

# Treating Greek *o eaftos mu* as a regular anaphor: Theoretical Implications.

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## Abstract

Binding theory Condition A must be so formulated as to accommodate the range of behaviors exhibited by anaphors crosslinguistically. In this respect, the behavior of the Modern Greek anaphor *o eaftos mu* is theoretically important as it has been reported to display a number of unusual distributional properties, thus leading to treatments by Iatridou (1988) or Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) different from that of standard anaphors represented by English *himself* and thus requiring a rethinking of the classic Condition A descriptive generalization and its theoretical derivation. This paper revisits the distribution of this expression documenting that previous discussions are subject to a confound as this expression is not always a reflexive, and it may have a logophoric usage. Controlling for the non-anaphoric usage of *o eaftos mu* as well as for logophoricity and relying on new data surveys, we conclude that when anaphoric, it is in fact a well behaved standard anaphor from the point of view of the standard Condition A (akin to Chomsky 1986). These surveys support some aspects of the empirical picture presented in Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) but not others. It does support an important conclusion of theirs, namely that this expression is allowed as nominative subject, but in derived subject positions only. This in turn leads to a number of new (theoretical) consequences and predictions: (a) the ability of anaphors to function as nominative subjects can be reduced to differences in their internal structure (Greek *o eaftos mu*  $\neq$  English *himself*), (b) an influential theoretical innovation made in Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) which takes the reflexivization mechanism to be *self* incorporation as a general solution to why *self* induces reflexive readings cannot be maintained as a general mechanism underlying anaphor binding in Greek.

## 1 Introduction

This paper studies the distribution of the Greek expression *o eaftos mu* ‘lit. the self mine’. It focuses on four syntactic contexts in which the distribution of *o eaftos mu* was argued in previous literature to be problematic for the standard Condition A because, it was claimed (cf. Iatridou 1988, Anagnostopoulou and Everaert 1999 i.a.) (a) it is disallowed

as dative object in double object constructions, (b) it is disallowed as genitive dependent of a noun, (c) it is - non standardly - allowed as nominative subject, (d) it is disallowed in adjunct positions. We examine each case separately and show that despite superficial evidence pointing in the opposite direction, *o eaftos mu* can receive a standard anaphor treatment. First, it is in fact allowed as a dative indirect object. Second, genitive *o eaftos mu* is indeed disallowed but only when interpreted as a possessor; it is otherwise allowed. The possessor prohibition exemplifies a broader, not fully understood restriction, also found in English, and thus is not specific to Greek *o eaftos mu*. Third, regarding nominative *o eaftos mu*, we present new data confirming a generalization in Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1995, 1999), namely that it is only allowed in derived subject positions differing from the English reflexive that is never allowed as a nominative anaphor. But pace Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999), we propose that nominative *o eaftos mu* can be analyzed as licensed via standard reconstruction (of A-movement) into a syntactic position lower than its antecedent. Moreover, building on the observation of Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1995, 1999) that English *himself* behaves like a modified pronoun while nominative *o eaftos mu* has the internal structure of a regular DP, we show that a reconstruction approach to the distribution of nominative anaphors derives why English disallows, but Greek allows such anaphors and thus sheds new light on the distribution of nominative anaphors. Fourth, we show that *o eaftos mu* is allowed in non-argument positions qua plain anaphor e.g. adjuncts, or coordinate structures, from where incorporation movement is strictly disallowed (pace Anagnostopoulou and Everaert 1999 and Patel-Grosz 2013). This has two consequences. First, regarding the reflexivization mechanism involved, we argue that a movement analysis of *o eaftos mu* in terms of *self*-incorporation as in Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999), Spathas (2010) and Patel-Grosz (2013) cannot be maintained. Second, the (partial) ungrammaticality *o eaftos mu* gives rise to in so-called *snake*-sentences e.g. *Mary saw a snake next to herself*, cannot be reduced to the adjunct status of the locative PP. The above conclusions take into account (a) a previously noted fact (cf. Anagnostopoulou and Everaert 1999), that is, that *o eaftos mu* has a ‘reified’ usage meaning *the self* (see also Safir 1996) which is not anaphoric, and (b) a new observation, namely, that it can have a logophoric usage (pace Anagnostopoulou and Everaert 1999). The existence of these usages creates an analytical confound that needs to be controlled for. We show first that these non-anaphoric usages are more pervasive than originally thought, not limited to syntactic contexts in which *o eaftos mu* is modified, e.g. by adjectives (pace Patel-Grosz 2013). Simple diagnostics systematically used in our investigation tease the non-anaphoric and logophoric usages apart from the anaphoric ones.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contrasts the usages of *o eaftos mu* and shows that once the ‘reified’ use is excluded, this expression behaves (in part) as a plain anaphor in the requisite sense. In all subsequent sections the ‘reified’ use is controlled away from. Furthermore, in section 3, we introduce two diagnostics that will also allow us to control away from possible logophoric usages of *o eaftos mu* when this is necessary. In section 4.1, we report new

survey data demonstrating that dative *o eaftos mu* is allowed undermining an appeal to *self* incorporation. Section 4.2 concludes that the distribution of genitive *o eaftos mu* is consistent with its status as a non logophoric reflexive, eliminating the need to appeal to aspects of predicate based theories of Condition A. Both sections thus diverge in their conclusions from the treatment Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) propose for dative and genitive *o eaftos mu*. Section 5 shows that the distribution of *o eaftos mu* in argument and adjunct PPs supports the conclusions of sections 4.1 and 4.2. In section 6, we corroborate Anagnostopoulou and Everaert’s (1999) conclusion that there are anaphoric instances of nominative *o eaftos mu* allowed in derived subject positions. Unlike Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999), we argue that this fact derives from nominative *o eaftos mu* satisfying Condition A via reconstruction into its base position and we derive why this is not available in English. This section also discusses why the evidence presented in previous literature against this conclusion is in fact inconclusive. Section 7 presents arguments that *o eaftos mu* must be bound as a whole (*pace* Iatridou 1988). Section 8 concludes.

## 2 *O eaftos mu*: Sometimes anaphoric, sometimes not

We first distinguish between the reflexive use of the expression *o eaftos mu*, where it behaves anaphorically, and its non-anaphoric use in which it receives what Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) calls following Safir (1996) ‘the reified substantive reading.’ As we show, the first use conforms to the expectations of it being subject to Condition A, while the second behaves as a run-of-the-mill DP. The first use requires a local c-commanding antecedent. The second use is not subject to these requirements, and can be used freely as an argument, internal or external, of different predicates (*pace* claims made in Patel-Grosz 2013). It retains its literal interpretation referring to the *self*, an abstract entity, and is thus, as we show, subject to distributional restrictions regarding what can be predicated of it.

### 2.1 *O eaftos mu* with no antecedent or a non-local one

As Horrocks (1994, 94) reports, (1) illustrates the existence of instances in which *o eaftos mu* does not require the presence of a grammatically realized, overt or covert, antecedent.

- (1) **O eaftos tu ftei.**  
the self.NOM his.GEN be.responsible.3SG  
‘His self is responsible.’

Horrocks (1994, (14))

But in such a case, the expression *o eaftos tu* means ‘his self’, and has what Safir (1996, (557)) calls the reified substantive reading that crucially arises ‘[...] when the SELF is conceived of as a ‘disembodied’ abstract part.’ The antecedent of the pronoun is contextually determined, and need not be a logophoric center: this sentence need not report the

antecedent's point of view (see Charnavel 2019 for background). It can for example express the speaker's opinion about the matter.<sup>1</sup> Now note that (1) is not a fixed expression/idiom in which non-anaphoric *o eaftos mu* is licensed exceptionally. This is shown in (2) where similar occurrences of non-anaphoric *o eaftos mu* are shown to be possible with different verbs.

- (2) a. Se aftin tin dhiadikasias ton pio simadiko rolo tha ton peksi **o eaftos tu**.  
 in this the process the most important role.ACC will 3SG.M.ACC play.3SG the self.NOM his.GEN  
 'In this process, his self will play the most important role.'
- b. O monos adipalos se aftin tin periptosi ine **o eaftos tis**.  
 the only opponent.NOM in this the case be.3SG the self.NOM her.GEN  
 'The only opponent in this case is herself.'

Notice also that non-anaphoric *o eaftos mas* is not limited to particular syntactic positions. In (2a) and (2b), it is used as an external argument, a causer, of *pezi* 'plays' and *dhimiurghi* 'creates'. In (3) and (4), *o eaftos mu* is an argument of a verb and a noun respectively:

- (3) a. Pada iparhi i anagki ja kati pu kseperna **ton eafto mas**.  
 always exist.3SG the need for something that exceed.3SG the self.ACC our.GEN  
 'There always exists a need for something that exceeds our selves.'
- b. Katheti kenurjo pu velitioni **ton eafto mas** tha prepi na apoteli ena anapospasto  
 anything new that improves the self.ACC our.GEN will must na constitute.3SG an integral  
 komati tis zois kathe anthropu.  
 piece the life.GEN every human.GEN  
 'Anything new that improves our selves must constitute an integral part of the life of all people.'
- (4) Tis pjo skotines plevres **tu eafthu tu** katafere na tis anakalipsi mia  
 the more dark sides.NOM the self.GEN his.GEN managed.3SG na 3PL.F.ACC discover.3SG a.FEM  
 psihologhos mono meta apo epta sinedhries.  
 psychologist.FEM only after from seven sessions  
 'A psychiatrist managed to discover the darkest aspects of himself only after seven sessions.'

<sup>1</sup> Following a reviewer's suggestion, we also tested the acceptability of sentences such as (i) below. This sentence was tested as uttered in two different contexts, shown below, where George, the antecedent of the reflexive, is either an empathy locus (see Charnavel 2019 for why expressions such as 'poor' etc., can mark empathy loci), or an attitude holder respectively (see Charnavel 2019 for reasons why either license logophoric uses of the reflexive). The sentence was judged as ungrammatical in both contexts (Average 1.4/5) by six native speakers who were asked to provide a judgment on the basis of a 1-5 Likert scale (with 1 the worst and 5 the best). This behavior of *o eaftos mu* corroborates our conclusion that non-anaphoric *o eaftos mu* does not instantiate a logophoric usage.

**Contexts:** #1: Poor George all these days he is in such a difficult situation; #2: George believes that he is in such a difficult position.

- (i) O eaftos tu tha prepi na ine se poli dhiskoli thesi.  
 the self.NOM his.GEN will must na be.3SG in very difficult position  
 'His self must be in a very difficult position.'

Given the ungrammaticality of (i), a question that arises is why *o eaftos mu* cannot have the reified usage here. As we note in fn.3, the distribution of the reified usage is pragmatically driven. Here, we believe the pragmatic restriction comes from the predicate *ine se dhiskoli thesi* 'be in a difficult position'; a person can be in a difficult position, but not one's abstract self, as is also the case that one's personality, another abstract entity, cannot be in a difficult position: #*O haraktiras tu ine se dhiskoli thesi*. 'His personality is in a difficult position.'

And *o eaftos mu* retains the same interpretation as above in cases where it has a non-local antecedent:<sup>2</sup>

- (5) Ja tin praghmatopiisi aftu tu taksidju, hriazete na pro<sub>i</sub> provume se ena alma/ stadhio pu tha  
for the realization.ACC this the trip.GEN be.necessary.3SG na we proceed to a jump/ stage that will  
apeleftherosi **ton eafto mas<sub>i</sub>** apo fovus ce eksoterikus paraghodes.  
release.3SG the self.ACC our.GEN from fears and external factors  
'For the realization of this trip, it is necessary for us to proceed to a stage which will release our selves  
from fears and external factors.'
- (6) Afu skeftika arketa ja tin proodho tis Marias<sub>i</sub> s-tis sinedhries mas, katalava  
after thought.1SG enough about the progress.ACC the Maria.GEN in-the sessions ours understood.1SG  
oti anakalipsa tis pio skotines plevres **tu eaftu tis<sub>i</sub>** meta apo efta sinedhries.  
that discovered.3SG the most dark aspects the self.GEN her.GEN after from seven sessions.ACC  
'After I thought enough about Maria's progress in our sessions, I understood that I discovered the darkest  
aspects of her self after seven sessions.'

Such instances must be distinguished from other cases, which do not mean 'the self' but act as reflexives, denoting what their antecedent denotes. As the literature reports and we will confirm, such instances behave like anaphors. However, the literature does not systematically distinguish between these two cases. One way to make the distinction is to keep track exactly of the semantic contribution of *o eaftos tu* via context, which is not always straightforward however, particularly with human antecedents. Another is to investigate the properties of this expression when the 'reified' use is excluded. There are two ways to exclude it. One way is to limit antecedents, if there are any, to inanimates, which do not have a 'self'. The other is to capitalize on the meaning 'the self' references, an abstract entity, and the fact that only certain properties consistent with its abstract status, can be predicated of it. Predicating concrete properties (height, weight, color, etc.) of *o eaftos tu* will guarantee the non-reified/anaphoric use. And as we will now see, in such cases, *o eaftos tu* behaves anaphorically.

## 2.2 Predicate Restrictions

The assumption that non-anaphoric *o eaftos mu* is a plain DP that refers to an abstract entity finds support in interpretive restrictions it exhibits as a subject of certain predicates. These restrictions are illustrated with non locally bound *o eaftos mu* in (7) and (8).

- (7) a. O Jorghos<sub>i</sub> theori/ siniditopiise oti **o eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** ine endiaferon/ mistirios.  
the George.NOM believe.3SG realized.3SG that the self.NOM his.GEN be.3SG interesting mysterious  
'George believes/realized that his self is interesting/ mysterious.'
- b. \* O Jorghos<sub>i</sub> theori/ siniditopiise oti **o eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** ine psilos/ hodros.  
the George.NOM believe.3SG realized.3SG that the self.NOM his.GEN be.3SG tall fat

<sup>2</sup> In (5), the antecedent of the reflexive is the silent subject of the verb, indicated as pro.

‘George believes/realized that his self is tall/ fat.’

- (8) a. O psichologhos ipe ja tin Maria<sub>i</sub> oti vriski **ton eafto tis<sub>i</sub>** harismatiko.  
 the psychiatrist.NOM said.3SG for the Maria that find.3SG the self.ACC her.GEN charismatic  
 ‘The psychiatrist said about Mary that he finds her self charismatic.’
- b. \*O psichologhos ipe ja tin Maria<sub>i</sub> oti vriski **ton eafto tis<sub>i</sub>** hlomo.  
 the psychiatrist.NOM said.3SG for the Maria that find.3SG the self.ACC her.GEN pale  
 ‘The psychiatrist said about Mary that he finds her self pale.’

(7) and (8) only differ with respect to the grammatical functions of *o eaftos mu*, reflected in the case it receives, nominative and accusative respectively. (7a) and (8a) feature more instances of non-anaphoric *o eaftos mu* and show that properties of non-concrete objects such as *endiaferon/mistirios* ‘interesting/mysterious’ or *harismatiko* ‘charismatic’ are compatible with its meaning, i.e one’s abstract *self*. In (7b) and (8b), *o eaftos mu* can only be an anaphor. Non-anaphoric *o eaftos mu* is precluded because predicate as *psilos, hodros, hlomos* ‘tall, fat, pale’ cannot be predicated of the abstract entity it expresses. Given this, (7b) and (8b) are ruled out as violations of Condition A because *o eaftos mu* is not locally bound.<sup>3</sup> In (9a), the context favors the reified usage of *o eaftos mu*, as suggested by the fact that it can be licensed without a c-commanding antecedent. On the other hand, if the context is different in such a way that the reified usage is less accessible, as in (9b), *o eaftos mu* has the anaphoric usage and so it requires a c-commanding antecedent. This suggests that the deviance of (9a), as opposed to the well-formedness of (9b), is pragmatically driven; normally, the only person to have access to ‘self’ is one’s self or a person, like a psychologist, whose job is to understand one’s self, but not one’s parents.

- (9) a. [I psiholoji [tis Elenis<sub>i</sub>]] vriskun ton eafto tis<sub>i</sub> merikes fores poli astathi/  
 the psychologists.NOM the Eleni.GEN find.3PL the self.ACC her.GEN some times very unstable  
 mistirio/ idhietero.  
 mysterious peculiar  
 ‘Eleni’s psychologists sometimes find herself unstable/mysterious/peculiar.’
- b. \* [I ghonis [tis Elenis<sub>i</sub>]] vriskun ton eafto tis<sub>i</sub> merikes fores poli astathi/  
 the parents.NOM the Eleni.GEN find.3PL the self.ACC her.GEN some times very unstable  
 mistirio/ idhietero.  
 mysterious peculiar  
 ‘Eleni’s parents sometimes find herself unstable/mysterious/peculiar.’

Now note that in syntactic configurations where Condition A can be satisfied, *o eaftos mu* is entirely compatible with properties of concrete objects, as e.g. being fat or pale. This is illustrated in (10a) and (11a). (10b) and (11b) is consistent with *o eaftos mu* being an anaphor in the previous examples.

<sup>3</sup> In contrast to predicates such as *tal, fat, pale* which are only compatible with the anaphoric usage, predicates such as *astathi, mistirio, idhietero* ‘unstable, mysterious, peculiar’ allow or favor the reified usage. Note, however, that in addition to these predicates, the context also plays a role in the licensing of the reified usage.

- (10) a. O Adreas<sub>i</sub> theori **ton eafto tu<sub>i</sub>** hodro.  
the Adreas.NOM consider.3SG the self.ACC his.GEN fat  
‘Adreas considers himself fat.’
- b. \* [I mitera [tu Adrea<sub>i</sub>]] theori **ton eafto tu<sub>i</sub>** hodro.  
the mother.NOM the Adreas.GEN consider.3SG the self.ACC his.GEN fat  
‘Adreas’s mother considers himself fat.’
- (11) a. O Adreas<sub>i</sub> vriski **ton eafto tu<sub>i</sub>** hlomo simera.  
the Adreas.NOM find.3SG the self.ACC his.GEN pale today  
‘Adreas finds himself pale today.’
- b. \* [I mitera [tu Adrea<sub>i</sub>]] vriski **ton eafto tu<sub>i</sub>** hlomo simera.  
the mother.NOM the Adreas.GEN find.3SG the self.ACC his.GEN pale today  
‘Adreas’s mother finds himself pale today.’

In conclusion, as previous literature reports, *ton eafto tu* is indeed an anaphor when the ‘reified’ interpretation is excluded. In what follows, we are systematically controlling away from this usage. In the next section, we discuss how we can also control away from logophoricity, which in turn is going to allow us to concentrate on the pure reflexive, anaphoric reading.

### 3 Logophoricity

Reflexives of different languages have been shown to have a logophoric usage in addition to their standard anaphoric one (cf. Charnavel 2019 i.a.). Under the logophoric usage, a reflexive can be exempt from the standard Condition A (cf. Charnavel and Sportiche 2016 i.a.). *O eaftos mu* can have a logophoric usage too, as in the example below where it is licensed without a c-commanding antecedent. In this case, *o eaftos mu* parallels the reflexives of different languages, e.g. English, which have been argued to allow for a logophoric usage in an identical context (see 13a).<sup>4</sup>

- (12) Anonimes anafores ja **ton eafto tis<sub>i</sub>** plighosan ta sinesthimata tis Anas<sub>i</sub>.  
anonymous mentions.NOM for the self.ACC her.GEN hurt.3PL the feelings.ACC the Ana.GEN  
‘Anonymous mentions about herself hurt Ana’s feelings.’

Documenting the logophoric usages of *o eaftos mu* is a task the scope of which extends beyond this paper; what is important for the purposes of this paper, and what this paper will do is control away from logophoric usages. Specifically, we present two diagnostics to control away from a possible logophoric usage of *o eaftos mu* when this is relevant. These diagnostics are based on properties of logophors cross-linguistically documented in Charnavel

<sup>4</sup> We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing to our attention more than one examples where *o eaftos mu* can be used as a logophor.

(2019). Specifically, (a) logophors do not require a c-commanding antecedent, (13a) (= Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, (4b)), and (b) they allow split-antecedents, (13b) (= Bryant and Charnavel 2020a, (8b)).<sup>5</sup>

- (13) a. Anonymous posts about herself<sub>i</sub> on the internet hurt Lucy<sub>i</sub>'s feelings.  
b. Mary<sub>i</sub> told John<sub>k</sub> that her son looks up to people like themselves<sub>i+k</sub>.

Charnavel and Zlogar (2016) argue that in (13a), the psychological expression *feelings* allow the speaker to empathize with *Lucy*. Based on this, they conclude that *Lucy* is an empathy locus, and so it can license the reflexive as a logophor (see Charnavel 2019 for discussion on why empathy loci can license a logophor). Note also in the same example that being embedded within a DP, the antecedent of the reflexive, *Lucy*, does not c-command the logophor illustrating the fact that logophors can be licensed without a c-commanding antecedent (cf. a above). In (13b), the reflexive is a logophor licensed by two antecedents, *Mary*, an attitude holder, and *John*, an empathy locus, a fact that also suggests that the logophor accepts split-antecedents (cf. b above).

To sum up, we take a reflexive that (a) can be licensed with a non c-commanding antecedent, and (b) can accept split-antecedents to constitute a logophor. So, in what follows, we use (a) and (b) systematically to detect possible logophoric usages of *o eaftos mu*, and control away from them when this is necessary.

## 4 Oblique *o eaftos mu*

We begin with cases in which our empirical findings are inconsistent with some previously reported data which motivated treating Greek *o eaftos mu* as a non standard anaphor.

### 4.1 Dative *o eaftos mu*

This section examines the distribution of *o eaftos mu* as a dative indirect object. Dative *o eaftos mu* is reported in previous literature either as less preferred (cf. Holton et al. 1997, 582) or totally ruled out (cf. Anagnostopoulou and Everaert 1999). This last property would not follow from Condition A, a fact that according to previous literature speaks in favor of a special treatment of *o eaftos mu* in terms of *self*-incorporation, as movement from within datives is typically excluded: dative DPs are islands blocking any kind of movement out of them (including incorporation

<sup>5</sup> Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (2013) claim that anaphors do tolerate split antecedents as in their (31), from Okada (1998), repeated below:

- (ii) John is talking with Mary about interesting and important political ideas, while Bill<sub>i</sub> is talking with Sue<sub>j</sub> only about themselves<sub>i+j</sub>.

This example is not controlled for a logophoric usage of the reflexive. Once it is, e.g. by using inanimate reflexives among other ways - cf. Charnavel (2019) for extensive discussion - it becomes clear that non logophoric reflexives disallow split antecedents.



cf. Baker 1988). Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) takes such device to indicate that the *self* noun of *o eaftos mu* must undergo incorporation; *self* in datives cannot incorporate, counterlicensing the anaphor. In order to figure out whether or not dative *o eaftos mu* is special from the perspective of Condition A, we conducted an informal grammaticality judgment task with 10 participants based on a 5-point Likert scale, 5 the best. The questionnaire comprised the sentence below that was originally extracted from a naturally occurring context, and was modified adding the sentence in parentheses.<sup>6,7</sup>

- (14) ? Arpakse ta klidja tu spitju ke tu aftokinitu ke (ja na dhi an ine omorfi emfanisiaka grabed.3SG the keys the house and the car and for na see.3SG if be.3SG beautiful appearancewise me ta cenurja tis ruha) erikse mia teleftea matia **tu eafu tis** s-ton kathrefti. with the new her.GEN clothes gave.3SG one last look the self.DAT her.GEN at-the mirror  
'She grabbed the keys of the house and the car and in order to see if she was nice in her new clothes, she gave one last look at herself in the mirror before leaving from her apartment.'

In (14), the context provided by the sentence in the parentheses ensures that the subject of the verb is interested in how her new clothes fit her appearance, not her abstract entity, thus, precluding the reified usage. In the survey we conducted, this sentence was not judged by any speaker as less good than 3.5 in a 5-point Likert scale with 5 the best (average was 4.1). Note also that *o eaftos mu* cannot be logophoric in this case, as suggested by the fact that it cannot be licensed by a non-c-commanding antecedent, (15a), and it cannot have split antecedents, (15b).

- (15) a. \* [O pateras [tis Marias<sub>j</sub>]] erikse mia matja **tu eafu tis<sub>i</sub>** s-ton kathrefti.  
the father.NOM the Maria.GEN gave.3SG a look.ACC the self.DAT her.GEN in-the mirror  
'Maria's father gave a look at herself in the mirror.'
- b. \* O Jorghos<sub>i</sub> ipe oti i Maria<sub>j</sub> theli na riksi mia matja **tu eafu tus<sub>i+j</sub>** s-ton kathrefti.  
the George.NOM said.3SG that the Maria want.3SG to give.3SG a look.ACC the self.DAT their.GEN  
in-the mirror  
'George said that Maria wants to give a look at themselves in the mirror.'

Furthermore, an anonymous reviewer provides the example in (16a) as grammatical, noting that a statue-reading whereby the agent throws water to a statue of herself, is preferable, and that the pure-reflexive reading is more prominent with a PP indirect object, (16b). While we were not able to duplicate this preference with native speakers, we agree that (16a) is a well-formed sentence. Note also that the statue interpretation is a subcase of the anaphoric

<sup>6</sup> Source: <https://www.wattpad.com/745381136-unravel>

<sup>7</sup> A reviewer suggests that the slightly degraded status of (14) might be related to the less preferred usage of the dative case with plain DPs in examples such as below:

- (iii) ? Ekane tu fititi mia sizitisi.  
made.3SG the student.GEN a conversation  
'She had a talk with a student.'

usage, so the grammaticality of (16a) further supports our claim that anaphoric *o eaftos mu* is available in the dative case.

- (16) a. Erikse ligho nero **tu eafu tis.**  
threw.3SG some water.ACC the self.DAT her.GEN  
'She threw herself some water.'
- b. Erikse ligho nero **s-ton eafu tis.**  
threw.3SG some water.ACC to-the self.ACC her.GEN  
'She threw some water to herself.'

We conclude that *o eafɔs mu* does not require any special treatment because of its distribution as a dative indirect object. In turn, that the *self* noun of *o eafɔs mu* must undergo incorporation into the verb is strongly challenged, since by hypothesis, datives disallow such incorporation.

## 4.2 Genitive *o eaf*tos *mu*

We now turn to cases as (17) in which *o eaf̣tos mu* is assigned genitive case and is ill formed. Recall throughout this section, the examples are chosen so that only a concrete interpretation of *o eaf̣tos mu* is felicitous.

- (17) \* O Jannis<sub>i</sub> den anexete [ ta pedhia **tu eafu tu<sub>i</sub>**].  
 the Jannis.NOM not tolerate.3SG the children.ACC the self.GEN his.GEN  
 ‘Jannis does not tolerate the children of himself.’ Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999, (16))

Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) proposes an account of this deviance in terms of the predicate based theory expounded in Reinhart and Reuland (1991). According to this approach, distinct from the classic Condition A approach, an anaphor that functions as an argument of a noun in cases like (17) cannot satisfy Condition A because the anaphor has no coargument it could be covalued with. Reinhart and Reuland (1991) take it that if the reflexive is licensed in such a syntactic context, it can only be a logophor. Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999, 110) argues, however, that *o eaftos mu* differs from the English reflexive in that it “[...] cannot be used as a logophor.” Given this, the deviance of (17) follows. Since the only usage that is in principle allowed by Reinhart and Reuland (1991) in such a syntactic context is the logophoric one, Anagnostopoulou and Everaert’s hypothesis predicts that *o eaftos mu* should never be permitted as the sole argument in ‘picture of DPs’ cases where, again, an anaphor can only be licensed as a logophor under Reinhart and Reuland’s approach. But this prediction is incorrect. In fact, the only cases of genitive *o eaftos mu* discussed in Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) are as in (17) where it is understood as a possessor. Other instances of genitive *o eaftos mu* with a distinct function are not explored and in fact genitive *o eaftos mu* is fine as the sole argument in ‘picture of DPs’ when it is not a possessor. This is the case in (18), where it is a theme argument denoting what the picture represents: here the pictures depict Eleana. Note in particular that

in such examples, neither the implicit agent, the picture taker, nor the possessor, if any, need to be Eleana. In other words, there is no implicit argument that could act as a local, DP internal, antecedent for the reflexive *o eaftos mu*.

- (18) I Eleana<sub>i</sub> edhikse tis kaliteres fotografies **tu eafu tis<sub>i</sub>** s-ton aderfo tis.  
 the Eleana.NOM showed.3SG the best photos.ACC the self.GEN her.GEN to-the brother.ACC her.GEN  
 ‘Eleana showed the best photos of herself to her brother.’

We conclude that the correct description of the behavior of genitive *o eaftos mu* in DPs is that it is allowed with a DP external antecedent, unless it is interpreted as a possessor. As a result, this does not require *o eaftos mu* to be treated differently from English *himself*, as the latter, as is well known, exhibits a similar behavior: it is excluded in DPs when it occupies the Saxon genitive position (viz. *\*John likes himself’s pictures*).<sup>8</sup> The conclusion that *o eaftos mu* behaves exactly like the English reflexive finds further support in one more fact, namely, that just like the English reflexive, *o eaftos mu* can be used logophorically in ‘picture of DPs’ (cf. Bryant and Charnavel 2020b), and so it can have a non-c-commanding antecedent, (19a), and it can accept split antecedents, (19b).

- (19) a. [I kampania [tu Mitsotaki]<sub>i</sub>] proevlepe oti i fotografies **tu eafu tu** tha  
 the campaign.NOM the Mitsotaki.GEN predicted.3SG that the photos.NOM the self.GEN his.GEN would  
 itan se oles tis stasis ton leoforion.  
 be.3PL in all the stops the buses.GEN  
 ‘Mitsotakis’s campaign predicted that the photos of himself would be in all the bus stops.’  
 b. O Janis<sub>j</sub> ipe oti i Eleana<sub>i</sub> ithele na dhiksi tis kaliteres fotografies **tu eafu**  
 the John.NOM said that the Eleana.NOM wanted na show.3SG the best photos.ACC the self.GEN  
**tus<sub>i+j</sub>** s-ton aderfo tis.  
 their.GEN to-the brother.ACC her.GEN  
 ‘John said that Eleana wanted to show the best photos of themselves to her brother.’

## 5 *O eaftos mu* in locative and adjunct PPs

This section briefly examines aspects of the distribution of *o eaftos mu* in various adjunct positions with particular focus on locative PPs. Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) report the illformedness of the following type of example:

- (20) \*O Petros idhe ena fidhi dhipla s-ton **eafu tu**.  
 the Petros.NOM saw.3SG a snake next to-the self.ACC. his.GEN  
 ‘Petros saw a snake next to himself.’ Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999, (29))

<sup>8</sup> English and Greek are not unique in lacking a possessive reflexive. Dutch, German, English and Italian are a few more languages with reflexives that exhibit the restriction illustrated in (17) (cf. Reuland 2011, 167). Reuland notes that these are languages in which definiteness is marked with a prenominal article. On the other hand, if definiteness is marked in a language by a postnominal affix/ clitic or if a language does not mark definiteness at all, possessor reflexives are allowed. We refer to Despić (2015) which verifies Reuland’s generalization in a new body of languages and proposes an analysis for it.

They attribute its deviance to the adjunct status of the locative PP coupled with the requirement that the *self* part of *o eafitos mu* must incorporate to the verb: since adjunct are movement islands (at least for incorporation), this deviance is predicted. However, as noted by two anonymous reviewers, (20) improves if the context makes clear that Petros is looking at himself in a mirror, as in (21).

- (21) O Petros kitahtik-e s-ton kathrefti ce pro<sub>i</sub> idhe ena fidhi dhipla s-ton **eafito**  
the Petros.NOM looked.PASS-3SG in-the mirror and saw.3SG a snake next to-the self.ACC.  
**tu<sub>i</sub>**.  
his.GEN  
‘Petros looked at himself in the mirror and saw a snake next to himself.’

This judgement was supported in an informal survey we conducted with five native speakers; the speakers judged (20) as ill-formed (average was 1.9 out of 5) whereas (21) was judged as significantly better (average was 4.2 out of 5). Note also that the reflexive has an anaphoric usage in this case, as can be shown by the fact that in the same context, it requires a c-commanding antecedent, (22a), and does not accept split-antecedents, (22b).<sup>9</sup>

- (22) a. \* [I mitera [tu Petru<sub>i</sub>]]<sub>j</sub> kitakse s-ton kathrefti ce pro<sub>j</sub> idhe ena fidhi dhipla  
the mother.NOM the Petros.GEN looked.3SG in-the mirror and she saw.3SG a snake next

<sup>9</sup> The contrast between (20) and (21) remains to be explained. It may possibly be derived by invoking a competition between the reflexive and the clitic. Under this view, (20) is ruled out because (iv) expresses the same meaning with the same form except for the use of a clitic, a weaker form (see Cardinaletti and Starke 1999 for the idea the weaker form is always preferred over a strong one and the extended discussion in Charnavel 2019 or in Bryant and Charnavel 2020a extending it to a pronoun / reflexive competition). Now it turns out that a genitive clitic inside a PP cannot immediately refer to a statue: in the example below where *ton eafito tis* ‘herself’ refers to a statue of Julia Roberts, the genitive clitic in *dhipla tis* ‘next to her’ can only refer to Julia Roberts herself, not her statue.

- (iv) O Petros idhe ena fidhi dhipla tu.  
the Petros.NOM saw.3SG a snake next him.CL.GEN  
‘Petros saw a snake next to him.’
- (v) I Julia Roberts eno paratiruse ton eafito tis apo makria ksafnika tromakse jati idhe ena fidhi dhipla  
the Julia Roberts while watched.3SG the self.ACC her.GEN from far suddenly got scared.3SG because saw.3SG a snake next  
tis.  
her.CL.GEN  
‘Julia Roberts was watching herself from far away when she suddenly got scared because she saw a snake next to her.’

Since the genitive clitic cannot refer to the statue in locative PPs (why remains to be understood), *o eafitos mu* can be used in such a context (cf. 21) because it lacks a weaker competitor. Competition thus appears promising but it would of course remain to investigate in detail when and how anaphoric *o eafitos mu* and clitics or weaker forms compete.

Interestingly, an anonymous reviewer points out that in a statue-context, where Julia Roberts looks at a statue of herself, Julia Roberts can utter (vi) where the reflexive is licensed in the absence of an overt antecedent. We agree with the reviewer’s intuition, even though we believe that (vi) sounds more natural in a context where Julia Roberts looks at herself in the mirror. In this case, the antecedent of *o eafitos mu* is the speaker, that is, Julia Roberts

- (vi) A! O eafitos mu.  
a the self.NOM mine  
‘A! Myself.’

This is consistent, and thus strengthens the conclusion that *o eafitos mu* can have logophoric usages, hence be anteceded by point of view holders, here the speaker (as is found with Chinese *ziji*, Japanese *zibun*, English *myself*; see Charnavel 2020 for further discussion).

s-ton eafto tu<sub>i</sub>.

to-the self.ACC. his.GEN

‘Petros’s mother looked at the mirror and saw a snake next to himself.’

- b. \*Kitazodas tus idjus s-ton kathrefti, o Janis<sub>i</sub> simfonise me ti Maria<sub>j</sub> oti to fidhi den  
looking the same at-the mirror the John.NOM agreed.3SG with the Maria.ACC that the snake not  
ine dipla s-ton eafto tus<sub>i+j</sub>.  
be.3SG next to-the self their  
‘Looking at them in the mirror, John agreed with Mary that the snake is not next to themselves.’

Furthermore, if we consider other adjuncts, they readily tolerate anaphoric *o eaftos mu*. This is exemplified in (23a). In such cases, *o eaftos mu* must, given the interpretation, be a reflexive anaphor, not a logophor, a conclusion corroborated by the fact that it needs a c-commanding antecedent, (23b), and it cannot have split-antecedents, (23c).

- (23) a. O vuleftis<sub>i</sub> shimatise kivernisi horis ton eafto tu<sub>i</sub> mesa.  
the MP.NOM formed.3SG government.ACC without the self.GEN his.GEN in  
‘The MP formed a government without himself in it.’
- b. \* [I mitera [tu vulefti]<sub>i</sub>] eftiakse kivernisi horis ton eafto tu<sub>i</sub> mesa.  
the mother.NOM the MP.GEN made.3SG government.ACC without the self.GEN his.GEN in  
‘The MP’s mother organized a government without himself in it.’
- c. \* I Maria<sub>i</sub> ipe oti o vuleftis<sub>j</sub> ithele na shimatise kivernisi horis ton eafto  
the Maria.NOM said that the MP.NOM wanted.3SG na form.3SG government.ACC without the self.GEN  
tus<sub>i+j</sub> mesa.  
them.GEN in  
‘Maria said that the MP wanted to form a government without themselves in it.’

These facts again speak against the idea that as part of the reflexivization mechanism, the *self*-noun of *o eaftos mu* must undergo incorporation into the verb (*pace* Anagnostopoulou and Everaert 1999, Patel-Grosz 2013, Spathas 2010, but in agreement with Sportiche 2022), as we would expect all instances of *o eaftos mu* inside adjunct PPs to be ill formed. Of course it remains to explain what the difference is between the adjunct PPs that allow *o eaftos mu* and those that do not but we set this issue aside for future research, as it relies on details about the internal structure of the various locative PPs that fall beyond the scope of the current paper (but see Angelopoulos and Bassel 2019 who argue that the distribution of *o eaftos mu* in locative PPs is consistent with Condition A).<sup>10</sup> This said, remark as a final note that similar challenges are posed for *self*-incorporation by cases in which anaphoric *o eaftos mu* occurs in standard island configurations different than PP adjuncts, for example the second conjunct of the coordinate structure in (24a). As before, *o eaftos mu* needs a c-commanding antecedent, (24b), and it does not accept split-antecedents (29b):

- (24) a. O Janis parighile mia bira ja tin Ann-Mari ce mia ja ton eafto tu.  
the John.NOM ordered.3SG a beer.ACC for the Ann-Mari.ACC and one for the self.ACC his.GEN  
‘John ordered one beer for Ann-Marie and one for himself.’

<sup>10</sup> See also Bassel (2018) for the distribution of the Hebrew reflexives in locative PPs.

- b. \* [I mitera [tu Jani]<sub>i</sub>] parighile mia bira ja tin Ann-Mari ce mia ja **ton**  
the mother.NOM the John.GEN ordered.3SG a beer.ACC for the Ann-Mari.ACC and one for the  
**eafto tu**.  
self.ACC his.GEN  
‘John’s mother ordered one beer for Ann-Marie and one for himself.’
- c. \* I Eleana<sub>i</sub> ipe oti o Janis<sub>j</sub> ithele na parighili mia bira ja tin  
the Eleana.NOM said.3SG that the John.GEN wanted.3SG na order.3SG a beer.ACC for the  
Ann-Mari ce mia ja **ton eafto tus<sub>i+j</sub>**.  
Ann-Mari.ACC and one for the self.ACC their.GEN  
‘Eleana said that John wanted to order one beer for Ann-Mari and one for themselves.’

Such cases are well-formed even though movement is blocked. The c-command facts in (24b) and the ban on split antecedents in (24c) suggests that it is not being like a logophor in such cases. Instead *o eaftos mu* in this case must have the anaphoric usage.

## 6 Nominative *o eaftos mu*

We now turn to nominative *o eaftos mu* which, remarkably, can be anaphoric. In this case, nominative *o eaftos mu* has the following properties which distinguish it from the non-anaphoric use: (a) it is compatible with properties of concrete objects, e.g. *jimnos, vamenos* ‘naked, painted’, (b) it can only occur in derived subject positions (as is reported in Anagnostopoulou and Everaert 1999). Anagnostopoulou and Everaert argue that this latter property cannot be accounted in terms of reconstruction of *o eaftos mu* into its base position and conclude that the licensing of *o eaftos mu* can therefore not be reduced to the standard Condition A. We argue otherwise, reducing the difference between this Greek anaphor and English anaphors like *himself* which cannot be nominative precisely to a difference in reconstructability. This is in part possible because surveys we conducted with native speakers of Greek do not support some of the judgments reported in Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1995). The conclusion is that the anaphoric instances of nominative *o eaftos mu* do not require any special treatment.

### 6.1 Nominative *o eaftos mu* at first sight

The following examples illustrate a few anaphoric instances of *o eaftos mu* in nominative case. As previously, the presence of predicates *jimnos/ vamenos* ‘naked, painted’ or *kodos* ‘short’ precludes the reified use:

- (25) a. **O eaftos mu<sub>i</sub>** dhen mu<sub>i</sub> aresi jimnos/ vamenos.  
the self.NOM mine.GEN not 1SG.DAT like.3SG naked painted  
‘Myself is not appealing to me naked/painted.’

- b. Ithela na skefto kati astio ce amesos **o eaftos mu<sub>i</sub>** mu<sub>i</sub> irthe  
 wanted.1SG na think.1SG something funny and immediately the self.NOM mine.GEN 1SG.DAT came  
 s-to nu jimnos/ vamenos.  
 to-the mind naked painted  
 ‘I wanted to think of something funny and immediately myself came to me/my mind naked/ painted.’
- c. **O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** tu<sub>i</sub> fenete kodos s-ton kathrefti.  
 the self.NOM his.GEN 3SG.M.DAT seem.3SG short in-the mirror  
 ‘His self seems to him to be short in the mirror.’

Note first that these cannot be instances of a logophoric usage because nominative *o eaftos mu* cannot be licensed by a non-c-commanding antecedent, (26a), and does not permit split-antecedents, (26b).

- (26) a. \***O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** dhen (tis) aresi [ tis miteras [tu Jorghu<sub>i</sub>]] jimnos/ vamenos.  
 the self.NOM his.GEN not 3.SG.DAT like.3SG the mother.GEN the George.GEN naked/ painted  
 ‘Himself is not appealing to George’s mother naked/painted.’
- b. \*O Janis<sub>i</sub> pistevi oti i Maria<sub>j</sub> theli **o eaftos tus<sub>i+j</sub>** na fenete leptos  
 the John.NOM believe.3SG that the Maria.NOM want.3SG the self.NOM their.GEN na seem.3SG thin  
 s-tis fotografies.  
 in-the photos  
 ‘John believes that Mary wants themselves to look thin in the photos.’

Importantly, in its surface position, *o eaftos mu* is not c-commanded by its antecedent in (25) raising the question of how exactly Condition A is satisfied. Looking at psych constructions, we propose that the mechanism via which Condition A is satisfied is simply (total) reconstruction.

## 6.2 Nominative *o eaftos mu* and reconstruction

Let us begin with the example below, repeated from previously, which illustrates a Class III psych predicate in the typology of Belletti and Rizzi (1988). Class III predicates as *aresi* ‘appeals to’ take a dative experiencer and a nominative theme as arguments and, as shown below, the theme can corefer with the experiencer (cf. Anagnostopoulou 1999).

- (27) **O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** dhen tu aresi [ tu Jorghu<sub>i</sub> ] jimnos/ vamenos.  
 the self.NOM his.GEN not 3SG.M.DAT like.3SG the George.GEN naked painted  
 ‘George naked/ painted is not appealing to him.’

As usual the presence of *jimnos*, *vamenos* ‘naked, painted’ precludes the reified usage of *o eaftos mu* in this (cf. also 26a), and subsequent examples in this section. Following extensive previous literature (cf. Belletti and Rizzi 1988, 2012, Pesetsky 1995, Landau 2009 i.a.), we assume that the theme enters the derivation lower than the experiencer, as illustrated in the structure below:

(28) [<sub>vP</sub> Experiencer [<sub>v</sub> [<sub>VP</sub> V Theme<sub>Target/ Subject Matter</sub>]]]

The theme *o eaftos mu* subsequently undergoes A-movement into its surface position in (27). Since A-movement can totally reconstruct (cf. Fox 2000, Sportiche 2005, Sportiche 2017) binding is possible under total reconstruction into its base position where it is c-commanded by the experiencer.<sup>11</sup> In what follows, we provide near minimal pairs differing in whether nominative *o eaftos mu* is generated below or above a potential binder and show that binding is permitted only when it is moved from below such a potential binder, as expected if binding is only possible via reconstruction. In order to illustrate this pattern, we examine Class II psych predicates. These are predicates that are ambiguously realized either as eventive or as stative. In both cases, they select an accusative DP argument interpreted as an experiencer and a nominative DP. The nominative DP is construed as an agent or a causer if and only if the psych verb is eventive, whereas it is construed as a theme<sub>Target/ Subject Matter</sub> if and only if the psych verb is stative (cf. Alexiadou and Iordăchioaia 2014). In Greek furthermore, Alexiadou and Iordăchioaia show that clitic doubling is strictly obligatory with the stative reading (see also Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2019, 11 for similar claims).<sup>12</sup>

- (29) a. O Jorghos (tin<sub>i</sub>) stenohorise tin Maria<sub>i</sub> (skopima/ ghrighora).  
 the John.NOM 3SG.F.ACC saddened.3SG the Maria.ACC on purpose fast  
 ‘John annoyed Maria on purpose/fast.’
- b. I katastasi tis miteras tu \*(ton<sub>i</sub>) stenohorise ton Jorgho<sub>i</sub>  
 the state.NOM the mother.GEN his.GEN 3SG.F.ACC saddened.3SG the George.ACC  
 (\*skopima/\*ghrighora).  
 on purpose/fast  
 ‘The state of his mother saddened George (\*on purpose/\*fast).’ modified from Alexiadou and Iordăchioaia 2014, (19b)

The verb in (29a) is eventive, as suggested by the fact that it is compatible with an event-oriented modifier, namely, *ghrighora* ‘fast’. The nominative subject of the verb is an agent, and so the verb is compatible with the agent modifier

<sup>11</sup> As an anonymous reviewer points out, it is well known that reconstruction of the theme argument lower than the experiencer is also possible in English, as shown below for pronominal binding (much literature, e.g. Reinhart and Reuland 1991 and Pesetsky 1987 report the same for reflexive binding but do not independently control for the reflexive not being logophoric)

(vii) The bad grades he<sub>i</sub> got worry every student<sub>i</sub>.

This suggests that the experiencer is merged, as in Greek, lower than the theme, and also rules out the (unlikely) possibility that *\*Himself worries John* is ill-formed due to differences in how argument structure is projected in the two languages.

<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, Clitic Doubling of the experiencer is not allowed if the nominative theme undergoes relativization, just as shown below:

- (viii) I spudhes \*(tin) endiaferun tin Maria.  
 the studies.NOM 3SG.F.ACC interest.PL the Maria.ACC  
 ‘Maria is not interested in studies.’
- (ix) [I spudhes pu (\*tin) endiaferun tin Maria] ine i anthropistikes.  
 the studies.NOM that 3SG.F.ACC interest.3PL the Maria.ACC are the humanities.NOM  
 ‘The studies that Mary is interested in are the humanities.’



*skopima* ‘on purpose’. In contrast, as noted by Alexiadou and Iordăchioaia (2014), the non-agentive (inanimate) subject in (29b), that is, *i katastasi tis miteras tu* ‘his mother state’ is not an agent or a causer. Instead, it ‘[...] is understood as a prolonged homogeneous object of emotion whose perception triggers a prolonged psychological state in the experiencer.’ Now since the experiencer is in a state, the psych verb in this case is stative too, and so it resists modification by the agentive modifier, *skopima* ‘on purpose’, and the eventive one, *ghrighora* ‘fast’. As noted, clitic doubling of the experiencer is obligatory only in (29b) under the stative usage of the verb. On the other hand, the verb is eventive in (29a), and, as shown, clitic doubling is optional.

Examples (30) and (31) below show that if the nominative DP is a reflexive, the experiencer must obligatorily be clitic doubled, showing that the psych verb must be used statively:

- (30) a. \***O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** jimnos aidhiaz/ provlimatizi ton Jorgho<sub>i</sub>.  
the self.NOM his.GEN naked disgust.3SG trouble.3SG the George.ACC  
‘Himself naked disgusts/troubles George.’
- b. **O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** jimnos ton aidhiaz/ provlimatizi ton Jorgho<sub>i</sub>.  
the self.NOM his.GEN naked 3SG.M.ACC disgust.3SG trouble.3SG the George.ACC  
‘George is disgusted/troubled with himself naked.’
- (31) a. \***O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** jimnos enohli ton Jorgho<sub>i</sub>.  
the self.NOM his.GEN naked annoy.3SG the George.ACC  
‘Himself naked annoys troubles George.’
- b. **O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub>** jimnos ton enohli ton Jorgho<sub>i</sub>.  
the self.NOM his.GEN naked 3SG.M.ACC annoy.3SG the George.ACC  
‘George is annoyed with himself naked.’

This pattern of data follows if, as is standard for the eventive case, the agent/causer subject is associated with a position as highest argument of the VP, thus above the theme, and is thus not in position to satisfy condition A under reconstruction, when reflexive.

- (32) [<sub>VP</sub> Agent/Causer [<sub>v'</sub> v [<sub>VP</sub> Experiencer [<sub>v<sub>exp</sub></sub> [<sub>VP</sub> V ....]]]]]

In the stative case on the other hand, the reflexive is associated with an argument position lower than that of the theme as in (28), is subsequently moved and can totally reconstruct under this theme. In sum, a nominative reflexive is licensed if and only if it has moved from under a potential binder, and is thus able to reconstruct, if needed.

The contrast in (31) was confirmed in a questionnaire run with fifteen native speakers of Modern Greek. The questionnaire was based on a 5-point Likert scale, 5 the best. The results, reported below, show that the structure in (31b) is the only one that is accepted by the speakers with a nominative reflexive.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> With or without *jimnos* ‘naked,’ the experiencer is obligatorily doubled suggesting that *o eaftos mu* can only be an anaphor in (30) and (31). It remains unclear to us why the reified usage is not allowed in this case.

	Nominative DP argument	
<i>O eaftos mu</i>	(31a)	(31b)
Survey Results	Average=1.5, Standard Deviation=0.73	Average=4.7, Standard Deviation=0.45

Table 1: Nominative Anaphors.

These conclusions can be corroborated by considerations independent from reflexives, namely pronominal binding patterns. Just like reflexive binding in psych verb constructions, a possessive pronoun hosted in the nominative DP argument of a Class II psych verb can be bound by a QP experiencer only if the latter is clitic doubled, supporting the idea that binding by the accusative experiencer is possible only if the nominative argument is a theme<sub>Subject Matter</sub> entering the derivation lower than the experiencer, as shown in the postulated structural analysis in (28):<sup>14,15</sup>

- (33) a. \*Ta pedhja tis<sub>i</sub> enohlun tin kathe mitera<sub>i</sub>.  
the kids.NOM her.GEN annoy.3PL the every mother.ACC  
'Her kids annoy every mother.'
- b. Ta pedhja tis<sub>i</sub> tin enohlun tin kathe mitera<sub>i</sub>.  
the kids.NOM her.GEN 3SG.F.ACC annoy.3PL the every mother.ACC  
'Every mother is annoyed with her kid.'

Another case in which a pronoun contained in a nominative argument can be bound by an accusative quantifier is illustrated in (34a). This case is different from the ones in (33) in that the Clitic Doubled accusative is a theme and the nominative argument is an agent, rather than an experience and a theme<sub>Subject Matter</sub>. Different analyses have been proposed to account for the fact that an object can bind into the subject position;<sup>16</sup> Angelopoulos (2019) proposes

<sup>14</sup> Pronominal binding by the experiencer into nominative theme is also possible in the corresponding Italian constructions (cf. Belletti and Rizzi 1988).

<sup>15</sup> An anonymous reviewer points out the following well formed example:

- (x) To mono pragma pu enohli ton Giani<sub>i</sub> ine o eaftos tu<sub>i</sub> gimnos  
the only thing.NOM that bother.3SG the John is the self.NOM his.GEN naked  
'The only thing<sub>k</sub> that t<sub>k</sub> annoys John is himself naked.'

This example might be taken to undermine the hypothesis that *o eaftos mu* requires a local c-commanding antecedent but in fact the opposite is true. A full discussion is beyond the scope of this article but note that this example belongs to the class of pseudo-cleft constructions discussed e.g. in Sharvit (1999) (see also Sportiche 2017). Sharvit (1999) shows that the connectivity effect observed - *o eaftos tu gimnos* behaves as if it was in the position marked t<sub>k</sub> in the transaltion - are specifically due to the properties of the verb *be* which "identifies" this focus with the head of the relative clause, raised from the position t<sub>k</sub>. Now if t<sub>k</sub> did not mark a position from which total reconstruction under the experiencer was possible, the reflexive would be deviant. Indeed, this prediction is borne out in the following example:

- (xi) \*To mono pragma pu kani ton Giani<sub>i</sub> eksalo ine o eaftos tu<sub>i</sub> gimnos  
the only thing.NOM that make.3SG the John upset is the self.NOM his.GEN naked  
'The only thing<sub>k</sub> that t<sub>k</sub> makes John upset is himself naked.'

Modulo this property of *be*, this pattern in fact strengthens the hypothesis that c-command of the reflexive by its antecedent is required.

<sup>16</sup> See Angelopoulos (2019) for an overview).

that a clitic doubled object, that is, *to kathe phedi* ‘every kid’ in (34a), undergoes A-scrambling into a middle field position higher than Spec vP. Under this view, the clitic doubled object can bind from the middle-field A-position where it has moved into Spec vP where the agent subject is reconstructed. On the other hand, note that a nominative *o eaftos mu* that is interpreted as an agent, as in (34b), cannot be bound by the clitic doubled theme object suggesting that bound pronouns and bound anaphors crucially differ. This needs to be explained.

- (34) a. I mitera tu<sub>i</sub> \*(to) peripiithike to kathe pedhi<sub>i</sub>.  
the mother.NOM his 3SG.N.ACC took care.3SG the every kid.ACC  
‘His mother took care of every kid.’
- b. \*O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub> (ton) peripiithike ton Jorgho.  
the self.NOM his 3SG.M.ACC took care.3SG the George.ACC  
‘\*Himself took care of George.’

Without getting into too much detail, this difference would follow under the approach defended in Charnavel and Sportiche (2021) and Charnavel and Sportiche (2022), the *him* of *himself* (and by extension the *tu* of *o eaftos tu*) is not directly bound by the antecedent of the anaphor. Rather this pronoun is one of the two arguments of *self* and the antecedent of the anaphor (here *Jorgho*=*George*) is first merged as the other argument of *self*, and is thus referentially identified with the pronoun (here *his*=*tu*) by the head noun *self* - i.e.  $self(his, George) \rightarrow his_k = George_k$ . This argument is subsequently remerged in the theta position of the antecedent (here it would be the subject of *take care of*). Defending this analysis here is beyond the scope of the present article but it has one virtue: such a derivation prevents an antecedent from ever being thematically lower than the anaphor it binds, since movement cannot be to a lower position, and thereby excludes such examples as (34b). Note incidentally that because the anaphor contains a trace of its antecedent, such derivations require anaphors to totally reconstruct (which, as we will see with English anaphors in the next section, is not always possible, yielding ill-formedness).

### 6.3 Greek vs. English anaphors

We concluded that an anaphoric nominative *o eaftos mu* being allowed only as a derived subject can be accounted for under the assumption that *o eaftos mu* is licensed via reconstruction into its base position. But if this is correct, why is it that the English counterpart of the Greek nominative anaphors cases are ill formed? This we propose can be attributed to the difference in internal structure between English reflexives and Greek reflexives: as Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1995) argues, the latter are regular DPs, while the former are (modified) pronouns. And pronouns can be independently shown never to (totally<sup>17</sup>) reconstruct when A-moved, unlike regular DPs, albeit they do when A-bar moved. Greek anaphors have a transparent structure since they are composed exactly like regular DPs, the head

<sup>17</sup> Throughout, the needed reconstruction of anaphors is total: it must be fully interpreted in the scope of its potential binder to be bindable by it. See footnote 17.

noun simply being *eafto/self* instead of some other common noun. English *himself/herself/yourself* on the other hand do not have a uniform transparent structure and in fact behave like pronouns and unlike DPs with overt nouns, as Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1995) note, citing examples due to Ingria (1982, 65-66) which show they obligatorily precede particles in verb particle constructions (in the absence of strong accent on the pronoun):

- (35) a. Elie turned him/her/you in.  
 b. \* Elie turned in him/her/you.
- (36) a. Elie turned himself/herself/yourself in.  
 b. \* Elie turned in himself/herself/yourself.

This means *himself* is headed by *him*, with *self* an adjunct/modifier to *him*. In addition, *yourself*, *herself* *ourselves*,... do not behave like simple possessive DPs, unlike inalienable or idiomatic elements. While a possessed noun can be elided as shown by such sentences as (37a), the noun *self* cannot be as illustrated in (37b)-(37c). This shows that *self* is not simply a possessed noun neither in *himself*, *themselves* as the morphology of the pronouns suggest, but also in *myself*, *yourself*, *ourselves*, *yourselves* despite the morphology (which of course raises the question of the exact internal structure of such items).<sup>18</sup>

- (37) a. You lost your book/way/mind and I lost mine.  
 b. \* You saw yourself and she saw hers. (meaning herself)  
 c. \* She saw herself and we saw ours.

We can now attribute the lack of reconstruction for English reflexives to an independent descriptive generalization about pronoun movement and reconstruction: quite generally, A-moved (definite) pronouns cannot totally reconstruct (see Sportiche 2005, for discussion of why such a generalization might hold). This is illustrated in the following examples:

- (38) a. \*  $He_k$  seems to  $John_k$ 's father to be  $t_k$  happy. (see also Lebeaux 2009)

<sup>18</sup> We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing to our attention an additional point that further supports our claim that the Greek reflexive is a plain DP whereas the English one is a pronoun. This point is illustrated in the pair in (xii) where we show that in contrast to the English reflexive cases, *o eaftos mu* behaves like a plain possessive DP, (xiiia), in that it allows nominal ellipsis (xiiib) (contrast it with English *\*Mary saw herself but Sue didn't see her own*):

- (xii) a. I Ana katighori to afediko tis ce o Adreas to diko tu.  
 the Anna.NOM blame.3SG the boss.ACC her.GEN and the Adreas.NOM the own his.GEN  
 'Anna blames her boss, and Adreas his own.'
- b. I Ana katighori **ton eafto tis** ce o Adreas to diko tu.  
 the Anna.NOM blame.3SG the self.ACC her.GEN and the Adreas.NOM the own his.GEN  
 'Anna blames herself, and Adreas his own.'

- b. \*John<sub>k</sub> expected him<sub>k</sub> to seem to me t<sub>k</sub> to be intelligent.

Chomsky (1995, 327)

These sentences are all deviant. The first one is a condition C violation. If total reconstruction of the pronoun were possible, the pronoun would have the option of being interpreted only in its trace position and the sentence could thus be binding theoretically equivalent to *it seems to John<sub>k</sub>'s father that he<sub>k</sub> is happy*, which is well formed. Similarly, the second is a Principle B violation. If total reconstruction of the pronoun were possible in the second, the result would be binding theoretically equivalent to *John<sub>k</sub> expected that it would seem to me that he<sub>k</sub> is intelligent*, which is also well formed.<sup>19</sup> Finally, in light of the last paragraph of section 6.2 outlining the approach found in Charnavel and Sportiche (2021) and Charnavel and Sportiche (2022), here is a rough sketch of how Greek and English would differ. The basic structure is similar in Greek and English but the derived structure pronoun/DP is slightly different. *Self* is the (near – because of proxies – ignored here) identity function:  $self(x) = x$ . It is used predicatively in a small clause:  $[y\ self(x)]$  meaning ‘y is the self of x’, that  $y = x$ . A basic structure would thus start with the small clause:  $[John\ [the\ self\ of\ him]]$ , which must be turned into a DP to occur in an (individual) argument position. This is where Greek and English differ. In Greek, this is done by predicate relativization to form: *the self of him [John t]* (with *John* subsequently moved as described in section 6.2). In English, relativization (overt or head internal) is used yielding *him [John self t]* (with *John* subsequently moved).

#### 6.4 Nominative *o eaftos mu*: alternative accounts

Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1995) does not adopt a reconstruction approach. First the theoretical context was one in which reconstruction was often assumed to be unavailable for A-movement, an assumption that no longer holds. In addition, it presents the following data in order to exclude an analysis in terms of reconstruction:

- (39) a. O eaftos tu<sub>i</sub> tu aresi tu Petru<sub>i</sub>/ s-ton Petro<sub>i</sub>.  
the self.NOM his.GEN 3SG.M.DAT appeal.3SG the Peter.DAT to-the Peter.ACC  
‘Himself appeals to Peter.’

- b. \*? Kathe jineka<sub>i</sub> tu aresei tu adra tis<sub>i</sub>.  
every woman.NOM 3SG.M.DAT appeal.3SG the husband.DAT her.GEN  
‘Every woman appeals to her husband.’

- c. Kathe jineka<sub>i</sub> aresei s-ton adra tis<sub>i</sub>.  
every woman.NOM appeal.3SG to-the husband.ACC her.GEN  
‘Every woman appeals to her husband.’

Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1995, (20))

<sup>19</sup> Note that A-bar moved pronouns however can reconstruct: A-bar moved pronouns do not trigger Condition C (or a Strong Crossover effect), viz. the well formedness of the following sentence in English.

- (xiii) Him<sub>k</sub>, John<sub>k</sub> thinks that you should invite t<sub>k</sub>.

In conclusion, A-moved pronouns cannot totally reconstruct while A-bar moved pronouns may.

(39b) and (39c) differ in how the experiencer is realized, a dative DP in the first one, a PP in the second one. The contrast between them is analyzed as a WCO effect and is taken to support the hierarchy below where the experiencer is introduced in two structurally distinct positions depending on whether it is realized as a dative or a PP:

$$(40) \quad \text{Dative}_{\text{Experiencer}} > \text{Nominative} > \text{PP}_{\text{Experiencer}}$$

Anagnostopoulou and Everaert argue as follows: first, the preverbal subject position in Greek is an A-bar Topic position. In (39c), WCO is obviated because the nominative QP is able to bind from its base position into the PP experiencer which, as shown in (40), is merged lower in the hierarchy. WCO cannot be obviated with a dative experiencer in (39b) because the only position from which the dative could be bound into by the nominative is the preverbal position of subjects. This position being an A-bar position in Greek, such binding yields a WCO effect.

First, the assumption that the preverbal subject is not in, or does not transit through, a high A-position is hard to maintain (see also Oikonomou et al. 2020 for independent arguments from scope that preverbal subjects occupy - or transit through - an A-position). Indeed, it is possible to bind pronouns inside high adjuncts as shown below, something that should not be possible from an A-bar position:<sup>20</sup>

- (41) a. Kathe aghori<sub>i</sub> troi pio sihna apo tin adherfi tu<sub>i</sub> spanaki.  
 every boy.NOM eat.3SG more often than the sister.ACC his.GEN spinach.ACC  
 ‘Every boy more often than his sister eats spinach.’
- b. \*I Maria proskali pio sihna apo tin aderfi tu<sub>i</sub> kathe aghori<sub>i</sub>.  
 the Maria.NOM invite.3SG more often than the sister.ACC his.GEN every boy.ACC  
 ‘Maria more often than his sister invites every boy.’

Secondly, certain quantifiers such as negative quantifiers normally resist occurring in an A-bar Topic position in a non-generic context, as in (42a) (cf. Alexopoulou 2009). Yet, they readily occur in a preverbal subject position, (42b).

- (42) a. \*Kanenan dhen ton idha cthes.  
 no one.ACC not 3SG.M.ACC saw.1SG yesterday  
 ‘I did not see anyone yesterday.’
- b. Kanenas dhen me idhe cthes.  
 no one.NOM not 1SG.ACC saw.3SG yesterday  
 ‘Noone saw me yesterday.’

But even if the preverbal subject position was in an A-bar position, reconstruction of the reflexive would be allowed, since reconstruction from A-bar position is allowed (see previous section for pronouns, and Angelopoulos and Sportiche 2020 for preposed topics). So the argument against reconstruction only rests on the analysis of the

<sup>20</sup> A reviewer notes that (41b) is possible if the direct object is Clitic Doubled. This is not surprising given that Clitic Doubling can, as is well-known, obviate WCO with the subject (see Anagnostopoulou 2003 and Angelopoulos 2019 for an account).

contrast between (39b) and (39c). It is attributed to WCO but given that the experiencer can be alternatively realized as a bare dative or as a prepositional dative, the contrast may be due to the slight dispreference for bare datives we observed independently (see also in footnote 7 of section 4.1). And indeed, the contrast between (39b) and (39c) seems fragile. Thus, similar sentences are reported as acceptable in more recent literature:

- (43) ?Kathe dhaskala<sub>i</sub> tu aresi tu mathiti tis<sub>i</sub>.  
 every teacher.NOM 3SG.M.DAT appeal.3SG the student.DAT her.GEN  
 ‘Every teacher appeals to her student.’ Michelioudakis (2012, (82b))

To evaluate the robustness of this contrast, we conducted an informal survey with eleven native speakers of Greek to test whether nominative QPs trigger WCO with clitic doubled bare dative experiencers or not. The speakers were asked to judge the acceptability of the following sentence, using a 5-point Likert scale with 5 the best, in a context where there are different movie creators, and each one likes their own movie.

- (44) Kathe tenia<sub>i</sub> tu aresi tu dhimiurghu tis<sub>i</sub>.  
 every movie.NOM 3SG.M.DAT appeal.3SG the creator.DAT her.GEN  
 ‘Every movie appeals to its creator.’

The results are presented in the table below and strongly suggest that nominative QPs do not trigger WCO with dative experiencers (*pace* Anagnostopoulou and Everaert 1995).

	Nominative DP argument
Example	(44)
Survey Results	Average=5, Standard Deviation=0

Table 2: Nominative Anaphors.

These results speak in favor of the hierarchy in (32). In this hierarchy, WCO between a nominative QP and a dative experiencer is obviated via an A-movement step that the first undergoes across the latter, regardless of the dative vs. PP status of the experiencer.

## 7 Clitic Doubling of *o eaftos mu*

Finally, we present a short note suggesting that *o eaftos mu* can be coindexed as a whole with its antecedent, just like what is standardly assumed of anaphors in other languages. This idea was argued against in Iatridou (1988) which

considered as evidence the behavior of clitic doubled *o eaftos mu*. We now discuss this analysis and show that her assessment of the behavior of clitic doubled *o eaftos mu* is confounded by one of her premises, namely that Greek clitics have referential import that matters for binding purposes. If instead clitics are expletive in terms of referential import,<sup>21</sup> the idea that *o eaftos mu* is bound as a whole is unproblematic.

The well-formed instances of clitic doubled *o eaftos mu*, as in (45a), pose an apparent problem if the clitic bears the index of the anaphor and the anaphor as a whole is bound by the subject of the sentence, as illustrated in (45a) again. That is, the clitic which in this case is locally bound by the subject should give rise to a Principle B violation, as in (45b), where, as a bare clitic, it forces disjointness with the subject.

- (45) a. O Jorghos<sub>j</sub> ton<sub>j</sub> aghapai [ **ton eaf**to **tu** ]<sub>j</sub>.  
the George.NOM 3SG.M.ACC love.3SG the self.SG.M.ACC his.GEN  
‘George loves himself.’
- b. O Jorghos<sub>j</sub> ton<sub>k/\*j</sub> aghapai.  
the George.NOM 3SG.M.ACC love.3SG  
‘George loves him.’

To avoid this undesirable result, Iatridou (1988) hypothesizes that *o eaftos mu* is not bound as a whole. Instead, she suggests that only the possessive pronoun, i.e. *tu*, is actually bound by the subject whereas the clitic is co-indexed with the whole DP as shown in (46). Under this view, Principle B is not violated when *o eaftos mu* is clitic doubled because the clitic is not locally bound.

- (46) O Jorghos<sub>j</sub> ton<sub>k</sub> aghapai [ton eaf

to tu<sub>k</sub> ]<sub>k</sub>.  
What is left undiscussed under this analysis is the value of index k. Could it in fact be something different than j, whether there is clitic doubling as in (46) or not as below?

- (47) O Jorghos<sub>j</sub> aghapai [ton eaf

to tu<sub>j</sub> ]<sub>??</sub>.  
If it could, there would be no bar in having as well formed an example such as (48) where what is shown as ?? above is determined by a non-local element:

- (48) \* O Jorghos<sub>j</sub> ipe oti o Adreas<sub>k</sub> ton<sub>j</sub> perighrafi [ **ton eaf**to **tu** ]<sub>k</sub>.  
the Jorghos.NOM said.3SG that the Adreas.NOM 3SG.M.ACC describe.3SG the self.ACC his.GEN  
‘George said that Adreas describes himself.’

But this is of course ill-formed. The intuitive reason is simple: the index of the whole expression *ton eaf*to *tu* must be the same as that of the possessive pronoun *tu*: Adreas is understood to describe Adreas, that is what the direct object

<sup>21</sup> We refer the reader to Tsakali (2006) and Angelopoulos and Sportiche (2020), where this is argued at length by showing that clitics themselves never are relevant for binding theory. One simple French fact discussed therein, namely that accusative clitics can double adjectives as in *Jean le sera, triste* ‘Jean it will-be, sad’ shows at the very least that such clitics need not be individual denoting.



of *describe* denotes. And in fact, in all treatments of the make up of pronoun-self anaphors, the lexical properties of *self* are taken to guarantee that the pronoun and the whole pronoun-self expression have the same index (cf. e.g. Sauerland (2013) for a recent version), and both have the same index as the antecedent (a widespread view, but not the only one, taking that *self* is an identity function mapping its possessor onto itself).

If *tu* and *ton eafto tu* necessarily have the same index (*pace* Iatridou 1988), (48) is predicted to be ruled out as an impossible interpretation. This being the case, why isn't there a Condition B violation in example (45a)? Angelopoulos and Sportiche (2020) argue that clitics are markers lacking the kind of referential import that matters for binding purposes. Thus, (45a) does not require any special treatment as it is from a binding perspective equivalent to cases as (49) where the anaphor is bound directly by the subject.

- (49) O Jorghos<sub>i</sub> aghapai [ **ton eafto** **tu<sub>i</sub>** ].  
the George.NOM love.3SG the self.SG.M.ACC his.GEN  
'George loves himself.'

Now why is there a Condition B violation in (45b)? Angelopoulos and Sportiche (2020) show that this is due to what the clitic doubles, namely a silent pronoun (*pro*). Quite generally, this illustrates that what matters for the binding theory in general, and for condition B in particular is not the clitic, but the DP doubled by the clitic.

From all this we conclude that there is no independent argument that the anaphor *ton eafto tu* is not bound as a whole and further that if the pronoun *tu* is bound by its antecedent, the whole *ton eafto tu* must be as well.<sup>22, 23</sup>

As to why the index on the whole anaphor and the index on its possessor have to be the same, all analyses of the internal structure of say *her-self* from Helke (1971) to and including Charnavel and Sportiche (2021) or Charnavel and Sportiche (2022) mentioned in section 6.2 and section 6.3 assume referential identity between *her* and *herself* is asserted by the presence of *self*.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Note in particular that lack of feature agreement is not a counter argument to this conclusion: as Collins and Postal (2012) show (see e.g. p.18 for numerous examples) the features of an anaphor (or of a pronoun for that matter) need not agree with those of its antecedent. And in fact, this is one standard view (not quite ours) for English: in *I saw myself*, *myself* = *my self*, 3rd person singular, with a first person antecedent. More generally, we take it that binding requires that, at the level of interpretation, the anaphor and the antecedent be semantically covalued (have the same index). Sometimes this will require agreement (because of Heim's 1991 principle of 'Maximize Presupposition') but not always as Collins and Postal document. As the text indicates, covaluation here is easily achieved by the standard assumptions about self that would extend to *eafto*: it is the identity function mapping its argument into a nominal with the same reference:  $||\text{ton eafto } \mu|| = ||\mu||$ .

<sup>23</sup> Note also that our analysis of nominative *ton eafto mu* might appear to counterexemplify the anaphor-agreement effect of Rizzi (1990), but a finer analysis of this effect is now needed given our analysis of the internal structure of *ton eafto mu*, a topic for future research.

<sup>24</sup> Note that the result  $[\text{ton eafto } tu_k]_k$  is an i-within-i condition violation but one that is innocuous as it is well-known - cf. e.g. Buring (2005) - that binding constraints apply to presupposed coreference or covaluation, not asserted coreference or covaluation as is the case here via *eafto/self*. This of course does not apply to the reified use of *self*: we get  $[\text{ton eafto } tu_k]_m$   $k \neq m$  as the whole DP is not covalued with the pronoun, but denotes the 'self' of the pronoun's referent.

## 8 Conclusion

The paper argued in favor of a standard treatment of *o eaftos mu* in terms of Condition A. It distinguished different usages of *o eaftos mu*, an anaphoric, a non-anaphoric, and a logophoric one, and proposed diagnostics to distinguish them. Using these diagnostics systematically, it showed that anaphoric *o eaftos mu* does not display a behavior that requires special treatment in subject and oblique argument positions, in locative PPs or clitic doubling: anaphoric *o eaftos mu* is allowed as a dative object. This fact together with the observation that obliques are strong islands for extraction were taken to speak against the idea that *self* incorporation is part of the reflexivization mechanism. This conclusion was corroborated in light of data showing that anaphoric *o eaftos mu* is possible in other configurations that block movement, e.g. coordinate structures and adjuncts. As for subject *o eaftos mu*, it was shown that under the anaphoric usage, it is possible in derived subject positions only. The paper argues that Condition A is satisfied via reconstruction. The English reflexive is not allowed in derived subject positions because in contrast to *o eaftos mu*, a run-of-the-mill definite DP, the English reflexive is headed by pronouns which resist reconstruction from A-positions. Lastly, with clitics lacking referential content, clitic doubling does not present any challenge to the idea that anaphoric *o eaftos mu* is bound as a whole, just as is standardly assumed for the English reflexive.

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