Bad For Enterprise

Attacking BYOD Enterprise Mobile Security Solutions

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- 4+ years hacking stuff professionally, specializing in mobile & exotic stuff

Agenda

- 1. iOS Applications in General
- 2. What is BYOD? Why BYOD? Who uses BYOD?
- 3. Security Features of BYOD Solutions
- 4. Good Technology
- 5. iOS Jailbreaks / Attack Vectors
- 6. Story of Alice & Bob
 - Local & Network Attacks against Good EMS

iOS Applications

- > 1.4m Applications¹ in iOS App Store
 - ~10% in Business Category
- 35% of Enterprises have an Enterprise App Store²
- Simple vs Complex Functionality
 - Mobile application capabilities have not caught up with device capabilities
 - Maybe 10% of apps have advanced functionality
 - MDM, Soft Tokens, Payment Applications, HomeKit.



VANTAGEPOINT

https://go.apperian.com/rs/300-EOJ-215/images/Apperian%202016%20Executive%20Enterprise%20Mobility%20Report_FINAL_20160216.pdf?aliId=16373787


BYOD

- BYOD?
 - What and Why?

BYOD

Which mobile security issues are you concerned about?


Multiple responses allowed





BYOD

- BYOD?
 - What and Why?
- BYOD Adoption
 - 74% using or adopting BYOD
 - Governments
- Enterprise Mobile Security
 - MAM (Mobile Application Management)
 - MIM (Mobile Information Management)
 - MDM (Mobile Device Management)



Protection Claims

"prevent employees from opening files in unsecured apps, backing up business data to personal cloud-based services, or copying and pasting business ..."



"Detect OS tampering and other policy violations"

"...remotely lock or wipe the device."


"Protect mobile apps and servers from being hacked..."

Enterprise Mobile Security Features




Password

Encryption



Good Technology

- Acquired by Blackberry in Nov 2015
- Top 5 EMS Solution Providers



As of June 2016

Good Technology

- Acquired by Blackberry in Nov 2015
- Top 5 EMS Solution Providers
- GFE received CC EAL4+ in 2013 and GD solution in 2016
- GD platform used as a foundation to the GCS to replace GFE
- GD platform allows developers to create and distribute apps that integrates with the GD services framework

GFE vs GCS

	GFE	GCS
Email	✓	Good Work
MDM	✓	✓
File Share	Local File Storage Only	Good Share – Access enterprise file share
Instant Messaging	×	Good Connect
Intranet Access	×	Good Access
Cloud Deployment	×	✓
Integrated MAM	×	✓
Common Platform	×	√



iOS Jailbreaks

iOS Versions	7.0	7.1	8.0	8.0	8.1.2	9.0	9.1 5.3.30	
Jail Broken?	evasi0n7	Pangu	Pangu8	TaiG	TaiG	Pangu9	Not Public	Not Public

- Non-Jailbroken Devices?
 - Resign via developer certificate
 - But apps will need to be reactivated

What about root?

- You've got to be root?!
 - Check out Stefan Esser's talk on "iOS 678 Security A Study In F
- Physical Access
 - DROPOUTJEEP (think NSA, GCHQ)
 - Lost Devices / Stolen Devices
- Remote Attacks

(TS//SI//REL) The initial release of DROPOUTJEEP will focus on inst implant via close access methods. A remote installation capability wi for a future release.





Looks like someone removed the harddisk and did not correctly slip it into holes when closing the notebook






¹ http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/vulnerability-management/creating-iphone-rootkits-and-like-the-nsas-dropout-jeep/ ²https://blog.fortinet.com/post/ios-malware-does-exist


Attack Vector

- Not normal pen testing...
 - Not just setting proxy and using Burp
- I'm not attacking the application
- Changing the <u>environment</u> in which the application runs.
- Not new. API Hooking and DLL Injections on Windows.
 - LD_PRELOAD on Linux. I'm just doing it on iOS.


- How do I change the Environment?
- Built an App... More precisely a Dynamic Library (aka tweak)
 - DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=<u>Swizzler</u>
- Loads itself before an application starts
 - Control all functionalities of an application

iOS Security Architecture









→ 🖘	10:36 pm	→ 76% → → → → → → → → → → → → → → → → → → →
Swizzler C C	Common Crypt	to
COMMON CRYPT	FOGRAPHIC ALGO	RITHM
CCCryptorCre	eate	
CCCryptorCre	eateFromData	
CCCryptorUp	date	
CCCrypt		
COMMON HMAC	ALGORITHM INTE	ERFACES
CCHmacInit		
CCHmacUpda	ate	
CCHmacFinal		
CCHmac		
COMMON COVET	LO SHV	

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Swizzler	Foundation	
NSSTRING		
NSString		
NSURL		
NSURL		
NSURLCon	nection	
NSURLCon	nectionDelegate	
NSURLReq	uest	
NSURLSess	sion	
NSURLSess	sionConfiguration	
NSXMLPars	ser	
NIGLIDI CONNE	CTION DROVV	

What else can you control?




Jailbreak

Jailbreak Detection

Container

App DLP



Device PIN


Container Password






Local Attacks











- Device PIN
- ✓ Jailbreak
- Jailbreak Detection
- Container Password
- **X** Container Encryption
- **★** App Wipe / Lock

Blacklist of Files

```
FILE *file = fopen("/Applications/Cydia.app", "r");
  if (file) {
    fclose(file);
    return JAILBROKEN;
  }

file = fopen("/usr/bin/ssh", "r");
  if (file) {
    fclose(file);
    return JAILBROKEN;
  }
```

```
FILE *replaced fopen (const char *filename, const
char *mode) {
    if (blockPath(filename)) {
         errno = ENOENT;
         return NULL;
bool blockPath(const char *fpath) {
NSArray *denyPatterns = [[NSArray alloc]
                   @"Cydia", @"lib/apt",
initWithObjects:
@"/private/var/lib/apt", @"/var/lib/apt",
@"/var/tmp/cydia.log", @"/etc/apt/",
@"/var/cache/apt"
```

Prohibited Functions

```
int pid = fork();

if(pid>=0)
{
    return JAILBROKEN;
}
```

```
pid_t replaced_fork(void){
    if (disableJBDectection()) {
        return -1;
    }
    pid_t ret = orig_fork();
    return ret;
}
```

NSURL openURL

```
if ([[UIApplication sharedApplication] canOpenURL:[NSURL
 URLWithString:@"cydia://package/com.example.package"]])
     return JAILBROKEN;
+ (id)URLWithString:(NSString *)URLString{
    NSRange range = [URLString rangeOfString:@"cydia"
    options:NSRegularExpressionSearch | NSCaseInsensitiveSearch];
    if (range.location != NSNotFound) { return nil; }
    return %orig;
```

Jailbreak Detection

- Jailbreak Detection Methods
 - Blacklist of files
 - Directories
 - Symbolic Links
 - Prohibited Commands
 - File System
 - URL Handles
 - Kernel Parameters


Jailbreak / Policy Implementation

```
GT::GeneralUtilityClass::constructStringList (
    GT::GeneralUtilityClass::tamper detection method t,
    std::vector<std::string, std::allocator<std::string> >
loc 2ddaa8:
   *(r5 + 0x150) = 0x1;
   <u>if ((statfs("/", sp + 0x8c0) != 0x0) || ((stack[1160] & 0x1) != 0x0)) goto loc_2ddace;</u>
loc_2ddc48:
    *(r5 + 0x150) = 0xb;
    r0 = fork();
    if (r0 != 0xffffffff) goto loc_2de498;
```


Jailbreak / Policy Implementation

- GD::GDSecureStorage::handleWrongPwd
- GD::GDSecureStorage::wipeDevice
- GD::PolicyProcessor::processLockAction
- GD::GDLibStartupLayer::checkPartialCompliance
- GD::PolicyComplianceChecker::checkComplianceUnlocked
- GD::PolicyComplianceChecker::checkComplianceLocked






Password Bruteforce









- Device PIN
- ✓ Jailbreak
- Jailbreak Detection
- Container Password
- **X** Container Encryption
- **★** App Wipe / Lock





Disable App Lock &

Device Wipe



Jun 9 10:57:07 iPhone Good[1987]:


Jun 9 10:57:07 iPhone Good[1987]: Jun 9 10:57:07 iPhone Good[1987]: /___/|_/|_//_//_/_/_/

Jun 9 10:57:07 iPhone Good[1987]: ############# Entry Point ############

Jun 9 10:57:07 iPhone Good[1987]: HTTPServer: Started HTTP server on port 80

9 10:57:07 iPhone Good[1987]:





- Device PIN
- ✓ Jailbreak
- Jailbreak Detection
- Container Password
- **X** Container Encryption
- App Wipe / Lock







Containerization

App Wipe / Lock

Container Container Password Encryption







- Device PIN
- ✓ Jailbreak
- Jailbreak Detection
- Container Password
- Container Encryption
- App Wipe / Lock

X Python ● 第1 X bash ● 第2 X Python 第3 X bash 第4


vincent: /Users/vincent/Desktop/iostesting/Good
>>>

Network Attacks




Password

Encryption



Application VPN

GD Network




GD Network Communications

Two methods of communication with the enterprise application server,


1. GDHttpRequest

2. Native URL Loading (NSURL, NSMutableURL, etc.)



GDHttpRequest


- Part of the GD SDK
 - #import <GDNETiOS.h>
- Easy to enable proxy
 - [GDHttpRequest enableHttpProxy:ip withPort:port];
 - [GDHttpRequest disablePeerVerification];



Native URL Loading

- Enabled via GDURLLoadingSystem Class
 - [GDURLLoadingSystem enableSecureCommunication]
- Enabled by default
- Proxying traffic is harder
- Doesn't obey iOS network proxy settings
- Swizzle [NSURLConnection initWithRequest]

Hooking the Network



Does everything suck?

- Local device access is important, but remote attacks possible.
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STIHO2XOOiM
- Be careful of USB chargers. BadUSB.
- Intranet == Internet
- Additional security checks on apps

Take Aways!

- Think outside the box to break the box!
- BYOD Policy helps to a certain extent, but such attacks will always be possible.
- Do not blindly trust what the vendors sell you.
- https://github.com/vtky/swizzler



Thank You!



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