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CHAPTER 16

Between desire and necessity

The complementarity of *want* and *need*

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In this paper, I relate three seemingly unrelated properties of the modal verb *want* that distinguish it from the semantically minimally different verb *need*. I show that these properties are determined by a single selectional characteristic that involves the evidential notions of perspective or evaluation. I argue that these notions must be configurationally represented, and that their properties can be couched in Binding theoretic principles. In addition, I show that uses of *want* expressing necessity and probability rather than desirability can be derived from this syntactic representation.

Keywords: modal, desirability, necessity, Binding, Speaker, perspective, evaluation, English, Dutch

1. Three properties distinguishing *need* from *want*

In this section, I would like to introduce three at first sight unrelated properties of *need* and *want* that to my knowledge have hitherto received scant notice in the literature.

1.1 Selection

In the sentences in (1a, b), the semantic distinction between *want* and *need* is not immediately apparent: *want* expresses a desire, while *need* refers to a requirement, but the interpretations of *want* and *need* are very close

(1) a. Kim wants that raspberry bavarois.
    b. Kim needs that raspberry bavarois.

This semantic closeness disappears when both verbs select complements that involve a risk for the subject Recipient as in (2):

(2) a.   Kim wants this operation
(nose job/# open heart surgery)

b.   Kim needs this operation
(# nose job/open heart surgery)

In intuitive terms, the difference might be described in terms of perspective. If Kim wants an operation, Kim's perspective entirely determines its desirability. The operation might be something that Kim's doctor and family are actually opposed to. It might be unnecessary, involve health risks, or other disadvantages. All these pragmatic contexts require that Kim be the unique evaluating instance for the desirability of the operation. In the case of *need*, by contrast, the situation is different: Kim's evaluation of the desirability of the operation doesn't seem to matter. Rather, it is a question of expert opinion whether the operation is desirable for Kim or not. The use of *need* does not however entirely exclude Kim as the evaluating instance determining desirability. In (1b), for instance, Kim most likely is the only person evaluating the need for raspberry bavarois. The difference between *want* and *need* therefore seems to be that *want* requires its subject to be the only relevant evaluating instance, while *need* does not.

1.2   Raising vs. control

A second property distinguishing *need* from *want* is apparent in infinitival complementation. The examples in (3) illustrate that the subject of *need* is determined by the infinitive, while that of *want* is not. In other words, *need* is a raising verb, while *want* is not.

(3) a.   Kim needs/wants to eat that raspberry bavarois.

b.   Kim's statue needs/*wants to be cleaned.

c.   It needs/*wants to rain to save the crops.

Traditionally, this difference would be analysed in terms of raising vs. control: *need* is a raising verb and does not assign a thematic role to its subject position, while the control verb *want* assigns an Agent role to its subject. However, an analysis of *want* as a control verb singles it out among modal verbs, as most modal verbs are either auxiliaries or raising verbs and do not impose thematic or selectional restrictions on their subject.

1.3 Want as need/*need as want

Lastly, in certain contexts *want* can come to mean *need/must*, but the reverse is not true. More precisely, modals expressing desirability can express necessity, but there seem to be no cases where modal verbs expressing necessity express desirability. The contexts under discussion are represented in (4): in certain varieties of English, a 2P subject allows *want* to shift in meaning from desirability to necessity.

(4) a. You really don't wanna do that.
(want = should/must)

b. I really don't wanna do that.
(want ≠ should/must)

c. Kim really doesn't wanna to do that.
(want ≠ should/must)

In Dutch, *willen* 'want' can be used as a raising verb expressing probability if it is modalized by adverbial expressions such as *wel eens* 'sometimes'.

(5) a. Het wil hier *(wel eens) regenen.
it wants here sometimes rain
'It is likely to rain here.'

b. Crit wil wel eens een pilsje drinken.
'Crit is likely to drink a beer.'
'Crit wants to drink a beer from time to time.'

The contrast between (5a) and (5b) shows that an animate subject allows for both the probability and the desirability reading, while an expletive subject only features the probability reading. In the same way as for the necessity reading, there are no cases where verbs expressing probability come to express desirability in specific contexts. Two questions arise. First, how does desirability turn into necessity and probability? Secondly, why is this shift in meaning unidirectional?

1.4 Grammaticalization?

Under a traditional account, such shifts in meaning from desirability to necessity or probability would most likely be analyzed in terms of grammaticalization and subsequent homonymy. The control verb *want* expressing desirability grammaticalizes into an auxiliary or raising verb expressing necessity or probability. The original *want* 'desirability' will then be homonymically distinguished from its raising counterpart expressing necessity or probability. At first sight, the shift from desirability

to necessity/probability could be explained by the unidirectionality of grammaticalization from lexical meanings to functional ones, along the lines of what happened to English *will* (e.g. Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994). However, such an analysis is unable to account for the fact that the necessity meaning of *want* is restricted to 2P.

1.5   Towards an analysis

I would like to show that the three properties outlined above can be derived in a principled way if the notion of "Evaluating instance" is configurationally represented as an anaphor in the case of *want* and a pronoun in the case of *need*. I will also show that the apparent Agent restriction on the subject of *want* is a direct consequence of the anaphoric status of the Evaluating instance represented in the infinitival complement of *want*. This analysis provides a natural account of *want* as a raising verb, in spite of appearances to the contrary. The shift from desirability to necessity and probability can be related to a configurational representation of the notion of evaluation. Let us proceed to some of the assumptions that are necessary to achieve that goal.

2.   A raising configuration for *want* and *need*

Following Larson, Den Dikken & Ludlow (1996), I will assume that the complementation of *need* and *want* is uniformly clausal. Under this analysis, even DP complements of verbs such as *need* and *want* involve a covert clausal complement. Larson, Den Dikken & Ludlow (1996) argue for such an analysis on the basis of the contrasts between (6a) and (6b). In (6a), the predicate *paint* cannot host two non-agreeing temporal adverbs, while *need* and *want* easily accommodate such a situation.

(6)   a.   A week ago Bill wanted/needed your car yesterday.

b.   #A week ago Bill painted your car yesterday.

(7)   A week ago Bill wanted [$_{CP}$ PRO HAVE your car yesterday]

Under an analysis of (6a) as (7), both temporal adverbs modify different clauses, while in (6b) the presence of two temporal adverbs in a single clause leads to a temporal contradiction.

Although I adopt Larson, Den Dikken & Ludlow's (1996) analysis of *want* and *need* as involving a clausal complement, I do not follow them in assuming that these verbs select a control complement, nor that there is a silent HAVE present in

these structures. Rather, I will assume that the clausal structure in the complement of *want* and *need* consists of a nonfinite clausal DP in the sense of Kayne (1993). This nonfinite DP can either consist of infinitival IPs, or nonfinite predicative DP structures headed by a Dative D° in Kayne's (1993) sense. This dative D° incorporates overtly (8) or covertly (9) into V$_{modal}$, deriving HAVE semantics. Overt incorporation of dative D° enables V$_{modal}$ to assign accusative case to the Possessee *your car*. V$_{modal}$ here is shorthand for *want* and *need*.

(8) a. __ V$_{modal}$ [$_{DP}$ Bill [D°DAT] [your car/that I go/for me to go]]]

    b. Bill [V$_{modal}$+[D°DAT]] [$_{DP}$ ~~Bill [D°DAT]~~ [your car/that I go/for me to go]]]

(9) a. __ V$_{modal}$ [$_{DP}$ [Bill] [D°DAT to] [$_{VP}$ ~~Bill~~ paint your car]]

    b. Bill [V$_{modal}$+~~D°DAT~~] [$_{DP}$ ~~Bill~~ [D°DAT to] [$_{VP}$ ~~Bill~~ paint your car]]

This analysis implies that the relation between the subject of D$_{DAT}$ and its predicate is rather different in (8) and (9). In (8), the complex structure of the predicate allows this predicate to contain a specifier whose reference is different from that of the subject of D$_{DAT}$. In (9), by contrast, the subject of D$_{DAT}$ is identical to the subject of the VP predicate. Specifically, this analysis predicts that both types of complements will display a slightly different behavior with respect to Binding relationships between the subject of D$_{DAT}$P and its predicate.

There seems to be evidence bearing out this prediction. Larson, Den Dikken & Ludlow (1996) note Ross's (1976) observation that nouns such as *help*, *cooperation*, or *sympathy* show disjointness effects in the contexts of both *want* and *have*. Other nouns such as *nomination* or *liberty* do not show these effects. The same observations apply to *need*.

(10) a. I had your/his/*my cooperation.

    b. You have my/his/*your sympathy.

    c. Ed$_i$ had my/your/*his$_i$ help.

(11) a. I want/need your/his/*my cooperation.

    b. You want/need my/his/*your sympathy.

    c. Ed$_i$ wants/needs my/your/*his$_i$ help.

(12) a. I have/want/need my nomination.

    b. You have/want/need your liberty.

Ross (1976) attributes the disjointness in the case of *want* to the presence of an empty HAVE in its covert sentential complement, an analysis adopted by Larson, Den Dikken & Ludlow (1996).

(12′) Ed$_i$ wants/needs [PRO$_i$ TO HAVE my/your/*his$_i$ help]

Now similar disjointness effects are present in the sentential complements of *want*. Ruwet (1984) observes that this disjointness is not complete, but that "temporal dissociation" effects can circumvent it as in (14).

(13) a. *I want that I cooperate/help you.

      b. *I want for myself to cooperate/help you.

(14) a. ?I would want that I become healthy again.

      b. I wanted for myself to be healthy again.

It seems then that the disjointness contrast in the sentential complements of (13) and (14) is quite similar to that between the DP complements in (11) and (12). Following the insight but not the implementation of Ross (1976) and Larson, Den Dikken & Ludlow (1996), I will attribute this disjointness effect to the HAVE/D$_{DAT}$ configuration in the complement of *want*.

Importantly now, the disjointness effects observed for tensed complements and DP complements of *want* are absent in the case of *to* infinitives:

(15) I want to cooperate/help you/be nominated/be liberated.

Now if *to* infinitives in the complement of *want* were simple control complements, they would be in the same position as NP and CP complements. As a result, it would be quite hard to explain why the disjointness effects observed for DPs, tensed CPs and *for to* infinitives do not obtain for control infinitives. This is true irrespective of whether the controlled PRO is viewed as essentially an anaphor (Borer's (1989) anaphoric AGR-S) or as a pronoun. If a purported PRO in (15) were a pronoun, it should behave as *I* in (13a); if it is an anaphor it should behave as *myself* in (13b). If it is a trace, as in (9), no such problem arises, and no disjointness effects are expected to occur. I therefore would like to take the fact that *to* infinitives do not show disjointness effects as indirect evidence that *want* involves a raising configuration as in (9). Note that this analysis does not address the difference between (13) and (14), nor does it intend to do so. I only wishes to use this property to illustrate that infinitival complements of *want* and *need* behave very differently from their tensed counterparts, and that this warrants a different syntactic analysis.

3.   The syntactic and semantic representation of *want* and *need*

In line with an increasing body of work (Cinque 1999, Speas & Tenny 2003, Giorgi 2010, Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd 2011), I will assume that the Speaker is syntactically represented in the left periphery. Rooryck (2001a, b) argues that the evidential "source of information" or "evaluating instance" can be syntactically represented in Cinque's (1999) functional approach to adverbials as a 1P feature in the $Mood_{evidential}°$ of main clauses. This means that $Mood_{evidential}P$ is associated with pronominal features that syntactically represent the "source of information" or "evaluating instance" of the sentence.

Rooryck (2001b) argues that the person features functioning as "Source of information" in $Mood_{evidential}°$ are different for direct and indirect speech complement CPs. In indirect speech CP complements, the person features in $Mood_{evidential}°$ are anaphoric in nature: they take the matrix subject as the "Source of information". In direct speech complements, the person feature functioning as "Source of information" in $Mood_{evidential}°$ is identical to that in main clauses, i.e. 1P. As a result, the difference in information status between direct and indirect speech CP complements derives from the difference in the pronominal or anaphoric status of the "Source of information" represented in the $Mood_{evidential}P$ of that CP complement.

The question then arises whether this Binding-theoretic difference is also relevant for other domains of evidentiality, such as $Mood_{evaluative}P$ or $Mod_{epistemic}P$, and how it applies to the nonfinite complementation proposed for *want* and *need* in Section 3. I would like to propose that when *want* and *need* select a nonfinite sentential complement as in (8) and (9) above, they impose selectional restrictions on the person features associated with the $Mood_{evaluative}P$ of that nonfinite sentential complement. These person features in $Mood_{evaluative}P$ function as the "evaluating instance" for that sentential complement. In other words, the representation for *want* and *need* in (8) and (9) should be extended as in (17):

(17) V_{modal} [$_{ModEvalP}$ $Mood_{evaluative}°$ [$D_{DAT}P$]]

{person}

$Mood_{evaluative}P$ can be viewed as belonging to the left periphery of the sentential complement of the modal verb, represented here as V_{modal}.

I would now like to return to the first interpretive difference between *want* and *need,* which was described above in terms of perspective. In (2a), *Kim wants this operation*, Kim determines the perspective in the sense that s/he is the only relevant evaluating instance for the desirability of the operation. The analysis we

propose derives this interpretation as follows. The evaluating instance is represented as the person feature associated with $Mood_{evaluative}P$ in the CP complement. The modal verb *want*, via selection, requires that the person feature in $Mood_{evaluative}P$ is anaphoric in nature in the sense of the Binding theory. This anaphoric person feature is necessarily bound by the subject of *want*, the first accessible subject for the $Mood_{eval}°$ anaphor. Taking into account (8), *Kim wants this operation* then receives a full representation as in (18):

(18)   Kim $_i$ [V_{modal}+[D°DAT]] [$_{ModEvalP}$ $Mood_{eval}°$[$_{DP}$ ~~Kim~~ ~~[D°DAT]~~ [this operation]]]

       wants

              |

          {person, anaphor}$_i$

Since the evaluating instance in the infinitival complement is bound by the subject of the modal verb, the evaluation of that complement is entirely dependent on the perspective of the matrix subject. This derives the relevant interpretation.

   In (2b), *Kim needs this operation*, the interpretation is that Kim is not necessarily the person who determines the perspective on the comparative desirability of φ – worlds. The evaluation may be due to the subject of *need* as in (1b), or it may be a matter of a third party, an "expert opinion" as in (2b). In Binding-theoretic terms, the evaluating instance for the comparative desirability of the operation seems to function like an (underspecified) pronoun that can be coreferential with the subject of the matrix verb *need*, but also with other discourse participants that can act as experts for the evaluation. The sentence *Kim needs this operation* then can be represented as in (19):

(19)   Kim $_i$ [V_{modal}+[D°DAT]] [$_{ModEvalP}$ $Mood_{eval}°$[$_{DP}$ ~~Kim~~ ~~[D°DAT]~~ [this operation]]]

       needs

              |

          {person, pron}$_{i/j}$

The difference in anaphoric or pronominal status of the person feature in $Mood_{evaluative}P$ is not the only difference between the sentential complements of want and need. In the case of want, the Binding domain of the anaphor extends to the matrix clause. By contrast, in the case of *need*, the Binding domain of the pronoun must be limited to the nonfinite sentential complement. If the Binding domain of the pronoun extended to the matrix clause, the pronoun could not be coreferential with the matrix subject by Principle B. This difference between the nonfinite complements of *need* and *want* is a stipulation under this analysis that we will take for granted for now. Under these assumptions, however, the analysis presented here derives

the interpretive difference between *want* and *need* in terms of evaluation and perspective, from the Binding-theoretic status of the person features in Mood$_{evaluative}$P.

The anaphoric/pronominal nature of Mood$_{evaluative}$° in the sentential complements selected by *want* and *need* allows for an explanation of additional difference between these modals. More specifically, we observed that *need* is a raising verb while *want* displays an agentive restriction on its subject. *Prima facie*, a raising analysis for *want* as in (18) predicts that there should be no thematic restrictions on the subject position of *want*. As a result, the subject position of *want* should be able to host any subject raising out of the complement clause: animate, inanimate or meteorological *it*. In other words, under a raising analysis of *want* and *need*, there should be no difference between both verbs with respect to the subjects they can host, contrary to fact, as shown in (3), repeated here.

(3)   a.   Kim needs/wants to eat that raspberry bavarois.

  b.   Kim's statue needs/*wants to be cleaned.

  c.   It needs/*wants to rain to save the crops.

However, I would like to argue that the agentive restriction on the subject position of *want* is not properly thematic in nature. Under the analysis in (18), the fact that the subject of *want* must be agentive and animate is a consequence of the anaphoric nature of the person features of Mood$_{evaluative}$°. Since the [+person] anaphor in Mood$_{evaluative}$° needs an animate antecedent in the immediately superordinate clause, the eventual subject of *want* must be animate. Any other subject raising out of the complement Mood$_{eval}$P will not be able to satisfy the [+person] animacy requirement of the anaphor, and yield an ungrammatical sentence. As a result, the illusion of a thematic restriction on the subject of *want* is created. Under this analysis, that restriction is not due to the assignment of a thematic role by *want*, but to the anaphoric nature of Mood$_{evaluative}$° selected by *want* in its nonfinite sentential complement.

4.   From desirability to apparent necessity

The last set of differences between *want* and *need* noted above in Section 1 involved the shifts in meaning: from desirability to necessity and probability.

Before addressing these questions, it is necessary to emphasize that the main difference between *want* and *need* is the Binding-theoretic status of the person feature in the Mood$_{eval}$P of the sentential complement. *Want* selects an anaphoric value for the person feature of Eval°, while *need* selects a pronominal value for the person feature of Eval°. In structural terms, one might even go as far as saying that if Eval°

is anaphoric, V_{modal} in (18) and (19) is spelled out as *want*, and if Eval° is pronominal, V_{modal} is spelled out as *need*. Under such an analysis, the morphological shape of the modal would be just a function of the Binding theoretic status of Eval°. The binding theoretic status of Eval° then determines spellout of V_{modal} as *need* or *want*: if the evaluating instance is an anaphor and bound by the matrix subject, V_{modal} is spelled out as *want*; if the evaluating instance is a pronoun and free, V_{modal} is spelled out as *need*. Desirability *want* and necessity *need* can thus be viewed as two sides of the same coin, in complementary distribution as a function of the anaphoric or pronominal nature of the Eval° selected in the sentential complement.

The relation between the morphological shape of *need* and Eval°$_{pron}$, and *want* and Eval°$_{anaph}$ doesn't entail anything about the meaning of these verbs. In this view, *need* and *want* are not intrinsically equipped with the meaning of necessity and desirability, respectively. As a result, the meaning of *need* and *want* can vary as a function of the exact anaphoric or pronominal nature of Eval°. It is then predicted that a configuration in which Eval° has a "special" anaphoric or pronominal status, can give rise to a meaning for *need* or *want* that does not correspond to either necessity or desirability. The exact meaning of *want* and *need* could vary as a function of more specific referential properties of the pronoun or anaphor or the antecedent/ operator binding them. We will show below that this prediction is borne out, and that such cases of "variable" meaning do exist and can be derived.

A first case of the change in meaning that *want* can undergo involves the apparent shift from desirability to necessity. It was observed above that *want* can mean 'need/must' in the context of a 2P subject, but that *need* can never express the desirability meaning of *want*. Volitional modals can express nonvolitional necessity, but nonvolitional modal verbs cannot express volition. The cases under discussion are repeated here for convenience:

(4)   a.   You really don't wanna/? want to do that.
          (want = should/must)

      b.   I really don't wanna/? want to do that.
          (want ≠ should/must)

      c.   Kim really doesn't wanna/? want to do that.
          (want ≠ should/must)

Some further comments on these data are in order. 1P or 3P subjects do not trigger such a shift in meaning in neutral contexts. It is possible to force such readings in contexts where the speaker puts him/herself in the position of the 3P subject:

(20)   a.   If Kim's got any sense at all, he'll wanna be very careful, I'm telling ya.

      b.   I know Kim's weak spots too well. He should know better; he really doesn't wanna take that job.

I will take the sentences in (20) to be special instances of (4a). In these cases, a 3P pronoun seems to function as a 2P pronoun in the sense that the 3P is in some sense "addressed" by the 1P speaker, as in "free indirect" style. I will therefore take sentences such as (4a) to represent the core cases. Finally, it is unclear to me why *wanna* contraction improves the sentences, and I will ignore this fact in my analysis, simply attributing it to dialectal variation.

In terms of the analysis developed above, the subject of *want* clearly is not the unique evaluating instance of the alternatives in this context. It appears as if the anaphoric Mood$_{evaluative}$° in the complement clause takes on a different status in these contexts. The evaluating instance in (4a) is not interpreted as involving a third party "expert opinion". Rather, the evaluating instance corresponds to the speaker of the sentence addressing the second person subject: it is the Speaker who evaluates the desirability/necessity of a course of action for the Addressee. In the terms of this analysis, the anaphoric Mood$_{evaluative}$° in the complement CP is bound by the Speaker of the matrix sentence (i.e. the 1P in the matrix Mood$_{evidential}$°), rather than by the subject of *want*.

The question now arises why this switch of the "evaluating instance" from subject to speaker of *want* correlates with a restriction to 2P subjects as illustrated in (4a), and with a shift in meaning from desirability to necessity. In fact, I would first like to argue that there is no shift in meaning from desirability to necessity at all in the cases (4a). As a matter of fact, the sentences under scrutiny do involve a desire report: that of the speaker. The speaker determines the desirability of the event. The sentences (4a) can be paraphrased as follows, without reference to the meaning of necessity:

(21)   a.   It is the speaker's desire that you don't do that

      b.   It is the speaker's desire that you be careful with that fuel.

Recall that under this analysis, the desirability meaning of *want* is ensconced in the selection of an anaphoric Mood$_{evaluative}$° in the complement CP. The fact that the speaker of the matrix sentence binds the anaphoric Mood$_{evaluative}$° in the complement CP therefore actually means that *want* in (4a) is predicated of the speaker. As a result, the 2P subject of *want* is not predicated of *want,* but just moves to that structural subject position for reasons of case. This situation is not surprising, it is in some sense reminiscent of locative inversion where the PP sitting in subject position is not predicated of the verb either.

The question still remains how the shift from the subject as the evaluating instance to the speaker as the evaluating instance can come about for *want*, and why this shift is correlated with a restriction to 2P subjects. I would like to suggest that this situation is due to the particular referential status of 2P. It is a classical insight

that the 2P addressee presupposes a (1P) speaker. Only 2P is immediately linked to 1P. Let us suppose that this close link is also formally represented. Recall that I adopted the idea that the speaker is represented as a 1P feature in the $\text{Mood}_{evidential}°$ of main clauses. Let us also assume that 2P pronouns need to stand in a formal licensing relation to this 1P $\text{Mood}_{evidential}°$. In effect, this means that 2P pronouns can be viewed as syntactically discontinuous constructs, involving a referential chain headed by 1P $\text{Mood}_{evidential}°$, and with the 2P pronoun as its tail. If a 2P pronoun is the subject of *want*, the anaphoric $\text{Mood}_{evaluative}°$ in the complement CP will be bound by that 2P subject. Since the 2P subject is the tail of a referential chain, the anaphoric $\text{Mood}_{evaluative}°$ in principle also has access to the head of that referential chain, the speaker of the matrix sentence. In other words, the anaphoric person feature in $\text{Mood}_{evaluative}°$ of the complement CP could in principle be bound by either the head or the tail of the referential chain 1P Speaker – 2P Addressee pronoun. Assuming that the antecedent for an anaphoric $\text{Mood}_{evaluative}°$ has to be unique, the anaphoric $\text{Mood}_{evaluative}°$ can be either bound by the matrix 2P Addressee subject pronoun or by the 1P Speaker in $\text{Mood}_{evidential}°$, but not by both. The first choice yields *want* referring to a desire report expressed by the subject, the second choice produces a desire report on behalf of the speaker. Only 2P subjects can make the 1P $\text{Mood}_{evidential}°$ accessible for Binding by the lower $\text{Mood}_{evaluative}°$. As a result, the correlation between 2P subjects and the shift of the evaluating instance from the subject to the Speaker can be explained.

5.   From desirability to probability

A final argument in favor of the analysis of *want* in terms of ranking with respect to the expectations of the speaker comes from Dutch. Dutch *willen* 'want' can be used as a raising verb expressing probability if it is modified by adverbial expressions such as *wel eens* 'sometimes'.

(22)   Het   wil   hier   *(wel eens)   regenen.
        it   wants   here   sometimes   rain
        'It is likely to rain here.'

In this context, *willen* 'want' in combination with *wel eens* 'sometimes' obtains a meaning of probability, not desirability. The modal interpretation of probability of *willen* is associated with generic tense in the main clause. This can be shown by the fact that the sentence in (23) becomes ungrammatical in the perfect tense (*pace* the IPP effect):

(23) *Het   heeft wel eens   willen regenen hier.
      it   has   sometimes want   rain   here
      'It has sometimes been likely to rain here.'

The modality reading introduced by the generic present tense therefore seems to be a necessary condition for construing *willen* 'want' with an interpretation of probability.

It is at first sight unclear why and how *willen* 'want' undergoes a shift in interpretation from desirability to probability in this context. Now desirability and probability are closely related notions in the sense that they both involve scalarity. The necessary presence of the modifying element *wel eens* 'sometimes' confirms the scalar interpretation of probability: *wel eens* 'sometimes' picks out an indefinite subset of possible worlds in which the raining event does take place.

The data show an interesting correlation between syntactic structure and interpretation. The shift in interpretation from desirability to probability is closely linked to the range of subjects permitted in (24). The probability reading of *willen* 'want' can feature any subject, while the desirability reading can only feature animate subjects, as shown by the contrast in translations of the sentences in (24a, b).

(24)   a.   Crit wil wel eens een pilsje drinken.
          'Crit is likely to drink a beer.'
          'Crit wants to drink a beer from time to time.'

      b.   Hoeden willen wel eens wegwaaien tijdens een storm.
          'Hats are likely to be blown away during a storm.'
          *'Hats want to be blown away during a storm.'

Syntactically, Dutch *willen* 'want' is much closer to *need*: both verbs behave as *bona fide* raising verbs allowing any subject from their complement clause to raise to their own subject position. Recall that the analysis of *need* and *want* presented here treats these verbs as two instantiations of the same abstract modal verb expressing necessity. The only difference between *need* and *want* is the anaphoric or pronominal nature of the Eval° selected in the complement clause. Verbs of desire simply express a particular type of necessity involving anaphoric evaluation.

In addition, verbs expressing necessity are well known to undergo shifts of meaning towards an epistemic meaning of probability.

(25)   John must be in his office.
      'John has to be in his office.'
      'John is likely to be in his office.'

In Dutch it can be shown that the probability reading requires generic tense. The sentence (26a) is ambiguous between a probability and a necessity reading. By

contrast, compound tenses with *moeten* only afford a necessity reading, as shown by (26b).

(26) a.   Jan moet in zijn kantoor zijn.
           'John has to be in his office.'
           'John is likely to be in his office.'

      b.   Jan had in zijn kantoor moeten zijn.
           'John had to be in his office.'
           *'John was likely to be in his office.'

This restriction in reminiscent of the restriction to generic tense observed for *willen* 'want' above. In other words, both for *willen* 'want' and *moeten* 'must', generic tense is a prerequisite for a probability reading. For the purposes of the analysis presented here, it is important to note that necessity is the common denominator allowing for a link between the desirability and probability readings of *willen* 'want'.

I would like to claim that the shift in interpretation from desirability to probability can be derived from the analysis of *want* developed here. In this analysis, it is assumed that an anaphor in the embedded Mood$_{eval}$°, is bound by the matrix subject. The animate nature of the anaphor forces an animacy restriction on the subject of *want*. In the contexts of *willen* 'want' with a probability reading, the anaphor must therefore be prevented from being bound by the matrix subject. Once the matrix subject is not the antecedent of the anaphor, inanimate and expletive matrix subjects are permitted.

An adequate analysis of the probability reading of *willen* 'want' within the confines of the configuration proposed above requires that the anaphor in the embedded anaphoric Mood$_{eval}$° is bound by an element other than the matrix subject. I suggest that the anaphor receives a "default" 3P interpretation, much in the same way as the impersonal use of the Italian simplex anaphor *si* (Burzio 1992).

(27) a.   Le   mele   si   mangiano.
           the apples self eat
           'Apples are eaten.'

      b.   Si   mangia bene qui.
           self eats   well here
           'One eats well here.'

This "indefinite" 3P pronominal interpretation is quantificationally bound by the matrix generic tense.

As a result of this analysis, the probability reading of *willen* 'want' and the necessity reading of *need* pattern together: in both cases the Eval° is a pronoun, in case of *willen* 'want' an anaphor with a "default" indefinite pronominal interpretation

bound by an operator, in the case of *need* a definite pronoun which can corefer with the matrix subject or any other expert instance provided in the context. Since both *need* and the probability construal of Dutch *willen* 'want' share this eventually pronominal Eval°, both verbs are in the range of meanings associated with pure necessity, and *willen* 'want' loses its association with desirability.

The question now remains how *willen* 'want' shifts from its underlying meaning of necessity to probability. Why couldn't *willen* 'want' just express necessity? The answer lies in the quantificational interpretation of the evaluating instance Eval°. In the case of *need*, the ranking of possible worlds in which S takes place as being more necessary than the worlds in which S does not take place is related to a definite pronominal evaluator. This evaluator may be the matrix subject, making it a personal need of the matrix subject (28a), or it may be related to a third person expert opinion (28b). It can also be linked to a universal evaluating instance (28c).

(28) a. John needs a cookie.
          (evaluating instance = John)

      b. John needs an operation.
          (evaluating instance = doctor)

      c. The elderly need care.
          (evaluating instance = every civilized person)

In other words, the necessity is a definite one, being evaluated by a definite evaluating instance. By contrast, binding of the "default" indefinite pronominal Eval° by the generic tense creates an indefinite set of evaluators with a quantificational value of high degree similar to *most*. Since the necessity is evaluated by a large, but restricted set of evaluators, the implication is that there are other possible evaluators who do not share this evaluation. The necessity is an indefinite one, evaluated by most, but not all, possible evaluators. I would like to suggest that indefinite necessity corresponds to probability. The uncertainty contained in probability is an effect of the indefinite nature of the set of evaluators.

A final question with respect to this construction concerns the unidirectionality of the meaning shift from desirability to probability. The answer lies in the nature of the anaphoric Mood$_{eval}$° of *want*: an anaphoric Mood$_{eval}$° can receive a "default" indefinite pronominal interpretation, but a pronominal cannot receive a "default" anaphoric interpretation. As a result, the meaning of desirability can shift to probability, but the reverse is impossible.

In fact, the analysis presented here maintains that different values of modality are determined by the referential status of the evaluating instance in Eval°. If Eval° is anaphoric, the modal verb selecting it will spell out as *want* and take on an interpretation of desirability. If Eval° hosts a definite pronominal, the modal verb

will be spelled out as *need* and it will express the interpretation of necessity. If the anaphoric Eval° receives a default indefinite pronominal interpretation, the modal will spell out as *want*, since Eval° is anaphoric in nature, but the modal verb will receive an interpretation of probability (Dutch probability *willen*). Similar considerations can of course be extended to other modals which can express probability such as *must* and *may*, if it is accepted that these modals also contain an EvalP in their syntactic representation.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I have related three properties of *want* that distinguish it from the semantically minimally different modal verb *need*. The difference between *want* and *need* in terms of "evaluating instance" was reduced to the presence of an anaphoric or a pronominal person feature in $Mood_{evaluative}°$ in the complement clause of both modals. This allows for treating both *want* and *need* as raising verbs. The apparent thematic restriction on the (animate) subject of *want* was argued to be a consequence of the requirement that the antecedent of $Mood_{evaluative}°$ in the matrix clause, the matrix subject, have a [person] feature. Finally, the fact that *want* can shift its meaning in specific contexts was derived from the interaction between the anaphoric $Mood_{evaluative}°$ and its antecedent in the following summary:

Table 1. An overview of modals and their meanings.

Modal	Interpretation	Evaluating instance	Antecedent	Ex.
English *want*	desire	anaphoric	subject	(3a)
English *want*	desire	anaphoric	speaker	(4a)
Dutch *wel eens willen*	probability	"default" indefinite pronominal	generic operator	(5)
English *need*	need	definite underspecified pronoun	free	(3a)

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