Free Indirect Discourse as logophoric context

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The goal of this article is to defend the hypothesis that Free Indirect Discourse belongs to the class of logophoric contexts.

Descriptively, Free Indirect Discourse (FID), which is illustrated in French in (1), appears to be a hybrid between Direct Discourse (DD) and Indirect Discourse (ID).

(1) Que faire ? … C'était dans vingt-quatre heures ; demain ! Lheureux, pensa-t-elle, voulait sans doute l'effrayer encore.   [Flaubert, *Madame Bovary*]
'What was there to do? It was in twenty-four hours; tomorrow! Lheureux probably wanted to scare her again, she thought.'   (cf. Banfield 1982: 98)

On the one hand, the discourse in (1) exhibits some properties of a DD (inwardly) uttered by Emma Bovary: it contains questions and exclamations representing Emma's thoughts, as well as an indexical (*demain* 'tomorrow') anchored to Emma's temporality. On the other hand, Emma is referred to by a third person pronoun and the discourse is narrated in the past, which are characteristic of ID.

For these reasons, FID is often considered in the literary tradition as a style presenting a character's consciousness through the narrator's voice. Although it is attested much earlier in literature (already in the Middle Ages – see e.g. Cerquiglini 1981 – or even the Antiquity – see e.g. Biraud & Mellet 2000), FID was first theorized only at the end of the nineteenth century (especially in French as *style indirect libre*[1]). From a formal linguistics' perspective, the study of FID was pioneered by Banfield (1982). The observation that FID is not confined to literary texts, but appears in everyday language, as exemplified in (2), may have then favored the development of linguistic analyses in the past forty years (see Doron 1991, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015, i.a.; see review in Reboul et al. 2016).

(2) X a appelé. *Est-ce qu'on peut l'emmener, toi ou moi, à Roissy, à 5 heures du matin, demain ?* Il rêve !   [oral 10–04–2005] (Authier-Revuz 2020: 314)
X called. *Can we drive him, you or me, to Roissy, at 5am tomorrow?* He is dreaming!'[2]

Recent debates about FID center on two main types of analyses. As we will detail in section 2, the first one, proposed by Schlenker (2004) and extended by Eckardt (2014), relies on dual-context dependency: under this hypothesis, the mixture between DD and ID properties in FID is due to the fact that both the protagonist's and the narrator's contexts are accessible in FID, and expressions are relativized to one or the other depending on their class (as in Schlenker 2004) or their lexical entries (as in Eckardt 2014). The second one, defended by Maier (2015, 2017), treats FID as a case of mixed quotation, some parts of which can be pragmatically unquoted. Both types of analyses thus make FID closer to DD than ID, in the sense that the protagonist's perspective is rendered in FID by direct access to her context without any mediation to the narrator's context.

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[1] It seems that the category of FID was created by the Swiss: Adolf Tobler gave the first definition of FID in 1887 and Charles Bally coined the French term of *style indirect libre* in 1912 (see Philippe & Zufferey 2018). Note that here, I cannot do justice to the rich stylistic literature on FID in various linguistic traditions and literary criticism (see e.g. Cohn 1978, Fludernik 1993 and references therein).

[2] For clarity, I will henceforth italicize all parts of examples that I interpret as FID. Further note that I indicate literary sources in small font between brackets, and linguistic sources in normal font in parentheses. English translations (from French, German, Italian or Hebrew) are either the linguistic author's or mine.

Instead, the present article defends an analysis of FID that makes it closer to ID, in the spirit of Doron (1991) and Sharvit (2008). The core idea consists in positing the presence of a syntactically represented logophoric operator (see e.g. Charnavel 2019a, 2020) that semantically embeds FID. This hypothesis – henceforth the log-FID hypothesis – will mainly be motivated by new arguments, such as recursive embedding of FID – facts that have been either overlooked or left unexplained in previous analyses.

Section 1 starts by laying out the empirical arguments for an ID-based, logophoric hypothesis against the class of DD-based analyses. Section 2 explains how these facts specifically challenge the two main previous analyses (bicontextual and quotation analyses), which object to FID embedding. Section 3 presents the log-FID analysis, as well as some predictions and future prospects.

In order to understand the linguistic (vs. stylistic) constraints on FID, note that I will use a variety of data in different languages (French, English, German, Hebrew, Italian) ranging from literary to constructed examples, including some from linguistic articles and oral corpora. Also note that I will restrict myself to FID representing speech and thought, and exclude from the analysis FID representing pre-linguistic perception, or so-called Protagonist Projection illustrated in (3) (see e.g. Abrusán 2021); we will briefly discuss in section 3 the prospects of extending the log-FID analysis to Protagonist Projection.

(3) The train was full of fellows: *a long long chocolate train with cream facings ... The telegraph poles were passing, passing*. [Joyce, *Ulysses*] (Abrusán 2021: 839)

1   Empirical arguments for FID as a case of logophoric context

This section lays out the empirical arguments for the hypothesis that FID is a logophoric context. As previewed in Table 1, not only are the arguments against attitude embedding (described in section 1.1) not convincing (as shown in section 1.3), but there are also (old and new) empirical arguments strongly supporting logophoric embedding (described in section 1.2).

	ID-based analyses	DD-based analyses
Root clause syntax	?	✓
De re non de dicto readings	?	✓
Protagonist's dialect	?	✓
Adverbial indexicals	?	✓
Third person pronouns: person	✓	?
number/gender	✓	?
de se	✓	?
Tenses/mood:	✓	?
logophoric (SOT, *Konjunktiv*)	✓	?
Person indexicals: person	✓	?
constrained distribution	✓	?
*Vocatives and imperatives	✓	?
Logophoric elements	✓	?
*Antilogophoric elements	✓	?
Recursive FID	✓	?
Narrator's style	✓	?

Table 1: Preview of empirical arguments distinguishing between ID- and DD-based analyses
(✓: fact directly explained under the analysis; ?: fact not straightforwardly explained under the analysis)

1.1 Similarities to DD

1.1.1 Root clause syntax

In FID, the narrator (or speaker) reports the perspective of a protagonist (or any other contextually salient and relevant individual). In that respect, FID resembles ID. But the main reason why it is agreed upon that FID differs from ID is that FID does not exhibit the syntactic complementation properties of ID, as already shown in detail by Banfield (1982).

First, FID is incompatible with a complementizer (hence the traditional label *Free* Indirect Discourse). An attitude verb can optionally appear in FID as a parenthetical as in (1) (*pensa-t-elle* 'she thought'), but it cannot introduce FID with a complementizer as in standard attitude reports like (4) (contrasting with (1)).

> (4) <u>Elle pensa que</u> Lheureux voulait sans doute l'effrayer encore.
> '<u>She thought that</u> Lheureux probably wanted to scare her again.'

This is corroborated by the fact that FID does not involve the syntax of embedded clauses: in FID, we routinely observe inverted questions, exclamations, repetitions, hesitations or incomplete clauses, which are characteristic of root clauses.

> (5) *Mais s'il y avait quelque part un être fort et beau, une nature valeureuse […],*
> <u>*pourquoi, par hasard, ne le trouverait-elle pas*</u> ? <u>*Oh ! quelle impossibilité !*</u>
> '*But if there had been somewhere a strong and handsome individual, a gallant nature […], <u>why, by chance, should she not find him</u>? <u>Oh, what an impossibility</u>!*'
> [Flaubert, *Madame Bovary*] (Banfield 1982: 74)

> (6) His wife still loved him, physically. <u>But, but</u> — he was almost the unnecessary party in the affair.   [Lawrence, *England, My England*] (Banfield 1982: 74-75)

For example, the question and exclamations in (5), as well as the repetition in (6), are all unacceptable when embedded under appropriate attitude verbs:

> (7) a. *Elle se demanda <u>pourquoi, par hasard, ne le trouverait-elle pas</u>.
>   '*She wondered <u>why, by chance, should she not find him</u>.'
>   b. *Elle s'exclama <u>oh quelle impossibilité.</u>
>   '*She exclaimed <u>oh, what an impossibility</u>.'
>   c. *He thought that <u>but, but</u> — he was almost the unnecessary party in the affair.

It is thus clear that FID does not involve subordination and syntactically behaves like DD rather than ID.

1.1.2 Protagonist's privileged perspective

For many, this syntactic resemblance to DD (rather than ID) is corroborated by a semantic resemblance: to the exception of tenses and pronouns (see details in section 1.2.1), FID exclusively expresses the protagonist's, rather than the narrator's perspective.

First, *de re* non *de dicto* readings, which are acceptable in ID, are prohibited in FID (Reinhart 1975/1983, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, i.a.); for example, the definite description *his mother* in (8) can be interpreted *de re* only in (8)a, rendering contradictory Oedipus' thought expressed in (8)b.

> (8) a. Oedipus believed that <u>his mother</u> was not his mother.   (Reinhart 1975: 132)
>   b. #*<u>His mother</u> was not his mother,* Oedipus believed.

Second, all evaluative expressions – including epithets (e.g. *ce grand fat* 'the conceited ass' in (9)), expressives (e.g. *cette damnée crise* 'this damned crisis' in (10)), speaker-oriented adverbs (e.g. *franchement* 'frankly' in (11)), discourse particles (e.g. *wohl* in (12) expressing that the speaker has imperfect evidence for the truth of her utterance, see Eckardt 2014) must be interpreted from the protagonist's point of view in FID, just like in DD (Banfield 1982, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015, i.a.).

(9) Ma tante continuait ; mais je n'écoutais plus ; une seule chose m'importait : *Alissa refusait de se marier avant sa sœur. – Mais Abel n'était-il pas là ! il avait donc raison, <u>ce grand fat</u>.*   [Gide, *La Porte Étroite*]
'My aunt kept talking; but I was not listening anymore; one thing alone mattered to me: *Alissa refused to marry before her sister. — But Abel wasn't there! He was then right, <u>the conceited ass</u>!*'   (cf. Banfield 1982: 73)

(10) *On devait*, disait-il, *trouver là de l'or à la pelle. L'idée était juste. Seulement, le million y avait passé et cette <u>damnée</u> crise allait lui donner raison.*   [Zola, *Germinal*]
'*One ought*, he said, *to find gold in one's shovel down there. The idea was good, only he had already sunk a million in it and this <u>damned</u> crisis was going to prove him right.*'   (Banfield 1982: 90)

(11) Pour savoir où s'établir, ils passèrent en revue toutes les provinces. *Le Nord était fertile, mais trop froid . . . et le Centre, <u>franchement</u>, n'avait rien de curieux.*
'In order to know where to set themselves up, they considered one by one all the provinces. *The North was fertile, but too cold . . . and the Center, <u>frankly</u>, had nothing of interest.*'   [Flaubert, *Bouvard et Pécuchet*] (Banfield 1982: 117-118)

(12) (…) Und er ging in ein kleines Wirtshaus, ließ sich eine Speise auftragen und trank Wein dazu. Er aß langsam; er wartete von Bissen zu Bissen. *Über der Eingangstür war eine Uhr … sie war <u>wohl</u> stehengeblieben …*   [Schnitzler, *Reichtum*]
'… and he [= Weldein] went into a small inn, let them serve him a dish, and drank wine with it. He ate slowly; he waited from bite to bite. *Above the door was a clock … it had <u>wohl</u> stopped.*'   (Eckardt 2014: 132)

Third, FID can reflect the manner of speaking of the protagonist, at least to some degree (Banfield 1982, Schlenker 2004, Maier 2015, i.a.). For instance, the character Camus' nonstandard dialect is used in the FID in (13), while the rest of the narration uses standard French language.

(13) Faudrait peut-être pas aller ce soir, hasarda Lebrac pensif. Camus bondit — *Pas aller ! <u>Ben</u> il la <u>baillait belle</u> le général. Pour qui <u>qu'</u>on le prenait, lui, Camus ! Par exemple, qu'on allait passer pour des <u>couillons</u>* ! Lebrac ébranlé se rendit à ces raisons.
[L. Pergaud, *La guerre des boutons*] (Authier-Revuz 2020: 317)
'We shouldn't go tonight, Lebrac ventured, thoughtful. Camus jumped up. *Shouldn't go! Well, how did the general dare spin them a line! Who did he think he – Camus – was! They would be thought to be bloody idiots*! Lebrac, shaken, listened to such reason.'

Last but not least, adverbial indexicals in FID like *demain* 'tomorrow' in (1) or *hier/avant-hier/aujourd'hui* 'yesterday/the day before yesterday/today' in (14) are interpreted relative to the protagonist's temporality (Banfield 1982, Doron 1991, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015, i.a.). This property is usually considered to be a hallmark of DD.

(14) Descendu de cheval, il allait […] et souriait, étrange et princier, sûr d'une victoire. *A deux reprises, hier et avant-hier, il avait été lâche, il n'avait pas osé. Aujourd'hui, en ce premier jour de mai, il oserait et elle l'aimerait.* [Cohen, *Belle du Seigneur*]
'Down his horse, he was walking […] and he was smiling, strangely and princely, certain of a victory. *Twice, yesterday and the day before yesterday, he had been a coward, he hadn't dared. Today, on this first-of-May day, he would dare and she would love him.*' (Authier-Revuz 2020: 135)

In many respects, FID thus patterns with DD, which motivates many analyses under which FID is directly anchored to the protagonist's context, whether it is through quotation (Maier 2015, 2017, Deal 2020, i.a.) or bicontextual dependency (Schlenker 2004, Eckardt 2014, i.a.) as we will see in more details in section 2.

In the rest of this section, I will instead present empirical arguments that FID is embedded under some kind of attitude (i.e. logophoric) operator (cf. Doron 1991, Sharvit 2008): several additional properties of FID, which are often overlooked, demonstrate that FID has to be (semantically) embedded. Furthermore, the properties we have just surveyed do not necessarily argue against the (semantic) embedding of FID.

1.2 Similarities to (logophoric) ID

1.2.1 Pronouns and tenses

As has long been noticed, personal pronouns and tenses in FID correspond to those in ID (see Banfield 1982, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015, i.a.). For example in (14), the protagonist (Solal) is referred to by a third person pronoun, even in the FID passage characterized by the DD properties described above. Similarly, the FID passage uses past tense, that is anchored to the narrator's (vs. Solal's) temporality. These two properties are found in the ID counterpart of (14) in (15).

(15) Solal se disait qu'à deux reprises, […] il avait été lâche.
'Solal was telling himself that twice, […] he had been a coward.'

As we will see in section 2, these properties impose an explanatory burden on analyses that liken FID to DD rather than ID: to account for them, quotation theories assume unquotation (Maier 2015, i.a.), bicontextual theories assign a specific contextual anchoring to some (presuppositional) expressions (Schlenker 2004, Eckardt 2014, i.a.). On the contrary, these properties straightforwardly follow from an account likening FID to ID.

Furthermore, the analysis of pronouns and tenses in FID must take into account three types of complications, whose exact empirical properties remain debated: the interpretation of gender and number features, the distribution of first and second person pronouns, and the absence of non *de se* (and *de te*) pronouns.

First, while it is agreed upon that the gender feature of a third person pronoun referring to the FID protagonist reflects the narrator's judgment (see (16)a), the gender features of pronouns referring to other individuals remain under discussion as exemplified in (16)b-c.

(16) a. [In her dream, Mary$_i$ was a cardinal.]
Really, she$_i$ thought, {*she$_i$*/#*he$_i$*} *had excellent chances of becoming Pope some day*.
b. [In John$_i$'s dream, Ann$_k$ was an old priest that he had known for ages.]
Really, John$_i$ thought in his dream, {*?she$_k$*/#*he$_k$*} *was now a terrible priest*.
c. [Mary wrongly believed that Robin was male. In fact, Robin was a woman.]

Where was <u>he</u> this morning, for instance? (Mary wondered).

<div align="right">(Schlenker 2004: 290-291)</div>

Thus, Mary in (16)a, who is the center of thought, must be denoted by a feminine pronoun even if she wrongly believes herself to be a man in the dream. But in (16)c, the pronoun designating Robin must reflect Mary's (wrong) judgment (see also Sharvit 2008: 370). In (16)b, the judgment is less clear, according to Schlenker. This contrast (between cases where mistaken gender concerns the protagonist herself and cases where it concerns a third party) challenges theories that liken FID to DD. As we will see in section 2, they must stipulate the difference. This is all the more problematic as pronouns reflecting the protagonist's judgment do not necessarily have the same form as in the DD counterpart:

(17) [Mary was talking to Robin, who she believes to be a man, but who is actually a woman.] *Where had <u>he</u> been all morning, for instance*? Mary asked her.

<div align="right">(Maier 2015: 370)</div>

As shown by Maier (2015), the gender of the pronoun *he* designating Robin in (17) can reflect Mary's judgment against the narrator's, even if Mary would not have said *he* in DD, but *you* (without gender marking). It is thus incorrect to assume that the gender features in FID simply correspond to those in DD.

These facts, however, follow from an analysis likening FID to ID as shown in (18).

(18) a. Mary$_i$ dreamed (that she$_i$ was a cardinal and) that {she$_i$/#he$_i$} had excellent chances of becoming Pope some day.
b. John$_i$ dreamed (that Ann$_k$ was an old priest and) that {she$_k$/he$_k$} was terrible.
c. Mary$_i$ (wrongly believed that Robin$_k$ was male, and) wondered where he$_k$ was.
d. Mary$_i$ asked (Robin$_k$, who she$_i$ wrongly believed to be male,) where he$_k$ had been all morning.

Some variety in judgments is observed for sentences (18)b-d (partly depending on whether the content of the parenthesis is included or not), but crucially, the following contrast as a whole holds robustly: while the protagonist herself (Mary in (18)a) must be referred to by a pronoun expressing her actual gender, other characters can be referred to by pronouns reflecting the protagonist's wrong judgment; as in the case of evaluative expressions reviewed in section 1.1.2, the difference between FID and ID in this latter respect is that gender features must be read *de dicto* in FID vs. ID.

As noted by Abrusán (2021: 848) and Sharvit (2008: 393), the same holds of number features, which must reflect the protagonist's judgment, which may be incorrect as in (19):[3]

(19) She was so drunk Fred looked like two guys to her. *Oh no! Now <u>they</u> were coming towards her*!　　　　　　　　　　(Abrusán 2021: 848, attributed to Stokke (p.c.))

Second, the distribution of first and second person pronouns is subject to some constraints that remain debated. According to Banfield (1982: 132), a first person pronoun can appear in FID

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[3] It is difficult to judge cases of mistaken number for pronouns intended to refer to the protagonist as in (i):

(i)　　　Fred was so drunk that when he looked at himself in the mirror, he perceived himself as two guys. *How strong {?they were/?he was}! {?They/?he} would definitely win tomorrow.*

This difficulty may come from the *de se* requirement (see (43)): if Fred perceives himself as two men, he can't think of himself as *I*, but as *we*, which thus includes both a *de se* component and a non *de se* component (Fred thinks of himself as *I + him*).

under two conditions: either the narrator is the same person as the FID protagonist (often a past self, as in (20), where the interpretation of the indexical *maintenant* 'now' supports the FID interpretation of the passage) or in cases of represented speech, the narrator is the protagonist's interlocutor at the time of the narrated event (as made clear by the parenthetical in (21)).

(20) *Les désirs qui tout à l'heure m'entouraient, d'aller à Guermantes, de voyager, d'être heureux, j'étais maintenant tellement en dehors d'eux que leur accomplissement ne m'eût fait aucun plaisir. Comme j'aurais donné tout cela pour pouvoir pleurer toute la nuit dans les bras de maman !* [Proust, *Du Côté de chez Swann*]
'*The longings by which I had just now been absorbed, to go to Guermantes, to travel, to live a life of happiness — I was now so remote from them that their fulfilment would have afforded me no pleasure. How readily would I have sacrificed them all, just to be able to cry, all night long, in the arms of Mamma*! (Banfield 1982: 94-95)

(21) *Did I really know the road?* Ralph asked me. *Were the muleteers to be trusted?*
[Brenan, *South from Granada*] (Banfield 1982: 123)

According to Schlenker (2004), Banfield's conditions are too strict: the first person is also acceptable if the narrator is present (without being the addressee) at the time of the reported speech, as illustrated in (22), or if the narrator has (at the time of the narrated event) magical powers that allow her to read other people's minds as shown in (23).[4]

(22) a. *Oh how extraordinarily nice I was*, she told my father, without realizing that I was listening to their conversation.
b. [Reporting on thoughts I read in my mother's diary]. *Oh how extraordinarily nice I was*, she thought. (Schlenker 2004: 290)
(23) I had become adept at reading my teachers' thoughts. My Greek teacher didn't like me so much after all. *Really, I was a little devil, not entirely without talent, but impossible to deal with — something had to be done about me, or else tomorrow I would become completely unbearable.* (Schlenker 2004: 290)

Under theories based on quotation (Maier 2015) or bicontextual dependency (Schlenker 2004), the interpretation of first-person pronouns should follow the same rules as that of third person pronouns; in particular, their person features are the narrator's responsibility. The further constraints on their distribution must thus come from an additional principle, which Schlenker (2004: 289-290) attributes to the pragmatics of narration: if the narrator presents herself as taking part to the action she is reporting, there must be a plausible reason for her to have information about the represented speech or thoughts at the time of the narrated event. We will come back to the issue below in 1.2.3 (esp. regarding the plausibility of (23)), but it is worth noting already that analyses likening FID to ID can straightforwardly account for the acceptability of the first person in FID: first person pronouns are all perfectly natural in the ID counterparts of (20)-(23), as shown in (24)-(27).[5]

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[4] According to Sharvit (2008: 358, fn. 3), at least some informants accept a first person pronoun in FID even if the speaker is not an addressee of the FID protagonist. But she does not detail under what conditions.
[5] Note that the use of French impersonal *on* in FID raises further questions. Outside FID, *on* exhibits a (colloquial) use as a first-person plural pronoun (besides existential and generic – speaker-inclusive or exclusive – uses; see e.g. Creissels 2008), as shown by the possible coreference with an actual first person plural possessive *nos* in (ii).
(ii)   *On verra bien demain ! On pourra reparler de nos problèmes à ce moment-là.*
'We'll see tomorrow! We'll talk again about our problems then.'

(24) Je pensais que j'aurais bien donné tout cela pour pouvoir pleurer toute la nuit dans les bras de maman.
'I thought that I would readily have sacrificed them all, just to be able to cry, all night long, in the arms of Mamma.'

(25) Ralph asked me if I really knew the road.

(26) a. She told my father how extraordinarily nice I was, without realizing that I was listening to their conversation.
b. My mother wrote in her diary how extraordinarily nice I was.

(27) My Greek teacher thought that I was a little devil.

Although the same considerations are expected to apply to second person pronouns, they usually do not receive the same treatment as first-person pronouns under the aforementioned theories. While most analyses (Doron 1991, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Maier 2015) do not discuss the use of second person pronouns in FID, Banfield (1982: 119-121) explicitly claims that second person pronouns are excluded from FID; according to her, this derives from the fact that FID appears in narration, not in communication. But in fact, we do observe cases of FID in communicative contexts including an addressee to the narrator, who can thus be referred to by a second person pronoun. As illustrated in (28), the narrator's addressee can correspond to the FID protagonist (cf. Eckardt 2014: 51).

(28) [Après le succès à un concours] Rappelle-toi… *tu n'étais pas au niveau ! Tu avais des lacunes fatales*, c'était ton mot, *les autres étaient bien mieux préparés*… Tu avais presque réussi à nous faire douter…   [oral, 06–02–2011] (Authier-Revuz 2020: 130)
'[After the success at a competition] Remember, *you were not good enough, you had fatal weaknesses* – it was your word – *the other people were better prepared*… You almost managed to make us doubt…

Here, the FID is included in a conversation (from an oral corpus) between a speaker and an addressee after the latter succeeded in a competition; the speaker reminds the addressee how (s)he had worried (s)he was not good enough, using FID to represent her past worries. Furthermore, a second person pronoun can also appear in FID even if the narrator's addressee does not correspond to the protagonist, but to a participant in the narrated event, as exemplified in (2) and (29).

(29) Nous nous inquiétions tous sur ton sort. *Qu'allais-tu devenir, après cela ?*

Interestingly, the first-person plural pronoun use seems to be attested in FID (cf. Fludernik 1993: 117-118) as shown in (iii), where count Muffat discusses a difficult matter with Nana, who is sick.

(iii)   Il la calma, en lui prenant une main. *Oui, l'on verrait, l'important était qu'elle se reposât.*   [Zola, *Nana*]
'He took her hand and soothed her. *Yes, he would see about it; the important thing now was for her to rest.*   [translation from the Project Gutenberg www.gutenberg.org]

As indicated by the English translation *he* (an alternative could have been *they*), *on* is here intended to include the protagonist (Muffat) in its reference, but not the narrator. At first glance, this seems to go against the generalization that person features are relativized to the narrator in FID; in other words, *on* seems to shift to the protagonist here. However, we also observe that a transposition of (ii) to FID is inexpressible: *on* is acceptable in FID, but the co-occurrence with *nos* is not transposable in FID.

(iv)   Elle s'impatientait devant l'insistance de son interlocuteur. *On verrait bien demain ! On pourrait reparler de {*nos/*leurs} problèmes à ce moment-là.*
'She grew impatient with her interlocutor's insistence. *They would see about it tomorrow! They could talk about their problems then.*'

This could suggest that the interpretation of *on* as a first-person plural pronoun does not necessarily require positing first person features for *on*.

'We were all worried about you. *What would <u>you</u> become after this?*'

In (2), the present tense of the FID makes the addressee directly salient in the narrated event as she is present at the other end of the line together with the speaker.[6] In (29), the speaker relates some past event involving both herself and her addressee. The FID represents past worries of the narrator and her entourage about the addressee's fate at that time, who may have addressed her directly (thus saying *you*) or talked about her in her absence (thus saying *she*). From the addressee's involvement in the narrated event, we imply some (e.g. family or friendship) relationship between the narrator and the addressee spanning at least from the time of the event to the time of the utterance.

These examples thus demonstrate that Banfield's assumed ban on second person pronouns in FID is incorrect. As long as the narrator's addressee is involved in the reported situation, (s)he can be referred to by a second person pronoun. This fact needs to be explained under approaches assimilating FID to DD, in which *you* would be transposed from a first or third person pronoun. Under an approach likening FID to ID, however, this fact directly follows as the ID counterparts of (28)-(29) or (2) all naturally contain a second person pronoun:

(30) a. You thought that <u>you</u> were not good enough.
    b. We were all worried about what <u>you</u> would become.
    c. He has asked whether we – <u>you</u> or me – can drive him to Roissy at 5am tomorrow.

Expressions implying an addressee, which are as little discussed as second person pronouns, raise further challenges to theories of FID as a kind of DD. First, the few studies that mention vocatives (Banfield 1982 and Eckardt 2014) agree on the fact that they are prohibited from FID as illustrated in (31)-(32).

(31) *No, (*<u>sir</u>,) he could not obey his orders*, he told the officer.   (Banfield 1982: 114)
(32) The teacher turned to Tom. *This, {*<u>his</u>/*<u>my son</u>}, was his worst essay.*
                                                      (Eckardt 2014: 230)

In both cases, Banfield (1982) and Eckardt (2014) consider cases where FID would report a discourse including a vocative, and observe that the vocative, just like a second person pronoun, cannot be shifted to the reported context. Furthermore, variations on (28), (29) and (2) in (33) show that vocatives intended to address the actual addressee are also banned from FID.

(33) a. Remember, *<u>you</u> were not good enough, (#my son,) <u>you</u> had fatal weaknesses*.
    b. We were all worried about you. *(#Honey,) what would <u>you</u> become, after this*?
    c. X has called. *Can we drive him, <u>you</u> (#my dear) or me, to Roissy at 5am tomorrow*?

These facts straightforwardly derive from a theory likening FID to ID, where vocatives are also banned under both interpretations as shown in (34). Under theories likening FID to DD, the absence of shifted interpretations is puzzling.

(34) a. The teacher told Tom that this, {*<u>his</u>/*<u>my</u>} son, was his worst essay.
    b. We all worried about what (#honey,) you would become after this.

The facts about imperatives are more controversial. Banfield claims that they are banned from FID (as shown in (35)) unless they are not intended to actually involve the reported addressee (as in (36)).

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[6] Banfield (1982) incorrectly assumes that present tense is prohibited from FID.

(35) *_Fix his_i dinner_, he_i ordered.   (Banfield 1982: 113)

(36) _He was really_, Lily Briscoe thought, _in spite of his eyes, but then look at his nose, look at his hands, the most uncharming human being she had ever met._
                                    [Woolf, _To the Lighthouse_] (Banfield 1982: 113)

Sharvit (2008), on the contrary, claims that imperatives are allowed in FID and provides as support for her claim example (37), where the narrator, a woman whose husband has been murdered, describes her last phone conversation with him to the police.

(37) _Go ahead, start dinner without him_ (, he said).   [from the TV series _Law and Order_]
                                    (Sharvit 2008: 368)

Maier (2015) also assumes – without exemplifying his claim – that FID can contain imperatives. Eckardt (2014), however, contends that imperatives are prohibited in FID as evidenced by (38).

(38) Der Lehrer sprach Tom an. *_Komme/käme zu ihm_ (sagte er).
     'The teacher talked to Tom. *_Come to him_ (he said).'   (Eckardt 2014: 229)

To my knowledge, no study considers an imperative involving the actual addressee (participating in the narrated event), but (39) suggests that it is also impossible in FID.

(39) I was worried about you and tried to make you react. (#_Hurry up now or_) _you would never reach your goal!_

These facts are surprising under an DD-based analysis of FID, which should predict that imperatives can routinely appear in FID (see further discussion in section 2). But they can be easily explained if FID is treated as a kind of ID. Interestingly, the facts about embedded imperatives in ID within and across languages are also controversial (see e.g. Kaufmann 2012). In English, Crnič & Trinh (2009) show that imperatives can be embedded only under _say_; strikingly, the contrast between (35) and (37) follows this pattern. A full investigation of imperatives in FID is beyond the scope of the article, but these observations strongly suggest that imperatives in FID pattern like in ID rather than DD.

The last class of elements involving the addressee is the class of addressee-oriented adverbs and particles. Banfield includes in the former category adverbs like _confidentially_, _honestly_ or _frankly_, as well as expressions like _between you and me_, and claims that only _frankly_ can be found in FID (see (11)), which she thus treats as a speaker-oriented adverb; addressee-oriented expressions are banned from FID, according to her:

(40) {#Confidentially/*Between him and her}, _how extraordinarily nice workmen were_!
                                    (Banfield 1982: 117)

Eckardt (2014) challenges Banfield's claim by showing that particles with addressee-oriented content such as German _ja_ (conveying that the speaker believes that the addressee might already know the content of the sentence) or English _of course_ (signaling that the asserted content should be already known to the addressee) can occur in FID.

(41) Mrs. Bartleby mounted the train. _She had made a reservation, of course_.
                                    (Eckardt 2014: 114)

This variety of facts again seems to support an ID-based vs. DD-based analysis of FID: while all addressee-oriented expressions can occur in DD, only some are compatible with ID.[7]

(42) a. He said that (*between him and her,) workmen were extraordinarily nice.
b. Mrs. Bartleby said that of course, she had made a reservation.

In sum, the distribution of first- and second-person pronouns, as well as expressions whose meaning involves the speaker and the addressee, seems to mostly pattern like in ID, but rather differently from DD. This supports an analysis treating FID as embedded discourse.

The third complication regarding pronouns in FID is the issue of (non) *de se* pronouns (see Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008). Schlenker (2004) explains how the *de se* reading of *his* in (43) does not straightforwardly follow from theories that treat pronouns as directly depending on the utterance context (through bicontextual dependency or unquotation), as is the case of DD-based theories, which must account for the non-DD distribution of pronouns.

(43) *His$_i$ pants were on fire*, John$_i$ thought.   (Schlenker 2004: 294)

Under such theories, the reference of *his* simply corresponds to the narrator's referential intentions, without taking into account the content of the protagonist's thoughts (i.e. whether John had a first-person thought or – due to mistaken identity – a third-person thought). As we will further discuss in section 2.1.1, *de se* readings thus require some additional mechanism (e.g. descriptive readings of pronouns in Schlenker 2004, challenged by Sharvit 2008).

Even more problematically, third person pronouns in FID referring to the protagonist not only can, but must, in my judgment, be read *de se* (cf. Charnavel 2019a: 254-255). For (43) (with intended coreference between *his* and *John*) to be interpreted as FID, John must have recognized himself and been ready to say "my pants are on fire" (see (44)a). (43) can only render a third person thought if the FID passage does not convey that the narrator identifies the intended referent as the protagonist (see (44)b).

(44) a. John$_i$ was looking at himself in the mirror without recognizing himself. #*Oh his$_i$ pants were on fire!* John$_i$ thought.
b. John$_i$ was looking at the mirror. *Oh his$_k$ pants were on fire*, John$_i$ thought, *he$_i$ should help [this man]$_k$ as quickly as possible!* In fact, John was looking at no other than himself.

This judgment is confirmed by the observation that pronouns referring to the protagonist unbeknownst to the protagonist do not trigger Condition B effects when c-commanding pronouns knowingly referring to the protagonist as in (45) (inspired from Sharvit (2008: 394) illustrating Condition C effects with pronouns referring to third party).

(45) When John$_i$ arrived, Mary$_k$ opened the door. *She$_k$ was a lab technician now. She$_k$ was holding the blood sample of [a man]$_m$ in her hand*. John$_i$ got closer. *Could he$_i$ look?* (he asked) Inadvertently, he$_i$ touched the blood. *Oh no!* (he exclaimed) *Did she$_k$ think he$_m$ could have infected him$_i$? Of course not!* she answered, *the blood was his*.

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[7] Although Eckardt (2014) does not discuss embedded uses of discourse particles in ID, she mentions an example with embedded *wohl* (Eckardt 2014: 129). See e.g. Zimmermann (2011) for a review of discourse particles, including a discussion on their embeddability.

This again supports ID-based analyses of FID. Certainly, a third person pronoun can, but need not be read *de se* in ID: as is well known, (46) can report a first-person thought as well as a third-person thought.[8]

(46) John$_i$ thought that his$_i$ pants were on fire.

But as is well known too, there exist some – so-called logophoric – elements specific to ID that must be read *de se*. As we will see in the next subsection, this is for instance the case of the possessive reflexive *his own*, whose use in (46) (instead of *his*) obligatorily gives rise to a *de se* reading. The fact that phenomena specific to ID are also attested in FID support an embedded analysis of FID.

Another similar fact in the tense domain corroborates such an approach. As observed by Sharvit (2008: 358), a language exhibits sequence of tense effects in FID if and only if it does in ID. For example, English and French exhibit sequence of tense effects both in ID and FID (see (47)), while Hebrew and Russian do not in either (see (48)).[9]

(47) a. Two years ago John found out that Mary {was/#is} pregnant.
　　 b. Yes, she {#is/was} definitely pregnant(, thought Mary).

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Sharvit 2008: 356)

(48) a. Yosef gila 　　　 Se Miriam ohevet 　 et Dan
　　　 Yosef find-out-PAST that Miriam love-PRES ACC Dan
　　　 'Yosef found out that Miriam loved Dan.'
　　 b. Ken, hi le-lo safek ohevet 　 et Dan(, xaSva 　　 Meri).
　　　 Yes, she definitely 　　 love-PRES ACC Dan 　 think-PAST Mary
　　　 'Yes, she definitely loved Dan(, Mary thought).' 　　 (Sharvit 2008: 357)

These facts directly derive from an ID-based analysis of FID (see Sharvit 2008, cf. von Stechow 2003), but must be stipulated under a DD-based analysis.

Furthermore, Sharvit (2008: 372) shows that tenses must be interpreted related to the protagonist in FID. The Hebrew past tense is unacceptable in (49) under a scenario where Dan wakes up from a coma in February and his wife was supposed to give birth on January 31, while he thinks it's still January because the hospital staff forgot to turn the calendar page.

(49) *Mira 　　　 (#hayta) amura laledet be-yanuar*(, xaSav 　 Dan)
　　　 Mira PRES/#PAST-be supposed give-birth in-January 　 think-PAST Dan

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[8] The same holds of *de te* readings. Pronouns in ID can be read *de te* or not (see vi), while it seems difficult to read a pronoun non *de te* in FID if the narrator specifies the identity mistake as in (v)a vs. (v)b.
　(v) 　　 a. At an association meeting, a group was talking about [the president of the association]$_i$. Mary, a new member of the association, turned to a man next to her, who was in fact the president, unbeknownst to her. *#Where was he$_i$? She had several complaints to make,* she asked.
　　　　　 b. At an association meeting, a group was talking about [the president of the association]$_i$. Mary, a new member of the association, turned to [a man next to her]$_k$. *Where was he$_i$? She had several complaints to make,* she asked. In fact, her addressee was the president himself.
　(vi) 　　 Mary asked the President where he was.
[9] As noted in e.g. Banfield (1982: 104), the French *passé simple* (historic preterite or aorist) seems to be precluded from FID (see also discussion in Bres 2018, Gollut & Zufferey 2021, i.a.); only the imperfective *imparfait* is used as past tense in French FID. Except for Doron (1991: 60; cf. Giorgi 2010: 186, 200 for Italian perfective tenses), both DD-based and ID-based accounts leave this fact unexplained. Informally, this ban on *passé simple* is due to its aspectual specificity, which induces that the event happened before the reference time (while the *imparfait* encodes that the event happens within the reference time), which must itself overlap with the actual utterance time; this creates a conflict given that the reference time must correspond to the protagonist's utterance time in FID (Doron 1991). We will see in section 3.2 how a logophoric approach imposing the protagonist's perspective in FID may derive this fact (see fn. 30).

'*Mira {is/was} supposed to give birth on January 31*(*, Dan thought*).'

In sum, FID patterns like ID regarding an array of facts about pronouns and tenses, thus supporting an analysis treating FID as embedded discourse. Furthermore, we observe in FID some phenomena that are specific to embedded, so-called logophoric, discourse, which supports our hypothesis that FID is a kind of logophoric context. The next section details the latter class of facts.

1.2.2 Hallmarks of embedded contexts: logophors

A strong argument for the analysis of FID as a logophoric context relies on the availability in FID of logophoric elements anchored to the FID protagonist. The specificity of these elements is to refer to the perspective center of their context if (s)he is different from the speaker (see e.g. Charnavel 2021 for a review). The notion originated for some pronouns in West African languages that are reported to mainly occur in indirect discourse, in which they must refer to the attitude holder of that discourse (see Clements 1975, i.a.). Logophoric pronouns are not attested in the languages under investigation here (see predictions for other languages in section 3.3), but some elements of these languages exhibit logophoric properties. This is for example the case of exempt reflexives. As reviewed in e.g. Charnavel (2019a), reflexives like *herself* or *her own* must descriptively be locally bound (in the relevant sense defined by Condition A, see e.g. see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016) unless they are logophorically interpreted, as shown by the contrast in (50).

(50) a. *[The iPhone broken into by the FBI]$_i$ showed that private hackers had the ability to crack encrypted devices like <u>itself</u>$_i$.
   b. [The reality show chef]$_i$ guessed that the next challenge would involve other chefs like <u>himself</u>$_i$.   (Charnavel 2019a: 46)

Descriptively, neither the inanimate *itself* in (50)a, nor the animate *himself* in (50)b obeys Condition A, as their antecedent sits outside their clause. But only *himself* is acceptable (i.e. can be exempt from Condition A) because it can refer to the perspective center of its context, namely the attitude holder *the reality show chef*; *itself*, however, cannot refer to a perspective center, as inanimates cannot hold perspective (see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016).

Crucially, exempt reflexives are attested in FID as illustrated in (51)-(52) (see also Fludernik 1992: 125-126, i.a.).

(51) a. *That was one of the bonds between Sally and <u>himself</u>.*   [Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*]
   b. *He still belonged to <u>herself</u>, she believed.*   [Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers*]
   c. *And this was a bit destressing to people who did not share it; to Mr Carmichael perhaps, to <u>herself</u> certainly.*   [Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*]
                                           (Banfield 1982: 91)
(52) Eve$_i$ était très inquiète. *Comment allait-elle faire ? <u>Ses</u>$_i$ propres enfants et ceux du voisin refusaient de l'écouter depuis hier.*
   'Eve$_i$ was very worried. *How would she manage? <u>Her</u>$_i$ own children and the neighbor's had been refusing to listen to her since yesterday*.'   (Charnavel 2020: 686)

These facts directly follow from an ID-based analysis treating FID as a logophoric context. The distribution and interpretation of exempt reflexives can generally be explained by the hypothesis that they are locally bound by a logophoric operator (see e.g. Charnavel 2019a, 2020, 2021). Similarly, the log-FID hypothesis directly accounts for (51)-(52) as will be detailed in

section 3.2. These facts, however, challenge DD-based analyses. Certainly, first-person exempt reflexives can appear in DD such as (53), but it is far from straightforward to explain how they can appear at the third person in FID under both quotation or bicontextual accounts (see details in section 2).

(53) This is one of the bonds between Sally and <u>myself</u>.

Some constraints on non-exempt uses of reflexives discussed in Sharvit (2010) and Sportiche (2022) corroborate the logophoric status of FID. Heim (1994) observes that the reflexive *himself* locally bound by PRO is acceptable in (54) even if *himself* is read *de re* and PRO is read *de se*.

(54) Oedipus wants PRO to find <u>himself</u>.

Let's consider Oedipus' myth according to which Oedipus is not aware of the fact that he killed his father himself, and he wants to find his father's killer. In this context, PRO refers to who Oedipus takes himself to be, while *himself* refers to who the speaker (vs. Oedipus) takes Oedipus to be. To explain why Condition A is nevertheless satisfied, Sportiche (2022) proposes to relativize the binding conditions to some relevant attitude holder (see other arguments in Sportiche 2022): *himself* in (54) is acceptable because it is co-valued with *PRO* at least for one attitude holder, i.e. for the speaker; in other words, Condition A is satisfied *de re*.

Now interestingly, a reflexive bound *de re* is unacceptable in FID as observed by Sharvit (2010):

(55) Mary was listening to an old recording of hers on the radio, not recognizing her own voice. The radio suddenly stopped playing, and she was disappointed that couldn't make it play again.   (Sharvit 2010: 85)
    a. She thought: ''Ah! To hear this woman sing again!''
    b. She wanted to hear <u>herself</u> sing again.
    c. Her mind was filled with frustrating thoughts. *Ah! To hear <u>herself</u> sing again!*

Here, *herself* is acceptable in ID in (55)b, but unacceptable in FID in (55)c. This fact is difficult to derive without stipulation under quotation or bicontextual accounts, which must allow pronouns to be anchored to the speaker. However, as shown by Sportiche (2022), this fact directly follows from a logophoric analysis of FID, where everything – including Condition A – must be *de dicto*.[10]

Another type of expression supporting the logophoric status of FID is motion verbs like *come*. This verb requires that a perspective center (e.g. speaker, addressee, attitude holder, empathy locus) be located at or associated with the goal of motion (see Oshima 2006, Barlew 2017, Charnavel 2018, 2019a, i.a.). As expected under the log-FID hypothesis, *come* can be anchored to the protagonist or her addressee in FID.

(56) Harriet had begun to be sensible of his talking to her much more than he had been used to do […] *When they had been all walking together, he had so often <u>come</u> and walked by her, and talked so very delightfully*!   [Jane Austen, *Emma*] (Anderson 2022)

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[10] Sharvit (2010) reports that the first-person reflexive is however acceptable in this scenario:
    (vii)   A month ago, when I woke up from a coma, I didn't know who I was. I listened to an old recording of myself, not recognizing my own voice. Suddenly, the radio stopped playing, and I was frustrated that I couldn't make it play again. My mind was filled with frustrating thoughts. *Ah! To hear <u>myself</u> sing again!*
The judgement of this example is however difficult. See fn. 13 for further discussion.

(57) Richard turned to Lady Bruton, with his hat in his hand, and said, "We shall see you at our party to-night?" whereupon Lady Bruton resumed the magnificence which letter-writing had shattered. *She might <u>come</u>; or she might not <u>come</u>.*

<div align="right">[<i>Mrs. Dalloway</i>, Virginia Woolf] (Anderson 2022)</div>

These facts are compatible with both ID-based and DD-based analyses as indicated by the acceptability of *come* in both ID and DD counterparts.

(58) a. Harriet was glad that he had <u>come</u> and walked by her.
     b. Lady Bruton replied to Richard that she might <u>come</u>.
(59) a. He has <u>come</u> and walked by me.
     b. I might <u>come</u>.

However, *come* cannot be anchored to the narrator at the utterance time.

(60) Twelve years ago I had sat in my dreary London apartment, dreaming of Southern Italy, and now I was here. *Oh how lovely it would be there! To feel the sun and taste the food! If only I could one day earn enough to {go/#<u>come</u>} there!* So I had sighed then. (Anderson 2022)

This fact challenges DD-based analyses (cf. Anderson 2022): it is not fully clear how mechanisms designed to shift tense and pronouns to the narrator under these accounts (unquotation, presupposition anchoring to the narrator's context) cannot also shift *come* here. However, this follows from the log-FID hypothesis, as we will see, because nothing can be read *de re* non *de dicto* in logophoric contexts.

Conversely, we observe that antilogophoric elements are banned from FID, which further supports the log-FID hypothesis against DD-based accounts. Epithets such as *the idiot* have been argued to be antilogophoric in the sense that they cannot be used to refer to the logophoric center of their context (see Ruwet 1990, Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998, Patel-Grosz 2012, Yashima 2015, i.a.). More specifically, Charnavel (2019a: 145) shows that epithets are anti-attitudinal in the following sense: "regardless of who evaluates its content, an epithet occurring in an attitude clause cannot refer to the attitude holder of that clause unless it is read non *de se*."

(61) a. #John$_i$ told us of a man who was trying to give [the idiot]$_i$ directions.
     b. John$_i$ ran over a man who was trying to give [the idiot]$_i$ directions.
     c. #According to John$_i$, [the idiot]$_i$ is married to a genius
     d. Speaking of John$_i$, [the idiot]$_i$ is married to a genius

<div align="right">(Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998: 688)</div>

(62) [*John hears on tape several people's voices. He must determine whose voice could be used for some advertisement. He finds that a certain person's voice sounds too aggressive for the task, without realizing that the person in question is John himself.*] John$_i$ is convinced that [the idiot]$_i$'s voice is too aggressive. (Schlenker 1999: 78)

For example, *the idiot* cannot refer to John in (61)a and c where it occurs in an attitude context anchored to John (if there is no mistaken identity about John, and even if John judges himself as an idiot). However, *the idiot* can refer to John in (61)b and d where it occurs in a context anchored to the speaker; note that this is the case in (61)b even if *the idiot* is c-commanded by John, which reveals that epithets are not subject to Condition C (but they are subject to Condition B, see e.g. Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998, Patel-Grosz 2012). Furthermore, *the idiot* can refer to John in (62) where it is not read *de se*.

Crucially, epithets referring to the FID protagonist are unacceptable as shown in (63).

(63) Lucy_i was very worried. *[The poor woman]_{*i/k}'s parents would not listen to her.*

<div align="right">(Charnavel 2019a: 147)</div>

Even if Lucy considers herself to be a poor woman who should be empathized with, the second sentence in (63) cannot be interpreted as FID reflecting Lucy's thoughts if *the poor woman* is intended to refer to Lucy. This fact directly follows from the log-FID hypothesis. Under DD-based hypotheses, this fact does not straightforwardly follow as we will see in section 2 (because of the availability of unquotation and because the epithet can correspond to the protagonist's judgment).

Pronominal antilogophoric elements challenge DD-based account even more clearly. As observed by Ruwet (1990), the distribution of French prepositional clitics *en* and *y* is subject to the same constraint as epithets (see also *ce* in Coppieters 1982 and *le* clustered with *lui* in Charnavel & Mateu 2015): they cannot refer to the attitude holder of their contexts as exemplified in (64) (see review in Charnavel 2019a: 148).

(64) a. Emile_i pense que Sophie_m <u>en</u>_{*i/k} est amoureuse.
    'Emile_i thinks that Sophie_m is in love with him_{*i/k}.'
    b. Emile_i pense que Sophie_m est amoureuse de lui_{i/k}.
    'Emile_i thinks that Sophie_m is in love with him_{*i/k}.'
    c. Emile_i mérite que Sophie_m en_{i/k} tombe amoureuse.
    'Emile_i deserves Sophie_m falling in love with him_{i/k}.'

<div align="right">(Ruwet 1990: 51, 53, 55)</div>

The prepositional clitic *en* ('of him') cannot refer to Emile in (64)a where Emile is the attitude holder of the clause containing *en*, while the strong pronoun *lui* is available in (64)b; however, *en* is acceptable in a non-attitude context as in (64)c.

Strikingly, *en* is unavailable in FID to refer to the protagonist as illustrated in (65).[11]

(65) a. Emile_i exultait. *Oui, c'était sûr maintenant, Sophie_m <u>en</u>_{*i/k} était amoureux !*
    b. Emile_i exultait. *Oui, c'était sûr maintenant, Sophie_m était amoureux de lui_{i/k} !*
    'Emile_i was exulting. *Yes, it was now certain, Sophie_m was in love with him_{i/k}!*'

Hypotheses treating FID as a kind of attitude context (such as the log-FID hypothesis) can directly derive this fact. DD-based hypotheses, however, cannot, given that as we saw in section 1.2.1, they must allow for pronouns to be anchored to the narrator (through unquotation or presupposition anchoring to the narrator).

Furthermore, it is not only in the person domain, but also in the tense domain that FID exhibits logophoric properties. This is especially the case of the German *Konjunktiv I* or reportive subjunctive (see Schlenker 2003, von Stechow 2003, Fabricius-Hansen & Sæbø 2004, Eckardt 2014, i.a.). As described in Fabricius-Hansen & Sæbø (2004: 228), the German reportive subjunctive clause "is (in the same sentence or in the preceding context) the object of a verb of

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[11] The same holds of the other French anti-attitudinal French pronouns *y*, *ce* and *le lui* mentioned above in the text:
　(viii)　　a. Emile_i s'inquiétait. **Sophie y_i penserait-elle quand il_i serait parti ?*
　　　　　　b. Emile_i s'inquiétait. *Sophie penserait-elle à lui_i quand il_i serait parti ?*
　　　　　　'Emile_i was worried. *Would Sophie think about him_i when he_i would be gone*?
　(ix)　　　Emile_i exultait. *Oui, {#ce_i'/il_i} était un génie !*
　　　　　　'Emile_i was exulting. *Yes, he_i was a genius* !'
　(x)　　　　a. [L'enfant]_i s'inquiétait. **Est-ce que les maîtresses allaient le_i lui confier, à la nouvelle assistante ?*
　　　　　　b. [L'enfant]_i s'inquiétait. *Est-ce que les maîtresses allaient le_i confier à la nouvelle assistante ?*
　　　　　　'[The child]_i was worried. *Would the teachers entrust him_i to (her –) the new assistant*?

saying (claiming, asking, commanding) or it is understood as if it were". The last part of this sentence is intended to capture cases of FID like (67). Otherwise, the German reportive subjunctive occurs in indirect discourse like (66).

(66) Er behauptete, dass jemand das Auto angefahren <u>habe</u>, . . .
    'He claimed that somebody <u>had</u> driven into the car, . . .'
    (Fabricius-Hansen & Sæbø 2004: 213)

(67) Wedells Verteidiger Mario Ortiz gab sich optimistisch. *Der angebliche Beweis gegen seinen Mandanten <u>reiche</u> zu seiner Verurteilung bestimmt nicht <u>aus</u>.*
    'Wedell's counsel Mario Ortiz gave a show of optimism: According to him, the alleged proof against his client <u>was</u> definitely <u>insufficient</u> for a sentence.'
    (Fabricius-Hansen & Sæbø 2004: 226)

The German reportive subjunctive thus appears in reported speech (in the complement of speech verbs) or in FID representing speech. Therefore, the occurrence of German *Konjunktiv* in FID directly follows under the log-FID hypothesis. In fact, Schlenker (2003) (cf. von Stechow 2003) proposes that it is a logophoric mood. However, the appearance of German *Konjunktiv I* in FID is unexpected and requires some stipulation under DD-based analyses (see Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015) as detailed in section 2.

In sum, FID is characterized by the fact that logophoric elements anchored to the protagonist are licensed in it, while antilogophoric elements are banned from it. These facts strongly support the log-FID hypothesis against DD-based analyses.

1.2.3 Recursive embedding

Another strong, new argument for analyzing FID as a kind of logophoric context is the possibility of multiple FID embedding. Recursive FID embedding has been sporadically noticed (implicitly by Banfield 1982: 130-131, explicitly by Doron 1991: 63 or Eckardt 2014: 57-59, 250-251; see also Philippe 2005, i.a.), but never taken into account in previous analyses as acknowledged by Doron (1991) and Eckardt (2014).

A very clear example of double FID embedding is provided in (68).

(68) <u>*Letting herself be helped by him*</u>, Mrs. Ramsay had thought (Lili supposed) <u>*the time has come now, she would say it now. Yes, she would marry him*</u>. *And she stepped slowly, quietly on shore. Probably she said one word only, letting her hand rest still in his. I will marry you, she might have said, with her hand in his; but no more. Time after time the same thrill had passed between them—obviously it had*, Lily thought, smoothing a way for her ants.   [Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*]
    Doron (1991: 63, noted as p.c. by Anita Mittwoch), Eckardt (2014: 250-251)

Here, the parentheticals *Mrs. Ramsay had thought (Lili supposed)* explicitly indicate the embedding of Mrs. Ramsay's thoughts (shown in underlined italics) in Lili's (shown in non-underlined italics). For instance, the indexical *now* (in *she would say it now*[12]) is anchored to Mrs. Ramsay's temporality, while the adverb *obviously* is relativized to Lili's judgment.

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[12] *Now* in *the time has come now* is also anchored to Mrs. Ramsay's temporality, but the FID status of this segment is less clear because of the present tense, suggesting that this clause may be DD rather than FID (like *I will marry you* later on in the passage).

Some examples provided by Banfield (1982) to show the possible presence of a listening consciousness (which she compares with echo questions), such as (69), also seem to correspond to recursive FID:

(69) "Let us all go to the circus." *No. He could not say it right. He could not feel it right. But why not?* she wondered. […] *Had they not been taken*, she asked, *to circuses when they were children? Never*, he answered. […] *He could never "return hospitality"* (*those were his parched stiff words*) *at college*. […] *He worked hard—seven hours a day; his subject was now the influence of something upon somebody*—they were walking on and Mrs. Ramsay did not quite catch the meaning, only the words, here and there . . . dissertation . . . fellowship . . . readership . . . lectureship.

[Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*] (Banfield 1982: 130-131)

(69) reports a dialog between Mrs. Ramsay and Charles Tansley from Mrs. Ramsay's perspective. Not only are Mrs. Ramsay's thoughts (e.g. *No. He could not say it right. He could not feel it right*) and speech (e.g. *But why not?*) reported in FID, but Charles Tansley's represented speech is also embedded within Mrs. Ramsay's FID as clearly indicated by the following: Mrs. Ramsay's FID includes comments on Tansley's choice of words (*those were his parched stiff words*), and Tansley's last sentence (*his subject was the influence of something upon somebody*) is clearly represented through Mrs. Ramsay's consciousness that does not identify the content of the dissertation's subject, as then explicitly stated by the rest of the narration (*Mrs. Ramsay did not quite catch the meaning, only the words*). In other words, just like (68), (69) can be transposed into ID using two attitude embeddings, the only difference consisting in the nature of the higher attitude (perception vs. thought).

(70) a. Lily supposed that Mrs. Ramsay thought that she would marry him.
b. Mrs. Ramsay heard that Charles Tansley said that his subject was the influence of something upon somebody.

Moreover, Doron (1991) reports a passage (without analyzing it) that seems to include recursive FID anchored to the same protagonist (at different times).

(71) *It was in all this she had found her occasion. She would launch his boat for him; she would be his providence; it would be a good thing to love him. And she had loved him* […]. [Henry James, *The Portrait of a Lady*] (Doron 1991: 63, noted as p.c. by Moshe Ron)

(71) is an excerpt from Isabel's meditations, in which she reflects on how she was seduced by Osmond. The contrast between the past perfect (*had found, had loved*) and the future in the past (*would*) indicates that Isabel's past thoughts are embedded within Isabel's present thoughts, as can be transposed in the following ID:

(72) Isabel thought that she had thought that it would be a good thing to love him.

These few examples thus reveal that FID can be recursively embedded under various configurations. As acknowledged by Eckardt (2014: 58-59, 250-251), this fact challenges DD-based analyses, especially bicontextual analyses (see details in section 2). However, it can be explained by the log-FID hypothesis, which is compatible with the stacking of logophoric operators (provided that semantico-pragmatic conditions are satisfied, as will be discussed in section 3). This fact thus strongly favors ID-based against DD-based analyses.

Furthermore, this fact suggests a partial explanation for the debated distribution of first-person pronouns in FID (see section 1.2.1). Recall that while Banfield (1982) claims that first person

pronouns can only appear in FID if referring to the protagonist or her addressee, Schlenker (2004) contends that their distribution is regulated by the pragmatics of narration: they are acceptable in FID as long as the narrator presents herself as taking part to the action she is reporting and can't thus be an omniscient narrator; there must therefore be a plausible reason for her to have information about the represented speech or thoughts. But the examples (22)-(23) Schlenker (2004) provides (repeated in (73)-(74)) do not seem to fully satisfy these conditions.

(73) a. *Oh how extraordinarily nice I was*, she told my father, without realizing that I was listening to their conversation.
b. [Reporting on thoughts I read in my mother's diary]. *Oh how extraordinarily nice I was*, she thought.   (Schlenker 2004: 290)

(74) I had become adept at reading my teachers' thoughts. My Greek teacher didn't like me so much after all. *Really, I was a little devil, not entirely without talent, but impossible to deal with — something had to be done about me, or else tomorrow I would become completely unbearable.*   (Schlenker 2004: 290)

While the narrator is indeed presented as having direct evidence about the represented speech in (72)a (she is present during the reported conversation), she is only presented as having indirect and delayed evidence about it in (72)b (she reads about it after the narrated action) and the reason for her to have information about the represented thought in (74) does not appear to be plausible (she is supposed to have magical powers that allow her to read other people's minds, while the narration is otherwise realistic and the narrator is not supposed to be omniscient). Interestingly, these problems disappear if we hypothesize that (73)-(74) are instances of recursive embedding as made explicit by the following ID counterparts:

(75) a. I read that she thought that that I was extraordinarily nice.
b. I guessed that he thought that I was a little devil.

In fact, (74) is compatible with a motion verb anchored to the narrator, indicating that the narrator can indeed be construed as a logophoric center here:[13]

(76) I had become adept at reading my teachers' thoughts. My Greek teacher didn't like me so much after all. *Really, I was a little devil. Tomorrow, he would come to see me and talk to me.*

Note that this possibility further raises the question whether Banfield's (1982) original intuition was not right after all, according to which first person pronouns are licensed in FID only if the

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[13] This hypothesis may provide an explanation for Sharvit's 2010 reported contrast between *de re* first and third person reflexives bound by PRO in FID (see fn. 10). Speakers who accept first person *myself* may construe the speaker as a FID protagonist through recursive FID embedding.
(xi)   *Ah! To hear myself sing again!* (I had thought, I then remembered).
Note that the second person reflexive (not mentioned in Sharvit 2010) seems to be licensed similarly:
(xii)   A month ago, when you woke up from a coma, you didn't know who you were. You listened to an old recording of yourself, not recognizing your own voice. Suddenly, the radio stopped playing, and you were frustrated that you couldn't make it play again. *Ah! To hear yourself sing again!* (I guessed you (had) thought/you then told me).
In the case of third person reflexives, however, fiction allows the (potentially omniscient) narrator not to provide evidence for their claim, which makes inappropriate the construing of the narrator as logophoric FID center through recursive embedding.

narrator is presented as a FID protagonist. Examples (72)a and (21), where the narrator is present in the narrated action, could also lend themselves to this analysis:

(77) a. <u>I heard</u> that she told my father that <u>I</u> was extraordinarily nice.
    b. <u>I heard</u> that Ralph asked me if <u>I</u> really knew the road.

But just as the discussion about the second person suggested in section 1.2.1, this constraint seems to only hold if FID occurs in a fictive narration (where the narrator's context is not precisely identified, see further discussion in section 3.2). If the FID occurs in a standard discourse involving a speaker and an addressee, it seems that the speaker can be referred to by a first-person pronoun in FID without being construed as a logophoric center.

(78) (You know what?) When my mother was pregnant with me, she often dreamt about when I would arrive. *How lovely it would be to look at <u>my</u> little eyes!*

The first-person possessive *my* is here acceptable in the FID fragment anchored to the speaker's mother. But at the time of the narrated action, the speaker (still a fœtus) cannot formulate any thought and cannot thus be a perspective center. Of course, the narrator must have been informed at some point by her mother about these thoughts to be able to report them (since (78) is intended not to be from fictive narration) so that we could in principle reconstruct a double attitude embedding:

(79) I heard from my mother that she had thought that it would be lovely to look at my little eyes.

But it seems that the discourse in (78) can be understood as directly focusing on the narrator's mother thoughts, making the source of the information irrelevant, just as in the ID counterpart in (80).

(80) My mother thought that it would be lovely to look at my little eyes.

Similarly, a second person pronoun can appear in FID if (and only if) it refers to the actual addressee of the speaker. Crucially, it need not be construed as protagonist. The only requirement is that the speaker have the relevant information to present the actual addressee as a participant in the narrated action (e.g. by taking part in the action herself as protagonist or addressee as in (81)-(82) or by having some evidence about it).

(81) a. [cf. (29)] We were all worried about you and talked about it in your absence. *What would <u>you</u> become after this?*'
    b. We wondered what you would become.
(82) a. [=(2)] X has called. *Can we drive him, <u>you</u> or me, to Roissy at 5am tomorrow?*
        He is dreaming!
    b. X asked me if you or I can drive him to Roissy.

In sum, person features in FID need not be evaluated by the FID protagonist, but can be read *de re* (be evaluated by the speaker at utterance time). This allows first and second person pronouns to appear in FID even if the actual speaker is not construed as a FID protagonist, as long as the speaker has appropriate (direct or indirect) evidence for presenting herself or her addressee in the represented speech or thought. In fiction where the narrator is not situated in a standard utterance context (i.e. without any specific place, time or addressee), however, only the first person pronoun is licensed, and only if the narrator can be construed as protagonist or protagonist's addressee, which can happen through recursive embedding. Thus, the possibility

of recursive FID embedding not only argues against DD-based analyses, but also clarifies some aspects of the distribution of first-person pronouns in FID.

1.2.4 Style

The last argument against DD-based analyses relies on stylistic considerations. When discussing example (13), we have observed that FID can reflect the manner of speaking of the protagonist just as is the case in DD. But crucially, FID need not be faithful to the speech or thought that it represents in ways that challenge DD-based analyses (*pace* Schlenker 2004: 285, Maier 2015: 357).

As noticed in e.g. Banfield (1982: 114-116), Fludernik (1993: chapter 8) or Abrusán (2023: 17-18), FID need not be a verbatim report of an actual speech or thought act. Neither pronunciation (phonetic properties), nor style (syntactic and vocabulary choices) need be identical to the thought or speech that is intended to be represented. As argued by Fludernik (1993), this is especially evident when FID does not reflect one speech or thought act, but condenses several ones, whether by the same protagonist at recurrent times, or by several protagonists through plural FID (see also Abrusán 2023) as illustrated in (83).

> (83) If I told my schoolmates that Lena Lingard's grandfather was a clergyman, and much respected in Norway, they looked at me blankly. *What did it matter? All foreigners were ignorant people who couldn't speak English.*
>
> (Fludernik 1993: 399, Abrusán 2023: 18)

This typicality and schematic nature of FID does not, however, straightforwardly argue against DD-based analyses. As also argued by Fludernik (1993: chapter 8), DD need not be an exact report of some original discourse. In fact, the transposition of (83) into DD does not require any reformulation (except for tense, of course, as discussed above).

> (84) If I told my schoolmates that Lena Lingard's grandfather was a clergyman, and much respected in Norway, they looked at me blankly and said: "What does it matter? All foreigners are ignorant people who can't speak English."

But crucially, FID can also involve some reformulation that is incompatible with DD. First, the choice of words can be explicitly indicated as different from the original discourse as in (85).

> (85) Quelque temps après [F. Mitterrand] me demanda de l'aller voir. […] Il me dit qu'il prêtait attention à ce que j'écrivais, à mon ton, à mon style… *Serais-je intéressé d'être mêlé à son environnement* (il employa un autre mot que j'ai oublié, car celui-ci n'existait pas à cette époque) *politique ?* Non, je n'avais de goût que pour l'écriture.
>
> [J. Cau, *Croquis de mémoire*, 1986] (Authier-Revuz 2020: 315)
> 'After some time, [Mitterrand] asked me to come see him. […] He told me that he paid attention to what I wrote, to my tone, my style. *Would I be interested in being involved in his political environment* (he used another word I forgot, as this one did not exist at that time).

Here, the word *environnement* is used in FID although it is explicitly mentioned as being absent from Mitterrand's actual discourse. This is infelicitous in DD:

> (86) #F. Mitterrand me demanda (en utilisant un autre terme) : « Seriez-vous intéressé d'être mêlé à mon environnement politique ? »
> '#F. Mitterrand asked me (using another word): "Would you be interested in being involved in my political environment?"

Second, the style in FID can be clearly distinct from the expected style of the protagonist, while DD is expected to reproduce it. This is for instance the case of example (20) relating Proust's thoughts when he was a child: the style does not reflect a child's manner of speaking (which would be used in DD), but is rather the narrator's. Joyce's following example makes the point even more clearly:

(87) At what o'clock did you dine? he [Bloom] questioned of the slim form and tired though unwrinkled face.
—Some time yesterday, Stephen said.
—Yesterday! exclaimed Bloom till he remembered it was already tomorrow, Friday. Ah, you mean it's after twelve!
—The day before yesterday, Stephen said, improving on himself. […]
Anyhow, upon weighing the pros and cons, getting on for one, as it was, it was high time to be retiring for the night. The crux was it was a bit risky to bring him [Stephen] home as eventualities might possibly ensue (somebody having a temper of her own sometimes) and spoil the hash altogether as on the night he misguidedly brought home a dog (breed unknown) with a lame paw, not that the cases were either identical or the reverse though he had hurt his hand too) to Ontario Terrace as he very distinctly remembered, having been there, so to speak. [Joyce, *Ulysses*] (Fludernik 1993: 392)

As argued by Fludernik (1993: 392), the comparison between Bloom's DD and FID makes obvious the stylistic contrast between the two: while DD seems to be intended to truthfully represent Bloom's manner of speaking, FID seems to be written in the narrator's style.[14]

In sum, the style used in FID is not intended to faithfully report the manner of speaking as is the case of DD (even under the assumption that a faithful report is not a verbatim report). This fact challenges DD-based analyses.

1.3   Back to similarities to DD

As summarized in Table 2, we have thus observed in FID several properties that argue for an ID-based, logophoric analysis, against DD-based analyses (see grey cells); we will make this point more precise in sections 2 and 3 when examining specific implementations of DD-based and logophoric analyses. In the rest of this section, we reexamine the properties described in section 1.1 that are supposed to argue for DD-based analyses against ID-based analyses and show that they do not, after all, challenge a logophoric, ID-based analysis.

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[14] Conversely, Currie (1990) suggests that the narrator's style may transpire by caricatural imitation of the protagonist's style, which may create irony effects. For example, Currie (1990: 143) argues that in (xiii), stylistic imitation partly serves to ironize the perspective of the artisan-witness by using their uneducated speech recollecting events in their own community with a conventional emphasis in the exposition of the horrors.
    (xiii)   People still remembered last year at Belchamp St Paul *how a strange gentleman came one evening in August years back; and how the next morning but one he was found dead, and there was an inquest; and the jury that viewed the body fainted, seven of 'em did, and none of 'em would speak to what they see, and the verdict was visitation of God; and how the people 'as kept the 'ouse moved out that same week, and went away from that part.* But they do not, I think, know that any glimmer of light has ever been thrown, or could be thrown, on the mystery. [*Count Magnus* 1931, M. R. James]
By simply displaying the words, DD, Currie argues, would not achieve the same effect.

	ID-based analyses	DD-based analyses
Root clause syntax	?	✓
*De re non de dicto readings	?	✓
Protagonist's dialect	?	✓
Adverbial indexicals	?	✓
Third person pronouns: person	✓	?
number/gender	✓	?
de se	✓	?
Tenses and mood: SOT	✓	?
logophoric	✓	?
Person indexicals: person	✓	?
constrained distribution	✓	?
*Vocatives and imperatives	✓	?
Logophoric elements	✓	?
*Antilogophoric elements	✓	?
Recursive FID	✓	?
Narrator's style	✓	?

Table 2 – Status of FID properties under ID-based and DD-based analyses
(✓: non-problematic; ?: problematic (i.e. does not straightforwardly follow))

1.3.1   Root clause syntax

The property that is usually first mentioned against ID-based analyses is the fact that FID exhibits root clause syntax: all characteristics of syntactic embedding shown in ID are precluded in FID as seen in section 1.1.1. But syntactic properties of (attitude) embedding should be distinguished from semantic properties of (attitude) embedding. For example, (88) (cf. (1)) expresses Emma's attitude without showing the syntax of embedded clauses.

(88) Selon Emma, Lheureux voulait sans doute l'effrayer encore.
'According to Emma, Lheureux probably wanted to scare her again.'

This is due to the fact that *selon Emma* 'according to Emma' semantically introduces another attitude than the speaker's without syntactically embedding a clause.[15] Similarly, we can assume that FID is introduced by an implicit operator that behaves like an attitude verb semantically, but not syntactically. This is the case of Sharvit's (2008) FID operator (cf. Giorgi 2010).[16] This will also be the case of our log-FID operator.

1.3.2   Protagonist's privileged perspective

As seen in section 1.1.2, DD-based analyses are also supported by the fact that FID mainly presents the protagonist's perspective: in particular, *de re non de dicto* readings are prohibited in FID and indexicals are anchored to the protagonist. The goal of this section is to show that these points do not argue against a logophoric ID analysis.

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[15] Conversely, syntactic embedding does not entail attitude embedding. This is for instance the case under modals (e.g. *it is likely that*) or non-attitude verbs such as French *mériter* 'deserve' (see e.g. (64), (159)b) which take a complementizer without introducing another attitude.
[16] In fact, Maier (2015: 368, fn. 15, 39) also has to postulate the presence of such an operator even under his mixed quotation analysis (see section 2.2).

First, it is important to note that ID does license *de dicto* readings. This is uncontroversially the case of referential expressions like *his mother* (see (8)a), but also the case of evaluative expressions such as epithets (see e.g. Patel-Grosz 2012), expressives (see e.g. Schlenker 2007), speaker-oriented adverbs (see e.g. Giorgi 2010: 72-75) or discourse particles (see e.g. Zimmermann 2011), as well as style or dialect as illustrated in (89)-(93).

(89) I am not prejudiced against Caucasians. But John, who is, thinks/claims that you are the worst <u>honky</u> he knows.   (Schlenker 2003)
(90) My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry <u>that bastard</u> Webster.
                                                                (Kratzer 1999, cited by Schlenker 2007)
(91) Mario disse a tutti che <u>francamente</u> era stanco di ascoltare sciocchezze.   [Italian]
     'Mario told everybody that <u>frankly</u> he was tired of hearing silly things.' (Giorgi 2010: 73)
(92) Tom glaubt, dass <u>wohl</u> die Birne durchgebrannt ist.   [German]
     'Tom believes that <u>wohl</u> the bulb has burned out.'   (Eckardt 2014: 129)
(93) […] to protest, like the Japanese in the anecdote, that he was <u>altogether flummoxed
     and perplexed by position of Honorable Bird</u>.   [Huxley, *After Many a Summer*]
                                                                          (Fludernik 1993: 255)

The argument against ID-based analyses thus lies on the obligatoriness of *de dicto* readings, since ID usually allows for, but does not require *de dicto* readings.

But crucially, the obligatoriness of *de dicto* readings is not in principle incompatible with attitude embedding. Sharvit's FID operator achieves obligatory *de dicto* readings by positing quantification over context-assignment pairs. Independently of FID, Charnavel's 2019a logophoric operator is also designed to force *de dicto* readings under its scope; this is motivated by the fact that logophoric reflexives cannot co-occur with non *de dicto* expressions in the same local domain as illustrated in (94).

(94) *[My grandfather Joseph mistakes fuzzy photos of me (taken from behind) for old portraits of himself and
     finds them beautiful while I think they are horrible.]*
     Joseph$_i$ espère que les <u>affreuses</u> photos de <u>lui$_i$(*-même)</u> sont préservées de la lumière.
     'Joseph$_i$ hopes that the <u>horrible</u> photos of <u>him$_i$(*self)</u> are protected from light.'
                                                                          (Charnavel 2019a: 160)

The obligatoriness of *de dicto* readings is thus not only compatible with ID-based analyses, but it directly follows from a logophoric analysis (see more details in section 3).

The second argument based on adverbial indexicals, which is one of the main arguments motivating DD-based analyses, is also to be qualified. As mentioned in section 1.1.2, it is usually stated that unlike in ID, adverbial indexicals are not anchored to the speaker, but to the protagonist in FID, just like in DD.[17] But several aspects of this statement need to be refined. First, it is in fact not the case that location and time indexicals are necessarily anchored to the speaker outside FID and DD, even in languages that do not exhibit indexical shift. One reason for this is that some adverbial indexicals such as English *now* and *here* (see Kamp & Reyle 1993, Recanati 2004, Hunter 2012, Altshuler 2016, Lee 2017, Anand & Toosarvandani 2019, i.a.), French *maintenant* and *aujourd'hui* (Gollut & Zufferey 2021), or German *jetzt* and *hier*

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[17] Sharvit (2008), which is the only defendant of an ID-based analysis, also endorses this description and therefore has to stipulate that the FID operator quantifies over contexts (and assignment functions) and that there are two types of indexicals: those that never shift (person indexicals) and those that can shift (adverbial indexicals). These assumptions undermine ID-based analysis in most subsequent views (see e.g. Eckardt 2014: 193-194, and further discussion in section 3.2).

(Eckardt 2014: 44-45) have been observed not to be anchored to the utterance time even outside reported discourse contexts:

(95) In the summer of 1829, Aloysia Lange, née Weber, visited Mary Novello in her hotel room in Vienna... Aloysia, the once celebrated singer, <u>now</u> an old lady of sixty-seven... gave Mary the impression of a broken woman lamenting her fate. (Recanati 2004: 18, adapted from Predelli 1998b)

(96) Napoleon wurde 1815 auf die Insel Sankt Helena verbannt. <u>Jetzt</u> war er nicht mehr so populär.   (Eckardt 2014: 44-45)
'Napoleon was banned to St. Helena in 1815. <u>Now</u>, he was not so popular anymore.'

(97) Notre héros eut la gaucherie de s'arrêter auprès de cette petite chaise de paille, qui jadis avait été le témoin de triomphes si brillants. <u>Aujourd'hui</u>, personne ne lui adressa la parole.   [Stendhal, *le Rouge et le Noir*] (Gollut & Zufferey 2021: 74)
'Our hero had the awkwardness to stop beside this little straw chair, which had once witnessed such brilliant triumphs. <u>Today</u>, no one spoke to him.'

Another reason is that even adverbial indexicals that do not exhibit this apparently non-indexical behavior can in fact be evaluated with respect to a reported context in ID as observed by e.g. Plank (1986), Fludernik (1993) or Anderson (2019).

(98) Vico telegraphierte mir aus Uzwil nach Oberuzwil, daß er am Samstag <u>hier</u> singt.
'Vico sent me a cable from Uzwil to Oberuzwil saying that he was singing <u>here</u> on Saturday.'   (Plank 1986: 289)

(99) Last week, Jane said that she would order the cake <u>tomorrow</u>, but she didn't.
                                                                                (Anderson 2019: 2)

(100) Nevertheless he [Tom] submitted to be kissed willingly enough though Maggie hung on his neck in rather a strangling fashion, while his blue-grey eyes wandered towards the croft and the lambs and the river, where he promised himself that he would begin to fish the first thing <u>tomorrow</u> morning. [G. Eliot, *Mill on the Floss*]
                                                                                (Fludernik 1993: 225)

Most of Plank's informants report that German *hier* in (97) can correspond to Uzwil.[18] Similarly, Anderson (2019) experimentally shows that many American English speakers find (99) coherent, thus relativizing *tomorrow* to the reported speaker; (100) is a natural occurrence of this pattern.

Second, it is crucial to note that location and time adverbials need not be indexical in FID: they can also be anaphoric – a fact that is overlooked in the formal linguistic literature.[19]

(101) *Und wie er auch gebeten hatte, es nicht anzusagen, so hatte sie es doch <u>an dem Tage</u> noch ihrem Guten redlich gemeldet, weil er's wissen mußte.*
'*And however much he had begged her not to, she had on that day honourably confessed to her good, upright bridegroom, who had to know.*'
                          [Mann, *Lotte in Weimar*] (Fludernik 1993: 225, quoted Weinrich 1985: 242)

(102) […] *enfin il fit valoir des raisons personnelles, le mort était son beau-père, le beau-père du maire de Rognes. Voyons, ce serait pour <u>le lendemain</u> dix heures.*

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[18] As mentioned above, *hier* and *here* seem to have non-indexical uses in general, which may weaken the point here (but see discussion in section 3.2). Examples (99)-(100) involving *tomorrow* are more telling. Relatedly, note that Eckardt (2014: 52-53) suggests that place does not have the same (prominent) status as time in FID.

[19] Gollut & Zufferey (2021: 75) interestingly note that adverbial indexicals (vs. anaphorics) in FID are not found before the nineteenth century. For example, La Fontaine's *Fables*, which clearly involve FID, do not exhibit adverbial indexicals anchored to the protagonist in FID.

[…] finally he put forward personal reasons, *the dead man was his father-in-law, the father-in-law of the mayor of Rognes. Come on! it would be at ten o'clock <u>the next day</u>*.
[Zola, *La Terre*] (Authier-Revuz 2020: 135; see also Gollut & Zufferey 2021)

Such occurrences, which are unacceptable in DD, challenge DD-based analyses.[20]

Third, the behavior of adverbial indexicals is crucially different in FID occurring in communication (vs. narration), i.e. in the presence of well-defined actual speaker and addressee. According to Eckardt (2014: 217), their interpretation is ambiguous: *heute* in (103) can be anchored to Tom or the speaker.

(103) Tom hat letzte Woche angerufen. *Er komme <u>heute</u>.*
'Tom called last week. *He would come <u>today</u>.*'

According to Gollut & Zufferey (2021: 86), they must be anchored to the actual speaker: in (104), where the actual speaker is explicitly temporally located (see *il y a trois jours* 'three days ago'), the protagonist's temporality cannot be expressed by an indexical (*hier* 'yesterday') but only by an anaphoric adverbial (*la veille* 'the day before').

(104) X m'a téléphoné il y a trois jours pour m'expliquer les raisons de son absence : *il avait {*<u>hier</u>/<u>la veille</u>} contracté un gros rhume.*   (Gollut & Zufferey 2021: 86)
'X called me three days ago to explain the reasons for his absence: *he had {*<u>yesterday</u>/<u>the day before</u>} contracted a bad cold.*'

It is thus only when the speaker's temporality coincides with the protagonist's, as in (105), that adverbial indexicals can be used and refer to the protagonist's circumstances in FID occurring in communication.

(105) Le cœur d'Edmond bat. […] *Allons, il faut sonner. Le silence et l'odeur des roses. La bonne.* « Mademoiselle a téléphoné. Elle s'excuse auprès de monsieur. *Si monsieur veut l'appeler <u>demain</u> matin à l'appareil… Pas trop tôt…* »   [Aragon, *Les beaux quartiers*]
'Edmond's heart beats. […] Come on, you have to ring the bell. The silence and the smell of roses. The maid. "*Mademoiselle* called. She apologizes to monsieur. *If monsieur wants to call him <u>tomorrow</u> morning on the telephone… Not too soon…*"'
(Gollut & Zufferey 2021: 86)

In (105), *demain* 'tomorrow' occurs in FID anchored to Mademoiselle, whose temporality corresponds to that of the maid, which corresponds to the speaker here (FID is embedded within the maid's DD).

Giorgi (2010: 193-194) even strengthens this claim: according to her, adverbial indexicals must be anchored to the narrator's (vs. the protagonist's) temporality as long as the narrator is explicitly referred to in FID as shown by the contradictoriness of (106) (inspired from (73)).

(106) #*Oh how extraordinarily nice <u>I</u> was <u>yesterday night</u>*, she told my father <u>last morning</u>, without realizing that I was listening to the conversation. (Giorgi 2010: 193)

In sum, the behavior of adverbial indexicals, which is usually treated as the main argument for DD-based analyses, is in fact far from straightforwardly supporting DD-based against ID-based

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[20] Further note that (102)-(103) cannot be treated as cases of Protagonist Projection (see discussion in section 3.3), where adverbial indexicals do not shift, unlike in FID (see Abrusán 2021, i.a.): Protagonist Projection expresses pre-verbal perception, while (102) seems to correspond to Charlotte's conscious recollection, and (103) clearly reports speech.

analyses. Under DD-based analyses, the shiftability of adverbial indexicals in some IDs, the availability of anaphoric adverbials in FID and the interpretation of adverbial indexicals in FID occurring in communicative discourse, remain problematic. We will discuss in section 3.3 how the log-FID analysis can fare better in this respect.

To recapitulate, we have observed in this section that a fine-grained description of FID properties as compared to DD and ID properties rehabilitates the class of ID-based analyses; on the contrary, the class of DD-based analyses, which have been favored in recent years, comes out undermined. The next sections reinforce these points by showing how the main specific implementations of DD-based analyses are challenged by several properties of FID (section 2) and how a specific implementation of ID-based analyses, i.e. the log-FID analysis, fares better (section 3).

2 Problems with previous analyses

What I called DD-based approaches (i.e. analyses assuming that the protagonist's perspective is rendered in FID by direct access to her context without any mediation through the narrator's context) encompass two types of analyses: bicontextual analyses (see Schlenker 2004, Eckardt 2014, i.a.) and mixed quotation analyses (see Maier 2015, i.a.). In this section, we examine the specific problems both types of hypotheses face, mainly in view of the observations of the previous section.

2.1 Bicontextual analyses

2.1.1 Schlenker (2004)

Building on Banfield (1982), Doron (1991) and Recanati (2000), Schlenker (2004) proposes that the grammatical notion of context of speech should be ramified into a context of thought and a context of utterance, and the specificity of FID (and historical present) is to distinguish between these two contexts: while the context of thought is anchored to the protagonist in FID, the context of utterance is anchored to the narrator. Sentences in FID must thus be evaluated with respect to two contexts. The division of labor between the two contexts, Schlenker argues, is determined by the distinction between truth and failure conditions: the context of thought contributes to the truth conditions while the context of utterance only contributes to the failure conditions. Specifically, the context of utterance only plays a role in the evaluation of the presuppositions associated with sorted variables – a class of elements which Schlenker argues (based on independent facts) is formed by tenses and pronouns.

Schlenker's hypothesis thus derives and predicts (broadly correctly, as we will discuss below) that tenses and pronouns are relativized to the narrator's utterance context, while the rest (including adverbial indexicals) is relativized to the protagonist's thought context. First, Schlenker (2004: 286-288) shows independently of FID that both tenses and pronouns behave like sorted variables, because they can be bound or free, they can be responsible for referential failure and they can be semantically uninterpreted in focus alternatives; the first and the third properties are illustrated in (107).

(107) a. Only Mary did her homework. [Therefore Peter didn't do his]
      b. Only I did my homework. [Therefore Peter didn't do his)

c. Only then did $\underline{I}$ work in Boston. [Therefore now I <u>don't</u> work in Boston]

<div align="right">(Schlenker 2004: 286-288)</div>

Assuming that the context of utterance υ (vs. the context of thought θ) only contributes to failure conditions, this gives rise to the following lexical entries for e.g. the feminine third person pronoun and the past tense (with g the assignment function).

(108) a. *she$_k$* denotes$_{g,\upsilon,\theta}$ # iff $g(x_k)$ isn't (in the world of υ) a female who is neither the speaker nor an addressee of υ. Otherwise it denotes$_{g,\upsilon,\theta}$ $g(x_k)$.

b. *past$_k$* denotes$_{g,\upsilon,\theta}$ # iff $g(t_k)$ isn't before the time of υ. Otherwise, it denotes$_{g,\upsilon,\theta}$ $g(t_k)$.

<div align="right">(Schlenker 2004: 292)</div>

In other words, pronouns and tenses are anchored to the narrator because they are presuppositional and the narrator's context is responsible for presuppositions (and only for them).

Second, all non-presuppositional elements are evaluated with respect to the context of thought. For example, adverbial indexicals are interpreted as in (109).

(109) a. *here* denotes$_{g,\upsilon,\theta}$ the location of θ.

b. *tomorrow* denotes$_{g,\upsilon,\theta}$ the day that follows the time of θ.   (Schlenker 2004: 292)

In sum, the strength of Schlenker's analysis is to derive (vs. stipulate) the perspectival differences observed in FID (esp. pronouns/tenses vs. adverbial indexicals) from an independent semantic difference (presuppositional variables vs. non-presuppositional elements) and to motivate the relativization to two contexts; in this respect, not only does the distinction between the context of thought and the context of utterance reflect the intuition that in FID, the protagonist's thoughts are articulated through the narrator's mouth, but Schlenker argues that the reverse image of FID (where it is the context of thought that is anchored to the narrator) is also attested with the historical present.

But this account faces three main types of problems. The first type of problem comes from the prediction that presuppositions are evaluated in the narrator's context. As acknowledged by Schlenker, this raises some issues regarding the interpretation of some pronouns. In particular, we saw in section 1.2.1 that the gender and number of at least some pronouns must be evaluated by the protagonist in FID (see e.g. (16) and (19) where the protagonist is mistaken about the gender or number of some individual), while Schlenker's account predicts gender and number features, just like person features, to be relativized to the narrator's context. To remedy this problem, Schlenker (2004: 291) tentatively suggests that in those cases, pronouns can be read as hidden descriptions (or so-called e-type pronouns) such as *the man* or *the woman* as is independently attested (see Karttunen 1969, i.a.). But in the absence of a motivation for the parallel between two types of cases, this hypothesis seems ad hoc, as mentioned by Maier (2015: 356). Sharvit (2008: 386) further claims that e-type pronouns in FID never stand for descriptions that fit the speaker's beliefs but not the protagonist's.

A similar solution is proposed by Schlenker (2004: 294) to tackle another problem regarding the rendering of *de se* thoughts in FID. Schlenker shows that the procedure he proposes entails that the sentence in (110)a (cf. (43)-(44)) expresses the thought in (110)b.

(110) a. His$_k$ pants were$_m$ on fire (, John$_k$ thought).

b. T(a) = $\lambda\theta$[*has-pants-on-fire(x_k, t_m, actually) is true$_{s,\theta}$]= $\lambda\theta$[g(x_k)'s pants are on fire at time g(t_m) in the world of θ].

(110)b is the set of thought contexts that make (110)a true; note that the context of utterance has been eliminated here by stripping the sentence of its person and tense features (assuming that no referential failure occurs). Crucially, the result fails to yield the desired difference between a *de se* thought (John thought *My pants are on fire*) and a non *de se* thought (John thought *His pants are on fire*). To solve the problem, Schlenker proposes to adapt Kaplan's (1969) solution to Quine's (1956) Ortcutt problem (i.e. Ralph believes of Ortcutt both that he – qua the man he saw in a brown hat – is a spy, and that he – qua the man he saw at the beach – is not a spy). Specifically, he suggests that the variable x_k can be replaced with a description under which the protagonist (i.e. the author of θ) is acquainted with the referent of x_k – including the indexical description *I*, as shown in (111), which thus yields the *de se* reading of (110)a.

(111) T_1((110)a) = $\lambda\theta'$[*has-pants-on-fire(I, t_m, actually) is true$_{s,\theta'}$]= $\lambda\theta'$[the pants of the author of θ' are on fire at time s(t_m) in the world of θ].

But especially given that under Schlenker's analysis, FID does not include any attitude operator (unlike in Ortcutt's cases), this solution also seems ad hoc (see discussion in Sharvit 2008: 372). Furthermore, the same problem arises when the protagonist is referred to by a first- or second-person pronoun as in e.g. (20) or (28). This makes the problem even more acute. It implies that a first-person pronoun (a variable associated with the presupposition that the referent is the speaker of υ) is understood as the description *the speaker of θ* (essentially promoting the presupposition to the assertion level and unshifting the indexical). But first- and second-person pronouns usually resist to being interpreted as hidden descriptions except under some very specific circumstances (see e.g. Jacobson 2012, Charnavel 2019b).

Further note that *de te* readings raise a similar problem. Recall that a third person pronoun (see (17)), a first person pronoun (see (21)) or a second person pronoun (see one possible interpretation of (29)) can refer to the addressee of the protagonist. But Schlenker's procedure fails to distinguish between a *de te* reading (where the protagonist actually said *you*) and a non *de te* reading (where the protagonist did not recognize the referent as her addressee and thus referred to her by *she*, see fn. 8). The solution suggested by Schlenker for *de se* readings can apply here (e.g. *me* could be interpreted as *the addressee of θ*) but raises the same issues.

Moreover, the explanatory power of Schlenker's analysis is weakened by the fact that not all presuppositions are evaluated uniformly with respect to the narrator's context. As we saw, the main strength of this hypothesis consists in deriving the difference in behavior between tenses/pronouns and other elements from the independent difference between presupposition and assertion. But as observed by Abrusán (2021: 870), other presuppositions than those associated with pronouns are evaluated with respect to the protagonist's context (cf. Eckardt 2014: 61) as illustrated in (112).

(112) Tom frowned. *The ghost in the attic was making noises again*.

(Eckardt 2014: 60, Abrusán 2021: 860)

Here, only Tom needs to presuppose that there is a ghost in the attic that used to make noises, the narrator need not. This observation weakens the explanatory power of Schlenker's analysis as the distinctive behavior of tenses and pronouns cannot be attributed to the distinctive

behavior of presuppositions in general, but only to those associated with pronouns. This may be independently motivated, since as noted by Schlenker (2004: fn. 6), pronoun presuppositions (or referential failure for pronouns, in his terms) exhibit some specific behaviors as compared to other presuppositions, but this specificity remains poorly understood.

The second type of problems comes from the prediction that non-presuppositions are evaluated in the protagonist's context. As shown by Maier (2015), this prediction is challenged by the fact that some proper names can appear in FID to represent a first or second person pronoun in the original speech or thought (cf. Fludernik 1993; 136-137, Authier-Revuz 2020: 137) as illustrated in (113).

(113) He [=Arnie] dialed Leigh's number from memory. Mrs Cabot picked the phone up and recognized his voice immediately. Her pleasant and rather sexy come-hither-thou-fascinating-stranger phone voice became instantly hard. *Arnie had had his last chance with her*, that voice said, *and he had blown it*.   [King, *Christine*] (Maier 2015: 358)

Here, *Arnie* in Mrs Cabot's FID stands for *you* in the DD counterpart (*you have had your last chance with her*). Maier suggests that the proper name is here used in place of a third person pronoun because the referent is not salient enough; more generally, proper names are used to avoid ambiguity. Such instances are unexpected under Schlenker's account, where *Arnie* should be evaluated in the protagonist's context, i.e. Mrs Cabot's, and thus correspond to her own words (while she in fact said *you*).

A similar problem is created by the fact that as we observed in section 1.3.2, anaphoric adverbials are acceptable in FID (see e.g. *le lendemain* 'the next day' in (102)), which cannot correspond to the exact words of the protagonist either (*Voyons, ce sera pour {#le lendemain/demain} dix heures* 'Come on! it will be at ten o'clock {#the next day/tomorrow}').[21] More generally, the hypothesis that the protagonist's words (except for tenses and pronouns) are recovered in FID (see Schlenker 2004: 295-296) is challenged by the observation that as described in section 1.3.2, FID need not be a verbatim report, but can involve typicality (see (83)), word reformulation (see (85)) or style change (see e.g. (87)).

The third type of problems is due to the assumption that FID does not involve any modal operator (Schlenker 2004: 293); relativization to the protagonist's thoughts is not achieved through scoping under an attitude operator, but through bicontextual dependency. This hypothesis creates difficulties for FID phenomena relying on attitude embedding described in sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3. First, we observed that FID can be recursively embedded. But as acknowledged by Eckardt (2014: 250-251), bicontextual accounts do not (at least straightforwardly) allow for recursive embedding.

(114) *Letting herself be helped by him*, Mrs. Ramsay had thought (Lili supposed) …
       obviously it had, Lily thought….

For example, Schlenker's account predicts (68) partially repeated as (114) to be evaluated with respect to a context of thought and a context of utterance. We may assume that the context of

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[21] As noted by Schlenker (2005: 61), adverbial indexicals that can shift in ID such as French *dans deux jours* ('in two days') also raise a problem for Schlenker (2004). Given that it can shift in ID, *dans deux jours* must be treated as compatible with any variable of context; but in FID, it isn't compatible with the narrator's context of assertion. It must thus be assumed that the context of assertion can only be used in presuppositions associated with variables in FID.

thought is first anchored to Mrs. Ramsay, then to Lili, and the context of utterance is first anchored to Lili and then to the narrator. But first, it is not obvious how the system can achieve such anchoring shift (in the absence of explicit explanation about the identification procedure for context authors). Second, even granting this, the first FID sentence would not express any thought embedding (and relativization to more than two contexts would considerably complexify and undermine the whole system). Worse, it would wrongly predict that a first-person pronoun could refer to another individual than the narrator in FID (i.e. Lili here) (cf. Eckardt 2014: 58).

Second, we observed that FID licenses logophoric elements, and excludes antilogophoric elements. It is unclear how Schlenker's system could allow for the use of logophoric e.g. *himself* in (51) (repeated below).

> (115) *That was one of the bonds between Sally and <u>himself</u>.*

Schlenker's account is incompatible with any analysis requiring a logophoric operator here, as FID is assumed not to involve any modal operator; in fact, Schlenker (2005: 62) explicitly states that his account predicts that logophors cannot refer to the FID protagonist. It could perhaps exploit the hypothesis that only *him* is evaluated in the narrator's context, while *self* is evaluated in the protagonist's context (assuming a DD counterpart involving *myself*). But this would ignore the logophoricity of *himself,* thus leaving its general distribution unexplained.

The unacceptability of antilogophoric elements in FID challenges Schlenker's account even more clearly. Recall that epithets referring to the protagonist (as in (63) repeated in (116)) and antilogophoric pronouns like French *en* (as in (65) repeated in (117)) are incompatible with FID.

> (116) Lucy$_i$ was very worried. *[<u>The poor woman</u>]$_{*i/k}$'s parents would not listen to her*.
> (117) Emile$_i$ exultait. *Oui, c'était sûr maintenant, Sophie$_m$ <u>en</u>$_{*i/k}$ était amoureux !*
>   'Emile$_i$ was exulting. *Yes, it was now certain, Sophie$_m$ was in love with him$_{i/k}$!*'

Under Schlenker's hypothesis, *the poor woman* in (116) is predicted to be evaluated by the protagonist and thus presumably expected to be acceptable if Lucy judges herself as a poor woman, contrary to fact. Unacceptability may be attributed to the infelicity of a DD counterpart using a bare epithet (*[The poor woman]$_{*i/k}$'s parents won't listen to me*); but this would require assuming that FID must be a verbatim report, which we saw above is problematic. Even more clearly, *en* in (117) is incorrectly predicted to be acceptable under Schlenker's account as pronouns are evaluated in the narrator's context; coding antilogophoricity as a presupposition would not work as pronoun presuppositions should be relativized to the narrator's context while antilogophoricity would require making reference to the protagonist's context. Note that for the same reasons, reflexives bound *de re* as in (55) and *come* anchored to the narrator's context as in (60) are incorrectly predicted to be acceptable under bicontextual accounts.

2.1.2   Eckardt (2014)

Eckardt's 2014 book's goal can be seen as broadening the empirical coverage of Schlenker's analysis. She basically adopts his bicontextual analysis, but modifies it so as to make correct predictions about phenomena that are not examined in Schlenker (2004) such as aspect, discourse particles and exclamatives.

Specifically, Eckardt proposes that sentences can be interpreted in two modes: the normal (i.e. non FID) mode relativized to only the external context of evaluation C ($[\![S]\!]^{M, g, C}$), and the FID mode relativized to two contexts of evaluation, C and the internal context c centered on a protagonist ($[\![S]\!]^{M, g, <C,c>}$). The difference between indexicals that do not shift in FID (e.g. first and second person pronouns) and those that shift (e.g. adverbial indexicals) is coded in the lexical entries of these items. For instance, the singular first-person pronoun is interpreted as in (118), while *here* is interpreted as in (119).

(118) a. $[\![I]\!]^{M, g, C} = [\![\text{SP}]\!]^{M, g, C} = C(\text{SP})$
     b. $[\![I]\!]^{M, g, <C,c>} = [\![\text{SP}]\!]^{M, g, <C,c>} = C(\text{SP})$
(119) a. $[\![\textit{here}]\!]^{M, g, C} = [\![\text{here}]\!]^{M, g, C} = C(\text{here})$
     b. $[\![\textit{here}]\!]^{M, g, <C,c>} = [\![\text{here}]\!]^{M, g, <C,c>} = c(\text{here})$

Thus, non-shiftable indexicals like *I*, noted in small capitals, are always evaluated with respect to C, while shiftable indexicals like *here*, noted in lower case, are interpreted with respect to C if there is only one context, but with respect to c in bicontextual mode.

The lexical coding of shiftability allows Eckardt to accommodate the behavior of discourse particles within her system. Discourse particles are usually assumed not to contribute to the assertive level, but to the presuppositional level or the expressive content of an utterance (see review in Zimmermann 2011). Nevertheless, Eckardt (2014) shows that they are anchored to the protagonist in FID, contrary to what would be expected under Schlenker's system. In her system, she can lexically encode shiftability in any semantic level of the lexical entries.

Furthermore, Eckardt (2014) introduces reference times in her system in order to capture the distribution of aspect in FID (see details in Eckardt 2014: chapter 4). Reference time (cf. Reichenbach 1947) corresponds to the time of interest, which is distinct from the event time – as reflected by aspect – and distinct from the utterance time – as reflected by tense. Their incorporation into the system allows Eckardt to explain the constraints on combinations between temporal adverbials and tense/aspect. Like Schlenker, she hypothesizes that adverbial indexicals depend on the protagonist's time (*now*), while tense relies on the narrator's time (*NOW*) (cf. (108)b-(109)b).

(120) $[\![\textit{yesterday}]\!]^{M, g, C} = \lambda e.\tau(e) \subset \iota t.\text{DAY-BEFORE}(t, now)$ (Eckardt 2014: 96)
(121) $[\![\textit{past}]\!]^{M, g, C} = \lambda P. (P(R) \wedge R < \text{NOW})$ (Eckardt 2014: 93)

But Eckardt also relativizes tense to the reference time (and adopts Davidson's 1967 use of events) and defines aspects with respect to a time of interest.

(122) $[\![\textit{simplified-perfect}]\!]^{M, g, C} = \lambda P \lambda t. \exists e (P(e) \wedge \tau(e) < t)$ (Eckardt 2014: 92)

She can thus derive the FID interpretation of sentences like (123) adopting Doron's 1991 generalization that the narrator's reference time R in FID coincides with the time of the protagonist (C(R)=c(now)).

(123) *Antje had bought a dress yesterday.*   (Eckardt 2014: 97)

The use of *yesterday* here implies that the event of Antje buying a dress takes place one day before the protagonist's time of utterance. Perfective aspect further indicates that it takes place before the time of interest, which corresponds to the protagonist's time of utterance due to Doron's generalization. As for past tense, it implies that this time of interest is before the

narrator's time of utterance. All this is coherent and more fine-grained[22] than Schlenker's predictions that Antje's time of buying a dress occurs before the narrator's time of utterance and one day before the protagonist's (cf. Eckardt 2014: 185-188 for a comparison with Schlenker's theory).

Similarly, Eckardt can derive the temporal interpretation of (124) assuming that it involves prospective aspect.

(124) *Tomorrow was Christmas!*

(125) $[\![$ prospective $]\!]^{M, g, C} = \lambda P \lambda t. \exists e \, (\, t < \tau(e) \wedge \tau(e) < \text{NOW} \wedge P(e) \,)$

In (124), past tense indicates that the time of interest (corresponding to the protagonist's utterance time) is before the narrator's utterance time, *tomorrow* that the event takes place one day after this time of interest, and prospective aspect that the event occurs after the time of interest and before the narrator's utterance time. This again coherently captures our intuitions and is more fine-grained than Schlenker's predictions that Christmas' time occurs before the narrator's time of utterance and one day after the protagonist's.

Furthermore, Eckardt proposes that the reference time is context-based and can be relativized to the protagonist in some cases such as exclamatives or German *Konjunktiv*. Inspired by Rett's 2008 analysis of exclamatives, she assumes that exclamatives express temporally anchored degrees; in FID, exclamatives must thus refer to the shifted reference time r (as the degree can only be witnessed as long as the event takes place). Similarly, Eckardt (2014: chapter 8) assumes that German *Konjunktiv* tenses such as anterior in (126) are relativized to the shifted reference time r (vs. other tenses as in e.g. (121)).

(126) $[\![$ *anterior* $]\!]^{M, g, <C,c>} = \lambda P. \, \exists t(\, p(t) \wedge t < now)$ (cf. Eckardt 2014: 213)

Schlenker's analysis, however, seems incompatible with the use of *Konjunktiv* in FID since tenses must be evaluated with respect to the narrator in Schlenker's system, while the use of *Konjunktiv* is restricted to reported contexts (see section 1.2.2). For Schlenker (2004), it thus raises the same problem in the domain of moods as logophoric pronominals in the domain of person (see section 2.1.1).[23]

Furthermore, Eckardt shows that Schlenker (2004) incorrectly predicts the unacceptability of FID in historical present. According to Schlenker (2004), the historical present is the mirror image of FID, in the sense that the context of thought corresponds to the narrator's actual context (thus attributing the assertion to the narrator) and the context of utterance to some other (past) context (thus licensing present tense and yielding the impression that the speaker directly witnesses the events reported). For example, in (127), the context of utterance is set fifty-eight years before the narrator's context of thought, which explains the co-occurrence of the present tense and the adverbial *fifty-eight years ago*.

(127) <u>Fifty-eight years ago</u> to this day, on January 22, 1944, just as the Americans are about to invade Europe, the Germans <u>attack</u> Vercors.

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[22] Eckardt's more precise lexical entry for *perfect* relying on the notions of post-phase and resultative states makes it even more fine-grained.

(xiv) $\|$ perfect $\| = \lambda P \lambda t. \exists e \exists s \, (\, P(e) \wedge \text{Post-Phase}_w(e) = s \wedge t \subset s \,)$ (Eckardt 2014: 91)

[23] In fact, Schlenker (2005: 62) notes that his system predicts that logophors such as *Konjunktiv I* cannot be relativized to the protagonist in FID (but can only be bound by a quantifier over contexts such as an attitude verb occurring within FID).

But Eckardt observes that this account cannot derive that FID can occur in stories told in the historical present:

(128) Alice <u>is looking</u> at the White Rabbit with amazement. *How tall it is!*

Under Schlenker's 2004 account, the use of the historical present in (128) contradictorily implies that the context of thought is the narrator's, while FID implies it is the protagonist's.[24]

In sum, Eckardt (2014) basically adopts Schlenker's 2004 bicontextual approach, but broadens its empirical coverage and overcomes some of its problems by enriching it. Nevertheless, Eckardt's approach remains problematic: not only doesn't it solve all of Schlenker's problems, it also looses its explanatory power. We saw that one of the strengths of Schlenker's analysis is to derive the perspectival division of labor between pronouns/tense and other elements from an independent difference between presupposition and assertion. To correct the empirical problems (reviewed above) this proposal raises, Eckardt instead codes contextual anchoring in lexical entries. We have already discussed cases involving person and location or time indexicals, discourse particles, tenses and moods. Similarly, Eckardt proposes to capture cases of mistaken gender like (16) using the following lexical entry, which relativizes gender belief to the protagonist (*sp*), and identity belief to the narrator (*SP*).

(129) $[\![she_j]\!]^{M, g, <C,c>} = x_j$
presupposition 1: BELIEF $(sp, w, \lambda w'.\text{FEMALE}(x))$
presupposition 2: $x \neq SP$ (Eckardt 2014: 195)

But the behavior of pronouns is thereby simply stipulated (and it does not capture the difference observed in (16) with respect to gender between pronouns referring to the protagonist and pronouns referring to other individuals). The same kind of stipulation is required to capture the distribution of imperatives or vocatives. In general, Eckardt's account does not thus derive the constraints on perspectival anchoring in FID, but lexically states it. If it certainly improves on Schlenker's hypothesis with respect to empirical adequacy, it thereby looses predictive power. Furthermore, Eckardt (2014) does not correct all wrong predictions of Schlenker's account. First, Eckardt (2014: 57-59, 250-251) acknowledges that her approach does not allow for recursive embedding as in (114). Eckardt (2014: chapter 3) hypothesizes that the belief ascription of FID sentences to the relevant protagonist (instead of the narrator) happens at the level of story update, which is based on Stalnaker's (2002) pragmatic rules. It may thus be assumed that in relevant circumstances such as (114), these rules ensure that the anchoring of the internal context c switches from Lili to Mrs. Ramsay (say, from <C, c> to <C, d>). But there is no formal way in this system – or in any bicontextual account – to encode thought (or speech) embedding (*Lili thought that Mrs. Ramsay thought that…*).

Second, the acceptability of logophoric elements and the ban on antilogophoric elements when anchored to the protagonist (see (115)-(117)) is problematic for Eckardt's account. As we saw

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[24] Schlenker's account of the historical present also raises problems regarding pronouns, which are predicted to depend on the (past) utterance context. For instance, the use of a first-person pronoun in examples like (127) must in some cases imply the use of improper contexts (i.e. a context whose agent does not exist at the time of that context in the world of that context, see Schlenker 2004: 298). Worse, it predicts that first and second person pronouns should be able to refer to other individuals than the actual speaker or addressee. While Schlenker (2004: 298-299) suggests that it is borne out for the first-person pronoun, Schlenker (2005: 60) acknowledges that it is not for the second-person pronoun.

above with the *Konjunktiv* in (126), it is possible for her to lexically encode dependency on the protagonist. But this proposal is doubly stipulative. First, as already mentioned, it simply states (instead of explaining) that some elements (e.g. *Konjunktiv* in (126)) are anchored to the protagonist while others (e.g. indicative) are anchored to the narrator. Second, this account, which relies on double context dependency, can only be applied to FID. But as mentioned in section 1.2.2, logophors are characteristic of embedded contexts, including both FID and ID. Thus, *Konjunktiv I* also appears in ID (as in e.g. (66); see Fabricius-Hansen & Sæbø 2004). But under Eckardt's account, only FID relies on bicontextual evaluation, so that it cannot extend to *Konjunktiv I* in embedded clauses (as acknowledged by Eckardt 2014: 213, fn. 5). The same problem arises for all logophoric elements: Eckardt's approach implies that their occurrence in ID and in FID cannot receive the same explanation contrary to theoretical economy.

Third, we have observed that in FID occurring in communicative contexts like (103), adverbial indexicals can (or even must, according to some) be anchored to the narrator. As acknowledged by Eckardt (2014: 217), this fact cannot be predicted by her account, which implies that all shiftable indexicals must shift when evaluated in the bicontextual mode of interpretation.

In sum, bicontextual accounts face important empirical and theoretical problems. The main empirical problems concern the explanation of recursive embedding and the distribution of (anti)logophoric elements in FID. The main theoretical problem consists in the stipulations that are required to correctly capture the perspectival division of labor between various elements in FID.

2.2   Mixed quotation analyses

An alternative to bicontextual accounts has been proposed by Maier (2015, 2017) (see also Deal 2020: 111-115) in terms of mixed quotation. Mixed (vs. pure) quotation refers to quotation in which a phrase is simultaneously used and mentioned, as in typical DD. Under Maier's approach, FID is thus an instance of DD in which some elements (typically pronouns and tenses) are unquoted as in (124) schematized in (130) (using editorial typographic conventions according to which brackets mark unquotation and quotation marks indicate DD).

(130) "Tomorrow [was] Christmas!"

Ignoring details of formalization here (which are irrelevant to our purposes), the protagonist's thought represented by FID is captured as DD where the verb is unquoted (and thus in past tense). More generally, FID is conceived as DD with holes for tenses and pronouns, which are unquoted. According to Maier (2015), this hypothesis is motivated by the fact that unquotation is independently attested overtly in certain genres of factual reporting.

As acknowledged by Maier (2015: 367-368) and mentioned by Abrusán (2023: 134), this extension of (un)quotation to FID requires two non-trivial adjustments. First, (un)quotation must be able to cover mental acts that are not uttered, while (un)quotation is otherwise typically attested in cases of speech reports. This adjustment is all the less trivial as it seems to correlate with a difference in communicative purposes and effects between journalistic (un)quotation and FID (whose precise examination would lead us too far afield, but see some ideas in Eckardt 2014: 197-198). Second, it must be assumed that the logical form includes a hidden attitude

operator to correctly attribute the mental act to the protagonist (vs. the speaker). This second move is also necessary to correctly capture the distribution of tenses and *de se* (and *de te*) readings (see Maier 2015: fn. 39), as well as, presumably, logophoric elements (which are not discussed by Maier).[25] This aspect of the analysis likens it to ID-based analyses, thus weakening its competitiveness as DD-based analysis.

Even granting these points, the mixed quotation approach, like bicontextual accounts it aims at improving upon, faces both theoretical and empirical challenges. The theoretical challenge is one of predictive power. Maier (2015) assumes that tenses and pronouns are by and large anchored to the narrator due to unquotation. Similarly, this account, unlike Schlenker's, is compatible with the occurrence of proper names referring to the protagonist in FID as in (113), as long as it is assumed that proper names can also be unquoted. The same could presumably hold of anaphoric adverbials as in (101)-(102), which also challenge Schlenker's proposal. But in the absence of any independently motivated principle regulating the use of unquotation, this solution is stipulative and lacks predictive power: any expression could be quoted or unquoted, predicting any possible combination, while FID is in fact constrained with respect to the perspectival division of labor between the narrator and the protagonist.

Aware of this problem, Maier (2017) strives to formulate such an independent pragmatic principle responsible for unquotation, based on cases of apparent unquotation in direct discourse constructions (including data from Kwaza speakers, Catalan signers, and Dutch children). Namely, unquotation arises as a solution to the conflict between two contradictory constraints: a bias for anchoring indexicals to the most salient speech act (attraction), and a bias for faithfully reproducing the linguistic form of the reported utterance (verbatim). Conflicts specifically arise when the quoted speech act involves someone who plays a different role in the actual speech act; unquotation resolves the conflict by locally suspending the verbatim constraint. This proposal directly applies to FID examples where in the DD counterpart, the FID first person pronoun corresponds to a second or third person pronoun (see e.g. (21)-(23)), or the FID second person pronoun corresponds to a first or third person pronoun (see e.g. (2), (28)). But in many cases of FID, the unquoted pronouns refer to the story's protagonist, which is both physically and temporally removed from the actual speaker, i.e. the narrator. In those cases, Maier argues that the same principle is at play, that is, attraction overrules verbatim, but the difference is that the source of attraction is the protagonist and her here and now instead of the actual speech act. This results from the fact, so the argument goes, that in stories told by an omniscient narrator, the protagonist is more salient than the narrator, and the story time is more salient than the time of the narration. That's why pronouns and tenses are generally unquoted in FID.

But Maier's 2017 proposal faces several challenges. First, cases of first or second person pronouns co-occurring with past tense (as in e.g. (21)-(23) or (28)) do not straightforwardly follow, as the form of the pronouns implies that the source of attraction is the actual speech act, while the past tense implies that it is the story's time. Second, Maier (2015) argues that partial unquotation can happen in cases like (17) where the FID *he*, corresponding to DD *you*, reflects

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[25] In the case of logophoric *herself*, Maier could alternatively assume that *her* is unquoted while *self* is quoted, raising the problems of partial quotation mentioned later in the text; also crucially note that in principle, the whole reflexive *herself* should be unquotable under Maier's account, which wrongly predicts the availability of reflexives bound *de re* as in (55).

the protagonist's judgment about gender, but the narrator's about person: gender features are quoted while person features are unquoted. It's unclear how such partial unquotation can result from Maier's 2017 pragmatic principle, since the resulting *he* neither respects verbatim, nor attraction. And even granting that this may somehow be a solution of compromise, it begs the question of the modalities of application of the principle: under what conditions does attraction win? When does verbatim win? When does a compromise solution obtain? These questions are especially pressing in the time domain. To account for the use of past tense, it is assumed that attraction overrules verbatim, and to account for the use of time indexicals anchored to the protagonist, it is assumed that verbatim wins. Why does the pragmatic principle apply differently to tense and to indexicals? Furthermore, the case of anaphoric adverbials (e.g. *the next day*) as in (101)-(102) should be assumed to result from attraction. The flexibility required for this pragmatic principle to correctly capture some facts undermines its predictive power. Worse, it makes incorrect predictions. In particular, it is never the case that the protagonist can be referred to as a first-person pronoun in FID if it is distinct from the narrator. But this is predicted to be possible as long as verbatim overrules attraction as happens with location and time indexicals.

Further incorrect empirical predictions, outside the domain of tense and pronouns, are made by Maier's account, which further question the possibility of independently motivating appropriate conditions of application for the pragmatic principle of unquotation. First, the ban on vocatives and imperatives (or at least their restricted distribution, see section 1.2.1) remains unexplained under a quotation account (in fact, Maier 2015 assumes that FID can contain imperatives, without empirical justification). Why couldn't vocatives and imperatives be quoted? If attraction is to blame, how exactly can it work so as to not lead to an overapplication of attraction against verbatim? Second, the possible stylistic manipulations of the narrator observed in 1.2.4 raise the reverse problem. In fact, Maier (2015) presents the possible occurrence of the protagonist's dialect in FID as an argument for the quotation account. Why can some formulations be unquoted, on the contrary? In what sense can attraction apply in such cases? This is especially puzzling given the observation that *de re* non *de dicto* expressions are uncontroversially precluded in FID, as we saw in section 1.1.2. The question is even more acute when the reformulation does not target only one word or expression as in (85), but whole sentences as in (20) or (87), which are intended to reflect the protagonist's (e.g. the child Proust) thought, but not his manner of speaking. In those cases, neither quotation (which should entail a faithful rendering of the style), nor unquotation (which should entail belief attribution to the narrator) can correctly predict the facts. In sum, not only is it difficult, under quotation accounts, to explain (vs. stipulate) the division of labor between quotation and unquotation in FID, it is also impossible to account for cases where some aspects of both are required.

Further notice that the same kinds of problem arise if we try to motivate a principle for quotation instead of unquotation, as Eckardt (2014: 197-204) argues. In particular, she observes that in ordinary quotation, words and their features cannot be split up so that the morphophonological form of words is quoted while the features (or even only some of the features) are unquoted, as we saw should happen in FID for tense and pronouns. Moreover, it is virtually impossible in ordinary quotation to quote isolated particles, and fully impossible to quote tacit operators such as question or exclamative operators as should be allowed in FID (e.g. German *Sie liebted ihn ja* 'she loved him *ja*' or English *Was she?*).

Finally note that recursive FID embedding is problematic, although perhaps not fully impossible, under quotation accounts. Certainly, DD within DD is possible, and the silent attitude operators posited by Maier can in principle be stacked. But while quotation seems to be recursively embeddable, unquotation does not, at least not in the appropriate way (e.g. *Mary said: "John begged me: "{you /[I] /*[she]} should come tomorrow" "*).

In sum, the two main types of DD-based analyses face important challenges as summarized in Table 3. In particular, both fail to capture the distribution of (anti)logophoric elements and the acceptability of recursive FID. The log-FID analysis we instead develop in the next section overcomes these problems.

	Bicontextual approach		Quotation approach
	Schlenker (2004)	**Eckardt (2014)**	**Maier (2015, 2017)**
Root clause syntax	✓	✓	✓
De re readings	✓	✓	?
de re reflexives	✗	✗	✗
Protagonist's dialect	✓	✓	✓
Adverbial indexicals	✓/✗	✓/✗	✓ / ?
Anaphoric adverbials	✗	✓	?
Proper names (referring to protagonist(s'addressee))	✗	✓	✓
3P pronouns: person	✓	✓	✓
number/gender	?	?	?
de se/ de te	?	?	?
Tenses/mood:	✓	✓	✓
logophoric (SOT, *Konjunktiv*)	✗	?	?
Person indexicals: person	✓	✓	✓
constrained distribution	?	?	?
*Vocatives and imperatives	✗	?	✗
Logophoric pronominals	✗	✗	✗
*Antilogophoric elements	✗	✗	✗
Recursive FID	✗	✗	?
Narrator's style	✗	✗	✗

Table 3 – Status of FID properties under DD-based analyses
(✓: predicted; ?: predictable with stipulation; ✗: unpredictable)

3   Proposal

In the previous sections, we have seen that several facts challenge DD-based analyses of FID, which assume a direct dependency on the protagonist's context through quotation or bicontextual evaluation. In particular, no implementation of DD-based analyses can account for the (un)acceptability of (anti)logophoric elements anchored to the protagonist and the possibility of FID recursive embedding. As shown in Table 3, other problems for these analyses include reflexives bound *de re*, *de se* and *de te* readings, number and gender pronominal interpretations, the distribution of first and second person pronouns, the ban on vocatives and imperatives, as well as the possible incursion of the narrator's style.

In this section, I propose a logophoric analysis as an alternative. Although I leave a full formalization for future research (which would require a systematic evaluation of previous proposals about the semantics of various aspects of indirect discourse), I spell out how the ingredients it incorporates can account for all the facts reviewed in the previous section, especially those challenging previous analyses. The core of the analysis is to posit the presence of an implicit logophoric operator scoping over FID passages. In section 3.1, I motivate the presence of an attitudinal operator. In section 3.2, I show that this operator must specifically be a logophoric operator. In section 3.3, I address the remaining issues, and identify predictions to check and refinements to make in future research.

3.1 An attitudinal operator

As we saw in section 2, a crucial component of bicontextual accounts is the absence of any attitudinal operator in FID; under these accounts, the perspectival properties of FID are captured by internal context dependency. Instead, I here argue that such an operator is required to correctly derive some properties of FID, reinforcing Sharvit's (2008) arguments with new ones. Like Sharvit (2008), I here hypothesize that this operator shares with overt attitude verbs (part of) their semantics, but not their syntax. That's why FID does not exhibit properties of syntactic embedding, as shown in sections 1.1.1 and 1.3.1.

Sharvit's main arguments for positing an implicit attitudinal operator are based on *de se* (and *de te*) readings as well as sequence of tense phenomena in FID detailed in section 1.2.1. As she shows, only binding by an attitudinal operator can derive such facts. Formally, Sharvit (2008: section 2.3) adopts von Stechow's (2003) mechanism of feature deletion under agreement. As Sharvit (2008: 359) explains, "the idea is that a tense embedded under an agreeing tense may be interpreted as a zero-tense (i.e., a relative present; in ID and FID—the subject's "now"), and that a personal pronoun embedded under an agreeing pronoun may be interpreted as a zero-person (i.e., a relative first person; in ID and FID — the subject's "I")." Concretely, past or *phi*-features can be deleted when the relevant tense or pronoun is bound by the attitude operator (including the FID operator) as schematized in (131)-(132) (cf. (47)-(48)). While (132) is available in both English and Hebrew, (131) is only available in English.

(131) a. [John Tns$^{\text{PST}}$ think [that Mary Tns$^{\text{PST}}$ be pregnant]]
      ↑_____|
    b. [FID-Tns$^{\text{PST}}$-John [.... Mary Tns$^{\text{PST}}$ be pregnant]]
      ↑_____| (Sharvit 2008: 361)

(132) a. John$^{\text{3M}}$ thinks [that pro$^{\text{3M}}$ is a genius]
      ↑_____|
    b. FID-John$^{\text{3M}}$ [pro$^{\text{3M}}$ is a genius]
      ↑____| (Sharvit 2008: 362)

As acknowledged by most DD-based analyses, *de se* (and *de te*) readings and sequence of tense phenomena cannot be captured in the absence of an attitudinal operator. In fact, Maier (2015: fn. 39) does posit such an operator, and Schlenker admits that his e-type solution to *de se* readings is stipulative, while Eckardt does not discuss these points.

Note that the other reason invoked by Maier (2015: 368) for positing such an operator even under a DD-based analysis is that it derives that the truth of the thought or speech is attributed

to the protagonist in FID. In its absence, it would wrongly be attributed to the narrator. Under bicontextual accounts, the correct truth attribution is done pragmatically. Specifically, Eckardt (2014) incorporates this aspect in the Stalnakerian pragmatic rules of context update she assumes. As opposed to *de se* readings and sequence of tense phenomena, this aspect is thus not underivable in the absence of an attitude operator, but remains a (weak) argument for the operator hypothesis that straightforwardly derives it.

Further note that the constraints on the protagonist's identity depend on this accommodation of an implicit attitudinal operator (sometimes doubled with an overt parenthetical, see discussion in section 3.3): the attitude operator takes a subject which must be identified with the relevant protagonist. This can be assumed to be done by usual semantico-pragmatic rules of coreference: the discourse preceding the FID passage makes salient the relevant protagonist. Abrusán (2023) further shows that this anaphora resolution is more complex in some cases involving plural protagonists. For instance, (133) requires e-type anaphora (*they* is interpreted as all the kids in town that were excited about Christmas).

(133) Most kids in town were excited about Christmas. *Santa Claus was coming!* (they thought)   (Abrusán 2023: 138)

Beyond *de se/te* readings and sequence of tense phenomena, two novel observations from sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 provide additional strong arguments for the necessity of positing an attitudinal operator. First, we observed in section 1.2.2 that so-called antilogophoric elements anchored to the protagonist (such as epithets or certain French pronouns) are banned from FID. More specifically, we saw that in general, such elements are anti-attitudinal in the sense that they are unacceptable in attitude contexts when anchored to the attitude holder associated with them, unless they are not read *de se*. Only an analysis incorporating an attitude operator can derive these facts.

Second, we observed in section 1.2.3 that FID can be recursively embedded. This fact directly follows from an analysis involving attitude operators, which can in principle be stacked as schematized in (134) roughly representing (68). As acknowledged by Eckardt (2014: 250-251), however, thought or speech embedding is underivable under bicontextual accounts.

(134) [pro_i ATT [pro_k ATT *Letting herself be helped by him*, Mrs. Ramsay$_k$ had thought (Lili$_i$ supposed) *the time has come now, she would say it now*.]]

Furthermore, recall from section 1.2.3 that the embeddability hypothesis allows for a plausible account for the distribution of first and second person pronouns in FID in fiction, thus providing an indirect argument for positing attitude operators in FID. For instance, we can assume that (74) can include a first person pronoun because the narrator can be construed as the subject of a silent attitudinal operator as represented in (135).

(135) I$_i$ had become adept at reading my teachers' thoughts. [My Greek teacher]$_k$ didn't like me so much after all. [pro_i ATT [pro_k ATT *Really, I$_i$ was a little devil…*]]

Finally, two further properties buttress the hypothesis that FID must include an implicit attitudinal operator. First, we observed in section 1.2.4 that FID can exhibit the narrator's style. In reported contexts outside FID, this only happens in the scope of an attitude operator, i.e. in ID vs. DD. Second, vocatives and (most) imperatives are banned from FID as discussed in

section 1.2.1. Similarly, this property uniquely characterizes complements of attitude verbs. Even without providing a precise analysis of such facts (which are controversial and remain poorly understood), [26] we can thus conclude that they support a treatment of FID as incorporating a silent attitudinal operator. Conversely note that the possible incorporation of the protagonist's manner of speaking in FID (see section 1.1.2) is fully compatible with an analysis relying on an attitudinal operator as ID can incorporate quotative elements (see Sharvit 2008: 391).

In short, the outcome of this section is that several properties of FID can only be derived if we posit an implicit attitudinal operator scoping over FID passages.

3.2   A logophoric operator

This section specifies the nature of this attitudinal operator and argues that it must be a logophoric operator (henceforth log-FID) similar to logophoric operators independently motivated in the literature (see Koopman & Sportiche 1989, Anand 2006, Charnavel 2019a, 2020, i.a.).

Logophoric operators have been hypothesized to explain the distribution of logophoric elements, such as specific pronouns mainly found in some West-African languages (see e.g. Koopman & Sportiche 1989) and anaphors exempt from Condition A of Binding Theory (see e.g. Charnavel 2019a). As mentioned in section 1.2.2, logophoric elements are characterized by having to refer to the perspective center of their domain, which constrains both their interpretation and their distribution.

Specifically, Charnavel (2019a, 2020), which I will here adopt, posits that in a given domain, the relevant logophoric center can be syntactically represented by a silent logophoric pronoun pro_{log} introduced by a logophoric operator (as its subject), which imposes the first-person perspective of the logophoric center on its complement. As logophoric centers encompass attitude holders and empathy loci, logophoric operators basically correspond to unspecified mental verbs imposing the perspective of the referent of their subject in their complement clause. A formalization is offered in (136).

(136)   *Semantics for the log-FID operator (first version)*:
for any world w, individual x, time t and function p from world-time-individual triples to truth values, $[\![log\text{-}FID]\!]^{c, g}$ (w)(p)(t)(x) = 1 iff for all world-time-individual triples <w',t',x'> compatible with x's mental state (belief, hope, feel, etc. – as identified by the semantico-pragmatic conditions) in w at t (where x' is the individual in w' that x identifies as himself), p(w')(t')(x') = 1.

This explains the interpretation of logophoric elements. To account for the distribution of exempt anaphors, Charnavel further assumes that such anaphors are in fact not exempt from Condition A, but locally bound by the silent logophoric pronoun. That's why logophoricity and exemption correlate. Leaving empathy aside for now (see section 3.3 for discussion), we can similarly hypothesize that FID passages are complements of a covert logophoric operator log-

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[26] Given that the attitudinal operator we posit for FID only gives rise to semantic (vs. syntactic) embedding, the argument based on imperatives and vocatives nevertheless forces us to commit to an analysis of the incompatibility of vocatives and imperatives in ID that exploits the properties of semantic (vs. syntactic) embedding. Put it differently, the unacceptability of imperatives and vocatives in FID provides an argument for semantic vs. syntactic analysis of their incompatibility with ID.

FID taking a silent subject *pro*, whose reference is determined on the basis of various discourse and syntactico-semantic factors. This explains why FID can contain exempt anaphors – if they refer to the FID protagonist – as in (51) represented in (137).

(137) [pro$_i$ log-FID [*That was one of the bonds between Sally and* <u>*himself*</u>$_i$.]

Under the log-FID hypothesis, *himself* is here acceptable because it is locally bound by the subject *pro* of the log-FID operator (as required by Condition A; see some further discussion in section 3.3). This is possible only because *himself* refers to the FID protagonist, to which the subject of the covert logophoric operator must refer. As we saw in section 2, no existing analysis can otherwise derive this fact.

Furthermore, Charnavel's logophoric operator forces *de se* readings (cf. Anand 2006) and *de dicto* readings in its scope to account for the perspectival homogeneity of logophoric domains (see e.g. (94)). However this is formalized (see Sharvit 2008 and Charnavel 2019a for implementations), assuming the presence of a log-FID scoping over FID passages thus accounts for why everything must be read *de dicto* in FID as discussed in sections 1.1.2 and 1.3.2.[27]

(138) Obligatory *de dicto* under log-FID: local binding of all world variables
pro log-FID -w_3 [λw_6 . . . XP- w_6 . . .] is well-formed
pro log-FID -w_3 [λw_6 . . . XP- $w_{(n \neq 6)}$ . . .] is ill-formed

Recall that under DD-based accounts, this requirement is accounted for by quotation or internal context dependency; but under these accounts, mechanisms must also be designed to account for the anchoring of tense and person pronouns to the narrator (i.e. unquotation or external context dependency), which, as we showed, are partly at odds with the *de dicto* requirement.

There are two further properties that we saw can be descriptively classified under *de dicto* requirements. First, we observed that pronominal gender and number judgments (for individuals different from the protagonist) must be attributed to the protagonist (see e.g. (16)). Under DD-based accounts, this must be stipulated as pronouns can generally depend on the external context. Under the log-FID hypothesis, however, this can follow from the independently motivated hypothesis that the operator imposes *de dicto* readings.[28] More formally, we can adapt Sharvit's 2008 hypothesis and assume that the logophoric operator quantifies over assignments.[29]

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[27] Sharvit (2008) relies on the hypothesis that her FID operator quantifies over context to derive this property, by assuming that world variables are indexicals that must shift. Under Charnavel's (2020) approach, world variables are always locally bound by local logophoric operators, and non *de dicto de re* readings in attitude contexts derive from the insertion of a logophoric operator anchored to the speaker in the relevant DPs; in this view, FID passages are characterized by the fact that no logophoric operator anchored to the speaker can occur within them; FID is thus a category, only descriptively, but not analytically.

[28] Conversely, the hypothesis makes a prediction for gender ascription in ID. While both gender judgments (by the attitude holder or by the speaker) are possible in ID in general (see (18)), only the attitude holder's judgment should be available in an attitude context containing a logophoric element such as an exempt anaphor. This seems correct:

(xv)   a. Mary$_i$ was getting angry at Robin$_k$, who she$_i$ wrongly believed to be a man. She$_i$ thought that {she$_k$/he$_k$} had destroyed the new pictures of her$_i$.
   b. Mary$_i$ was getting angry at Robin$_k$, who she$_i$ wrongly believed to be a man. She$_i$ thought that {#she$_k$/he$_k$} had destroyed the new pictures of herself$_i$.

[29] As discussed below, Sharvit's hypothesis crucially differs from us in that her FID operator also quantifies over contexts (and can't thus be assimilated to a logophoric operator). In her system, the variable assignment can thus be relativized to the (internal) context. As log-FID does not quantify over contexts, we instead relativize the assignment to the attitude holder's beliefs.

(139) *Revised semantics for the log-FID operator*:
for any world w, individual x, time t and function p from world-time-individual-assignment quadruples to truth values, $[\![\text{log-FID}]\!]^{c,\,g}$ (w)(p)(t)(x) = 1 iff for all world-time-individual-assignment quadruples <w', t', x', g'> compatible with x's mental state in w at t (where x' is the individual in w' that x identifies as himself), p(w')(t')(x')(g') = 1.

Given that a variable assignment reflects the beliefs of the speaker, the individuals in the range of the assignment must be acquainted with by the speaker. In the scope of log-FID, pronouns thus refer to individuals as identified by the protagonist; in particular, the gender presuppositions must be relativized to the protagonist's beliefs. Recall (from e.g. (16)) that the gender of pronouns referring to the protagonist is however evaluated by the narrator. This also follows from our hypothesis under Sharvit's 2008 assumption that *de se* pronouns (i.e. pronouns referring to the protagonist) are zero pronouns bound by the operator and inheriting the features of its subject (see previous section, e.g. (132)).
Second, we observed that reflexives cannot be bound *de re* in FID (see e.g. (55)c).

(140) a.   She$_i$ wanted [PRO$_i$ to hear <u>herself$_i$</u> sing again].
    b. *She$_i$ wanted [PRO$_i$ to hear <u>herself$_k$</u> sing again].
(141) a. *pro$_i$ log-FID [Ah! PRO$_i$ to hear herself$_i$ sing again!]
    b. *pro$_i$ log-FID [Ah! PRO$_i$ Ah! to hear herself$_k$ sing again!]

The ID in (55)b (as represented in (140)a) can be appropriate because the speaker may be responsible for the binding of *herself* by PRO; the attitude holder, however, cannot, as represented in (140)b because she is not aware of the coreference relation between herself and the woman on the radio. As suggested by Sportiche (2022), this observation can also be captured by assuming that assignment functions are relativized, and such *de re* binding is acceptable when the assignment function is anchored to the speaker. These assumptions coupled with the above hypothesis that the logophoric operator forces the assignment function to be anchored to the protagonist (i.e. be *de dicto*) correctly predict that the FID in (55)c is unacceptable: the representation in (141)a is inappropriate because the protagonist is not aware of the coreference relation, and the representation in (141)b is unacceptable because it violates condition A. Thus, the log-FID hypothesis allows us to motivate Sharvit's 2008 assumption that the FID operator quantifies over assignment functions; this property is not an idiosyncrasy of the FID operator, but derives from the property of logophoric operators to force *de dicto* readings generally, including with respect to (co)reference/valuation relations. Note that this relies on the idea that contrary to standard assumptions, (co)reference/valuation relations can be relativized to the attitude holder in attitude contexts in general, while they must in logophoric contexts (cf. Sportiche 2022).
Finally note that the log-FID hypothesis may provide a way to derive (vs. stipulate) Doron's generalization that in FID, the reference time must correspond to the protagonist's utterance/thought time, which accounts for aspectual restrictions. Recall example (123) including a past perfect:

(142) a. Antje <u>had bought</u> a dress.
    b. pro TNS$_i$^{past} log-FID λ$_i$[Antje TNS$_i$~~past~~ perfect-t$_i$ a dress].

As observed by Doron and Eckardt, the perfective aspect here implies that the event took place before the protagonist's thought time. Assuming Sharvit's treatment of tense, the past tense comes from feature deletion under binding: the log-FID operator takes a time argument that binds the tense variable. We can further assume that it also binds the reference time variable induced by the perfect.[30] In other words, Doron's generalization also derives from the property of the log-FID operator to impose *de dicto* readings universally.

In sum, the log-FID hypothesis allows us to derive simultaneously a set of properties that must be stipulated or remain unexplained under DD-based analyses using a mechanism (the logophoric operator) that is independently motivated. In other words, the hypothesis that FID is a kind of logophoric context explains why in FID, we observe an array of logophoric properties observed in logophoric contexts in general such as obligatory *de se* and *de dicto* readings. At the same time, it also accounts for why this set of properties is associated with another set of properties (anchoring of tense and person to the speaker), which are also attested in other logophoric contexts. On the contrary, this association is problematic under DD-based analyses.

Furthermore, the log-FID hypothesis makes predictions that seem to be borne out in the case of recursive embedding. Charnavel (2019a, 2020) argues that logophoric domains must be perspectivally homogeneous, in the sense that the whole domain must be evaluated by the same logophoric center. This predicts that in the case of double embedding, all elements must be anchored to the same protagonist. An example provided by Eckardt (2014: 58) confirms the prediction:

(143) Little Mr. Bowley pushed his way through the crowd. *Where for God's sake did all these unfortunate creatures come from?*

(Eckardt 2014: 58, adapted from Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*)

Under the recursive FID reading where (143) is part of Mrs. Dalloway's train of thought, the underlined evaluative expressions crucially give rise to only two interpretations: either both are anchored to Little Mr. Bowley, or they are both anchored to Mrs. Dalloway. A perspectival mix, where Mrs. Dalloway is responsible for the question, but Mr. Bowley is for the qualification *unfortunate*, or vice versa, is unavailable, according to Eckardt. This is predicted by our hypothesis:

(144) [pro_i log-FID [pro_k log-FID [Where for God's sake did all these unfortunate creatures come from?]]]

Under the log-FID hypothesis, the FID in (143) is outscoped by two logophoric operators taking Mrs. Dalloway and Mr. Bowley for subjects, respectively. As independently argued by Charnavel (2019a), the perspective of a logophoric domain outscoped by two different logophoric operators can be set to either perspective; however, it must crucially be perspectivally homogenous.[31] Thus, *where for God's sake* and *unfortunate* must both depend

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[30] This also derives the ban on *passé simple* in French FID, assuming as in Doron (1991) that the *passé simple* implies that the event happened before the reference time and the reference time overlaps with the utterance time. Contradiction ensues if both the reference time and the utterance time correspond to the protagonist's time (see fn. 9).

[31] Charnavel (2019a, 2020) shows that in some cases, the same proposition can incorporate two different perspectives, as in (xvi) where *her own* and *strange* can be anchored to Paul's daughter, and *horrible* and *herself* to Paul's granddaughter.

on the same operator, either the one expressing Mrs. Dalloway's perspective, or the one expressing Mr. Bowley's, but no mix is possible: only one operator can be active in a given domain.

In sum, the log-FID operator is a specific kind of attitudinal operator that imposes universal *de dicto* and *de se* readings in its scope, that is, it forces anchoring of all variables (pronouns, times, worlds) as well as the assignment function to the protagonist. Crucially, this kind of operator is independently motivated for logophoric contexts, and need not be assumed to be specifically designed for FID as is the case of Sharvit's 2008 operator, which achieves most of the same effects.

Another conspicuous difference with Sharvit's operator is that the log-FID operator does not quantify over contexts. Specifically, Sharvit's 2008 FID operator quantifies over context-assignment pairs. Furthermore, Sharvit adapts dual context dependency to her analysis to account for the difference between first and second person pronouns, which do not shift in FID, and adverbial indexicals, which always do according to Sharvit (and most of the previous literature). Specifically, the lexical entry of first and second person pronouns specifies that they must depend on the external context of evaluation, while adverbial indexicals like *tomorrow* depend on the internal context whenever it is available.[32] This aspect of Sharvit's account, which makes it hybrid (see Eckardt 2014: 194), seems to be the reason for its unpopularity (see criticisms in Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015, Reboul et al. 2016, i.a.), even if it is the only existing account able to derive (vs. stipulate) *de se* (and *de te*) readings, sequence of tense phenomena and gender/number pronominal judgments. The present account aims at improving on Sharvit's account, not only by independently motivating the FID operator (as a specific kind of logophoric operator), but also by abandoning dual context dependency.

As it stands, our account thus predicts all indexicals in FID to depend on the actual context of utterance, namely, the narrator's.[33] This straightforwardly predicts the correct interpretation of first and second person pronouns, which never shift (see section 1.2.1). Regarding adverbial indexicals, this also correctly predicts their distribution in FID occurring outside narration in conversational discourses, unlike all previous accounts: recall from section 1.3.2 that contrary to the predictions of all previous proposals, time and location indexicals must be anchored to

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(xvi)   [Paul's daughter]$_i$ explains that [$_{TP}$ pro$_i$ LOG [her$_i$ own daughter]$_k$'s <u>strange</u> diary relates [$_{DP}$ pro$_k$ LOG the media's <u>horrible</u> remarks about herself$_k$]. (Charnavel 2019a: 225)

This does not question the logophoric homogeneity hypothesis, but derives from the hypothesis that a logophoric operator can be inserted within a clause under the appropriate semantico-pragmatic conditions. Here, the expressions *diary* and *relate* introduce Paul's granddaughter's perspective (expressed as the content of the diary). This is compatible with Charnavel's hypothesis, under which a logophoric domain need not correspond to a full clause, but can be smaller; in fact, it must correspond to spell-out domains (basically TPs or other phrases with subject), which explains the behavior of apparently exempt anaphors. See further discussion about the consequences of this hypothesis for FID in section 3.3.

[32] As observed by Anand (2006) (cf. Deal 2020), indexical shift in ID respects an implicational hierarchy according to which if first and second person pronouns shift in a language, then adverbial indexicals do too (while the reverse does not hold). According to them, this justifies positing operators that only shift the speaker and addressee coordinates, but not operators that only shift time and location coordinates. That's probably why Sharvit cannot simply assume that the FID operator shifts the time and location coordinates, but needs a hybrid account relying on both a shifting operator and a modification of the lexical entries of indexicals requiring dual context dependency.

[33] Except for first or second person pronouns representing the protagonist (see section 1.2.1). In this case, they undergo binding (and thus feature deletion, under Sharvit's approach adopted here) like any *de se* pronoun (see Sharvit 2008: 390).

the narrator when the narrator is a regular speaker involved in a conversation with a specific addressee at a specific time and location as in (104) repeated below in English.

(145) X called me three days ago to explain the reasons for his absence: *he had {*yesterday/ the day before} contracted a bad cold*.

The unacceptability of *yesterday* is explained by the hypothesis that it must be anchored to the narrator's time, which makes the discourse incoherent. This directly follows from the log-FID hypothesis, given that indexicals do not shift under logophoric operators in general (see Charnavel 2020: 698, fn. 34).

However, the log-FID hypothesis seems to be challenged by the well-known observation – often considered to be a hallmark of FID and motivating DD-based analyses – that adverbial indexicals are anchored to the protagonist in narrative FID as discussed in section 1.1.2 and illustrated in (14) repeated below in English.

(146) *Down his horse, he was walking [...] and he was smiling, strangely and princely, certain of a victory. Twice, <u>yesterday</u> and <u>the day before</u>, he had been a coward, he hadn't dared. <u>Today</u>, on this first-of-May day, he would dare and she would love him.*

Here, all adverbial indexicals are clearly anchored to the protagonist (Solal). But given that our log-FID operator does not quantify over contexts, they should depend on the actual utterance, namely the narrator's.

To account for this fact, I'd like to appeal to the specificities of the narrative context in which the FID is inserted. (146) corresponds to the beginning of Cohen's novel *Belle du Seigneur*. As often happens in fictions, no clue is given about the narrator and her circumstances, so that the context of narration remains unspecified (i.e. it is a set of possible contexts as discussed in Eckardt 2020, 2021). The intuitive idea I would like to pursue here is that in the absence of a well-defined actual context of utterance, the reader interprets the indexicals with respect to a context that is identifiable, namely that of the protagonist.

More precisely, fictive contexts can be treated as intended contexts of interpretation as in Predelli (1998a-b). Predelli (1998a-b) argues that in cases where the addressee is not in presence of the speaker, but receives the message later, the relevant context for interpreting indexicals need not be the actual context of utterance, but can be a context in which the speaker intends the addressee to interpret the message (henceforth, the intended context of interpretation). For instance, *I am not here now* heard from a recording machine is not incoherent because the context in which the speaker intends the sentence to be interpreted is not the context in which she actually uttered the sentence, but the context in which she intends the sentence to be heard. To be more concrete, imagine that I wrote a note when I was at home saying *I am not here now* and later put it on my office's door just before going on holidays. The note is interpretable if the indexicals are relativized to the intended context of interpretation (i.e. the office during the holidays), not the actual context of utterance (i.e. home before the holidays): *I* refers to the author of the message (even if she wrote the note in the past, before the message is decoded), *here* denotes the location of the intended context of decoding (i.e. the office) and *now* the time of the intended context of decoding (i.e. any time during the holidays). For the message to be felicitous, the reader of the note must recognize and accept that the note has been intended to be interpreted at those time and place. In other words, Predelli assumes the existence of

improper contexts, in which it may not be the case that the time coordinate is the actual time of utterance and the location coordinate the actual location of utterance.

Similarly, we can treat fictive contexts as improper contexts, i.e. assume that in fictions, indexicals can also be interpreted with respect to an intended context of utterance, whose parameters can correspond to coordinates of the story. Predelli (1998a) explicitly makes this hypothesis and illustrates it with (147)-(148).

(147) It is 1796. Napoleon, <u>now</u> commander of the French troops defeats the Sardinian
        forces and turns against Austria   (Predelli 1998a: 112)
(148) <u>Here</u>, to the sheltered columned coolness, Ramanujan would come. <u>Here</u>, away
        from the family, protected from the high hot sun outside, he would sometimes fall
        asleep ....   (Predelli 1998a: 113 from Kanigel 1991: 29-30)

We observe that (147) involves the historical present, which may be argued to involve some kind of shifting or bicontextual dependency (see Schlenker 2004, Anand & Toosarvandani 2017, i.a.), but crucially, the presence of the historical present is not necessary to license the indexical *now* here as observed by Recanati (2004): see (95). Moreover, both examples include *now* and *here*, which we mentioned in section 1.3.2 seem special in exhibiting non-indexical uses. But the present proposal is to suggest that *now* and *here* are in fact no exception *per se*: all indexicals can in principle have some apparently non-indexical uses in discourses allowing the use of an intended context of interpretation, which include FID. The reason why *now* and *here* seem more liberal than other indexicals is that the apparently non-indexical uses they can have arise from a combination of factors, some of which are less easily compatible with other indexicals than *now* or *here* (or *today*). Unlike previous proposals, we thus argue that *now* and *here* are not lexically specific as compared to other indexicals, and FID and other narrative contexts are not semantically different with respect to the licensing of indexicals.

Specifically, Anand & Toosarvandani (2019) argue that the apparently non-indexical uses of *now* should not motivate the positing of a different lexical entry (as in e.g. Altshuler 2016); but first, *now* can be relativized to a temporal perspectival point different from the utterance time (cf. Kamp & Reyle 1993, Recanati 2004, Lee 2017); second, the pragmatics of contrastive topic that is relevant to instances of *now* in some positions (i.e. in initial vs. final position as in (149)) license forward-shifted interpretations.

(149) a. People began to leave. <u>Now</u>, the room was empty.
        b. People began to leave. #The room was empty <u>now</u>.

Regarding the former point, Anand & Toosarvandani (2019) argue that *here* can be interpreted with respect to a time of assessment, and that the time of assessment can be distinct from the time of utterance in some cases: in the case of historical present for pragmatic reasons (see Anand & Toosarvandani 2017, 2018) and in FID for semantic reasons (due to Sharvit's 2008 FID shifting operator).[34] But we saw that *now, here* or *today* can have apparently non-indexical

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[34] The possible dissociation of the anchoring time from utterance context could suggest a logophoric interpretation of *now* (where it denotes the time of the perspective center). But *now* is in fact not always compatible with logophoric interpretations (cf. Charnavel 2020: 698, fn. 34), as shown by Recanati's following example:

(xvii)   When I <u>came</u> back to Rome after my six-month stay in Tokyo, I greatly enjoyed the food one could
          find {*<u>here</u>/there}.   (Recanati 2004: 20, attributed to Philippe Schlenker p.c.)

Come implies that the goal of motion is associated with a logophoric center (see Charnavel 2018, 2019a: 200-201); but in (xvii), Rome cannot corefer with *here*, thus showing that *here* is not logophoric.

uses outside cases of historical present and FID (see e.g. (95)-(97), (148)), and a logophoric operator does not shift contexts. For these reasons, I instead hypothesize that *now*, *here* or *today*, like any other indexical, are relativized to the context of utterance, but as mentioned above, the context of utterance can be treated as an intended context of interpretation in appropriate pragmatic conditions as suggested by Predelli (1998a-b). The specifics of these conditions remain to be determined, but crucially, they require the actual utterer to be remote from the situation in which the sentence is interpreted – as in narration.[35] This explains why examples like (106) repeated in (150) are incoherent: *yesterday night* cannot be anchored to the protagonist's time (time of the reported context), because the speaker's time (reporting time) is well-defined (see *last morning*, *I*).

(150) #Oh how extraordinarily nice <u>I</u> was <u>yesterday night</u>, she told my father <u>last morning</u>, without realizing that I was listening to the conversation. (Giorgi 2010: 193)

Furthermore, the latter point of Anand & Toosarvandani's (2019) explanation of the apparently non-indexical uses of *now* (i.e. independent constraints on discourse interpretation relying on contrastive topic) suggests an explanation for why apparently non-indexical uses outside FID are more often observed for *now*, *here* and *today* than for more complex indexicals like *tomorrow* or *yesterday*: the latter indexicals are less amenable to the relevant contrastive uses.

A full account of the apparently non-indexical uses of adverbial indexicals would lead me too far afield. But to wrap up, the crucial point for the current proposal is that under appropriate pragmatic conditions, sentences are not interpreted with respect to the actual context of utterance, but to an intended context of interpretation, esp. when the actual circumstances of utterance are clearly not relevant or available, as in narrative contexts where the narrator is not situated in a clear context of utterance; then, the temporal and locative coordinates of the story can be treated as parameters of the context. In these conditions, indexicals – including *now* and *here* – are relativized to this intended context of interpretation, and adverbial indexicals can thus seem non-indexical. In FID, this implies that the apparent shift of adverbial indexicals is neither due to the semantics of the log-FID operator (as argued in Sharvit 2004 or Anand & Toosarvandani 2019), nor to bicontextual dependency.

Note that Schlenker (2004: 282) explicitly distinguishes his account from one relying on improper contexts, even if he accepts the existence of improper contexts (see fn. 24). Instead of positing an improper context in which the relation between the parameters is less strict than in Kaplan's contexts, Schlenker distinguishes between a context of thought and a context of utterance, as we saw in section 2.1.1. This makes available a double set of context coordinates. But interestingly, only a subset of those is actually accessible for indexicals in FID: speaker and addressee of the context of utterance, time and location of the context of thought. As we saw, this is difficult to motivate (Schlenker's hypothesis based on presuppositions is problematic on several grounds reviewed in section 2.1.1; Eckardt simply stipulates it in lexical entries). The improper context hypothesis, on the contrary, only makes available the coordinates effectively used for indexicals.

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[35] This may suggest an explanation for why indexicals in FID are not found before the nineteenth century, as mentioned in fn. 19. It relies on the idea that the narration before the nineteenth century does not meet the pragmatic conditions licensing the replacement of the actual context of utterance with an intended context of interpretation, i.e. the narrator is not appropriately remote from the context of interpretation.

Finally note that so far, we have only examined examples of improper contexts where only the time and location coordinates do not correspond to coordinates of the actual context of utterance. What about the author coordinate? It seems that the improper context hypothesis, unlike bicontextual accounts, implies that it need not refer to the actual utterer. In fact, Predelli (1998b) provides an example of improper context in which the agent coordinate is not the actual author of the utterance in (151). The sentence is uttered by a lecturer commenting on the *Nicomachean Ethics* in an introductory class.

(151) I argued at length that one lives the best life by exercising both moral and intellectual virtues. And now I am suddenly advocating a rather different position, namely that the good life must be devoted solely to theoretical activity. Do you see a way out of this apparent inconsistency?

Here, the first-person pronoun is used to refer to Aristotle rather than to the lecturer, who is temporarily pretending to be in Aristotle's shoes. Is this case attested in FID? At first glance, this does not seem to be the case since we claimed that first person pronouns must always depend on the context of utterance (see e.g. section 1.2.1.). But crucially, this claim relies on the assumption that the author of the context of utterance is the narrator, which is widely adopted in linguistic articles. As often acknowledged too (see e.g. Abrusán 2021: 861, fn. 29), this assumption is too simplistic though, and glosses over the difference between the author and the narrator, which is well-studied in literary studies. In the sense of Kaplan, the author of the actual context of utterance must be the actual author of the fiction, and the narrator is not a proper context agent since a narrator is not situated in a specific context of utterance, but her context must rather be conceived as a set of possible contexts (cf. Eckardt 2019, 2020, Abrusán 2021: 855, fn. 23). It seems to me that this tension can be resolved if we hypothesize that the narrator is the author of an intended context of interpretation in Predelli's sense. For example, the author in (151) would then correspond to the lecturer, and the narrator to Aristotle. First person fictive narrations can thus be treated as involving an improper context where all coordinates correspond to intended parameters of interpretation, and as we saw, such narrations can include FID.[36] As these coordinates need not – or sometimes, as we saw, should not –

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[36] We similarly expect a second person pronoun to be able to refer to the addressee of an intended context of interpretation. The case seems less clear than that of the other coordinates, perhaps because an addressee is by nature an intended addressee: the utterer of a message intends it for a specific addressee or audience. Predelli (1998a) nevertheless provides examples of intended addressees in (xviii) and (xix):

(xviii)   [recording machine] You have reached 123-4567. Please leave a message after the beep.

(xix)   [uttered by an exam proctor] You have by now finished writing your name at the top of every sheet.

You here refers to the addressee of an intended context of interpretation rather than an actual addressee in the sense that the actual addressee is a plurality (all potential callers, all students), while the sentence is meant to be interpreted with respect to each individual context containing only one caller or one student as addressee.

In fiction, this case corresponds to cases where the (individual) reader is referred to by *you*. The case is quite rare as it implies that the intended reader is involved in the narrative, which put strong constraints on the narrative and creates specific effects (note that while the narrator – never fully specified in a story – is less specified than the author – an actual individual, the intended reader is more specified – through details of the story – than the actual readers, which can be anybody). This has been exploited in second person narrations (famously in Butor's *Second thoughts* – French *La Modification*, for example).

In section 1.2.1., all our examples with second person pronouns in FID exhibit FID occurring in conversational contexts and thus involve addressees of actual contexts of utterance. But as noted by Fludernik (1993: 81-82), FID also occurs in second person narratives as illustrated in (xx).

correspond to those of the context of the protagonist, they should not depend on the mechanism responsible for FID as correctly predicted by our log-FID operator hypothesis.

3.3 Open questions and crosslinguistic implications

In sum, I have argued that our log-FID hypothesis coupled with the improper context hypothesis can correctly predict the empirical properties of FID in languages like English, French, German, Italian or Hebrew. Furthermore, it makes specific predictions for other languages. First, it predicts that in languages with logophoric pronouns, the protagonist in FID can (or perhaps should) be referred to by a logophoric pronoun (contrary to Schlenker's explicit predictions, see fn. 23). This seems to be borne out, at least in Ewe. The literature on logophoric pronouns does not mention FID, but reports instances of discourses where the logophoric pronoun occurs in unembedded sentences after an attitude report has been introduced (see Clements 1975, Koopman & Sportiche 1989, Adesola 2005, Pearson 2015, i.a.). This is illustrated in (152)-(153) in Ewe.

(152) Kofi koudrin be   yè bidzi. *Marie zu   yè.*
Kofi dream   COMPL LOG angry Mary   insult LOG
'Kofi$_i$ dreamed that he$_i$ was angry. *Mary insulted him$_i$.*'   (Pearson 2015: 96)

(153) Wo ame   etɔ̃a woɖui veviɛ̃   be yèwoaɖe   dyinua tɔa me.
the three of them they   planned firmly that LOG would take out the moon from the water .
Ne   yèwoɖii tɔa me ko a,   yèwoakɔe   wòanɔ yewo ŋutɔ yèwo si,
When LOG had taken it out of the water. LOG would lift it (so that) it would be LOG's,
ale be wòanɔ ɖiɖim   na yèwo ɣesiaɣi le zã me. Ne zã do ko a, dyinu
so that it would be shining for LOG   always   in the night . When night fell,   the moon
ɖiɖim   na yèwo, ke vivityi mega dodoge   na yèwo ɣeaɖekeɣi o.
would be shining for LOG,   and darkness would not come again for LOG   ever .
'The three of them$_i$ resolved that they$_i$ would take the moon out of the water. When they$_i$ had taken it out of the water, they$_i$ would lift it up so that it would be theirs$_i$, so that it would be shining for them$_i$ always in the night. When night came, the moon would be shining for them$_i$, and darkness would never again fall on them$_i$.'

(Clements 1975: 170-171)

The second sentence in (150) is syntactically not embedded under the attitude verb *dream* and the complementizer *be*. But as noted by Pearson, it is semantically embedded as it implies that the insult took place in the dream.[37] This seems to correspond to FID, and crucially the logophoric pronoun *yè* is used to refer to the dreamer. (153) is an excerpt from an oral retelling of the tale "the Monkeys and the Moon". Again, the logophoric pronoun referring to the protagonist (the three monkeys) occurs throughout the discourse, even if only the first sentence includes an attitude verb; furthermore, the whole discourse is understood under the scope of this attitude verb. I leave for further investigation a more careful examination of FID in languages with logophoric pronouns, but these examples are promising with respect to our hypothesis.

(xx)   Sunlight. A morning. *Where the hell are your sunglasses?* You hate mornings—anger rises in you, bubbling like something sour in your throat—but you grin into the morning because somebody is approaching you, shouting a magic word. Your name.   ['*You*', Oates] (Fludernik 1993: 82)

In sum, the predictions of our hypothesis are also borne out with second person pronouns.
[37] Pearson (2015: 96) reports another possible interpretation according to which the discourse reports Kofi describing the dream to Mary. The same point holds under this interpretation. The difference is the type of attitude embedding the FID (dreaming or describing a dream, which seems to imply double embedding (*say* + *dream*).

Second, the log-FID hypothesis makes a clear prediction for languages with indexical shift, as mentioned by Sharvit (2008: 358-359). Given that the log-FID hypothesis (like Sharvit's hypothesis) likens FID to ID, it predicts that person indexicals should be shiftable in FID, i.e. the protagonist could (or should, depending on the shifting properties of the language) be referred to using a first person pronoun (and her addressee a second person pronoun). The relevant data are not accessible yet, but future research should determine whether the prediction is borne out.

I also leave for further research the investigation of some issues that remain open under this (and other) proposal(s). First, the constraints on the distribution of parentheticals in FID remain to be specified. As noted by Sharvit (2008: 392-393), parentheticals do not license negation (e.g. (154)), license *only* only in certains conditions (e.g. (155)a vs. (155)b), but license modals (e.g. (156)). In those respects, FID contrasts with ID and DD, which both license all these options.

(154) a. #*She was pregnant*, Mary did<u>n't</u> say.
       b.# *She was pregnant*. Mary did<u>n't</u> say that.
(155) a. #*She was pregnant*, <u>only</u> Mary said.
       b. *She was pregnant*. <u>Only</u> Mary said that.
(156) a. *Yes, she was pregnant*, Mary <u>may</u> have said.
       b. *Yes, she was pregnant*. Mary <u>may</u> have said that.

As noted by Giorgi (2010: 205-209), the parenthetical also obeys some constraints of insertion: generally, it occurs in post-sentential position or after a topic (i.e. as given information with respect to the protagonist's context).

(157) *Sarebbe partita domani*, <u>pensò</u>.
       'She would leave tomorrow, <u>she thought</u>.'   (Giorgi 2010: 205)
(158) *Domani*, <u>pensò</u>, *Gianni sarebbe partito*.
       'Tomorrow, <u>she thought</u>, Gianni would leave.'   (Giorgi 2010: 206)

Under our hypothesis, we also need to understand how the parenthetical relates to the logophoric operator, which it seems to double.

Second, our hypothesis crucially relies on the idea that the same kind of operator is used in FID and in logophoric contexts, thus making FID a kind of logophoric context. But besides the differences due to syntactic (un)embedding (including the (im)possible presence of a parenthetical), which I have argued are independent of the presence of the operator, there seems to be a difference pertaining to the size of the logophoric domain. While logophoric operators are often assumed to scope over the whole proposition (they take a CP as argument, see e.g. Koopman & Sportiche 1989, Anand 2006), Charnavel (2019a, 2020), which I here adopt, argues that logophoric domains can be smaller than CP, and include different types of spell-out domains (TP or any other XP with subject); this explains why apparently exempt anaphors are licensed in logophoric contexts: they are locally bound by the subject of the logophoric operator, which is contained in the same spell-out domain (which Charnavel argues is the relevant locality domain for Condition A, see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016). The question raised by the extension of this hypothesis to FID bears on the fact that FID seems to systematically consist of full sentences. The facts can be derived under the logophoric operator hypothesis: it suffices to assume that the log-FID operator usually sits above TP, and that – as Charnavel assumes – covalued logophoric operators can appear in the smaller domains of the same sentence (as can

be revealed e.g. if an exempt anaphor is contained within a DP with subject). But the question arises as to why we do not seem to find instances of FID covering smaller domains than full sentences. One approach to address this question is to assume that we do in fact observe such instances. Charnavel (2020: 688) in fact suggests that the logophoric contexts she examines could be conceived as embedded FID. One potential problem with this hypothesis is that adverbial indexicals are evaluated with respect to the speaker's context in these smaller logophoric contexts, while they can be evaluated with respect to the protagonist's context in FID as we discussed at length. But the solution we proposed for explaining this fact in FID (the use of improper contexts) also provides a solution for this apparent problem, as an improper context must be relevant for a full proposition. Another, compatible, approach to address the question is to derive the difference in domain size between FID and other logophoric contexts from the syntactic difference between them: as we saw, FID is syntactically unembedded, while logophoric ID is syntactically embedded. Positing a log-FID operator within a smaller domain (say, a DP) within an unembedded sentence would imply that this domain is uniformly evaluated by the protagonist while the rest of the sentence is uniformly evaluated by the speaker. This is not impossible (and some instances of mixed quotation could be reexamined under that light,[38] see also examples in Harris & Potts 2009), but imposes strong pragmatic conditions that could explain their rarity.

Finally, the log-FID hypothesis raises a question regarding the apparent restriction of FID to attitude contexts. FID standardly expresses represented speech or thought and thus corresponds to attitude contexts. Although logophoricity is sometimes assumed to also be restricted to attitude contexts (see e.g. Schlenker 1999), Charnavel (2019a, 2020) argues that it encompasses all types of mental perspective, including some non-attitude contexts (cf. Sells 1987, Oshima 2006, i.a.). Specifically, Charnavel proposes that logophoric contexts can be divided into two types of perspectival contexts, attitude and empathy, and the logophoric operator is unspecified with respect to the type of perspective it encodes, which is determined by a mixture of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic factors. Under the log-FID hypothesis, we thus expect to find instances of FID that correspond to empathy contexts. In the remaining of this article, I want to suggest that this is indeed the case, and these instances have been examined under different names such as Protagonist Projection (see (3)).

Inspired by the literature on Japanese (see esp. Kuroda 1973, Kuno & Kaburaki 1977), Charnavel (2019a, 2020) defines an empathy locus as a perceptual center of perspective, i.e. an event participant that the speaker identifies with from a sensory or emotional perspective: according to Charnavel (2019a: 166), "under empathic conditions, the speaker puts herself in the empathy locus's shoes to report his first-personal perception". While attitude contexts report beliefs subject to errors, empathy contexts report (potentially unconscious) experience immune to errors. Empathy loci can be diagnosed by specific lexical items, such as Japanese sensation adjectives (such as 'be cold' which express an inherently first-personal sensation; see Kuroda 1973), Japanese giving verbs (implying that the event is described as experienced by the giver or by the receiver or from the outside, depending on the choice of verb; see e.g. Kuno &

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[38] To decide between both types of hypotheses, it will be crucial to make progress on what the facts are exactly about faithfulness of the message in DD and FID and on how to capture them (in particular, we saw in section 1.2.4 that there is in fact no verbatim requirement neither in DD nor in FID, but that DD seems to require more faithfulness than FID).

Kaburaki 1977) or *son cher* in French ('her dear', expressing an evaluation that can only be made by the individual experiencing the feeling; see Charnavel 2019a, 2020). Thus, Charnavel (2019a, 2020) argues that exempt anaphors like *son propre* or *lui-même* in (159)a-b are licensed in spite of occurring in non-attitude contexts, because they are in empathy contexts, as can be diagnosed by the acceptability of coreferring *son cher*: they can thus be locally bound by the empathy center (represented by a logophoric pronoun subject of a logophoric operator).

(159) a. Le courage de Paul$_i$ a [$_{VP}$ pro$_{log-i}$ sauvé des flammes {sa$_i$ propre /sa$_i$ chère} maison et celle de ses voisins].
       'Paul$_i$'s courage [$_{VP}$ pro$_{log-i}$ saved from the fire {his$_i$ own/his$_i$ dear} house and his neighbors'].'
       b. Emile$_i$ mérite que Sophie pense [$_{VP}$ pro$_{log-i}$ à {lui$_i$-même/sa$_i$ chère fille} et à sa famille.]
       'Emile$_i$ deserves Sophie [$_{VP}$ pro$_{log-i}$ thinking about {himself$_i$ /his dear daughter} and his family].'

Empathy as defined by Charnavel (2019a, 2020) bears a striking resemblance to the lesser known cousin of FID described under the names of represented perception (Brinton 1980), non-reflective consciousness (Banfield 1982, Kuroda 1973), narrative perception (Fludernik 1993), viewpoint shift (Hinterwimmer 2017), or Protagonist Projection (PP), which I will henceforth adopt (Holton 1997, Stokke 2013, Abrusán 2021). As summarized by Abrusán (2021), examples of PP such as (3) or (160) describe the non-reflective mental states of a protagonist such as perceptions, emotions or non-verbal beliefs that do not require to be put in a linguistic form.

(160) When Mary stepped out of the boat, *the ground was shaking beneath her feet* for a couple of seconds.   (Abrusán 2021: 845)

Rather than describing a conscious thought, the italicized passage in (160) seems to capture a perception or sensation as experienced by Mary, and that in (3) represents the perception of the character as she looks out the window of the train. According to Abrusán (2021), PP, like FID, is an instance of a more general category of perspective shift. The differences between PP and FID are the following: PP is not a report of thoughts or speech, but a report of pre-linguistic mental states; PP, unlike FID, can be embedded (see (160)); PP does not license the evaluation of adverbial indexicals with respect to the protagonist's context (see (161)[39]).

(161) A week ago, Ann was pacing around after coming home from the jeweller, disappointed and angry with John. *{#Yesterday/the day before} he gave her a ring studded with diamonds*, but they turned out to be glass.
                                                     (Abrusán 2021: 858 citing Stokke 2013)

According to Abrusán (2021), the first two properties derive from the pragmatic licensing of PP realized by rules yielding an update of the story with what the character feels and perceives (vs. thinks or says in FID); and speech or thought acts are root level phenomena. The latter property,

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[39] The perception described in (161) is subject to errors (the ring is in fact not studded with diamonds but with glass) and thus rather corresponds to attitude than empathy under Charnavel's approach. This is the case of all examples involving what Abrusán (2021) calls implicit belief. Due to space limitations, I must leave a more systematic comparison between empathy and protagonist projection for further research, but ultimately, crucially note that this does not really matter for our analysis, since attitude and empathy (or FID and PP) are analyzed uniformly. Our approach is thus compatible with the idea of a spectrum of perspective shift as argued by Abrusán (2021).

she argues, comes from a lexical presupposition of adverbial indexicals that require them to be used in a speech act: in other words, the use of temporal adverbs such as *yesterday* presupposes a reflective mental state that is linguistically explicit.[40]

Although Abrusán couches her analysis in terms of Eckardt's bicontextual account, her observations can directly be captured by our logophoric approach: PP corresponds to empathy, and perspective shift to logophoricity. PP and FID can thus be uniformly captured by the log-FID hypothesis, which relies on the presence of an unspecified logophoric operator. As in Abrusán (2021), the difference between empathy (PP) and attitude (FID) comes from a combination of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic factors that determine the type of perspective realized by the operator. As in Abrusán (2021), and as suggested above, the difference in domain size comes from the syntactico-pragmatic constraints imposed by the type of perspective. Finally, Abrusán's (2021) explanation regarding the unshiftability of adverbial indexicals in PP is compatible with our logophoric account: as discussed above, the log-FID operator does not yield context shift; the apparence of shift in some cases merely comes from the availability of improper contexts in some narrative contexts which happen to license FID. If we assume, like Abrusán (2021), that adverbial indexicals require linguistic consciousness, it follows that they cannot be evaluated with respect to an improper context corresponding to the protagonist's context in PP. In fact, we independently know that adverbial indexicals do not shift in empathy contexts.

In sum, the existence of PP provides an additional argument for our log-FID hypothesis, as it instantiates the empathy counterpart of FID, which is expected to be attested given that under the hypothesis adopted here, logophoricity encompasses both empathy and attitude.

4   Conclusion

This article has made a case for a logophoric analysis of FID. The hypothesis that FID passages are under the scope of a logophoric operator straightforwardly accounts for several properties that remain unexplained under bicontextual or quotation analyses: most strikingly, the licensing of logophoric elements and the ban on antilogophoric elements in FID, as well as the acceptability of recursive FID. Instead of being conceived as an idiosyncrasy, FID is thereby classified under an independently motivated linguistic category, and can be treated uniformly with other similar phenomena such as logophoric contexts or Protagonist Projection. Literary effects derive from the exploitation of this linguistic mechanism licensing the expression of various perspectives in a constrained way.

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[40] This hypothesis may further explain the difference in behavior between indexicals that seem to have non-indexical uses (e.g. *now*, *here*) and those that don't (e.g. *tomorrow*, *yesterday*) discussed in section 3.2, assuming that only the latter require a linguistically explicit, reflective mental state.

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