

LANGUAGE, MIND AND COMPUTATION (to appear in 2014). Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

*Précis:*

Mainstream theoretical linguistics has long maintained that linguistic representations are (internalized) mental representations, and operations on such representations by means of rule systems are computations. It is believed that this connects language to the human mind and computation. Beneath all this lie a number of deep-seated assumptions about the connection between language, mind and computation. *Language, Mind and Computation* aims to demonstrate that there does not exist any determinate, coherent and consistent way in which grammar can be both mental and intrinsically computational, or computations can be both mental and linguistic if grammars for natural languages are assumed to be mentally represented in a non-intentional manner. That is, if the mentally represented grammar is delinked from intentional processes of the human mind, this invites fiendishly deleterious and formidably recalcitrant paradoxes, puzzles and inconsistencies at points of contact of grammar, mind and computation. This book exposes these inconsistencies by re-examining a number of standard and familiar linguistic phenomena in English and other different languages. More perplexingly, the book demonstrates that the notion of interpretation applied to syntactic and semantic phenomena cannot be the notion of a frozen entity that comes attached to syntactic/semantic objects in that interpretation as a process of the mind creeps into everything syntactically and semantically constructed, and in virtue of this, interpretation cannot be both a form of (mental) computation outside of the architecture of grammar and a part of syntactic/semantic objects in linguistic constructions.