


Chapter 14: Protection






Domain Structure

- Access-right = <object-name, rights-set>
 where rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object
- Domain = set of access-rights








Access Matrix

- □ View protection as a matrix (access matrix)
- Rows represent domains
- Columns represent objects
- Access(i, j) is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain; can invoke on Object;

object domain	F ₁	F ₂	F ₃	printer
<i>D</i> ₁	read		read	
D_2				print
D_3		read	execute	
D_4	read write		read write	





Use of Access Matrix

- If a process in Domain D_i tries to do "op" on object O_j , then "op" must be in the access matrix
- User who creates object can define access column for that object
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection
 - Operations to add, delete access rights
 - Special access rights:
 - owner of O_i
 - copy op from O_i to O_j (denoted by "*")
 - ▶ control D_i can modify D_j access rights
 - ▶ transfer switch from domain D_i to D_i
 - Copy and Owner applicable to an object
 - Control applicable to domain object






Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy
 - Mechanism
 - Operating system provides access-matrix + rules
 - If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced
 - Policy
 - User dictates policy
 - Who can access what object and in what mode
- But doesn't solve the general confinement problem






Access Matrix of Figure A with Domains as Objects

object domain	F ₁	F ₂	F ₃	laser printer	<i>D</i> ₁	D ₂	D ₃	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D ₂				print			switch	switch
D ₃		read	execute					
D_4	read write		read write		switch			





Access Matrix with Copy Rights


object domain	F ₁	F_2	F ₃	
D_1	execute		write*	
D_2	execute	read*	execute	
D_3	execute			

(a)

object domain	F ₁	F ₂	F ₃
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute	read	

(b)





Access Matrix With Owner Rights

object domain	F ₁	F ₂	F ₃
D_1	owner execute		write
D ₂		read* owner	read* owner write
D ₃	execute		

(a)

object domain	F ₁	F ₂	F ₃
<i>D</i> ₁	owner execute		write
D_2		owner read* write*	read* owner write
D ₃		write	write

(b)






Modified Access Matrix of Figure B

object domain	F ₁	F_2	F ₃	laser printer	<i>D</i> ₁	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D ₂				print			switch	switch control
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	write		write		switch			





Implementation of Access Matrix

- Generally, a sparse matrix
- □ Option 1 Global table
 - Store ordered triples <domain, object, rights-set> in table
 - □ A requested operation M on object O_j within domain D_i -> search table for $< D_i$, O_i , R_k >
 - with $M \in R_k$
 - But table could be large -> won't fit in main memory
 - Difficult to group objects (consider an object that all domains can read)





- □ Option 2 Access lists for objects
 - Each column implemented as an access list for one object
 - Resulting per-object list consists of ordered pairs <domain, rights-set> defining all domains with non-empty set of access rights for the object
 - □ Easily extended to contain default set -> If M ∈ default set, also allow access





Each column = Access-control list for one object
 Defines who can perform what operation

Domain 1 = Read, Write

Domain 2 = Read

Domain 3 = Read

□ Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
 For each domain, what operations allowed on what objects

Object F1 - Read

Object F4 - Read, Write, Execute

Object F5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy





- Option 3 Capability list for domains
 - Instead of object-based, list is domain based
 - Capability list for domain is list of objects together with operations allows on them
 - Object represented by its name or address, called a capability
 - Execute operation M on object O_j, process requests operation and specifies capability as parameter
 - Possession of capability means access is allowed
 - Capability list associated with domain but never directly accessible by domain
 - Rather, protected object, maintained by OS and accessed indirectly
 - Like a "secure pointer"
 - Idea can be extended up to applications





- □ Option 4 Lock-key
 - Compromise between access lists and capability lists
 - Each object has list of unique bit patterns, called locks
 - Each domain as list of unique bit patterns called keys
 - Process in a domain can only access object if domain has key that matches one of the locks

