
Gestural Presuppositions*

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For Ebert_and_Ebert_2014, co-speech gestures contribute supplementary meanings, analyzed as 'appositive impositions' (AnderBois_et_al._to_appear). Thus (1)a is analyzed as in (1)b-c, with p corresponding to at-issue and p^* to non-at-issue proposals (the gesture co-occurs with the bracketed constituent). We suggest that some gestural enrichments are better analyzed as presuppositions.



[a bottle of water] to the talk.

b. At-issue: the speaker brought a bottle of water to the talk

Non-at-issue: the bottle is big

c. $\exists z \land z = \lceil x \rceil \land \exists x \land bottle_p(x) \land SIM_{p*}(x, z) \land bottle_{p*}(z) \land bring_p(speaker, x)$

Appositives are highly restricted in downward-monotonic environments, but gestural enrichments aren't, as shown by (2)a-(3)a-(3)a, which contrast with (2)b-(3)b-(4)b (experimental data would be needed to establish the facts rigorously). Furthermore, in these environments gestural enrichments project like presuppositions: they 'project out' of conditionals/modals, and yield universal inferences under no_NP (Chemla_2009). We suggest that they are presuppositions that can be justified on the basis of the clause or predicate they attach to; underlining gestural presuppositions, (2)a/(3)a have the LFs if $p \land p'$, $q/unlikely p \land p$, and both yield the presupposition $p \Rightarrow p'$; while (4)a has the LF $f(Q \land Q')$ and yields $f(Q \Rightarrow Q')$.

- (2) a. If the session chairman brings **[a bottle of beer]**, I'll feel free to bring one too.
 - => if the session chairman brings a bottle of beer, it will be a small one.
 - b. ? If the session chairman brings a bottle of beer, which is **[this]** large, I'll feel free to bring one too.
- (3) a. It's unlikely that the next speaker will bring **a bottle of beer** to his talk. =>? if the session chairman brings a bottle of beer, it will be a large one

 - b. #It's unlikely that the next speaker will bring a bottle of beer, which is [this] large
- (4) a. No philosopher brought **a bottle of beer**] to the workshop.
 - =>? when a philosopher brings a bottle of beer, it is usually a large one
 - b. #No philosopher brought a bottle of beer, which is **[this]** large.

Potts_2005 argues that supplements cannot contain bound elements. But gestural enrichments can—just like presupposition triggers.

- (5) a. No philosopher brought [his bottle of beer] to the workshop.
 - =>? each philosopher had a large bottle of beer
 - b. No philosopher brought **[a beer he liked]** to the workshop.
 - =>? each philosopher likes the kind of beer that comes in large bottles

A supplement-based analysis could provide an account, but at a cost.

(i) It could posit that gestural supplements can come with a covert version of the indicative/counterfactual mood in (6); but without independent evidence, this is stipulative.

(6) a. If the session chairman brings a bottle of beer, which will be [this] large, I'll feel free to bring one too.

b. No philosopher brought a bottle of beer, which would have been [this] large.

(ii) Alternatively, it could posit that in (2)-(3)-(4) the supplement modifiers the bare NP rather than the entire indefinite; but it would still need to explain how the modified NPs in (5) can contain a bound element.

Finally, unlike presuppositions, supplements must be 'non-trivial' (Potts_2005). It is dubious that gestures must be too:

(7) a. Yesterday a philosopher bought [a bottle of beer]. I thought he'd drink it over dinner. But this morning, he brought [his bottle of beer] to the workshop!

b. Yesterday a philosopher bought a bottle of beer, which was [this large]. I thought he'd drink it over dinner.

But this morning he brought his bottle of beer, #which was [this large], to the workshop!

References

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