云时代DDoS溯源实践与解析

金山云高级安全产品经理梁洋洋





网名: bt0sea 海啸 Freebuf特约作者

个人公众号: GSGSoft

个人微信号: lyyer2010



目前研究领域:抗D产品、WAF、蜜罐、服务器安全、AI #C++ #Python #vue.js

Symantec SE 青藤云安全产品经理 长亭科技产品经理 金山云安全高级产品经理



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公有云溯源系统简介

Part 2

DDoS事件溯源实践

Part3

金山云高防服务介绍

Part4






面对行业内恶意竞争,为高防用户提供攻击证据链技术支持,方便警方立案

购买高防服务期间,降低用户遭受DDoS攻击峰值,减少高防支出









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C&2外联获取



攻击数据获取

4层攻击数据获取

7层攻击数据获取



攻击数据清洗

4层攻击源伪造处理

CC攻击特征分析



攻击样本获取

攻击源定向渗透



控制端溯源

逆向分析

C&C Server渗透

威胁情报溯源

身份溯源



团伙溯源

社交关系分档

行业竞争分析

商业攻击事件溯源报告

向警方提供攻击证据链



7层CC防护日志

路由追踪系统

自动化分析脚本

商业威胁情报溯源API

溯源分析平台&情报交换系统


攻击数据获取
















域名溯源

M3溯源项目能力

渗透测试小组(国家队)

逆向分析小组

情报分析小组

法律问题

渗透IoT设备

司边资源分析

只下载攻击样本

合作方

公安部

公有云厂商

拥有安全数据资 源专业公司





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


1、XXX用户在2017年10月29日 22:38,发现高防IP连接数 10万+,用户才3000多连接数, 攻击类型为CC攻击

2、获取转发系统上对应时间的访问日志&统计频率 Top1000

```
377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (
88 387 - [29/Oct/2017:22:14:11 +0800] "GET http://59.
30 305 - [29/Oct/2017:22:14:11 +0800] "GET http://59
                                                                  377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0
80 270 - [29/Oct/2017:22:14:11 +0800] "GET http://59
                                                                  377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (
80 250 - [29/Oct/2017:22:14:11 +0800] "GET http://59
                                                                  377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (
                                                                  377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (
 660 - [29/Oct/2017:22:14:11 +0800] "GET http://59.
                                                                 377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (
 524 - [29/Oct/2017:22:14:11 +0800] "GET http://59.1
                                                                 377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (
                                                                  377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (
 250 - [29/Oct/2017:22:14:11 +0800] "GET http://59.
                                                                  377 499 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0
 1057 - [29/Oct/2017:22:14:11 +0800] "GET http://59.1
```





溯源实践-Demo

3、由于CC是建立session连接,略过伪造源检测步骤, 攻击源IP回扫,寻找服务特征: IoT设备。 通过DVR漏洞远程得到root访问权限。

4、查询网络连接状态(netstat)&获取攻击样本, 发现C&C服务器

					_
	product	 address 		• num	۰
1		195."	42.58	22	
2		96.8	5.158	4	
3		218.	0.162	3	
4		122.	284.82	3	
5		172.	8.289	2	
6	Boa httpd	195.	42.58	2	
7	MikroTik bandwidth-test server	31.3	53	1	
8	Web server	94.2	.39	1	
9	VNC	195.	2.58	1	
18		212.	.178	1	
11	JAWS/1.0 Dec 20 2014	103.7	85.33	1	
12	security DVR telnetd	212.	9.168	1	
13	JAWS/1.0 Jun 25 2013	118.	4.148	1	
14	HP Comware switch sshd	211.	44.2	1	
15	security DVR telnetd	109.0	4.87	1	
16		109.1	57.252	1	
17	lighttpd	31.10	1.91	1	
18	Contiki httpd	96.8	رد 158	1	
19	APC SmartUPS http config	195.	42.58	1	
20	HP Comware switch sshd	218.).162	1	
21	lighttpd	195.	2.58	1	
22		188.	3.191	1	
23		88.9	9	1	
24	Microsoft Terminal Service	218.	0.162	1	_
25	DrayTek Vigor 2800-series ADSL router httpd	88.5	9	1	
26	dnsnasq	213.	131.54	1	
27	MySQL	218.7	.162	1	
28	JAWS/1.0 Nov 6 2015	220	2.185	1	
29	uhttpd	96.8	.158	1	
38	JAWS/1.0 Nov 17 2014	108	39.228	1	

Proto Be			ections (servers and Local Address		ress	State	PID/Program name
tco			0.0.0.0:00	0.0.0.0:*		LISTEN	1411/dvr_app
tcp		1 1	197 168 9 3-41184	147.32.112	148 - 6888	SYN SENT	2428/sh
CD			192,168,8,3:68929 192,168,8,3:33921	183, 131, 186		SYN SENT	2447/159
CD			192, 168, 8, 3:33921	192,168,0,1		TIME WAIT	24417.200
CD		- 1	192,168,8,3:68939	183,131,186	-98:88	SYN SENT	2447/159
02		- 1	192,168,8,3:68928	183,131,186	.98:88	SYN SENT	2447/159
CD			192,168,8,3:42692	114,184,64		SYN SENT	2429/sh
tcp	1		192,168,8,3:80	198,12,82,9		CLOSE MATT	1411/dvr_app
tce		1	192,168,8,3:68935	183, 131, 186	.98:88	SYN SENT	2447/159
co		1	192,168,8,3:68925	183, 131, 186	.98188	SYN_SENT SYN SENT	2447/159
t CD	-		192, 168, 8, 5 669.56	185,151,788	98 (89	STR_SENT	24477339
tcp			192.168.8.3:54583		11:50058	ESTABLISHED	2441/159
tcp		- ;	192,168,8,1:68927	183, 131, 186	98-88	SYN_SENT	2447/159
ten			192,168,8,3:68931	183, 131, 186		SYN_SENT	2447/159
CD			192,168,8,3:39436	102,92,214.	787:88	SYN SENT	2428/sh
CO		- 1	192,168,8,3:68937	183,131,186		SYN_SENT	2447/159
tre		1	192,168,8,3:68941	183, 131, 186		SYN SENT	2447/159
tcp		1	192,168,8,3:57978	210,289,72,	18:88	SYN SENT	2423/sh
tcp			192,168,8,3:33926	192,168,0,1	12848	TIME WAIT	-
tco	1		192,168,8,3:80	185,183,96,	9:36332	CLOSE_WAIT	2198/ u7:11
tco			192,168,8,3:33928	192,168,0,1	12848	TIME WAIT	* 15 EST
tcp			192,168,8,3:33929	192,168,0,1	12848	TIME WAIT	
tcp			192,168,8,3:88	139.162.115	.251:39488	ESTABLISHED	1411/dvr_400
tco			192.168.8.3:68924	183.131.184		SYN_SENT	2447/159
tco		1	192,168.8.3:64938	183,131,184		SYN. SENT	2447/159
tcp			192,168.8.3:60922	183.131.186		SYN_SENT	2447/159
tcp			192,168.8.3:48625	215.139.103		SYN_SENT	2420/sh
tcp			192.168.8.3:33924	192.168.0.1		TIME_WAIT	
tcp			192.168.8.3:58677	48.159.48.2		SYN_SENT	2420/sh
tcp		1	192.168.8.3:60938	183.131.184		SYN_SENT	2447/159
tcp		1	192.168.8.3:58313	3.139.167.5	8:88	SYN_SENT	2428/sh
tcp			192.168.8.3:68932	183.131.186	.98:88	SYN_SENT	2447/159
tcp			192.168.8.3:57967	210.289.72.		SYN_SENT	2421/sh
tep		1	192.168.8.3:57968	210.209.72.	10:00	SYN_SENT	2422/sh
tcp		329	192.168.8.3:68976	199.66.72.4	3:00	FIN_WAIT1	-





JAWS/1.0



159/sh

5、逆向分析 159样本

```
pthread_create(&Infolpdate, 0, SendInfo, 0);
pthread_create(&Back_doorA, 0, backdoorA, 0);
pthread_create(&Back_doorA, 0, backdoorA, 0);
y7 = getlocalip();
memcpy(&Rowip, v7, 20);
while (1)
{
    ConnectServer();
    puts("connect server.");
    if ( pid && owner == 1)
    {
        kill(pid, 9);
        StopFlag = 1;
        pid = 0;
    }
    usleep(5000000);
}
```

```
194.4.21150000 -> 72.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.1311449971 -> 192.16.131144991 -> 192.16.131144991 -> 192.16.131144991 -> 192.16.131144991 -> 192.16.131144991
```

```
| Determination | Determinatio
```

沙箱: SendInfo函数会向样本内置的3个cnc 服务器报告当前设备的cpu利用率,当前网 速等信息

backdoorA,backdoorM,_ConnectServer 开头有个很长时间的延时,在15个小时之 后,尝试连接到内置的cnc服务器: 183.60.149.199:48080 bot作为一个样本分发器,用来传播新的 Mirai样本


221.194.44.211:50050 45.34.66.108:50050 43.248.97.251:50050


```
P:\text{"example \cdot 20171182 occan\text{"pk} for \cdot b \text{ 159 pk} \\
\text{Comparison of his list 319 and PK} \\
\text{Comparison of his list 319 and PK} \\
\text{Boundary of his list 319 and PK} \\
\text{Boundary of his list 319 and list 319 and PK} \\
\text{Comparison of his pk} \\
\text{Comparison of his pk} \\
\text{Comparison of his list 319 and UL} \\
\text{Comparison of his list 319 and UL} \\
\text{Comparison of his pk} \\
\text{Comparison of his list 319 and UL} \\
\text{Comparison o
```

TCP_Flood, CC_Flood, CC2_Flood, CC3_Flood.

溯源实践

6、身份溯源





FIT · I=REEBUF

QQ/QQbot

INA/模拟登陆

/



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