually anteceded by the imposter is supported by the uncontroversial fact that independently of imposters, obligatory control in purpose clauses obligatorily requires the sort of pronominal agreement with an antecedent enforced by agreement principles like (17), as illustrated in (29):

- (29) a. PRO₁ to avoid perjuring *himself₁/yourself₁/*themselves₁,
you₁ should tell the truth.
b. PRO₁ to avoid perjuring *himself₁/*yourself₁/themselves₁,
those officials should tell the truth.

That is, it is impossible to claim that in general PRO in this construction can have a feature makeup other than by pronominal agreement with a controller in the main clause. Therefore, (29a) must manifest such pronominal agreement with an antecedent. This renders appeal to accidental coreference impossible for the example in (28a).

We observe though that word order plays a role in the grammaticality of the 1 person variant of (28a), as illustrated by its minimal contrast with (28b). That is, a non-3 person reflexive anteceded by a PRO in turn anteceded by an imposter is often acceptable for us only if it *precedes* the imposter. A survey of thirty three NYU undergraduates in an introductory syntax course reinforces our claim that there is a difference between (28a) and (28b). These students had never studied imposters or pronominalization issues. The following survey was done by a show of hands. Parenthesized numbers indicate numbers of students.

- (30) a. To keep myself₁ from getting sunburned, Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion.
* (8) ? (10) OK (15)
b. To keep himself₁ from getting sunburned, Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion.
* (0) ? (3) OK (30)
c. Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion to keep *myself₁ from getting sunburned.
* (16) ? (11) OK (6)

- d. Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion to keep himself₁ from getting sunburned.

* (0) ? (0) OK (33)

The contrast between (30a) and (30b) reveals a general preference for third person singular pronoun agreement with an imposter. But the fact is that 15 people rated 1 person singular pronoun agreement as perfect, and 25 people rated it as either perfect or slightly unacceptable. The data in (30a) then show beyond doubt that 1 person singular pronoun agreement with an imposter is possible.

When the purpose clause follows the imposter, as in (30c), 1 person singular pronoun agreement is degraded. Only six people considered the example acceptable, and only 17 of 33 considered it either marginal or acceptable. This suggests that there is some sort of linear order effect, which one might state as:

- (31) If an imposter DP antecedes a non-3 person pronominal P, then the DP follows P.

Unfortunately, examples such as (19) and (20) already show that (31) is not accurate,⁹ and it misdescribes many other cases as well. We return to issues relating to (31) in section 6.

A paradigm similar to that in (28) is presented in (32). Instead of reflexives, the construction illustrated requires matching between the genitive pronoun occurring with *cool* and a clause mate subject:

- (32) a. Barbara₁ lost her₁/*your₁/*their₁/*my₁ cool.
 b. After losing her₁/*your₁/*their₁ cool, Barbara₁ apologized.
 c. After losing his₁/her₁/my₁ cool, this reporter₁ apologized.

We see no way in which the restriction illustrated in (32a) could be described without stating that the genitive pronominal must be anteceded by the subject. Given that, there is no way the 1 person form of (32c) could exist without recognizing the ability of a 1 person imposter to antecede a 1 person pronominal form. In this case, the 1 person imposter controls PRO, the subject of the *after* constituent, which in turn antecedes the visible 1 person pronoun.

The 1 person instance of cases like (33) are worse than the 1 person variants of (32c):

- (33) This reporter₁ lost his₁/her₁/*my₁ cool.

We believe two factors are involved. First, in our dialect (see section 4), antecedence by an imposter of a non-3 person pronominal form is greatly degraded if that form occurs in a local domain (e.g. if they are clause mates) of the imposter. Second, as (31) indicated, such antecedence is also degraded if the anteceded non-3 person pronominal occurs to the right of the imposter. But (33) evidently instantiates both of these negative factors.

The properties illustrated in (28a) for 1 person imposters hold of 2 person, imposters as well.

- (34) a. To make herself₁/yourself₁ more comfortable,
 madam₁ might wish to move to the table by the window.
 b. Madam₁ might wish to move to the table by the window,
 to make herself₁/*yourself₁ more comfortable

Such examples also represent a control structure, in which only *Madam* can be the controller of the invisible PRO subject of the initial adjunct. Despite that, we find that a 2 person reflexive in the adjunct is as grammatical as the 3 person one. But again, (34b) indicates that word order plays a role. Since each reflexive needs a matching local antecedent, it again follows that the invisible PRO subject can be non-3 (here 2) person. The facts then show that, like 1 person imposters, the form *Madam* has the possibility of anteceding non-3 person singular pronominal forms as well as 3 person ones.

Cases like those considered above for *yours truly/this reporter* and *Madam* show that *in different cases* an imposter such as *yours truly*, *this reporter*, or *Daddy* can antecede either 1 person or 3 person pronominals and that one like *Madam* can antecede either 2 person or 3 person forms. Such cases alone would be consistent with a claim that there are two distinct analyses of the relevant imposters, one determining one type of pronominal agreement, the other another. That is, one might conceive of a view in which imposters are syntactically ambiguous: some instances of imposters would be regular 3 person DPs, others would be either 1 person or 2 person.

But any such view immediately clashes with the fact, noted in section 1, that regardless of their links to pronominal elements, English imposters never determine anything but 3 person singular subject-verb agreement (recall (5) above).

Furthermore, a dual analysis view cannot in general be correct in the face of examples like the following (from Collins, Moody, and Postal (2008)):

- (35) a. PRO₁ to cover myself₁ in case of an investigation,
 yours truly₁/this reporter₁ is going to keep himself₁ out of the newspapers.
 b. PRO₁ to cover yourself₁ in case of an investigation,
 madam₁ should keep herself₁ out of the newspapers.

In such examples, the adjunct contains a controlled subject which itself antecedes a 1 person reflexive in the *yours truly* case, a 2 person reflexive in the *Madam* case. The controller is the main clause subject, *yours truly* in (35a), *Madam* in (35b). However,

these forms also antecede reflexive pronominals in their own clauses, these being 3 person forms. So an analysis where a single imposter, such as *this reporter*, can alternatively be analyzed as 1 person or 3 person, but not both, is impotent in the face of the fact that single instances of these imposters reveal the ability to determine antecedence of pronominal elements of distinct person ‘*simultaneously*’ in a single sentence.

Combined with the uniform determination by imposters of 3 person verbal agreement regardless of the person of any elements they antecede, cases like (35) indicate that a dual analysis of each imposter type to handle its antecedence possibilities is not viable.

We believe it evident at this point that there is no serious alternative but to recognize that imposters *enter into antecedence relations with non-3 person pronouns*. But this is of course a property which no ordinary 3 person DP manifests. Hence one can already conclude, contra the Notional Hypothesis, that whatever they are, imposters differ from regular 3 person DPs in ways which go beyond the mere fact of their having *non-3 person denotations*.

This last conclusion is supported by observations about Mandarin Chinese (MC). Wang (2007) observes that MC elements corresponding to English imposters, e.g. *laoshi* ‘teacher’ (1 person) and *furen* ‘Madam’ (2 person), can, unlike English imposters, never antecede 3 person pronominals. Relevant MC pronominals can only manifest 1 or 2 person pronominal agreement. This contrasts with the behavior of the same MC DPs when they have 3 person denotations, where any pronominals they antecede manifest 3 person pronominal agreement.

Given the semantic equivalence between corresponding MC and English phrases, this comparative fact requires a syntactic explanation. If the Notional Hypothesis were correct, and a 3 person DP could just refer (idiosyncratically) to the speaker/hearer in English, there would be no known reason such a semantic state of affairs could not hold in MC as well. That is, one would expect to find an MC form like e.g. *laoshi* designating the speaker could only antecede 3 person pronominals, entirely contrary to fact.

We take this to indicate that there is a syntactic contrast between MC and English in this respect. Regardless of what this might be, there is no possibility of such if both MC and English imposters are, as the Notional Hypothesis claims, simply syntactically 3 person DPs with non-3 person denotations.

4. Local Antecedence of Singular Reflexives

Given the fact that imposters can antecede either 3 person or non-3 person forms, one would expect that an imposter could antecede either a 3 person or non-3 person *reflexive*. This prediction is born out in the case of plural imposters as discussed in section 5.

Somewhat surprisingly, however, in our dialect a singular imposter cannot antecede a non-3 person reflexive, as (36) documents:

- (36) a. Daddy is enjoying himself/*myself
- b. Yours truly will only vote for himself/*myself
- c. This reporter sees himself/*myself as managing editor in the future.
- d. The baroness should take better care of herself/*yourself.

The antecedent of the reflexive in (36a) is the 1 person imposter *Daddy*, a clause mate of the reflexive object. However, even though (36) accurately represents the dialect of the authors, the internet provides numerous examples illustrating a different variant of English; see (37):

- (37) a. while yours truly treated myself to a few ice cold Miller Lites.
www.sportingnews.com/blog/terpfan76/tag/NASCAR
- b. This reporter sent myself to cover Bill Clinton's lecture at the Dorothy Pavilion...
www.louisepalanker.com/archive/
- c. This reviewer found myself frustrated at times with the various storylines...
www.amazon.com/.../A1NEYE93FWXT36?ie=UTF8&display=public&sort_by=MostRecentReview&page=4
- d. the present writer set myself to consider the chapter from the historical context, ...
ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110000046887

While we only accept versions of these examples where *himself* or *herself* replaces *myself*, the number and diversity of the cases in (37) and their mostly standard properties exclude taking them to be errors, language play, or nonnative output. The existence of these cases provides a further very sharp disconfirmation of the Notional Hypothesis and shows in a direct way the need to assign 1 person imposters a grammatical analysis including 1 person grammatical properties. Under the Notional Hypothesis, it would be impossible for any imposter to antecede a 1 person reflexive (since the relevant imposter would only have 3 person feature values).

The fact that one dialect manifests these data and another does not, combined with the fact that in both dialects the imposters cited denote the speaker, shows, further, that there is no applicable theory under which reflexive antecedence is directly determined by meaning.

Unfortunately, we have not encountered an *informant* for the dialect (37) represents. However, the simplest assumption is that the structure of the 1 person imposters *yours truly/this reporter*, etc., in the dialect illustrated is the same as in ours, the contrast hinging on partially different constraints on the ability of 1 person imposters to antecede a *local 1 person singular* reflexive.

All the cases like (37) are such that the 1 person reflexives *follow* their imposter antecedent. Possibly then, the difference between our dialect and the one illustrated in (37) hinges at least in part on the latter having a weaker (perhaps null) word order constraint (31) on antecedence of non-3 person pronominals/reflexives by imposters than our dialect does.

Favoring such a view is the fact that despite our total rejection of forms like (37), we find analogs where the non-3 person reflexive is a subconstituent of a constituent which is fronted to the left of the imposter antecedent to be more acceptable (although not perfect for one author):

- (38) a. This reporter/Daddy is not proud of himself/*myself
 b. How proud of himself/?myself do you think that this reporter/Daddy could possibly be under such circumstances?
 c. Proud of himself/?myself is what this reporter/Daddy is right now.

However, word order cannot be the only factor determining possible antecedence of 1 person forms. In certain types of long distance reflexives, 1 person singulars seem much better than local reflexives:

- (39) a. This reporter believes no one but himself/?myself capable of solving that problem.
 b. Daddy doesn't consider Captain Marvel to be much different than himself/?myself.

The data in (37) reinforce our early claim that any appeal to accidental coreference is ultimately irrelevant to issues of whether imposters could antecede non-3 person pronominals. For it is uncontroversial that reflexives require antecedents and that accidental coreference is irrelevant for them. And the conclusion is reinforced by the fronted DP examples in (38) and the long-distance reflexive examples in (39) which are (nearly)

acceptable even in our dialect and have the virtue of not depending on unidentified informants.

5. Plural and Conjoined Imposters

Previous examples cited as arguing that imposters enter into antecedence relations with non-3 person forms have in general involved singular imposters and singular pronominals. It turns out that plural imposters as well as coordinate structures with singular imposter conjuncts strongly support the claim that imposters can antecede, or at least participate in the antecedence of, non-3 person pronominal forms. Consider first the following data, noting that all *plural* imposter examples in this section must be thought of *as part of joint correspondence*:

- (40)
- a. In this reply, we₁ attempt to defend ourselves₁/*themselves₁ against the scurrilous charges which have been made.
 - b. In this reply, the present authors₁ (= the writers of the reply) attempt to defend ourselves₁/themselves₁ against the scurrilous charges which have been made.
 - c. In this reply, the authors₁ (≠ the writers of the reply) attempt to defend *ourselves₁/themselves₁ against the scurrilous charges which have been made.
 - d. In this reply, the author₁ (≠ the writer of the reply) and his assistant₂ attempt to defend *ourselves_{1,2}/themselves_{1,2} against the scurrilous charges which have been made.
 - e. In this reply, the author₁ (= the writer of the reply) and his assistant₂ attempt to defend ourselves_{1,2}/themselves_{1,2} against the scurrilous charges which have been made.

It emerges from these data that a plural imposter has antecedence possibilities distinct both from those of a 1 person plural pronoun and from an ordinary 3 person plural DP. Similarly a conjunction of a 1 person singular imposter and a regular 3 person DP has antecedence possibilities distinct from those of a conjunction of exclusively non-imposter 3 person DPs.

A similar distinction between imposters and ordinary 3 person DPs is seen in conjunctions with 2 person pronouns:

- (41)
- a. The author(s) (= the writer(s)) and you must defend ourselves/*themselves/*yourselves against these scurrilous charges.
 - b. The author(s) (≠ the writer(s)) and you must defend *ourselves/*themselves/yourselves against these scurrilous charges.

Here the 1 person imposter usage of *the author(s)* conjoins with a 2 person pronoun to determine only an antecedent of a 1 person reflexive, while the normal (non-imposter) usage of *the author(s)* combines with such a pronoun only to yield an antecedent of a 2 person reflexive.

While the data in (40) and (41) represent our own judgments, the internet provides multiple instances of coordinate structures with an imposter as one conjunct anteceding non-3 person plural reflexives:

- (42) a. So to continue, on the 10th December John Ambler and yours truly presented ourselves at the China Air check in counter of Singapore airport ...
users.tinyworld.co.uk/paul.a.jones/journal/stage14/stage14.htm - 40k
- b. But it might be time for pre-emptive action to protect the likes of Bridget Jones - and this reporter - from ourselves.
(<http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/gyms-are-cleaning-out-the-jerks-with-a-snatch/2007/03/15/1173722650796.html?page=2>)
- c. Yet because of that volume, this reviewer-and others-allowed ourselves to anticipate another transcendent overview, again of biblical dimensions, ...
([links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00218723\(199812\)85%3A3%3C1041%3APOFAIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00218723(199812)85%3A3%3C1041%3APOFAIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3))

These cases, all perfect for the present authors as well, show that local reflexives can have as their antecedents coordinate structures containing imposters.

That imposters can antecede or partially determine the antecedence of non-3 person pronominals, a state of affairs contradicting the Notional Hypothesis, is shown even more strongly by plural and conjoined cases than by singular ones. First, unlike singular imposters, plural and conjoined ones are free of the constraint holding in our dialect barring a singular imposter from locally anteceding a non-3 person reflexive (see section 3 above).

Second, antecedence of plural pronominals by imposters or DPs containing imposter conjuncts seems not to be subject to the word order constraint touched on several times earlier. That is, we see no contrast between pairs like (43a, b) and (44a, b) (compare these to (30) in section 3):

- (43) a. Without committing ourselves to any course of action, Justine and this reporter discussed the matter at length.
- b. Justine and this reporter discussed the matter at length without committing ourselves to any course of action.

- (44) a. Before exposing ourselves to that kind of questioning, the present authors will need assurances from the prosecutor.
- b. The present authors will need assurances from the prosecutor before exposing ourselves to that kind of questioning.

The data in this section indicate that in the same environments where a single imposter DP can antecede non-3 person pronominal forms, plural imposters have the same property:

- (45) a. In order PRO₁ to protect myself₁, the present author₁ (= the writer) plans to keep herself₁ out of sight.
- b. In order PRO₁to protect ourselves₁, the present authors₁ (= the writers) plan to keep themselves₁ out of sight.
- c. In order PRO₁to protect ourselves₁, [the present author (= the writer) and you]₁ should keep ourselves₁ out of sight.

These data support the conclusion that what we have called plural imposters are in fact imposters in the same sense as singular forms like *yours truly*, *this reporter*, *madam*, *my lady*, etc. And like singular imposters, their antecedence behavior is incompatible with the implications of the Notional Hypothesis.

6. C-Command and Linear Order

Section 3 advanced the following constraint on pronouns with imposter antecedents:

- (46) Linear Order Constraint on Imposter Antecedence
- If an imposter, DP₁, antecedes a non-3 person pronominal P,
then DP₁ must follow P.

Since c-command correlates with linear order in a right branching structure (see Kayne 1994), it is worthwhile asking whether (46) could be replaced by:

- (47) C-Command Constraint on Imposter Antecedence
- If an imposter DP is the antecedent of a non-3 person pronominal P,
then the imposter DP must not c-command P.

This constraint on imposters is proposed in Baker (to appear): “using a third person DP to refer to the speaker should only prevent a first person pronoun in the same sentence from referring to the speaker when the third person DP c-commands the pronoun...”.

Consider again the minimal pair:

- (48) a. To keep myself₁ from getting sunburned, Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion.
- b. *Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion to keep myself₁ from getting sunburned.

Since *Daddy* clearly does not c-command *myself* in (48a), the structure satisfies the c-command constraint. If *Daddy* c-commands *myself* in (48b), the structure would be ruled out by (47). The linear order constraint predicts the difference between (48a) and (48b) as well.

The issue of whether imposter antecedence obeys a linear order constraint or a c-command constraint or conceivably both is complex and murky, and we have not arrived at a satisfactory conclusion. This section outlines a few of the relevant factual considerations that bear on the issue.

Consider first examples involving an embedded clause 1 person pronoun bound by the subject of a matrix clause

- (49) a. Daddy feels that he needs/??I need a break.
 b. Daddy feels that Mommy has been unfair to him/?me.
 c. This reporter has said that he/??I will only speak the truth.
 d. This reporter has said that they will find out nothing about him/?me.

While (49a-d) are all somewhat degraded with a 1 person pronoun, the more embedded the 1 person pronoun is the better the result. Categorical c-command or linear order constraints would though predict these to all be unacceptable *to the same degree*.¹⁰ Baker's (to appear) approach to similar sentences based on appeal to the strong crossover condition wrongly predicts these sentences to be much worse than they are, given the severity of *standard* strong cross-over violations.

While the singular pronoun data above might be consistent with some form of linear order or c-command constraint, plural pronoun data is inconsistent with both. For example, plural 1 person reflexives take preceding imposter antecedents unproblematically as shown in the previous section. Similar facts can be adduced for non-reflexive plurals as in (50a,b):

- (50) a. The present writers₁ think that they₁/we₁ have been misrepresented.
 b. [Mommy and Daddy]₁ said that they₁/we₁ would be back in an hour.

Furthermore, plural pronouns with singular partial antecedents (See section 11 for a way to view this type of plural pronoun) also don't show any linear order or c-command effect:

- (51) a. Daddy₁ thinks that we_{1,2} are going to be late.
 b. This reporter₁ thinks that we_{1,2} should have won the prize.

Curiously, for reasons that we do not understand, such overlapping reference is completely impossible with 3 person pronominal agreement:

- (52) a. *Daddy₁ thinks that they_{1,2} are going to be late.

- b. *This reporter₁ thinks that they_{1,2} should have won the prize.

This impossibility represents another striking difference between imposters and ordinary 3 person DPs since (52a, b) are fine if the subjects denote people other than the speaker.

Baker (to appear, Chapter 4: 14) gives the following data to support a c-command based view of imposter antecedence:

- (53) a. Because Daddy_k forgot something at the office, he_k/?I_k have to go back there.
 b. Daddy_k has to go back to the office because he_k/*I_k forgot something there.

Baker claims that the 1 person pronoun in (53b) is bad because it is c-commanded by *Daddy*, whereas the 1 person pronoun in (53a) is ‘more or less possible’ because there is no c-command. But, significantly, Baker does not claim (53a) is perfect, and for us, both sentences with the 1 person pronoun in fact have an equal status (slightly marginal “?”).

Another pair of sentences Baker gives in favor of the c-command constraint is:

- (54) a. This old picture of Daddy_k shows him_k/?me_k with long hair.
 b. Daddy_k finally showed his_k/*my_k boss the new contract today.

For some speakers (one of the authors, but definitely not the other), the contrast in these sentences seems genuine and points to the fact that c-command can make a difference. But c-command alone would leave unexplained the following data. In all cases, a 1 person pronoun is unacceptable even in the (a) examples of (55)-(57), where the imposter is a possessor and hence does not c-command the 1 person pronoun:

- (55) a. Daddy's cousin adores him/*me
 b. Daddy adores his/*my cousin
 (56) a. The present writer's success frightens him/*me
 b. The present writer frightens his/*my audience
 (57) a. This reporter's mother loves him/*me
 b. This reporter loves his/*my mother

As can be seen from the discussion in this section, and that in section 3, the conditions on the use of 1 and 2 person pronouns with imposter antecedents are complex and the data is murky. Linear order, c-command, and clausematiness are relevant. Furthermore, there appears to be considerable inter-speaker variation. We leave study of these factors to future research.

7. Descriptive Summary of Characteristics of Imposter Antecedence

The preceding sections have presented data arguing that imposters have grammatical antecedence properties which show that (i) they contrast with standard 3 person DPs and (ii) the relevant differences indicate that 1 person imposters can participate in the antecedence of 1 person pronominal forms and that 2 person imposters can participate in the antecedence of 2 person pronominal forms. These properties coexist with the invariant fact that all imposters determine only 3 person verbal agreement.

We take the evidence just mentioned to show that the Notional Hypothesis of section 2 is untenable. The reasoning is as follows. While the first class of data we took to show that imposters can antecede non-3 person forms, that like e.g. (19), (20) and (21), might be addressed via appeal to accidental coreference if there is such a thing, this is not possible for many other examples. These involved tag-questions (27), obligatory control like (28), (34) and (35), reflexive antecedence by plurals and coordinate structures as in (40) and (for certain dialects) clause mate antecedence of singular reflexives like (37), and long-distance reflexives (39). The defining characteristic of these three data classes is that each uncontroversially involves constructions which instantiate obligatory antecedence, rendering issues of accidental coreference entirely moot.

Moreover, any view which, contrary to the principle in (17), takes pronominal antecedence to be a nongrammatical phenomenon of semantic matching is also untenable. To be concrete, suppose that the following principle were responsible for determining the phi-features of pronouns:

(58) Phi-features introduce presuppositions constraining the semantic value of pronouns.

For example, *you* has a 2 person feature value, introducing the presupposition that its referent is the addressee.

Were this view correct, a 1 person imposter would have exactly the antecedence properties of a 1 person pronoun. Both refer to the speaker and would, according to (58), antecede exactly the same types of pronouns. 1 person imposters could thus never antecede 3 person forms at all, since 1 person pronouns can never antecede 3 person pronouns (**I₁ thought he₁ won.*). But imposters can clearly antecede third person pronouns (*Daddy is enjoying himself*).

We summarize each position below, and give the relevant counter-examples to it:

(59) Notional Hypothesis + Pronominal Agreement Condition

Prediction: Imposters only antecede 3 person forms.

Counter-examples: (27) (tag-questions), (28) (obligatory control), (40) (plurals)
(pronoun anteceded is 1 person)

(60) Notional Hypothesis + Possibility of Accidental Coreference

Prediction: Imposters could corefer (accidentally) with 1 person forms;
3 person forms would also be possible given Pronominal Agreement Principle.

Counter-examples: (27) (tag-questions), (28) (obligatory control), (40) (plurals)
(no accidental coreference analysis possible in contexts where there is obligatory antecedence of a non-3 person pronoun)

(61) Notional Hypothesis + semantic matching of phi-features

Prediction: 1 person imposters only antecede 1 person forms;
2 person imposters only antecede 2 person forms.

Counter-examples: (18), (27) (tag-questions), (28) (obligatory control),
(36) (reflexives) (pronoun anteceded is 3 person)


So no constellation of hypotheses involving the Notional Hypothesis is workable, and nothing like the semantic matching condition is either. Rather, we argue in the next section that the preferred theory involves a complex structure for imposters.

8. The Structure of Imposters

The discussion so far indicates that the structure of imposters has to be rich enough to allow either 1 or 2 person pronominal agreement *and* 3 person pronominal agreement simultaneously (see e.g. 35 above). Our view of imposters has a number of foundational assumptions. The *first* of these is that imposters of the type we have dealt with so far ultimately involve three distinct DPs (see section 18 for another type.). So the imposter *Nixon* in (62) would overall manifest the distinct elements in (63) (linear order of the core and secondary DPs is not relevant):

(62) You won't have *Nixon* to kick around anymore.

(63) Schematic Structure for Imposters¹¹



In (63), there is a DP which represents the *notional core*, which in this case is 1 person singular. That is, this DP represents the denotational meaning of the whole. By convention,

we will symbolize a 1 person singular core as ME. Second, there is a *secondary* DP, here *Nixon*. Third, there is the DP which represents the combination of the core and secondary DPs. We call this dominating DP the *shell*, analogizing from our usage of the same term in Collins, Moody and Postal (2008).

We proceed from the assumption that the relation between the secondary DP and the notional DP bears a close resemblance to that holding between sequences of DPs where the second is in *apposition to the first*. Such a relation is illustrated by the pairings of imposters in (64) and appositives in (65).

- (64) a. I, Nixon, am going to get even.
 b. We, the present writers, disagree with the following points.
 c. We, the undersigned, propose a number of improvements.
 d. I, yours truly, am here to discuss witchcraft and money spells.
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/364234/witchcraft_and_money_spells.html
 e. I, your faithful correspondent, should write more often.
 f. You, Madam, should not push us around.
- (65) a. Nixon is going to get even.
 b. The present writers disagree with the following points.
 c. The undersigned propose a number of improvements.
 d. Yours truly is here to discuss witchcraft and money spells.
 e. Your faithful correspondent should write more often.
 f. Madam should not push us around.

First, the appositive DP in (64b) functions as a predicate of the pronoun (see Doron 1992, 1994). So using the appositive *we, the present writers* implies that we are the present writers. A similar relation holds between the secondary DP of an imposter and the core.¹² For example, the use of *the present writers* as an imposter (65b) implies that we are the present writers.

Another parallelism is that both imposters and appositives involve speaker oriented content (see Potts 2005). So note that the speaker-oriented reading of imposters and appositives precludes a contradictory reading of the complement in cases like (66):

- (66) a. Rodney believes this Episcopalian is not an Episcopalian.
 b. Rodney believes that I, an Episcopalian, am not an Episcopalian.

The only way to interpret (66a, b) is that the speaker is characterizing him or herself as an Episcopalian and stating that Rodney has a false (but consistent) belief about the religious affiliation.

However, the relation between appositives and imposters is not so simple and we need to say here more about the semantics of both. For it turns out that although imposters and appositives are closely related, they are not equivalent in meaning.

First, appositives give rise to what Potts (2005: 12) calls an *anti-backgrounding* requirement (see also Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000: 351). This requirement is illustrated in (67b).

- (67) a. I survived cancer.
 b. #When reporters interview me, a cancer survivor,
 I often talk about the disease.
 b'. When reporters interview this cancer survivor, I often talk about the disease.

The anti-backgrounding effect illustrated in (67b) is not found with imposters as illustrated in (67b').

Second, a 1 person imposter gives rise to a presupposition that the speaker is described by the secondary DP. This is why, we suggest, it is quite infelicitous for a mother to call up e.g. an airline and begin by saying something like: 'This mother would like information about flights to Istanbul'. 'I, a mother, would like information about flights to Istanbul' is also inappropriate but in a different way. In the latter case, the listener can only wonder why the speaker has provided what seems to be useless and irrelevant information. But in the former, the use of *this mother* leads to presupposition failure since the fact that the speaker is a mother is not known by the addressee. As noted in Potts 2005 and Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000, appositives do not give rise to presuppositions; rather they engender secondary assertions.

Despite these differences between imposters and appositives, we will assume that they are partially parallel semantically, and hence have some structure in common.


If the syntactic relation between the notional core DP ME and the secondary DP *Nixon* in (65a) is similar to that found in an appositive, why do overt appositives manifest the pattern of subject verb agreement shown in (68a), notably different from the imposter pattern in (68b):

- (68) a. I, Nixon, am/*is unhappy.
 b. Nixon is/*am unhappy.

One possible account of the subject-verb agreement in (68a) is to simply deny that *I, Nixon* forms a single DP. The appositive *Nixon* would be an external phrase following the unambiguously 1 person subject, which regularly determines the 1 person subject-verb agreement. But Potts 2005 and De Vries 2006 offer compelling arguments against this type of analysis. So we take the sequence *I, Nixon* to be a constituent, which we label XP. An account of the agreement facts in (68a) (not given here) must ensure that the phi-feature values of the outer XP are identical to those of the core DP *I*; see (69):

(69) Schematic Structure for appositives

phi-features of XP_{App} = phi-features of core DP.




What is the nature of the outer XP in (69)? It is beyond this paper to address this issue in a serious way. De Vries (2006) claims that modification involving appositive relatives involves a coordinate structure. So in our example, the core would be in Spec of CoP (Coordination Phrase) and the secondary DP would be the complement of CoP. Potts (2005) adopts an analysis where the secondary DP is adjoined to the core DP. In this case, the XP_{App} would be a DP. Yet a third possibility is that XP is a kind of PredP (see Bowers 1993 and Den Dikken 2006 on PredP). This latter possibility would give a structural form to Doron's (1992, 1994) insight that appositives are predicative. Whatever the exact structural category of XP is in the case of appositives, we assume that the same XP category plays a role in the syntax of imposters.

We need to account for the agreement facts involving imposters in (68b). Specifically, it needs to be indicated why the shell DP of an imposter is always 3 person, and singular or plural depending on whether the core DP is. The idea we pursue is that in some way the shell DP will inherit the person feature value of the secondary DP and the number value as well, since that number value will match that of the core DP in a well-formed predication:

- (70) a. I am the doctor/*doctors.
 b. I, the doctor/*doctors,
 c. We are the doctors/*doctor

- d. We, the doctors/*doctor

We suggest that these matchings depend on the fact that in imposter DPs, the secondary DP is promoted syntactically into a position higher than the core. That is, it raises out of its containing XP to a position where it determines (indirectly) subject-verb agreement. More precisely, in a structure like (71), the core DP component of the XP raises to the specifier of the shell DP position (see Den Dikken, 2006: 184 on instances of what he calls *predicate inversion* in English, which are structurally parallel to the analysis in (71)):



We then assume that the shell D agrees with its specifier (via Spec-Head Agreement), which in this case is the DP *Nixon*. The shell D becomes 3 person singular by virtue of agreement with the shell Specifier *Nixon*. Since the shell DP is headed by the D, the shell DP is also 3 person singular.¹³ The phonologically empty D of the shell DP is semantically empty as well, in accord with our broader view that imposter shells make no semantic contribution.

As becomes clearer in the next section, we assume that XP as a unit moves into the imposter shell (the semantically vacuous outer DP). This assumption is closely related to the assumption about camouflage structures in Collins, Moody and Postal (2008).

One invariable feature of imposters which does not follow from anything so far is that their core DPs can never be overt:

- (72) a. Nixon (*me/*I/*of me) is unhappy about that.
 b. The present authors (*us/*we/*of us) are unhappy about that.
 c. Is the general (*you/*of you) unhappy about that?

This state of affairs clearly contrasts with the predicate inversion structure studied in Den Dikken (2006) and illustrated by the English cases:¹⁴

- (73) a. My idiot of a brother.

- b. *My idiot a brother
- c. *My idiot.

Here, the partial analog of our core DP, *brother*, is obligatorily *present* and associated with a preposition. Unfortunately, the contrast between (72) and (73) does not follow from any previous assumptions. So we have no present alternative to stipulating (74):

(74) The core DP of an imposter is obligatorily null.

To supplement (74), we can only note that constructions in which definite pronouns, and all of our core DPs are such, can or must be null are common in the world's languages, English included:

- (75)
- a. I talked to him about (his) constantly contradicting himself.
 - b. Please (*you) try to control yourself.
 - c. Not (*me/*for me) to praise myself, but I am awfully cute, no?
 - d. (Your) deluding yourself amounts to (your) ruining your chances.

We take this to indicate that while it is an ad hoc fact about imposters so far that their core DPs are unpronounced, that property does not render these DPs beyond well-attested features of (some) pronominal DPs.

We end this section by discussing one final difference between appositives and imposters. The appositive DP can be either definite or indefinite:

- (76)
- a. I, the doctor on duty, am overworked.
 - b. I, a doctor/someone who respects the family, am overworked.

However, English imposters normally have the form of definite DPs, e.g., *the present author*, *Nixon*, *the undersigned*, *Daddy*, *your Daddy*, *Madam*, *the general*, etc. So indefinite DPs cannot in general be used by a speaker for self-reference or to denote the intended addressee(s):

- (77)
- a. A/Some linguist does not know the answer to that question.
 - b. Does some lady/a distinguished general need a room for the night?

The phrases *A linguist* and *Some linguist* in (77a) cannot be interpreted as denoting the speaker nor can *some lady*, *a distinguished general* be interpreted in (77b) as denoting the addressee. Expectably then, such phrases never satisfy either 1 or 2 person imposter antecedence diagnostics:

- (78)
- a. *To protect myself against the sun, some American will put on suntan lotion.
 - b. *Some linguist and Barbara embarrassed ourselves at the party.
 - c. *Some linguist and Barbara embarrassed yourselves at the party.

So the following generalization appears to hold for English¹⁵:

(79) No English imposter has the form of an indefinite DP.¹⁶

Generalization (79) is surprising, since given the analysis in (71) one might expect indefinite predicative DPs to be able to raise to the specifier of the DP shell. But we have little to say at this point as to the reason why the secondary DPs in imposters are systematically definite.

We briefly discuss the status of *this reporter* as an imposter. *This reporter* is a definite DP, and so does not violate generalization (79). However, it does not correspond directly to any appositive or to any subject/predicate clause:

- (80) a. I, a reporter, will not reveal my sources.
 b. I am a reporter.
 c. I, the reporter for this case, will not reveal my sources.
 d. I am the reporter for this case.
 e. This reporter will not reveal his sources.
 f. *I, this reporter, will not reveal his sources.
 g. *I am this reporter.



Given the ungrammaticality of (80f) and (80g), there does not appear to be any source for the imposter *this reporter*, given the analysis in (71).

While we cannot offer a convincing analysis of this paradigm, we speculate that *this* in *this reporter* is a morphological reduction of an instance of the definite article in the presence of core pronoun *ME*. Furthermore, we suggest that the analysis of *this* in *this reporter* is different from the analysis of the regular demonstrative *this* in phrases such as *this cat* or *this chair*. In the latter case, it is plausible that the demonstrative *this* is a morphological reduction of the combination of the definite article and a locative such as *here*, so that *this cat* would derive from something like *the cat here*.¹⁷

9. External Origin of the Core DP

The account of imposter structure given in the previous section leaves out an important aspect of the construction without which it would be impossible to account for the ambivalent pronominal agreement that imposters give rise to. We propose that the core DP (modified by the secondary DP) in a structure like (71) originates external to the shell DP and moves into it. The predicate inversion we have proposed takes place after movement into the shell DP. Schematically, this is shown in (81):

(81) External Origin Hypothesis

- a. $[_{DP} D \ [_{XP} ME, Nixon]] \quad \dots \quad [_{XP} ME, Nixon]$

 (movement of core into shell)
- b. $[_{DP} Nixon \ [_{D'} D \ [_{XP} ME, <Nixon>]] \quad \dots \quad <[_{XP} ME, Nixon]>$

 (predicate inversion)

The External Origin Hypothesis functions *inter alia* to address an obvious inadequacy of a structure like (71) alone. Since the core notional DP in (71) is dominated by the shell, it is unclear how that DP could ever play a role in various obligatory antecedence relations such as tag-questions, obligatory control, binding of local and long distance reflexives. In addition, the External Origin Hypothesis plays a crucial role in the account of how the person feature values of a coordinate structure are determined (see section 13).

For example, consider the fact that plural imposters can antecede 1 person plural reflexive pronouns:

- (82) The present authors₁ attempt to defend ourselves₁.

One widely cited condition governing the distribution of reflexive pronouns is Condition A of the Principle and Parameters Binding Theory:¹⁸ This states that a reflexive must be bound (c-commanded and coindexed with an antecedent) in its local domain. In (71) the core notional DP, dominated by the shell, would, according to Condition A, then wrongly never be able to antecede a reflexive external to that shell. A similar problem arose in the analysis of camouflage constructions in Collins, Moody and Postal (2008). The External Origin Hypothesis deals with this issue by taking the notional DP to have an external origin compatible with the requirements of Condition A for cases like (82).

Consider (82) in more detail. (81) sanctions a structural representation where the notional core DP, WE, is external to the shell. We assume that the secondary DP and the core DP together form an XP constituent (see (71)) which initially occupies a position external to the shell. Given this assumption, the overall analysis of (82) is as in (83):

- (83) a. [DP₁ D] ... [XP [DP₂ WE] [DP₃ the present authors]] ... ourselves
(Condition A satisfied with WE anteceding *ourselves*)
b. [DP₁ D [XP [DP₂ WE] [DP₃ the present authors]]] ... <XP> ... ourselves

Since the XP [_{XP} [_{DP2} WE] [_{DP3} the present authors]] in (83a) is external to the shell, it is in a position to antecede the reflexive, giving rise to 1 person plural pronominal agreement. Of

course, the predicate inversion described in (71) takes place after the imposter core has raised into the shell.

Hypothesis (81) means that *every position in which an imposter can occur*, which is essentially every DP position, subject, direct object, object of a preposition, conjunct, possessor, etc., must represent a rich enough structure to subsume at least two DP positions, the position of origination of the core DP (the *theta-position*, in Principles and Parameters terminology) and the terminus position, that of the shell DP (*the Case position*, in Principles and Parameters terminology). For instance, consider a subject imposter case like e.g. (84):

(84) The present authors disagree with that claim.

The most straightforward proposal about the theta position of the core DP WE of (84) in the Principles and Parameters/Minimalism framework is that it originates in Spec VP and moves into the complement of the shell DP, which occupies Spec IP, that being the Case position. We need not pursue this suggestion for present purposes.

Hypothesis (81) raises in general the problem of the c-command condition on movement, since internal to the shell, ME does not c-command its initial occurrence (trace/copy). Since a similar problem arose in the analysis of camouflage cases, we refer the reader to Collins, Moody and Postal (2008) for relevant remarks.

10. Antecedence: Some Theoretical Considerations

While the preceding discussion has leaned heavily on a notion of antecedence, we have given no theoretical account of that relation beyond that implicit in (17). But providing such becomes critical in what follows, where we wish to advance from the largely descriptive content of the discussion so far to a level of theoretical explication.

Traditional grammar of course appealed to a notion *antecedent* relating particular pronominal forms to certain others:

(85) Curme (1931: 557)

“A pronoun as a mere substitute for a noun agrees with its antecedent in gender, number, and person wherever there is a distinct form to indicate these conceptions.”

While modern work informally utilizes such a notion as well (see e.g. Chomsky 1980: 43; 1995: 79); Safir (2004: 16, 7-72), it seems in general not to play an elaborated theoretical role, Higginbotham (1983) being a notable exception.¹⁹ In Principles and Parameters work, a certain part of the domain covered by the traditional notion of *antecedent* is dealt with in terms of two principle notions: *coindexing* and appeal to *c-command* to define a notion of

binding. There is though no easy correspondence between these ideas and the unformalized traditional idea of antecedent.

First, coindexing yields a *symmetric, reflexive* relation between DPs, whereas despite its unclarity, the traditional notion of antecedent is clearly *asymmetric*. Second, the antecedence relation holds in cases where there is no binding, due to lack of c-command, as illustrated in (86):

(86) Lucille₁ ('s mother) got dressed and then she₁ started drinking.

While *Lucille* is the antecedent of *she* in (86), *Lucille* does not c-command *she*.

Partially different points are seen in:

- (87) a. An associate of Lucille's₁ was worried about her₁.
 b. It was Lucille₁ that an associate of hers₁ was worried about.
 c. It was her₁ that an associate of Lucille's₁ was worried about.
 d. *She₁ was worried about an associate of Lucille's₁.
 e. Lucille₁, I am sure she*_{1/ok2} will never criticize, although I can criticize her_{1/2}.

In antecedence terms, one would take *Lucille* to antecede *her* in all of (87a, b, c). But in neither (87a, c) does *Lucille* technically bind *her*. Moreover, while in the actual string of words, in (87b) *Lucille* does c-command *hers*, in the otherwise parallel (87c), *her* actually asymmetrically c-commands *Lucille's*, as in the ungrammatical (87d). And finally, in the actual string of words in (87e), *Lucille* c-commands *she* and hence if coindexed with it, binds it, but cannot antecede it, a fact known as the *strong crossover phenomenon*.

So while *antecedence*, unlike *binding*, is an asymmetric relation between DPs, it is also a more broadly applicable notion. Moreover, we are aware of no way to reconstruct it in terms of symmetrical coindexing. That is, it has not been shown that *antecedence* can be treated as a *defined* term in any standard framework based on phrase structure tree and coindexing notions.

The latter conclusion was in effect drawn some time ago by Higginbotham:

(88) Higginbotham (1983: 401)

"I have noted that the role of numerical indexing of syntactic structures is to indicate the *antecedence* relation. The numerals themselves are a mere typographical means of expressing this relation. The role of indexing is unchanged in the more elaborate binding theory of (13). Evidently, however, numerical indexing of structures loses information in comparison with a direct assignment of antecedence, because indexing abstracts both from the particular choice of antecedents giving rise to the indexed structure, and from the direction in which the

relation was assigned. Let us represent the assignment of the anaphor-antecedent relation to two positions in a syntactic structure by linking those positions with a headed arrow, whose head points to the antecedent.”

We adopt for purposes of this article the explicit view that antecedence involves a further primitive relation between (DP) nodes on a par with traditional relations like *daughter of* and *linearly precede*. It is though arguably possible to avoid recognizing such a primitive and to treat antecedence as a defined relation in the framework of Johnson and Postal 1980.²⁰

We add that the present paper offers no arguments positive or negative as to the existence of co-indexing in grammar. That issue is orthogonal to our central claim that capturing pronominal agreement with imposters requires a notion of antecedent independent of the symmetrical co-indexing relation. Our claim is that regardless of what one says about co-indexing, it simply does not supply a rich enough specification of pronominalization structures to account for the facts in this paper. We return to this assertion in the conclusion.

So the foundational assumptions of the present paper about *antecedence* are these. First, we posit a relation between (DP) nodes called *antecede*, treated as a primitive. Second, more controversially, we propose that if *c* is a nonexpletive definite pronominal form then *c* has an antecedent. In standard cases the antecedent of *c* is in the same sentence as *c* (*Laurence₁ likes himself₁*). In others the antecedent is in a different sentence (*Laurence₁ just left. He₁ didn't say why.*); see Kayne, 2005: 111 for a related assumption. a

Third, we assume the antecedent relation is *asymmetric*, so that there is no mutual antecedence and no node antecedes itself. Fourth, we assume that antecede is *transitive* (see Higginbotham, 1983: 406). The transitivity of antecede leads us, however, to define an intransitive subsidiary notion *immediately antecede*, as follows:

- (89) Node *a* *immediately antecedes* *b* if and only if *a* antecedes *b* and there is no *c* such that *a* antecedes *c* and *c* antecedes *b*.

We also define the relation *ultimate antecedent*, as follows:

- (90) Node *a* is the *ultimate antecedent of* *b* if and only if *a* antecedes *b* and there is no *c* which antecedes *a*.

It is important to say a little bit about the relationship between our notion of antecedence and semantic interpretation. We assume the following connection:

- (91) Antecedence-Variable Condition

In determining the interpretation of a sentence *S* containing two distinct elements *DP₁* and *DP₂*, *DP₁* and *DP₂* can map to the same variable only if they are antecedent linked.

Consider the following example:

- (92) a. Every boy loves his mother.
 b. For every x such that x is a boy, x loves x 's mother.

A reasonable logical form for (92a) is (92b). Since *every boy* must then map to x , and *his* must map to x to obtain that representation, (91) requires that these DPs be antecedent-linked for that interpretation to obtain.

We do not adopt anything like the converse of (91), which could not be true for many cases. Examples include (93a, b):

- (93) a. Willard behaved himself/*herself/*myself.
 b. There is a problem, isn't there/*it/*them.

In (93a), the inherent reflexive *himself* maps to no variable at all, and the same is true of the tag expletive *there* in (93b). But the agreement facts leave no alternative to taking these forms to be anteceded by respectively *Willard* and *There*.

To further clarify the situation, consider the following statement from Buring (2005: 95):

- (94) "Coindexing between two NPs can be interpreted in two essentially different ways: as coreference (both NPs denote the same individual); or as semantic binding (the bound NP covaries with its binder)."

One possibility would be to incorporate our system of antecedence into a system with co-indexing. In that case, semantic interpretation of the indices could be more or less as in Buring 2005. Another possibility would be to refine (94) so that antecedence itself could serve as the basis of interpretation, as initiated in (91). Finally, one could adopt a notion of 'overlapping arc' (multidominance) as in Johnson and Postal (1980). This would allow the elimination of co-indexation all together and the definition of antecedence in terms of more primitive concepts, as in note 20. We cannot pursue these issues.

11. Accounting for Dual Pronominal Agreement Possibilities with Imposters

This section shows how the analysis of imposter structures in sections 8 and 9 combines with the theoretical ideas about antecedence in section 10 to yield a basic analysis of pronominal agreement relating to imposters. The most critical fact we have documented is that pronominal antecedence by imposters can (in various contexts) manifest two distinct forms. Our assumption is that this is possible precisely because, as described in section 8, each imposter structure offers two distinct DPs as potential antecedents, the core DP and the

shell DP. Where the core DP is non-3 person, this permits antecedence of pronominal DPs with distinct person values, given that the shell DP is always 3 person.

The fundamental basis for our treatment of imposter antecedence is the following hypothesis:

(95) Shell Antecedence

Let A be the notional DP of an imposter whose shell DP is B.

Then if A antecedes C, B antecedes C, and if D antecedes A, D antecedes B.

Informally, imposter creation 'passes' both the properties of anteceding and of being anteceded from notional core DP to shell DP. Shell Antecedence interacts crucially with the analysis of imposters. Recall, that the notional core DP moves into the shell. Therefore, whatever antecedence relations that the core DP possesses external to the shell, analogs are assumed by the shell DP as a consequence of the core DP movement into it.

Principle (95) determines that in the case of imposters, a pronominal form can have two *immediate* antecedents: either the shell or the core of the imposter. Of course, as given (95) is a seemingly arbitrary stipulation which follows from nothing. Our suspicion though is that this is an artifact of our decision for the purposes of this paper to take the antecedence relation as a primitive. We believe that in a framework in which antecedence can be defined in terms of more basic notions, Shell Antecedence will follow from the interaction of the definitions together with a proper interpretation of our analysis of imposters.

Underlying this discussion is, of course, the general and presumably uncontroversial assumption touched on earlier in (17) that pronominal *agreement* relations involve a matching between a relevant set of grammatical features of an agreeing pronominal with those of an immediate antecedent.

Recall that Sag, Wasow and Bender (2001)'s principle (17) assumes agreement can simply require coindexed forms to match in phi-features. To implement that idea in the domain of imposters would require assigning the shell of an imposter an index, since some pronominals agree with imposter shell DPs. However, nothing independent of agreement motivates assigning indices to shell DPs. For instance, as discussed in section 8, shell DPs are semantically vacuous (headed by a semantically vacuous D). We return to the indexing issue in the conclusion.

Assuming shell DP indexation is irrelevant, we propose to recast Sag, Wasow and Bender's (17) in terms of antecedence, a decision supported in later sections.

(96) Pronominal Agreement Principle (second version)

If P is a pronominal, then for some immediate antecedent, A,
 of P, P is assigned (or, takes on) the exact phi-feature values of A.

The formulation of (96) allows in principle a pronominal DP to ‘choose’ alternative DPs to agree with if the alternatives are immediate antecedents. Just this situation is, we claim, instantiated by pronouns linked to imposters. And, of course, this principle makes sense here only because of principle (95), which determines that any pronominal form which has the core DP of an imposter as an immediate antecedent also has the shell DP as an immediate antecedent.

An important caveat to (96) is that singular DPs can often link to plural DPs in a way seemingly related to antecedence but which does not fall under the straightforward account of such, as illustrated in the following sentences:

- (97) a. Laura₁ said that she₁ could attend the meeting.
 b. Laura₁ said (to John₂) that they_{1,2} could attend the meeting.
 c. Laura₁ said (to John₂) that he₂ and she₁ could attend the meeting.

While we can take *Laura* to antecede *she* in (97a), this is certainly not sufficient for (97b), where *they* can refer to Laura plus somebody else. We cannot attempt to treat this problem in this study and note that it is often not treated in works dealing with pronominal relations, e.g. Sag, Wasow and Bender (2003). One possibility is that cases like (97b) would be some sort of reduction of a coordinate structure like those of (97c).

One word of caution: the freedom for a pronominal form to have its phi-features determined by one or another of distinct DPs in the case of imposters is not absolute. Nothing precludes specific grammatical conditions which restrict this freedom in particular cases. And of course we documented a number of restrictions (based on word order, and local antecedence) in sections 3 and 4.

With these considerations in mind, consider a basic sentence type showing that an imposter can give rise to two different pronominal agreement patterns:

- (98) PRO₁ to keep myself₁/himself₁ from getting sunburned,
 Daddy will put on suntan lotion.

Here, the imposter is the subject of the matrix clause, and obligatorily controls PRO in the adjunct clause. We assume that PRO is a (nonexpletive) pronominal form. Hence it follows from the assumptions in section 10 that any instance of it has an immediate antecedent, and, given (95), potentially two immediate antecedents. Moreover, given (96), PRO in (98) must match an immediate antecedent in phi-features.

Thus, by choosing cases, like (98) in which the instance of PRO is not only anteceded but is itself an antecedent, one can, despite the invisibility of PRO, determine its phi-features by those of the (in this case, reflexive) form it antecedes.

The central fact needing to be explained about (98) is that the PRO subject of the adjunct clause, can antecede either the 1 person singular reflexive *myself* or the 3 person singular reflexive *himself*, with no difference in meaning. This follows from the assumption that PRO itself in (98) can have either a 1 person or 3 person feature value. The former permits proper antecedence of *myself*, the latter of *himself*. The question then is how PRO comes to have these feature values.

We assume that when PRO in (98) antecedes the 1 person reflexive form, it is immediately anteceded by, and moreover agrees with, the covert 1 person singular core pronominal DP of the imposter, *Daddy*. Under this assumption, the relevant structure of (98) is partially isomorphic to that of (99):

(99) PRO₁ to keep myself₁ from getting sunburned, I₁ will put on suntan lotion.

Since (98) differs from this only in that in (98), the 1 person pronoun forms the core DP of an imposter, the fact that (98) and (99) are synonymous is not mysterious, given that shell DPs themselves lack semantic substance.

Turn then to the subcase of (98) where PRO antecedes *himself*. Here too we assume that the relevant structure is partially isomorphic to that of (99), differing again only in that the 1 person pronoun forms the core DP of an imposter. So in this case as well the semantic equivalence follows. The difference in pronominal agreement simply results from the fact that since the 1 person pronoun in the main clause of (99) can be an immediate antecedent of PRO in the purposive adjunct, when that pronoun forms the core DP of an imposter, as in (98), condition (95) guarantees that the shell DP of that imposter is also an immediate antecedent of PRO. Hence the Pronominal Agreement Principle (96) is also satisfied if PRO's phi-features match those of the shell DP and are 3 person.

This explication of dual agreement possibilities applies without alteration to cases touched on earlier, where a single imposter occurrence relates to conflicting pronominal agreements. One such case cited in (35a) was:

(100) PRO₁ to cover myself₁ in case of an investigation,

yours truly₁/this reporter₁ is going to keep himself₁ out of the newspapers.

Here the core DP of the imposter is 1 person, and that DP can be the immediate antecedent which determines the phi-features of the PRO in the purposive adjunct. That PRO will then

be 1 person singular and a proper antecedent for *myself*. But, given condition (95), Shell Antecedence, nothing precludes the shell DP of e.g. *Daddy* from being the immediate antecedent which determines the phi-features of the reflexive in the main clause. That can then unproblematically be 3 person.

12. Imposters and Camouflage

Both (101a,b) involve 3 person DPs that refer to the speaker. Furthermore, in each case there is an overt possessor:

- (101) a. Will *my lord /lady* be dining in the castle this evening?
 b. Will *your lordship/ladyship* be dining in the castle this evening?

Nonetheless we will argue that although (101a,b) share common properties, only the highlighted forms in (101a) are imposters; those in (101b) are instances of the construction type called *camouflage* in Collins, Moody and Postal (2008).

The first difference between the two phrase types is that while both involve overt possessors, only for (101b) can one maintain that its possessor DP represents the notional core of the containing DP. That is, *your lordship/ladyship* denote the addressee and add respectful recognition of lordly status. These are notionally 2 person DPs. But *my lord/lady* also denote the addressee and add respectful recognition of lordly status. So they are also notionally 2 person DPs, despite the 1 person possessor DP. In other words, both construction types involve the internal presence of an externally originating DP representing the notional content. In both cases of (101) this externally arising DP is 2 person. But only in the imposter case is the notional DP invisible. We take this to be characteristic. That is:

- (102) a. The notional DP of an imposter is systematically covert (see (74)).
 b. The notional DP of a camouflaged DP is
 (i) always overt and (ii) appears as a possessor.

Second, forms like *your lordship/ladyship*, which we will call *social hierarchy camouflage structures*, fall into a relatively extensive set of terms partially free as to the possessor DP, which must though be pronominal, and based on a number of distinct possessed nouns. Thus one finds:

- (103) a. his/her/your
 Excellence/Excellency/Highness/Holiness/Honor/Ladyship/Lordship/Majesty/
 Reverence,

- a. their/your
Excellences/Highnesses/Holinesses/Honors/Ladyships/Lordships/Majesties/
Reverences

Excluded though are all instances of *1 person* possessors, singular or plural, and all non-pronominal possessors (which may be 2 person imposters):

- (104) a. *my excellence/highness/lordship/majesty
- b. *our holinesses/honors/ladyships/reverences

On the contrary, what we will call *social hierarchy possessor imposters* permit 1 person singular forms: *my lord*, *my lady*.

Third, although both constructions at issue here can occur as appositive DPs on pronouns, only the camouflage variant manifests person matching, which is obligatory:

- (105) a. Will you, your/*his excellency, wish to attend?
- b. Will you, my/*your lord, wish to attend?

A fourth property distinguishing the imposters of (101a) and imposters in general from the camouflage structures of (101b) is illustrated in (106):

- (106) a. Would my Lord and Lady prefer to dine on the veranda?
- b. Your Mommy and Daddy are going to get a divorce
(E. g. father and mother talking to a child).
- c. *Will your Honor and Excellency prefer to dine on the veranda?
- d. *Will your Majesty and Holiness prefer to dine on the veranda?

That is, the possessed N in the complex imposter type illustrated in (101a) can be coordinated, while the N in the camouflage type in (101b) cannot. We believe the latter restriction is general (see Collins, Moody, Postal 2008, footnote 4). So, given that the nouns of camouflage DPs were called *masks* in Collins, Moody and Postal (2008), we posit:

- (107) The masks of camouflage DPs do not coordinate.²¹

The failure of this generalization for cases like (106a,b) argues that their nouns are not masks (hence not parts of camouflage structures), but are a different phenomenon referred to here as imposters.

Finally, a fifth property distinguishing imposters from camouflage structures relates to an observation in note 41 of Collins, Moody and Postal (2008). There we observed the concord facts in (108a, b), which are particular to camouflage cases.

- (108) a. her majesty/*majesties
 b. their *majesty/majesties
 c. my lord/lords

But (108c) shows that the cases taken here to be imposters, not camouflage cases, do not manifest this number concord, supporting claims of an imposter/camouflage distinction. So this is another argument that *my lord* is not a camouflage case, hence is distinct from *your lordship(s)*, where the plural ending goes only with a *plural* version of *your*.

Despite the differences just indicated, the two constructions of concern nonetheless also manifest significant similarities. First, both imposters and camouflage structures determine exclusively 3 person verb agreement:

- (109) a. Your honor is/*are certain to be criticized.
 b. Your Excellency needs/*need to take better care of himself.
 c. My lord is/*am sure to win the prize.

Second, strikingly, although complex imposters are distinct from the kind of camouflage cases in (101b), the latter fall under the generalizations governing the antecedence behavior of imposters documented earlier. That is, they too can determine both 3 person and non-3 person pronominal agreements, under the same conditions that imposters can. This was in part already noted by Curme, whose description, however, obscured matters with prescriptivism:

- (110) Curme (1931: 558)

“If there is reference to *your Majesty*, *her Grace*, etc., use requires repetition of the full title or the use of *you*, *your*, *he*, *his*, etc., instead of the grammatically correct *it*, *its*: ‘*Your Majesty can do as your Majesty will with your Majesty’s ships*’ or ‘*Your Majesty can do as you will with your ships*’ (Fowler, *Modern English Usage*). ‘*His (Her) Majesty can do as he (she) will with his (her) ships*.’ ‘*Her Grace summoned her chef*.’”

We provide a list of social hierarchy possessor camouflage structures paired with corresponding imposters, to reveal the parallelism of their dual pronominal antecedence behavior.

- (111) a. Your Majesty loves to drink champagne, doesn’t she/don’t you?
 b. Madam/My lady loves to drink champagne, doesn’t she/don’t you?
 (112) a. PRO to cover himself/yourself in case of an inquiry,
 your Excellency should keep himself out of the newspapers.

- b. PRO to cover herself/yourself in case of an inquiry,
Madam/My lady should keep herself out of the newspapers.
- (113) a. Neither your Excellency nor the Count need to defend themselves/yourselves.
- b. Neither Madam/My lady nor the Count need to defend themselves/yourselves.

Notable is that the systematic parallels of the social hierarchy camouflage cases and the social hierarchy imposters yield sharp contrasts with regular (non-imposter/non-camouflage) possessor structures. Compare (111a) and (112a) to:

- (114) a. *Your wife loves to drink champagne, don't you?
- b. *PRO to cover yourself in case of an inquiry,
your wife should keep herself out of the newspapers.

Despite their differences, the systematic parallels between complex imposters and the camouflage cases as well as their joint contrasts with regular possessive structures suggest minimally two things. The proper analyses of complex imposters and the subset of camouflage cases at issue should be significantly similar and, moreover, similar in such a way as to yield the contrast with regular possessive structures, although all three construction types involve a superficial possessor phrase.

We believe that the analyses we have suggested here for imposters and those offered for camouflage cases in Collins, Moody and Postal (2008) take major steps toward yielding the required results, although lacunae remain. These analyses share features which differentiate both constructions from regular possessive structures. For both, the DP defining the notional properties of the overall DP structure originates external to the latter. This is *not* the case for the possessor DP of a regular possessive case. Schematically:

(115) Camouflage Structure

- a. [DP majesty] ... your (movement of possessor into shell)
- b. [DP your majesty] ... <your>

(116) Imposter Structure

- a. [DP D] ... [XP YOU [DP my lord]] (movement of core into shell)
- b. [DP D [XP YOU [DP my lord]]] ... <XP> (inversion omitted)

In the case of imposters, we have advanced principle (95), Shell Antecedence, which specifies that any pronominal which the externally originated DP antecedes is also anteceded by the resulting shell DP.

We did not in our 2008 work propose such a principle for camouflage cases for various reasons. The particular camouflage construction we were concerned with in that

study, the AAE ACC (*Ass* Camouflage Construction) illustrated in (117), did not manifest the dual antecedence possibilities which have been central to this paper (Collins, Moody, Postal 2008: 41d, 42d, 60b):

- (117) a. Your ass making a fool of yourself/*itself/*hissself.
 b. Your ass was late wasn't *it/*he/*she/you?

In the ACC, *no* antecedent relations show agreement with any DP except the possessor. But we now believe that this is a function of an extra constraint specific to the ACC rather than something which follows from the inherent nature of camouflage structures. Basically, in the ACC, DPs built on the light noun *ass* cannot determine the phi-features of any pronoun under (96). DPs built on masks such as *majesty* are not subject to this constraint, so that camouflage cases like *your Majesty*, display the same dual person antecedence possibilities as imposters (e.g. *Daddy*).

These considerations suggest (i) that a parallel to Shell Antecedence (95) for camouflage cases would be appropriate and (ii) that it would be correct to combine these two antecedence principles into a single generalization. The commonality we see is that in both cases, contrary to regular possessives, antecedence tends to be 'extended' from an externally originating DP node to a shell DP node it comes to be a daughter of. Moreover, in each type of case, the shell DP has no contentful semantic properties of its own. The following section reveals further commonalities between imposters and camouflage structures.

13. Coordination

This section considers the behavior of imposters in coordinate structures. These reveal a clear difference between the 1 person singular pronouns *I/me* and imposters such as *this reporter*, *daddy* and *yours truly*:

- (118) a. Me and Jerome will devote ourselves/*themselves to music.
 b. Yours truly and Jerome will devote ourselves/themselves to music.
 (119) a. Jerome and I are enjoying ourselves/*themselves on the beach.
 b. Jerome and Daddy are enjoying ourselves/themselves on the beach.

A coordinate structure composed of a 1 person singular pronoun and *Jerome* can antecede only a 1 person plural pronoun. But when the 1 person singular pronoun is replaced by the imposter *yours truly*, the coordinate structure can antecede either a 1 or 3 person plural pronoun. Sentences (119a, b) illustrate parallel facts for *Daddy*.

Surprisingly, coordination of a 1 person imposter with a 2 person singular pronoun, does not yield two possibilities for a pronoun anteceded by the coordinate structure, as shown in (120).

- (120) a. Me and you/You and I should disguise ourselves/*yourselves/*themselves as ghosts.
 b. You and Daddy should disguise ourselves/*yourselves/*themselves as ghosts.

The sentences in (121) illustrate similar facts for *this reporter*:

- (121) a. This reporter and Jerome will disguise ourselves/themselves as ghosts.
 b. This reporter and you will disguise ourselves/*yourselves/*themselves as ghosts.

Before considering how the person feature values of coordinate structures involving imposters are determined, one needs to characterize the more basic case of coordinate structures involving non-imposter DPs.²²

In the following definition, a coordinate structure is formed from two or more DPs, called *conjuncts*, as follows: [DP₁, (and) DP₂, (and) DP₃... , and DP_n]. The exact internal structure of coordination (e.g., binary versus *n*-ary branching) is irrelevant for our concerns.²³

Our basic claim is that the phi-feature values (more precisely, the person value) of a coordinate structure depend on one of its conjuncts called its *key*. We ignore number, since the coordinate nodes at issue are always plural, via principles which do not bear on the current discussion of imposters.²⁴

A coordinate structure key can be initially characterized as follows:

- (122) a. Definition of *Key* (first version)

Let M be a coordinate structure of the form:

[DP, (and) DP, (and) DP... , and DP].

M's *key* is any conjunct whose person feature value is not inferior to that of any other conjunct, where *inferior* is characterized as in (b):

- b. Value A is inferior to value B if and only if A precedes B in the sequence:

3 < 2 < 1 ('<' stands for 'inferior to')

In a coordinate structure *without imposters* (or camouflaged DPs see below), person choice works as follows:

- (123) Person Value Assignment to a Coordinate Structure (first version)

The person value of a coordinate structure is identical to the person value of its key.²⁵

Claim (123) of course embodies the traditionally noted asymmetry among person values for coordinate structures, as in:


(124) Curme (1931: 557)

“When a pronoun refers to two or more antecedents of different persons, the first person has precedence over the second and third, and the second person precedence over the third: ‘You and I divided it between *us*.’ ‘You and he divided it between *you*.’”

For example in (118a), the key is *me*, and so the coordinate structure person feature value is 1. Therefore, that coordinate structure can only antecede a 1 person plural pronoun, *ourselves*. Turn to coordination involving imposter DPs, such as [Jerome and Daddy] in (119b). Since there are two alternative pronominal agreements in (119b), principle (123) is not sufficient.

Our claim is that key selection in coordinate structures involving imposters makes primary reference to their cores. Recall that the core DP of an imposter moves into the shell. In the case of an imposter conjunct, we take this to mean that its core DP is itself a conjunct (which has moved into the shell, which is another conjunct). This is shown schematically for the coordinate structure in (119b) (CJP stands for Conjunction Phrase):²⁶

(125) [CJP [DP Jerome] (and) [DP D [XP ME Daddy]] (and) <[XP ME Daddy]>]



(movement of core into shell)

The coordinate structure [Jerome and Daddy] is initially [Jerome and [DP D] and [XP ME, Daddy]]. We assume that the last *and* does not show up for purely morphological reasons (there can be no over conjunction before a null conjunct).

Give this background, the key of a coordinate structure involving an imposter will be chosen from the *key selection set*, defined as follows:

(126) Definition of *Key Selection Set*

Let M be a coordinate structure of the following form:

[DP₁, (and) DP₂, (and) DP₃....and DP_n].

Then for $1 \leq j \leq n$, DP_j is in the *key selection set* iff

- a. DP_j is a conjunct into which no other conjunct has moved; or
- b. DP_j is a conjunct which moves into another conjunct.

Clause (126a) identifies the set of non-imposters (and non-camouflaged structures too). So in [Ken and you], both *Ken* and *you* are DPs into which no other conjunct has moved.

Therefore, the key selection set is {Ken, you}. Clause (126b) identifies the set of imposter cores. So in [Jerome and Daddy] the set of imposter cores is {ME}. Therefore, the key selection set is {Jerome, ME}. From now on, we leave out explicit representation of the core in the coordinate structure so that [Jerome and [_{DP} D] AND [_{XP} ME, Daddy]] is represented as [Jerome and Daddy].

Now let us redefine the notion key so as to also be relevantly applicable for coordinate structures involving imposters:

(127) Definition of Key (second version)

Let M be a coordinate structure and J be its key selection set. Then M's key is any DP in J whose person feature value is not inferior to that of any other DP in J.

For example, in the coordinate structure [Daddy and you] involving the imposter *Daddy*, the key selection set is {ME, you}; so the key is ME (the core DP of the imposter *Daddy*).

In (123) the notion of key is used in determining the person feature value of a coordinate structure. Since coordinate structures involving imposters can have two different person feature values (determining distinct forms of pronominal agreement), we introduce the notion *secondary key*:

(128) Definition of *Secondary Key*

Let M be a coordinate structure and C be one of M's conjuncts. Then C is a secondary key of M if and only if (i) C is a DP into which M's key has moved and (ii) C is not inferior to any other (non-core DP) conjunct of M.

First, given this definition, the secondary key will always be an imposter shell (or a camouflage shell; see below) since some constituent will have moved into it. Second, by *non-core conjunct* in (128) we mean to exclude the core DP of an imposter both in its shell internal position and in its shell external position. For example, in [Jerome and Daddy], there are three conjuncts {*Jerome*, the shell DP of *Daddy*, ME (the core DP of *Daddy*)}. The core ME moves into the shell DP. The selection of the secondary key (which should be the shell DP of the imposter *Daddy*) simply ignores the core conjunct.

The notions of key and secondary key permit the following condition:

(129) Person Value Assignment to a Coordinate Structure (second version)

The person feature value of a coordinate structure M is identical to the person feature value of either M's key or of M's secondary key.

This allows a coordinate structure to have either of two different values in some cases, the person feature value of an imposter's core DP or that of *that imposter's* shell DP. This

condition underlies the possibility of a single coordinate structure anteceding alternative reflexive pronouns in (119b), for example.

Given the conditions assumed, consider the cases above, starting with (119a). The key of [Jerome and I] is *I*, and no imposters are involved. Therefore, by (129), the person feature value of the coordinate structure is 1.

In (119b), the key of [Jerome and Daddy] is ME, the core of the imposter *Daddy*. The secondary key is the shell of *Daddy*. Therefore, by (129), the person feature value of the coordinate structure is either 1 or 3 (either the person feature value of the key or of the secondary key).

In (120a), [me and you] contains no imposters. The key is *me*, and the person value of the coordinate structure is 1.

In (120b), the key of [you and Daddy] is ME, the core of *Daddy*. But the shell DP of *Daddy* cannot be the secondary key, since the 3 person feature value of the shell is inferior to the 2 person feature value of *you*. So there simply is no secondary key. Therefore, [you and Daddy] can only have 1 as a person value and that phrase can only antecede *ourselves*, not *themselves*.

Next, consider the behavior of the imposter *Madam* under coordination. First, focus on cases where *Madam* conjoins with a 3 person singular DP. As with *yours truly* and *this reporter*, the presence of *Madam* increases the agreement possibilities for the pronoun bound by the dominating coordinate structure.

- (130) a. You and that doctor should enjoy yourselves/*themselves.
b. Madam and that doctor should enjoy yourselves/themselves.

In (130a), the key of the coordinate structure [you and the doctor] is *you*. Therefore, by (129) the coordinate structure's person value is 2.

In (130b), the key of the coordinate structure is YOU, the core of *Madam*. The secondary key is the shell DP of *Madam*. Therefore, by (129), the coordinate structure's person feature value is either 2 or 3 person (the person feature value of the key or of the secondary key). So the coordinate structure can bind either *themselves* or *yourselves*.

Next, consider coordination of two imposters, e.g. *Madam* and *yours truly*:

- (131) a. Madam and I must take care of ourselves/*yourselves/*themselves.
b. Madam and yours truly must take care of ourselves/themselves/*yourselves.

In (131a), the key is *I*. Since *I* is not the core of an imposter, the coordinate structure's person feature value is 1. In (131b), the key is ME, the core of *yours truly*. There is a secondary key,

the shell of *yours truly*, which is 3 person, since that shell is not inferior to any other (non-core DP) conjunct. By (129), the coordinate structure's person feature value can then be either 1 or 3.

We observe that the view of coordinate person assignment we have advanced, accounts for data like the following:

- (132) a. [Daddy and mommy]₁ ourselves₁/themselves₁ haven't cleaned up.
 b. [Daddy and mommy]₁ ourselves₁/*themselves₁ haven't cleaned our₁ room.
 c. [Daddy and mommy]₁ themselves₁/*ourselves₁ haven't cleaned their₁ room.

The good cases here simply illustrate the alternative 1 and 3 person feature values which can be assigned to coordinate nodes with 1 person imposter conjuncts. The ungrammatical *themselves* in (132b) and *ourselves* in (132c) are bad because the coordinate node assignments are exclusive. If *Daddy and mommy* is 1 person, it can antecede a 1 person pronominal but not a 3 person one. And if that phrase is 3 person, it can antecede a 3 person pronominal but not a 1 person one. Hence the mixed cases require distinct plural antecedents, which do not exist.

We have built the statement of person assignment to coordinate nodes in (129) to cover person assignment for standard cases and those involving imposter conjuncts. However, the account covers as well camouflage constructions mentioned in section 12. Parallel facts are seen with e.g. the *majesty* type of camouflage structures discussed in the previous section:

- (133) a. You and Ray should defend yourselves/*themselves.
 b. Your majesty and Ray should defend yourselves/themselves

As noted in section (12), Collins, Moody and Postal (2008) claimed that the possessors in these structures, like the core DPs of imposters, originate external to their shell DPs. Therefore, the notions key and secondary key cover coordination involving camouflage shells. In that case, the fact that *Your majesty and Ray* in (133b) can be either 1 person or 3 person would follow from a condition like (129) depending on whether the coordinate structure matched its key, *your* (originating as a conjunct external to the shell), or its secondary key, the whole camouflage shell DP *your majesty*.

We note that the AAE camouflage construction, called the ACC, studied in Collins, Moody and Postal (2008) embodied at least one extra condition on coordination not represented by (129). For example, that work (page 12, example 53) gave the following data:

- (134) a. Me/My ass and Ray got ourselves/ourself/*theyself a job.

- b. You/Your ass and Ray should get y'all self/selves/*ourselves a job.
- c. Ray and her/her ass got theyself/*yourselves a job.

These cases illustrate the fact that the construction restricts the freedom allowed by (129) and only manifests assignment to the coordinate structure of the person feature value of the key, the possessor, not of the shell DP, the secondary key. This, we must regard as a construction-specific constraint, not a general property of coordination involving camouflage or imposter structures. There is a clear relation between the failure of the ACC to permit its secondary key's person value to be assigned to coordinate structures and the failure of the same constituent type, the ACC shell, to function as the phi-feature value source under pronominal agreement, illustrated in (117) in the previous section. But we cannot consider in this work the best way to capture these two facts, which we take represent a single structural restriction on the ACC.

To conclude this section on coordination, data from Bellinzone (a Northern Italian Dialect) and from French provide a striking confirmation of principle (129). In these languages, unlike in English, it is possible to discern a difference between 1 person and 3 person plural verbal agreement with subjects. Coordinate structures involving imposters give rise to two different patterns of subject-verb agreement.

The following data from Cattaneo (2007) illustrates coordinated imposters in Bellinzone.

- (135) a. Al LUIS e al sotuscrit i pensa da vend la ca'
 The Louis and the undersigned 3pl.sc think. 3pl of to.sell the house.
 "Louis and the undersigned are thinking about selling the house."
- b. Al LUIS e al sotuscrit a pensum da vend la ca'
 The Louis and the undersigned 1pl.sc think. 1pl of to.sell the house
 "Louis and the undersigned are thinking about selling the house."

The sentences in (135) manifest a subject clitic appearing between the subject and the finite verb. In (135a), the subject clitic and the finite verb are 3 person plural. In (135b), the subject clitic and the finite verb are 1 person plural. These alternative subject agreements are just what principle (129) permits for coordinations of a 1 person imposter and a 3 person DP.

In contrast to coordinate structures though, plural imposters never give rise to 1 person plural subject clitics:

- (136) a. I sotuscrit/ Chescti giornalisti
 The(pl) undersigned /These journalists

“The undersigned/these journalists are thinking about selling the house.”

i pensa da vend la ca’
 SubjCl.3pl think.3pl of to.sell the house

- b. *I sotuscrit/ Chescti giurnaliscti

The(pl) undersigned /These journalists

“The undersigned/these journalists are thinking about selling the house.”

a pensum da vend la ca’
 SubjCl.1pl think.1pl of to.sell the house

Similar facts hold in French (data provided by Jean-Yves Pollack):

- (137) a. Votre serviteur et quelques amis sommes fier(s) de nous-mêmes.

Your servant and a few friends are.1pl proud of ourselves

“Your servant and a few friends are proud of ourselves.”

- b. ? Votre serviteur et quelques amis sont fier(s) d'eux-mêmes.

Your servant and a few friends are proud of themselves

“Your servant and a few friends are proud of themselves.”

But plural imposters, do not give rise to 1 person plural subject-verb agreement:

- (138) a. *Les auteurs sommes fiers de nous-mêmes.

The authors are.1pl proud.pl of ourselves

“The authors our proud of ourselves.”

- b. Les auteurs sont fiers de eux-mêmes.

The authors are.3pl proud.pl of them-selves

“The authors are proud of themselves.”

Given (129), when one of the conjuncts is a 1 person imposter, the coordinate structure is permitted to be either 1 person plural or 3 person, a prediction that is borne out in Bellinzonese and French. But principle (129) does not apply to plural imposters, which, as we have stressed throughout, have exclusively 3 person (plural) shells and hence can only determine 3 person verbal agreement.

14. Principle C Phenomena

Given the evidence so far that imposters can antecede either non-3 person or 3 person pronominals, the contrast between (139) and (140) is at first sight mysterious.

- (139) a. I₁ think that yours truly₁ was treated rather well.

- b. I₁ think that this reporter₁ deserves credit.

- c. I₁ think that your faithful correspondent₁ should write more often.
 - d. Do you₁ think that Madam₁ will be able to contact the doctor?
- (140)
- a. *He₁ thinks that yours truly₁ was treated rather well.
 - b. *He₁ thinks that this reporter₁ deserves credit.
 - c. *He₁ thinks that your faithful correspondent₁ should write more often.
 - d. *Does she₁ think that Madam₁ will be able to contact the doctor?

In (139), a 1 person pronoun can c-command an imposter whose core DP denotes the same individual, even when these are linked by antecedence. But in (140), where pronoun and imposter match so as to indicate 3 person agreement with the shell DP, ungrammaticality results.

We claim this contrast reduces to the interaction of several principles, the first of which is (147):

(141) Restricted Principle C Alternative

If a DP Q is an *immediate antecedent* of a pronominal DP P, then P does not c-command Q. (See Higginbotham 1983: 402 for a related principle).

Under pronominal agreement, pronouns are regarded as receiving the values of their relevant features from an immediate antecedent, as indicated in the Pronominal Agreement Condition (96) of section 11. Underlying that view is the idea that the values of features like person can have two different origins. For lexical DPs (such as *the tiger*), the values are inherent, not dependent on feature values of other DPs. For pronominal DPs, however, the values are imposed by the grammar as a function of the immediate antecedents.²⁷

Returning to the contrast between (139) and (140), *he* agrees with the 3sg shell of the imposter *yours truly*. From this, we conclude that *yours truly* is an immediate antecedent of *he* (see (96), the Pronominal Agreement Principle). Since *he* c-commands its immediate antecedent, principle (141) blocks that analysis. Why then does this logic does not apply directly to (139a) to block it as well?

Example (139a) does not violate principle (141) because the c-commanding pronoun is *I*, a 1 person form, and the shell DP need not be taken as its immediate antecedent. In such cases, the immediate antecedence can run from the subject of *thinks* to the notional DP component of the imposter so that even given condition (95), no pronominal in the sentence obtains its phi-feature values from the imposter *shell*.

The main clause subject is then free to take its antecedent elsewhere, and the remaining mystery is where. In line with older ideas of Ross (1970) and newer ones

including Speas (2000), Tenny and Speas (to appear), Baker (to appear) and other work referenced in the latter (see Chapter 4), we believe that each sentence has at its highest level, structure including a pair of basic DPs, of course invisible, one of which denotes the speaker, call it AUTHOR, and the other the addressee, call it AUDIENCE. The proposed structure is schematically given in (148):²⁸

(142) [[DP AUTHOR] [DP AUDIENCE] [This reporter deserves credit.]]

Several comments about this representation are requisite. First, elaborate views as to the exact structure of the highest constituent in (142) have been proposed in work cited just above. We take no position on these. It suffices for current goals that there are separate syntactic DPs for the two functions in question, and that each is in a very high position in the clause. Second, we allow for both AUTHOR and AUDIENCE to be plural. Although plural instances of the former are rare and special, that is exactly what is needed for plural imposters like (143):²⁹

(143) The undersigned hereby commit ourselves to a fair division of the property.

Third, AUTHOR and AUDIENCE are *not* pronominals and are assigned respectively inherent 1 person and inherent 2 person, that is, without being anteceded by any other DP. So the short answer to the question about the antecedence of the 1 person subjects of the main clauses of (139) is that each of these has as its immediate antecedent the *nonpronominal* inherent 1 person DP AUTHOR. More generally, we take antecedence by AUTHOR to define what a genuine 1 person pronominal is and make a parallel assumption for AUDIENCE and 2 person pronominals.³⁰

Of course, we take the 1 person notional DP component of all 1 person imposters to have AUTHOR as their ultimate antecedent. The key though is our claim that pronominal agreement does not work by pure antecedence or ultimate antecedent. Rather, it is in general determined by immediate antecedents. Thus, although *he* in e.g. (140b) has AUTHOR as an antecedent and ultimate antecedent, its phi-features are determined by its only 3 person immediate antecedent, the shell DP of *this reporter*.

To conclude, it is worth commenting on suggestions of Baker (to appear, Chapter 4: 14). He maintains that a DP can only be 1 or 2 person if it is bound by a one of two special operators (which he calls S ‘speaker’ and A ‘addressee’). He furthermore claims that lexical DPs cannot be bound by operators, and that therefore ‘lexical NPs cannot be first or second person.’ We essentially agree with the claim that 1 and 2 person pronominals only exist via their relation to special elements, those we called AUTHOR and AUDIENCE above. But our

overall multi-DP treatment of imposters is designed to combine that recognition with the unquestionable 3 person properties of imposters.

This it does by having the notional DP components of imposters anteceded by AUTHOR and AUDIENCE while nonetheless allowing (indeed requiring) the overall shell DP into which the core DP moves to be 3 person. Unlike Baker's proposal, which treats imposters as syntactically straightforward exclusively 3 person DPs, the current analysis yields a description of the properties these DPs can have of jointly determining 3 person verbal agreement but antecedence of *non-3 person pronominals*.

15. Antecedence Homogeneity

A property of imposters we have repeatedly returned to is that a single imposter DP can seemingly antecede pronominal forms with distinct person values. This section documents a fundamental constraint on this property. We suggest that it is a reflection of some more general feature of pronominalization and make a proposal as to the condition involved.

Consider first:

- (144) a. If I₁ were not convinced I₁ could win, this reporter₁ would not run.
 b. If he₁ were not convinced he₁ could win, this reporter₁ would not run.
 c. *If I₁ were not convinced he₁ could win, this reporter₁ would not run.
 d. *If he₁ were not convinced I₁ could win, this reporter₁ would not run.

Such facts appear to indicate that while an imposter like *this reporter* can antecede both 1 person and 3 person pronominals, some constraint bars 'mixing' these pronominals under certain conditions. A similar point is manifest in:

- (145) a. In order to protect myself₁ at the beach when I go there,
 Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion.
 b. In order to protect himself₁ at the beach when he₁ goes there,
 Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion.
 c. *In order to protect myself₁ at the beach when he₁ goes there,
 Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion.
 d. *In order to protect himself₁ at the beach when I₁ go there,
 Daddy₁ will put on suntan lotion.
- (146) a. PRO₁ to guarantee that our₁ critics respect our₁ rights,
 the present authors₁ are not going to reveal their₁ sources.

- b. PRO₁ to guarantee that their₁ critics respect their₁ rights,
the present authors₁ are not going to reveal their₁ sources.
- c. *PRO₁ to guarantee that their₁ critics respect our₁ rights,
the present authors₁ are not going to reveal their₁ sources.
- d. *PRO₁ to guarantee that our₁ critics respect their₁ rights,
the present authors₁ are not going to reveal their₁ sources.

The relevant principle imposes a constraint on the possibility of distinct antecedent related DPs internal to some constituent having immediate antecedents external to that constituent. In fact, only one such DP permits this, as expressed in:

(147) External Antecedence Uniqueness

For any constituent K, if DP₁ and DP₂ are pronominals internal to K whose immediate antecedents are both external to K, then DP₁ and DP₂ are not antecedent-linked.

The property *antecedent-linked* is defined as follows:

(148) DP₁ and DP₂ are *antecedent-linked* if and only if DP₁ antecedes DP₂ or conversely.

Condition (147) claims inter alia that no constituent can contain antecedent-linked pronominals which both have their immediate antecedents external to that constituent. From the perspective of this constraint, consider again (144c) repeated in (149):

(149) *[_K If I₁ were not convinced he₁ could win], this reporter₁ would not run.

Since *I* and *he* disagree in phi-features, neither can immediately antecede the other³¹. Since *I* and *he* corefer, we assume they are antecedent-linked and anteceded by AUTHOR. But since *he* is third person singular, one of its *immediate* antecedents must be the shell of the imposter *this reporter*. The pronoun *I* also needs an immediate antecedent. But there is none for *I* internal to K. External to K, AUTHOR could be the immediate antecedent of *I*. Since AUTHOR is non-pronominal, it needs no antecedent. The situation is summarized in (150) (“>” stands for immediate antecedent):

- (150) a. Shell of *this reporter* > he (immediate antecedent external to K)
b. AUTHOR > I (immediate antecedent external to K)

Since both *he* and *I* have immediate antecedents external to K (the *if*-clause), the example is ruled out by (147).

Consider now representations of the *good* examples in (144):

- (151) a. [_K If I₁ were not convinced I₁ could win,] this reporter₁ would not run.
b. [_K If he₁ were not convinced he₁ could win,] this reporter₁ would not run.

In (151a), *AUTHOR* can be the immediate antecedent of the subject of the *if*-clause. Then, the first *occurrence of I* can be the antecedent of the second. So there is no violation of (147)

In (151b), the shell DP of *this reporter* can be the immediate antecedent of the subject of the *if*-clause. Then, the first *he* can be the immediate antecedent of the second. Once again, there is no violation of (147).

The External Antecedence Uniqueness Principle has an important theoretical consequence. It seems incompatible with any notion that the relations between pronouns and their antecedents could be captured by the symmetrical concept of co-indexing. For while co-indexing can specify that two DPs are related, it does not provide the kind of asymmetric link referenced in (147).

16. Imposters and VP Deletion

This section examines the relation of imposters to VP-deletion. The basic paradigm is illustrated in (152).

(152) I think that I know how to ski well, and so does Ted.

This sentence has a strict reading and a sloppy reading. On the strict reading, Ted thinks that the person who utters (152) knows how to ski well. On the sloppy reading Ted thinks that he himself knows how to ski well (he may or may not think the speaker does too).

These readings can be captured by postulating that the deleted VP is different in the two cases, as shown in (153):

(153) I think that I know how to ski well, and so does Ted.

- a. Strict Reading: Ted does <think that I know how to ski well>
- b. Sloppy Reading: Ted does <think that he knows how to ski well>

The above representations leave out the syntactic position of *so* in order to simplify the representations. A surprising fact is that *in general* imposters categorically preclude sloppy readings; but see below for one notable exception:

- (154)
- a. I think that yours truly knows how to ski well, and so does Ted.
 - b. I think that this reporter knows how to ski well, and so does Ted.
 - c. I think that mommy knows how to ski well, and so does Mary.

These sentences only have strict readings. For example, in (154a), the interpretation is that Ted also thinks that the speaker knows how to ski well. It is not possible to interpret (154a) as meaning that Ted thinks that he himself knows how to ski well. Similarly, (159b)

lacks a sloppy reading even if Ted happens to be a reporter. Lastly, (154c) lacks a sloppy reading, even if Mary happens to be a mother appropriately related to the speaker.

Ignoring various complications, let us assume the following condition on VP-Deletion (see Fiengo and May 1994, and Merchant 2007 for some discussion):³²

(155) Verb Phrase Ellipsis Identity

VP₁ is subject to ellipsis determined by another, VP₂, only if VP₁ and VP₂ are syntactically identical.

Given this condition, consider again (154) where only the strict reading is allowed. The two readings would correspond to the following deleted material:

(156) I think that yours truly knows how to ski well....

- a. Strict: Ted does <think that yours truly knows how to ski well>
- b. Sloppy: *Ted does <think that he knows how to ski well>

The strict reading in (156a) is permissible, since the deleted VP is identical to a cooccurring VP. But the sloppy reading in (156b) is ruled out by (155). That is, since the DP *yours truly* is not syntactically identical to the DP *he*, there is no VP that is syntactically identical to <think that he knows how to ski well> to sanction deletion in (156b).

Consider again the ambiguous cases in (154) not involving imposters:

(157) I think that I know how to ski well....

- a. Ted does <think that I know how to ski well>
- b. Ted does <think that he knows how to ski well>

The strict reading in (157a) is licit, since the deleted VP is identical to a cooccurring VP. In (157b) though, there does not seem to be identity between the deleted VP and its antecedent, as the pronouns have distinct forms:

- (158) a. [VP think that I know how to ski well] ≠
 b. [VP think that he knows how to ski well]

While we lack a full account of the ambiguity of (157), on our conception of pronouns, all (nonexpletive) pronouns originate without any phi-feature values and, with limited exceptions, obtain them only via agreement. Hence, (158a, b) do not differ before pronominal agreement has taken place.

Jespersen (1924: 217) noted the existence of what he called a ‘distinctively jocular substitute for ‘I’, namely *number 1*, which has a seemingly unique and surprising property. It seemingly functions as a reflexive (see section 17) and supports sloppy readings:

(159) I (only) look out for number 1 and so does Eddie.

In fact, for us, (159) *only* has a sloppy reading. No other imposter known to us behaves this way. It thus represents the exception mentioned earlier in this section.

Although the matter is beyond the scope of this work, it might seem that one way of accounting for the contrast between the imposters *this reporter* and *number 1* would be to specify that only the latter can have as a core DP a reflexive form. The antecedent clause imposters of cases like (26) of section 3, would then have as core DPs the type of 1 person pronoun found in (160a), also noted not to permit sloppy readings under VP deletion.

- (160) a. I respect ME and so does Greta.
 Strict: ‘Greta respects me’
 Sloppy: *‘Greta respects herself’
- b. I respect yours truly/this reporter and so does Greta.
 Strict: ‘Greta respects me’
 Sloppy: *‘Greta respects herself’.

17. Fake Indexicals

An observation in Partee (1989) initiated a discussion of so called *fake indexicals*, forms with the shapes of non-3 person pronominals but interpreted as bound variables; see Kratzer (1998; 2007); Rullman (2004). The following data illustrate a 1 person singular fake indexical pronoun:

- (161) a. I think that I know how to ski well.
 b. Only I think that I know how to ski well.

Unlike (161a), example (161b) is ambiguous. One reading implies that no person other than the speaker thinks that the speaker knows how to ski well. Another implies that no person other than the speaker thinks that he/she knows how to ski well. The latter is the bound variable reading.

Examples (162a-c) admit the same ambiguity:

- (162) a. I am the only one who thinks I know how to ski well.
 b. It is only me who thinks I know how to ski well.
 c. Kratzer (2007) attributed to Irene Heim;
 Only I got a question that I understood.

Again, the notable property is the existence of a bound variable reading for *I*. The fact that in all these cases, a form with the standard shape of a 1 person pronominal is not interpreted as

referring to the speaker motivates the ‘fake indexical’ terminology, the normal 1 person forms being real indexicals.

The existence of this phenomenon is of current relevance because the bound variable reading does not survive when the second instance of the morphological 1 person pronoun in (161b) or (162) is replaced by an imposter:

- (163) a. Only I think that yours truly/this reporter/Daddy knows how to ski well.
- b. I am the only one who thinks yours truly/this reporter/Daddy knows how to ski well.
- c. It is only me who thinks yours truly/this reporter/Daddy knows how to ski well.
- d. Only I got a question that yours truly/this reporter/Daddy understood.

This might suggest the following generalizations:

- (164) a. No imposter can be interpreted as a bound variable
- b. No imposter can be a fake indexical.

We return to the nature of this constraint below, noting at least one counterexample.

Either generalization in (164) yields further disconfirmation of the Notional Hypothesis. For if imposters were simply grammatically 3 person DPs with non-3 person denotations, why would they function differently in the relevant contexts from grammatically non-3 person (pronominal) DPs with the same non-3 person denotations!

There are distinct cases where morphological non-3 person forms arguably function as fake indexicals, specifically where 1 plural *we* and 2 plural *you* are interpreted as bound variables. These merit brief discussion because they link to problems in our view of pronominal agreement and ultimately yield an argument for our treatment of what we call *pronominal imposters* in the next section.

The Pronominal Agreement Principle (96) of section 10 claimed that pronominal agreement depends on the matching of a pronominal form’s phi-feature values with those of *one of its immediate antecedents*. This works for cases like the following:

- (165) Every one of the starlets believed she was talented.

On a reading where *she* is not anteceded by some arbitrary DP external to (165), this expression has a logical structure schematically like (166):

- (166) For every x such that x is a starlet, x believed x was talented

Here x would be a variable over individuals. Given that and the systematic relation between semantic binding and our notion of antecedence expressed in (91) of section 10, one would

assume that *she* in (165) on the relevant reading is anteceded by *every one of the starlets*, not by *the starlets*. That is, as in section 10, we assume that if DP_1 and DP_2 are such that the former represents a quantifier phrase binding a variable represented by the latter, then DP_1 antecedes DP_2 . The DP *Every one of the starlets* is arguably singular; note the verb agreement in (167). So pronominal agreement fully in accord with principle (96) yields the right result.

(167) Every one of the starlets believes/*believe she is talented.

But, related sentences like (168a-c) are incompatible with this (96), the Pronominal Agreement Principle:

- (168) a. Every one of us thinks she is talented.
 b. Every one of us thinks we are talented.
 c. Every one of you thinks you are talented.

For these cases also have readings representable as (166). The non-3 person agreement phenomenon in (168b,c) was noted at least as long ago as Jespersen (1913a: 140), who gave (169), which clearly has the bound variable reading:³³

(169) Neither of us had broken our fast.

Examples like (168a) are unproblematic. But not so (168b,c). If *we* in (168b) is *not* anteceded by *Every one of us* but rather by *us* (as suggested by the agreement) how can it have reading (166)? Alternatively, if *we* is anteceded by *Every one of us*, how can it (dis)agree the way it does, given principle (96)? At least something about the account so far is evidently inadequate.

To discuss the problem raised by cases like (168b,c), one needs some minimal view of structures like those in (170), which we refer to as *partitive* structures:

- (170) a. each/every/neither one of the students/those professors/us/you,
 b. all/both/few/many/some of the students/those professors/us/you.

See Barker (1998) for discussion of this expression type. We take a partitive phrase generally to be a DP of the form [Quantifier + [_{NP} Noun (= one(s))] + (of) DP_2]. We refer to DP_2 as the *set DP*. One can regard such structures as making explicit that the relevant quantifier is of the restricted type, with the set DP providing the domain of restriction. Evidently, for this schematic view to apply to (170b), one must recognize phonologically null plural variants of the noun *one* of (170a).

Against this background, we reason as follows: To obtain reading (166) for (168b), as for (165), it is necessary for *Every one of us* to (immediately) antecede *we*. Principle (96)

demands that *we*, which is 1 person plural, get its phi-features values from an immediate antecedent, and *Every one of us* is the only relevant such antecedent. Since the DP *Every one of us* is though 3 person singular, not 1 person plural in (168b) (likewise *Every one of you* is 3 person singular not 2 person plural in (168c)), Principle (96) is not correct for at least this class of cases.

One can then either (i) reject (96) entirely; or (ii) modify it to allow restricted cases where even a nonexpletive pronominal does not agree with any immediate antecedent. We think (ii) is the right choice but cannot attempt in this paper to construct an adequate replacement for (96). Instead of replacing (96), we merely note that it must ultimately be weakened in at least one particular way. Namely, in certain cases, of which (168b,c) are instances, a pronominal must be permitted to agree with a DP which is *not* one of its immediate antecedents *but is related to one of them in a fixed way*.

The source of the 1 person plural value of *Every one of us* in (168b) must be the set DP *us*; likewise the source of 2 person plural value of *Every one of you* in (168c) must be the set DP *you*. Therefore, the particular exception to (96) manifest in (168) is this: in certain cases, a pronominal form immediately anteceded by a partitive DP has the option of agreeing *not with that DP but with its set DP*. This optional agreement is simply not present in (168a), which then manifests more standard agreement of a pronominal with an immediate antecedent. Given these specifications, the *distinct* agreement patterns in (168a, b, c) are now correctly described, even though all three cases have *identical* patterns of antecedence.

We propose that examples like (168b,c) are another case of *fake indexicals*. The first person plural *we* in these sentences does not denote a collectivity of persons including the speaker; rather it is semantically a bound variable.

Our account so far has ignored the fact that there is a different case partially parallel to (168a,b), namely (171c), whose grammaticality is supported by (171a, b):

- (171) a. I'll bet every one of us thinks they are the best, but only one can REALLY be the BEST.
www.chickfight.com/story/story174.htm
- b. And we all know that each and every one of us thinks they could do a better job than them on at least one example, right?
tfans.com/talk/lofiversion/index.php/t31022.html
- c. Every one of us thinks they are a genius.

For (171c) can also represent bound reading (166). Such cases are, we believe, instances of the singular *they* phenomenon; see Lagunoff (1997) and many citations there, Payne and Huddleston (2002: 493-495). But that claim, even if valid, does not provide any immediate analysis of (171). Given what has been said so far, the natural suggestion is that cases like (171) again represent agreement of a pronominal not with one of its immediate antecedents, but with the set DP of a partitive phrase immediate antecedent. The difference would be that in this case, in contrast to (168b, c), the agreement would be *partial*, that is, only in number. This is at the least rather unusual and the whole question of agreement with respect to singular *they* demands intense research, which is not possible here. In addition, Lagunoff (1997) cites many cases of singular *they* whose relation to partitive structures is, to say the least, not obvious. We cannot treat these issues here.

But both the 1 person plural forms of agreement with set DPs and those falling under the rubric of singular *they* have a key feature. Namely, both can manifest curious hybrid reflexive forms, that is, with a seemingly plural pronominal part but a singular-looking *self*:

- (172) a. You'll be relieved to know that neither of us fancies *ourselves* a statistician!

<http://tolstoy.newcastle.edu.au/R/help/02a/1399.html>

- b. Nobody sees *themselves* that way...

<http://www.sylviaplathforum.com/archives/56.html>

While subject to prescriptivist condemnation, these forms seem common and are perfectly grammatical for the present writers.

While found in those environments we have suggested analyzing as representing agreement of pronominals with the set DPs of partitives, neither *ourselves* nor *themselves* can unrestrictedly occur in contexts where *ourselves/themselves* are grammatical.

- (173) a. We New Yorkers respect *ourselves*/**ourself*.

- b. They described us to *ourselves*/**ourself*.

- c. The recruits distinguished *themselves*/**themselves* in that exercise.

- d. Ferdinand talked to few lawyers about *themselves*/**themselves*.

So a grammar cannot allow the peculiar *-self* forms to vary freely with ordinary plural reflexives. We believe the following condition governs when they can appear:

- (174) Singular *Self* with Plural Pronominals

ourselves/themselves is possible only if it has a singular antecedent.

This statement rightly blocks the singular variants of cases like (173) while rightly allowing those like (172), where the special forms are anteceded by (singular) partitive DPs despite agreeing with their set plural DPs.

Statement (174) does not by itself account for the fact that in environments where *ourself/themselves* are possible, so in general are respectively *ourselves/themselves*:

- (175) a. None of us think of ourself/ourselves in that way.
 b. None of them think of themself/themselves in that way.

Therefore, we suggest the following view of the distribution of *self/selves*:

- (176) The morpheme *-self* in forms like *myself*, etc., is a reflexive camouflage mask
 (see Collins, Moody, and Postal 2008, section 10).

This means the preceding pronominal element (*my* in *myself*) originates external to the shell DP defining the whole. Normally, the mask *self* matches the number value of the camouflaged pronominal (by concord): *himself/*himselves*, *your(plural)*self/selves*. This accounts for *ourselves* in (175a), and *themselves* in (175b). But, if the camouflaged pronoun (e.g. *them* in *themself*) has a singular antecedent, then the mask (*self* in *themself*) can alternatively match the number value of the pronoun's antecedent. We consider the form *ourself* again in the section that follows, showing that it occurs with another class of forms falling under condition (174).

Returning to partitive cases, the idea that (168b, c) and (171) involve agreement with the set DP illuminates the differences between the 1 person cases in sets like the following:

- (177) Every one₁ of us thinks she₁ is/we₁ are/they₁ are/*I₁ am the smartest person in
 the group.

That is, the *she* form is possible because it agrees with the 3 person singular antecedent (*every one of us*) when there is no agreement with the set DP; the *we* form is possible because it agrees with the set DP in both number and person and the *they* form is possible because it represents agreement with the set DP only in number. The banned case could only exist if there was agreement with the set DP only in person. But whereas the singular *they* phenomenon suggests the existence of agreement with set DPs only in number, nothing independently in English suggests the existence of such isolated person agreement.

Given the view that the bound variable use of *we* is a fake indexical and the claim in (164) that imposters cannot be fake indexicals, the prediction emerges that the bound variable use of *we* cannot be replaced by a 1 person plural imposter. So compare the following pairs limited only to readings of *the present writers* on which it is a 1 person plural imposter:

- (178) a. Every one of us thinks we are clever.
 b. Every one of us thinks the present writers are clever.
- (179) a. Every one of us thinks we are the smartest person in the class.
 b. *Every one of us thinks the present writers are the smartest person in the class.

While both (178a,b) are grammatical, only the former has a bound variable reading parallel to (166). Examples like (178b) can only mean that every member of the group including the speaker thinks the present writers (properly including the speaker) are all clever. Correspondingly, where (179a) has *only* a bound variable reading, (179b) is flatly ungrammatical.

Surprisingly though, at least one English form which might well be an imposter, as assumed earlier, namely, *number 1*, does, contrary to (164), permit bound variable readings for the *only* type examples:³⁴

- (180) a. Only I look out for number 1.
 b. It is only I who look out for number 1.
 c. I am the only one who looks out for number 1.

We find that all of these have clear bound variable readings. What accounts for the fact that *number 1* behaves differently from all the other imposters we are aware of? We are unable to answer this question satisfactorily. But, notably, it correlates with another previously cited property of this form. For recall that section 16 indicated that *number 1*, unlike other imposters, supports *sloppy* readings under verb phrase ellipsis; see (159). This correlation can hardly be an accident.

There are two possible approaches. One would simply deny that *number 1* is an imposter. This is conceivable since it is not possible to apply to it our most convincing imposter diagnostics, e.g. determination of person feature values for coordinate structures. And such a conclusion would eliminate its behavior as a counter-example to the generalization (164).

Alternatively, one could recognize that *number 1* represents a sub-type of imposter restricted to having only *reflexive* core DPs. This assumption may help explain why *number 1* can only occur in object position, forces sloppy readings under VP-deletion, and favors bound variable readings in contexts permitting that (just like reflexives):

- (181) Only I can take care of myself/number 1.

In contrast, the types of imposter that we have studied in this paper not only would not be required to have a reflexive core DP, they would not be permitted to have such. We cannot seriously pursue here the issue of the right analysis of *number 1* and its implications.

We have attributed the existence of fake indexicals of the partitive (179a) type to the possibility of agreement of a pronominal with the set DP of its partitive DP antecedent rather than with that antecedent itself. This raises the possibility of the following hypothesis:

- (182) A fake indexical is a pronominal form P which agrees with a non-3 person DP where that DP is (i) not an antecedent of P but (ii) is related to some antecedent of P in one of several ways (hopefully, fixed by grammatical theory).

In terms of this hypothesis, (ii) is instantiated for cases like (179a) by the specification that the actual source of the agreement features is the set DP of the partitive phrase antecedent.

Hypothesis (182) of course raises the issue of tenable analyses of cases like (163) which would be consistent with it. We cannot pursue such issues.

We have not offered any explanation for principle (164), nor are we in a position to provide that. But we can observe further that the facts about imposters summed up in (164) correlate with a related property of appositive phrases:

- (183) A pronominal interpreted as a bound variable cannot be modified by an appositive phrase.³⁵

Evidence for (183) is seen in (184):

- (184) a. Only I think that I (, a lowly peasant,) should not be persecuted.
b. It is only I who thinks that I (, a lowly peasant,) should not be persecuted.

In these examples, when the appositives are present, only non-bound variable, true indexical readings are possible.

The question evidently arises then as to why *both* (164) (ignoring *number 1*) and (183) hold. Section 8 indicated that imposters and appositives shared a number of semantic properties, including a basic predication relation between two DPs, and speaker orientation for the secondary DP. They also differ in various ways, (e.g., the anti-background effect and presupposed versus asserted content). The best we can do at this point is observe that the joint validity of (164) and (183) is another semantic commonality between appositives and imposters.

18. Pronominal Imposters

The 1 person plural variant of example (185) represents one of the most extraordinary imposter examples we have encountered:

- (185) The present author₁/This reporter₁ believes that he₁ and Ruth can successfully defend themselves/ourselves against these charges.

We not only accept the *ourselves* variant of (185) ourselves but have checked several times with two other informants who also systematically accepted both variants. The grammaticality of the 3 person reflexive anteceded by the coordinate structure is not noteworthy. Since both conjuncts are superficially 3 person, it is exactly what would be expected. The puzzle is the well-formedness of the 1 person reflexive anteceded by that coordinate phrase.

Given the assumptions of section 13, the 1 person antecedence possibility, indicated by the grammaticality of *ourselves* in (185), requires the coordinate phrase itself to be 1 person. And for that to be the case, given the treatment of person assignment under coordination we proposed, there must minimally be a 1 person conjunct in the structure of the phrase *he and Ruth*. Since no actual surface phrase is 1 person, this is obviously initially mysterious. The form *he* seems to be simply a pronoun (immediately) anteceded by the shell DP of the imposter *this reporter*, which is of course external to the conjoined phrase.

How then to understand the grammaticality of the 1 person plural reflexive? We propose that the pronoun *he* in (185) is actually a type of imposter, one not previously encountered and not yet analyzed. We will refer to these as *pronominal imposters* (since they are imposters with the shape of normal pronouns).

The structural sketch given in section 8 of 1 person uses of e.g. *the present writer* indicated that such full imposters involve three DPs, a notional core one, a secondary one in a predication relation to the core DP and a shell DP container. Clearly, in a pronominal imposter, no secondary, predication component is present. A basic representation of a pronominal imposter like that we posit for *he* in (185) would then include the following elements (Here D is initially both semantically and phonologically empty):

- (186) a. [DP D[empty]] ... [DP ME]
 b. [DP D[empty] [DP ME]] ... <DP ME>
 c. [DP D[3 person, singular, masculine] [DP ME]] ... <DP ME>

(Note that D[3 person, singular, masculine] is pronounced *he/him/his*)

The initial stage is parallel to that we posited for three DP imposters, given the lack of predication modifier on the external DP representing the notional core. The second stage,

where that DP moves into the shell, is also essentially parallel. At this point though, further dissimilarities with the structure of 1 person imposters like *the present writer* emerge. Necessarily missing in (186) is the full inversion structure found in our treatment of three DP imposters, since in cases like (185) there is no secondary DP to undergo the inversion.

An immediate question is how the D in (186c) comes to have the phi-feature values it does, which determine the 3 person singular masculine form of the resulting shell DP, *he*. The treatment of full imposters in section 8 assumed that the 3 person value of their shell DPs was due to agreement/matching between the shell DP person value and that of the secondary DP raised to the highest Spec position. Evidently, this state of affairs can *not* pertain to pronominal imposters, where there is no secondary DP. There are then at least two conceivable origins for phi-feature valuation of the pronominal imposter shell DP.

The overwhelmingly plausible hypothesis and the one we adopt for the type (185), is that this pronominal imposter shell DP has its phi-feature values determined by agreement, under principle (96), with an immediate antecedent. For this to be feasible, the following immediate antecedent relations need to hold:

- (187) a. The notional 1 person DP component of the imposter *The present author*, ME, immediately antecedes the notional 1 person core DP component, ME, of the pronominal imposter *he*;
- b. The 3 person shell DP of *The present author* immediately antecedes the shell DP of *he*.

But given that the core DP of *The present author* is a 1 person pronoun, like the core DP of *he* under our analysis, nothing precludes this antecedence relation from holding. Moreover, given the Shell Antecedence principle (95) in section 11, the shell DP of *The present author* will antecede the shell DP of *he* under analysis (186).

The other possibility for valuing the phi-features of a pronominal imposter is inherent specification. This would mean that the assigned values are not a function of the values of other DP nodes cooccurring with the pronominal imposter but rather are specified in whatever statements in the grammar define the existence of the particular case of pronominal imposter (e.g., nurse-*we*). While irrelevant for the pronominal imposter type in (185), this sort of phi-feature value assignment to pronominal imposter shell DPs is illustrated later in this section and in the next.

Now return to the original mystery of the possibility of the 1 person reflexive *ourselves* in (198). What needs to be made explicit is that in the structure of the antecedent

*he*₁ and *Ruth*, the 1 person core of *he* will head a conjunct as will the shell DP. That is, the phrase *he and Ruth* represents a more complex coordination in which ME is one conjunct. Since *he* in (198) then has both core and shell DPs, the principles of person assignment in coordinate structures of section 13 can function in the same way as described there for non-pronominal imposters. In (185), the key of the coordinate structure is ME, the core DP of the pronominal imposter *he*. By (129) of section 13, the person feature value of the coordinate structure can then be either 1 person, the key value, or 3 person, the secondary key value. Correspondingly, *he and Ruth* can then regularly bind either *ourselves* or *themselves*.

We believe that the notion of pronominal imposter is also critical to the analysis of the full paradigm of *camouflage* structures, specifically, those we called *social hierarchy camouflage structures* in section 12. These were the cases based on possessed nouns including *Excellency/Holiness/Honor/Majesty*, etc. As shown there, these occur with exclusively 3 person or 2 person possessors.

Expectably, the 2 person cases define DPs denoting addressees and the 3 person cases those denoting non-addressees (and, of course, non-AUTHORS):

- (188) a. Your Majesty (= you) should take better care of yourself.
 b. His Majesty (= he) should take better care of himself.

But an extraordinary fact, not noted in section 12, is that 3 person possessors with these nouns can also form addressee-denoting camouflage DPs:

- (189) a. Would his Majesty prefer not to receive the ambassador from Inner Outistan?
 b. “Would Her Majesty care to stand on the cushion so I can measure you?”
 “No, not at all. Do please get on with it.” “Yes yes Your Majesty.”
www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~david/derya/story5/story5762.htm

How is this possible? The notion of pronominal imposter provides an answer.

Our proposal is that cases like (189) represent the camouflage of a 3 person pronominal imposter built on a 2 person core DP. Schematically:

- (190) a. YOU (core) ---> (movement into imposter shell)
 b. [DP [YOU] him] ---> (movement into camouflage shell)
 c. [DP [DP [YOU] him]’s majesty]
 d. his majesty (surface form)

More precisely in PP/minimalist terms, one would say the following: The core DP YOU starts in a theta-position. This DP raises into a pronominal imposter shell, which is inherently

assigned 3 person singular values; this would yield *him* if nothing further affected its structure. Lastly, the pronominal imposter *him* raises to possessor position of a camouflage shell DP whose mask is *majesty* forming *his majesty*.

We note that in PP terms, *him/his* is never in a theta-position, moves to an intermediate position and ends up in a Case position (the possessor position of *his majesty*). *His majesty* never occupies a theta-position but does end up in a Case position (Spec IP). There is a distinct logically possible imposter analysis in which the 2 person pronominal is first camouflaged and the resulting 2 person possessor DP then forms an imposter. We will not consider this possibility here.

The analysis sketched here posits the formation of a 3 person pronominal imposter from a 2 person pronominal DP core, one anteceded in our terms by AUDIENCE. This is though of course *not* always possible. For instance, the object DP of (191) cannot refer to an addressee:

(191) Sarah supported him last year.

There are, however, 2 person cases parallel to (185) like (192) which are not subject to obligatory camouflage.

(192) Does Madam₁ believe that she₁ and Mary can easily disguise yourselves as ordinary peasants?

Here *she* is a pronominal imposter with core DP YOU anteceded by the core and shell DPs of *Madam*. But evidently *she* is not camouflaged.

One more case of a pronominal imposter with a 2 person core is nurse-*we*, discussed in Joseph (1979), which can inter alia be used by a nurse talking to a single patient:

- (192) a. Are we₁ taking good care of ourself₁/ourselves₁/*yourself₁ today?
b. We seem a bit displeased with ourself₁/ourselves₁ don't we?

While cases of nurse-*we* like (192a, b) are semantically singular, there are plural instances as well, which we would analyze by taking their core DPs to be 2 person plurals. But the claim that semantically singular nurse-*we* involves a singular core DP is supported by the fact that that usage, contrary to the plural one, does not permit quantifier floating (see Collins, Moody, Postal, 2008: (165)), even though both usages are morphologically plural (e.g. with respect to verb agreement and pronominal antecedence).

- (193) a. Are we all/both taking good care of ourselves?
b. *Are we all/both taking good care of ourself?

Here, (193a) has a nurse-*we* interpretation only when understood as plural, and (193b), in which the singular *self* requires a singular antecedent, is correspondingly ungrammatical.

Nurse-*we* can be analyzed in present terms as representing the following pronominal structure:

- (194) a. [DP D[empty]] ... [DP YOU]
 b. [DP D[empty] [DP YOU]] ... <DP YOU >
 c. [DP D[1 person, plural] [DP YOU]] ... <DP YOU >

Here the phi-feature values in (194c) are not a function of agreement with any antecedent, but rather the result of ad hoc stipulation associated with the imposter formation itself.

In summary, there are at least three cases of pronominal imposters with 2 person cores.

- (195) a. *his majesty*
 b. pronouns like *she* in (192)
 c. nurse-*we*

Giving the principles which distinguish these three cases is beyond the scope of this article.

Now consider the analysis of the reflexive forms anteceded by semantically singular nurse-*we* in e.g. (193a). The most obvious treatment, accepting the Collins, Moody and Postal (2008) view of the reflexive form *self* as a camouflage mask, would take *our* as being (immediately) anteceded by the core DP YOU of (193a), accounting for the meaning, and, via principle (95), as also being immediately anteceded by the shell DP of (193a), with which it agrees, as allowed by principle (96).

However, once the possibility of pronominal imposters is recognized, an additional analysis is conceivable, namely, one which treats the *our* in (193a) as representing the shell DP of a distinct (from the prior nurse-*we*) imposter. This too would have YOU as its core DP, again anteceded by the core DP of the nurse-*we*. Agreement here would be between the shell DP of *our* and the shell DP of nurse-*we*, between which antecedence would again hold via principle (95). We do not know of any direct evidence which chooses between these possible analyses; nor do we have grounds for excluding the logical possibility that both might exist.

Support for the hypothesis that nurse-*we* represents a pronominal imposter structure can go beyond the mere fact that such an analysis can account for the mixture of 2 person meaning with the presence of 1 person plural morphology. For the possible use of *self*

instead of *selves* in examples like (193a,b) argues, via the reasoning in the previous section which led to statement (174), that the reflexives here have *singular* antecedents. The imposter analysis provides just such an antecedent for each, namely, the 2 person singular core DP. Under standard sorts of analysis, it is obscure how nurse-*we*, which is morphologically plural, could antecede the mixed plural/singular *ourself*.

As noted in some dictionaries,³⁶ *ourself* is also possible when anteceded by the royal *we* and the editorial *we*:

- (196) a. We (= the monarch) have decided to absent ourselves/ourself from the meeting.
 b. We (= a single author) find ourselves/ourself in disagreement with Dr. Herrenheim.

This suggests of course that royal-*we* and editorial-*we* could also be rightly analyzable as pronominal imposters in addition to nurse-*we*. The relevant structures would parallel (194) but have 1 person core DPs moved into the shells.

The present study of imposters has thus permitted uncovering an a priori curious correlation. Namely, all of the cases in (197) share the property of permitting *ourself*:

- (197) a. Each one of us wants to improve *ourself*.
 b. Are we (= singular you) monitoring *ourself* as we should?
 c. We (= singular author) consider *ourself* expert in that matter.
 d. We (= the sovereign) hereby declare *ourself* immune to criticism.

As far as we know, only by analyzing the last three types as pronominal imposters and the first as involving agreement of a form with a singular partitive DP antecedent with the plural set DP of that antecedent can one reduce this to generalization (174). The latter permits *ourself* only in the case of a reflexive which agrees with a 1 person plural DP but is (in addition) anteceded by a singular one. As previously shown, in general, contexts permitting regular *ourselves* do not permit *ourself* because they cannot satisfy (174).

The various uses of *we* just mentioned do not exhaust potential cases of English pronominal imposters. Another is provided by generic *you*, illustrated in (198a):

- (198) a. You shouldn't pass a law, if you have no means to enforce it.
 b. One shouldn't pass a law, if one has no means to enforce it.

Here *you* evidently does not refer to the addressee but rather means essentially what *one* does in (198b). One could capture this by postulating that generic *you* is a pronominal imposter with a structure parallel to (194), but with a generic *one* notional DP. Again, as with nurse-

we, etc., the specification of the phi-feature values of the shell DP would be independent of agreement and associated ad hoc with a condition parallel to (195), one which, in this case, assigns 2 person to the empty D.

19. Conclusion

Forms of the type we have called (three DP) imposters have been noted and commented on for at least the better part of a century. But as far as we are aware, they have in general been considered to be merely 3 person forms with odd meanings. Not surprisingly then, we can find no previous syntactic analysis of them. And what we have considered treating as pronominal imposters seem to also have engendered no real syntactic investigation. We would be surprised if coordinate facts like those represented by (185) have ever been previously noticed.

The main result of the current work is a demonstration that, as the name chosen for them suggests, imposters are not what they seem, that is, not syntactically banal 3 person forms. Rather they have a rich syntactic structure containing covert elements. In particular then, the Notional Hypothesis is untenable. The principle evidence for such claims involves the interaction of imposters with pronominal agreement. As we have reiterated, imposters *in general* have a dual nature, being able to antecede 3 person pronominals via agreement with their shell DP or non-3 person pronominals via agreement with their covert notional DP, while still uniformly determining 3 person verbal agreement. This does not mean that particular imposters in particular contexts may not exclude one or the other of the a priori allowed varieties of pronominal agreement.

The basic idea grew out of the present authors' previous research on camouflage constructions (see Collins, Moody and Postal, 2008), at the end of which we first noticed the dual agreement ability of imposters (specifically, *yours truly*).

The question of the proper treatment of imposters impacts a host of major issues in syntax. These include:

- (199) a. the untenability of the Notional Hypothesis (contra e.g. Stirling and Huddleston, 2002: 1464-1465; Baker, to appear: Chapter 4: 14);
- b. the proper description of feature assignment to coordinate structures; our view conflicts with e.g. that of Dalrymple and Kaplan (2000). Moreover, we doubt that there is any previous treatment of this issue at all which takes into account the properties of coordinated imposters;

- c. the nature of the category of *person* and the issue of whether entities like AUTHOR and AUDIENCE exist;
- d. the nature of so-called ‘fake indexicals’, taken here to be *nonindexicals* which manifest unusual pronominal agreement with nonantecedents; our view takes this to be a nonsemantic phenomenon;
- e. the nature of what we have called pronominal imposters, forms with the overt shapes of simple pronouns whose denotations are, however, distinct from regular occurrences of those pronominal shapes;
- f. Last but not least, key implications of the current work relate to the role of co-indexation in the characterization of pronominal agreement. This deserves a bit of elaboration.

Focus on an imposter with shell DP S and core DP C. In the current antecedence-based framework, the Shell Antecedence principle, (95), determines that S ‘inherits’ all antecedence linkages independently entered into by C. In frameworks appealing to co-indexing, questions about related proposals would exist. Should S and C be co-indexed with each other? Should they be coindexed with other elements? For C, the answer to the latter question is surely positive.

Since this paper takes no stand on the existence of co-indexing, no answer about S can follow internal to it. However, as previously noted, since shell DPs determine pronominal agreement, an indexing system which, like that of Sag, Wasow and Bender (2003), depends on indices to describe pronominal agreement, must associate shell DPs with indices, since pronominals agree with them.

For us, an imposter’s semantic content is that of its core DP (plus that of the associated predicative modifier). And like inherent reflexives (e.g. that in *Carla behaved herself*), shell DPs have no semantic substance. Suppose that indices play a role in DP interpretation (see Fiengo and May, 1994 and Büring 2005 for detailed statements). Then, although essential for core DPs to bear indices, to capture the fact that imposters denote speakers or addressees, there is no *semantic* reason for imposter shell DPs *also* to bear them. So basing pronominal agreement on index assignments forces otherwise unmotivated indexing of phrases, shell DPs in particular.

That aside, the more important factual issue is whether such indexing offers an alternative approach to pronominal agreement, one embodying no appeal to anything like our

antecedence notion. We claim our results indicate that the posit of indexing cannot do the work assigned here to the antecedence relation.

Specifically, this is shown by what was revealed about two of the imposter properties treated above. First, consider the antecedence homogeneity property of section 15, which manifests in contrasts like:

(200) If *I₁/he₁ were not convinced he₁ could win, this reporter₁ would not run.

As shown earlier, in the bad subcase both *I* and the *he* subject of *could* require immediate antecedents external to the *if* clause since they are antecedent-linked. For *he* would have to be immediately anteceded by the shell DP of *this reporter*, *I* by some 1 person form, either the core DP of that imposter or AUTHOR. This violates (147). But in the grammatical version, the first *he* can be the immediate antecedent of the second, and take the imposter shell DP as its own immediate antecedent, satisfying (147).

These consequences depend on the asymmetrical antecedence relations holding between the core and shell DPs of *this reporter* and linked pronominals in the adjunct clause. While one might claim that the shell DP is coindexed with the core DP, without a notion like antecede, that would fail to distinguish the contrasting pair in (200), which would then come out as structurally identical. So just as indexing shell DPs is unmotivated by semantics, it cannot permit avoidance of a concept of antecedence with respect to homogeneity facts.

A parallel indication of the inability of shell coindexing to supplant the notion of antecedence derives from the principle C phenomena discussed in section 14. At issue were contrasts like:

(201) I₁/*He₁ used to believe people were trying to cheat yours truly₁.

As explicated there, in our antecedence-based system, this contrast reduces to a restricted version of principle C, (141) above. But since co-indexing the shell and core DPs leaves the pair in (201) undifferentiated, it can yield no basis for the contrast. Again then, while the facts do not preclude coindexation of shell DPs with their core DPs, such a move is excrescent and fails to provide the descriptive distinctions needed.

Our conclusion then is that regardless of whether indices exist and whether shell DPs are indexed, such notions do not provide a proper basis for analyzing the pronominalization facts linked to imposters. More generally then, they cannot eliminate appeal to antecedence in the description of natural language pronominals. This conclusion clashes, for instance, with the position of Sag, Wasow and Bender (2003: 208), that underlying their principle represented in our (17).

To recapitulate, we believe the preceding sections provide material relevant to each of the issues cited in (199) and document factual generalizations which need to be taken into account in reaching viable resolutions of the questions involved. Our hope is that this work will stimulate other researchers to study imposters in a wide range of languages and to seek to integrate their properties into broader theoretical frameworks. Rather than being anything like the last word even on English imposters, the present study is merely a first step in the investigation of what we find to be a neglected but surprisingly rich and intricate domain.

References

- American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition.* 2006. New York.
- Baker, Mark. to appear. *The Syntax of Agreement and Concord.* Cambridge University Press.
- Barker, Chris. 1998. Partitives, Double Genitives and Antiuniqueness. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 16.679-717.
- Bowers, John. 1993. The Syntax of Predication. *Linguistic Inquiry* 24: 591-656.
- Büring, Daniel. 2005. *Binding Theory.* Cambridge, England. Cambridge University Press.
- Cherchia, Gennaro and Sally McConnell-Ginet. 2000. *Meaning and Grammar.* Cambridge. MIT Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1980. *Rules and Representations.* New York. Columbia University Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1981. *Lectures on Government and Binding.* Dordrecht, Holland. Foris Publications.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1995. *The Minimalist Program.* MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Collins, Chris, Simanique Moody and Paul M. Postal. 2008. An AAE Camouflage Construction. *Language.*
- Curme, George O. 1931 *Syntax.* Boston, D. C. Heath and Company.
- Dalrymple, Mary and Ronald M. Kaplan. 2000. Feature Indeterminacy and Feature Resolution. *Language* 76.759-798.
- Dalrymple, Mary and Ronald M. and Kaplan. 2000. Feature Indeterminacy and Feature Resolution. *Language* 76.759-797.
- Den Dikken, Marcel. 2001. "Plurilinguals", Pronouns and Quirky Agreement. *The Linguistic Review.* 18.19-41.
- Den Dikken, Marcel. 2006. *Relators and Linkers.* Cambridge, The MIT Press.
- de Vries, Mark. 2006. The Syntax of Appositive Relativization: On Specifying Coordination, False Free Relatives, and Promotion. *Linguistic Inquiry* 37.229-270.
- Fiengo, Robert and Robert May. 1994. *Indices and Identity.* Cambridge, Massachusetts. The MIT Press.
- Fiengo, Robert and Robert May. 1997. The Semantic Significance of Syntactic Identity. *Atomism and Binding*, ed. by Hans Bennis, Pierre Pica and Johan Rooryck. 89-114. Dordrecht, Holland, Foris Publications.
- Grodzinsky, Yosef and Tanya Reinhart. 1993. The Innateness of Binding and Coreference. *Linguistic Inquiry* 24. 69-101.

- Higginbotham, James. 1983. Logical Form, Binding and Nominals. *Linguistic Inquiry* 14.395-420.
- Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey K. Pullum et. al. 2002. *The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language*. Cambridge, England. Cambridge University Press.
- Jespersen, Otto. 1913a. *A Modern English Grammar, Part II, Syntax, First Volume*. Copenhagen. Ejnar Munksgaard.
- Jespersen, Otto. 1924. *The Philosophy of Grammar*. London. George Allen & Unwin.
- Jespersen, Otto. 1949. *A Modern English Grammar, Part VII, Syntax*. Copenhagen. Ejnar Munksgaard
- Johnson, David E. and Paul M. Postal. 1980. *Arc Pair Grammar*. Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press.
- Joseph, Brian. 1979 On the Agreement of Reflexive Forms in English. *Linguistics* 17.519-523.
- Kathol, Andreas. 1999. Agreement and the syntax–morphology interface in HPSG. *Studies in Contemporary Phrase Structure Grammar*, ed. by Robert Levine and Georgia M. Green, 223-274. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kayne, Richard S. 2005. *Movement and Silence*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Kratzer, Angelika. 2007. Making a Pronoun. Ms., Amherst, Massachusetts, University of Massachusetts.
- Lagunoff, Rachel. 1997. *Singular they*. Los Angeles. University of California Doctoral Dissertation.
- Lasnik, Howard. 1989. The Necessity of Binding Conditions. *Essays on Anaphora*, 149-167. Dordrecht, Holland, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Lassiter, Daniel. 2007. Author Control and Imposters: Evidence for Syntactic Representation of Speaker and Addressee. Ms., NYU.
- Merchant, Jason. 2001. *The Syntax of Silence*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Merchant, Jason. 2007. Voice and Ellipsis. Ms., Chicago. University, Chicago.
- Partee, Barbara H. 1989. Binding Implicit Variables in Quantified Contexts. In *CLS* 25.
- Payne, John and Rodney Huddleston. 2002. Nouns and Noun Phrases. *The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language*. ed. by Rodney Huddleston and Geoffrey K. Pullum, 324-523. Cambridge, England. Cambridge University Press.
- Pollard, Carl J., and Ivan Sag. 1992. Anaphors in English and the scope of binding theory. *Linguistic Inquiry* 23, 262–303.

- Pollard, Carl J. and Ivan Sag. 1994. *Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar*. Chicago. University of Chicago Press.
- Postal, Paul M. 1989. *Masked Inversion in French*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
- Postal, Paul M. 1990. *French Indirect Object Demotion*. *Studies in Relational Grammar*: 3, ed. by Paul M. Postal and Brian D. Joseph. 104-200. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
- Postal, Paul M. 1996. A Glance at French Pseudopassives. *Grammatical Relations*. ed. by Clifford S. Burgess, Katarzyna Dziwirek and Donna Gerds. 391-428. Stanford, California. CSLI
- Potsdam, Eric. 1997. English Verbal Morphology Meets VP-Ellipsis. *Proceedings of the 27th Meeting of the North East Linguistics Society*. Amherst, Mass.: GLSA, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 353-368.
- Potts, Christopher. (to appear). Conventional Implicatures, a distinguished class of meanings. In Gillian Ramchand and Charles Reiss (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Interfaces*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Reuland, Eric, and Tanya Reinhart. 1991. Binding conditions and chains. *Proceedings of the Tenth West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics*, 399-415.
- Reinhart, Tanya and Eric Reuland. 1993. Reflexivity. *Linguistic Inquiry* 24, 657-720.
- Ross, John Robert. 1970. On Declarative Sentences. 222-272. *Readings in English Transformational Grammar*. ed. by Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum. Boston. Ginn.
- Ross, John Robert. 1967. *Constraints on Variables in Syntax*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Doctoral Dissertation [1986] Published as: *Infinite Syntax*, Norwood New Jersey, Ablex Publishing Corporation].
- Rullman, Hotze. 2004. First and Second Person Pronouns as Bound Variables. *Linguistic Inquiry* 35, 159-168.
- Sag, Ivan A., Thomas Wasow and Emily M. Bender. 2003. *Syntactic Theory*. Stanford, California: CSLI.
- Safir, Ken. 2004. *The Syntax of Anaphora*. New York. Oxford University Press.
- Speas, Peggy. 2000. Person and Point of View in Navajo. 2000. Eloise Jelinek, ed., *WCCFL Papers in Honor of Ken Hale*. Cambridge, Massachusetts. MIT Press.
- Stirling, Lesley and Rodney Huddleston. 2002. Deixis and Anaphora. *The Cambridge*

- Grammar of the English Language*. ed. by Rodney Huddleston and Geoffrey K. Pullum. Cambridge, England. Cambridge University Press.
- Tancredi, Christopher. 1997. Pronouns and Perspectives. *Atomism and Binding*. 381-407.
- Hans Bennis, Pierre Pica & Johan Rooryck (eds.). Dordrecht, Holland. Foris Publications.see): 106, 110-111, 135).
- Tenny, Carol and Peggy Speas. (to appear) Configurational Properties of Point of View Roles.
- Anna Maria Di Sciullo, ed., *Proceedings of UQAM Asymmetry Workshop*.
- Vazquez Rojas, Violeta. 2007. Indefinite Imposters. Ms., NYU.
- Wang, Arthur. 2007. Some Notes on Chinese Imposters. Ms., NYU.
- Zwicky, Arnold. 2004. Subject-verb Agreement. American Dialect Society. at: <http://listserv.linguistlist.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0403b&L=ads-l&P=7872>

¹ This usage is hardly novel or particular to (modern) English. Jespersen (1924: 217) remarked: "...Caesar, who in his commentaries throughout uses Caesar instead of the first pronoun." And Jespersen (1949: 127): "Occasionally a speaker uses his own name instead of the pronoun 'I'; thus in Sh Caesar and Othello often, taken by commentators as a sign of their pride." Moreover, names can also be used as 2 person imposters. A recently broadcast true crime program had a detective say to a female suspect named Roxanne: *You've got to look out for Roxanne*.

² The usage was of course traditionally noted; see Jespersen (1925: 217). Despite its special features, *yours truly* offers one enormous advantage to the study of imposters lacked by other English forms. It has almost no other sentential use except as an imposter, making searching for internet examples relatively easy. With others, one typically has to sort through enormous numbers of occurrences to find one which is unambiguously an imposter.

³ Phrases like *we dancers*, *you lawyers* are counterexamples. Their grammatical behavior is unexceptionally 1 person plural, e.g.:

i. We dancers are lithe aren't we/*they?

⁴ Of course, a condition of use of the set in (a_{ii}) is that the addressee(s) be a child/children, and moreover, those to whom the speaker bears the relation denoted by the term. This suggests inter alia that each involves a null instance of a 2 person possessive.

⁵ The use of kin terms as 1 person imposters was noted in Jespersen (1924: 217):

“Still another case is found when grown-up people in talking to small children say ‘papa’ or ‘Aunt Mary’ instead of ‘I’ in order to be more easily understood.”

⁶ Jespersen (1924: 218) observed: “Similarly a lover may say *my darling* or *my own girl* instead of *you*.” Use of the second phrase as an imposter seems impossible in contemporary American English.

⁷ Tancredi (1997: 385) states a distinct view even further from our position on imposters than the Notional Hypothesis.

⁸ The possibility for an imposter to appear in an environment normally requiring a reflexive does not extend to the environment of inherent reflexives, providing another distinction between these and standard reflexives:

- i. a. Roxanne better behave herself.
- b. *You better behave Roxanne/ROXANNE.

⁹ Condition (31) should probably be limited in scope to a single sentence.

¹⁰ For some speakers there may be an anti-logophoricity condition on imposter antecedence. For one of the authors, there is 0a difference between (a,b) and (c) below:

- i. a. This reporter said that he/??I should have won the prize.
- b. It was said by this reporter that he/??I should have won the prize.
- c. It was said of this reporter that he/?I should have won the prize.

¹¹ Our approach has a single DP with two distinct sets of phi-features internal to it, one for the core DP, one for the secondary DP. In this, it resembles the approach of Kathol (1999), who proposes that there are two sets of agreement features: the HEAD|AGR features which determine subject-verb agreement and the CONT|INDEX features which determine pronominal agreement.

¹² Note that while *I am yours truly* does not sound so great, *I remain yours truly* is acceptable, indicating that *yours truly* can be a predicate.

¹³ To guarantee the correlation in the text, we assume the following principle holds:

- i. Head/Maximum Projection Feature Matching

If X is the head of XP, then the phi-feature values of X and XP are identical.

¹⁴ Den Dikken (2006) proposes that expressions such as *the committee* which determine plural subject verb agreement (in British English), but have the overt form of a singular DP, are appositives with a null pronominal head [DP pro [DP the committee]]. There is some overlap between this view and our conception of imposters (e.g., both involve a null core). But we can not pursue the similarities here.

¹⁵ Spanish imposters do not obey generalization (64). There are two, *un servidor* and *un amigo*, which have the outward shapes of indefinite DPs but the same definite interpretations as e.g. corresponding English imposters; see Maldonado (2007) for discussion.

(65) Un servidor está intentando engañarse a sí mismo

A servant be.3sg trying fool.inf.refl Acc si self

“A servant (I) is trying to fool himself.” (Maldonado 2007: 2)

¹⁶ DPs with *certain* (e.g. *a certain linguist*) seem to more easily allow a 1 person imposter interpretation than the cited indefinites, since i. needs only a single question mark at worst.

i. ?A certain linguist and his spouse should concentrate on enjoying ourselves.

This property may be related to the semantic fact that the denotation of *a certain* DPs is known to the speaker, which is not true of cooperative uses of regular indefinites. This makes *certain* DPs semantically closer to definites.

¹⁷ Some indication that the demonstrative found in imposter uses of *this doctor/reporter* is rightfully to be distinguished from the normal deictic demonstrative comes from contrasts such as the following involving the use of *one* anaphora:

i. Many reporters believe that there is nothing more to this story, but

a. this reporter believes it is all a cover up.

b. *this one believes it is all a cover up.

Non-imposter DPs allow *one* anaphora (*this one*, *not that one*), but *one* anaphora is not possible with *this* type imposters.

¹⁸ Other analogs of Condition A also predict that the core notional DP in (71) would be unable to be the antecedent for a reflexive external to the shell. For example, the binding theory of Pollard and Sag (1992, 1994) states: A locally o-commanded anaphor must be locally o-bound. The problem is that the core is not on the SUBCAT of the matrix predicate, and so does not o-command a reflexive. A similar issue arises in the binding theory of Reuland and Reinhart (1991), Reinhart and Reuland (1993).

¹⁹ For instance, Brown and Miller’s (1999) encyclopedia of grammatical categories, contains no entry for *antecede(nt)*, whereas *binding* gets eight pointers and *binding theory* six more.

²⁰ In the framework of Johnson and Postal (1980), Postal (1989, 1990, 1996), there is no need for a special primitive antecede relation or any conceptual posits aiming solely to characterize antecedence. Rather, independent, aspects of the framework, the relations

Sponsor and Erase holding between arcs, can be taken to permit a relevant definition of antecedence between arcs, which then yields a trivial definition of antecedence between the nodes which are heads of those arcs. The overlapping arc idea appealed to there had various earlier instantiations that have had little influence. Their history is briefly traced in Johnson and Postal (1980: Chapter 11).

²¹ Tricia Irwin informs us of recently appearing, human-denoting expressions like *her grumpiness*, *her snootiness*, and more generally *her X-ness* where X is an adjective. We take these to be instances of a new camouflage construction and observe that it appears to obey (107):

- i. How is her grumpiness (*and snootiness) this morning?

²² Throughout this discussion, we are concerned only with *conjunctive* coordination. *Disjunctive* cases differ and we will not deal with them here. See e.g. Jespersen (1949: 137-139), Zwicky (2004) for some issues they raise.

²³ We must assume that on a binary branching analysis of [DP₁, (and) DP₂, (and) DP₃... , and DP_n] all the conjunct DPs (DP₁, DP₂,...DP_n) may count as conjuncts of the highest coordinate structure constituent. Otherwise, none of the principles elaborate below will function properly.

²⁴ This fact is apparently not universal. Anna Szabolcsi informs us that many instances of Hungarian coordinate structures are not plural.

²⁵ Dalrymple and Kaplan (2000: 760) remark as follows: “For example, when one *of the* conjuncts in a coordinate noun phrase in Slovak is first person, verb agreement shows that the person of the coordinate phrase is also first person:

(3) Ja a ty sme bratia.

I and you are. 1PL brothers

‘You and I are brothers.’

If the PERSON feature is represented as an atomic value such as 1 or 2, it is not clear how the rules for determining the person of coordinate phrases can be formulated in a non-ad-hoc way for examples like 3, since there is no straightforward way of operating on the features 1 and 2 of the individual conjuncts in 3 to obtain the feature 1 for the coordinate subject noun phrase.”

But of course what they take to be unclear is just what we claim to have specified here. A key reason the phenomenon they saw as problematic is not in present terms is that we have

not adopted a unification approach. So, as shown in the text, there is no special difficulty at all in giving a principle which determines the person value for coordinate phrases as a function of the atomic person values of their conjuncts.

Needless to say, Dalrymple and Kaplan's account, which involves set valued features, was not constructed with the properties of imposter coordination in mind and does not account for the features we have documented. We cannot speculate on how it might be modified to accomplish that.

²⁶ The movement of the core DP into the shell does not violate the Coordinate Structure Constraint (Ross 1967 [1986]), since there has been no movement out of a coordinate structure.

²⁷ Exceptions to this generalization include expletive pronouns (which lack antecedents), the shells of pronominal imposters such as Nurse-*we*, discussed in section 18, and pronouns agreeing with the set DPs of partitive expressions.

²⁸ Plausibly, there should also be covert DPs with a status parallel to AUTHOR denoting the time and the place of utterance. But these play no role in the present discussion.

²⁹ Jespersen (1949:127) seems to deny the existence of plural AUTHOR in the following: "As already remarked in vol II 4.52, *we* is not a normal pl (= several I's, like horses, etc.) but a pl of approximation = 'the speaker +some one else or some others'."

Of course, many instances of *we/us...*, and also *you*, have the mixed character Jespersen alluded to. See note 30.

³⁰ An obvious issue arises from cases like:

- i. Quentin said *we* could go to the movies.

Here, in some sense *we* might have a joint relation to AUTHOR and AUDIENCE, or to *Quentin* and AUTHOR; there are other 'mixed' possibilities. How can that be? One approach, already alluded to in the text, is a system in which such instances of *we/us* are a kind of replacement of conjoined pronominals, that is, schematically one reading of i. would be a mapping of ii.:

- ii. AUTHOR₁AUDIENCE [*Quentin*₂ said [*I*₁ and *he*₂] could go to the movies]

Of course, a serious account would have to spell out in detail the nature of such a mapping which would, evidently, depend heavily on the particular overall grammatical framework in which one would seek to embed it. We cannot consider such matters here.

³¹ In section 18, we propose that some 3 person singular pronouns are imposters, with a core and a shell. One such case is (i):

-
- i. *[K If I₁ were not convinced Mary and he₁ could win], this
reporter₁ would not have us run.

Even on the imposter analysis of the pronoun *he* in (i), the homogeneity condition is still needed. In this example, the immediate antecedent of *I* is EGO, the immediate antecedent of the core of *he* is *I* and the only immediate antecedent of the shell of *he* capable of providing its 3 person feature value is *this reporter*. This state of affairs is rightly ruled out by (147), but not otherwise.

³² Potsdam (1997) notes sentences like (i) which pose a problem for a syntactic identity condition:

- i. Chicken, she'll eat, but ostrich, she won't.

See also:

- ii. She may eat chicken, but ostrich, she definitely won't.

³³ See also Jespersen (1913b: 128): "*some of us* and *most of us* are, strictly speaking, in the third person; therefore we should say: Most of us lost their heads. But it is, at any rate, excusable, if the speaker includes himself, to say: Most of us lost our heads. Similarly with *most of you*."

³⁴ Since this form has no plural variant, it cannot be tested for bound variable readings in the partitive cases.

³⁵ A similar observation is made independently in Kratzer (2000).

³⁶ See the *Free Dictionary* at <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ourself>, and the *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*.