

Another Note on Number^{*}

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Cowper (2005) presents an intriguing theory of number features in which she suggests that plural is more marked than dual, contrary to perceived wisdom (Corbett, 2000). This claim has been rebutted by Nevins (2007). In this squib I revisit the debate on number with data from Onondaga (Iroquoian), which support Cowper's analysis of number. Doing so, I tease apart the notion of structural markedness and typological markedness. The results of this investigation show, as Cowper did, that plural is structurally more complex than plural; however, this does not imply that plural is typologically more marked than plural. Thus, the Nevins' arguments that dual is more typologically marked than plural still hold, even though plural is structurally more complex than dual. The broader implication here is that structural complexity and typological markedness are not necessarily correlated.

1 Introduction

In number systems around the world, it is commonly acknowledged that dual is more marked than plural (Corbett, 2000). As Nevins (2007) re-iterates from previous studies, dual is acquired later than plural, is more likely to be lost than plural, and is found in fewer languages than plural. Also, the existence of dual in a language entails the existence of plural. Despite the relative markedness of dual number over that of plural, we will explore an analysis of number in which plural number is represented by a more complex feature geometry than that of dual number (Cowper, 2005).


This squib examines these issues in light of dual number in Onondaga, a Northern Iroquoian language spoken in central North America near Niagara Falls. Onondaga is a

^{*} Acknowledgements added later.

polysynthetic language, closely related to Mohawk, with extensive subject and object agreement (Barrie, 2005, 2015, Lounsbury, 1949, Woodbury, 2003). As will be explained below, Onondaga has both dual and plural number and exhibits what Nevins (2007) calls *omnivorous number*, which means number agreement is found for either the subject or the object. When dual and plural compete, plural wins out and triggers plural agreement on the verb. To be precise, if one argument is dual and the other is plural, then plural agreement is found on the verb.

Once we examine the facts using the various models of number described below, we will see that number in Onondaga shows support for Cowper's model of number. This has implications for our understanding of markedness, which we take up in the final section.


The discussion below makes use of the notion of structured Probes (Béjar, 2003, Béjar & Rezac, 2009), and the lack of the necessity for Agree to succeed (Béjar, 2003, Béjar & Rezac, 2009, Preminger, 2014). Within standard Minimalist assumptions (Chomsky, 1995, 2000) a Probe has an unvalued and uninterpretable feature that must be valued by a Goal. Thus, the Probe may have an unvalued phi-feature set that is valued by the subject. A structured probe is more precise in what it searches out. Assume the following features for person (Harley & Ritter, 2002).¹



¹ Although this squib deals with number, the theory of Agree here is illustrated with person, since most of the literature deals with person agreement.

For instance, the Probe may look for only 1st or 2nd person by specifying the Probe as [π -participant], where the feature [participant] refers to the set of 1st and 2nd person. Thus, in such a situation, if the subject is 3rd person and the object is 1st person, then the Probe bypasses the subject and agrees with the object.

The core properties of Agree are illustrated here (Preminger, 2014). The Probe must find a matching Goal (a Goal with the same set of features) to Agree with. The Goal then values the Probe with its full set of features. Consider the following examples. The Probe (on the left) is specified [π -participant], and the Goals are on the right. Both subject and object are shown to illustrate how it is possible for either argument to value the Probe.



In (2)a, the Probe searches for [π -participant] (i.e., 2nd person). The subject does not have this feature set, so the Probe continues. It finds it on the object and successfully values the Probe as 2nd person. In (2)b, the Probe this time successfully finds the feature set on the subject, and the Probe stops searching. So far, this pattern gives rise to 2nd person agreement, regardless of

whether it is the subject or the object that is 2nd person. Next, in (2)c, the Probe again finds a matching feature set on the subject. The subject then copies its person features on to the Probe, and the Probe is valued for 1st person. Finally, in (2)d, the Probe fails to find a matching Goal, so the [participant] feature is deleted, leaving a bare [π] feature, which gives rise to 3rd person agreement. See Béjar (2003), Béjar & Rezac (2009), and Preminger (2014) for more details.

The gist of the analysis is as follows. A structured number Probe searches for a plural Goal to agree with. If it finds one, then plural agreement is found on the verb. If not, then dual agreement is possible, if there is a dual argument in the search domain. This entails that the features for dual are a subset of the features for plural, contrary to what is standardly assumed. This analysis crucially relies on Preminger's (2014) notion of failed agreement. That is, the Probe attempts to find a Goal to agree with, but if it doesn't find one, the derivation still proceeds.

The remainder of this squib is structured as follows. Section two presents the facts on number agreement in Onondaga. Section three presents current models of number focussing on feature geometric analyses. Section four analyzes the Onondaga data in light of the models presented in section three. Section five is a brief discussion and conclusion.

2 Number in Onondaga

We start with the description of number agreement in Onondaga. The following chart shows the observed number agreement for all possible 1st and 2nd person combinations. The top row indicates the number of the subject, and the left column indicates the number of the object. The interior cells, which are in italics and with the corresponding abbreviation, indicate the number agreement found on the verb. Two examples are given to illustrate.²

² The following abbreviations are used. du = dual, f = feminine, hab = habitual, m = masculine, pl = plural, prfv = perfective, sg = singular.

Table 1 Agreement with 1st and/or 2nd person arguments

object \ subject	singular	dual	plural
singular	<i>singular</i>		
dual		<i>dual</i> (du)	
plural			<i>plural</i> (pl)

(3) s-g-ni-gę-ha?

2-1-du-see-hab

‘I see you two.’ or ‘We two see you (sg).’ or ‘We two see you two.’

(4) s-g-wa-gę-ha?

2-1-pl-see-hab

‘I see you all.’ or ‘We two see you all.’ or ‘We all see you all.’

or ‘We all see you two.’ or ‘We all see you (sg).’

Descriptively, the pattern can be described as follows. If either the subject or the object is plural, then plural agreement is found. Otherwise, if either the subject or the object is dual, then dual number is found. Otherwise, no overt number agreement is found. As mentioned in the introduction, this pattern is referred to as omnivorous agreement. Crucially, the number agreement morpheme doesn’t care whether it agrees with the subject or the object.³ Note also that in the pattern shown above, plural trumps dual if both are present.

Moving on to 3rd person, the following chart shows number agreement with one 1st or 2nd person argument and one 3rd person singular masculine argument. The pattern here is rather

³ A reviewer asks what the function of number marking is, given that it references either the subject or the object. This is an excellent question for which I have no answer other than to note that this effect is not particular to Onondaga or even to Northern Iroquoian. It is found in a number of unrelated languages around the world.

straightforward. Either dual or plural agreement shows up, referencing the 1st or 2nd person argument, regardless of grammatical function. This pattern is not overly surprising given the pattern above. Again, two examples follow.

Table 2 Agreement with 1st or 2nd person against 3rd person singular masculine

	1 st or 2 nd singular	1 st or 2 nd dual	1 st or 2 nd plural
3 _{M.SG}	<i>singular</i>	<i>dual</i>	<i>plural</i>

(5) a. he-s-ni-gɛ-ha?

3_{M.SG}-2-du-see-hab

‘You two see him.’

b. s-he-s-wa-gɛ-ha?⁴

?-3_{M.SG}-2-pl-see-hab

‘He sees you all.’

The last set of data, however, introduces an additional complication. This table presents the agreement pattern when one argument is either 1st or 2nd person and the other is 3rd person feminine (singular or plural) or 3rd person plural (masculine or feminine). For convenience, this argument is labelled 3_{F/PL}, meaning 3rd person feminine or plural (or both).

Table 3 Agreement with 1st or 2nd person with 3rd person feminine and/or plural

1 st or 2 nd π	3 _{F/PL}
singular	<i>singular</i>
dual	<i>plural</i>
plural	

⁴ The function of the morpheme glossed ? here is unclear. In this example, it appears to be some kind of inverse marker, indicating a reversal in the grammatical relationship between 3rd person and 2nd person, but it doesn’t appear elsewhere in the paradigm.

- (6) a. k-he-gę-ha?
 1-3_{F/PL}-see-hab
 ‘I see her.’ or ‘I see them.’
- b. ye-c-hi-gę-ha?
 3_{F/PL}-2-pl-see-hab
 ‘You two/all see her/them.’ or ‘She/they see(s) you two/all.’

The most noteworthy observation here is that the distinction between dual and plural is neutralized when one of the arguments is 3_{F/PL}.

To conclude, we have the following number morphemes for Onondaga.

- (7) a. dual \Leftrightarrow ni-
 b. plural \Leftrightarrow wa-
 c. plural \Leftrightarrow hi- / __ 3_{F/PL}

3 Number Features

As mentioned in the introduction, phi-features are organized into feature geometries (Harley & Ritter, 2002). We examine here a series of proposals for the geometry of number features. The first is Harley and Ritter’s original proposal.

- (8) . Singular Plural Dual
- | | | |
|---|---------|-----------|
| # | # | # |
| | | |
| | [group] | [group] |
| | | |
| | | [minimal] |

This model proposes that the feature [group] forces a plural interpretation. The feature [minimal] is a dependent of [group] and forces a dual interpretation. This model captures the standardly

accepted notion that dual is more marked than plural, in that the typologically more marked category (dual) is structurally more complex.

Cowper (2005) proposes a radical departure from the usual set of features for number based on the constructed dual in Zuni (isolate) and Hopi (Uto-Aztecan). The constructed dual employs a combination of a singular form and a plural form to give rise to a dual meaning. To form the dual in Hopi and in Zuni, the plural form of the subject noun combines with the singular form of the verb. The following Hopi example illustrates the form (Corbett, 2000: 169).

- (9) puma wari
 that.pl run.prfv.sg
 ‘They two ran.’

Cowper proposes the following novel structures for number features in languages with dual and plural in (10)a, and languages with only plural in (10)b. Languages which contrast only singular and plural require only one feature, [>1], to indicate plural number. Languages with dual number use [>2] to indicate plural number, while [>1] indicates dual number. Thus, the meaning of [>1] depends on how it contrasts with other features.

(10)	a.	Singular	Dual	Plural	b.	Singular	Plural
		#	#	#		#	#
			>1	>1			>1
				>2			

She also proposes the following vocabulary items (as per Distributed Morphology, Halle & Marantz, 1994, et seq.). Note that the forms here are abstract since suppletive plural forms are found in the Hopi example above. For example, if the [>1] feature is found on a noun the suppletive plural form of the noun is inserted. Note that the formalisms in (11) are instructions

purposes, he notes that while Zuni plural pronouns distinguish between objective and possessive Case, Zuni dual pronouns neutralize this Case distinction. Thus, Nevins concludes that any approach to dual number must proceed from the premise that dual is more marked than plural.

Nevins argues that the following features (originally proposed in Harbour, 2003) suffice to account for the constructed dual construction.

(13) Singular = [+singular, -augmented]

Dual = [-singular, -augmented]

Plural = [-singular, +augmented]

In doing so, he makes the unconventional claim that the negative values for the two features in question are marked. Specifically, he makes the following two markedness statements.

(14) a. [-singular] is marked

b. [-augmented] is marked in the context of [-singular]

With these features and markedness statements Nevins can derive the constructed dual construction in example (9) as follows. The verbal form *wari* is specified as [-augmented], so appears in singular and dual contexts. The nominal form *puma* is specified as [-singular], so appears in dual and plural contexts.

If one were to update the features here so that the marked features are positively specified or privative (as Nevins, 2011 subsequently argues), we get the following. Binary features are shown on the left and privative features are shown on the right.

(15) Singular = [-plural, -minimal]

Singular = []

Dual = [+plural, +minimal]

Dual = [plural, minimal]

Plural = [+plural, -minimal]

Plural = [plural]

These feature specifications align more closely with the notion of markedness Nevins wishes to capture; however, they are now identical to the feature geometry originally proposed by Harley and Ritter (2002) in that [minimal] entails [plural]. This, however, is exactly the same representation that Cowper showed is not tenable with the constructed dual.

This section has introduced three proposals for number, which will be evaluated against the Onondaga data on number in the following section.

4 Onondaga Number and Number Features

Recall from section 2 that we have the following vocabulary items that refer to number for 1st and 2nd person in Onondaga.

- (16) a. dual \Leftrightarrow ni-
 b. plural \Leftrightarrow wa-
 c. plural \Leftrightarrow hi- / ___ 3_{F/PL} (recall this form is neutralized for dual/plural number)


Let's investigate now what kind of number system can account for these data.

We consider the model from Harley & Ritter (2002), which is also our revised model of Nevins' (2007) proposal in which privative features are assumed. If we assume the Probe is fully specified, then we predict dual agreement to be preferred over plural agreement, contrary to fact. On the other hand, if the Probe is specified only with [plural], then we expect dual agreement never to be found, again contrary to fact.

Let's consider this analysis in detail. Consider the following possible structures for the number Probe.

- (17) a. $\begin{array}{c} \# \\ | \\ [\text{plural}] \\ | \\ [\text{minimal}] \end{array}$ b. $\begin{array}{c} \# \\ | \\ [\text{plural}] \end{array}$

The Probe in (17)a preferentially seeks out a Goal with dual number. Thus, even if an argument with plural number is present, dual number is predicted to control agreement. As discussed in section 2, if one argument is plural and the other is dual, then plural agreement is found. The Probe in (17)b, however, will seek out plural number. The correct result holds if the subject is plural or singular, but if the subject is dual and the object is plural, then (17)b incorrectly predicts dual agreement on the verb. This is illustrated below. The Probe is on the left, and the subject and object are on the right




In (18)a, the subject matches the features of the Probe, so establishes an Agree relation, and the search stops. Thus, the [minimal] feature on the object has no effect on agreement. Plural agreement arises as predicted. The problem is (18)b. Again, the subject matches with the Probe. However, the features of the subject Goal are now copied to the Probe (shown by a dashed line), erroneously giving rise to dual agreement. Thus, the Harley & Ritter number system fails to account for the Onondaga facts.

It is difficult to adapt Nevins's (2007) binary approach to number to Béjar & Rezac's structured Probe theory since this theory requires a feature geometry. If the Probe is unspecified it fails to give rise to omnivorous number, since only the number features of the subject will

value the Probe. If the Probe is [-singular, α augmented], it will still only take on the values of the closest non-singular Goal, giving no way to capture omnivorous number, where plural is preferred over dual. We could assume that the Probe is specified [-singular, +augmented]. That way, the Probe will try to find a plural Goal. If it finds one, then plural agreement is found as the verb, as predicted. If not, it is difficult to see how dual agreement will arise. Some mechanism would have to be created that could change the value of the Probe from [+augmented] to [-augmented] should no plural Goal be found. Likewise, should no dual Goal be found either, then the [-singular] feature on the Probe must change to [+singular]. It is unclear what kind of mechanism would be responsible for changing the features of the Probe, however. An entirely new theory of Agree would have to be developed to test the number features that Nevins' proposes against the Onondaga data. Finally, as mentioned above, adapting Nevins' features to privative values gives rise to the same system as Harley & Ritter, which was just shown not to work for Onondaga.

Finally, let us examine Cowper's feature geometry for number in light of the Onondaga facts. Let's assume the following structure for the Probe, along the lines of Béjar & Rezac (2009). Note we have enriched the Probe to include a Participant feature, since only the 1st and 2nd arguments trigger number agreement.



Finally, let's assume the following vocabulary items.

- (20) a. [>1] \Leftrightarrow ni-
 b. [>2] \Leftrightarrow wa-
 c. [>1] \Leftrightarrow hi- / $__ 3_{F/PL}$

We can now capture the facts from section 2 with this apparatus. The following chart gives all the possible scenarios discussed above for 1st and 2nd person arguments only. It is important to remember that under the mechanism of Agree proposed by Bejar (2003), Bejar and Rezac (2005) and Preminger (2014), failure to agree does not cancel the derivation. Crucially, the Probe must attempt to find a suitable Goal; however, if it doesn't find one, or if it finds a Goal with only a subset of the features it's seeking, then the derivation can proceed with the unmatched features simply deleted. Unmatched features on the Probe are crossed out, and features that value the Probe are boldfaced and underlined.

Table 4 Agreement with 1st or 2nd person arguments

Probe	Subject (1 st or 2 nd π)	Object (1 st or 2 nd π)
# >1 >2	#	#
# <u>>1</u> >2	#	# <u>>1</u>
# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>	#	# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>
# <u>>1</u> >2	# <u>>1</u>	#
# <u>>1</u> >2	# <u>>1</u>	# >1
# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>	# <u>>1</u>	# >1 <u>>2</u>

# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>	# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>	#
# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>	# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>	# >1
# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>	# <u>>1</u> <u>>2</u>	# >1 >2

To understand this chart, let's run through a couple of the derivations. In the first derivation, the Probe is seeking a Goal with the features [#]-[>1]-[>2]. The subject has the feature [#], so it matches the [#] feature on the Probe and values it. The object has no additional features, so has no effect on valuation. Since the features [>1] and [>2] are not matched, they are deleted. This is an instance of Preminger's (2014) notion of failed agreement. In the second derivation, the Probe seeks the same set of features. Again, the subject only has the feature [#], so this feature matches and values the [#] on the Probe, and the Probe keeps looking. The object has the features [#]-[>1], so the [>1] feature matches the [>1] feature on the Probe and values it. There are no more potential Goals, so the remaining [>2] feature is deleted. Finally, consider the fifth derivation. The subject matches the [#] and [>1] features on the Probe, but not the [>2] feature, so only [>1] is valued. The Probe continues to look and finds the [>2] feature on the object, which matches and values the Probe.

The situation in which one argument is 1st or 2nd person and the other is 3rd person masculine singular is more straightforward. Recall that we have proposed that the Probe is also specified with a [Participant] feature, so it bypasses any 3rd person argument. Thus, whatever number features the 1st or 2nd person argument has they will value the probe, giving rise to the expected agreement.

Finally, recall that when one of the arguments is 3_{F/PL}, the dual/plural distinction is neutralized. Let's examine first the three situations of interest—namely, where one argument is 1st or 2nd person and the other is 3_{F/PL}. In the following representations only the number features are shown for ease of exposition. Again, unmatched features on the Probe are crossed out, and the valued feature that triggers vocabulary insertion is boldfaced and underlined.

(21)	Probe	1 st /2 nd #	3 _{F/PL}
	<u>#</u>	<u>#</u>	g
	>1		3 _{F/PL}
	>2		
	<u>#</u>	<u>#</u>	g
	>1	>1	3 _{F/PL}
	>2		
	<u>#</u>	<u>#</u>	g
	>1	>1	3 _{F/PL}
	>2	>2	

Given the vocabulary items in (20), we may expect competition between the insertion of the plural morpheme, *wa-*, (which values the [>2] feature) and the neutralized plural morpheme, *hi-*, (which values the [>1] feature in the context of 3_{F/PL}). We assume that the satisfaction of contextual allomorphy supersedes the satisfaction for a more highly specified feature.

5 Discussion

The facts concerning omnivorous number in Onondaga described above support Cowper's feature geometry along with Béjar and Rezac's (2009) theory of structured probes. To repeat, the number probe in Onondaga attempts to agree with a plural argument. In the event it cannot find

one, it attempts to agree with dual number. If both the subject and the object are singular, no overt agreement surfaces.

One issue raised by Nevins in response to Cowper's model of number is the issue of markedness. Nevins correctly points out that dual is traditionally considered more marked than plural number for the reasons mentioned in section 1. However, as Arsenault (2007) suggests, there is no obligation for typologically more marked elements to be more structurally complex, either in the shape of the feature geometry or in the number of features involved. Thus, despite the objections raised by Nevins (2007), positing a structure of the plural that is featurally more complex than the dual does not entail that the plural is more marked than the dual. Although structural complexity may correlate with typological markedness, it is not necessarily an absolute.

To briefly illustrate this point, let us discuss the case of acquisition. As Nevins mentions, the dual is acquired later than the plural. In the Harley & Ritter model in (8) this falls out naturally. The feature [minimal], which is dependent on the feature [group], is plausibly acquired later, thus dual number is also acquired later.⁵ In Cowper's model of number in (10), however, the feature [>2] is dependent on [>1], so is plausibly acquired later. Recall, however, that in the absence of the feature [>2], the feature [>1] simply means plural. Thus, if one follows the same

⁵ As a reviewer notes, the tacit assumption here is that features lower in the hierarchy are acquired later and features higher in the hierarchy are acquired earlier. While I am in no position to discuss the mechanics of acquisition, I mention this point here as a possible resolution between Nevins and Cowper. A reviewer also asks about the precise interaction between markedness and feature structure; however, it is beyond the scope of this squib to defend a particular theory of markedness.

line of reasoning, dual is predicted to be acquired later in Cowper's system, too. Thus, one cannot simply correlate the general notion of markedness to structural complexity.

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