

RUSSIAN *NIBUD'*-INDEFINITES AND NEG-RAISING

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Abstract: This paper discusses the phenomenon of ambiguous interpretation of Russian *nibud'*-indefinites in Neg-Raising contexts. There are two major approaches to Neg-Raising: the syntactic approach which considers it an instance of the syntactic process of raising and the pragmatic approach which takes it as a result of pragma-semantic processes happening to Neg-Raising predicates. In this work I argue for the compromise approach which admits that both models of establishing of Neg-Raising inference co-exist in language. I assume that the ambiguous reading of the sentences including a *nibud'*-indefinite with double negation arises since there are two ways of yielding the Neg-Raising inference.

Keywords: Neg-Raising, negation, indefinites, Russian, pragmatics, semantics

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1. Background on Neg-Raising

Neg-Raising (henceforth NR) is a cross-linguistically attested phenomenon which consists in that the negation phonologically expressed in the higher clause receives the semantic interpretation in the lower clause. The typical NR inference is illustrated in (1) where the sentence (1a) is naturally interpreted as (1b).

- (1) a. Kelly *doesn't* think that Lee will be elected. \Rightarrow
 b. Kelly thinks that Lee *won't* be elected. [Jacobson 2020: 112]

Since the early 1960-s there has been a major discussion on the origin of Neg-Raising. Generally, two main approaches to it can be distinguished. The syntactic approach which dominated among the earliest scholars [Fillmore 1963; Ross 1973; Prince 1976] sees Neg-Raising as the consequence of the syntactic process involving the raising of lower-clause negation to the higher clause. In line with such an approach negation is assumed to be originally born inside the lower clause and then moved to the higher one. In (2a), the negation firstly appears in the embedded clause *it will <not> rain tomorrow* as shown in (2b) and then moves to the matrix clause (2c). Thus, the negative operator retains its original semantic interpretation being expressed in the matrix clause.

- (2) a. *I don't think it will rain tomorrow.*
 b. [*I think [it will NEG rain tomorrow]*].
 c. [*I NEG think [it will rain tomorrow]*].

The pragmatic approach to Neg-Raising was proposed in [Bartsch 1973] and developed in many modern works ([Gajewski 2007; Romoli 2013] among the most prominent). Unlike the syntactic approach, it considers that the negation in NR-sentences occurs in the matrix clause. The outcoming semantic interpretation is considered pragmatically born given that the matrix predicates yielding the NR-interpretation (so-called Neg-Raising predicates) such as *believe*, *think*, *expect*, *seem* [Popp 2016] are granted with the same semantic peculiarity, namely the excluded-middle inference (EM). EM is either presupposition [Gajewski 2007] or scalar implicature [Romoli 2013] involving that we have two

options (“alternatives”) provided by such predicates: if I say *I believe* I can either *believe that X* or *believe that ¬X*. Negating the first disjunct (what literally happens to the NR-utterances) sets *believe that ¬X* as the only possible variant. The explanation of NR in (3) is sketched in (4) in Gajewski’s fashion.

(3) *Bill believes that aliens exist.*

(4) a. Presupposition: *Bill believes ((aliens exist) ∨ ¬ (aliens exist))*

b. Assertion: *¬Bill believes (aliens exist) ⇒*

c. *Bill believes ¬(aliens exist)*

By now the pragmatic approach has become the mainstream way of explanation of Neg-Raising since the traditional syntactic approach faces some serious challenges. For example, the hypothesis on the matrix-clause origin of negation is supported by the fact that negated matrix clauses in NR-sentences can undergo VP-ellipsis (5).

(5) *John didn’t think it would snow but Sue did <think it would snow>.*

[Crowley 2019: 3]

Despite this, some scholars [Collins, Postal 2018; Crowley 2019] believe that both models of Neg-Raising can simultaneously co-occur in language (it may be called the “compromise approach”). According to my hypothesis, this approach can explain some complicated issues concerning Russian NR. In this paper, I show that it is precisely the compromise approach that explains the ambiguous interpretation of Russian *nibud’*-indefinites in NR-sentences.

2. Russian *nibud’*-indefinites

In Russian, *nibud’*-indefinites are pronouns formed via joining the *-nibud’* affix to the wh-stem, like *kto-nibud’* (who + *nibud’*, ‘somebody’), *gde-nibud’* (where + *nibud’*, ‘somewhere’), *что-nibud’* (what + *nibud’*, ‘something’). Unlike some other Russian indefinites, for example, of *-to* series, *nibud’*-indefinites can only be licensed in a very restricted number of contexts. The possible licensors of *nibud’*-indefinites listed in [Fitzgibbons 2011] include conditional antecedents, universal quantifiers, interrogatives etc. (6)–(8).

- (6) a. ^{OK}*Khorosho, esli on kogo-nibud' tam uvidel.*
 good if he who-nibud' there saw
 'It's good if he saw anybody here.'
- b. **Khorosho, chto on kogo-nibud' tam uvidel.*
 good that he who-nibud' there saw
 Int.: 'It's good that he saw anybody here.'
- (7) a. ^{OK}*Vse s kem-nibud' podruzhilis'.*
 everybody with who-nibud' became.friends
 'Everybody became friends with anybody.'
- b. **My s kem-nibud' podruzhilis'.*
 we with who-nibud' became.friends
 Int.: 'We became friends with anybody.'
- (8) a. ^{OK}*Vas chto-nibud' interesuet?*
 you what-nibud' be.interested.in
 'Are you interested in anything?'
- b. **Vas chto-nibud' interesuet.*
 you what-nibud' be.interested.in
 Int.: 'You are interested in anything.'

Since *nibud'*-indefinites require non-veridical environments to be licensed, they are banned under the factive predicates like *videt'* 'see' being grammatical with non-factive ones like *nadeyat'sya* 'hope'. Meanwhile, *to*-indefinites are grammatical in factive environments:

- (9) ^{OK}*Nadeyus', chto vchera kto-nibud' ne prishel.*
 hope that yesterday who-nibud' NEG came
 'I hope that yesterday somebody did not come.'
- (10) **Videl, chto vchera kto-nibud' ne prishel.*
 saw that yesterday who-nibud' NEG came
 Int.: 'I saw that yesterday somebody did not come.'
- (11) ^{OK}*Videl, chto vchera kto-to ne prishel.*
 saw that yesterday who-to NEG came
 'I saw that yesterday somebody did not come.'

Another crucial property of *nibud'*-indefinites is that they obligatorily fall inside the scope of its licenser [Geist 2008; Yanovich 2005]. Considering the sentence in (12) where *kto-nibud'* is licensed by the conditional operator only the interpretation in (13a) where *if* outscopes the existential quantifier introduced by where *kto-nibud'* is grammatical but not (13b) with the reverse order of scopes. The same happens to the universal quantifiers, as shown in (14)–(15).

- (12) *Esli kto-nibud' pridet, my nachnem urok.*
 if who-nibud' come we will.start lesson
 'If anybody comes, we will start the lesson.'

- (13) a. ^{OK}*If there is anybody who will come we will start the lesson.* if > ∃
 b. **There is somebody who's coming is a condition in which we will start the lesson.* ∃ > if

- (14) *Vse gde-nibud' kupili kvartiru.*
 everybody where-nibud' bought flat
 'Everybody bought a flat somewhere.'

- (15) a. ^{OK}*For everybody, it is true that this person bought a flat somewhere.* ∀ > ∃
 b. **There is a certain place everybody bought a flat there.* ∃ > ∀

The situation is opposite concerning negation since negation does not license *nibud'*-indefinites and moreover, as stated in [Pereltsvaig 2000], clausemate negation cannot outscope the *nibud'*-indefinite as exemplified in (16). It may be compared with (17) where the negation is not clausemate with *komu-nibud'* (at least, phonologically) and thereby is interpreted above the existential.

- (16) *Dumayu, professor ne postavit komu-nibud' dvoiku.*
 think professor NEG will.give who-nibud' an.F
 a. ^{OK}'I think there is somebody the professor will not give an F to.' ∃ > ¬
 b. *'I think there is nobody the professor will give an F to.' ¬ > ∃

- (17) *Ne dumayu, chto professor postavit komu-nibud' dvoiku.*
 NEG think that professor will.give who-nibud' an.F
 a. *'I think there is somebody the professor will not give an F to.' ∃ > ¬
 b. ^{OK}'I think there is nobody the professor will give an F to.' ¬ > ∃

The interpretational distinction arising between a NR context in (17) and non-NR context in (16) at the first glance seems an additional argument against the syntactic view of Neg-Raising. Under the syntactic analysis we expect the original syntactic structure of (17) to look like (16) since the raised negation should originate in the lower clause. However, both sentences involve the interpretations with the opposite scope order. The pragmatic approach though can justify the exclusive acceptability of (17b) via the mechanism discussed before as illustrated in (18). If negation is originally born in the matrix clause it is capable of negating the whole clause with the existential in it giving rise to the non-existence interpretation.

- (18) a. Presupposition: *I think* $((\exists x. \text{professor will give an } F \text{ to } x) \vee \neg (\exists x. \text{professor will give an } F \text{ to } x))$
- b. Assertion: $\neg I \text{ think } (\exists x. \text{professor will give an } F \text{ to } x) \Rightarrow$
- c. *I think* $(\neg(\exists x. \text{professor will give an } F \text{ to } x)) \Rightarrow$
- d. *I think* $(\neg \exists x. \text{professor will give an } F \text{ to } x)$

However, the traditional pragmatic approach faces some challenges in explaining the ambiguity of interpretation of *nibud'*-indefinites in NR-sentences if they are equipped with more than one negative operator. In the following section, I will discuss this ambiguity and propose a hypothesis on its origin.

3. Double negation + *nibud'*-indefinites

Let us imagine the following context.

There are a bunch of friends walking around the evening city (let it be Anya, Borya, Vlada, and Grisha). They all are also friends with Dima, their former classmate, who is currently not with them since he is preparing for his birthday party which he will hold this weekend. Dima had not yet sent the invitations, so no one of these guys knows if he will invite them. Borya sadly utters that he is not sure that Dima will invite somebody of them — him, or Anya, or Vlada, or Grisha — since Dima has a very great number of new friends, so he may have forgotten about them. But Vlada objects to him. She says that Dima appreciates his old friends, so she is certain that he will invite at least one of them. She says:

- (19) *Ne dumayu, chto Dima ne pozovet kogo-nibud'*
 NEG think that Dima NEG invite who-nibud'
iz nas na vecherinku.
 of us to the.party
 'I do not think that Dima will not invite any of us to the party.' (I think that Dima will invite at least one of us to the party).

Let us assume another situation. Friends, who walked around the city the whole evening, are tired so they are saying goodbye to each other. Grisha says "See you soon!" because he is sure that they will meet very soon, at Dima's birthday party this weekend. However, Anya doubts it. She says she is not sure Dima is going to invite her specifically since it seems to her, he has closer relationships with Borya, Vlada and Grisha. And here Grisha says that Anya should not worry because it is known that they four are bosom friends to each other and probably Dima will invite the whole quartet to avoid separating them. He utters the same sentence as in (19) but with another interpretation.

- (20) *Ne dumayu, chto Dima ne pozovet kogo-nibud'*
 NEG think that Dima NEG invite who-nibud'
iz nas na vecherinku.
 of us to the.party
 'I do not think that Dima will not invite any of us to the party.' (I think that Dima will invite all of us to the party).

I would call the interpretation in (19) the "existential interpretation" and the interpretation in (20) the "universal interpretation". In both interpretations, the sentence has the same set of operators containing an existential and two negative operators but the order their scopes are arranged in differs for (19) and (20). The only way to receive a universal interpretation is schematized in (21). It may be reformulated as *it is not the case that there exists a situation that x is not true* entailing that *x* is true in every situation. In (22), there is a logical entailment derived for our context. Assuming that *x* is a situation 'person is invited' we receive truth conditions 'in any situation it is true that a person will be invited' (so it applies to each person of our set).

- (21) $\neg > \exists > \neg \Rightarrow \forall$

- (22) a. *it is **not** the case that there **exists** a person which will **not** be invited* \Rightarrow
 b. *for **every** person it is true that this person will be invited*

The existential interpretation, however, may be derived via two different ways. To get it, the adjacency of two negative operators is necessary since they must reach the mutual deletion and release a single-standing existential operator. There are two possible configurations which fit this scenario: the existential can either outscope both negative operators as in (23a) or fall under them (23b). The logical entailment for these variants is sketched in (24) and (25) respectively.

(23) a. $\exists > \neg > \neg \Rightarrow \exists$

b. $\neg > \neg > \exists \Rightarrow \exists$

(24) a. *there **exists a person** for which it is **not** the case that this person will **not** be invited \Rightarrow*

b. *there **exists a person** for which it is true that this person will be invited*

(25) a. *it is **not** the case that there **doesn't exist a person** that will be invited \Rightarrow*

b. *there **exists a person** for which it is true that this person will be invited*

The scenario in (23a) corresponds to the syntactic view of Neg-Raising. In that case, both negative operators are considered clausemate. One of them (negating *invite*) naturally stays in the embedded clause both at LF and syntactic surface, the second one (negating *think*) is immediately involved in the process of Neg-Raising while it stays in the lower clause at LF but moves to the higher clause in syntax. At the LF, as schematized in (26), two negative operators reach mutual deletion leading to the existential interpretation.

(26) a. [*I think [that Dima NEG NEG will invite **who-nibud'** of us to the party]]*

b. [*I think [that Dima will invite **who-nibud'** of us to the party]]*

As for the scenario in (24a), it possibly fits the pragmatic approach since each negation is located above the existential. The possible derivation of meaning is illustrated in (27). The negative operator negating *think* which is located in the lower clause takes the negated existential from the lower clause.

(27) a. *I think $(\neg \exists x. \text{Dima will invite } x) \vee \text{I think } \neg(\neg \exists x. \text{Dima will invite } x) \Rightarrow$*

b. *$\neg \text{I think } (\neg \exists x. \text{Dima will invite } x) \Rightarrow$*

c. *$\text{I think } \neg(\neg \exists x. \text{Dima will invite } x) \Rightarrow$*

d. *$\text{I think } (\exists x. \text{Dima will invite } x)$*

However, there is a reason for which (27) is problematic. The assumption that $\neg\exists x$. *Dima will invite x* is a possible logical representation of the embedded clause contradicts the Pereltsvaig's stipulation that negation cannot outscope a clausemate *nibud'*-indefinite (henceforth, I will refer to it as to "Pereltsvaig's rule"). In line with this rule, the only way for two non-clausemate negative operators to interact involves the obligatory presence of the existential operator between them. In (28), it is shown that under these conditions the existential outscopes its clausemate negation and then falls into the scope of matrix-clause negation via the operation of pragmatic Neg-Raising which finally leads to a universal interpretation with no possible alternative options.

- (28) a. *I think* ($\exists x$. $\neg(\textit{Dima will invite } x)$) \vee *I think* $\neg(\exists x$. $\neg(\textit{Dima will invite } x)$) \Rightarrow
 b. \neg *I think* ($\exists x$. $\neg(\textit{Dima will invite } x)$) \Rightarrow
 c. *I think* $\neg(\exists x$. $\neg(\textit{Dima will invite } x))$ \Rightarrow
 d. *I think* ($\forall x$. *Dima will invite x*)

The dilemma we face there has two possible solutions. Either we admit that the existential interpretation in (19) is being born via syntactic Neg-Raising (while the universal interpretation in (20) may be born via pragmatic Neg-Raising) or postulate that Pereltsvaig's rule does not apply to this certain case. In fact, the second option may be chosen if we analyze the existential interpretation as a result of the pragmatic operation of "rescuing". In the following section, I show some problematic points of rescuing analysis.

4. Rescuing PPIs

The operation of rescuing is closely related to the conception of Positive Polarity Items (PPIs), the elements which cannot fall inside the scope of negation and obligatorily outscope the negative operator when co-occur with it [Szabolcsi 2004]. In [Spector 2014], two types of PPIs are distinguished: local PPIs which are only sensitive to clausemate negation and global PPIs which cannot co-occur with negation at all. English *some* is an obvious example of a local PPI. In (29) *not* and *someone* are not in the same clause, so it is possible and natural to interpret the existential below the negation. Meanwhile in (30), where *not* and *someone* are clausemate, such an interpretation is banned. The only possible interpretation of (30) involves negation inside the scope of *someone* as it is predicted for PPIs.

(29) *I do not think that John called someone.*

^{OK}‘I think that John called nobody.’ $\neg > \exists$

(30) *I think that John didn’t call someone.*

^{OK}‘I think that there is such a person that John didn’t call her.’ $\exists > \neg$

*‘I think that John called nobody.’ $\neg > \exists$

The operation of rescuing PPIs discussed in detail in [Szabolcsi 2004] is possibly the only known way to implement PPI inside the scope of negation. When PPI is rescued, the clause containing it together with negation occurs in a Downward Entailing (DE) context. In this case, the PPI receives the interpretation inside the scope of negation. Consider the classical example from [Baker 1970]. Exactly as the sentence from (19)–(20) it exhibits two possible interpretations: the existential and the universal one. The universal interpretation follows the direct expected order of scopes with the existential above the negation (*it is not the case that there is such a person that John didn’t call her*). The existential interpretation violates it but still is perceived as fully grammatical due to rescuing.

(31) *I do not think that John didn’t call someone.*

^{OK}‘I think that John called someone’ $\neg > \neg > \exists \Rightarrow \exists$

^{OK}‘I think that John called everyone’ $\neg > \exists > \neg \Rightarrow \forall$

Russian *nibud’*-indefinites were not often analyzed as PPIs. Nevertheless, there are some prominent Russian PPIs, like disjunctive operator *ili* [Ivlieva 2016] which show a predicted behavior in rescuing contexts. For (32), let us imagine that Dima had recently made a short trip to Paris, and we want to give him some touristic advice for the next trip. Though, we do not know exactly which sights he has seen and which he has not. We assume that he is probably already familiar with the most popular sights and there is no reason to advise them again. In that case, somebody can utter (32) which however can be interpreted ambiguously. Just like the sentences we discussed before, it may have either a universal interpretation (the conjunctive *ili* in that case is stacked between two negative operators without facing rescuing) or an existential interpretation (negation outscopes the conjunctive *ili* in the lower clause, rescuing takes place).

- (32) *Ne dumayu, chto Dima ne videl Luvr ili Eifelevu Bashnyu*
 NEG think that Dima NEG saw the.Louvre or the.Eiffel.Tower
 ‘I think that Dima saw both the Louvre and the Eiffel Tower.’
 $\neg > \forall \neg > \neg \Rightarrow \forall$
 ‘I think that Dima had seen either the Louvre or Eiffel Tower (at least one of them).’
 $\neg > \neg > \forall \Rightarrow \exists$

Being applied to the case of (19)–(20), the rescuing analysis saves the pragmatic approach making it possible to form the configuration $\neg > \neg > \exists$ without violating the Pereltsvaig’s rule. However, the theoretical problem arising here is that we are not sure that *nibud*’-indefinites can be considered PPIs and hence the possibility of rescuing is doubted. In the following section, I am providing some arguments against analyzing *nibud*’-indefinites as PPIs.

5. *Nibud*’-indefinites are not PPIs

Under the PPI-analysis, we expect *nibud*’-indefinites to show the behavior akin to that of true PPIs like *ili* so they should undergo rescuing in any DE-context. However, the pair (33)–(34) shows the distinction between *kto-nibud* and *ili*. Being implemented into the conditional clause, *ili* may fall inside the scope of negation (33) while it is impossible for *kto-nibud*’ (34). In (33), the interpretation (35a) (born by rescuing) is allowed while for (34) only (35b) is well (while the interpretation (35a) is impossible).

- (33) *Esli ty ne dogovorish’sya s Antonom ili Katjej, napishi mne.*
 if you NEG negotiate with Anton or Katya write.to.me
 ‘If you don’t negotiate with Anton or Katya, write to me.’
- (34) *Esli ty ne dogovorish’sya s kem-nibud’, napishi mne.*
 if you NEG negotiate with who-nibud’ write.to.me
 OK ‘If you don’t negotiate with somebody, write to me.’
 * ‘If you don’t negotiate with anybody, write to me.’

- (35) a. *if there is nobody you negotiate with, <...>* $\text{if} > \neg > \exists$
 b. *if there is such a person that you don’t negotiate with this person, <...>*
 $\text{if} > \exists > \neg$

This observation reveals a strange distinction between the behavior of clauses with *negation + kto-nibud*’ under negation and in weaker DE-contexts.

“Rescuing” of *kto-nibud’* is impossible in simple DE-contexts like conditional antecedents. Other DE-contexts like the scope of universal quantifier (36) and *only* (37) show the absence of rescuing as well. The only possible interpretation of (36) involves the existential *kakoe-nibud’ zadanie* above the negation leading to the meaning *everyone for whom there is at least one task this person will not complete* (or simply *everyone who fails at least one task*). With rescuing, we would expect the meaning *everyone who will not complete a single task* (otherwise *everyone who fails all tasks*) but this meaning does not arise. The same is held with the scope of *tol’ko* ‘only’ in (37) where the only accessible interpretation is *only for Dima there exists a dish he will not eat (the others eat anything)* but not *only for Dima there doesn’t exist a dish he will eat (the others will taste at least one dish)*.

- (36) *Kazhdyj, kto ne sdelajet kakoe-nibud’ zadanie,*
 everyone who NEG complete which-nibud’ task

pojdet na peresdachu.

will.retaken the.exam

OK ‘Everyone who fails at least one task will retake the exam.’ $\forall > \exists > \neg$

*‘Everyone who fails all tasks will retake the exam.’ $\forall > \neg > \exists$

- (37) *Tol’ko Dima ne budet chto-nibud’ est’.*
 only Dima NEG will what-nibud’ eat

OK ‘Only Dima will not eat something.’ $\text{only} > \exists > \neg$

*‘Only Dima will not eat anything.’ $\text{only} > \neg > \exists$

This shows that *nibud’*-indefinites are not PPIs (at least, not prototypical ones) and we should be extremely careful proposing an analysis of (19)–(20) in terms of rescuing. Given that, we have no reason to postulate the scope order $\neg > \exists > \neg > \exists$ for the cases observed and hence the order $\exists > \neg > \neg$ corresponding to the syntactic view of Neg-Raising seems more plausible. In the next section, I am providing some additional cases which show that syntactic approach definitely can explain the arising of existential interpretation.

6. Where the existential interpretation is banned

As it was mentioned before, some recent works like [Collins, Postal 2018] and [Crowley 2019] support the hypothesis that both syntactically and pragmati-

cally born Neg-Raising simultaneously exist in language. Their conclusion is mostly based on the fact there are some phenomena which can be plausibly explained within the syntactic approach (e.g. so-called Horn Clauses in English and Dutch) while the pragmatic approach does not provide an elegant explanation of it, and vice versa there are some phenomena which may be explained within the pragmatic but not syntactic theory. I do not plan to discuss Horn clauses and other cases which fit the syntactic idea of NR (addressing the reader to [Crowley 2019] and [Collins, Postal 2018] themselves) but I will discuss some tests which are assumed to maintain the pragmatic approach like contexts with *only* + *DP* and the sentences with VP-ellipsis.

The example of *only* + *DP* test borrowed from [Collins, Postal 2018: 16] is illustrated in (38). The crucial peculiarity of such sentences of type (38a) consists in that they do not even contain an overt negative operator but nevertheless give rise to Neg-Raising inference. Logically the sentence of kind *only x. P(x)* entails $\forall y(y \text{ is not } x). \neg P(y)$, for instance, *Only Carol drinks beer* is naturally interpreted as *Everybody other than Carols don't drink beer*. As Collins and Postal show, the purely logical negation which barely can be generated anywhere but in the matrix clause is capable of providing the NR-inference. Below we see that (38a) through some logical operations reaches the interpretation (38d) with the negation in the lower clause.

(38) a. *Only Carol thinks that it is raining.*

b. *Nobody other than Carol thinks that it is raining.* — Truth Conditions of (a)

c. *Everybody other than Carol does not think it is raining.* \Rightarrow

d. *Everybody other than Carol thinks it is not raining.*

The claim that it cannot be the syntactic Neg-Raising which makes the inference in (38) possible is additionally supported by the fact that it does not license strict NPIs in the lower clause which is typical for NR-inferences, as the contrast between (39a) borrowed from [Collins, Postal 2018: 17] and (39b) illustrates.

(39) a. **Only Carol thinks that Mike has seen his mother in years.*

b. ^{OK}*Carol doesn't think that Mike has seen his mother in years.*

If we believe that the existential interpretation can be born only syntactically, we do not expect the context which only maintain pragmatically born Neg-Raising to support it. Hence, in those contexts, the *double negation* + *-nibud'* should only entail the universal interpretation. The examples below show that it is exactly how it works. In (40), the clause containing negation together with a *nibud'*-indefinite is embedded under the *only* clause. The only possible interpretation of this sentence is the universal one.

- (40) Tol'ko Yura dumaet, chto kto-nibud' tuda ne pridet.
 only Yura think that who-nibud' there NEG come
 OK 'Everybody other than Yura thinks that everybody will come there.'
 * 'Everybody other than Yura thinks that at least one person will come there.'

The derivation of this interpretation is similar to (38) and shown in (41). It may be seen that the negation appearing in the matrix clause is stacked above the interplay of negation and existential in the embedded clause which on its turn completely follows Pereltsvaig's rule (*kto-nibud'* outscopes negation). Finally, we get the order $\neg > \exists > \neg$ with the universal quantifier as its output (everybody thinks that *everybody* will come there).

- (41) a. **Only** Yura thinks that *kto-nibud'* NEG come there.
 b. **Nobody** other than Yura thinks that *kto-nibud'* NEG come there.
 c. *Everybody* other than Yura does NEG think that *kto-nibud'* NEG come there. \Rightarrow
 d. *Everybody* other than Yura thinks that **everybody** will come there.

The comparison of this example with the original model involving two overt negative operators reveals the difference between them since the latter but not the former maintains the existential interpretation as a possible option (42).

- (42) Yura ne dumaet, chto kto-nibud' tuda ne pridet.
 Yura NEG think that who-nibud' there NEG come
 OK 'It is not the case that Yura thinks that there is a person who will not come there.' \Rightarrow 'Yura thinks that everybody will come there.'
 OK 'There is at least one person that Yura doesn't think that this person will not come there' \Rightarrow 'Yura thinks that at least one person will come there.'

Another case of purely pragmatic Neg-Raising as admitted by both [Crowley 2019] and [Jacobson 2020] (despite in general they defend different approaches, the syntactic and the pragmatic one respectively) is VP-ellipsis. The example (43a) from [Crowley 2019: 3] is considered an argument against the syntactic account of NR since if the syntactic analysis was applicable here, we would expect negation in the elided clause, as shown in hypothetical but ill-formed example (43b). Since it does not happen, we should conclude that in syntax the negation is situated only in the matrix clause.

(43) a. *John didn't think it would snow but Sue did <think it would snow>.*

b. **John didn't think it would snow but Sue did <think it would not snow>.*

As shown in (44), in case of Russian only the universal interpretation is allowed in VP-ellipsis context. Moreover, another type of VP ellipsis (with negation posited before the elided part) also maintains only the universal interpretation as shown in (45).

(44) *Yura ne думает, что кто-нибудь не придет,*
Yura NEG think that who-nibud' NEG come

a Dasha думает.

but Dasha think

OK 'Yura does not think that there is a person who will not come but Dasha thinks that such a person exists.' ⇒ 'Yura thinks that everybody will come.'

Int.: *'There is such a person that Yura thinks that it is not the case that this person will not come but Dasha thinks this person will not come.' ⇒ 'Yura thinks that somebody will come.'

(45) *Yura думает, что кто-нибудь не придет, а Dasha нет.*
Yura think that who-nibud' NEG come but Dasha NEG

OK 'Yura thinks that there is such a person that this person will not come but Dasha thinks it's not the case.' ⇒ 'Dasha thinks that everybody will come.'

Int.: *'Yura thinks that there isn't such a person that this person will come but Dasha thinks it's not the case.' ⇒ 'Dasha thinks that at least one person will come.'

7. Conclusion

In this paper, I have discussed a special and still barely observed case of Neg-Raising on the Russian material. I had shown that the ambiguity arising in the interpretation of co-occurrence of double negation and existential may be yielded with two possible ways. The first way corresponds to the idea of pragmatic Neg-Raising and requires a higher negation which takes negated existential into its scope at LF (repeated in (46)). The second way corresponds to the idea of syntactic Neg-Raising where an existential in the lower clause outscopes both negative operators at the LF opening the way to the mutual annihilation of them and revealing a bare existential (repeated in (47)).

(46) Pragmatic Neg-Raising: $\neg > \exists > \neg \Rightarrow \forall$

a. *Ne dumayu, chto kto-nibud' ne pridet* \Rightarrow

b. $\neg(\text{think}(\exists x. \neg(x \text{ will come})))$

c. $\text{think}(\neg \exists x. \neg(x \text{ will come}))$

d. $\text{think}(\forall x. x \text{ will come})$

(47) Syntactic Neg-Raising: $\neg > \neg > \exists \Rightarrow \exists$

a. Syntax: [*dumayu*, [*chto kto-nibud'* NEG NEG *pridet*]] \Rightarrow
[NEG *dumayu*, [*chto kto-nibud'* t NEG *pridet*]]

b. Logical form: $\text{think}(\exists x. \neg(\neg(x \text{ will come}))) \Rightarrow$
 $\text{think}(\exists x. x \text{ will come})$

The model in (46) is problematic since the accommodation of a *nibud'*-existential below negation would violate the Pereltsvaig's rule. The only way to justify it is to postulate that *kto-nibud'* is rescued in the negative environment. As it was shown in the Section 5, *nibud'*-indefinites are not PPIs and hence cannot undergo rescuing.

The syntactic approach however does not face this problem and then may be used to explain the existential interpretation. This claim may be proved by that the contexts which can only involve the pragmatic NR (like VP-ellipsis and the *only* + *DP* subject) do not allow any other interpretation but the universal one.

Given these circumstances, I find it rightful to conclude that the ambiguity in the sentences of type (19)–(20) is reached due to that there are two possible

models of Neg-Raising which may be applied. When the pragmatic Neg-Raising applies (so the negation stays in the matrix clause where it in fact is generated) the universal interpretation arises, while the syntactic Neg-Raising evokes the existential interpretation. Generally, I consider it an argument in favor of non-exclusionist analysis of Neg-Raising proposed in [Collins, Postal 2018] and [Crowley 2019] which assumes that both types of NR can simultaneously co-exist.

If it is in fact the pragmatic Neg-Raising which evokes the existential interpretation, its nature still seems mysterious and needs further detailed research. As a working hypothesis for the endorers of the pragmatic approach I would suggest the idea that the rescuing of *nibud'* really occurs there but *nibud'*-indefinites belong to a peculiar class of PPIs, for example, they may be licensed by negation but not by other DE-contexts. Nevertheless, unlike the non-exclusionist hypothesis of NR, such an analysis still does not seem to be elaborated.

Abbreviations

NEG — negation.

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