Gestural Presuppositions*

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Ebert and Ebert 2014 argue that co-speech gestures can contribute supplementary meanings, which they analyze in AnderBois et al.'s framework of 'appositive impositions'. Thus (1)a is given the analysis in (1)b, formalized in (1)c, with p corresponding to at-issue and p^* to non-at-issue proposals (the gestures co-occurs with the bracketed constituent that follows the corresponding picture). We suggest that some gestural enrichments better analyzed as presuppositions.

(1) a. I brought **[a bottle of water]** to the talk.
    b.   At-issue: the speaker brought a bottle of water to the talk
          Non-at-issue: the bottle is big
    c. $\exists z \wedge z = \ulcorner \text{☞ } g \urcorner \wedge \exists x \wedge \text{bottle}_p(x) \wedge \text{SIM}_{p*}(x, z) \wedge \text{bottle}_{p*}(z) \wedge \text{bring}_p(\text{speaker}, x)$

        Appositives are thought to be impossible or highly constrained in downward-monotonic environments, but gestural enrichments are possible in such contexts, as shown by (2)a-(3)a-(3)a, which seem to contrast with (2)b-(3)b-(4)b (experimental data would be needed to establish the facts rigorously). Furthermore, in these environments gestural enrichments project like presuppositions: they 'project out' of conditionals and modals, and yield universal inferences under *no NP* (Chemla 2009). We suggest that they are presuppositions that can be justified on the basis of the clause or predicate they attach to; if we underline gestural presuppositions, (2)a/(3)a have the LFs *if p ∧ p', q/unlikely p ∧ p,* and both yield the presupposition $p \Rightarrow p'$; while (4)a has the LF *[No P](Q∧Q')* and yields *[Every P](Q⇒Q').*

(2) a. If the session chairman brings **[a bottle of beer]**, I'll feel free to bring one too.
    => if the session chairman brings a bottle of beer, it will be a small one.

    b. ? If the session chairman brings a bottle of beer, which is **[this]** large, I'll feel free to bring one too.

(3) a. It's unlikely that the next speaker will bring **a bottle of beer** to his talk.
    =>? if the session chairman brings a bottle of beer, it will be a large one

    b. #It's unlikely that the next speaker will bring a bottle of beer, which is **[this]** large.

(4) a. No philosopher brought **[a bottle of beer]** to the workshop.
    =>? when a philosopher brings a bottle of beer, it is usually a large one

    b. #No philosopher brought a bottle of beer, which is **[this]** large.

        On some theories (e.g. Potts 2005), a supplement cannot contain a bound element. But gestural enrichments can, and here too they are reminiscent of presuppositions.

(5) a. No philosopher brought **[his bottle of beer]** to the workshop.
    =>? each philosopher had a large bottle of beer

    b. No philosopher brought **[a beer he liked]** to the workshop.
    =>? each philosopher likes the kind of beer that comes in large bottles

        A supplement-based analysis could account for these data, but at a cost.
(i) It could posit that gestural supplements can be accompanied with a covert version of the indicative or counterfactual mood found in (6); but without independent evidence, this might be stipulative.

(6) a. If the session chairman brings a bottle of beer, which will be **[this]** large, I'll feel free to bring one too.

   b. No philosopher brought a bottle of beer, which <u>would have been</u> **[this]** large.

(ii) Alternatively, it could posit that in (2)-(4)-(3) it is not the entire indefinite but just the NP which is modified; but it would still need to explain how the modified NPs in (5) can contain a bound element.

References

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