On The Syntax of Raising Verbs

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1. Introduction:

In this paper we will try to get some insight on the so-called "raising structures" with verbs like "seem", "appear", "occur" and the like. We will first deal with the traditional definition of raising, and then briefly review some new foundings. We will then attempt a new description of raising structures -using a modified version of Mateu Fontanals' *Relational Semantics*- as well as an explanation on some constraints on the lexical realization of the experiencer and the apparent "quirky subject" situation generated when both the clitic and the PP are fronted with basis on *Relevance Theory*. Finally, we will propose a radically minimalist theory of raising taking into account both narrow syntax and the interface with semantics, as a provisional point of departure for future research.

2. Development:

The difference between raising and control predicates was developed within the GB model, as the difference, in Hornstein's (2003) terms, between "*Movement and Construal*". The postulation of the existence of the empty category PRO as subject in non-finite clauses selected by a theta-assigner was essential in the further development of the theory, since non-finite clauses selected by non-theta-assigners had to be characterized differently from those selected by verbs with a theta grid. That difference was accounted for via movement of the embedded subject to the matrix subject position to receive Case. The relevant structures in each case were:

i) $John_i$ wants/tries/hopes/likes [PRO_i to go camping] *Control Structure*

ii) $John_i$ seems/appears/occurs (to me) [t_i to be sleeping] *Raising Structure*

In (ii), non-finite T is unable to check[1] NOM Case with the external argument of the embedded clause, so after theta-assignment, that subject needs to *rise* to a position in which NOM Case can be checked. In (i), both the main V and the embedded V are theta-assigners (and thus impose semantic constraints on the arguments they can co-occur with), and since an element cannot bare more than *one* theta-role (or acquire extra theta roles in the

[1] In GB terms, NOM and ACC Case were not *checked* but *assigned* via *government*. *Checking* features is an operation devised within the MP, from Chomsky (1995) to Chomsky (1998), where *checking* (a relation between a *head* and a *Spec*-) was replaced by *matching* (a relation between a *probe* and a *goal*). We will not, however, deal with these theoretical problems.

course of the derivation, according to the fully developed formulation of the Theta-criterion in Chomsky, 1981), the existence of two different elements had to be posited: a null category PRO is controlled by the subject of the main clause (that is, it has the same "referent" and features), and receives an independent theta-role and case (apparently, *null* case).

From Chomsky (1999) on, it has been assumed that, while *control* structures are full CPs (therefore, *strong phases*), *raising* structures are TPs, with a defective T node. We will not review the arguments Chomsky gives in favor of this proposal (as we have done it elsewhere, see Krivochen 2010b), but we can have a look at some consequences and implications of this theory. Saying that *control* structures are CPs equals saying that there is independent case-assignment in the embedded clause, and since C is a phase head, no element can escape from the CP domain (because of the PIC), which has been transferred at the point of C_0 merging (Chomsky, 1998, but see Chomsky, 1999 for a different view on this and Krivochen, 2010b for a comparison of both proposals). PRO stays *inert* in Spec-TP without any further possibilities of moving, since an element with no uninterpretable features cannot be taken for future computations, it is, we will say, *frozen in place*.

On the other hand, TPs are *not* strong phases in English (but see Gallego, 2010 for the possibility of having TP phases in romance languages), and therefore it is possible for an external probe to have access to the clause, and for an element with uninterpretable features ([u-Case]) to move up after valuating its own features to satisfy a requirement of the probe (say, an EPP feature in the T node of the matrix clause)[2]. The lack of CP layer also makes the embedded TP *defective*, that is, lacking a full complex of φ-features, and with its [TENSE] feature only receiving a residual interpretation (see Chomsky, 2005, 2007; although the meaning of "residual interpretation" remains unclear). If this element does not bare a full set of φ-features, it cannot check NOM-Case, taking as valid that a probe can only check Case if it has a full set of φ-features, as Chomsky (1998 on) explicitly does. ***This is what triggers DP raising in traditional generative models, regardless any particular proposal*** (Chomsky's, Hornstein's, Grohmann's, to put only a few examples)***: the impossibility of getting (in the way one prefers, checking, matching, licensing) NOM Case in the non-finite embedded clause***. To sum up, let us compare the two trees, according to what has been said so far:

[2] This could be seen as an instance of what Hornstein (2003) calls "enlightened self interest", as opposed to pure *greed*. In this framework, both the probe and the goal can trigger movement, whereas in Chomsky's (1995) approach, an element only moves if the movement results in the checking of a feature in that element, regardless of the attractor.

Raising Structure *Control Structure*



In a Control structure, both PRO and the subject DP merge in a theta-position and receive Case within their respective clauses, whereas in a Raising structure the subject merges in a theta-position, but it has to move as part of the checking / matching. It would be useful at this point to remember that we have a composite operation here, namely:

a) **Search** in a minimal c-command domain

b) **Agree** (same dimension, one valued, the other, unvalued)

c) **Internal merge** to the periphery of the probe

Now that we have taken a look at the orthodox generativist approach to raising, let us go on considering the RSS that underlies these constructions.

2.1 RSSs and raising:

We will take RSSs to be hierarchical, binary-branched structures of semantic primitives, construals which are made up of generic concepts that are built in a pre-syntactic instance of the C-I component / module of the mind-brain by the same means that any other module uses for combination purposes: the operation *merge*[3]. These structures represent the three basic construals that help us organizing the sensorial experience in spatial terms: the *unergative* construal, the *unaccusative* construal and the *(di)transitive* construal. RSS are generated from the projection of three nodes: *R*, a causative node that licenses the presence of an *initiator*, T, a transitional-eventive node related with telicity and *r*, a spatial node that establishes a relation between two non-relational elements (*figure* and *ground*, using Talmy's words) in terms of *central-terminal coincidence*. These RSS must be later on *transduced* (in very much a Fodorian way) to syntactic terms, since one of our main claims here and in other papers is that *RSSs are not syntactic*. Semantic primitives are generic concepts, *a-categorial* (by which we mean that not only they lack category, but that they *cannot be categorized*), non-linguistic and accessible by many other faculties within the mind-brain. The Faculty of Language (FL) deals with *roots*, linguistic instantiations of these *generic concepts*. Roots are *pre-categorial*, that is, they do not bare category, but they must "acquire" one by merger with a suitable head (which we call a "categorizer", in the tradition of Marantz, 1997, Fábregas, 2005 and Panagiotidis, 2009, 2010)[4]. The RSS is the semantic construal that underlies a given piece of language or a given "piece of thought". In this section, we will analyze the RSS of raising structures.

Let us consider in the first place the structure proposed (very tentatively) by Juan Stamboni (p.c)[5]. He claims that raising verbs (seem, appear, happen, occur) are in fact *unaccusative*, and therefore, lack a causative node but have a relational node within which theta-roles are interpreted:

[3] For a detailed discussion, see Boeckx (2010) and Krivochen (2010d).

[4] The distinction was devised in parallel to the one explained in Boeckx (2010) between *concepts* and *conceptual addresses*, but even though the notions may seem similar, the implications we draw are quite different from his.

[5] The following representation is used by Stamboni with pedagogical purposes only, and it must not be taken as a theoretical proposal. However, we take it as a point of departure, since it is the only RSS representation of raising we know of.



We can see here that the {*r*, {[TO], DP / Ø}} projection corresponds to a *location*, in this case, a *mind*. If we have a pronoun or another overt DP (such as a proper name), the experiencer will be individual and definite, but if we have a null element (Ø), we interpret a *generic experiencer*. The spatial relation, then, is established between a *theme* (a whole idea, a "proposition", in logical terms) and a *location* (an experiencing mind, either individual or generic).

We find some problems with this representation. To begin with, we cannot have a full CP as *figure*: CPs are *fully-fledged judgments*, the final product of the syntax, and thus we could not find them in a pre-syntactic purely conceptual instance. Another problem is the relation between the *figure* and the *ground*: we can see a *terminal coincidence node*, but we will claim that if it seems to you [that…], and the CP is the syntactic realization of what can be generically considered a "belief", you ***have*** the belief, and therefore the coincidence should be *central*, since the P [with] is equivalent to the V [have] (as we can see in the analysis of DOCs), and the distribution of both *figure* and *ground* must be changed. However, a *terminal coincidence node* is apparently necessary to account for the preposition that introduces the doubled experiencer (clitic + PP), both in English and in Spanish:

i) *A mí* me parece [que…]

ii) It seems *to me* [that…]

iii) It occurs *to me* [that…]

We will replace the previous representation with the following one, which will suffer modifications throughout the development of the paper:



The [THING] primitive that we see in Compl-*r* is equivalent to an [EVENT], it is, in fact, an event, but *conceptualized as a noun expression*. The [THING] in Spec-*r* is the mind that *has* the belief. As Stamboni (2005) says, "(…) *the nature of the 'entities', in a very broad sense, that linguistic expressions talk about, do not depend on the nature of "reality" so much as on the nature of the* ***structure*** *that human beings* ***impose*** *on the world as a result of their* ***conceptual organisation*** (…)". Therefore, a whole judgment can be conceptualized as a "thing", and we thus avoid the first problem. The interpretation of this element will occur in a post-syntactic instance of C-I, and we have FL in the middle to provide C-I with "clues" as to how to interpret the relation between conceptual entities, namely, *procedural categories*.

We have dealt so far with structures without raising, in which the embedded CP is finite, let us see what would happen if we had something like:

iv) John$_i$ seems (to me) [t_i to...]

In this case, going back to Stamboni's tree we would have to replace the CP we saw in the other representation for a TP (according to Chomsky), from which to extract the subject. Here, we argue that this is one of the strongest proofs of the inadequacy of the first tree. According to the *Condition on Extraction Domains* (Huang, 1982), we cannot extract material either from a Spec- or from an adjunct, as we can see in the following examples:

v) *What$_i$ did John say that he liked the book very much [when you brought t_i]? *Wh- element extracted from the adjunct*

vi) *¿Quién$_i$ [la novia de t_i] vino ayer? *Wh- element extracted from an element in Spec-TP* (Cf. ¿La novia de quién vino ayer?, an example in which we extract *the whole Spec-*)

vii) *¿De qué$_i$ diste [el libro t_i] a María? (compare with "Diste el libro de cuentos a María", where [El libro de cuentos] is in Spec-PP and [de cuentos] is an abridged restrictive relative clause adjunct to the NP

[cuentos]. In this example we are extracting an element from an adjunct which is on a Spec-position).

According to this principle, we could not extract an element from inside Spec-*r*. That is, we think, powerful evidence in favor of changing the representation. If we consider that the clause is in Compl-*r*, no problem arises. What is more, if we argue that such a complex element as a clause is on a Spec-position, we have no other choice than to resort to parallel derivations to generate the complex Spec- and then apply a Generalized Transformation to insert the tree into the main one, *à la* Uriagereka (1999 / 2002), with all concomitant (theoretical and empirical) problems. In our structure, the syntactic derivation can proceed bottom-up in strict binary order, and if we posit that the *r* node is a *central coincidence relation* between an event and a mind, no special correspondence rule is needed in the semantics-syntax interface.

Digression 1: <u>On the nature of non relational elements and procedural instructions:</u>

Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986 / 1995, Wilson & Sperber, 2003, Yus, 2010) makes a distinction between *conceptual* and *procedural* contents, instantiated in conceptual and procedural categories respectively. *Conceptual content* refers to entities, either nominal or verbal (which are, in turn, derived from nominals), and *procedural content* refers to instructions as to how to relate conceptual elements and how to interpret that relation in the construction of the semantic-post-syntactic representation of the explicit content of a sentence, the *explicature.* Those contents are instantiated in categories in the syntax, because FL is the only module where the notion of "category" itself has any relevance. We will try to use the notion of procedural instruction to explain the syntactic realization of the primitive [THING] as a TP / CP in the syntax. For us, that primitive carries a procedural feature that triggers a syntactic process. We can think of the former as the primitive [EVENT] in Jackendoff's *Thematic Tier.* Recall that Jackendoff's tiers made use of rewriting rules, so that in a semantic function, a given primitive had to be replaced by a string of primitives, until a wholly developed formula was generated. Let us say, for expository purposes only, that the primitive [THING] we are dealing with carries an instruction for the syntax in the form of a procedural feature [F], something like "insert a fully-fledged clause here", or, in EST terms, "*rewrite* this terminal node as a whole clause", a rule that could be formalized in purely semantic terms as (viii)

viii) $[\text{THING}_{[F]}] \rightarrow [\text{EVENT}]$

[THING] *is a terminal primitive, that is, it does not rewrite*.

Where:

ix) [EVENT] → { [CAUSE ([THING], [EVENT])] *Transitive /Unergative Vs*; [GO ([THING], [PATH])] *Telic Unaccusative Vs*; [BE ([THING], [PLACE])] *Atelic Unaccusative Vs* }

Traditionally, non relational elements have been thought to bear conceptual content, but we see that we need to resort to procedural meaning to account for the fact that a judgment is conceptualized as a nominal expression and as such is manipulated by C-I in the assembly of RSSs. When this feature is absent, the primitive [THING] is instantiated as a DP, the *default* linguistic expression (a concept that can be think of as analogue of that of "Canonical Structural Realization", used by Chomsky during the '80) of that generic concept.

The fact that two linguistic instantiations may correspond to the same semantic primitive has lead us to the following preliminary conclusions:

a) RSSs are the way in which thought is organized and complex conceptual elements are built from a small set of primitive elements and a unique combinatory operation[6], and are therefore *not* linguistic, but much more abstract and apparently accessible by other mental modules than FL

b) An intermediate level[7] (an interface) inserts and rearranges elements in the RSS according to syntactic requirements (for example, creating the necessary configuration for Case to be licensed)

2.1.1 Different verbs considered:

We have accepted Stamboni's hypothesis that raising verbs are in fact *unaccusative*. But if this is really so, we have a further distinction to make: unaccusative verbs can be either *telic* (presentational, motion) or *atelic* (existential, spatial configuration). The transitional primitive [GO] corresponds to the former, [BE], to the latter. The primitive we use in each case depends on the relation that the verbs in question establishes between the proposition and the mind. Let us analyze some examples:

a) *Seem*, *appear*: [BE]

[6] For details, see Krivochen (2010d).

[7] In Krivochen (2010b), we have identified this interface level with Distributed Morphology's A List.

b) *Occur*: [GO]

In the (a) cases, we have a *spatial configuration* unaccusative V. The idea is located in the mind, and it was there prior to the utterance. That is, if *it seems to you* or *it appears to you* [that John is a good man], that is an opinion you have permanently, a state that goes beyond the moment of the utterance in both directions, past and future.

[Occur], on the other hand, is a *presentational* unaccusative V. The idea appeared in your mind in a certain moment in time, linked to the features in T (we will see that T is not the only head whose features have to be considered). If it occurred to you [that…], then it was like an epiphany, an achievement, and, therefore, something *telic*. [Happen], used as a raising verb, seems to belong to this class.

We have to bear in mind that the "pure" unaccusative use of the verbs and their "raising" use may differ as regards the transitional primitive. For example, [appear] as an unaccusative V is a *presentational unaccusative*, and therefore *telic*, but we have seen that it behaves like a *spatial configuration* when used in a raising structure. We have to think in terms of *metaphorical* use of the Vs. Apparently, these raising V are metaphoric uses of some unaccusative Vs, and the metaphor sometimes requires the primitive to be changed, as in the case of [appear].

2.2 The (narrow) syntax of raising revisited:

So far, we have been taking a look at the RSS that underlies the syntactic structure. Following the order of the derivation of a linguistic expression, it is time to turn our attention to the syntax proper[8], the *computational system* $C_{(HL)}$, which receives this semantic representation enriched with categorizers and functional categories so as to make it more a linguistically legible structure than a pure expression of thought. Let us begin by taking some examples, always bearing in mind that the RSS is *unique*, and does not vary in any way, all modifications are performed by the semantics-syntax interface or by the syntax itself:

x) $Juan_i$ parece [t_i ser un buen pibe]

xi) $John_i$ appears / seems [t_i to be a good boy]

xii) Me parece [que Juan es un buen pibe]

[8] We use the expression "syntax proper" or "narrow syntax" to refer to the *linguistic* mechanism that merges discrete elements. Syntax, used in general terms, can (and, in fact, we use it that way) refer to an algorithm usable by any component of the mind-brain to generate complex structures from simple discrete units, linguistic or not.

xiii) It seems to me [that John is a good boy]

xiv) A mí me parece [que Juan es un buen pibe]

xv) $Juan_i$ me parece [t_i ser un buen pibe]

xvi) A mí, $Juan_i$ me parece [t_i (ser) un buen pibe]

xvii) *A mí, Juan parece [un buen pibe]

xviii) It occured to me [that John may be a good boy]

xix) It happened [that John was doing something strange when I came in]

xx) $John_i$ happened [t_i to be doing something strange when I came in]

We will first take a look at the syntactic structure, and after having the whole picture, we will be able to analyze some other questions regarding, for example, experiencers and apparent quirky subjects.

We said that a raising structure, being unaccusative, involves a relation between a *theme* (propositional) and a *location* (a mind), and that that relation was one of possession, since the mind can be said to *have* the idea. But we also said that the *terminal coincidence relation* was justified if one takes into account the experiencer and the prepositions that realize its doubling both in English and in Spanish. To solve this problem, we have to resort to an idea of Mateu (2008, 2010), that is, to decompose the *r* node in two: a π (Path) node and a P (Place) node. This descriptive device was originally used to explain the nature of elements such as the preposition [into], which encodes both *path* and *location*, and some delimitative Ps in structures like "He heated the soup up", which means "he heated the soup up to a point where no further heating was possible". We will "split" *r* in the syntax in π and P, and generate the experiencer in π as a head, since the PP [a / to + DP] is a doubling of this element, a clitic (as we can see in (xvii), where the PP is overtly realized but there is no clitic, with ungrammatical results). English has no overt clitics, but we will posit that there can be (in fact, there *must* be) a null clitic in π to license the PP. The structure would be as follows:



In our representation, the subject raises from inside a complement, which is allowed by CED, and the split *r* allows us to account for the terminal nature of the experiencer PP and the fact that the experiencer has an idea / proposition *in* mind. The clitic [me], in Spanish, then adjoins the V and the whole complex moves to T. Different linguistic varieties (chronolects, for example[9]) may differ as regards the position of the clitic (proclitic or enclitic), but the most common in casual conversation in standard register and style is *pro*clitic: me-parece. This adjunction process would be banned by the *Head Movement Constraint* if the experiencer was generated in any other position, in Stamboni's first representation, we would have to adjoin a P´ to a head, which is impossible because of two reasons: first, only heads or fully-fledged phrases can adjoin / incorporate onto heads, and second, intermediate projections are "invisible" to the computational system (see Chomsky, 1994), so they cannot be moved.

Taking this representation to be valid, we will continue analyzing the problem of raising. The motivations of raising have always been argued to be Case-related, but we will pursue other possibility: **movement is never triggered by Case reasons, because case is not checked or matched, but *licensed*.** That is, we defend that there is no need for checking theory to exist, if syntax can operate within local domains. To support this view, let us take this quote from Rizzi (2004):

Feature K is licensed (checked, valued…) on (H, XP) only if:

i) XP is a Minimal Configuration with H and,

ii) C-command holds

[9] In XVII century Spanish, for example, it was not strange to find forms like "envió-le / se-lo", "rompió-lo", etc.

A minimal configuration must be understood as a locality requirement: no potential "governor" (in classic GB terms) must c-command XP but exclude H, being of the same type than one of those: either a head or a maximal projection. The head must have certain features that can license the feature on the XP, but there is no reason why valuation or anything like it should be put in play. Let us assume that NOM Case is licensed by finite T, and no other head can license it. If this is true (as it seems to be the case), then even if we have a V (or *v*) head between T and XP in the embedded clause, the intervenient head will not be a problem, since it cannot license NOM, and if it licensed any other case (say, ACC), the derivation would crash at the interface levels. The T head in the main clause must be capable of reaching the Spec-TP of the embedded clause, and although it seems quite distant, locality is not measured, as some linguists think, by number of branches, but by Minimality conditions within a *phase*.

But, if licensing is a process that can dispense with movement, since it only needs locality to hold between H and XP, then why do we have raising? The answer may have to do with the concept of *theme* and processes involved in other constructions as well. Let us consider the whole picture as we have described it (marking only relevant processes):



Now we can analyze this structure on the light of Rizzi's proposal. What we have to do now is check whether the conditions for the Case Feature in the DP obtain. Let us proceed bottom-up. After the complete assembling of the thematic domain (*v*P / VP), we merge a T node. This T, being non-finite, cannot license NOM Case in the relevant argument. If V tried to license ACC / OBJ in that DP the derivation would crash, as we have already said, so we must find an appropriate probe for NOM licensing. All the heads that are merged until matrix T are unable to license NOM, so they are not intervenient heads in terms of Minimality. If the only requirement to license NOM is finite T, which would be the optimal scenario (and the one we will assume), then matrix T is the only appropriate probe. As there are no intervenient heads between T and DP, T (H in Rizzi's definition) can license a feature in DP (XP). So how and why do we fill Spec-TP? The answer seems to have to do with the concept of *theme*. One proposal could be the following: we can dispense with [EPP] if we consider that Spec-TP is an *informationally relevant* position, in terms of the construction of the explicature. Of course we are not trying to do discourse analysis here, but it is known that the dynamic *old information-new information* is important for determining the relevance of a proposition. If it only provides old information, it will not be relevant. If it provides only new information, then we will not be able to select an appropriate context to process it, and optimal relevance could not be achieved. Elements that move to Spec-TP are *themes*, and when we have mere presentational sentences, which introduce new referents to the discourse, an *expletive* is required:

xxi) There is a book on the table

xxii) Hay un libro sobre la mesa

[a book] is not an element that can be independently manipulated by C-I, that is, it is *not a phase* in Krivochen's (2010b) terms. Indefinite elements cannot rise because they *cannot be theme*, as they are newly introduced. Sentences like (xxi) and (xxii) are called *thetic sentences*, as they lack *theme*[10]. Spec-TP seems to be a position reserved to elements whose features of definiteness have already been licensed (in the way described in Krivochen, 2010a) and that are thus able to function as *theme*. Violations of these descriptive generalizations rarely generate ungrammaticality (since no principles of the grammar are violated), but semantic anomaly at the *explicature* level. See, for example, (xxiii):

xxiii) ?! There seems John to be in the room (irrelevantly, [There seems to be John in the room] is equally anomalous)

[10] For a detailed analysis of these sentences, and existential sentences in general, see Stamboni (2008).

[John], as a proper noun, is by definition *thematic*, and thus its raising is "obligatory" for the explicature to be built without any problems. But bear in mind that Case can be assigned without raising, and therefore, it would be wrong to regard (xxiii) as ungrammatical because of case reasons, which is what the generativist orthodoxy would say. Interestingly, we have a preference of Move over Merge for *interface* reasons, contrary to what the Merge-over-Move principle would lead us to think.

Movement to Spec-TP is, then, triggered by interface conditions, namely, C-I conditions on the construction of the *explicature*.

2.2.1 Why are raising structures TPs? Why *must* they be?:

Chomsky (1999) presents a clear asymmetry between Control and Raising structures: the former are full CPs, whereas the latter are mere TPs. His reasons, we will not review here, but we will give our own view on the topic. To do so, we have to resort to the concept of *phase* as outlined in Krivochen (2010b):

P is a phase in a level L iff it is the smallest term fully interpretable by the next level.

A further assumption we make is that, following Pesetsky's "Earliness principle", *transfer* must apply as early as possible, that is, as soon as a fully interpretable object is generated *in real time*. Now, let us analyze the structure of the clause according to Chomsky (1986) and subsequent work, that is, [CP [TP [VP]]]. As we have argued elsewhere, VP (or *v*P) denotes an event, but a generic event, that may or may not include a relational projection (i.e, PP). The merger of T results in a localization of the event in the time dimension, with which it gains reference, a process analogue to that occurring in DPs. However, we will introduce here what we consider an important tool, both for theoretical and practical purposes: *Split TP*. We argue that TP (that is, Tense Phrase) must be split into three projections, in order to account for multiple phenomena (such as definiteness licensing, see Krivochen, 2010a):

a) Modality Phrase: in terms of [± realis] primarily

b) Aspect Phrase: in terms of [± perfective]

c) Time Phrase: in terms of [± present]

Different meanings arise from the combination of the values of these nodes. For example, let us analyze the conformation of the notions "present", "past" and "future" in these terms:

- Present: [+ present], [+ realis]

- Past: [- present], [+ realis]
- Future: [- present], [- realis]

The values of AspP depend on the decision of the speaker to present an event as a point in time or as a developing event with internal complexity, and therefore we have not included them in the definition in order not to generate confusion, but it is undoubtedly important.

Once we have merged a complete TP, we introduce AspP, since it must have scope over the definite event; and we have a complete event, a fully-fledged *dictum*, in Bally's terms. This is all what we need in raising structures. Embedded raising structures are non finite clauses (with *relative* tense, according to Comrie) with the following structure: [AspP [TP [VP]]]. Our claim here will be that this structure is *not a phase*, since it is not completely interpretable by the interface systems: it lacks the expression of the attitude of the speaker towards the dictum, which is encoded in the so-called "left periphery" or, in our terms, ModP. We must take into account that for a head to have scope over a proposition, it must be *outside the proposition itself*. Therefore, ModP has scope over a syntactic element that is taken as a whole, but that is not completely interpretable: *higher-level explicatures* need ModP and the "discourse-relevant nodes" TopP, FocP, etc. If the AspP term (that is, AspP and its domain taken as a syntactic object) is not completely interpretable, then it is *not a phase* according to our definition, and is therefore *not transferred*. This means that the matrix T node *can freely access* the embedded TP, since it is still active in the working space. Then, licensing and movement occur as we have said before. If we claimed that Raising structures are "full CPs", then, as we will see below, licensing could not take place, and the derivation would crash.

Now let us take a look at Control structures, to see in what ways they differ from Raising structures. Ignoring proposals like Hornstein's "Movement Theory of Control" for the time being, embedded Control clauses have a PRO subject, with independent Case and Theta-role with respect to its controller. This independency is what has led us to think that Control clauses are *phases*, and that since *transfer* has taken place, an external probe cannot access the clause to license anything. The fact that the embedded clause has independent case and theta-licensing means that there is also independent *transfer* and independent *explicature* interpretation. Full clauses include not only *dictum* but also *modus*, which is encoded in procedural nodes like ModP and the nebulous "left periphery", and must therefore be full CPs, in traditional GB / MP terms. The difference between Control and Raising is simply the difference between independent transfer and interpretation and accessibility in the embedded clause to license features, and only *one explicature* for the whole structure.

2.2.2 Quirky subjects and the left periphery:

Now we will drive our attention to examples such as:

xv) $Juan_i$ me parece [t_i ser un buen pibe]

xvi) A mí, $Juan_i$ me parece [t_i (ser) un buen pibe]

xvii) *A mí, Juan parece [un buen pibe]

We have already said that the experiencer clitic is generated as the head of the π projection, and then it adjoins the V in the PF branch of the derivation, since clitics are syntactically but not phonologically independent units. The problem we will try to address now is that of the doubling of the experiencer by a PP. Being a doubling, it may not be "base-generated", but merely added post-syntactically, as a form of *fission*: the same features are spelled-out by means of two different vocabulary items, in two different places. This PP is not an argument, but the doubling of an argument, and it therefore occupies an A´-position: when we have a covert clitic, we cannot phonologically realize the PP, as (xvii) clearly shows. This means that, if we have a sentence like:

xxiv) It seems to me [that…]

We should suppose that there is a covert π head, a null equivalent to the Spanish clitic that is licensing the presence of the overt PP. This proposal leads us to a more uniform account of raising, since we have only one underlying structure, and the rest is left to idiosyncrasies of the B List of particular languages (that is, for example, the availability of clitics to spell-out the π node).

(xvi) faces us with a situation in which we have both raising and doubling. The natural thing to suppose would be that Juan lands in Spec-TP, as it is *thematic* and definite. The PP should land in a higher position, therefore, we will think of it as landing on the left periphery. However, this is by no means an explanation, but barely a description of what we see there. Let us consider the following example:

xxv) A mí me parece [que…]

Can we say that the PP lands in Spec-TP? Our answer is *no*. TP can be characterized as a *semantically transparent position*, by which we mean that it does not generate any entailments, presuppositions or other semantic implicatures. TopP can be associated with a contrastive value, that is:

xvi) A mí (no a Pedro), $Juan_i$ me parece [t_i un buen pibe]

On the contrary, Spec-TP only entails "*themehood*":

xxvi) ?! Juan (no Pedro) me parece [t_i ser un buen pibe]

Of course, the contrastive value can be achieved if we make [Juan] phonologically prominent, but in that case, the contrastive value would be carried by the phonology, and *not by the syntactic position*.

The question that we must ask ourselves now is what happens when we have doubling but not raising. That is, how do we account for sentences like (xxvii)?

xxvii) A mí me parece [que…]

In that case, [a mí] can perfectly be said to carry contrastive value, as (xxvii´) is perfect:

xxvii´) A mí, no a Pedro, me parece [que…]

Then, we cannot claim that the PP is in other position than Spec-TopP (or elsewhere in the left periphery). What happens with Spec-TP in this example? We have two ways of solving this problem, which ultimately subsumes in one: first, we can consider that the structure of (xxvii) is:

[$_{TopP}$ A mí [$_{Top}$ Ø][$_{TP}$ pro [$_{T}$ me-parece] [$_{VP}$…]]]

In which case, Spec-TP is occupied by a *pro* element. However, the motivations for this analysis are far from clear. Why should Spec-TP be occupied in the first place? The answer we would get from the core tendencies in Generative Grammar would be that something must be put there in order to check the [EPP] feature in T, a feature that requires that a clause have a subject. Several linguists have argued against the EPP since the late '90s (linguists to which we refer the reader, like Bong-Kim, Epstein & Seeley, Grohmann, among others), and we do not find any reason why this principle that was somehow transformed into a feature should have a place in a really minimalist theory. Therefore, the simplest (and, optimally, the correct) representation for (xxvii) should actually be:

[$_{TopP}$ A mí [$_{Top}$ Ø][$_{TP}$ [$_{T}$ me-parece] [$_{VP}$ …]]]

Where the Spec-TP position is not even projected, since in the real-time course of the derivation nothing has merged there. Our conclusion is that, in particular, there are *not* quirky subjects in raising constructions, and, in a more general spirit, that the whole theory of quirky subjects should be revisited, in terms of the semantic implications of the different positions arguments take in the syntax and without any stipulation like the EPP, which forces us to introduce an extra element to the derivation, an element we can perfectly dispense with.

2.3 Experiencers and raising predicates:

Now we turn to the analysis to the compatibility of the overt realization of the experiencer with certain matrices of features. In Krivochen (2010a) we have argued that the features of nominal expressions are licensed by the procedural heads Time, Aspect and Modality, taking concepts from both Minimalist syntax and Relevance Theory. Here, we will try to apply that procedure to experiencers.

According to Stamboni (2010), *perfective* aspectual features *require* the overt realization of the experiencer. We will try to account for examples like these:

xxviii) *Pareció que María había muerto mientras dormía

xxix) Nos pareció que María había muerto mientras dormía.

Our original thesis in Krivochen (2010a) was that:

> ***La valuación de un rasgo, entonces, no depende de la categoría que componga, sino de la relación local de cotejo que establezca ese rasgo (esa categoría) con determinados nodos funcionales en la estructura sintáctica.*** *Asimismo, la contrapartida de esta hipótesis en términos de TR es que* ***no hay una relación uno-a-uno entre categoría y codificación procedimental en el sentido en que pueda decirse que una categoría codifica procedimentalmente una determinada instrucción a priori, sino que esa codificación también es composicional***

In that paper we had found an apparent correlation between *perfectivity* and *definiteness*, which could be better explained in terms of optimal relevance: the valuation of definiteness in a local relation with [+ perf] Asp_0 seems to be the most accessible option for the inferential module to process. As we have pointed in that paper, it is just a non-deterministic correlation, but it seems that that licensing is the most accessible one when we have a perfective node. If this is so, then we could argue that the incompatibility of the covert realization of the experiencer is due to the fact that we would be choosing an option (that is, an LF in terms of Relevance Theory) that cannot lead us to the construction of an optimally relevant explicature.

Imperfective aspect requires a more detailed analysis, since it allows both the overt and the covert version of the experiencer. This situation in raising is analogue to the following:

xxx) El elefante **comía** varios kilos de comida (al día).

As we said in Krivochen (2010a), in this example, both the generic and the definite interpretation are available in isolation, thus, no option is obviously more relevant that the other since there is no procedural clue to construct a context that favors either of them:

a) Todo elefante comía varios kilos de comida

b) Un elefante previamente mencionado y parte del conocimiento común comía varios kilos de comida

The same principle applies to raising structures and the overt realization of the experiencer. Our conclusion would be that both an overt experiencer and a covert experiencer *could* be optimally relevant, but only if the proposition is processed in different contexts[11], thus generating different positive cognitive effects. The only variant would be that we would be referring to a specific mind or to a generic mind, as we showed in the trees above.

Digression 2: On other (non-raising) uses of Spanish "parecer":

One caveat is in order here: not all uses of "parecer" are covered by the label "raising verb". Here, we analyze some "non-raising" uses of this verb: "parecer" as a modality expression. According to the French theory of discourse (Maingueneau), we can have two types of "subjective expressions":

a) Axiological

b) Modal (*modalizadoras*)

Axiological expressions qualify a proposition or a noun expression in terms of *true-false*, whereas Modal expressions qualify a proposition or a noun expression in terms of *good-bad*. We claim here that "parecer" can work as either, depending on the context. For example:

xxxi) ¿Te parece lo que hizo esta mina?

xxxii) ¿Te parece que tomar esto me va a hacer bien?

In the first example, we have a clear axiological value. The meaning is "te parece *bien* lo que hizo esta mina", with the conversational implicature that the speaker clearly thinks that what the woman in question did was wrong. In the second example, however, this analysis would fail, since the meaning we get is not "te parece *bien* que tomar esto me va a hacer bien" but "te parece *verdadero* que tomar esto me va a hacer bien". The evaluation, then, is in Modal terms (using Maingueneau's words). These were just a couple of examples of non-raising uses of "parecer". In our conclusion we will try to extend such an analysis to *all instances of* "*raising*". If we succeed, we hope to be on the track of a more simple and uniform theory of so-called "raising".

Conclusion: towards a radically minimalist theory of raising:

[11] The reader should remember that the notion of "context" in RT is internist and propositional in nature.

In this section we will take all we have said so far as (at least in part) valid in some level of analysis, but we will try to go deeper in our understanding of the semantics and the syntax of verbs like "parecer", the paradigmatical example of the raising phenomenon. In order for us to do so, we will confront again *raising* with *control*, and see what do they differ in.

The (informal) logical structure of a sentence like (xxxiii) is (xxxiv):

xxxiii) Yo quiero [ir]

xxxiv) querer (yo, ir (yo))

This is, we have two different predicates and two different arguments, one per predicate. It is useful to confront these examples with the following:

xxxv) Juan parece trabajar

xxxvi) * parecer (Juan, trabajar (Juan))[12]

Which exactly is the problem with (xxxvi)? The answer is simple: [Juan] is not an argument of "parecer", but of "trabajar". What is "parecer" doing there, then? It is a *modality expression*, it indicates the attitude of the speaker with respect to the propositional content in *epistemic* terms. That is, [Juan trabajar] is a proposition, a complete θ-domain (let us remember that the φ-domain is outside the proposition strictly considered so that it can have scope over it). The speaker may then choose to present that proposition as something *he is not sure about*, and it is now that "parecer" comes into play, as a Spell-Out of the features in ModP. The only real argument of "parecer", in semantic / logical terms, would be the *experiencer*. If this is so, then it would be possible that **there are not two clauses but *only one***, with a full θ-domain and a modifying modality element in the Ω-domain (if one considers, as we do for obvious reasons, that ModP is part of this Prolific Domain). A *radically minimalist theory* would then be one in which we do not have two clauses in a typical raising construction, but only one, and *Split TP* is the perfect tool for the job. A direct theoretical consequence of what we have said is that not all projections associated with what has been called T(ense)P form part of the φ-domain, since no agreement features are checked in ModP in this case (however, the licensing of definiteness, which involves ModP, may be

[12] Although Grohmann (2003) claims that one can be a "seemer" (as an external argument in a full *v*P) under certain circumstances, namely, when the raising structure is embedded within a control one, as in:

i) John wants [to seem [to…]]

That is nothing but a theoretical manoeuvre so that his *intra* and *inter-clausal movement generalizations* work. For details, see Grohmann (2003: 40-41). In our terms, the only thing that changes would be the person that makes the modal judgment.

taken as a process analogous to those of φ-domain checking. We will not go deeper into it, for the time being). The movement that leaves [Juan] before [parece] for LCA purposes may be attributed to two processes:

a) A PF movement in order to satisfy some requirement of antisymmetry (*à la* Moro, 2000).

b) A movement justified in terms of *theme*, following the idea that the *theme* is the leftmost constituent, as claimed in Brown & Yule (1983).

The corresponding tree would look like this, presenting only a very basic and tentative skeleton which the reader may fill with his favorite primitives:



Accepting this representation would entail also accepting two important premises:

a) "Parecer" is unaccusative *only in the RSS level*, but not in the narrow syntax.

b) As a consequence of (a), the *possession* entailed between the *idea* and the *mind* is also present only in the *RSS level*, but it is carried along in the syntax and interpreted in the *explicature* level.

c) The strongest claim would be that there is *no raising at all*, as we have seen.

We propose that *every clause* has a ModP, in which we have modality features, either materialized (for example, as "parecer") or not, a case which would generally correspond to the assertive version (sometimes called "zero modality"), since it is the unmarked option: we present a proposition and no mark of modality is interpreted as "I fully believe what I have just said". It is a *commitment to the propositional content*, which must not be confused with *truth value*, the latter being extralinguistic and of no relevance to syntax or inferences. It is possible that so-called "factive verbs" (those which generate a presupposition about the truth value of the clause -CP- they select, like "lamentar", "creerse", etc.) can also be analyzed from this perspective, giving us a useful tool for the description of the syntactic-semantic behavior of many verbs that have been almost completely ignored so far in Generative studies, in contrast with the attention that has been paid to them in semantic studies.

If our claims result correct, then, as we have said elsewhere (Krivochen, 2010b, d), it would turn out that there is *no direct projection between RSS and the narrow syntax*, which, taking into account that RSSs are much more abstract, and accessible to other components of the mind than FL, would be a desirable result in the pursuit of a radically minimalist theory not only of the faculty language but also of the functioning of the mind-brain as a complex of faculties.

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