



Report: Simulated Phishing Campaign Analysis

Executive Summary



- Objective: To simulate a basic password-harvesting phishing attack in a controlled educational environment to understand the mechanics and identify key defensive weaknesses.
- Methodology: A campaign was launched using the Gophish framework, targeting a single test user (myself).
- Key Finding: The simulation was 100% successful. The email was delivered, the link was clicked, and credentials were successfully captured. This demonstrates the high risk of credential-harvesting attacks, even simple ones.

Campaign Setup & Configuration





Execution & Results



Parameter	Value(s)
__original_url	https://www.linkedin.com/login/checkpoint/lg/login-submit
_d	d
ac	0
apfc	[]
authUUID	
controlId	d_checkpoint_lg_consumer_login-login_submit_button
csrfToken	ajax:7888160290166278369
fp_data	default
loginCsrfParam	aee209-bfed-4906-8482-995061e99229
loginFailureCount	0
pageInstance	urn:li:page:checkpoint_lg_login_default;A37FIAUjQd2rwAbjRDqw8g==
parentPageKey	d_checkpoint_lg_consumer_login
password	test123
pkSupported	false
rememberMeOptIn	true
sidString	f6e344ac-f2e8-4168-a421-a6465c504b8f
session_key	test@mail.com
session_redirect	
showAppleLogin	true
showGoogleOneTapLogin	true
showMicrosoftLogin	true
trk	

Analysis & Defensive Recommendations

Analysis: The attack was successful because it relied on social engineering (a sense of urgency) and a cloned website that looked legitimate. The "victim" (me) clicked the link and entered credentials without verifying the URL.

Defensive Recommendations:

1. User Training: This simulation proves that users should be trained to always hover over links to check the destination URL before clicking.
2. Email Filters: Better email security gateways could potentially block emails with links to raw IP addresses or newly registered domains.
3. Two-Factor/Multi-Factor Authentication (2FA/MFA): This is the single most effective defense. Even though the attacker (me) successfully stole the password, I would still be unable to log in to the real LinkedIn without the 2FA code from the user's phone.