Judicial Selection and the Democratization of Justice:

Lessons from the Bolivian Judicial Elections

Appendix

(To be placed online)

May 30, 2014

Supporting Information

As mentioned in the body of the paper, we explain our measurement strategy in more detail and explain a series of additional analyses to assess the robustness of our empirical results. This appendix presents the results of those alternative model specifications and indicate that our results are robust to a variety of different modeling and control variable choices.

Measuring Candidate Qualifications: A Latent Variable Approach

In our paper, we eschew traditional approaches to measuring candidate quality to more adequately capture the heterogeneity and breadth of professional experience the Bolivian candidates brought to bear. Though only 18% of the candidates reported previous judgeships, 70% of candidates were lawyers while 72% served as legal counsel for high court judges, legislative committees, or in the ministry of justice. Yet another 65% of candidates reported previous leadership in non-governmental organizations, the constitutional assembly, the ministry of justice in the prosecutor's or Attorney General's office. 90% of the candidates had some graduate training, several of whom studied at prestigious international institutions. Also, 65% of the candidates had some professorial experience training undergraduates and graduate students in law and social policy, while 36% listed academic publications among their previous accomplishments. In sum, the Bolivian judicial candidates brought a varied set of professional accomplishments from the judicial, legal and academic fields.

We first coded the information presented in the voter information, recording all mentions of candidates' professional experiences, academic formation, evidence of academic productivity and areas of expertise. We then construct a measure using a logistic item-response model to capture each candidates' relative rank of qualifications. Taken from the literature on educational testing, the model takes J test-takers who are quizzed on K items, with $y_{jk} = 1$ if the response is correct. The model is then:

$$Pr(y_i = 1) = logit^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} - \beta_{k[i]}), \tag{1}$$

where α_j is the ability of person j, β_k is the difficulty of item k and $[i]$ is the individual response of each person on any given item k, leaving open the possibility that individual may not answer all of the items. The IRT model has the advantage of incorporating a large variety of professional experiences by which a candidate may advertise her relative experience without imposing artificial requisites of an 'ideal' career trajectory. Second, though the information provided in the candidate profile was semi-standardized by the OEP, the information reported was not identical for each candidate. In other words, we may not know all of the candidates' professional history simply because they chose not to report it, but rather reported other professional accomplishments instead. At the same time, we incorporate the full set of information available to voters via the voter information guide, because the candidates were explicitly prohibited from campaigning and thereby providing voters with additional information.

	Third Lowest Candidate Score Profile Characteristics	Third Highest Candidate Score Profile Characteristics
Educational Qualifications		
	Top 20 Law School; Graduate coursework in human rights, leadership and education; Undergraduate degree in Education; Teachers certificate	Top-ranked Law School; Ph.D. in Tax Law; MBA in Tax Law; M.A. in Constitutional Law; M.A. in Constitutional Procedures; B.A. Higher Ed; B.A. Constitutional Law; Advanced professional training at Spanish National Judicial School
Professional Experience		
	Executive Assistant & Lawyer 27 years experience as secretary and teacher in national education system; 34 years experience as volunteer to Potosí Human Rights Assembly	Head clerk of National Tax Court; Administrative judge La Paz Supreme Court; President La Paz Supreme Court; Judge and President of Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal; Top-ranked Law School Faculty in the area of Tax Law

Table 1: Face Validity of IRT measure of judicial candidate qualifications.

Our measure of candidates' professional qualifications has a minimum of -1.92 and a maximum of 1.22. The mean of the data is $-.28$ and the median is $-.14$, and the data have a slight negative skew. Table 1 presents the full list of the educational and professional experiences for candidates who were rated relatively low and relatively high, providing face validity to our measure. At one end of the spectrum, a candidate was a legal secretary with extensive professional experience, though only some of it pertained to law or the legal training. At the high end of our qualifications measure, the candidate had completed multiple graduate or doctoral degrees, some of which was acquired outside the country, and had experience as a departmental and national judge. This same candidate reported multiple academic works pertaining to constitutional and tax law. These profiles were the third highest and the third lowest of our IRT ranking, and are similar to the candidates with similarly low or high scores.

Candidate Qualifications: Alternative Measures

	Est.	S.E.	z-Stat.		Est.	S.E.	z-Stat.
Professional Qualifications							
Prior Judicial Experience	-0.03	0.21	-0.13	*Number of Claimed Qualifications*	0.03	0.09	0.30
Political Representation							
Government Affiliate	0.15	0.30	0.49	Government Affiliate	0.14	0.30	0.48
Government Stronghold	-0.00	0.00	-0.55	Government Stronghold	-0.00	0.00	-0.55
Government Affiliate × Government Stronghold	0.00	0.01	0.74	Government Affiliate ×Government Stronghold	0.00	0.01	0.73
Descriptive Representation							
Overtly Indigenous	-0.65	0.46	-1.42	Overtly Indigenous	-0.66	0.46	-1.43
Percent Indigenous	-0.01	0.00	-2.57	Percent Indigenous	-0.01	0.00	-2.57
Overtly Indigenous × Percent Indigenous	0.02	0.01	4.10	Indigenous Candidate ×Overtly Indigenous	0.02	0.01	4.10
Female Candidate	0.05	0.18	0.28	Female Candidate	0.03	0.18	0.18
Female Mayor	-0.05	0.39	-0.13	Female Mayor	-0.05	0.39	-0.13
Female Candidate × Female Mayor	-0.25	0.60	-0.41	Female Candidate ×Female Mayor	-0.25	0.60	-0.41
Controls							
Ballot Position	-0.10	0.01	-9.28	Ballot Position	-0.10	0.01	-9.30
Intercept	-2.06	0.27	-7.59	Intercept	-2.10	0.29	-7.20
Log-likelihood	-176.6			Log-likelihood	-167.6		
BIC	454.4			BIC	454.3		
S.D. (Candidate)	0.22			S.D. (Candidate)	0.21		
N	9464			N	9464		

Table 2: Hierarchical logistic regression model estimates of candidates' vote share at the municipal level using alternative measures of *Candidate Qualifications*. The models include random intercepts for each candidate.

To further assess our null result for the effects of candidate qualifications on a candidate's vote share, we reestimated the model using two alternative measures of candidate qualifications. Following Bonneau and Hall (2009), our first alternative measure of the concept is dichotomous and indicates if the candidate had any prior judicial experience. The left panel of Table 2 shows the results of the reestimated model using *Prior Judicial Experience* as the measure of candidate qualifications. Our conclusions are robust to this measure; the estimated coefficient is not statisti-

cally significant and therefore provides no evidence that Bolivians selected candidates on the basis of candidates' professional qualifications. All other substantive effects discussed in the paper hold.

Additionally, as discussed in the body of the paper, the candidate profiles explicitly indicated separate sets of qualifications for each candidate: their educational background, their academic production, their past professional history, and other relevant experience. The presence of each of these areas of expertise varied for each candidate. For example, if a candidate had no relevant past professional history, then that section was absent from their candidate profile. Using this as a baseline, our second measure of candidate qualifications is a five point scale indicating the *Number of Claimed Qualifications* by each candidate in their profile. Even if voters do not carefully read the entries, the presence or absence of more or less information on the candidate profile may have served as an informational shortcut by which candidate quality could be objectively assessed. The results of the model are shown in Table 3. As with the other measure of candidate quality, there is no evidence that Bolivians elected judicial candidates on the basis of their professional or academic record.

Indigenous Identity: Alternative Measure

Next, the main empirical specification relies on subjective evaluations of a candidate's indigenous status using the photographs of the candidates which were provided to voters in the candidate information guide as well as printed next to the candidate's name on the ballot itself. We chose to rely on the picture to identify candidates as *Overtly Indigenous* for a number of reasons. First, because the photos were provided on the ballot while the candidate's self-identification was not, the candidate photo was a source of information to which all voters were exposed. Even if voters did not (or could not) carefully scrutinize the candidate profiles, the pictures were available on the ballot for everyone to see. Second, the photo may have been a signal candidates strategically employed to communicate their ideological or political priorities and commitments. It is certainly plausible that this was an attempt to curry sympathies with the indigenous majority, many of whom are MAS affiliates, who has been a prominent electoral voting bloc in recent years (Alpert et al.

	Estimate.	S.E.	z-Statistic
Political Representation			
Government Affiliate	0.06	0.33	0.19
Government Stronghold	-0.00	0.00	-0.93
Government Affiliate×Government Stronghold	0.01	0.00	1.31
Descriptive Representation			
Self-Identified Indigenous	-0.57	0.37	-1.52
Percent Indigenous	-0.01	0.00	-2.69
Self-Identified Indigenous×Percent Indigenous	0.02	0.00	3.70
Female Candidate	0.00	0.23	0.02
Female Mayor	-0.07	0.39	-0.19
Female Candidate×Female Mayor	-0.21	0.60	-0.34
Professional Qualifications			
Candidate Qualification Score	0.15	0.17	0.84
Controls			
Ballot Position	-0.10	0.01	-7.63
Intercept	-1.93	0.31	-6.18
Log-likelihood	-172.8		
BIC	464.6		
Standard Deviation (Candidate)	0.33		
N	9464		

Table 3: Hierarchical logistic regression model estimates of candidates' vote share at the municipal level using candidates' *Self-identified indigenous* status in place of the *Overt Indigenous* classification employed in the paper. The model includes random intercepts for each candidate.

2009; Boulding 2010). [1]

However, as discussed and shown in Figure 2 in the body of the paper, not all candidates who self-identify as indigenous were easily identified as such based on their photograph. Indeed, one candidate was coded as appearing to be indigenous but did not self-identify as indigenous in the profile. Four candidates self-identified as indigenous but did not overtly signal their indigenous identification in the picture of themselves that they submitted. In order to ascertain the robust-

[1] Our coders are both American undergraduate students who received no training or priming regarding the classification of 'indigenous-looking,' and they have no knowledge of Bolivia or Bolivian politics. The coders were given the pictures of the candidates, and were simply asked if the candidates appeared to be indigenous. This procedure ensured that their coding decisions were driven by the photograph they saw rather than by the candidate's stated self-affiliation with an indigenous group, the candidate's place of residence or name.

ness of the empirical results to candidate's stated self-classification, we re-estimated the model replacing the original measure of *Overtly Indigenous* with a dichotomous variable indicating if the candidate was a *Self-identified Indigenous* candidate.

Table 3 presents the model estimates. These results are very similar to the model results discussed in the body of the paper. To assess the robustness of the interactive effect between a candidate's indigenous status and the percentage of the municipality that identifies as indigenous, Figure 1 displays a plot of the marginal effect of self-identified indigenous status on vote share. The plot still indicates that indigenous candidates receive a boost at the polls in heavily indigenous areas; An indigenous candidate in a district that is 25% indigenous can expect to receive about a 4% boost in vote share; in a district that is 75% indigenous, that effect doubles to an 8% increase in vote share. These results are consistent with the effects reported in the main body of the paper.



Figure 1: Marginal Effects of a candidate's indigenous status on the candidate's vote share in the 2011 Bolivian judicial elections using candidate *Self-identified Indigenous* status. The gray bands are confidence intervals at the $p < .05$ level using two-tailed tests. The rug shows the distribution of *Percent Indigenous* in the data. All other covariates are held at their median or modal values.

Alternative explanations pertaining to information, partisanship and voter sophistication

Fourth, even though the institutional rules surrounding the Bolivian elections hold constant a number of potentially alternative explanations, readers may be concerned that our empirical analysis fails to control for an influence that may be highly correlated with one of our key independent variables and the dependent variable and therefore may cause omitted variable bias. As such, we reestimated our model, this time including a variety of control variables for potentially confounding effects.

First, to assess the potential nonrandom distribution of campaign information to rural areas (*TSE admite* 2011; *OEA recomienda* 2011), our model includes a measure of the percentage of citizens who have access to electricity (*Percent Rural*).[2] Second, as Bolivian politics scholars (e.g. Alpert, Centellas and Singer 2010; Centellas 2009) have noted, deeply-held political cleavages divide the eastern and western halves of the country, which have the potential to confound our results pertaining to voters' affinity (or antipathy) for the MAS party. To assess the extent to which these cleavages hamper the robustness of our results, we include a dichotomous variable, coded '1' if the district is in the eastern half of the country (known to Bolivians as the 'half moon' or *Media Luna*) (*Regional Cleavage*). Third, models of vote choice often include a measure of voters' level of *Wealth*. To assess the robustness of our results to the malapportionment of economic circumstances by municipality, the model includes the percentage of citizens in the municipality who own a cell phone. Finally, to counter any effects of education on vote choice, the model includes the municipality's *Illiteracy Rate*.

Table 4 presents the results of a re-estimated model that includes these control variables. Though three of the four control variables do appear to have some independent explanatory power, their inclusion does not change the sign or statistical significance of any of the variables that were

[2]Though the OEP claimed that their distribution methods ensured that citizens across the country, media reports suggested that some rural areas did not receive information about the candidates (*TSE admite* 2011; *OEA recomienda* 2011). If candidates living in rural areas were less likely to receive any information about the candidates, then the null result presented in the body of the paper regarding the effects of candidate characteristics may be due to the fact that some voters did not have access to information about candidate qualifications and could not, therefore, factor qualifications into their decision-making.

	Estimate	S.E.	z-Statistic
Political Representation			
Government Affiliate	0.04	0.31	0.14
Government Stronghold	-0.00	0.00	-0.43
Government Affiliate×Government Stronghold	0.00	0.01	0.72
Descriptive Representation			
Overtly Indigenous	-0.58	0.45	-1.29
Percent Indigenous	-0.01	0.00	-1.77
Overtly Indigenous×Percent Indigenous	0.02	0.01	4.09
Female Candidate	0.14	0.18	0.79
Female Mayor	-0.05	0.39	-0.13
Female Candidate×Female Mayor	-0.25	0.60	-0.41
Professional Qualifications			
Candidate Qualification Score	0.14	0.13	1.09
Controls			
Percent Rural	0.00	0.00	0.31
Media Luna	0.03	0.21	0.12
Percent Illiterate	0.00	0.01	0.23
Wealth	-0.00	0.01	-0.01
Ballot Position	-0.10	0.01	-9.72
Intercept	-2.09	0.42	-4.95
Log-likelihood	-167.1		
BIC	489.8		
Standard Deviation (Candidate)	0.17		
N	9464		

Table 4: Hierarchical logistic regression model estimates of candidates' vote share at the municipal level including a variety of control variables with random effects coefficients for each candidate.

the focus of our discussion above. Moreover, though not included here in the interest of space, the inclusion of these variables does not affect the marginal effects of gender, indigenous status, or government affiliation. Notably, though some of these variables achieve conventional levels of statistical significance, their substantive effect is very small.

The Interactive Effects of Voter Sophistication

While the Bolivian government went to great lengths to standardize the information available to voters by providing printed voter information guides, members of the public varied in their ability to understand that information. Indeed, voter literacy rates vary widely across the country. In the median municipality, approximately 20% of the public is illiterate, and illiteracy ranges from 3% to 80% in municipalities across the country.As a result, one may worry that the rate of municipal illiteracy might condition voters' reliance on the voting cues available to them.[3]

	Estimate	S.E.	z-Statistic
Political Representation			
Government Affiliate	-0.62	0.56	-1.11
Government Stronghold	-0.01	0.01	-1.20
Percent Illiterate × Government Affiliate	0.03	0.03	1.10
Percent Illiterate × Government Stronghold	0.00	0.00	0.95
Government Affiliate × Government Stronghold	0.01	0.01	1.33
Percent Illiterate × Gov. Affiliate × Gov. Stronghold	-0.00	0.00	-0.97
Descriptive Representation			
Overtly Indigenous	-0.97	0.93	-1.05
Percent Indigenous	-0.01	0.01	-1.48
Percent Illiterate × Overtly Indigenous	0.02	0.05	0.44
Percent Illiterate × Percent Indigenous	0.00	0.00	0.30
Overtly Indigenous × Percent Indigenous	0.03	0.01	2.85
Percent Illiterate × Overtly Indigenous × Percent Indigenous	-0.00	0.00	-0.86
Female Candidate	0.15	0.31	0.48
Female Mayor	0.44	0.93	0.47
Percent Illiterate × Female Candidate	0.00	0.01	0.11
Percent Illiterate × Female Mayor	-0.02	0.05	-0.54
Female Candidate × Female Mayor	-0.52	1.41	-0.37
Percent Illiterate × Female Candidate × Female Mayor	0.01	0.07	0.22
Professional Qualifications			
Candidate Qualifications Score	0.35	0.21	1.66
Percent Illiterate × Candidate Qualifications Score	-0.01	0.01	-1.05
Controls			
Percent Illiterate	-0.02	0.02	-0.73
Ballot Position	-0.09	0.02	-5.08
Percent Illiterate × Ballot Position	-0.00	0.00	-0.62
Intercept	-1.57	0.48	-3.29
Log-Likelihood	-162.4		
BIC	553.8		
Standard Deviation (Candidate)	0.09		
N	9520		

Table 5: Hierarchical logistic regression model estimates of candidates vote share at the municipal level. The model includes random intercepts for each candidate.

[3]By this theory, easily available heuristics, like ballot position, indigenous status, and gender that were available to voters inside the polling place because of the fact that these cues were printed on the ballot may be particularly important to voters in areas with high rates of illiteracy while other cues, such as party affiliation and candidate qualifications that did not appear on the ballot may have mattered more in places with higher literacy.



Figure 2: Marginal Effects of a candidate's indigenous status and publicized party affiliation on the candidate's vote share in the 2011 Bolivian judicial elections, by the level of illiteracy within the municipality. The gray bands are confidence intervals at the $p < .05$ level using two-tailed tests. The rug shows the distribution of *Percent Illiterate* in the data. All other covariates are held at their median or modal values.

To test this hypothesis, we reestimated the model presented in the body of the paper, interacting each of the covariates with *Percent Illiterate*. The resulting model estimates are shown in Table 5. As the table indicates, the addition of the literacy rate interactions results in a multitude of three-way interactions which cannot be interpreted directly from the table. Thus, Figures 2 and 3 present plots which assess the marginal effects of the candidate characteristics of interest on candidate vote shares.

Figure 2 shows the marginal effects for ballot position and qualifications on candidate vote shares. Recall from the body of the paper that our original model results suggested that ballot

position had a negative effect on vote shares; candidates who appeared at the bottom of the ballot, all else equal, performed worse than candidates who appeared at the top of the ballot. The top panel of Figure 2 indicates that this result holds across all levels of illiteracy.[4] Indeed, there is no evidence from the figure that the size or statistical significance of this effect changes with the illiteracy of the municipality.

The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the effects of candidate qualifications over the range of municipal illiteracy.[5] Recall from the body of the paper that our model results found no evidence that qualifications have a reliable relationship with vote share. This figure shows that our result holds across all levels of municipal illiteracy.

To assess the effects of indigenous status and party affiliation on candidate vote shares across levels of both illiteracy and the municipality's composition, we turn to Figure 3. The three panels that comprise the top row of Figure 3 plot the effects of indigenous status while the bottom panels plot the effects of MAS affiliation. The left-hand panels in both rows plot the effects of that candidate characteristic at the highest levels of literacy in the data while the right-hand panels show the effects in municipalities where illiteracy is highest. The middle panels plot the effects where illiteracy is held at its median value. The x-axes in each figure plot the effect of indigenous status (the top row) or MAS affiliation across the observed ranges of percent indigenous (the top row) or Government Stronghold (the bottom row).

Recall from the body of the paper that our results indicated that indigenous candidates received a boost in districts that were heavily indigenous. The results from the top panels of Figure 3 indicate that that finging might be slightly more nuanced. Indeed, it appears that the boost stems from municipalities where literacy was relatively high; the slope of the marginal effect among municipalities with low literacy (the right-hand panel) is negative, indicating that, among those municipalities, the relationship goes in the opposite direction. Still, the slope of the line is not very steep and is certainly not statistically significant, indicating that this effect may not be reliable.

[4]This figure plots the marginal effect of ballot position as ballot position moves from the median value to the median value plus one ballot position.

[5]Specifically, this plot shows the effect of moving from the median level of qualifications to the third quartile level of qualifications.



Figure 3: Marginal Effects of a candidate's ballot position and formal qualifications on the candidate's vote share in the 2011 Bolivian judicial elections, by the level of illiteracy within the municipality. The gray bands are confidence intervals at the $p < .05$ level using two-tailed tests. The rug shows the distribution of *Percent Illiterate* in the data. All other covariates are held at their median or modal values.

Finally examining the bottom row of Figure 3 to assess the effects of party affiliation, the story mirrors that told in the body of the paper: party affiliation appears not to have a statistically significant role in determining candidate's vote shares. Recall from the paper, however, that party affiliation did have a statistically significant effect for candidates at the bottom of the ballot. Though not apparent from the figure, the results indicate that this may not be the case once the literacy rate is interacted with party affiliation and government stronghold. While the confidence intervals get tighter as ballot position increases, the effect just misses statistical significance in these models for all levels of literacy.

In sum, this additional analysis provides strong evidence that the results presented in the body of the paper hold once the potential conditional effects of voter comprehension are accounted for. Indeed, the majority of our results are robust to the addition of these interactions. It seems that, regardless of a municipality's illiteracy, the effects of candidate characteristics on candidates'

electoral fortunes remain fairly stable.

Distribution of District-level predictors

Because the unit of analysis is the candidate-district, readers may be concerned that the degree of homogeneity among districts may affect the empirical results. In particular, if several variables are highly correlated, multicollinearity may inflate the standard errors of the estimated coefficients and cause misleading results. Likewise, if the makeup of the districts is too similar (which might happen, for example, if the MAS party dominated most of the districts or if the vast majority of the districts were majority-minority districts), then the marginal effects plots displayed may be strained by the task of making out-of-sample predictions. To this end, Table 6 displays a table of descriptive statistics for district-level predictors, and Table 7 provides a correlation matrix for those predictors. The large standard deviations for most of the variables in Table 6, coupled with the lack of very high correlations in Table 7 suggests that these concerns are unfounded. There is no evidence that the districts are too homogeneous to produce reliable inferences.

	Min.	Mean	Median	Max.	St. Dev.
Government Stronghold	1.40	50.69	47.15	100.00	23.40
Percent Indigenous	1.54	70.97	87.89	100.00	30.43
Female Mayor	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.21
Percent Rural	0.00	33.64	28.95	95.30	25.40
Illiteracy Rate	3.20	21.12	17.85	79.80	12.43
Wealth	0.00	4.77	0.72	50.53	9.15

Table 6: Table of Descriptive Statistics of District-level predictors

	Govt. Strong.	Pct. Indig.	Fem. Mayor	Pct. Rural	Illit. Rate	Wealth
Govt. Stronghold	1.00	0.40	-0.02	-0.38	0.37	-0.33
Pct. Indigenous	0.40	1.00	-0.09	-0.20	0.32	-0.25
Female Mayor	-0.02	-0.09	1.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04
Pct. Rural	-0.38	-0.20	-0.02	1.00	-0.43	0.74
Illiteracy Rate	0.37	0.32	-0.02	-0.43	1.00	-0.38
Wealth	-0.33	-0.25	-0.04	0.74	-0.38	1.00

Table 7: Correlation Matrix of District-level predictors

Public Confidence Before and After Election

From the AmericasBarometer surveys, we collected a variety of demographic and and political information regarding individual's lifestyle, education, attitudes and political predilections. We are particularly interested in the effect of one's support for the government on her confidence in the Supreme Court. To this end, the model includes a measure of Presidential approval. Respondents were asked to rate the current (Morales) administration on a scale from one to five, with lower values being more positive. We have inverted this scale for the ease of interpretability. Addtionally, as discussed in the body of the paper, many Bolivians cast null or blank votes in the 2011 election as an act of protest. To this end, we include two dichotomous variables for respondents' vote choice in the 2011 election, one for those respondents who cast blank votes and one for those who cast null votes.

Next, we note in the manuscript that blank and null voting was more common in some sections of the country. Namely, voters residing in Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarjia—the Media Luna departments—were vastly more likely to spoil their ballots, and so may be more likely to express skepticism towards the Supreme Court and the judicial system following the judicial elections. Conversely, the analysis of **[Redacted]** suggests that indigenous voters were a voting bloc that appeared to spoil their ballots with less frequency, likely due to indigenous voters' historical affiliation with the MAS political movement. On this account, we included dummy variables for both of these predictors based on respondents' self-identification as indigenous (as opposed to mestizo, white or black), and based on respondents' department.

Political sophistication is a well-documented predictor of support for judicial institutions (e.g. Gibson & Caldeira 2009). To measure the public's awareness of of judicial institutions, we include the respondent's level of Education, which is simply a numeric value for the number of years of schooling for each survey respondent. This variable ranges from zero to 18, with a median of 11 and a mean of approximately 10 years. As another measure of political sophistication, we create a measure of News Frequency, in which respondents describe the frequency with which they obtain news from any news source: never, rarely, weekly or daily. We anticipate awareness of

current events would make respondents more aware of courts and the judicial elections.

Additionally, extant literature on public support for the judiciary (e.g. Gibson and Caldeira 1992) suggests that respondents' basic political beliefs structure their support for judicial institutions. Our measure of respondents' attitudes towards democracy combines respondents' affect for democracy generally and Bolivian Democracy specifically. The questions queried Bolivian's satisfaction with democracy overall (1-4), respondents' ratings of the quality of Bolivian democracy (1-4) and the extent to which they agreed with the statement that "Democracy may have its problems, but it is still superior to alternative forms of government" (1-7). The composite index of Democratic Values ranges from 3 to 15, and is normally distributed around 10 with a slightly negative skew. Finally, our measure of Procedural Justice combines respondents attitudes towards their assessment of the fairness judicial institutions. In particular, respondents ranked the extent to which they anticipated courts would ensure a fair trial (1-7) and the extent to which they thought that criminals would be brought to justice if they took a case to a criminal trial. The combined minimum of this variable is 2, the maximum 13, with an observed median value of 6.

Finally, we also control for a number of demographic characteristics, including whether the respondent lives in a rural area (a dichotomous indicator) and their wealth (whether the respondent owns a cell phone), as well as the respondent's age and gender.

The results of the full models (including intercepts) are presented below. Additionally, in the middle column of the table, we present a model on the 2012 data that mirrors the specification from the 2008 model exactly to assuage any concerns that the difference in the size of the effect for Morales approval is driven by the introduction of variables for vote choice in the 2011 judicial election.

	2008	2012	2012
Morales Approval	0.19*	0.75*	0.72*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Blank			-0.39*
			(0.13)
Null			-0.24*
			(0.10)
Auto-ID Indigenous	0.37*	0.13	0.11
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Media Luna	0.46*	0.50*	0.48*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education	-0.00	-0.02*	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
News Consumption	0.06	0.05	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Democratic Values	0.11*	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Procedural Justice	0.50*	0.47*	0.47*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Rural	0.17	0.07	0.06
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Cellphone	0.27*	0.17	0.17
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.05	0.08	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
1|2	2.64*	3.06*	2.84*
	(0.52)	(0.47)	(0.48)
2|3	3.55*	4.20*	3.98*
	(0.52)	(0.48)	(0.48)
3|4	4.51*	5.57*	5.35*
	(0.52)	(0.49)	(0.49)
4|5	5.94*	7.16*	6.95*
	(0.54)	(0.50)	(0.50)
5|6	7.67*	8.68*	8.48*
	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.52)
6|7	9.30*	9.95*	9.75*
	(0.57)	(0.55)	(0.55)
N	2386	2301	2301

Table 8: Ordered logistic regression of citizen confidence in the Bolivian Supreme Court in 2008 and 2012. $*$ Indicates significance of $p < .05$. Standard Errors in Parentheses