MAHSA JAHANDIDEH

Address:	Asgari 6, Jamal Abad, Niavaran, Tehran,	Zip Code:	1978911114
Homepage:	https://mjahandideh.github.io/	Phone:	+982126116706
Email:	m.jahandideh@imps.ac.ir		

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2017-Present **Postdoctoral Researcher**, Institute for Management and Planning Studies (IMPS)

EDUCATION

2013-2016 **Ph.D. in Economics**, Tilburg University.

Advisors: Prof. Manuel Oechslin, Prof. Sjak Smulders.

2011-2013 **Research Master in Economics**, Tilburg University (with honors).

2009-2011 **M.Sc. in Economics**, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.

2005-2009 **B.Sc. in Petroleum Engineering**, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Macroeconomics, Environmental Economics, Political Economy

WORKING PAPERS

Inequality, Public Good Provision and the Composition of Trade (R&R: Econ. of transition)

Resource-driven Victory (R&R: Journal of Public Economic Theory)

Environmental Taxes in Presence of Credit Market Imperfections (With Sjak Smulders)

SELECTED WORKS/PROJECTS IN PERSIAN

Financial Programming and Policy Modeling for Iran, in collaboration with modeling group of IMPS, 2017-present.

Pollution Control in Tehran using Tradable Driving Credit, IMPS, 2018.

Current Financial Crises in Iran, Turkey, and Venezuela: Similarities and Differences, IMPS, Aug 2018.

Modeling and Forcasting International Trade of Iran, IMPS, 2017.

Sanction Bi-weekly Reports, IMPS, 2018.

CONFERENCE/SEMINAR PRESENTATION

First International Conference of Labor Market Studies, Tehran, 2017;

23rd Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE), Athens (Greece), 2017 ;

Association for Public Economic Theory (PET), Luxembourg 2015;

Economic Growth and Development: The Structural and Institutional Factors, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Rimini (Italy) 2015;

ENTER PhD jamboree, Mannheim (Germany), 2015;

ENTER PhD jamboree Stockholm, (2014);

Tilburg University internal seminars (2014-2016);

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Economics for Management (Master), *IMPS, 2018*

Development Economics (Master, Guest Lecturer), *IMPS, 2017*

Macroeconomics 3 (PhD), Teaching assistant, *Tilburg University, 2014-2016*

Macroeconomics for IBA (Bachelor), Teaching assistant, *Tilburg University, 2014-2016*

Mathematical economics (Master), Teaching assistance, *Sharif University, 2010*

SUPERVISION

Bachelor Thesis (Economics): Robbert Van Riel, The effect of natural resources on sectorial employment, Tilburg University, June 2015.

Master thesis (Economics): Fatemeh Zarei, Estimating Tariff Elasticity of Trade: Gravity Model, IMPS (Advisor), September 2017.

REFERENCES

Sjak Smulders	Tilburg University	Email: j.a.smulders@tilburguniversity.edu
Manuel Oechslin	University of Lucerne	Email: manuel.oechslin@unilu.ch
Gonzague Vannoorenberghe	Tilburg University	Email: G.C.L.Vannoorenberghe@uvt.nl

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Year of Birth:	1986	Gender:	Female
Nationality:	Iran	Languages:	English (Fluent), Persian (Native), Dutch (Basic)
Software skills:	STATA and MATLAB, LaTeX, Office family		

DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS

Inequality, Public Good Provision and the Composition of Trade (R&R: Economics of Transition)

This paper investigates the effect of trade openness on the provision of productive public goods and shows that inequality plays an important role in this regard. The theoretical model suggests that the provision of productive public goods has differentiated effects in closed and open economies. In a closed economy, it decreases the price of the manufacturing commodity, whereas in a small open economy, it increases the firms' profits. Consequently, opening up the economy shifts the benefits of productive public spending from consumers to firms' owners. If manufacturing income inequality is sufficiently small, the median voter earns a sufficiently high share of the firm's profit and thus opening up the economy increases the provision of productive public goods. In this circumstance, the manufacturing export also increases via the increase in productivity of the firms.

Resource-driven Victory (R&R: Journal of Public Economic Theory)

The huge popularity of distributive policies in many resource abundant countries was coincided with the rise in oil and gas prices started in 2004. Following the sharp recent price decrease, however, this popularity is becoming fragile and a tendency is increasing toward more productive policies. Using a theoretical model, this paper demonstrates that, with a decrease in resource revenue, voters opt for more investment in productivity enhancing public goods and a lower share is devoted to distributive policies. Furthermore, the initial productivity of the resource abundant economy plays an important role in determining the composition of public spending. If the initial level of productivity in a country is too low or too high, people may prefer distributive policies even for a low amount of resource revenue. Yet there is an important difference. Resource revenue eradicates the individuals' incentive to work in countries with low initial productivity while in highly productive countries, individuals always prefer to work.

Environmental Taxes in Presence of Credit Market Imperfections

Credit market imperfections may undermine the effectiveness of market incentive instruments (e.g. dirty input tax and emission fees) to control pollution in developing countries. Using two different approach to model credit market imperfections, this paper demonstrates that the socially optimal pollution tax is higher in countries with more severe distortions in credit market due to the higher amount of pollution. However, these countries may not impose a higher tax on dirty energy under two circumstances: First, if the clean energy is very expensive, the amount of pollution is high regardless of the level of credit market imperfection. The

socially optimal tax may then be lower in a country with less-developed credit market since it is less effective in reducing pollution. Second, the imposed tax may differ from the socially optimal level if it is determined in a political process where the winner party represents a specific group instead of the whole population.