Implicatures from silence: A remark on Chung's puzzle

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Abstract: We focus on the observation that the interpretation of some elliptical utterances does not match that made available by the putative non-elliptical alternant. We propose an account of this couched in the assumption that ellipsis involves non-insertion of (otherwise) pronounced material in the PF-branch (Merchant 2005, Saab 2008, amongst others). The capacity for ellipsis to give rise to implicatures, unavailable in the absence of ellipsis, follows from standard and independently motivated assumptions about the featural content of pronounced lexical items (as opposed to elided/unpronounced items, extending ideas in Kratzer 1998, 2009, Safir 2014). Our approach is consistent with a view of the identity condition on ellipsis resolution that crucially incorporates a semantic/interpretive component.

Keywords: Ellipsis, Implicatures, Pronouns, Isomorphism, Pragmatics

A robust generalization in the ellipsis literature regarding the interpretation of indexicals and other referring expressions in E(llipsis)-sites is that recoverability conditions must make reference to content and not to character (in Kaplanian terms). This is more or less suggested explicitly in Potts et al (2009), but it is also present in many previous works on Vehicle Change (VC) phenomena (Fiengo & May 1994 and Merchant 1999/2001 being two prominent references). Let us call this generalization the VC Generalization, which is stated in the following way:

    VC Generalization (VCG):

(1)   Recoverability conditions in ellipsis make reference to *content* not *character*.[1]

Our main claim is essentially that the interpretation of elided material is not always identical to the interpretation of the putative non-elliptical alternant of the elided structure. We show this by highlighting the simple observation that certain instances of ellipsis have an interpretation that is not predicted to be possible under extant assumptions about the identity conditions on elided material and its antecedent. We paint a pragmatic picture for how such interpretations are achievable while maintaining standard assumptions about recoverability/identity requirements under ellipsis. The, perhaps surprising, result of this investigation is that the capacity for Gricean implicature differs between elliptical, and non-elliptical material.

1.0 Empirical Background

The VCG is confirmed by different phenomena. Maybe the most well-known studied aspect of such a generalization is the attested mismatches between R(eferring)-expressions and pronouns in cases like (2) from Merchant's (1999) dissertation (we represent elided structure in angle brackets <…> throughout):

(2)   a. They arrested **the man$_3$**, but **he$_3$** doesn't know why.

        b. They arrested **the man$_1$**, but **he$_1$** doesn't know why <they arrested ***the man$_1$/him$_1$**>.

In order to avoid a Principle-C violation, the E-site is assumed to contain a pronoun co-referential with the R-expression in the antecedent.

        Other mismatches between indexical expressions are treated on a par with VC of the type presented in (2) (see Thoms 2013, 2015 for recent discussion).

(3)   A: Can you help **me**? [requesting help]

        B: Yes, I can <help **you**>.

Finally, we also find expressive mismatches. See the following examples:

(4)   A: I saw your ***fucking*** dog in the park.

B: No, you didn't—you couldn't have. The poor thing passed away last week.

[Potts *et al* 2009: 364]

(5)   A: You should ***fucking*** fire that ***asshole*** John!

B: I know you think I should, but I won't as I like him.

[Thoms 2013]

For both (4B), and (5B), the surrounding discourse allows us to conclude that B does not have A's negative attitude towards the dog, or John, respectively. Taking for granted that expressives form a natural class with indexicals (Potts 2005, 2007) the data in (3-5) fall under the VCG. Indeed, this was the sort of data that led Potts et al 2009 to suggest that identity in ellipsis can only make reference to content.

The VCG is the type of generalization that seems to call for a purely semantic condition on ellipsis. At least, this was one of the main arguments that led Merchant to formulate his FOCUS CONDITION ON ELLIPSIS.[2]

FOCUS CONDITION ON ELLIPSIS:

(6)   A constituent α can be deleted only if α is e- GIVEN.

Associated definitions:

(7)   An expression E counts as e-GIVEN iff E has a salient antecedent A and, modulo ∃-type shifting,

i. A entails the Focus closure of E (written F-clo(E)), and

ii. E entails F-clo(A)

(8)   F-clo(α), is the result of replacing F-marked parts of α with ∃-bound variables.

Under this approach (call it the *mutual entailment* approach, or ME, for short), ellipsis crucially involves the notions of *truth* and *entailment* (i.e., ME makes reference to *content*, not *character*). As the reader may check, VCG in any of the aforementioned examples complies with ME under Focus-closure, given an appropriate variable assignment. For instance, in (2), ME allows an R-expression to antecede a pronoun, provided they are coreferential. E and F-clo(E), and A and F-clo(A) are all identical in (2) (modulo ∃-closure), thus ensuring ME. Informally:

(9)   a. $F\text{-}clo([[A]])=[[A]]=\exists x[x \textbf{ arrested } g(1)]$

      b. $F\text{-}clo([[E]])=[[E]]=\exists y[y \textbf{ arrested } g(1)]$

      c.   Thus: $[[A]]$ entails $F\text{-}clo([[E]])$ and $[[E]]$ entails $F\text{-}clo([[A]])$.

The same conclusion holds in cases of indexical mismatches and expressives, taking for granted that expressives do not contribute to the truth conditional meaning of the proposition in which they occur.

Regardless of particular implementation, the VCG seems well motivated empirically. We are aware of one exception, which, to the best of our knowledge, was first noticed by Sandra Chung in a short note (Chung 2000). Here are her examples:

(10)   Jack: I_i don't want to be divorced from you_j.

        Jill: Well, I_j do __!

                (a) $[_E$ want to be divorced from $you_i]$

(11)   Jill: For instance, I_j would be reluctant to criticize you_i in public

        Jane: I_i wouldn't be __.

                (a) $[_E$ reluctant to criticize you_j in public$]$

(12)   Jack: You_m pushed me_j first!

        Mike: No, you_j did __!

(a) [$_E$ push me$_m$ first]

In (10-12), elided indexes interrupt ME, in violation of Merchant's focus condition, yet ellipsis is still possible. Consider (12). Both A and F-clo(A) translate as $\exists x[x$ **pushed** $g(j)]$ (modulo existential closure). In turn, E and F-clo(E), translate as $\exists x[x$ **pushed** $g(m)]$. Assuming $g(m) \neq g(j)$, ME is not met.

Here, we argue that, despite appearances, such cases are not counterexamples to ME.[3] Our strategy is to demonstrate that E-sites must, indeed, be modeled as ME predicts (i.e., the proffered E-sites in (10-12) are wrong). Shortly, we highlight examples where ME is demonstrably not met, for the same reasons the proffered parses for the E-sites in (10-12) fail to meet ME. The relevant interpretations of the ellipses in (10-12) arise via conversational implicature, and do not map to the elided structure, which, we claim, *does* satisfy ME.

In short, in (10), counter to the chosen representation, the E-site's structure is #[$_E$ want to be divorced from me] (satisfying ME). Of course, this structure is infelicitous. We argue this infelicity triggers a Gricean implicature, generating the reciprocal meaning indicated in the (incorrectly analyzed) E-site in (10a).

If this is correct, then E-sites would have particular conversational properties not attested in their non-elliptical counterparts (for reasons we discuss below). As mentioned above, the E-site we defend for examples like (10) is pragmatically deviant, and, crucially, in the absence of ellipsis, the implicature consistent with the elliptical interpretation of (10) is inaccessible.

Before discussing the details of our account, we first discuss Chung's solution to the puzzle raised in (10-12). Then, we discuss our analysis in section 3. In section 4

we discuss consequences for the theory of recoverability under ellipsis and its connections with the pragmatic interface.

2. Chung's suggestion

Chung's brief note is mainly concerned about the puzzle raised by (10-12) regarding the VCG (although she does not state the problem in this way). However, she does suggest a possible solution. In her words,

The solution I want to suggest to this puzzle draws on a further piece of traditional linguistic wisdom concerning pronouns: *I* and *you* are opposed in that *you* picks out the participant in the speech event who is not the speaker. Likewise, *I* picks out the participant who is not the hearer […]. To put the point differently, *I* and *you* have a relational use: these pronouns stand in the "salient other" relation, and that relation can form the basis for a referential dependency (cf. Heim, Lasnik, and May on *other*). I claim that this referential dependency can be accessed by the process responsible for VP ellipsis. When that happens, the result is the sloppy reading of [(10-12) - authors].

If we understand Chung's suggestion correctly, the E-sites are recoverable in their sloppy (relevant) readings just because you can guess that the different referential indexes that A and E express are recoverable from the differential relation that these pronouns explicitly make salient. One way to take this idea is that the sloppy reading arises by pragmatic or discursive accommodation. The more explicit the "salient other" relation is the more recoverable the sloppy reading is. Take for instance her following (ambiguous) example:

(13) $Jane_n$:   Jack would be reluctant to criticize you_m in public.

   $Mike_m$: Jill wouldn't be __.

      (a) [$_E$ reluctant to criticize me_m]

      (b) [$_E$ reluctant to criticize you_n]

As Chung notices, and we agree, the sloppy reading ((13b)) is hard to get in out of the blue contexts. However,

"if one knows that Jack and Mike are partners and Jill and Jane are partners, then the sloppy reading in [9b][our (13b) – authors] is easy to accept" (Chung 2000)

It seems clear, then, that Chung is advocating a pragmatic accommodation account. The proposal is still too weak, as it seems to us that it predicts sloppy readings in cases where this is impossible.

In this respect, consider the following example:

(14)   [John and Peter are talking by Skype]

         John: It's cold **here**. #Is it <cold **there**> too?

This example is fully deviant. Yet, Chung's story should rule in such cases, given that *here* and *there* are in a relevant "salient other" relation. Concretely, *here,* in A denotes the place where John is, and *there,* in E, the place where Peter is. This is impossible as predicted by the VCG (and ME). We do not see how Chung's suggestions can handle (14) and related examples. Let us, then, focus on another alternative.

3. A Solution in Terms of Conversational Implicatures

Let's start with a stripping/VP-ellipsis example like (15), which is acceptable for most speakers:[4]

(15)   A: I love you.

         B: Me too / I do <love you> too.

Of course, both examples accept a narcissistic reading according to which B loves herself (<love me>). Notably, this is a reading predicted by our account (in short, (15) is ambiguous). Indeed, you can make the relevant joke by adding:

(16)   A': Oh! You love yourself? What a narcissistic thing to say!

Our claim is that the narcissistic reading is the literal reading that the rules of grammar provide. Put differently, the VCG and ME are obeyed.

In short, when it comes to the rules of the grammar, ME is obeyed in the generation of ellipses like (15) (and examples like it), with the narcissistic interpretation. Where, then, does the sloppy/relevant/non-narcissistic interpretation come from? Our answer is that they are the result of a conversational implicature. According to Grice, conversational implicatures arise whenever the literal meaning violates ones of Grice's maxims of rational conversation (Grice 1975). By literal meaning, it is understood that the logical entailments produced by some utterance U are not always conversationally relevant. In the general case, the literal (truth-conditionally relevant) meaning is not blocked by the implicated meaning. To illustrate from an example by Hom (2010: 1981, ex 58), if you say "the dog is on the fucking couch," there is always a literal way to read this as the dog is on a couch dedicated to fucking. Given that this seems to be absurd, you understand that the speaker is communicating something different (i.e., a negative attitude towards the object or event at hand). The moral of this is that conversational implicatures often leave room for a literal meaning, and indeed, are often triggered by a communicative failure of such a literal meaning. With this in mind, let us come back to (15).

The literal meaning of (15B) under ellipsis is the narcissistic one (<love me>, consistent with ME and the VCG). Indeed, this reading is always allowed and even preferred by some speakers.[5] Yet, there are reasons to believe that such a narcissistic reading makes no relevant contribution to the conversation (violating the relevance maxim). So, a conversational implicature is triggered, one consistent with a referential index mismatch; the non-narcissistic meaning is achieved as an implicature.

(17) A: I love you.

   B: Me too <love myself>.   Literal Meaning (consistent with VCG/ME)

   B′: Me too <love you>.   Implicated Meaning

The analysis in terms of conversational implicatures makes some concrete predictions. First, it makes the prediction that the narcissistic reading must always be available, however absurd it may be in context. And this is borne out, as we have already seen. Second, it also correctly predicts the badness of (14), repeated from above, which was problematic for Chung's suggestion:

(14) [John and Peter are talking by Skype]

   John: It is cold **here**. #Is it <cold **there**> too?

On our account, the grammar never generates this E-site; it gives us instead:

(18) [John and Peter are talking by Skype]

   John: It is cold **here**. *Is it <cold **here**> too?

The E-site in (18) complies with the VCG and is also in consonance with ME (and more recent theoretical cousins, e.g. AnderBois 2011, Weir 2014, Barros 2014, Thoms 2015). But this example is anomalous independently for a variety of reasons. First, the licensing conditions on questioning are not met, since John's question has already been answered in the antecedent. Additionally, "too," is unlicensed, since it introduces an incompatible contrast between identical referential indexes. Conversational implicatures are typically generated by well-formed sentences, whose literal meaning, so to speak, produces a bad move in the conversational flow. In (18), no implicature can be generated given that the sentence is simply ungrammatical.[6] By the same token, (19) is also correctly ruled out:

(19) [same context as (18)]

A: It's cold here$_i$.

B: #It is <cold here$_j$> too.

Again the *here* in A and in the E site refers to different referential indexes and this clearly violates mutual entailment and, by extension, no implicature can be generated from a deviant sentence/proposition (i.e., the ellipsis cannot be generated).[7]

It is worth noting that the use of salient contextual clues, such as pointing, are insufficient to render disjoint reference in an E-site (violations of ME) recoverable under ellipsis. This fact emphasizes the basic claim that, pace Chung 2000, the "salient other" relation is not enough to account for the facts. Consider (20), below:

(20) *First, Sally will put a box over there$_A$ (pointing to place A), and then Jack will <put a box over there$_B$> (pointing to place B).

Example (20) can only be interpreted as asserting that Jack will place a box in the same place Sally did, never mind that pointing should contextually disambiguate things. Importantly, regardless of recoverability or contextual scaffolding, ellipsis fails under the relevant interpretation. As it stands, our analysis correctly predicts why this sloppy reading is not available in examples like (20).

Implicatures are also cancelled whenever a narcissistic or self-referential reading is suspended by other means. Consider a case like (21):

(21)   John: I love you.

        Peter: Carl does <love me> too.

As the reader can check, the literal reading (ME-compliant) in (21) is a non-narcissistic one, so no implicature is triggered and the VCG is respected. This is because the use of an R-expression in the subject position of the elliptical sentence refers to an entity other than the speaker (Peter in this case). Of course, the context

can force an implicature, as in Chung's example in (13). In other words, an implicature can be generated whenever (a) ellipsis is licensed, and (b) the context determines what's relevant and sensible.

In summary, we have shown that the VCG stands, and that some putative counterexamples are obtained by pragmatic means. Concretely, we have proposed that what lies behind the sloppy readings in examples like (15B) is a particular instance of conversational implicature. This approach does better than Chung's suggestion, insofar it correctly rules out cases like (18-20), where the "salient other" relation stands, but, anyway, the sloppy reading is inaccessible, while preserving Chung's intuition that the relevant reading is sensitive to pragmatic factors. Now, we turn to some important consequences that the facts under exploration here have for the theory of identity in ellipsis and pragmatic accommodation.

4. Final remarks

The implicature strategy we have adopted has some notable consequences for the theory of ellipsis and its interaction with the pragmatic interface. First, it supposes a particular conception of pragmatic accommodation in ellipsis that connects in interesting ways with recent approaches to accommodation in ellipsis (see Fox 1999, 2000, van Craenenbroeck 2013 and Thoms 2015, among others). Second, it raises the question of why silent structures give rise to implicatures that are absent in non-elliptical sentences. In closing this remark, we briefly address these issues, in turn, with the hope to open future research on the topic.[8]

4.1. Ellipsis and pragmatic accommodation

One salient consequence of the particular paradigm we explore here is that it forces us to revise other theories of the role of pragmatics in ellipsis on the market. Here, we

show that they all share in common with ME the property where the implicated meaning is not generable (literally/semantically) under ellipsis, so all such approaches fail to account for the data as they stand.

One prominent account is provided in Fox (1999, 2000). According to Fox 1999, accommodation of a new antecedent for a given elliptical sentence must have a trigger. Fox 1999 claims that accommodation has a trigger when the elliptical sentence (ES) contains what he calls *accommodation-seeking material*, i.e., non-focus marked, but pronounced, parts in ES (overt deaccented material). This non-focused material, moreover, must be absent in the antecedent (see Fox 1999 for details). At any rate, the reader can easily see that any of the sentences in our paradigm fail to meet Fox's condition. Consider (22):

(22)　　A: I_k love you_i.

　　　　B: $[Me_i]_F$ $[too]_F$ <...>

The elliptical sentence in (22B) just has no accommodation seeking material, i.e., there is no relevant constituent outside the E-site that is non-F marked. Therefore, accommodation ala Fox 1999 cannot be the relevant culprit behind the non-narcissistic interpretation, 'I_i love you_k too.'

Thoms' recent 2015 theory of accommodation in ellipsis, although one of the most explicit and detailed ones available in recent literature, also fails to capture the relevant paradigm. According to Thoms, the identity condition on ellipsis is strictly syntactic in nature. In order to account for the many attested counterexamples to such an approach, Thoms 2015 adopts the assumption that, in instances of ellipsis where the elided structure is demonstrably not syntactically isomorphic to its antecedent, a syntactically isomorphic antecedent is accommodated.

Such accommodated antecedents can only be generated when isomorphism between the actual antecedent and the elided structure fails. Among several structural conditions, accommodated antecedents must satisfy the following semantic constraint (Thoms 2015: 20): "All members of Ad(A) [the set of accommodated antecedents - authors] must be [semantically – authors] identical to A [the original antecedent - authors] under some variable assignment, i.e., $[[A]]^g = [[A']]^g$." This move is quite brilliant, as it manages to maintain syntactic isomorphism as the recoverability condition, while simultaneously accounting for counterevidence to such a condition.

In short, under Thoms's account, what has been misperceived as a semantic component to the identity condition on ellipsis in the recent literature (i.e., detectible violations of syntactic identity), is instead modeled as the result of a semantic constraint on accommodatable alternative antecedents (to the actual). The overall effect is to, if we may, transmit the relevance of ME (and more recently proposed relatives) to the accommodation procedure itself.

Provided a syntactically distinct (from the actual antecedent) antecedent may be accommodated thusly, we expect detectible mismatches between the E-site and the actual antecedent. Syntactic isomorphism is nonetheless respected, however, given that it is syntactic isomorphism between the accommodated antecedent (and not the actual antecedent) that is relevant.

However, as the reader may check, this semantic constraint is not met in (22B) (or any of our relevant examples thus far for that matter), for there is no variable assignment in A that would be semantically identical to the variable assignment for some accommodated A' in the relevant cases. As such, we conclude that Thoms's

approach will not generate the exceptional readings noted in Chung 2000, at least not as analyses of the elided material. We must still make reference to implicatures.

Finally, van Craenenbroeck's (2013) theory is in a similar situation. His condition for accommodated antecedents is an extension of Fox's theory:

(23)   An accommodated antecedent can only be built up from non-F-marked overt material present in the discourse or from elements that are freely available in any discourse.

It is worth briefly discussing the possibility of accommodation by means of "elements that are always available in the discourse." These elements are expletives, indexicals with salient antecedents, copulas, and the like.

In van Craenenbroeck's work, the motivation is to account for copular sources in ellipsis (for a recent review with detailed discussion of such cases, see Barros 2014 and references) amongst other phenomena, such as *discourse initial fragments*, and so on (see Merchant 2004, 2010 for discussion of these in particular, and earlier discussion of copular sources in such contexts). We emphasize, importantly, this theory cannot provide the felicitous reading we observe in (22B), since a change in indexes is not "freely available" in any discourse, as we have already seen in cases like (18-19). In short, a disjoint reference correlate for the elided deictic element fails to make salient/recoverable the reference of the elided deictic element.

To be clear: It is not our purpose to show that the theories discussed here are falsified by the data we have concerned ourselves with. Our more modest claim is that cases like (22B) call for a solution that goes beyond LF accommodation. Some recoverability by a purely pragmatic strategy should be appealed to on independent grounds. On our account, this pragmatic strategy is conversational implicature.

4.2. Why Ellipsis May Exceptionally Trigger Certain Implicatures

As we have argued, in examples like (15), what is actually generated/elided is a syntactic structure as indicated below (cf. our (15B) above).

(24) A: I love you

B: I do <love me> too.

Implicated meaning: "I do <love you> too." (cf. (15B))

We argue that this discourse gives rise to the non-narcissistic implicature via Grice's relevance maxim. Importantly, this implicature does not appear to be available in the absence of ellipsis, as the native English speaking reader may check in (24). In short, our claim is that certain implicatures associated with strings may only arise if those strings are elided. What justifies this conclusion?

At the heart of our proposal is the assumption that ellipsis proceeds by way of non-insertion of material on the PF branch (after spellout). Assuming, e.g., Distributed Morphology (Halle and Marantz 1993), the insertion of vocabulary items (pronounced material) happens post-syntactically in the PF branch. Ellipsis can then be seen as the non-insertion of such material (see Bartos 2000, 2001, Kornfeld & Saab 2002, Merchant 2005, and Saab 2008, among others). The consequence of this assumption, as we see below, buys us the distinction between the capacity of non-elliptical XPs to give rise to certain implicatures, vs. elliptical XPs. In short, *pronouncing* 'you' in (15B) blocks the relevant reciprocal/non-narcissistic implicature. Eliding 'you,' on the other hand, allows it.

One way to unpack this analysis is to take advantage of the standard assumption that pronominal Φ-features contribute presuppositions (Cooper 1983,

Dowty and Jacobson 1989, Heim and Kratzer 1998, Büring 2005, Heim 2005, 2007).

The presupposition is tantamount to the descriptive content associated with a given feature: e.g., 1st or 2nd person restricts the assignment function, responsible for giving the variable contributed by the pronoun a value, to values consistent with 'speaker,' or 'hearer,' respectively.

Recent work on pronominal morphosyntax and interpretation posits that certain pronouns come into the derivation bereft of Φ-features (Kratzer 1998, 2009, Safir 2014) in certain contexts. Such an analysis is motivated as an account of "fake indexicals," as in (25), where first person "I," does not receive an indexical interpretation, rather, that of a bound pronoun:

(25) Only I got a question that I understood. (Kratzer 1998, example 4, pg. 92)

The relevant reading of (25) is where (paraphrasing from Kratzer 1998), apart from the speaker, no individual had the property of being an x, such that x got a question x understood. Under this reading, the person features of *I* are not interpreted (and its presuppositions irrelevant). Kratzer 1998, 2009 adopt the assumption that such pronouns may enter the derivation *only* with a referential index, and no Φ-features (we adopt her term "minimal pronoun" for such cases). The second instance of *I* is a minimal pronoun, and receives its Φ-features after spellout, and the presuppositions associated with 1st person are invisible to the LF interface.[9]

Importantly, under Kratzer's 2009 approach, only bound pronouns may be minimal pronouns (i.e., non-bound indexicals must enter the derivation featurally specified). As the reader may check, many of our crucial examples do not involve bound pronouns, raising a question about the viability of the marriage between our approach and Kratzer's minimal pronoun theory. We propose that, in tandem with the

assumption that ellipsis bleeds morphological insertion, unbound/free pronouns in ellipsis sites may be minimal pronouns as well. In short, in (25), it is only the referential index associated with the elided pronoun that makes it to LF under ellipsis. This index must receive the same value as its correlate indexical in the antecedent (under ME/VCG assumptions). Vocabulary insertion is irrelevant under ellipsis.

We therefore assume ellipsis exceptionally licenses the presence of a minimal pronoun in the E-site, even when that pronoun is unbound. This allows us to avoid the presup dpositions associated with Φ-features on pronounced pronouns (allowing for the relevant, non-narcissistic implicatures). Evidence for this analysis's plausibility comes from considering scenarios like the following.[10] Suppose that A and B are conversing and B is not very proficient in English (e.g., she has problems with the form of pronouns). Under this situation, the following exchange is perfectly coherent:

(26)   A: Can you help me?

B: I can. By the way, which is the form of the second person in English? I just forgot it.

The fact that B's discourse is consistent, even with her metalinguistic remark, gives important support to the hypothesis we are suggesting here, namely, that E-sites can be modeled as minimal pronouns also when used as a free pronouns (cf. B's elliptical response in (26), with an overt non-elliptical alternant, which would be infelicitous: #I can help you, (but) by the way, which is the form of the second person singular pronoun in English?).

To summarize, briefly, ellipsis allows for certain implicatures absent in the relevant overt versions of the elided structure. This is because non-insertion of vocabulary (in a distributed morphology framework), licenses "minimal pronouns"

(ala Kratzer 2009) in the E-site. Thus, the presuppositions associated with Φ-morphology never make it to LF, leaving room for the capacity of an E-site to give rise to implicatures which are otherwise unavailable in the absence of ellipsis, under the assumption that it is the presuppositions associated with such Φ-morphology that block such implication in the absence of ellipsis.

5. Conclusion

The main claim we defend here is that the interpretation of ellipsis does not always match the literal meaning associated compositionally of the elided syntactic structure. This assumption allows us to understand the apparent paradox arising from Chung's (2000) observations, exemplified in (10-12), and the empirically motivated, and fairly standard assumptions about identity conditions in ellipsis, which make reference (at least to some, relevant, extent) to semantic identity between E-sites and their antecedents. Our analysis makes crucial reference to a view of ellipsis where it involves non-insertion of lexical material on the PF branch (as in, e.g., Distributed Morphology).

In short, the presuppositions associated with Φ-features of certain deictic vocabulary items appear to be inert under ellipsis. We argue that this observation is consistent with an analysis that licenses the presence of Kratzer's 1998, 2009 "minimal pronouns" in E-sites, even if unbound. The unavailability of such free minimal pronouns in the absence of ellipsis accounts for the unavailability of the implicatures we referenced throughout, in the non-elliptical alternants of the relevant examples. This gives us a couple of interesting results: first, the capacity of elided structures to implicate one thing or another differs from the capacity of the non-elliptical alternants of said structures, and (b), we cannot always trust our intuitions

about the meanings of elliptical sentences in ascertaining what the actual elided structure is. Here, we learned that, sometimes, the actual elided structure (consistent with ME/VCG assumptions) would be deviant if paraphrased overtly.

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[1] As is standard since Kaplan (1989), we take the character of any expression E as a

[1] As is standard since Kaplan (1989), we take the character of any expression E as a function from context to content and the content itself as function from circumstances of evaluation to truth values (i.e., to <s,t> objects under some accounts). Standardly, a Kaplanian context is a tuple consisting at least of the following parameters: <w, t, a, h, l>, where w is a possible world, t is a time, a is the agent of the utterance, h the hearer, and l the location.

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[2] Since Merchant 2001, several proposals assume elliptical identity makes reference to both syntactic and semantic content (see e.g., Chung 2013, Barros 2014, Lipták 2015 for discussion). Our discussion here is compatible with either the view where identity is purely semantic (e.g., Merchant 2001), or such hybrid approaches.

[3] This is independent of our own commitment to ME, which has to face other well-known problems (see Chung 2006, 2013, Merchant 2013, Saab 2008, 2014, AnderBois 2011, 2014, among others).

[4] There seems to be no substantial differences between VP-ellipsis and Stripping in the availability to obtain the relevant sloppy readings.

[5] In informal data collection, most speakers report finding this exchange, to paraphrase, something they're sure they've said, with full awareness of the potential for confusion with the narcissistic reading. We submit that perhaps the pressure to avoid redundancy (favoring ellipsis), and the pressure to make relevant contributions interact in an interesting way in this corner of the grammar, so that, perhaps, the "me too/I do too" response is somewhat conventionalized. The availability of the relevance implicature (non-narcissistic) marginally licenses what is otherwise a narcissistic statement.

[6] Ungrammatical phrases/utterances arguably do not flout Gricean maxims, so much as create real confusion.

[7] Note that if we remove "too" from (19), the example becomes felicitous, but only under the interpretation where speaker B means to refer to the same locale as speaker A. This is expected under our account. "Too" requires contrastive focus, which is unlicensed under referential identity, referential disjointness violates ME, and cannot

be generated in (19). Removing "too," and fixing coreference, is therefore predicted to be acceptable.

[8] Additionally, our approach also leads to broad questions regarding the interaction between ellipsis resolution both in surface and deep anaphora. Allow us to just mention the issue briefly.

An alternative analysis could just claim that the E-sites in the relevant examples must be modeled in a different way, concretely, as containing a deep anaphor: Consider example (12) once again, repeated below, but with a different analysis for the E-site.

(i)   Jack: You pushed me first!

        Mike: No, you did <**do that**>!

Given that the non-elliptical version of Mike's answer produces the same ambiguities that we observe in the elliptical version, one could be tempted to conclude that a deep anaphor analysis is plausible. There are reasons to suspect that this cannot be on track in the general case. First, if Merchant (2004, 2010) was correct as far as the interaction between surface and deep anaphora is concerned, then whenever a surface anaphor and a deep anaphor are in competition for the some anaphoric resolution, surface anaphora wins under his account. Second, such an analysis would not account for cases where the predicate is non-episodic, as in (15), and similar ones (e.g., *#I love you and Peter also does that.*). At any rate, the point seems to be irrelevant, since if the E-site in (i) were indeed modeled as containing a deep anaphor, the puzzle still remains. In other words, we should answer why deep anaphora also gives rise to the same sloppy readings. Notice that, indeed, in overt uses of deep anaphors, the same

constraints are observed. Thus, the overt version of (12), repeated below in (ii), allows both for a sensible and non-sensible reading:

(ii)   Jack: You$_m$ pushed me$_j$ first!

Mike: No, you$_j$ did that!

Reading 1: You pushed yourself first. (Literal meaning)

Reading 2: You pushed me first. (Implicated meaning)

The implicature (Reading 2) is canceled in the same contexts that are canceled in ellipsis. In view of these facts, we conclude that surface and deep anaphora simply trigger the same type of conversational implicatures when it comes to this type of communicative exchange.

[9] Post-spell out agreement mechanisms assign the DP the right morphology via agreement (see Kratzer 2009 for details of how this proceeds).

[10] Thanks to Hedde Zeilstra (pers. comm.) for calling our attention to this datum.