



# From Nation-States to Member States: Accession Negotiations as an Instrument of Europeanization

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This paper analyzes recent accession negotiations to evaluate pressures for ‘Europeanization’ upon countries seeking to join the European Union (EU). Despite the European Commission’s policy of evaluating applications for membership on a country-by-country basis, the paper finds that accession negotiations followed an unexpectedly uniform process, whereby a similar sequence of policy areas were opened for evaluation and closed across diverse countries that had, in some cases, initiated their applications at different times. Using data from the EU’s regular reports on progress towards accession, the paper compares and analyzes patterns of negotiations with the European Commission, contrasting the sequence of openings and closings of chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, the duration of negotiations for each chapter, and patterns of transition periods. Second, the paper finds that applicant countries have made substantial and similar adaptations of policies and institutions to comply with the EU’s requirement that they adopt the *acquis*. The paper compares adaptations for the chapter on regional policy to highlight an arena in which the demands for institutional and policy adaptation are high and conditionality is especially powerful due to prospective EU funds associated with this chapter. The paper raises questions about whether changes in new member states can be considered to be deep or long-lasting and considers the future prospects for Europeanization.

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## Introduction

On December 14, 2002 the European Union (EU) announced that it would expand its membership from 15 to 25 countries, welcoming eight East European countries previously under the sphere of Soviet influence, as well as Cyprus and Malta.<sup>1</sup> The current enlargement will re-draw the political boundaries on the European continent, alter decision-making procedures within the EU, and expand the common market to new economies, many of which have only recently made the transformation from central planning. Despite its enormous relevance, the scholarly literature on enlargement has tended to emphasize the unprecedented challenges posed by the current round of negotiations and focused on policy-specific aspects of accession.<sup>2</sup> As a result,



enlargement has been seen largely of interest to specialists of Eastern Europe, and the potential insights from past enlargements and for current member states have been obscured.

This paper reviews the literature on the ‘Europeanization’ of current member states to argue that new member states also face pressures to adopt EU policies and institutions during accession negotiations characterized by conditionality, monitoring and evaluation. Using data from the EU’s regular reports on progress towards accession, the paper surveys the 12 applicant countries to analyze patterns of negotiations with the European Commission. It then analyzes adaptations for the chapter on regional policy in terms of territorial re-organization, new legislation, institutions and policies. Finally, it considers the implications of these findings for the debate on the ‘Europeanization’ of EU member states, the prospects that these changes will be enduring, and possible scenarios for future integration.

## **Europeanization and Enlargement**

Recent literature on the ‘Europeanization’ of current EU member states argues that membership in the EU has led to the gradual transformation of nation-states from autonomous actors in the international sphere to embedded actors within regional networks of exchange (Marks *et al.*, 1996; Meny *et al.*, 1996; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998). The European Court of Justice has emerged as a key actor in ensuring compliance with European laws and directives among current member states. This process has not been complete or uniform, as scholars have demonstrated variation across issue areas and member states in the light of past domestic policy legacies and the organization of domestic interest groups (Duina, 1999; Cowles *et al.*, 2001; Borzel, 2002). This suggests that nation-states are not simply losing autonomy in a zero-sum fashion. Rather, they are entering what some have called a multi-level polity whereby sovereignty over particular arenas is shared at different levels of governance.

Nation-states wishing to join the EU also undergo a process of transformation, of ‘Europeanization,’ in which they adapt their domestic institutions and policies to meet the EU’s requirements of membership. The nature of the enlargement process may in fact create even greater pressures for more rapid adaptation among applicant countries than current member states. Enlargement is a formal intergovernmental process between the governments of applicant countries and the EU’s Council of Ministers, in consultation with the European Commission and European Parliament. Countries wishing to become members of the EU must first submit a formal application to the Council of Ministers, which then requests an opinion from the European Commission regarding the readiness of an applicant for membership. If a positive opinion is given by the Commission and adopted by the Council, an

accession conference is convened and negotiations are begun with representatives of the governments of applicant countries, the Council and the Commission. These negotiations typically concern the ability of an applicant country to undertake the obligations of membership and, in cases where a country is not fully prepared to meet these obligations, an agreement upon transitional periods for adjustments to European law. Finally, the European parliament votes on an agreement for membership, which is approved by an absolute majority, and the agreement must be ratified by all current member states, as well as applicant countries themselves. The ratification process may include public referenda, parliamentary ratification or both, depending on the countries involved.

The EU exerts its influence through the principle of conditionality, by which, on the basis of the Treaty on European Union Article 49, ‘any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union.’ These principles are defined as ‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.’ At each point in the process, the European Commission must approve an applicant country’s progress in a wide range of changes to align its institutions and policies with those of the EU. More concretely, the EU identified three criteria for membership at its summit in Copenhagen in 1993: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; (2) the existence of a fully functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The third criterion constitutes the framework for negotiations for membership, which has been codified as the body of EU laws known as the *acquis communautaire*. The *acquis* is composed of 31 chapters on substantive issues from the free movement of goods to culture and audio-visual policy, each of which must be opened, negotiated and closed by each applicant country before membership can proceed (see Table 1 for a list of chapters of the *acquis*).

Despite the lure of the benefits of membership and a similar process for joining, there is considerable variation in the efforts by applicant countries to meet the EU’s requirements (Grabbe, 2001). Some scholars have analyzed the likelihood of countries meeting the pre-conditions to begin membership negotiations and find that, while all applicant countries declared EU membership their top foreign policy goal, governing coalitions varied in the translation of this goal into policy. Liberal coalitions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland aligned their policies with the EU but nationalist coalitions in countries like Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania frequently failed to do so (Mattli and Plumper, 2002; Vachudova, 2002). The focus of this article,



**Table 1** Negotiation CHAPTERS of the *Aquis Communautaire*

Chapter 1:	Free movement of goods
Chapter 2:	Freedom of movement for persons
Chapter 3:	Freedom to provide services
Chapter 4:	Free movement of capital
Chapter 5:	Company law
Chapter 6:	Competition policy
Chapter 7:	Agriculture
Chapter 8:	Fisheries
Chapter 9:	Transport policy
Chapter 10:	Taxation
Chapter 11:	Economic and Monetary Union
Chapter 12:	Statistics
Chapter 13:	Social policy and employment
Chapter 14:	Energy
Chapter 15:	Industrial policy
Chapter 16:	Small and medium-sized undertakings
Chapter 17:	Science and research
Chapter 18:	Education and training
Chapter 19:	Telecommunications and information technologies
Chapter 20:	Culture and audio-visual policy
Chapter 21:	Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments
Chapter 22:	Environment
Chapter 23:	Consumers and health protection
Chapter 24:	Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs
Chapter 25:	Customs union
Chapter 26:	External relations
Chapter 27:	Common foreign and security policy
Chapter 28:	Financial control
Chapter 29:	Financial and budgetary provisions
Chapter 30:	Institutions
Chapter 31:	Other

Source: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/screen\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/screen_en.htm)

however, is not why do countries seek to join the EU, but how does enlargement create pressures for the Europeanization of applicant countries? I will consider two areas: patterns in accession negotiations and patterns of adaptation by applicant countries.

## Patterns in Accession Negotiations

The European Commission in 1998 ‘recommended to conduct accession negotiations through a differentiated approach taking account of the progress made by each candidate.’<sup>3</sup> The recent round of accession negotiations included 10 countries formerly part of the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and

Slovenia), as well as Cyprus and Malta.<sup>4</sup> Accession negotiations began for half of the countries in 1998 and for the others in 2000. While many of these countries faced similar political and economic challenges after the fall of communism, there is considerable variation in the size and economic conditions for accession. The largest of these countries is Poland with 38 million people, roughly the size of Spain, and the smallest is Malta, with only 390,000 people. In 2000, the GDP per capita in purchasing power in applicant countries ranged from 82% of the EU average in Cyprus to 24% in Bulgaria.<sup>5</sup> While some countries such as Slovenia have very small agricultural sectors, others like Poland have larger agricultural sectors than most current EU members. Some countries like Estonia have lower tariffs in certain areas than the EU and would have to raise them for membership, while others like Poland fear the lower tariffs on certain goods would eliminate their competitiveness in the European markets.

This section of the paper considers whether accession negotiations reflect the Commission's principles of differentiation, analyzing patterns across countries in negotiating the chapters of the *acquis*. Using data from the EU's regular reports on each applicant country's progress towards accession, the paper analyzes the sequence of openings and closings of chapters of the *acquis*, as well as transition periods, or agreements between applicant countries and the EU whereby the implementation of certain chapters is temporarily delayed due to costs associated with them.<sup>6</sup> I compare and contrast patterns across the two groups of countries that began accession negotiations at different times: the first six countries in 1998 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and the second six countries in 2000 (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia).

### Sequence of openings and closings

If enlargement were conducted on a case-by-case basis that proceeds where countries are prepared to open negotiations, we might expect differences in the sequence of chapters opened by each country, reflecting differences in national political and economic situations. When we look at the openings of chapters in applicant countries, however, we see that those countries invited to begin negotiations in 1998 followed an identical sequence, opening the same chapters in 1998, 1999 and 2000 (See Table 2a).

Similarities in the sequence of openings might be explained by the practical demands of organizing the vastly complex process of enlargement, for which the EU needed to set a similar structure for negotiations across countries. Despite the tremendous differences between Poland and Slovenia, for example, one might have also argued that the first group of countries shared similarities or prior progress towards accession that enabled them to follow the same



sequence. It is striking, however, that the even more diverse countries in the second group (including Slovakia, the remaining Baltic countries, Malta, and Bulgaria and Romania) followed an almost identical sequence of chapter openings as well, with only Malta opening the transport chapter later than other countries (See Table 2b).

Bulgaria and Romania are exceptions to this pattern and have not been considered candidates for the current wave of enlargement. While this indicates a measure of differentiation among countries, the similarities in sequence across the 10 other countries in both groups suggest that negotiation chapters were not opened on a differentiated basis in light of each country's situation, but rather followed a schedule set by the EU. Notably, Table 2b indicates that many chapters were opened more quickly in the second wave than in the first. For example, the Czech Republic opened eight chapters in its first year of negotiations, whereas Slovakia opened 15. While the sequence of openings alone cannot explain this difference, the data are consistent with the argument that the EU set the agenda for negotiations across the applicant countries, not that the countries in the second group were more prepared for negotiations than those in the first group. Across both groups, the chapters associated with direct funds for new members were opened last, including agriculture, competition and regional policy.

Next, one might ask, do we also see similarities in the patterns of closing negotiating chapters? If we look at the closings of chapters, there is minor variation across countries in timing (See Tables 3a and 3b).

In the first group, all countries but Cyprus closed the same three chapters in 1998. In the second and third years, although similar chapters are closed in all countries, modest variation appears. Some of these differences clearly reflect the varying demands of particular chapters upon countries, so that land-locked countries like the Czech Republic and Hungary close the chapter on fisheries before Estonia and Poland. Others are less clear and may reflect differences in the concerns and domestic situations of applicant countries, as I will discuss below.

Strikingly, the pace of closings is much faster in the second wave than the first, so that by the end of 2001 Latvia and Lithuania had closed more chapters than Estonia, which began negotiations 2 years earlier. Some chapters were closed in the same year across the two groups, despite their having been opened years apart. For example, the chapter on foreign and security policy was opened among the first chapters in 1998 in the first group of countries and in 2000 for the second group of countries, and closed among all of them in 2000. Although analysis of the sequence alone does not permit an explanation for this, it suggests that the EU sought to close the chapter for all applicant countries at the same time. Similarly, across both groups, the chapters associated with EU funds for new members (such as regional policy and

**Table 2a** Opening of all chapters of the *acquis* across applicant countries, first wave

Cyprus, 3/31/1998	Czech Republic, 3/31/1998	Estonia, 3/31/1998	Hungary, 3/31/1998	Poland, 3/31/1998	Slovenia, 3/31/1998
Company law					
Culture/AV	Culture/AV	Culture/AV	Culture/AV	Culture/AV	Culture/AV
Ed/training	Ed/training	Ed/training	Ed/training	Ed/training	Ed/training
Foreign/security policy					
Industrial	Industrial	Industrial	Industrial	Industrial	Industrial
Science/research	Science/research	Science/research	Science/research	Science/research	Science/research
Sm/med undertakings					
Telecom/Info Tech					
Competition	Competition	Competition	Competition	Competition	Competition
consumer/health protection					
Customs Union					
Econ/Monetary Union					
Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy
Environment	Environment	Environment	Environment	Environment	Environment
External relations					
Fisheries	Fisheries	Fisheries	Fisheries	Fisheries	Fisheries
Free-capital	Free-capital	Free-capital	Free-capital	Free-capital	Free-capital
Free-goods	Free-goods	Free-goods	Free-goods	Free-goods	Free-goods
Free-services	Free-services	Free-services	Free-services	Free-services	Free-services
Social Policy/Employ					
Statistics	Statistics	Statistics	Statistics	Statistics	Statistics
Taxation	Taxation	Taxation	Taxation	Taxation	Taxation
Transport	Transport	Transport	Transport	Transport	Transport
Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture
Financial/budgetary	Financial/budgetary	Financial/budgetary	Financial/budgetary	Financial/budgetary	Financial/budgetary
Financial control					
Free-persons	Free-persons	Free-persons	Free-persons	Free-persons	Free-persons
Justice/home affairs					
Regional policy					
Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions

**Table 2b** Opening of all chapters of the *acquis* across applicant countries, second wave

<i>Latvia, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Lithuania, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Malta, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Slovakia, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Bulgaria, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Romania, 2/15/2000</i>
Company law	Company law	Company law	Company law	Company law	Competition
Competition	Competition	Competition	Competition	Consumer/health protection	Culture/AV
Consumer/health protection	Culture/AV	Consumer/health protection	Consumer/health protection	Culture/Av	Ed/training
Culture/AV	Ed/training	Culture/AV	Culture/AV	Ed/training	External relations
Econ/Monetary Union	Environment	Econ/Monetary Union	Customs Union	External relations	Foreign/security policy
Ed/training	External relations	Ed/training	Ed/training	Foreign/security policy	Science/research
External relations	Foreign/security policy	External relations	External relations	Free-capital	Sm/med undertakings
Fisheries	Free-Capital	Fisheries	Fisheries	Science/research	Statistics
Foreign/security policy	Free-services	Foreign/security policy	Foreign/security policy	Sm/med undertakings	Telecom/info tech
Free-capital	Industrial	Free-capital	Free-capital	Statistics	Company law
Free-services	Science/research	Industrial	Free-services	Telecom/info tech	Consumer/health protection
Industrial	Sm/Med undertakings	Science/research	Industrial	Competition	Customs Union
Science/research	Social policy/employ	Sm/med undertakings	Science/research	Customs union	Fisheries
Sm/med undertakings	Statistics	Statistics	Sm/med undertakings	Energy	Free-capital
Statistics	Telecom/Info Tech	Telecom/Info Tech	Statistics	Environment	Social policy/employ
Transport	Transport	Agriculture	Telecom/Info Tech	Financial/budgetary	Taxation
Agriculture	Agriculture	Customs Union	Transport	Financial control	Transport
Customs Union	Consumer/health protection	Energy	Agriculture	Fisheries	Financial control
Energy	Customs Union	Environment	Econ/monetary Union	Free-Goods	Free-goods
Environment	Econ/Monetary Union	Financial/budgetary	Energy	Free-Persons	Free-persons
Financial/budgetary	Energy	Financial control	Environment	Free-services	Regional policy
Financial control	Financial/budgetary	Free-goods	Financial/budgetary	Industrial	Econ/monetary union
Free-goods	Financial control	Free-persons	Financial control	Justice/home affairs	Environment
Free-persons	Fisheries	Free-services	Free-goods	Regional policy	Justice/home affairs
Justice/home affairs	Free-goods	Justice/home affairs	Free – persons	Social policy/employ	Energy
Regional policy	Free-persons	Regional policy	Justice/home affairs	Taxation	Industrial
Social policy/employ	Justice/home affairs	Social policy/employ	Regional policy	Transport	Institutions
Taxation	Regional policy	Taxation	Social policy/employ	Agriculture	Agriculture
Telecom/Info Tech	Taxation	Transport	Taxation	Econ/Monetary Union	Financial/budgetary
Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Free-services

Legend

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

**Table 3a** Closing of all chapters of the *acquis* across applicant countries, first wave

Cyprus, 3/31/1998	Czech, 3/31/1998	Estonia, 3/31/1998	Hungary, 3/31/1998	Poland, 3/31/1998	Slovenia, 3/31/1998
Culture/AV	Ed/training	Ed/training	Ed/training	Ed/training	Ed/training
Ed/training	Science/research	Science/research	Science/research	Science/research	Science/research
Industrial	Sm/med undertakings				
Science/research	Consumer/health protection				
Sm/med undertakings	Econ/monetary union				
Consumer/health protection	Fisheries	Industrial	Fisheries	External relations	Fisheries
Customs Union	Free-goods	Statistics	Industrial	Industrial	Industrial
Econ/Monetary Union	Industrial	Telecom/Info Tech	Statistics	Statistics	Statistics
External relations	Statistics	Company law	Energy	Telecom/Info Tech	Telecom/Info Tech
Statistics	Telecom/Info Tech	Culture/AV	External relations	Culture/AV	Company law
Telecom/Info Tech	Customs Union	External relations	Financial control	Financial control	Financial control
Financial control	External relations	Fisheries	Foreign security policy	Foreign security policy	Foreign security policy
Fisheries	Foreign/security policy	Foreign/security policy	Social policy/employ	Free-services	Free-services
Foreign/security policy	Company law	Company law	Telecom/Info Tech	Company law	Company law
Free-goods	Culture/AV	Culture/AV	Company law	Customs Union	Social policy/employ
Social policy/employ	Energy	Environment	Customs Union	Energy	Competition
Company law	Environment	Competition	Environment	Environment	Culture/AV
Energy	Financial control	Environment	Free-capital	Customs Union	Customs Union
Environment	Free-capital	Financial control	Free-goods	Free-goods	Energy
Free-capital	Free-persons	Free-services	Free-persons	Free-persons	Environment
Free – persons	Free-services	Customs union	Free-services	Free-services	External relations
Free-services	Justice/home affairs	Free-persons	Justice/home affairs	Free-capital	Free-capital
Justice/home affairs	Social policy/employ	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Free-goods
Transport	Taxation	Justice/home affairs	Transport	Taxation	Free-persons
Competition	Regional policy	Regional policy	Agriculture	Agriculture	Justice/home affairs
Institutions	Agriculture	Taxation	Competition	Transport	Taxation
Regional policy	Competition	Transport	Culture/AV	Transport	Transport
Taxation	Financial/budgetary	Agriculture	Financial/budgetary	Institutions	Institutions
Agriculture	Institutions	Energy	Institutions	Justice/home affairs	Agriculture
Financial/budgetary	Transport	Financial/budgetary	Regional policy	Financial/budgetary	Financial/budgetary

**Table 3b** Closing of all chapters of the *acquis* across applicant countries, second wave

<i>Latvia, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Slovakia, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Malta, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Lithuania, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Bulgaria, 2/15/2000</i>	<i>Romania, 2/15/2000</i>
Consumer/health protection Econ/Monetary Union	Consumer/health protection Culture/AV	Company law	Culture/AV	Consumer/health protection Culture/AV	Ed/training External relations
Ed/training External relations Foreign/security policy Industrial Science/research Sm/Med undertakings	Ed/training External relations Fisheries Foreign/security policy Industrial Science/research	Consumer/health protection Econ/Monetary Union Ed/training External relations Foreign/security policy Industrial Science/research Sm/Med undertakings	External relations Foreign/security policy Industrial Science/research Sm/Med undertakings Statistics	Ed/training External relations Foreign/security policy Industrial Science/research Sm/Med undertakings Statistics	Foreign/security policy Science/research Sm/Med undertakings Statistics Company law Consumer/health protection Fisheries
Statistics Company law Competition	Sm/Med undertakings Statistics Company law	Science/research Sm/Med undertakings Statistics	Company law Competition Consumer/health protection	Company law Fisheries Free-capital	Econ/Monetary Union Industrial
Culture/AV Customs Union Environment Financial control Fisheries Free-capital Free-goods Free-persons Free-services	Customs Union Econ/Monetary Union Energy Environment Financial control Financial control Free-capital Free-goods Free-persons Free-Services	Telecom/Info Tech	Customs Union Energy Financial control Free-capital Free-goods Free-persons Free-services	Free-services Industrial Telecom/Info Tech Customs Union Econ/Monetary Union Financial control Free-goods Free-persons Institutions	Institutions Social policy/employ Telecom/Info Tech Culture/AV Customs Union Energy Environment Financial control Free-capital
Social policy/employ Transport Energy Justice/home affairs Regional policy Taxation Telecom/Info Tech Agriculture Financial/budgetary Institutions	Social policy/employ Telecom/Info Tech Institutions Justice/home affairs Regional policy Taxation Transport Agriculture Competition Financial/Budgetary Financial/Budgetary	Environment Fisheries Institutions Justice/home affairs Regional policy Agriculture Competition Customs Union Taxation Taxation	Social policy/employ Telecom/Info Tech Transport Energy Institutions Justice/home affairs Regional policy Transport	Social policy/employ Taxation Energy Agriculture Environment Financial/budgetary Justice/home affairs Regional policy Competition Transport	Free-goods Free-persons Justice/home affairs Regional policy Taxation Competition Transport Agriculture Financial/Budgetary Free-Services
<b>Legend</b>					
1998					
1999					
2000					
2001					
2002					

agriculture) were among the last to be negotiated as part of an overall agreement for membership for all applicant countries.

The pattern of openings and closings creates a portrait of pre-accession negotiations with unexpected similarities across applicant countries with very different political and economic conditions. This suggests a logic of negotiation driven by the EU rather than by the conditions within applicant countries, either administrative (such as the organizational demands of negotiating the same issues across 10 applicant countries) or political (such as external demands that negotiations be concluded by a fixed date, permitting enlargement to happen, for example, before the next elections to the European parliament). Alternatively, one could argue that the sequence reflects the nature of the demands of the chapters themselves. Enlargement could be seen, as the EU often argues, as a technical process that began with simple chapters and left the more difficult chapters until the end of negotiations. If this were true, we would expect that the length of negotiations for chapters of the *acquis* should be brief at the outset and increase across subsequent chapters. To evaluate this argument, Tables 4–6 contrast the length of negotiations across all chapters for three applicant countries, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The data for the three countries in the tables, however, do not indicate the linear relationship one might have expected. While negotiations for the chapters on science and research and education and training lasted only one month in all countries, the length of negotiations across other chapters varied. Poland, as the largest country, shows long negotiations other chapters for chapters in each year. Comparing the Czech Republic and Slovakia, countries with a similar history but invited to begin negotiations at different times, one sees overall shorter negotiations in Slovakia but, again, no clear pattern of shorter durations with the initial chapters opened with increasing length. Competition policy, for example, was opened in the second group of chapters in the Czech Republic in 1999 and in the first group of chapters in Slovakia in 2000 but closed at the same time in both countries, October 2002.

While many chapters were opened at different times across a group of countries but closed at the same time, as above, variation in others reflected natural differences in applicant countries, such as fisheries, which was a significant concern in some countries but not in others. While most applicant countries faced challenges in the field of domestic media that previously had been controlled by communist regimes, the chapter on culture and audio-visual policy was closed after 16 months by the Czech Republic and Slovenia, but only after 33 months in Hungary due to controversy surrounding its Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting. Other possible explanations might include differences in perceived negotiating strength among applicant countries, so that some countries may have simply accepted the EU's proposal concerning the



**Table 4** Duration of chapter negotiations, Czech Republic

		No. of months	6	12	18	24	30	36	42
1998	Common foreign and security policy	1998 First half							
	Company law	1998 12	~24	31	31	31	31	31	T
	Culture and audio-visual policy	1998 10		June 01					
	Education and training	1998	Second half	June 01					
	Industrial policy	1998	Second half	Oct 98					
	Science and research	1998	Second half	First half 99					
	Small and medium-sized undertakings	1998 10		Oct 98					
	Telecommunications and information technologies	1998 10		Nov 98					
	Competition policy	1999 05		April 99					
	Consumers and health protection	1999 04		Oct 02					
	Customs Union	1999 05							
	Economic and Monetary Union	1999 First half							
	Energy	1999 Second half							
	Environment	1999 12							
	External relations	1999 First half							
	Fisheries	1999 04							
	Free movement of capital	1999 Autumn							
	Free movement of goods	1999 06							
	Freedom to provide services	1999 07							
	Social policy and employment	1999 09							
	Statistics	1999 03							
	Taxation	1999 11							
	Transport policy	1999 11							
	Agriculture	2000 06							
	Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs	2000 05							
	Financial and budgetary provisions	2000 First half							
	Financial control	2000 First half							
	Freedom of movement for persons	2000 05							
	Regional policy	2000 04							
2002	Institutions	2002 First half							

T: transitional arrangement.

**Table 5** Duration of chapter negotiations, Slovakia

		No. of months	6	12	18	24	30
2000	Common foreign and security policy	2000 First half	First half 00				
	Company law	2000 11	June 01				
	Competition policy	2000 05	Oct 02				
	Consumers and health protection	2000 10	Oct 00				
	Culture and audio-visual policy	2000 05	Nov 00				
	Customs Union	2000 10	First half 01				
	Education and training	2000 First half	May 00				
	External relations	2000 First half	First half 00				
	Fisheries	2000 10	Oct 00				
	Free movement of capital	2000 Autumn	Spring 01				
	Freedom to provide services	2000 07	May 01				
	Industrial policy	2000 Second half	Second half 00				
	Science and research	2000 First half	May 00				
	Small and medium-sized undertakings	2000 05	May 00				
	Statistics	2000 05	June 00	2			
	Telecommunications and information technologies	2000 11	April 01	6			
	Transport policy	2000 11	April 02	18			
	Agriculture	2001 06	Dec 02	18			
	Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs	2001 06	June 02	13			
	Economic and Monetary Union	2001 First half	First half 01	~1			
	Energy	2001 First half	Second half 01	~6			
	Environment	2001 03	Dec 01	10			
	Financial and budgetary provisions	2001 First half	Dec 02	~21			
	Financial control	2001 First half	Second half 01	~6			
	Free movement of goods	2001 03	March 01	1	T		
	Freedom of movement for persons	2001 06	June 01	1			
	Regional policy	2001 03	July 02	16			
	Social policy and employment	2001 02	May 01	4			
	Taxation	2001 06	March 02	10	T		
2002	Institutions	2002 First half	First half 02	~1	T		

T: transitional arrangement.



**Table 6** Duration of chapter negotiations, Poland

		No. of months	6	12	18	24	30	36	42
1998	Common foreign and security policy	First half 1998–First half 2000 (approx. 24 months)	~24	37	37	37	37	37	T
	Company law	Dec 1998–Dec 2001 (37 months)	26	26	26	26	26	26	T
	Culture and audio-visual policy	Nov 1998–Dec 2000 (26 months)	~1	~1	~1	~1	~1	~1	
	Education and training	Second half 1998–Oct 98 (approx. 1 month)							
	Industrial policy	Second half 1998–First half 99 (approx. 6 months)	~6	~6	~6	~6	~6	~6	
	Science and research	Second half 1998–Oct 98 (approx. 1 month)	~1	~1	~1	~1	~1	~1	
	Small and medium-sized undertakings	Oct 1998–November 1998 (1 month)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	Telecommunications and information technologies	Oct 1998–May 1999 (7 months)	7	7	7	7	7	7	T
	Competition policy	May 1999–Dec 02	43	43	43	43	43	43	T
	Consumers and health protection	Apr 1999–May 1999 (1 month)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
1999	Customs Union	May 1999–First half 01 (approx. 26 months)	~26	~26	~26	~26	~26	~26	
	Economic and Monetary Union	First half 1999–End 1999 (approx. 6 months)	~6	~6	~6	~6	~6	~6	
	Energy	Second half 1999–Second half 2001 (approx. 24 months)	~24	~24	~24	~24	~24	~24	T
	Environment	Dec 1999–Oct 2001 (23 months)	23	23	23	23	23	23	T
	External relations	First half 1999–Second half 1999 (approx. 6 months)	~6	~6	~6	~6	~6	~6	
	Fisheries	Apr 1999–June 01 (39 months)	39	39	39	39	39	39	T
	Free movement of capital	Autumn 1999–Mar 02 (approx. 30 months)	30	30	30	30	30	30	
	Free movement of goods	Jun 1999–Mar 2001 (22 months)	22	22	22	22	22	22	T
	Freedom to provide services	Jul 1999–Nov 00 (17 months)	17	17	17	17	17	17	T
	Social policy and employment	Sep 1999–Mar 01 (19 months)	19	19	19	19	19	19	
2000	Statistics	Mar 1999–Jun 1999 (3 months)	3	3	3	3	3	3	
	Taxation	Nov 1999–Mar 02 (29 months)	29	29	29	29	29	29	
	Transport policy	Nov 1999–June 02 (32 months)	32	32	32	32	32	32	
	Agriculture	Jun 2000–Dec 02	30	30	30	30	30	30	
	Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs	May 2000–July 30, 2002	27	27	27	27	27	27	
	Financial and budgetary provisions	First half 2000–Dec 02	~33	~33	~33	~33	~33	~33	
	Financial control	First half 2000–First half 2000 (approx. 1 month)	~1	~1	~1	~1	~1	~1	
	Freedom of movement for persons	May 2000–Dec 01 (19 months)	19	19	19	19	19	19	
	Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments	Apr 2000–Oct 2002	30	30	30	30	30	30	
	Institutions	First half 2002–First half 2002 (approx. 1 month)	~1	~1	~1	~1	~1	~1	T

T: transitional arrangement.

free movement of capital and negotiated for 6 months (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia), while others negotiated hard for separate deals to reflect their own concerns and negotiated for 30 months (Poland).

### Patterns of transition periods

In addition to similarities in patterns of openings and closings, this paper considers patterns of transition periods at the conclusion of accession negotiations. If the EU were conducting its negotiations on the principle of differentiation, one would expect there to be significant differences in the patterns of transition periods that reflect differences among the applicant countries. As of June 2003, the number of transition periods for countries accepted to join the EU ranged from nine in the Czech Republic and Estonia to 14 in Poland (Tables 2a and b on closings also note the transition periods agreed upon by asterisks in particular chapters). Given differences across applicant countries, it is striking that the difference between the greatest and fewest transition period is only five chapters, and the majority of transition periods were negotiated in 2001 for a similar group of chapters: free movement of capital, of persons and of services, energy and the environment, and taxation.

Similarities in the number and nature of transition periods suggest common pressures for institutional and policy changes currently beyond the reach of applicant countries. In contrast to previous enlargements when new members such as Spain or the United Kingdom were granted long transition periods to adjust to EU policies, the EU sought to minimize agreements for transition periods in the current wave of enlargement, creating pressures for rapid change among applicant countries prior to membership. Transition periods in some cases (such as free movement of persons) reflect the EU's concerns about the consequences of enlargement (in this case, fears of migration). In other cases, transition periods reflect concerns of applicant countries (such as free movement of capital that pertains to the right for non-citizens to purchase land). In the areas of energy and the environment, the costs and difficulties associated with implementing EU law in the applicant countries prior to membership were simply too high, and applicant countries negotiated concrete timetables for achieving specific remaining objectives. For example, many countries were granted transition periods under the environment chapter until 2005 to meet the EU's requirements for the recovery and recycling of packaging waste and until 2010 for the treatment of urban waste water. Transition periods negotiated between the EU and applicant countries may be modified by bilateral agreements between current and future member states, such as the declaration by the Netherlands that it would not enforce a transition period for the free movement of persons.



## Patterns in Adaptation by Applicant Countries

Analysis of patterns in accession negotiations creates a picture of broadly similar pressures on applicant countries, suggesting significant but not complete convergence. Even so, one might ask, how have applicant countries adapted their policies and institutions to comply with this process? While it is obviously too early to evaluate their long-term impact, we should expect that the impact of negotiations will vary by chapter of the *acquis* and policy legacy in each country (Jacoby, 2002). For some chapters, the EU requirements for compliance are relatively low (involving little new legislation or institutional adjustment), whereas for others the demands are quite high (involving new legislative arenas and institutions). Similarly, for some chapters, the policy legacies prior to reform in applicant countries are relatively weak, whereas in others, prior laws and institutions must be significantly changed.

Using data from the EU's reports on progress towards accession, I analyze the chapter on 'regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments' to highlight the consequences of an arena in which the demands for institutional and policy adaptation are high and conditionality is especially powerful due to prospective EU funds associated with the closure of this chapter. Similarities in adaptation in this chapter, given the variation in geographic size, population distribution and prior policy legacy among applicant countries, provide support for the paper's argument that accession negotiations create pressures for convergence. Indeed, the argument in this paper is not that accession negotiations have had a uniform impact in all areas across countries, but rather that the process of negotiations created pressures for applicant countries to adopt similar administrative structures and policies to meet the requirements of closing each chapter in accession negotiations.

Regional policy is the second largest source of EU funding for new members through the so-called structural and cohesion funds for poorer regions that total 275 billion ECU, or 38% of the total EU budget, for 2000–2006. Access to these funds is conditional upon the ability of countries' administrative and programming capacity to manage such funds, as well as financial controls to monitor them and the capacity to co-finance them. At the same time, in response to the concerns of applicant countries about the possible results of joining, the EU has declared that no new member will become a net contributor to the EU budget, and direct subsidies to new members are the means by which this will be maintained.

Structural funds are granted to regions within member states that meet one of three objectives: regions with a GDP per capita of less than 75% of the Community average, regions undergoing economic and social restructuring, and regions requiring assistance in education, training and employment. Cohesion funds are granted for environmental and transport projects to

member states whose national GDP is less than 90% of the Community average. If new members were to receive such funds on the same principle as current members, nearly every region in every applicant country would be eligible (with the exceptions of the capital cities in some countries), although the maximum amount any member state can receive has been fixed at 4% of national GDP. In the 1990s the EU sought to assist in the applicant countries from East Central Europe in their preparation for this chapter with direct funds through a technical assistance program known as Phare. More recently, the EU developed the so-called Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (or ISPA), which applied to all applicant countries. Since 1999, ISPA has financed major environmental and transport infrastructure projects in applicant countries, with an annual budget of 1,040 million euros.

In principle, the actual nature of administrative structures to be adopted is left to applicant countries, and countries with varying sizes and degrees of regionalization should reflect those differences. The requirement of territorial re-organization demands, however, that applicant countries establish regions that match the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (known as NUTS) at different levels. These structures may have the status as governments, filled through regional elections. While the *acquis* does not require that regional policy be transposed into national law, the closing chapter necessitates at least four results: the creation of a legal basis for regional development, as well as the organizational structure, and definition of competencies at different levels of government. Finally, the chapter calls for applicant countries to develop national development plans that specify the programs to be undertaken, the evaluation and monitoring systems for such programs, and their financial management.

The demands of the chapter on regional policy are high for applicant countries, many of which are undergoing dramatic political, economic and legal transformations since the fall of communism in 1989. Regional policy for most applicant countries is a largely underdeveloped policy arena that has necessitated significant changes in domestic policies and institutions. Among formerly communist countries, sub-national regions either did not exist prior to accession negotiations or had been merely extensions of regimes dominated by central planning. In the early 1990s, after the fall of the communist regimes, regional policy remained weak as concerns about the efficiency of economic reforms focused attention on macro-economic policies and institutions. Regional disparities tended to be exacerbated by the consequences of economic restructuring in areas in which the economy was dominated by outmoded heavy industry. Further, for many in East Central Europe regional policy was perceived associated with the state interventionism of the old regime and considered suspect.



There is significant variation in the size and regional make-up of the applicant countries. Whereas the population is spread more or less evenly across the territory in Poland, Hungary and smaller countries like Estonia are dominated by their capitals, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia fall in the middle (Hardy *et al.*, 1995; Gorzelak, 1996). Since regional policy models are defined at the European level, however, we may anticipate that potential members will seek to adopt similar policies in countries of very different sizes. Hausner and Marody (2000, 106) describe the results of the pressures for similar regional policies as follows: 'each programme speaks of the needs for air transport and airports (international ones, of course). Each is quick to point out the tourist attractions of its own region, whilst ignoring those of neighboring regions. Proposed environmental protection measures are always restricted to a single region. The problems and consequences of population shifts and migration are overlooked. Each strategy expresses a desire for its regional capital to be transformed into a thriving metropolis with no mention of, for instance, the costs that this would entail. And finally we learn that each region must also have its own academic community and university of international repute.'

In practice, all applicant countries have had to adopt what might be called the EU model for member states. This entailed a division of national territory into categories matching the NUTS classification system, establishment of new government bodies to coordinate the structural funds either through a minister or national agencies, and prepared programming, monitoring and reporting administrative structures. By December 2002, the chapter had been closed in all applicant countries except Bulgaria and Romania. Table 7 on the length of negotiations for the chapter on regional policy for all applicant countries suggests a bureaucratic logic similar to that discussed above whereby the EU sought to resolve the issue for all applicant countries at the same time regardless of the length of negotiations.

Thus, while the chapter was opened in April 2000 for the first group of countries and in March 2001 for the second group of countries, the chapter was closed for all but three countries in April–July of 2002 and for all the countries invited to join the EU (all but Bulgaria and Romania) by the end of 2002.

Table 8 highlights the impact of negotiations for the chapter on regional policy upon applicant countries. As the table illustrates, Cyprus was the only applicant country with prior regional structures and legislation judged largely acceptable. This must be seen as an exceptional case in light of the partition of the country and separate efforts by the EU to negotiate a resolution of the dispute. In most applicant countries, the initial screening reports by the EU in 2000 were critical of the lack of legislative and institutional framework in the area of regional policy. By 2001, as a result of the pre-accession negotiations, new regions had been established in seven countries (Bulgaria, the Czech

**Table 7** Length of negotiations for all countries, chapter on regional policy

	Apr 00	Jul 00	Oct 00	Jan 01	Apr 01	Jul 01	Oct 01	Jan 02	Apr 02	Jul 02	Oct 02	Jan 03	Apr 03
<b>First Wave</b>													
Cyprus	April 00–April 02												
Czech Republic	April 00–April 02												
Estonia	April 00–June 02												
Hungary	April 00–July 02												
Poland	April 00–October 02												
Slovenia	April 00–July 02												
<b>Second wave</b>													
Latvia	March 01–June 02												
Lithuania	March 01–June 02												
Malta	March 01–July 02												
Slovakia	March 01–July 02												
Bulgaria	November 01–still open												
Romania	March 02–still open												

**Table 8** EU evaluation of applicant countries, chapter on regional policy

	<i>New legislation</i>	<i>New institutions</i>	<i>New territories</i>	<i>Programming</i>
<i>First wave</i>				
Cyprus	Prior sufficient	No, Planning Bureau	No	Strategic Development Plan
Czech Republic	November 2000	Yes, Regional Councils	Yes	National Development Plan
Estonia	April 2001	No, Min. of Finance	No	Single Programming Document
Hungary	October 1999	No, Min. of Economic Affairs	Yes	National Development Plan
Poland	May 2000	Yes, Min. of Reg. Dev	Yes	Nat. Strategy for Reg. Dev.
Slovenia	May/June 1999	Yes, Nat. Agency for Reg. Dev	Yes	Single Programming Document
<i>Second wave</i>				
Latvia	March 2002	No, Min. of Finance	Yes	Single Programming Document
Lithuania	July 2000	Yes, Dept of Reg Dev	No	National Development Plan
Malta	October 2003	Yes, Reg. Policy Directorate	No	Single Programming Document
Slovakia	October 2001	Yes, Min. of Construction and Reg Dev	Yes	National Development Plan
Bulgaria	Not yet	Yes, Min. of Reg. Dev and Public Works	Yes	Preliminary
Romania	Not yet	Unclear	No	Preliminary

Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), while four applicant countries had not (Estonia, Lithuania Malta and Romania, although Estonia, Lithuania and Malta closed the chapters later in 2002). Seven applicant countries established new institutions for regional policy, including new ministries, national agencies and regional governments, while others folded regional policy into existing government institutions. All countries but Cyprus have passed or are developing new legislation and new programming strategies for regional development, which are monitored and evaluated by the EU. The EU's evaluation of this legislation and programming varies, and in most cases is accompanied with the warning that applicant countries (as in the 2003 evaluation of Slovenia) 'must be prepared to apply effectively the new rules on public procurement in line with EU requirements, in order to benefit from Community funding from 1 January 2004.' ([http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2003/pdf/cmr\\_si\\_final.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_si_final.pdf))

In many applicant countries, the creation of new regions came only slowly and was often accompanied by political controversy. In Poland, the creation of new regions necessitated an extensive and politically costly territorial re-organization from the previous 49 voting districts into 16 NUTS II regions, as national parties were reluctant to cede financial and political authority to lower levels of government. In the Czech Republic, a rightist government led by Vaclav Klaus until 1997 rejected the creation of regional levels of administration as contrary to its neo-liberal economic policies, and regional policy remained underdeveloped until new social democratic governments adopted policies reflecting the EU's principles (Jacoby and Cernoch, 2002; Marek and Baun, 2002). In Slovakia, regional policy was largely blocked until after the fall of the semi-authoritarian Meciar government in 1998, with regional administrations perceived by the democratic opposition and Hungarian minority as a possible counterweight to the central authorities. In smaller countries such as Slovenia as well, new regions provoked controversy when initial plans for two regions were challenged by both the European Commission and local municipalities leading to the creation of three regions (Dieringer and Lindstrom, 2002). Only perhaps in Hungary and Estonia, by contrast, did new regions emerge relatively harmoniously (Brusis, 1999). Hungary is notable for its early efforts at adopting Western policy models, relatively high share of GDP devoted to regional development, and extensive consultations between government and societal organizations around regional policy.

None of the 10 countries invited to join the EU requested transition periods, since doing so would entail delaying the receipt of structural funds. Further, each of the applicant countries have declared that nearly all regions in their country (with some exceptions for regions containing capital cities) should be eligible for the receipt of structural funds upon accession under Objective 1,



whereby funds are allocated on the basis of a per capita GDP of less than 75% of the EU average. Although this may be true in principle, it is far from clear whether the applicant countries will be able to meet the co-financing and bureaucratic requirements of the structural funds. Many current EU member states such as Spain and Ireland do not use the entire available commitments for structural funds for similar reasons. Regions undoubtedly have differing capacities for administering these policies, especially since nearly the entire countries of many applicant countries would be eligible for such funds. Further, there is variation across applicant countries by territorial size. Whereas new regions in Poland, the largest country, may be able to serve as functional administrators of EU funds, new regions in the smallest countries like Slovenia may prove to be more cosmetic.

Attention to the impact of conditionality in regional policy suggests that applicant countries may see greater convergence than current members (see Brusis, 1999, 2002; Dieringer and Lindstrom, 2002). By contrast, the literature on regional policy in current EU member states finds diversity. At one extreme, Belgian regions deal directly with the Commission, as do some German Lander to some extent. At the other, Greece, Ireland and Portugal lack regional governments, and France and the UK have seen increased centralization (Hooghe, 1996, Keating, 1998). For current members, some have argued that European governance influences the reorganization of member states 'by modifying the opportunity structures and the rules of the game,' but that this influence varies in ways that reflect the diversity of states and regions (Le Gales and Lequesne, 1998, 4). For applicant countries, the impact of complying with accession negotiations, as well as the dynamic policy environment after the fall of communism in 1989, may mean greater similarity than difference.

## Discussion and Conclusions

This paper argues that accession negotiations may create even greater pressures for more rapid compliance and convergence among applicant countries than current member states. In contrast to the role of the European Court of Justice in the 'Europeanization' process for current member states, the European Commission is central to the monitoring and sanctioning of applicant countries in accession negotiations. At the same time, a skeptic might ask, how deep or meaningful are these changes? Even current EU members have not adopted uniform policies across the spectrum of policy arenas but participate to varying extents in a variety of cooperative agreements, including the Schengen customs treaty and policy opt-outs such as monetary union. A review of the scholarly literature on the future of the state in the European Union reveals multiple accounts, from those who contrast the 'strong' with the 'weak' transnational

thesis (Tarrow 1998) to those in the intergovernmental school of international relations who resolutely reject transnationalism (Moravcsik, 1998). This argument should not be overstated. Many scholars argue that membership in the EU has actually strengthened nation-states by creating new areas of authority in a context of global capitalism (Milward, 1992; Mann, 1993). One must ask, in which arenas does the state relinquish sovereignty? Clearly the state has not lost all its powers as a sovereign actor, since two so-called pillars of the EU — Common Security and Foreign Policy and Justice and Home Affairs — remain resolutely intergovernmental.

Given the detailed monitoring and public nature of the accession negotiations across 1998–2002, however, there is little reason to believe that applicant countries have been able to deceive the European Union with superficial changes that led to the premature closure of chapters of the *acquis*. It is too early to tell, however, how long-lasting these changes will be and how these new institutions will function, especially after these countries become members. Once accession negotiations are closed, the bargaining relationship between the EU and new members will change and possibilities for backsliding may emerge. Monitoring and sanctioning of the current applicant countries, however, has been built into the first years of new membership, perhaps especially in the arena of regional policy with its requirements of co-financing and programming for all funds. Should the EU perceive that countries do not continue to meet the requirements of membership, it will maintain the ability to sanction members, and this will provide an incentive to continue change.

Due to the relatively rapid adaptation to the demands of membership the current wave of enlargement offers a striking view into the future of nation states within the European common market. The arguments in this paper are consistent with the growing body of literature that analyzes the spread and impact of transnational models, including the literature on the rise of global culture (Meyer *et al.*, 1997). Research on the impact of international actors upon domestic politics has argued that success is more likely when international programs are flexible for varying local contexts and when domestic actors are invested and influence such programs (Jacoby, 2000, Mendelson and Glenn, 2002).

In this way, the paper avoids a zero-sum portrait of the future of the nation-state and those that foresee its demise (Mathews, 1997). Even the adoption of regional policies can be a way for the state to rid itself of difficult and costly problems and thereby strengthen the center. Vigorous differences in models for the EU remain among current member states. Although few dispute that EU membership was the only feasible choice for formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe for reasons of economics and security, it remains unclear as to exactly what type of union they have joined, as highlighted by current debates surrounding the prospects for a European constitutional treaty. For some such



as German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, enlargement presents an opportunity to move forward boldly to a new federal Europe based on a constitution and shared rights (Fischer, 2000). For others such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, enlargement highlights the reality that the EU is already too diverse to be based on shared political sovereignty and should remain based in common markets. Given the difficulties in administering the previous union of 15 members, enlargement and its impact on new member states remain key arenas in which the future of the EU will be decided.

## Notes

- 1 Thanks to Ivana Ergovic, Barbora Somogyiova and C. Carlton Vann for research assistance in the preparation of the paper and to Francesco Duina, Charles Tilly and three anonymous reviewers for feedback on earlier drafts.
- 2 See Baun (2000), Bokova and Houbtchev (2001), Hanousek and Lizal (2001), Hausner and Marody (2000), Mayhew (1998), and Zielonka (2002). Recent efforts to address enlargement from a theoretical perspective include Jacoby (2002) and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002).
- 3 <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm> From cooperation to accession.
- 4 In this paper, I will refer to those countries that have opened negotiations with the EU as applicant countries, to distinguish them from those countries that have been recognized as candidates for membership but not have yet begun negotiations (such as Turkey and Croatia).
- 5 Eurostat News Release (2001), 'GDP up by 5% in Candidate Countries in 2000,' No. 87/2001, p. 2.
- 6 For the European Commission's opinions and regular reports on progress towards accession, as well as other Commission documents related to enlargement, see [www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/).

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