


Suppose (If Only for an Hour) That Negative Polarity Items Are Negation-Containing Phrases

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I'm amazed that anyone would think Chomsky knows diddly, frankly.

<http://www.demosophia.com/>

September 16, 2003 Paul Berman on Noam Chomsky



John Crudele, *New York Post*, March 8, 2005 The government's employment figures aren't worth squat.

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Section 1 Background

These remarks attempt to partially justify elements of a programmatic view of *negative polarity items* (NPIs) which may initially induce judgments of speaker derangement, hopefully a bit weakened at the *conclusion*. One reason for at least briefly considering a nonstandard approach is that despite significant progress over the last quarter of a century, NPIs arguably remain poorly understood: see (0):.

(0) Negative Polarity Items are Pretty Mysterious: Experts Speak

a. Horn (1978: 146):

"An even more serious difficulty with arguments for NR [or anything else] based on the behavior of NPIs lies in the inherent intractability of the polarity phenomenon and the consequent syntactic danger of drawing any syntactic conclusion from the patterning of such items."

b. Hoeksema (1994:273)

"The phenomenon of polarity sensitivity is not, in general, very well understood."

c. Horn and Lee (1995: 401)

"While the fundamental question—what is the nature of polarity items and of the principles that determine their distribution? – has yet to receive a fully satisfactory answer, the efforts toward a solution have been fruitful in informing our understanding of the interrelationship of configurational syntax, formal semantics, pragmatics and the lexicon."

d. Krifka (1995: 209)

"For some thirty years negative polarity items [NPIs] have provided crucial evidence for linguistic theory. But the various accounts of NPIs have not yet attained explanatory adequacy."

e. Ladusaw (1996a: 326) (speaking of questions about NPIs)

"I think it is fair to say that in none of these cases are fully satisfying explanatory answers available."

f. One can doubt that the situation is today, nearly a decade after the last of a.-e., deeply different.

g. Point f. is relevant because unorthodox and surely controversial ideas like the present proposals always demand considerable justification and (0) indicates at least that a search for new perspectives remains well-motivated.

To start, I make the conceptual and terminological assumptions in (1).

(1) Some Assumptions and Notation

a. Let the *semantic value* of any constituent Q be $\llbracket Q \rrbracket$.

b. Let \neg = semantic negation.

c. Let the denotation of \neg be the complement function so that for any $\llbracket Q \rrbracket$ and any model M , the denotation of $\neg (\llbracket Q \rrbracket)$ in M is the complement of the denotation of $\llbracket Q \rrbracket$ in M .

d. Claim c. should be regarded as part of a rejection of the common view that appeal to semantic negation is equivalent to, or requires, a restriction to *proposition* level negation. Rather, it adopts the attitude of e. and accepts the view in f.

e. Haspelmath (1997: 203: note 6)

"The Fregean view of negation as a sentence operator contributes little to our understanding of the form of negation in natural languages."

f. Ladusaw (1996a: 322)

"If negation is based upon an opposition of elements within a certain domain, we can recognize what is logically the same negative opposition in different semantic and pragmatic domains.

A good example of this is the boolean semantics of Keenan and Faltz [1985], which argues that the denotational domains for linguistic expressions of a wide variety of categories show a common algebraic structure within which boolean meet, join, and complementary negation operations can be defined. Contradictorily opposed linguistic expressions can be found in every category whose interpretations are complementary within their semantic type. This gives a well-defined sense in which the determiner phrases *no* dogs and *some* dogs are negations of each other and similarly for *every cat* and *not every cat* when interpreted as generalized quantifiers. Similarly, the pairs *few/many* and *sometimes/never* are negations of each other in terms of the denotation algebras appropriate for these categories. Given the homomorphic nature of many denotation functions, the boolean relations are preserved in semantic composition in such a way that sentences containing these phrases are correctly predicted to have contradictory truth-conditions without formal decompositions which would assimilate each to analysis in terms of propositional negation. There is no formal necessity of giving propositional negation primacy in linguistic analysis."

g. Given f., one could even hypothesize that proposition-level negation plays *no* role in natural language. In cases like They proved not that he was a werewolf but rather that he was a vampire the seemingly negated proposition would then be a negated argument or conjunct of an argument. To pursue this hypothesis, one would claim that seemingly negated clauses like Hippos don't fly involve negated verbs/predicates. From that point of view, the existence of languages where putatively negated *clauses* involve morphological negation on verbs and the existence of English equivalences like our shareholders are unwilling to wait/our shareholders are not willing to wait are not surprising. But I will not defend this hypothesis today.

h. Let NEG be *syntactic* negation (and let letter subscripts index distinct occurrences).

i.. Assume that, *contrary* to van der Wouden (1994: 41), for every x , $\iint (\text{NEG}_x) = \neg$

j. I do *not* need to, and do not, assume every instance of \neg in any sentence to be the value under function i.. of some instance of NEG.

On that basis, the overall view in question takes NPIs to be elements abstractly associated with their own instances of NEG but structurally separated from them in the syntax, as in (2):

(2) An Informal NEG-Based View of NPIs

a. Quasiserious version: A phrase Y *is an NPI* in sentence S if and only if Y occurs in the structure of S in *both* of the forms:

(i) [... [_Z ... [_Q NEG_x + Y] ...] ...] (ii) [... [_Z ... NEG_x [_Q Y] ...] ...]

b. Informal definition: In (i), the constituent Q will be called the *source* of NEG_x

c. Slogan version: A phrase Y is an NPI if and only if Y has been syntactically separated from a NEG sister constituent (equivalently from its source).

d. Observation: the syntactic separation in *a.* can be taken to uniformly involve step-wise NEG raising into immediately containing constituents

e. Observation: the view that NPIs can involve their own negatives is not novel here. This idea is, for instance, expressed in Progovac (1994: 102). However, she seems to take the possibility in question to be merely *an exceptional characteristic of certain fixed phrase idioms* (her examples were lift a finger and budge an inch) and does not contemplate such a view of regular, productive NPI constituent classes like e.g. English NPI any forms, which is central to the more general conception represented by (2a).

I attempt to provide some justification for framework (2), an outgrowth of a long study of English nonstandard *nominal* NPIs, chiefly by invoking *seven* classes of English facts characterized as *mysteries*. This nomenclature seems just since the literature appears not to offer any account of most of them. The logic of the justification runs roughly like this: The mysterious aspects of the properties turn out to a significant extent to be consequences of assumptions about NPIs in effect inconsistent with, (2) and the properties appear considerably less mysterious if analyzed internal to framework (2). But mere adoption of (2) certainly fails to solve *all* the problems associated with the mysteries.

The analysis in (2) requires, of course, acceptance of some general conception of natural language syntax in which the syntactic separation of NEG from a phrase is *feasible*, as in (3).

(3) One Basic Implication of (2)

Adoption of (2) requires embedding it in an overall syntactic framework in which separation of instances of NEG from their original structural loci is both well-defined and permitted, that is, in effect, a syntactic framework which countenances some notion NEG raising.

Various surface oriented frameworks would clearly *not* qualify. But transformational views would, and given their longstanding social dominance it may be convenient for you to interpret my remarks in such terms. My own conception is though quite different and appeals to the framework of the works in (4). But lacking the time and will

to develop the proposal in such terms today, my description will inevitably remain quite informal. Only where driven by necessity will ideas from position (4) be invoked.

(4) Arc-Based ('Relational') Works

Johnson and Postal (1980), Postal (1989, 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004: Chapter 1)

Before turning to mysteries, (5a) - (9a) provide initial indication of what view (2) implies and some concretization of it from English to show it might have *some* connection to reality.

(5)a. Lauren won't show up *until Thursday*. (*Lauren showed up until Thursday.)

b. Not everyone will show up until Thursday.

c. Not until Thursday will Lauren show up.

(6)a. Lauren hasn't worked *in weeks*. (*Lauren has worked in weeks.)

b. None of them has worked in weeks.

c. Not in weeks has Lauren worked.

(7)a. Lauren didn't contribute *a damn thing*. (*Lauren contributed a damn thing.)

b. No one contributed a damn thing.

c. Not a damn thing did Lauren contribute.

(8)a. *Even wild horses* could not keep her away from the polarity workshop.

(i) ok'Not even untamed instances of equus caballus could keep her away from the polarity workshop'

(ii) ok'Nothing could keep her away from the polarity workshop'

b. *Even wild horses could keep her away from the polarity workshop. [except on irrelevant 'untamed equus caballus' reading])

c. Not even wild horses (= 'nothing') (did they believe) could keep her away from the polarity workshop.

(9)a. Lauren did not talk honestly to *any* of her neighbors. (*Lauren talked honestly to any of her neighbors.)

b. No one talked honestly to any of her neighbors.

c. *To not any of her neighbors did Lauren talk honestly.

d. Not to any of her neighbors did Lauren talk honestly.

Uncontroversially, the highlighted phrase in each data set is an NPI. Moreover, in each except (9), the grammatical c. example has two relevant properties. The NPI occurs as a constituent of a phrase with a superficially visible instance of syntactic negation and truth functionally, each c. example is equivalent to the corresponding a. example. One might note, parenthetically, that case (8a_{ii}) seemingly counterexemplifies claim (10a) as well as the more general (10b):

(10)a. Ladusaw (1992: 245)

"Despite plausible arguments that clausal negation can take the subject position in its scope, it cannot license negative polarity items there."

b. An NPI must be c-commanded by its licenser.

c. But *b.* can hardly be taken literally as applying to *actual strings of words* in any case since counterexamples have long been known. Consider the French case in *d.* involving the nominal NPI de + noun with licenser emphasized, or the English inverse scope cases in *e.* And see also Hoeksema (2000).

d. Muller (1995: 254)

Je n'attache d'importance à rencontrer personne/*Jacques.

'I attach any importance to meeting no one/Jacques' =

"I don't attach any importance to meeting anyone/Jacques"

e. Attacks on any member's reputation will not be tolerated.

Revealed by (5) - (9) then, as by many other cases, is that structures manifesting at least most of the properties doctrine (2) motivates for NPIs often show up as actual surface constituents. In (9d), this is not strictly true, since one would expect instead the ungrammatical (9c). But one can assume that under certain circumstances, an instance of NEG or NEG + even is forced to raise out of a DP into the immediately containing PP; see also (11):

(11)a. *To not every gorilla in the camp did he send a Christmas card.

b. Not to every gorilla in the camp did he send a Christmas card.

c. *From not many retailers did she receive such nice catalogs.

d. Not from many retailers did she receive such nice catalogs.

e. *Under not even that bridge can a respectable troll live.

f. *Not under even that bridge can a respectable troll live.

g. Not even under that bridge can a respectable troll live.

So arguably (9d) is an independently motivated realization of the structure view (2) demands.

Whatever can be inferred from the visible occurrence of many English NPIs in close phrasal association with syntactic negation, that surely cannot serve as an argument *against* view (2). Remarkably, the NPI literature appears silent about relations like those between the a/c pairs in (5)-(9).

Skeptics might now observe that if, for example, the NPI in (5b) is associated with an instance of NEG, compositionality yields the wrong meaning when the subject nominal negation is taken into account. Nonetheless, I am not reverting to Klima's (1964) view, which simply required no principled connection between posited instances of syntactic negation and the meanings of their containing sentences. In accord with standard current

opinion, posited structures must get the meanings right. Any presumption that the facts of (5b) combine with view (2) to render this essentially *impossible* in any reasonably general system for calculating the meanings of syntactic phrases, especially given (1c, h), leaps to a conclusion not entailed by view (2).

For while requiring NPI association with an instance of NEG, view (2) does not preclude association with *more than one*. This sanctions saying that unlike the NPI in (5a), which is associated with one NEG, that in (5b) is associated with *two*. Since according to (2h), every occurrence of NEG has semantic negation as its the value, instances of NEG one immediately under the scope of the other would, given the nature of semantic negation represented in (2c), semantically cancel out. So an until phrase with two associated instances of NEG would be equivalent to an unnegated one. The grammatical condition on until would merely require the underlying presence of a NEG, satisfied regardless of how many are present. This stance demands mechanisms which can render instances of syntactic negation invisible. And such deletion mechanisms must indeed be *central* to any viable version of view (2).

Just because the NPI until for example can occur underlyingly with one or two instances of NEG, doesn't mean *every* NPI has that freedom. And there are grounds for limiting some, like the NPI sense of even wild horses in (8a), to one and others to more than one.

At best, view (2) carves out a wider collection of NPIs than normally recognized. For instance, if as argued in Lasnik (1972) and supported later, the phrase many books in (12b) on reading (i) has an underlying analysis as in (12c), then (2) says that occurrence of many books is an NPI in (12b) though not in (12a).

(12)a. Stan studied many submarines.

b. Stan did not study many submarines.

(i) ok $\neg > \text{MANY}$ (ii) ok $\text{MANY} > \neg$

c. Stan did study [[NEG + many] submarines]

This terminological outcome differs harmlessly from standard usage, which at best recognizes as NPIs only phrases for which the *morphology* signals a special relation with negation in the broadest sense.

Section 2 Some Conceptions of Nominal NPIs

Turn to English nominal NPIs, specifically, NPI any forms. I designate the ideas about these in (13) as a *consensus view*, . Such an unnuanced categorization may be offensive to some, who may well not see as minor enough to deserve being obscured under a supposed consensus --the differences between their views and others I have lumped together. My intention is neither to offend nor to minimize genuine differences between the terminologically unified positions. It is only to draw a fundamental distinction between one admittedly nonhomogenous range of ideas about NPIs and what view (2) ends up saying.

(13)a. Kadmon and Landman (1993: 354)

"Ladusaw [1979] offers a whole battery of arguments that show beyond doubt that PS any is an indefinite with an existential meaning."

b. Jackson (1995: 182)

"One assumption I am making about *any* that will be important below is that *any* is an existential quantifier, rather than a universal quantifier."

c. Ladusaw (1996b: 211)

"In sentence [14], the italicized items are negative polarity items (NPIs), which must be licensed by the occurrence of an appropriate expression of negation.

[14] Maria didn't say anything to anybody

In [14], the negation indicated in the finite auxiliary which is the head of the clause is the license for these NPIs. Since Klima 1964, these NPIs have been termed as 'indefinites', and it is best to interpret this term in the sense of Heim 1982. An indefinite is an argument expression which has descriptive content but no inherent quantificational or referential force. Its composition with other expressions results in parameterized meanings. Parameters associated with indefinites are grounded, typically by existential closure, at predictable points in the interpretation. Under Heim's original proposal, these parameters must be grounded whenever they fall in the restriction or nuclear scope of an operator with quantificational force, a category into which the expression of negation should fall. The expression that triggers the anchoring or binding of an indefinite I will call the roof of the indefinite."

d. Giannakidou and Quer (1997: 96)

"NPIs are *Heimian* indefinites, hence predicate-and-variable contributing elements with no quantificational force of their own. This assumption contrasts with the more traditional one according to which NPIs are existential quantifiers."

e. Haspelmath (1997: 34)

"The best known negative polarity indefinite is of course the English any series."

f. Honcoop (1998: 109)

"In view of these observations, I will adopt Jackson's characterization of NPIs as uniformly denoting (restricted) existential quantifiers."

g. Horn (2000: 158)

"While it is now generally accepted that NPI *any* is an existential or indefinite (*contra* Reichenbach 1947, Quine 1960, and others; see below), ..."

h. Horn (2000: 182)

"I have argued elsewhere in joint work with Young-Suk Leethat both *anys* are end-of-scale indefinites (= 'a ____, even the Xest'), where indefiniteness is treated non-quantificationally as in Heim [1982]. NPI *any* is a minimal element on a quantity scale,...

i. Chierchia (2001: 30)

"Here is the basic idea. NPIs are parasitic upon indefinites. They differ from the meaning of basic indefinites (say, the meaning of *some*) in that they invite us to consider possible domain expansions. Not necessarily a specific one: any reasonable domain expansion will do. Let me elaborate on this idea as to make it clearer. The meaning of NPIs

comes, as it were, in two parts. First, as on the version of K&L's idea discussed in the previous section, they introduce in the domain variable associated with indefinites a variable ranging over increasing functions:

$$(112) \quad \text{'any'} = \lambda P \lambda Q \text{ some}_{g(D)} [P](Q) \quad [\text{where, for any } D, g(D) \supseteq D]"$$

Despite certain clear differences, the views in (13) all entail (14):

(14) Consensus View A

Nominal NPIs do *not* contain (defining) instances of syntactic negation.

The evident inconsistency of (14) with view (2) forces me to reject it. This does not require denying that nominal NPIs are associated with the sort of existential/indefinite meaning elements referenced in (13). But *if* they are, they must *also* be associated with at least one instance of NEG.

A subtler implication of consensus view (13) ultimately equally incompatible with position (2) is (15):

(15) Consensus View B

There is one unique correct analysis for all NPI any forms.

While I cannot specify how many distinct analyses the totality of English NPI any forms represent, various considerations argue their number is greater than one. Consider (16):

(16) Here and hereafter, *capitalization* represents strongly stressed forms.

- a. She doesn't have any moral values.
- b. None of them have any moral values.
- c. At most two of them have any moral values.
- d. I am glad that *any/ANY moral values were discussed.
- e. She lacks any moral values.

The type in (16d) can only appear with strong stress. The others can appear with or without it. Moreover, my impression is that the NPI any form in (16d) is only usable in response to a preceding assertion. The other cases are not subject to such a constraint.

Further, for the inanimate variants, as in (17), of the first four cases, only the *d* variant precludes the *expansion much*:

- (17)a. They didn't accomplish anything (much).
- b. No one accomplished anything (much).
- c. At most two people accomplished anything (much).
- d. I am glad that he accomplished ANYTHING (*much).
- e. *She lacks anything (much)/okShe lacks anything which I need.

The fifth case precludes that and, more generally, is impossible with an unmodified weak pronominal NPI form. Thus in several respects the *d.* and *e.* types are distinct from the other three and from each other.

Consider next possible expansions of NPI *any* forms with exceptives, as in (18):

- (18)a. She didn't call any friends (except (for) Joan).
- b. No one called any friends (except (for) Joan).
- c. At most two people called any friends (*except (for) Joan).
- d. I am glad they called ANY friends (*except (for) Joan).
- e. She lacks any friends (except (for) Joan).

The pattern here differs from those seen so far, in that it is the behavior of the first two and last types which are similar. And this difference not only supports a claim of differences among the types but provides information as to their nature. For independently of NPIs, it has been claimed that they attach to phrases whose meanings are end point or universal quantifiers; see (19).

(19)a. Moltmann (1995: 227)

"The NP that an exception phrase associates with must denote a universal or negative universal quantifier."

b. Horn (1999: 6)

"Exceptive clauses introduced with but, save, except and their analogues can only be hosted by universals."

c. The end point claim is though now strongly *challenged* by Horn, e.g. (2005a, b)

That this is a correct necessary but not sufficient condition is supported in (20):

(20) Every/No/All (of) the/Each (of the)/*Both (of the)/*Some (of the) /*Many (of the)/All eighty seven (of the)/*Most (of the)/*Few (of the) chimp(s) except Nim was/were interviewed.

These facts provide an initial argument that the *a.*, *b.*, and *e.* types of NPI any forms represent end point quantifiers, while those of types *c.* and *d.* do not.

I add nothing further about types *d.*, and *e.*, because I don't understand them and cannot offer serious analyses. For the other three categories, henceforth types A, B and C, see (21), I propose two syntactic analyses, one for types A, B, the other for type C. The analyses, which exploit both view (2) itself and the freedom as to number of NEG's it allows, are given in (22):

(21) NPI any Forms

- a. Type A (found in (18a))
- b. Type B (found in (18b))
- c. Type C (found in (18c))

(22)a. [_{DP} [_D NEG SOME] X] = structure of Types A and B (hereafter: the *small analysis/structure*)

- b. $[_{DP} [_D \text{NEG} [_D \text{NEG} \text{SOME}] X]]$ = structure of Type C (hereafter: the *large analysis/structure*)

Given (1c), the small structure defines a D and a DP whose semantics are decreasing and antiadditive, while the large one defines increasing ones. Since the former yield an endpoint quantifier, while the latter do not; these facts combine with principle (19) to predict that types A and B NPI any forms permit exceptives, while type C does not. Since the consensus thesis has it that NPI any forms in general are indefinites, existentials, etc., it would on the contrary determine without ad hoc additions that *no* NPI any forms should ever allow exceptives, just as *non*-NPI existentials never do. So the consensus position arguably accounts neither for the possibility of exceptives on some NPI any forms, nor for the division which yields some which do *not* permit that. In present terms, both parallelisms like (23a, b) and nonparallelisms like (23a, c) are accounted for:

- (23)a. The first beaver built no dam except that one.
 b. The first beaver did not build any dam except that one.
 c. Exactly three beavers built any dam (*except that one).

One cannot approach the exceptive-accepting property of Types A and B NPI any forms via the once live view that such forms are universals obligatorily taking wide scope over negation. As Horn (1972, 1999) and others have observed, that proposal crashes inter alia against fine NPI any forms after existential there, given that the context resists universal quantifiers but in no way precludes NPI any forms with exceptives; see (24):

- (24)a. There weren't any morlocks except that one in the cave.
 b. There should not be any visitors except close relatives.
 c. There was never any proposal except his on the agenda.
 d. *There were all the morlocks in the cave. ELOI
 e. *There was every morlock in the cave.
 f. There were no morlocks except that one in the cave.
 g. Exactly three experts said there were any morlocks (*except that one) in the cave.

The contrast between for example (24d, e) and (24f) argues that the endpoint quantifier property of types A and B NPI any forms is not captured by taking them to represent positive universals. But the grammaticality of (24f) and its contrast with the large analysis case in (24g) indicates that appeal to contrasting small and large analyses gives the right answers here.

Three *historical* remarks about the relation I have sketched between no forms and type B any forms, the type in (25), are found in (25PRIME):

- (25) No officer criticized any sergeant.

(25')a. First, the present view is in a sense the *opposite* of that advanced in Klima's (1964) groundbreaking work on English negation, which took no forms to result from the incorporation of clause level syntactic negation into phrases containing in effect any forms.

b. Second, it might also be said to be the opposite of the view of Ladusaw (1992: 251), which explored claiming at least for negative concord languages that analogs of English no forms are NPIs.

c. Third, arguably one essential element of the analysis advocated here for Type B NPI any forms was first suggested in the throw away passage (26a), never subsequently elaborated by its author as far as I know.

(26)a. Chomsky (1955 [1975: 566])

"Suppose now we add a mapping that carries **472** into **473**:

472 no[^] Noun ... no[^] Noun

473 no[^] Noun ... any[^] Noun

This mapping will account for the fact that case [h] occurs, but not 'no one foresees no improvement.' And it will also automatically give 'no improvement was foreseen by any friends' as the passive of case [h]."

b. One notes in *a.* a lack of concern for *meanings*, since it is not taken to be a problem that an analysis of 473 as 472 would appear to yield under operator combination a meaning equivalent to 'every Noun ... some Noun'. The same isolation from semantics is seen even more explicitly in Klima (1964).

Of course, (26b) raises the question of how the *present* approach deals with the semantic problem. Specifically, positing two antiadditive negative DPs in a context which should place the meaning of one under the scope of the meaning of the other as in (27a) would not predict the correct meaning, something like (27b), but wrongly one like (27c):

(27)a No one called anyone important.

b. 'No one is such that they called someone important'

c. *'No one is such that they called no one important' = 'Everyone is such that they called someone important'

The same posit raises the question of the meanings of cases like (28):

(28) *No trainer taught any gorilla (except Kong) any Romance language (except French) (in any camp) (except that one) (in any month (except June)) (on any planet (except Earth)).*

Why don't the combinations of posited negative quantifiers, interact in terms of negative cancellations? If they did, when there is one plus a no form, it would yield a positive assertion, but when there are two, a negative proposition, when three again a positive, when there are four again a negative one, etc.. This is simply not the factual situation; regardless of how many type B NPI any phrases occur in a clause with a single no form, a single logical negation interpretation invariably results. So my assumptions motivate taking multiple type B (and type A) NPI any phrases in a clause to instantiate the crosslinguistically well known situation designated *negative concord*.

Although nontraditional, analyzing English NPI any cases like (28) as manifestations of negative concord is entirely reasonable. For this closely links *standard* English to *substandard* varieties, involving parallels like (29) and (30):

(29)a. Standard English

Nobody knows about any club.

b. Substandard English (Labov, 1972: 812)

Nobody ain't know about no club.

(30)a. Standard English

You better not ever steal anything from me.

b. Substandard English (Labov, 1972: 805)

You better not never steal nothing from me.

Since it is uncontroversial that (29b) and (30b) involve negative concord, consensus views impose a sharp distinction between varieties of English. Under view (2), the differences might be as trivial as in (31):

(31) **Speculation**

a. Whereas in standard English, the migration of a negative out of a [NEG + SOME] form yields, the word any, in substandard English it yields no.

b. Migration of the NEG out of an antiadditive [_{DP} [_D NEG + SOME] X] quantifier, in general optional in *standard* English, would be obligatory in *substandard* varieties, at least postverbally; Nobody fights fair is good in substandard and standard English (Labov, 1972: 806). The obligatory character is shown by contrasts like:

(i) standard

I saw nothing.

(ii) substandard


*I saw nothing. (ok I didn't see/ain't seen nothing.)

c. It *might* be correct to interpret *a.* as meaning that migration in the substandard variety leaves a copy instance of NEG. One could then say either that in the standard language, raising from [NEG + SOME] does not leave a copy, or that the resulting copy is deleted, or that it alone yields the shape any.

Remaining is the overall problem of getting negative concord meanings right, to which there are several current approaches. Ladusaw (1992), advocates taking the concord elements as indefinites all under the scope of a single negation; Giannakidou (2000) takes the concord elements to represent universal quantifiers obligatorily taking wide scope over negation, while Sag and de Swart (2002) appeal to distinct instances of negation forming a *polyadic quantifier* with one logical negation. Nothing at this stage of inquiry determines that all cases called negative concord represent the same analysis type. Already cited facts about existential there favor the polyadic quantifier approach over any invocation of wide scope universals for English NPI any forms. I will not consider in detail how

that might be technically implemented; but note that the framework of (4), unlike transformational accounts, permits underlying structures of *grossly* and *incompletely* the form (32), in which distinct DPs share the same NEG-including subpart.

(32)a. Possible Structure of No socialist praised any reactionary.



Finally, the exceptive facts and various subsequent considerations will argue against a proposal like Ladusaw's for standard English, specifically, against taking the relevant any forms to be nonnegative indefinites.

I have not referred to the exceptive facts about NPI any forms as a mystery; if I had, I could now say the discussion has partly vindicated the initial claim that view (2) would render certain NPI facts *less* mysterious. For the small analysis quasitrivially explicates why some any forms behave like end point quantified DPs by saying such NPI forms *are* end point quantified DPs. Moreover, the claim that some NPI any forms instantiate the large analysis contributes to explicating why some NPI any forms *preclude* exceptives.

One must link the distinction between the small and large analyses to the distribution of the forms so characterized. because it correlates with distinct licenser types; see contrasts like (33):

- (33)a. No woman said anything (except hello).
b. Not many women said anything (*except hello).
c. Not every woman said anything (*except hello).
d. Not more than three women said anything (*except hello).
e. Exactly three women said anything (*except hello).
f. If those women said anything (*except hello), it is unusual.
g. Should those women say anything (*except hello)?

One generalization, stated in partially standard terms, might be (34a):

- (34)a. If a type B NPI any form is licensed by a DP, T, T is a no form.
b. Not a single/Not one (of the) /Neither (of the) woman/women said anything (except hello).

But (34b) shows this is too limited: The work in (35) might suggest that something like (36) is in order:

(35) Zwartz (1996, 1998, 1999); van der Wouden (1997)

(36) If a type B NPI any form is licensed by a DP, T, $\int\int$ (T) is antiadditive.

While apparently true, (36) is also insufficient, since the highlighted phrases in (37) also manifest antiadditive semantics; but the exceptive facts argue that they nonetheless *preclude* small analysis NPIs:

- (37)a. *Zero* women said anything (*except hello).
b. *Less than one* woman said anything (*except hello).
c. *Who the hell* (= 'no one') (except Jane) said anything (*except hello)!

The difference between the antiadditives in (37) and those permitting the small analysis as indicated by the exceptive criterion is, I suggest, that (only) the latter involve *syntactic* negation. This claim is supported by contrasts involving so-called tests for syntactic negation first suggested in Klima (1964) and illustrated in (38):

- (38)a. No woman/Not a single woman/Neither woman said that did(*n't) she?
 b. Zero women/Less than one woman said that *did/didn't they/she.
 c. No woman/Not a single woman/Neither woman said that, not even once.
 d. Who the hell said that (, *not even once)!

The idea is that the good cases of (38a, c) are only possible in the presence of *syntactic* negation, motivating (39a):

- (39)a. If a Type B NPI any form is licensed by a DP, T, then T is *syntactically negative* and $\int\int$ (T) is antiadditive.
 b. Issue: what it means for a constituent, especially a DP, to be syntactically negative is *partially obscure*.
 Certainly, it seems right to assume that a DP C has this property if C has an immediate constituent which is or contains NEG. That is, in *ci*, *ü*, both DP₁ and DP₃ are syntactically negative:

- c. (i) [DP₁ NEG [DP₂ [D X] Y]]
 (ii) [DP₃ [D NEG+ X] Y]]

d. But the templates in c. hardly characterize all DPs one must specify as syntactically negative, e.g. they appear to fail for the highlighted DPs in *e*.

- e. (i) *No linguist's mother's house* was destroyed was it/*wasn't it
 (ii) *No linguist's mother's assistant* said a damn thing.

Principle (39a) is far from the last word on the matter of possible licensors for the small analysis, as indicated by its curious conditional, motivated inter alia by grammatical small analyses in which it is not obvious how the licensor could be an antiadditive DP or indeed any DP at all; see (40).

- (40)a. Gwen refused to drink anything except champagne.
 b. It is illegal to drink anything except domestic products.
 c. It is not right to drink anything except domestic beer.

But rather than attempting to refine (39a), which relates inter alia to the issue of scope representation, I instead briefly ask how such a principle would fit into an overall framework of NPI analysis based on view (2).

The answer involves the unmistakable implication of view (2) even as minimally explicated so far in (41):

(41) **Implication**

Some instances of NEG, although syntactically present, do not show up as morphological material, that is, are deleted.

The validity of this implication is seen sharply in cases of the large analysis, as in (42):

- (42)a. Exactly three people contributed [DP [D NEG₂ [D NEG₁ + SOME]] thing]
 b. Exactly three people contributed anything.

If the structural posits in (42a) are correct, both instances of NEG have been deleted, as nothing in the actual string of words could morphologically represent either. I suggest that the deletion of instances of NEG should be conceptualized as in (43), which *inter alia* links view (2) to consensus views.

(43) Assumptions

a. The deletion of a NEG involved in the determination of a phrase as being an NPI represents an instance of a relation, the *NEG deleter* relation.

b. The NEG deleter relation holds between two phrases, the second of which is an instance of NEG and the first of which may or may not be.

c. The NEG-deleter relation compounds to yield *NEG Deletion chains*. Every such chain is a sequence each of whose non-initial elements is NEG.

d. Actually, *b, c* are *presentational* artifacts; in the framework of (4), the NEG deleter relation would hold between *arcs* not phrases and NEG Deletion chains would be sequences of arcs.

e. The members of each pair in the NEG deleter relation must be sisters.

f. Since instances of NEG will never *originate* as sisters, NEG deletion can only be fed by NEG raising.

g. Given *e.*, any condition which blocks NEG raising therefore can block NEG deletion by precluding an instance of NEG from being a sister of one of its potential NEG deleters.

h. The NEG deleter relation is the point in the current system of ideas which links to the need for a semantic principle of NPI licensing like Ladusaw's (1980) well-known downward entailing proposal. It is this relation, more precisely, NEG Deletion chains, which will ultimately be subject to whatever the right instantiation of the semantic conditions linking NPIs and their so-called licensors turns out to be.

i. More precisely, if $[A, \dots, \text{NEG}_n]$ is a NEG Deletion chain, then

[1] $\text{Source}(\text{NEG}_n)$ is under the scope of A and:

[2] The semantic relation between A and $\text{Source}(\text{NEG}_n)$ is X where X has something to do with nonincreasingness, nonveridicality, etc.:

j. Hopefully, there are universal constraints on NEG Deletion chains; Szabolcsi (2004) has hypothesized one such according to which the number of deleted instances of NEG in any chain is given by an *even* integer. This would need refinements, specifically if polyadic quantifiers are recognized (e.g. for (33a)).

Section 3 Mystery Properties

Section 3.

3.1 Mystery Property I: Idioms

The first, minor, mystery is that some idioms show an alternation which, from viewpoint distinct from (2), is peculiar. Consider (44):

(44)a. Omar will stop at *many things/*few things/*that/*that thing/*something/*everything/nothing to achieve dominance.

b. Omar will not stop at anything (not even murder/not theft, not bribery and not murder) to achieve dominance

c. None/Neither/Not a single one of them would stop at anything except murder.

d. *Not many of them would stop at anything except murder.

e. *Not all of them would stop at anything except murder.

This usage of the verb stop takes an at phrase combined with only two types of DP, no forms and any forms. In consensus terms, there is no reason why the existence of one should align with that of the other. Given view (2) though, requiring that the PP object of the idiomatic verb be a no form, as in (45), accounts for both variants:

(45) The object of stop at X = 'obey no ethical restrictions' is [[NEG + SOME] + thing]

The nothing case arises if the NEG fails to raise, those in (44b, c) when it does. Principle (39) allows (44c) while blocking (44d, e).

A similar argument rests on cases cited in McCawley (1998: 624); see (46): BUT I WILL SKIP TO SAVE TIME.

(46)a. John thinks *that/*that thing/*something/*everything/nothing of driving for ten hours at a time.

b. John doesn't think anything of driving for ten hours at a time.

c. [think + DP of X] = roughly 'not consider X a problem'

This idiomatic expression also occurs with no or any forms, but seemingly no other DPs. While a sheer oddity in standard terms, this once more follow under view (2) from taking the object to be an underlying no form in all cases.

And again, via principle (39), type B NPI any cases like (47a) are not anomalous but type C cases like (47b) are:

(47)a. None/Neither/Not a single one of them think anything of driving for ten hours at a time.

b. *Not all of them think anything of driving for ten hours at a time.

c. They believed that nothing did he understand/*think of driving for ten hours at a time.

d. They didn't believe that anything did he understand well/*think of driving for ten hours at a time.

I will return to the Negative Fronting cases (47c, d), which show a different parallelism between no forms and NPI any forms.

3.2 Mystery Property II: Predicate Nominals

Mystery property II involves predicate nominals like those in (48):

(48)a. Otto is no philosopher (*except Hegel/*an epistemologist).

b. Otto isn't any philosopher (*except Hegel/*an epistemologist).

c. *No philosopher did they claim you were.

d. I don't believe that any philosopher did they claim you hired.

- e. *I don't believe that any philosopher did they claim you were.
- f. *No anthropologist is any linguist.
- g. *Not every linguist is any syntactician.
- h. *If she were any sociologist, he would be a happy doctor.

(48a, b) show that both no forms and NPI any forms can be predicate nominals, but cannot be expanded with exceptives, exceptional for no forms. But under view (2), this restriction correctly projects onto the any forms, whereas the parallelism has no obvious consensus basis. Example (48c) shows predicate nominal no forms are also not subject to Negative Fronting, while (48e) shows this also holds for NPI any form predicate nominals, another parallelism which seems ungrounded in standard terms. I return to the link between Negative Fronting and NPI any forms. Examples (48f, g, h) indicate that types B and C NPI any forms cannot be predicate nominals; while the reasons for this are unclear to me, this fact supports the nonhomogeneity of NPI any forms.

The predicate nominal cases like the idiomatic ones show the existence of environments either limited to no forms and any forms or in which these two share specific properties. In consensus terms, these are unnatural classes. But internal to framework (2), an environment abstractly restricted to no forms will, without special statement allow (type A and type B) NPI any forms, as a result of NEG migration and regular morphophonemics; and if an environment E restricts no forms such that exceptives are banned, or Negative Fronting is impossible, POSSIIBLY VIA TYPE SHIFTING, the default is that NPI any forms in E will equally manifest those constraints.

3.3 Mystery Property III: More Expansions

There are a variety of elements of different types which can be added to minimal NPIs; I call these generically *expansions*. Exceptives and postnominal much, already discussed, are instances, but I treated them separately. Relevant expansions include the elements of (49):

(49) Some Expansions

not even, not A,and not N, not any (one/thing/of them), especially not, at all, what(so)ever, I don't think.

Mystery property III is that the independently ascertainable distributional conditions on the association of such forms with host phrases render it anomalous that they appear with NPI any forms under the consensus assumption that such are *negationless* indefinites, existentials, etc. For the relevant expansions all reveal independent affinities for syntactically negative expressions and an aversion for indefinites or existentials, as illustrated in (50)-(53):

(50)a. I saw a/some linguist/several linguists (, *not even Frank).

b. I saw no linguist (, not even Frank).

c. I didn't see any linguist(s) (, not even Frank).

(51)a. I saw a/some linguist/several linguists (, *not Frank, not Lucy and not Imre).

b. I saw no linguist(s) (, not Frank, not Lucy and not Imre).

c. I didn't see any linguist(s) (, not Frank, not Lucy and not Imre).

(52)a. I saw a/some linguist/several linguists (, *especially not Lucy.).

b. I saw no linguist(s) (, especially not Lucy).

c. I didn't see any linguist(s) (, especially not Lucy).

(53)a. I saw a/some linguist/several linguists (, *not any).

b. I saw no linguist(s) (, not any).

c. I didn't see any linguist(s) (, not any).

While the *a.* examples indicate the relevant expansions are impossible with clear indefinites or existentials, the *b.* and *c.* examples show that they happily combine with no forms and type A NPI any forms. The structural closeness of no forms and NPI any forms taken here to instantiate the small analysis emerges more strongly from the fact that the expansion types just illustrated are incompatible those NPI any forms motivated earlier to involve the *large* analysis, as (54) illustrates:

(54)a. Not many philosophers saw any linguists (, *not even Frank/*not Frank, not Lucy and not Imre/*especially not Lucy).

b. Not every philosopher saw any linguists (, *not even Frank/*not Frank, not Lucy and not Imre/*especially not Lucy).

c. Exactly three philosophers saw any linguists (, *not even Frank/*not Frank, not Lucy and not Imre/(, *especially not Lucy).

For these four expansions, a plausible informal generalization might be (55):

(55) If H is a DP host of the relevant expansions, H is syntactically negative and $\neg\neg$ (H) is antiadditive.

The examples in (56) further support view (2) with certain slang NPI forms which also satisfy condition (55):

(56) I didn't see a damn/fucking/single thing, not even a bird/not a bird, not a snake and not a squirrel/especially not a squirrel/not one.

To the extent (55) is correct, the mystery of why these expansions go on type A NPI any forms is dissipated by view (2). This also determines that the expansion types characterized by (55) should be compatible with type B NPI any forms, a conclusion supported in (57).

(57) No philosophers praised any linguists (, not even Frank/not Frank, not Lucy and not Imre/especially not Lucy/, not any).

Different expansions, illustrated in (58)-(60), support the idea that NPI any forms embody syntactic negation:

(58)a. He sent a linguist/some linguist/several linguists (*, I don't think,) that sort of insulting e-mail.

b. He sent no linguist(s) (, I don't think,) that sort of insulting e-mail.

c. He didn't send any linguist(s) (, I don't think,) that sort of insulting e-mail.

(59)a. I saw a/some linguist/several linguists (*at all).

b. I saw no linguist(s) (at all).

c. I didn't see any linguist(s) (at all).

(60)a. I saw a/some linguist/several linguists (*what(so)ever).

b. I saw no linguist(s) (what(so)ever).

c. I didn't see any linguist(s) (what(so)ever).

As with the four previous expansions, the NPI any forms here also behave anomalously if considered indefinites or existentials, since these expansions are impossible with uncontroversial instances of such categories. But unlike the previous types, these three attach to a range of negative hosts not limited to antiadditives, as in (61)-(63):

(61)a. Not many philosophers, I don't think, believe that.

b. Not every philosopher, I don't think, believes that.

c. No(t) more than five philosophers, I don't think, believe that.

d. Not even that philosopher, I don't think, believes that.

(62)a. Not many philosophers at all believe that.

b. *Not every philosopher at all believes that.

c. *No(t) more than five philosophers at all believe that.

d. *Not even that philosopher at all believes that.

(63)a. *Not many philosophers what(so)ever believe that.

b. *Not every philosopher what(so)ever believes that.

c. *No(t) more than five philosophers what(so)ever believe that.

d. *Not even that philosopher what(so)ever believes that.

Consider the type I don't think. My best guess is that its host requirement is as in (64), which predicts contrasts like (65a, b); for only the first meets the decreasingness condition.

(64) If H is a DP host of the expansion type I don't think, H is syntactically negative and \Downarrow (H) is decreasing.

(65)a. Not more than three scientists, I don't think, claimed that.

b. Not less than three scientists (, *I don't think,) claimed that.

c. Not many scientists (, I don't think,) claimed that.

d. Not even Bob (, I don't think,) claimed that.

e. Not only Bob (, *I don't think,) claimed that.

f. The contrast between d./e. underlines the role of the decreasingness condition.

g. Few scientists (, ?*I don't think,) claimed that.

h. The doubtful nature of the long form of (65g) raises issues about the notion *syntactically negative*. b
 If a principle like (64) is correct, the possibility of the relevant expansion on types A and B NPI any forms as in (58c) and (66a, b), argues for *their* syntactically negative character.

(66)a. They didn't serve any whiskey, I don't think, to the kids playing over there.

b. None of them served any whiskey, I don't think, to the kids playing over there.

c. Not many of them served any whiskey (, *I don't think,) to the kids playing over there.

d. Not every one of them served any whiskey (, *I don't think,) to the kids playing over there.

e. Few of them served any whiskey (, *I don't think,) to the kids playing over there.

f. Exactly three of them served any whiskey (, *I don't think,) to the kids playing over there.

g. If you served any whiskey (, *I don't think,) to the kids playing over there, then.....

The badness of the expanded forms of (66c through g), shows the relevance of the decreasingness condition, which excludes the semantically increasing large analysis and hence precludes type C NPI any form hosts.

Turn to at all. The ungrammaticality of (62b, c, d) shows this is more restricted than I don't think but unlike the original three expansions not even, etc., (62a) indicates it is not limited to syntactically negative antiadditives. If, as can be easily argued, the source of the negation in combinations of the form Not every/Not all is at the DP level, as is that of nowhere near n and not even + definite and not at the D level, while that of not many is at the D level, then the condition on these expansions would likely include necessary requirement (67):

(67) If H is the DP host of the expansion at all, H has a *syntactically negative D*.

This would predicts fact like (68):

(68)a. Not every linguist (*at all) believes that.

b. Not all linguists (*at all) believe that.

c. Nowhere near twenty linguists (*at all)

d. Not even Barbara (*at all) believes that.

e. Not only Barbara (*at all) believes that.

Moreover, (67) predicts that the at all expansion is compatible with both the small and large analyses and hence with all of types A, B and C NPI any forms, supported in (59c) and (69):

(69)a. Not many philosophers respect any linguists at all.

b. Not every philosopher respects any linguists at all.

c. Exactly three philosophers respect any linguists at all.

d. If Professor Lindner respects any linguists at all, ...

The what(so)ever expansion is even more restricted than at all. One might think that it requires reference to antiadditivity as well as to syntactic negation. But that can hardly be right, given that what(so)ever like at all is compatible with *free choice any*, as in (70):

(70)a. Anyone at all/what(so)ever can learn Mohawk.

b. Pick any card at all/what(so)ever.

Although I can offer no serious analysis of free choice any, my assumptions about expansions would minimally require an analysis like (71):

(71) **Free Choice any**

[_{DP} [_D NEG [_D NEG + X]] Y]

If, *contrary* to Horn's recent work, one accepted that these involve universals, X would be a universal type quantifier. If Horn is right and they are indefinites, then, what follows is materially inadequate. Ignoring that, the proper condition on the what(so)ever expansion would be partially like that governing exceptives in appealing to endpoint quantifiers and partially like that limiting at all in appealing to syntactic negation, as in (72):

(72) If H is the DP host of the expansion what(so)ever, H's D contains syntactic negation and $\int\int$ (H) is an endpoint quantifier.

This and earlier restrictions predict similarities and difference like those in (73):

(73)a. Everyone except Bob/*at all/*what(so)ever can understand that.

b. No one except Bob/at all/what(so)ever can understand that.

c. Anyone except Bob/at all/what(so)ever can understand that.

d. Not everyone ??except Bob/at all/*what(so)ever can understand that.

e. Zero linguists *except Bob/*at all/*what(so)ever can understand that.

f. Who the hell except Bob/*at all/*what(so)ever can understand that!

Moreover, (72) determines that this expansion will be compatible with either the small or large analysis, and so the facts for the three types of NPI any forms should be as in (74):

(74)a. Type A I didn't see any gerbil what(so)ever.

b. Type B He gave no gerbil any food what(so)ever.

c. Type C If he gives any gerbil what(so)ever that much food, it will die.

3.4 Mystery Property IV: Negative Fronting of Nominal NPIs

The highlighted phrases in (75) represent standard cases of the *Negative Fronting* construction:

(75)a. *Never* has he visited Madrid.

b. They proved that *never* had he visited Madrid.

c. *No student* did she manage to convince of that.

d. They determined that *no student* had she managed to convince of that.

The construction characteristic is that the extracted *non*-WH-constituent in the clause initial position, hereafter the *Negative Fronting focus*, cooccurs with subject auxiliary inversion, the latter normally obligatory, as (76) indicates:

(76)a. **Never* he has visited Madrid.

b. *They proved that *never* he had visited Madrid.

c. **No student* she did/DID manage to convince of that.

d. *They determined that *no student* she had managed to convince of that.

The mystery property, first uncovered in Horn (1978), is that in certain contexts, an NPI any form can be an embedded Negative Fronting focus. While Horn's (only) example was (77a), (77b through k) provide further instances, although they may belong to a formal or literary style.

(77)a. Horn (1978: 168)

I don't think that *ever before* have the media played such a major role in a kidnapping.

b. McCawley (1998: 598)

I don't suppose that *under any circumstances* would he help me.

c. I don't believe that *at any time* have the media played such a role.

d. I don't believe that *any friends like that (not even Barbara/not any)* could we reasonably hire.

e. I don't guess that *any of your friends* have they yet interviewed.

f. I can't imagine that *in any sense* could he have outperformed your brother.

g. I can't imagine that *any other proposals* have they actually considered adopting.

h. I don't imagine that *either of them* would she be anxious to marry.

i. One can't suppose that *any friends like that* would they really hire.

j. I don't believe that in any of my classes have I actually made such a statement.

k. They did not think that *any more handicapped workers* could they consider hiring.

For skeptics still doubting the reality of the phenomenon, Google supplied the examples in (78):

(78) Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines Movies Reviews - DealTime

... The car chase is really taken to a new ultra destructive level in Terminator 3.

I don't believe that ever in the history of film have so many vehicles been ...

designtechnica.shopping.com/ xMPR-Terminator-3--Rise-of-the-Machines~PD-480935383937~RI-104807370372

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... **I don't believe that ever** before has a women put such agonized poetry on canvas.

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the clinton years: discussion

... **I don't believe that ever** in history has a president's privacy been so invaded by

the necessity of the media to have something to put in the paper, on the ...

www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/clinton/talk/index2.html - 24k - Cached - Similar pages

Seanad Éireann - Volume 71 - 03 November, 1971 - Courts Bill Therefore, **I do not think that in any sense** can the report of the committee be relied on as giving carte blanche to any Minister or any Government to take

away ...

historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/ S/0071/S.0071.197111030004.html - 101k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

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... theories, I will continue. I **do not think that in any way** should the white race aim for becoming an r-strategist. Genetics is a ...

www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread. php?t=108311&page=2&pp=10 - 100k - Supplemental Result - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[Queendom's discussion board](#)

... I'm writing letters and trying to change policies. I **don't believe that at any time** while I was in the Young Offenders Centre was I at risk to myself. ...

community.queendom.com/forum/depression/736.html - 101k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[FreeLists / si-list / \[SI-LIST\] Re: \[OT\] Offshore engineering](#)

... When I sat in class (in college), I **don't believe that at any time** in any math, science, or engineering class was I in the ethnic majority. ...

www.freelists.org/archives/ si-list/11-2003/msg00219.html - 16k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[Overregulation limits growth, companies say -The Olympian](#)

... "The regulations I know best are Seattle's. I **don't believe that at any time** in the last 20 years has anybody done a complete revision of the building codes. ...

www.theolympian.com/home/specialsections/ NorthwestEconomy/20030105/2262.shtml - 32k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[The Mac Weekly, March 8, 1999](#)

... I used my judgment the best that I could and I **don't believe that at any time** did my former residents think that I had compromised my ability to perform my ...

www.macalester.edu/~weekly/599.html - 101k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[Bondage.com Forums: Fetish, Bondage, and BDSM Message Boards](#)

. I don't believe **that anywhere have I** suggested that in modern day they do. ...

www.unitednorthamerica.org/041503.htm - 43k - Feb 22, 2005 - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[teenmania.com discussion board](#)

I dont think **that anywhere have I** ever found anything that states the opposite. just because ...

www.teenmania.org/discussion/ viewmessages.cfm?Forum=6&Topic=5145 - 101k - Supplemental Result - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Viewed from the consensus position, such examples can only be bizarre; that follows from the logical conjunction of a negation-free view of NPIs with independent general conditions on Negative Fronting foci, whose essence, I suggest, is informally captured in (79):

(79) Conditions on Negative Fronting Foci

If Q is a Negative Fronting focus and $\int\int$ (Q) is *increasing*, Q's *surface form* is (P) + [NEG + Y]

This is intended to allow Negative fronted phrases to be either decreasing expressions, nonmonotonic expressions or just those increasing ones which are syntactically negative, all attested, as in (80):

(80) Arrows Postposed to Phrases Represent increasing \uparrow /decreasing \downarrow /nonmonotonic $\uparrow\downarrow$ operators

- a. No gorillas \downarrow did they claim to have trained.
- b. Not many gorillas \downarrow did they claim to have trained.
- c. Less than seven people \downarrow have they interviewed.

d. Atlas (1996: 301)

Exactly one feature $\uparrow\downarrow$ did I notice in the landscape.

e. B \nrightarrow ring (2004: 2)

In exactly two of these $\uparrow\downarrow$ cases did we find traces of the virus.

f. Not less than seven gorillas \uparrow have they claimed to have trained.

g. Not less than seven gorillas said *anything/something interesting.

h. Evidently, (80f, g) illustrate a context in which the conditions on Negative Fronting foci diverge from those on NPI licensors, contrary to B \nrightarrow ring (2004).

Condition (79) rightly predicts that in general, Negative Fronting of simple, unnegated, increasing phrases, as in (81) is impossible.

(81)a. *Seven gorillas have they trained.

b. *Some gorillas are they claiming to have trained.

c. *Most of the gorillas have they claimed to have trained.

d. *That gorilla did they claim to have trained.

e. *An old female gorilla did they claim to have trained.

But under consensus views, NPI any forms involve indefinites or existentials without negatives and so represent increasing operators, which would fail to satisfy condition (79) on Negative fronting foci.

The seemingly anomalous character of NPI Negative Fronting arguably underlies the fact that in the quarter century plus since Horn's discovery, not only has there been no analysis of the phenomenon, it is hardly ever mentioned, comment (82) being an exception. That is, consensus ideas have not yielded insights into the phenomenon.

(82)a. Den Dikken and Giannakidou (2002: 53, note 25)

"Richard Kayne [personal communication] suggests that [62b] becomes better if negative inversion applies in the embedded clause.

(i) ?I don't think that any linguists would I invite to the party.

However, this judgment seems rather hard to replicate; note that for most speakers negative inversion with past tense remains unacceptable [but see Postal 2000].

(ii) *I don't think that any linguists did I invite to the party.

To the extent that cases like (i) are acceptable, the fact that a nonnegative constituent like *any linguists*, being licensed by negation in the matrix clause, may trigger negative inversion raises interesting questions orthogonal to our concerns in this article."

b. Note that remark *a.* suggests unawareness of Horn's discovery and attributes the authors' knowledge of the matter to a then recent personal communication. Moreover, of course *a.* says nothing substantive about the construction. But even mentioning it makes their remark noteworthy.

What about view (2)? Under that conception, the Negative Fronting foci in (77) for example can be taken to be type A NPI any forms, a conclusion supported by the expansions in (77d). They then represent the small analysis, and contain a single instance of NEG, with the same underlying structure as no forms, which, as decreasing expressions, happily occur as Negative Fronting foci. Since type B NPI any forms also have that structure, it correctly follows that they also should be possible Negative Fronting foci; see (83):

- (83)a. Nobody believed that *ever* would he reach his full potential.
- b. Not a single one of the jurors thought that *in any way* had the prosecution proved its case.
- c. Not one columnist imagined that *any bill of that sort* would they permit to reach the floor of the Senate.

However, since type C NPI any forms instantiate the large analysis, principle (79) blocks their being Negative Fronting foci, which appears correct; see (84):

- (84)a. *Not many jurors believed that *ever* had he violated the injunction.
- b. *Not every juror imagined that for any reason would they be sequestered.
- c. *If that juror imagined that for any reason would he testify, he was very unrealistic.
- d. *Did that juror imagine that for any reason would he testify.?

So both the possibility for *some* NPI any forms to appear as Negative Fronting foci and the impossibility of this for others are rendered less mysterious by view (2).

That examples like (77) involve type A NPI any forms means one must specify how their underlying instances of NEG end up in the main clause. Horn (1978) claimed that main verbs permitting NEG Fronted NPIs are a subset of those involved in the classical NEG raising construction, those permitting a narrow, complement-internal scope for a main clause instance of syntactic negation, yielding on one reading semantic quasiequivalences like (85):

- (85)a. I believe that he is not a spy.
- b. I don't believe he is a spy.

Horn's list of such verbs taking finite complements included those of (86) and *not* those of (87):

- (86) anticipate, appear, believe, feel, guess, imagine, seem, think,
- (87) assert, admit, brag, concede, determine, grant, prove, state, suggest, testify,

His claim was that only the former verbs allow the pattern of (77), as in (88) and (89):

- (88)a. It didn't appear /seem that in any sense had he really met the requirements.
- b. I did not anticipate/believe/feel/guess/imagine/think that *ever* would I have to flee the country.
- (89) *I did not assert/admit/brag/concede/determine/grant/prove/state/suggest/testify that *ever* had my child won that prize.

Adoption of view (2) then almost inevitably draws one into assuming, as I did for years, that a viable explication of NPI Negative Fronting depends on the classical NEG raising phenomenon; that made it mildly troubling that a syntactic conception of that seems currently quite disfavored; see (90).

(90) Horn (1989: 315)

"As it happens, there are ample grounds to doubt both the feasibility and the desirability of a grammatical treatment of the NRP [negative raising phenomenon: PMP]."

Horn's generalization induced the following seductive path. Putatively, Negative fronted NPIs, analyzed here as involving raised instances of NEG, occur only in the complements of verbs classically taken to permit raising of NEG's from their complements. Such a situation is at least grossly comprehensible internal to view (2), whereas consensus views of NPIs leave it anomalous. Since the explication depends on raising a NEG out of a complement, Horn's generalization would predict this is at best possible only with verbs which independently were once analyzed as allowing that.

However, despite the initial lure of a correlation between NPI Negative Fronting and classical NEG raising triggers, this is a false step. For Horn's generalization turns out to be incorrect. During class preparation in 1999, I observed that, at least under condition (91), NPI Negative Fronting is far more generally available:

(91) NPI any Negative Fronting in a complement clause with main verb X is possible even when X is *not* a classical NEG raising trigger *if there is another nominal NPI in the complement clause*.

So although their highlighted main verbs are *not* members of the class in (86), the multiple NPI examples of (92) are perfectly grammatical for me, with all the NPIs stressed.

(92)a. It was not *proven* that at any time had he contacted any of them.

b. We cannot *testify* that in any sense had he violated any law

c. I didn't *accept* that any of those problems had she ever really solved..

d. She did not *suggest* that ever would she attempt to contact any of them.

Moreover, the bona fide character of such cases is also sustained by Google searches, which provide at least a few examples, specifically (93a-d):

(93)a. **DOC]** 1996/1997 Journal of Legal Studies

File Format: Microsoft Word 2000 - View as HTML

Moreover, he denied that at any time had he signed any documents in relation to L.'s arrest. Fortunately, I had ...

www.usafa.af.mil/dfl/documents/lawrem.doc - Similar pages

b. http://www.henrymarkholzer.com/articles_pot_and_constitution.shtml

No evidence was presented that at any time had the Complainant ever assigned, granted, licensed, sold, transferred or in any way authorized the Respondent to register or use the marks MARRIOTT REWARDS or MARRIOTT in any manner.

c. <http://arbitrator.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0610.html>

there was no suggestion that at any time had he been guilty of any impropriety at all.

d. <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199293/cmhansrd/1992-11-12/Debate-7.html>

Since Horn's generalization is irreparably counterexemplified, it remains obscure how view (2) can deal with the main clause locus of the negative in NPI Negative Fronting cases.

My rather speculative proposal depends on the scope of the quantifiers associated with the relevant NPIs. Independently of the realm under consideration, I believe something like principle (94) holds:

(94) If X is a Negative Fronting focus of clause C, then the scope of the quantifier represented by $\text{ff}(X)$ is the highest scope in C (there is an exception if a phrase can be extracted to the left of a Negative Fronting focus).

But, although terrible at grasping scopes, I find that Negative Fronted NPI cases *fail* to satisfy (94). Rather, in these cases, the quantifier, which is the meaning of a small analysis has main clause scope, so that (95a) for example means roughly (95b):

(95)a. She did not believe that at any time could she succeed.


b. There is no x such that she believed that at x she could succeed.

These presumed scope facts directly underlie a possible solution to the question internal to view (2) of how the syntactic negative achieves a main clause locus. Alas for short term clarity, the connection is one case where I must appeal to view (4) and to an assumption already touched on in (32) that quantifier scope, at least in the relevant cases, is syntactically represented; see (96):

(96)a. The quantifier scope relevant (at least) to Negative Fronted NPIs is represented syntactically by arcs. For instance, the determiner of a DP could head *both* an arc inside the DP and an external arc *representing its scope*. This idea makes use of the fact that view (4) *does not impose the single mother condition* and indeed richly appeals to analyses in which it does *not* hold.

b. Note that the Negative raising posited in c. is consistent with claim (2d)

c. Schematic Partial Structure of (95a)



Avoiding excessive focus on details of (96c), its crucial features are these. Arc C and the substructure of its head node 10 indicate that the time DP represents the small analysis. Arc D represents the fact that that DP is a NEG Fronting focus. Moreover, the substructure dominated by node 50 indicates that the time DP is a *proper* Negative Fronting focus according to condition (79). Arc B represents the fact that, contrary to (94), the scope of the quantifier defined by node 10 is in the main clause, above believe. Finally, and crucially, arc A represents the raising of the syntactic negative out of the determiner. While that raising satisfies claim (2d), it can yield a main clause instance of NEG because of the Q arc. Without that, NEG raising dependent on the existence of arcs C and D would yield a complement clause instance of NEG.

Despite obscurities, such a structure hopefully gives a little sense of how main clause scope can reasonably permit the presence of a NEG in a main clause without appeal to the specific phenomenon of classical NEG Raising. And given the untenability of Horn's 1978 generalization, this is key. For it permits explaining how an NPI can be a Negative Fronting focus in terms of the instance of NEG which view (2) determines each NPI to incorporate with no special link to classical NEG raising contexts. If any element of this talk is worth retaining, it is the representation of the time DP in (96c).

Support for the scope relevance idea about NPI Negative Fronting can be strengthened as follows. All Negative Fronted NPIs previously cited appear in simple active clauses. But (97) illustrates cases where the complement clauses are topicalized, passivized, embedded below the claim, etc.:

(97)a. I don't believe that in any sense was he a spy.

b. *That in any sense was he a spy, I don't believe.

c. *That in any sense was a he spy was not believed (by any friends).

d. It was not believed (by any friends) that in any sense was he a spy.

e. *I didn't believe the claim that in any sense was he a spy.

f. *What I didn't believe was that in any sense was he a spy.

One should ask first whether the facts in (97) correlate with scope facts. To check this, I recall Kempson's (1985) observation that *stressed* NPI any forms can have wide scope even from finite clauses. But it seems that this possibility is constrained in tandem with the facts in (97); see (98):

(98) In this data set, stars indicate only absence of wide scope

. a. I don't believe that he was a spy in ANY sense.

b. *That he was a spy in ANY sense, I don't believe.

c. *That he was a spy in ANY sense was not believed (by any friends).

d. It was not believed (by any friends) that he was a spy in ANY sense.

e. *I didn't believe the claim that he was a spy in ANY sense.

f. *What I didn't believe was that he was a spy in ANY sense.

While as indicated I am poor at scope, even with strong stress, I find wide scope only possible in (98a, d). If so, there is a correlation between wide scope facts and NPI Negative Fronting, which gives additional support to the current view.

Evidently, the blockages of both scope and Negative Fronting seen in (97) and (98) raise the question of what principle yields them;...notably, the bad cases all involve but the good ones do not, an *island boundary* between the quantifier and the negative. The general question then involves the extent to which islands constrain quantifier scope. But I cannot treat that topic today.

The account of NPI Negative Fronting I have sketched depends entirely on the assumption that quantifier scope is *syntactically* represented. For skeptics of such a notion, I recall a quasifantastic supporting observation from Klima (1964), which has never received the attention it deserves. As already mentioned, Klima uncovered several characteristics of English clauses which he took to be tests for the presence of syntactic negation. These included the possibility of a positive confirmation tag and of an either or neither tag, revealed in simple cases like (99):

(99)a. Somebody screamed did *(n't) they?

b. Nobody screamed did (*n't) they?

c. Some woman screamed and so/*neither did some man.

d. No woman screamed and *so/neither did Jack.

The key case was (100a), which Klima noted to manifest ambiguous scopes for the DP no one, yielding equivalences to either of (100b, c), which contain type A NPI any forms:

(100)a. I will force you to marry no one.

b. I will not force you to marry anyone (not even Jane).

c. I will force you not to marry anyone (not even Jane).

Crucial was Klima's observation that when reading (100b) is present, (100a) manifests the property of main clause syntactic negation. His very limited evidence for this consisted only of (101):

(101)a, I won't force you to marry anyone and neither will he.

b. I will force you to marry no one and neither will he.

In (101b) the scope of the negative is exclusively that of (100b) and not, for example, of (100c). Arguably then, Klima had discovered that the semantic scope of negation in (100a) was tied to the syntax via the sentence negation property. This observation is confirmable from the semantic facts found with Klima's other test types, as in (102):

(102)a. I will force you to marry no gambler and he will force you to marry no gambler either.

b. They will force you to marry no one, will they?

The presence of the test factors for main clause sentence negation indicates that the scope of no one in these examples should be restricted to the main clause, which is the case. The lower reading only yields examples like (103):

(103)a. She will force them to taste no wine and he will force them to taste no wine too..

b. She will force them to taste no wine, won't she?

While the proper way to formulate the constraints involving various tests for syntactic negation eludes me, I cannot see how the task could in principle be accomplished without a syntactic representation of negation in the main clauses of cases like (102), clauses which lack *surface* negations. Significantly then, the kind of arcs suggested in (96c) satisfy at least this minimal requirement; so, in (96c) the main clause node 300 has a negative constituent merely on the basis of the existence of arc B, even if NEG raising does not take place and arc A is hence absent.

There is though one small snake in the garden just tended, represented by the Google-supplied examples in (104), a tiny sample of dozens:

(104) ... I don't believe that at any time in history there has been a more important necessity for the voices of peace and reason to sing their song at the top of their ...

ebabbie.com/sane/callas.html - 18k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[Truman Library - George M. Elsey Oral History Interview, July 17 ...](#)

... mentioned. I don't believe that at any time Truman ever had on board the full six Administrative Assistants authorized by law. The ...

www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/elsey5.htm - 63k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[MINUTES REGULAR MEETING OF THE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS](#)

... I don't believe that at any time we've entered into discussion it was driven by somebody who wanted to buy down the annual harvest. ...

www.dnrc.state.mt.us/archive/bo031020.htm - 67k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

These seem to be NPI Negative Frontings *without* subject auxiliary inversion. Two reactions: first, for me and others, they are hopelessly ungrammatical. Second, nonetheless there are vastly too many of them to contemplate denying their grammaticality for many. I leave it to others to draw some conclusion.

3.5 Mystery Property V: Secondary Triggering

1971 saw the discovery of the NPI licensing phenomenon which is called *secondary triggering*; see (105):

(105)a. Horn (1978: 146)

"There is, to begin with, a phenomenon which John Lawler has called 'secondary triggering': a liberal NPI triggered by a nonraised, nontautoclausal negative element, can in turn pass on the triggering effect to a strict NPI in its clause. Cf.:

[43]a. * A bomb will explode until midnight
 Any bombs
 Some bombs

- b. *I don't claim that a bomb [some bombs, that bomb] will explode until midnight.
- c. I don't claim that any bombs will explode until midnight.

b. Horn (2001: 181)

"We have an instance of what John Lawler, Paul Neubauer and I [in unpublished investigations] during the 1971 California Summer Program in Linguistics at Santa Cruz] have dubbed SECONDARY TRIGGERING. In this phenomenon, an NPI with relatively restricted distribution [in weeks, until] which is normally blocked after inherent negation is rescued from infelicity by the proximity of a more liberal NPI. Classic examples include the following, again from Lawler [p.c.]:

[11]a. ??I doubt he's been here in weeks.

b. I doubt anybody's seen him.

c. I'm surprised anybody's seen him in weeks."

c. Something has (irrelevantly) gone **wrong** in Horn's (11c); which presumably should have begun I doubt.

What is, I suggest, the same overall phenomenon was apparently independently discovered by Gilles Fauconnier in French data involving the NPI de + N; see (106):

(106)a. Fauconnier (1976: 198-199) (my translation: PMP)

"Finally, in a curious phenomenon, de N can appear in polarized contexts in the presence of jamaïs: GLOSS

[335] ÇÇ m'étonnerait que Julien porte jamaïs de chemise [cf. 323]

"It would surprise me if Julien ever wore any shirt"

[323] *ÇÇa m'étonnerait que Julien porte de chemise

[336] Il est trop pauvre pour s'acheter jamaïs de chemise [cf 324]

"He is too poor to ever buy himself any shirt"

[324] *Il est trop pauvre pour s'acheter de chemise

One notes that jamaïs is the only element which brings about the acceptability of de N in polarized contexts:

[338] *ÇÇa m'étonnerait qu'aucun homme porte de chemise

"It would surprise me if any many wore any shirt"

[339] *Il est trop fier pour qu'aucun de nous lui achète de chemise."

"He is too proud for any of us to buy him any shirt"

b. Fauconnier supplied neither a name for the phenomenon nor any analysis of it.

(107)a. While Fauconnier stated that the secondary triggering he noted was *only* licensed by jamaïs and not in particular by so-called N-words like aucun, represented by Fauconnier's example (339), that restriction may not be generally viable. On the same page where he references Fauconnier's secondary triggering observation, Muller cites without special comment examples inconsistent with Fauconnier's claim:

b. Muller (1995: 256)

Il est trop désagréable pour qu'aucun d'entre nous lui fasse de cadeau.

"He is too disagreeable for any of us to give him any gift(s)"

Remarkably, as in the case of NPI Negative Fronting, the NPI literature has apparently had almost nothing to say about secondary triggering over the thirty five years since its discovery. Thanks to Larry Horn for informing me a little more than a year ago that he was unaware of any attempts to explicate the phenomenon. Marcel Den Dikken's work provides, of course, a *very* recent exception.

To see what view (2) might offer for this mostly theoretical virgin territory, consider English cases based on the slang minimizer forms in (108a):

(108)a. jack(shit)_A/squat_A = 'anything'

b. jack(shit)_Z/squat_Z = 'nothing' *are not relevant here and are ignored*; see Postal (2004: Chapter 5).

c. My impression is that the NPI variants of these forms need strong stress, which I will not mark except in *d*.

d. She doesn't understand ANYTHING/SQUAT_A.

e. She doesn't UNDERSTAND anything/*squat_A.

f. It is assumed that the NPI uses of the slang forms are nouns limited to *antiadditive NEG-containing Ds*; that is, they occur only in the same small D structure as type A NPI any forms = [_{DP} [_D NEG + SOME] jack(shit)/squat]

g. But unlike type A NPI any forms, the NEG in the D of a slang noun *must always raise out of both the D and containing DP*.

As illustrated in (109) and (110), these slang forms seem to yield instances of secondary triggering, at least in my dialect; the crucial fact is the stars on the *a* examples.

(109)a. It would be surprising if she contributed anything/*squat_A.

b. It would be surprising if she *ever* contributed squat_A.

(110)a. It is wrong to say he proposed anything/*jack_A.

b. It is wrong to say *anyone* (except Bob)/(not even Bob)/(not anyone) proposed jack_A.

The idea that view (2) is immediately supported could arise from the assumption that what the relevant slang NPIs need is a negative *local* licenser, likely an antiadditive one; for under view (2), the secondary trigger could provide all that in both (109b) and (110b). But regardless of genuine virtues of this view, it is very far from the whole story.

Focus on (110b). Assuming view (2), one needs to specify the NEG-including analysis of each of the two NPIs. The expansions argue that the any form is of type A; supposing as in (108f) that the slang form has a parallel structure, the complement of (110b) would have form (111):

(111) [NEG + SOME] of them] contributed [[NEG + SOME] SQUAT]

Even assuming that the relevant elements form a polyadic antiadditive quantifier, as touched on earlier, if that quantifier has narrow scope, the complement would, wrongly, mean 'none of them proposed anything'. I suggest

that the meaning of (110b) is given by assuming the polyadic quantifier has maximally wide scope, above wrong. By itself, that also yields a wrong meaning, so assuming such a wide scope polyadic quantifier requires another semantic negation, whose source I take to be the adjective wrong. That claims that the right meaning of (110b) is equivalent to (112d), in part calculated on the basis of (112a-c).

(112)a. For no pair X, Y <it is $\int\int$ (NEG + wrong) to say X proposed Y >

b. $\int\int$ (wrong) = [\neg RIGHT]

c. $\int\int$ (NEG + wrong) = [$\neg\neg$ RIGHT] = [RIGHT]

d. For no pair X, Y <it is RIGHT to say X proposed Y>.

Example (113), parallel to Fauconnier's (1976) example (336), provides another case where I would posit a wide scope polyadic quantifier:

(113)a. *He is too poor to buy himself squat_A.

b. He is too poor to ever buy himself squat_A.

c. For no pair X, Y <he is NEG too poor to at (time point) Y buy himself X> =

d. For no pair X, Y <he is wealthy enough to at (time point) Y buy himself X>

Even if one were to *accept* the many questionable radical posits involved in speculative analysis (112), basic questions remain open. Under the proposals, at least three instances of NEG are deleted and the question arises as to what the right NEG Deletion chain is. And it still has not been specified why the slang version of (110a), which *lacks* a secondary trigger, is ungrammatical. Explaining the latter has at least two components.

One is required to block the simplest analysis in which the NEG associated with the slang DP raises from the complement into the main clause, finding a NEG deleter in the negative predicate wrong. This analysis would seemingly yield a complement-internal meaning 'nothing' for the slang DP, which is not in fact possible. Blocking depends, I assume, on the informal principle in (114c) based on the equally informal distinction in (114a):

(114)a. A *Down* instance of NEG is one whose source does *not* consist of [NEG+[NEG+X]].

b. Thus the NEG in the small analysis is a down NEG; that in the large analysis is not; call it an *Up* instance.

c. No Down NEG can raise out of the complement of a predicate of the class {wrong,}

d. Depending on how classical NEG raising is treated, c. *might* be generalized to cover *all* complement clauses.

While arguably necessary, (114c) still fails to account for the contrast between the slang variants of say (110a, b). The key remaining issues are these: why can the slang form not have main clause scope, which would permit its NEG to raise, as in (96c) above, without violating (114c), and why is something like this *possible* in the presence of

the secondary trigger. A logically possible partial answer to the latter question might depend on an evidently incomplete principle along the lines of (115):

(115) Wide Scope Restriction on Monadic Negative Quantifiers Formed from Slang Minimizer Nouns

In (at least partial) contrast to type A NPI any forms, *monadic* quantifiers formed on the slang forms jack(shit), squat, ...occurring in clause C1 embedded in clause C2 can only have scope external to C1 if:

- a. C2 determines that C1 is subjunctive; or
- b. C2 determines that C1 is one type of infinitive; or
- c. C2 is headed by one of the verbs permitting classical NEG Raising from a finite complement; or
- d. C2 determines that C1 is irrealis
- e. ???

Obviously this motley list is a representation of ignorance, but it is the best I can currently do. The categories mentioned are respectively justified by contrasts like those in (116)-(119):

(116)a. *Edward didn't insist that Molly (had) said squat_A about global warming.

b. Edward didn't insist that Molly say squat_A about global warming.

(117)a. *It was not right for Molly to say squat_A.

b. Edward didn't tell Molly to say squat_A.

(118)a. *Edward didn't testify that Molly said squat_A about global warming.

b. Edward didn't believe that Molly said squat_A about global warming.

(119)a. *I am surprised that Molly said jack(shit)_A/squat_A to them.

b. I would be surprised if Molly said jack(shit)_A/squat_A to them.

Under the assumption that the secondary triggers provide the appropriate elements for combining with the slang forms to form polyadic quantifiers, principle (115) will then not block wide scope for that quantifier, allowing each starred instance of (116)-(119) to be grammatical with a wide scope reading when the word Molly is replaced by for example any student. In each case then, the main clause negative in the good slang minimizer_cases originates inside the determiner of the slang DP, and ends up in the main clause via a raising dependent on the scope arc in the same way seen in structure (96c).

What I take to emerge from this discussion of secondary triggering is informal statement (120):

(120) Secondary Triggering, a General View

Secondary triggering is the phenomenon whereby certain classes Q of (??usually) antiadditive negative elements, which can form either monadic or polyadic quantifiers, are *not* permitted, because of some constraint V to take wide scope from certain environments in the *monadic* case. In such cases, the secondary triggers are nonmembers of Q

(hence not subject to V) which constitute the elements permitting formation of the relevant polyadic quantifiers, permitting the relevant wide scope.

A consequence of (120) is that secondary triggering should be limited to those NPis which can be interpreted as instances of the small analysis. Where this is impossible for any reason, secondary triggering should fail; see then (121):

- (121)a. I regret that anyone (, *except Barbara/, *not even Barbara) said anything/*squat_A.
b. I forgot that he sent anyone (, *except Barbara/, *not even Barbara) anything/*squat_A.
c. No one testified he sold any child (, except Barbara/, not even Barbara) anything/squat_A.
d. Not everyone testified he sold any child (, *except Barbara/, *not even Barbara) anything/*squat_A.
e. Did he sell any child (, *except Barbara) anything/*squat_A?

The consensus view which treats all NPI any forms as indefinites or the like offers no basis for the bifurcation of NPI any forms with respect to secondary triggering, as it has provided none for the existence of the phenomenon itself.

Since, according to (120), secondary triggering is linked to polyadic quantifiers and wide scope, one should inquire into island limitations on the phenomenon parallel to those touched on in the discussion of NPI Negative Fronting. At issue are cases like (122), where only in *a* are the putative polyadic forming quantifiers and the negative *not* separated by an island boundary:

- (122)a. Jim didn't assert that she ever learned squat_A.
b. ??That she ever learned squat_A was not asserted by Jim.
c. ??That she ever learned squat_A, Jim did not assert.
d. ??Jim did not discuss the assertion that she ever learned squat_A.
e. ??What Jim did not assert was that she ever learned squat_A.

While the facts are not entirely clear, I veer toward regarding (122b through e) as all dubious at best, suggesting again a role for islands in controlling wide scope.

For me secondary triggering also fails to rescue the minimizers at issue inside of restrictive relative clauses; strikingly though, such constraints are absent for those relative clauses associated with there insertion, recalling McCawley's (1998: 460-462) claim that such were not really relative clauses; see (123):

- (123)a. *I didn't interview anyone who sent her squat_A.
b. *I interviewed no one who sent her squat_A.
c. *I didn't interview anyone who sent anyone squat_A.
d. *I interviewed no one who sent anyone squat_A.

e.. There wasn't anyone in the room who knew squat_A about global warming.

f. There was no one in the room who knew squat_A about global warming.

The facts in (123a through d) might also follow from island constraints on scope; it remains obscure what is going on in (123e, f) and, admittedly, one informant doubts my judgment of those.

A final point about the slang NPIs like squat_A, which redeems an earlier statement to the effect that *some* nominal NPIs should be regarded as *precluding* the large analysis. The slang NPIs fall under this restriction, necessary to predict their failure to occur in the environments open to type C NPI any forms like (121e) and (124):

(124)a. If he sold her anything/*squat_A, I would be annoyed.

b. Exactly three people sent her anything/*squat_A.

c. Should we sell them anything/*squat_A?

d. He is sad but not because she sent him anything/*squat_A.

The relevant property follows from stipulation (108f).

3.6 Mystery Property VI The Magic Link Property

The restricted nominal NPIs like those in (108) are, as partially illustrated in the secondary triggering discussion, subject to much stricter conditions than NPI any forms. A different manifestation is seen in (125):

(125)a. It is immoral/wrong /not legal to shout anything/ANYTHING/*squat_A in church.

b. It is immoral/wrong/not legal to say anything/ANYTHING/*jack(shit)_A/*squat_A to them.

Remarkably, the contrasts fail to manifest in only *some* more complex structures, like (126):

(126)a. It is immoral/wrong/not legal to tell her to do anything/ANYTHING/squat_A

b. It is immoral/wrong/not legal to insist that she do anything/ANYTHING/squat_A.

c. It is immoral/wrong/not legal to *believe/imagine/suppose/think* he shouted anything/ANYTHING/squat_A in church.

d. It is immoral/wrong/not legal to *believe/imagine/suppose/think* he said anything/squat_A to them.

Despite the stars in (125), even the more restricted NPIs are grammatical with the same main predicates if the clauses containing them are separated from the top clause by an intermediate one consisting of certain infinitives, subjunctive complements or main clauses headed by classical NEG raising triggers like believe, imagine, etc. Arbitrarily chosen intermediate verbs fail to manifest the rescuing property, even though they do not serve as general barriers to NPI licensing, as seen in (127):

(127)a. It is *immoral/*wrong/*not legal to *assert/prove/recognize/state/testify* he shouted anything/ANYTHING squat_A in church.

b. It is *immoral/*wrong/*not legal to *assert/prove/recognize/state/testify* he said jack(shit)_A/squat_A to them.

Call the possibility in (126) the *magic link property*. The clause types serving as magic links appear to be those mentioned in condition (115). Examples (128) provide further support:

- (128)a. *It is wrong/not legal to insist that she did squat_A.
 b. It is wrong/not legal to insist that she do squat_A.
 c. It is wrong/not legal to order her to do squat_A.

The facts suggest generalization (129):

(129) A magical link verb is one which permits a *monadic* antiadditive negative DP to take wide scope out of its complement.

If that is correct, one expects that even the *bad* cases of, for instance, (125) will yield grammatical variants if modified to meet secondary triggering conditions which permit *polyadic* quantifiers, hence ones *unconstrained by* (115). Examples (130a, b) illustrate that this is correct:

- (130)a. It is immoral/wrong to assert/prove/recognize/state/testify that anyone said jack(shit)_A/squat_A to her.
 b. It is not legal to assert/prove/recognize/state/testify that anyone said jack(shit)_A/squat_A to her.

But verbs which don't allow wide scope even for *polyadic* antiadditives in their complements, for example, factives like forget, regret, presumably due to the associated island property, should fail to serve as magical links *even* under secondary triggering conditions. I think this is also correct; see (131):

- (131)a. *It is not right to forget/regret that anyone said jack(shit)_A/squat_A to her.
 b. *It is immoral to forget/regret that anyone said jack(shit)_A/squat_A to her.

Finally, focus on grammatical cases like (130a), where there is no surface main clause instance of NEG. To get their meanings right, there must be an invisible instance of NEG in the main clause, originating in the adjective, accounting for the fact that the example means something like (132):

(132) For no pair X, Y it is [NEG + immoral] = [$\neg \neg$ MORAL] = [MORAL] to assert that X said Y-

3.7 Mystery Property VII Coordinate Asymmetries

Starting from Ross's (1967 [1986]) introduction of the *Coordinate Structure Constraint*, which inter alia blocks extraction from less than all of *n* coordinated phrases, it has been sporadically suggested that NPI licensing is subject to an analog. Ross himself proposed this, citing X1 in his (133), arguably parallel to an extraction example like (X2).

(133).Ross (1967 [1986] :275-276)

"Rule [5.71] is subject to CSC.

[X1] *I didn't eat the ice cream and any cake.

[X2] *It was chocolate cake that he ate/didn't eat the ice cream and."

Parallel claims are seen in (134) and (135):

(134) Fauconnier (1976: 19) (my translation: PMP)

"In the same way, the Coordinate Structure Constraint eliminates (90) in comparison to (89):

(89) Mrs. Crabtree refuses to let her daughter elope with any friends.

(90) *Mrs Crabtree refuses to let her daughter and any friends elope."

(135) Progovac (1994: 58)

"Anyseems to obey the Coordinate Structure and Adjunct Constraint.

[] *I am not asking you to prepare this and bring anything."

However a review of Progovac's monograph cited in ((136) claimed to refute the claim of Coordinate Structure Constraint relevance:

(136) Hoeksema (1996: 5)

"In (18) [= X]: PMP], the NPI anything occurs with a coordination, and movement of this NPI to the higher clause would violate the Coordinate Structure Constraint (Ross, 1967). However, the following examples, involving a coordination with a NPI in one disjunct are just fine:

(19) I didn't think his remarks were very important or indicative of anything other than the occasion on which they were made.

(20) I don't think he'll agree to your proposal now or at any point in the future.

These examples show that whatever factor explains the ill-formedness of (18), it cannot be the Coordinate Structure Constraint."

Despite Hoeksema's assurance, his conclusion is hardly definitive and Ross himself had already discovered disjunctive-looking counterexamples, see (137):

(137) Ross (1967 [1986: 275-276])

a. *I didn't realize that it had rained and any crops had been destroyed.

b. I didn't eat any ice cream or/*and any cake.

c. I didn't eat *the cake or any ice cream

d. I didn't eat ?Mary's cake or any ice cream.

e. While for me (137a, b) represent correct judgments, all variants of (137c, d) are perfect.

Not in dispute is Ross's basic discovery that there are disjunctive/conjunctive asymmetries in NPI any forms, whose manifestation is that they cannot appear as, or in, *conjuncts* which fail to contain their licensors but can appear as or in the corresponding *disjuncts*.

(138)a. The asymmetry facts may be poorly known; so blog entry (138a) does not cite Ross and attributes the barred conjunct observation to a contemporaneous personal communication:

b. Weatherson (2003)

"For instance, it seems NPIs are not licenced inside conjunctions, unless something that licences them appears in the same conjunct. So even though (1) is OK, (2) is bad.

- [1] I doubt that he ate any beans.
- [2] *I doubt that he ate some potatoes and any beans."

Some idea of the generality of the asymmetry phenomenon is provided by (139)-(141).

- (139)a. *I did not investigate any verbs and that noun.
- b. *I did not investigate that noun and any verbs.
- c. *I did not investigate any verbs and any nouns.
- d. *I did not investigate that noun, any verbs and most adjectives.
- e. *I did not investigate any verbs and study any nouns.

- (140)a. I did not investigate any verbs or that noun.
- b. I did not investigate that noun or any verbs.
- c. I did not investigate any verbs or any nouns.
- d. I did not investigate that noun, any verbs or most adjectives.
- e. I did not investigate any verbs or study any nouns.

The examples in (141) illustrate that the property in question is not limited to any forms in particular but holds for other NPIs, nominal and otherwise, here highlighted:

- (141)a. *Helen did not eat *a damn thing* and drink *a damn thing*.
- b. Helen did not eat *a damn thing* or drink *a damn thing*.
- c. They didn't believe that *even wild horses* could deter Jim (*and keep Lucille away).
- d. They didn't believe that *even wild horses* could deter Jim (or keep Lucille away).
- e. *She doesn't like the ballet and *give a damn* about opera.
- f. She doesn't like the ballet or *give a damn* about opera.
- g. *Melvin could not speak clearly and *help* lying.
- h. Melvin could not speak clearly or *help* lying.
- i. *He did not believe they *need* take the exam and should take it.
- j. He did not believe they *need* take the exam or should take it.

No doubt facilitating Hoeksema's rejection of the role of the Coordinate Structure Constraint, .Ross (1967 [1986]) proposed no basis for the asymmetry he discovered and to my knowledge, almost no one else has since; but see Chierchia (2004).

View (2) suggests an approach to the asymmetry Ross discovered consistent with his invocation of the Coordinate Structure Constraint, based on two ideas. One is that of *across the board* relations involving coordinate constituents.

For as Ross (1967 [1986]) noted, despite the constraint, *across the board* extraction from coordinate structures is *not* banned, as illustrated in (142):

- (142)a. *That yellow fish, Frank caught ____ and Jane prepared the black fish.
b. That yellow fish, Frank caught ____, Jane prepared ____ and Mary will serve ____.
c. *It was that fish that Frank caught the black fish, Jane prepared the potato salad and Mary served ____.
d. It was that fish that Frank caught ____, Jane prepared ____ and Mary served ____.

In (142b), each of the three verbs arguably occurs with an object, but only one phrase capable of filling those three object roles is found in the sentence and similarly in (142d).

As in most of the literature, my talk of across-the-board extraction is entirely informal; I have given no idea of how this is to be instantiated, nor will I. I would just argue that across-the-board extraction should be regarded as a special case of the respectively phenomenon seen in (143), the special case being that where the extracted elements from the distinct conjuncts are the same element, entirely possible in the framework of (4) which rejects the single mother condition.

- (143) The yellow fish, the red fish and the black fish, Frank caught __, Jane prepared ____ and Mary will serve ____ respectively.

The other idea relative to the conjunct/disjunct asymmetries is a suggestion of Seuren (1974). Extracting it from his generative semantics assumptions, one can state the informal idea in (144):

(144)a. **Quasiserious Version**

In *English*, across the board extraction (ATB) of instances of NEG from a coordinate constituent of at least the common ('boolean') conjunction type determines that the *morphological* properties of the logical conjunction merge with those found with logical disjunction, yielding inter alia or where one might have expected and, neither where one might have expected both, etc.

b. **Slogan version**

In a coordinated phrase subjected to ATB NEG extraction, 'boolean' type and → or

Principle (144) can be taken to combine with ideas already mentioned linking no forms to type A NPI any forms to establish such equivalences as (145a, c):

- (145)a. Frank will eat no meat, no fish and no eggs. =
b. *Frank will not eat any meat, any fish and any eggs. =
c. Frank will not eat any meat, any fish or any eggs.

Under view (2), the three type A NPI any phrases in (145b) each involved an underlying instance of NEG, but only one such is found in the output. This can be taken to represent the same across-the-board relation as that in such

non-NEG related cases as (142). Application of such ideas to cases like those in (146) requires analyses like (146b, d), but I see no principled objection to such, even though the highlighted conjuncts may raise eyebrows.

(146)a. Shirley didn't call Frank or any lawyer.

b. Shirley called [NEG + Frank] and [NEG + SOME lawyer].

c. Shirley didn't drink any wine or the poisoned scotch.

d. Shirley drank [NEG + SOME wine] and [NEG + *the poisoned scotch*].

So the hypothesis is that principle (144) is both the basis for the 'neither' reading of English disjunctions and for the ungrammaticality of externally licensed NPIs inside conjuncts, first noticed by Ross. Obviously, such an analysis can at best make sense only if NPI phrases like the any forms in (145), (146) etc., do involve, as view (2) claims, instances of extracted syntactic negation, which can feed the across the board phenomenon, a view of course foreign to consensus approaches.

Recall my earlier introduction of a notion of *invisible* NPI and suggestion that instances of many under the scope of negation qualified as such. Support for that idea derives from the interaction of such forms with expansions and with the across the board extraction and the conjunct/disjunct asymmetries of current focus. Consider (147):

(147)a1. Veronica did not read many books.

a2. Veronica did not read many books at all/what(so)ever to Frank.

b1. a1. is scope ambiguous = ok (i) $\neg > \text{MANY}/ = \text{ok}$ (ii) $\text{MANY} > \neg$

b2. a2 is unambiguous = ok (i) $\neg > \text{MANY}/ = *$ (ii) $\text{MANY} > \neg$

The facts in (147a2) follow if the wide scope negation reading results from an object internal, in fact, Determiner-internal, instance of NEG which can, and postverbally must, raise out of the nominal. The other reading involves a verbal source for the negative and the principle that the quantifier associated with every argument of a predicate scopes over that predicate. For given the principles (67) and (72) governing the expansions found in (147a2), there has to be an instance of NEG to get the wide scope negation reading. Turn to (148):

(148)a. Many books, Veronica did not read to Frank.

b. a. is unambiguous = $*$ (i) $\neg > \text{MANY}/ = \text{ok}$ (ii) $\text{MANY} > \neg$

c. Many books ($*$ at all/ $*$ what(so)ever) were not read to Frank.

d. Many books ($*$ at all/ $*$ what(so)ever), Veronica did not read to Frank.

The unambiguity of (148a) in present terms must be attributed to a condition on permissible topic phrases. Specifically, the missing reading should arguably be absent for the same reason (149) is ungrammatical:

(149) $*$ Not many books (at all/what(so)ever), Veronica read.

Involved is a constraint barring phrases like not many books from being topics. For in present terms, only the presence of such a phrase could yield a higher negation reading of (148a), since it differs from (149) crucially in the raising of the NEG out of the nominal. Suppose the constraint is (150):

(150) **Conditions on Topics**

If T is a Topic, then T is not of the form (P) + [NEG+Y] (*at any level*) and $\int\int$ (Q) is not decreasing.

The highlighted informal specification in (150) indicates that whether or not a NEG raises out of a phrase is irrelevant to the condition on topics. Under view (2), the condition blocks any topicalization of *any* NPI nominal, even one instantiating the large analysis which represents an *increasing* quantifier. It also blocks phrases with explicit syntactic negation. Both entailments seem correct, as (151) illustrates:

(151)a. Lasnik and Uriagereka (1988: 156)

- *I don't think that any problems, Mary solved.
- b. *Any books, I didn't read.
- c. *Any books, no professor/not many professors/not every professor read
- d. *Even wild horses (= 'nothing'), I am sure could not keep her away from the workshop.
- e. Exactly three students claimed that Terry's article, they had definitely read.
- f. Exactly three/Few students claimed that they had definitely read any article.
- g. *Exactly three/Few students claimed that any article, they had definitely read.
- h. *A single/damn thing, she didn't read.
- i. *Not less than five books, I read last month.

And of course the same condition entails that raising the NEG away from a NEG+MANY constituent will in no way permit a many phrase to feed topicalization, crucial for predicting the properties of (148a, c):

Consider now (152):

(152)a. *Arthur didn't read *The Antisymmetry of Syntax* and any phonology monograph.

- b. Arthur didn't read *The Antisymmetry of Syntax* or any phonology monograph.
- c. Arthur didn't read *The Antisymmetry of Syntax* and many phonology monographs (*at all/*what(so)ever).
- d. Arthur didn't read *The Antisymmetry of Syntax* or many phonology monographs at all/what(so)ever.

The facts of (152a, b) have already been explicated in terms of across the board NEG extraction and principle (144). Key about the grammatical (152c) is that the object cannot be under the scope of negation. In present terms, that requires a nominal-internal instance of NEG, and when expansions requiring that are added, the result is ungrammatical. Example (152d) is fine because even assuming the required nominal-internal instance of NEG, it satisfies principle (144). Simply, many under the scope of negation behaves in a way essentially identical to that of an *uncontroversial* NPI like the any form.

While an across the board account combined with a NEG raising view of NPIs like (2) appears to explicate the asymmetry Ross discovered, *another* asymmetry associated with NPIs and coordination has not been accounted for. For as is well known, English disjunctions manifest a semantic ambiguity when combined with negation, as in (153):

(153) Helen didn't like (either) sushi or rat meat.

(i) 'At least one of the two delicacies was such that Helen didn't like it'

(ii) 'Helen liked neither of the two delicacies'

A priori then, the possibility of an externally licensed NPI inside a disjunct could freely combine with either reading. But not so, as (154) illustrates:

(154) Helen didn't like (either) the photos (of anyone) or the carvings of anyone.

(i) *'At least one of the two types of cultural product was such that Helen didn't like it'

(ii) 'Helen liked neither of the two types of cultural product'

So question (155) arises:

(155) Why don't externally licensed NPIs in disjuncts combine with the 'true' disjunction reading of these?

Clearly, there is no general constraint on across the board extraction which accounts for the facts, as cases like (156) are ambiguous:

(156) It was Ed that she didn't copy (either) a photograph of ____ or a carving of ____.

But this is irrelevant and there is no real mystery here. To obtain the (i) reading of (154) would require that the disjoined phrase scope above the negative. And in that case, the condition that an NPIs must be under the scope of their licensors, represented in the current framework as (43i[1]), would be violated, as the only possible NEG deleter for the NEGs associated with the various any in (154) is the negation which the object scopes over.

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