

(U) Appendix D: Evaluation of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative

(U) Presidential Directive NSPD-54/HSPD-23, *Cybersecurity Policy*, established “United States policy, strategy, guidelines, and implementation actions to secure cyberspace.” It includes a Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), created to strengthen policies for protecting U.S. Government information and systems, clarify roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies related to cybersecurity, and explore how the Federal government might enhance its relationship with the private sector in order to better protect our critical infrastructures. The resourcing and implementation of the CNCI has been undertaken by the Federal government with a sense of urgency that reflects the nature and severity of the threat. The major “initiatives” within the CNCI are:

- Manage the Federal Enterprise Network as a single network enterprise, with Trusted Internet Connections that collapse the number of portals between government networks and the Internet;
- Deploy consistent intrusion detection capabilities across the Federal enterprise;
- Pursue deployment of intrusion prevention systems across the Federal enterprise;
- Catalogue, coordinate and redirect as appropriate cyber research and development efforts;
- Connect current cyber centers to enhance cyber situation awareness;
- Develop a government-wide cyber counterintelligence plan;
- Increase the security of classified networks;
- Expand cyber education;
- Define and develop enduring “leap-ahead” technology, strategies, and programs;
- Define and develop enduring deterrence strategies and programs;
- Develop a multi-pronged approach for global supply chain risk management; and
- Define the Federal role for extending cybersecurity into critical infrastructure domains by working with the private sector.

(U) These major portions of the CNCI required strengthening key strategic foundational capabilities within the Federal government, hence the CNCI includes several strategic “enablers” that augment ongoing cyber-related activities at specific departments and agencies:

- Ensuring adequate support to neutralize, mitigate, and disrupt domestic illegal computer activity;
- Increasing information assurance programs and activities;
- Increasing predictive, behavioral, information and trend analysis of foreign intrusion activities and computer network operational threats;
- Expanding and enhancing U.S. offensive capabilities in support of network defense;
- Increasing investment in U.S. Government cryptanalysis;
- Developing, deploying, and managing an intrusion response capability; and
- Monitoring and coordinating implementation of the CNCI.

(U) Significant CNCI accomplishments to date include rapid progress on many of the initiatives and their strategic enablers; extensive engagement with the Congress; the development of a consolidated view of the disparate budget resources committed to cyber programs funded under national intelligence, military, information assurance, law enforcement, and civilian agency program budgets; and the initiation of key out-of-cycle resource and acquisition activities that would have been difficult within normal legislative appropriations schedules. As a consolidated portfolio scarcely more than one year in existence, the results achieved have been overwhelmingly positive, and although challenges remain, the objectives are clear and in keeping with the larger strategy. The Federal government should continue to go forward with CNCI implementation.

(U) NSPD-54/HSPD-23 assigned responsibility for monitoring, coordinating, and reporting on implementation of the CNCI to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), despite the fact that much of the CNCI portfolio falls outside of the Intelligence Community. The DNI has done a commendable and effective job using a Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force (JIACTF) created to carry out these responsibilities. The JIACTF uses a portfolio approach—complete with detailed performance measures and target achievement goals—for tracking the status of the 19 separate initiatives and enablers. Under this approach, the JIACTF serves as the central “steward” for oversight and monitoring, but unlike a traditional joint program management office, individual departments and agencies maintain responsibility for the development of business requirements, program management, and budgeting for each specific initiative and activity.

(U) As anticipated by individual CNCI component implementation plans, much work remains to achieve the objectives of the CNCI program and of NSPD-54/HSPD-23. Progress has been uneven, and subsequent oversight must put greater emphasis on scalability and sustainability. While the “steward” model for monitoring and coordinating CNCI activities has been effective as a start-up approach for a complex, multi-agency portfolio, stronger central coordination and oversight will be required to ensure that the individual components are commensurately resourced and mesh effectively to attain the required joint operating capabilities. Only the White House has sufficiently broad authority to provide the required central leadership. JIACTF-like staff support would be necessary to sustain and strengthen the interagency coordination that has been a hallmark of the CNCI successes. Anticipated outcomes

would include more effective collaboration and development of joint standard operating procedures where needed; more fully integrated program acquisition and management; and accelerated opportunities for technology training and re-use.

(U) The CNCI and associated activities identified by NSPD-54/HSPD-23 must evolve to become key base elements of the broader, updated national cyberspace strategy. Successful programs within NSPD-54/HSPD-23 should proceed apace; other programs are keys to the overall success of the strategy but have not fully matured or achieved their anticipated results. Where necessary, “Go Forward” recommendations should endorse the objectives of these programs and provide new direction for resolving roadblocks as well as considering innovative alternatives to accomplish the objectives.

(U) Status of CNCI Activities

(U) The JIACTF, in its “monitoring and coordinating” role, has highlighted areas of concern with CNCI implementation and recommended areas for course correction and has highlighted successes within the CNCI that could be expanded as the program advances. The 60-day cyberspace review team, based on inputs from the JIACTF, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the departments and agencies, makes the following observations about the various CNCI components:

(U) Initiative #1. **Manage the Federal Enterprise Network as a single network enterprise, with Trusted Internet Connections (TICs).** Currently, Federal government networks have thousands of Internet access points that have proven to be too difficult to manage and secure. This Initiative, the primary purpose of which was publicly announced in November 2007,¹⁰⁶ aimed to cut the number of portals between government and the Internet to fewer than 100, using the General Services Administration award of the NETWORX contract for telecommunications service and the Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) to implement secure desktop configurations. *These program goals and timeframes have proven to be overly ambitious: the TIC and NETWORX consolidation initiative is behind schedule and unlikely to achieve its goal of delivering less than 100 connections either in short- or mid-term timeframes.*

(U) Initiative #2. **Deploy an intrusion detection system of sensors across the Federal enterprise.** Intrusion Detection requires software to identify when unauthorized entities have gained access to computer networks. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) EINSTEIN 1 software package offers “after the fact” analysis of network flow information from participating Federal agencies and provides a high-level perspective from which to observe potential malicious activity in computer network traffic. The updated version, EINSTEIN 2, incorporates network intrusion detection technology capable of alerting the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) in real time to the presence of malicious or potentially harmful computer network activity in federal executive agencies’ network traffic based on specific pre-defined signatures derived from known malicious activity. DHS reviewed the legal and privacy implications of this system and published a Privacy Impact Assessment for EINSTEIN 2 on its website,¹⁰⁷ thereby providing greater transparency for this part of the CNCI than for most of the other program elements. *Unfortunately, EINSTEIN 2 was envisioned for deployment at the Trusted Internet Connections established by Initiative #1—and hence this Initiative’s deployment schedule has slipped because of the slippage in the TIC and NETWORX consolidation.*

¹⁰⁶ (U) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2008/m08-05.pdf>

¹⁰⁷ (U) http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_einstein2.pdf

(S//REL TO FVEY) Initiative #3. **Pursue deployment of intrusion prevention systems across the Federal enterprise.** Intrusion prevention requires a capability to not only identify intrusions in progress, but to block the attacker from successfully entering the network. Work is under way on developing EINSTEIN 3, a sensor-based system that will automatically block or otherwise mitigate the impact of attempted cyber intrusions. In practice, intrusion prevention is a capability required and routinely deployed by private industry, typically through managed security services offered by Internet Service Providers and Data Exchange Internet Exchange Points, and for home users through commercially available firewall and antivirus programs. The Initiative #3 plan offers advantages unavailable commercially, in particular NSA cryptanalysis and decryption services to address threats masked by encryption. The linkage of EINSTEIN 3 to the NSA Signals Intelligence system, similar to the system already being deployed to defend Department of Defense networks, raises civil liberties and privacy concerns that have significantly complicated EINSTEIN 3 development. *The need for sophisticated intrusion prevention capabilities for government networks is beyond question. There also is a need for greater transparency and public dialogue on the means by which this will be accomplished, taking into account civil liberties and privacy concerns while remaining mindful of the need to protect from release any information that would allow adversaries to subvert U.S. defenses. Given the significant challenges facing this implementation as well as those of Initiatives #1 and #2, EINSTEIN 3 implementation should proceed with a) enhanced transparency and dialogue to address civil liberties and privacy concerns, and b) concurrent assessment of additional implementation concepts that could reduce risks to program implementation while meeting the goals and objectives of Initiative #3.*

(U) Initiative #4: **Coordinate and redirect research and development efforts.** No single individual or organization is aware of all of the cyber-related R&D activities being funded by the Federal government. This Initiative remains critical to determining whether there is redundancy, figuring out research gaps, and ensuring the taxpayers are getting full value for their money as we shape our strategic investments. *Our review determined that a successful process has been created, and the government is beginning to identify shortfalls needing additional investment and those where overlap exists.*

(U) Initiative #5: **Connect current cyber centers to enhance situation awareness.** There is a pressing need to ensure that government information security offices and cyber operations centers share data as legally appropriate regarding malicious activities against federal systems in order to have a better understanding of the entire threat to government systems. This effort focuses on key aspects necessary to enable practical mission bridging across the elements of U.S. cyber activities: network connectivity, common information standards, and shared standard operating procedures. *The review determined that full connectivity at all levels of data classification does not yet exist between the centers, and the continued use of disparate toolsets complicates the development of common situation awareness. The success of this Initiative requires reconsideration of its governance structure and its resourcing requirements.*

(U) Initiative #6: **Develop a government-wide cyber counterintelligence (CI) plan,** encompassing development of a plan across agencies to identify, analyze, share information, and respond as appropriate to foreign-sponsored cyber intelligence threats to the United States. This government-wide Cyber CI Program plan is aligned with the *National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America*—which predates the creation of the CNCI—and supports the other programmatic elements of the CNCI. *The plan is in place and execution is under way, although out-year funding remains a concern.*

(U) Initiative #7: **Increase the security of our classified networks.** These are the networks that house the Federal government's classified and most sensitive information. *A detailed implementation plan has been approved for some Federal government components, although issues surrounding the authorities needed to enforce the plan remain unresolved, as do funding concerns associated with government-wide implementation.*

(U) Initiative #8: **Expand cyber education.** There are too few cybersecurity experts within the Federal government or private sector to adequately implement the CNCI, nor is there an adequately established Federal cybersecurity career field to build upon. Cyber training and personnel development programs, while good, are limited in focus and lack unity of effort. In order effectively to address the scope of the cyber threat, we must develop a technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce and ensure an adequate pipeline for the future. *Our review concluded that the current effort is behind schedule, lacks focus, and requires additional senior level policy guidance.*

(U) Initiative #9: **Define and develop enduring “leap-ahead” technology, strategies, and programs.** One goal of the CNCI is to develop technologies that provide increases in cyber security by orders of magnitude above our current systems and which are deployable 5 to 10 years hence. The Federal government has begun to outline Grand Challenges for the research community to help solve these hard problems, which require “out of the box” thinking. In dealing with the private sector, the government is identifying and communicating common needs that should drive mutual investment in key research areas. In this regard, the government has publicly issued three Requests for Input.¹⁰⁸ *An approved plan is in place and is proceeding well, although some elements are behind schedule in implementation.*

(U) Initiative #10: **Define and develop enduring deterrence strategies and programs.** Senior U.S. policymakers must think through the long-range strategic options available to the United States in a world that depends on assuring the use of cyberspace. To date, the U.S. Government has been implementing traditional approaches to the cybersecurity problem, and these measures have not achieved the level of security needed. *This Initiative is proceeding methodically to build an approach to cyber defense strategy that deters interference and attack in cyberspace using such tools as warning and communication of “red lines”, roles for private sector and international partners, and appropriate response by both state and non-state actors. Outreach to a number of key constituencies that can contribute to the development of this strategy has been successful. Out-year funding remains a concern and implementation of the previously approved strategy is lagging.*

(U) Initiative #11: **Develop a multi-pronged approach for global supply chain risk management.** Today's information technology marketplace often provides insufficient software assurance, hardware assurance, or data integrity assurance. Risks stemming both from the domestic and globalized supply chain must be managed in a strategic and comprehensive way over the entire lifecycle of products, systems and services. *Managing this risk requires greater awareness of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with acquisition decisions; development and employment of tools and resources to mitigate risk technically and operationally across the lifecycle of products (from design*

¹⁰⁸ (U) As stated on the website of the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program, “[O]ver 160 responses were submitted to the first RFI issued by the NITRD SSG (October 14, 2008), indicating a strong desire by the technical community to participate. RFI-2 (issued on December 30, 2008) expanded the opportunity for participation by permitting submitters to designate parts of submissions as proprietary. RFI-3 presents prospective cyber security categories derived from responses to RFI- 1 for further consideration.” http://www.nitrd.gov/leapyear/NCLY_RFI-3.pdf

through retirement); and development of new acquisition policies and practices that influence industry to develop and adopt supply chain and risk management standards and best practices. One significant Federal component—the Department of Defense—has issued policy guidance assigning roles and responsibilities and is proceeding to pilot implementation of its approach. This Initiative must continue with increased emphasis on expanding education about supply chain risks and on including more government and private sector communities.

(U) Initiative #12. **Define the Federal role for extending cybersecurity into critical infrastructure domains.**

Dialogue about cyber security between the Federal government and the private sector (which owns and operates most of the U.S. critical cyber infrastructure) is essential and has been ongoing for well over a decade. It is widely accepted that the government needs to gain and share with the private sector an operational understanding of how adversaries create and exploit our cyber vulnerabilities, including an assessment of the extent and reach of these adversarial activities and informing the private sector of what is being targeted and, if possible, why. Progress is being made on multiple fronts, but the government's efforts are not well aligned and, as a result, create an undue burden on private-sector entities that wish to work with the government but cannot commit the resources necessary to participate in multiple forums. As a result, this Initiative should proceed while cataloguing current efforts, determining overlaps and gaps, and communicating in a more streamlined manner with industry.

(S//REL TO FVEY) Strategic Enablers:

- **Ensure adequate support to neutralize, mitigate, and disrupt domestic illegal computer activity.** *This law enforcement-led activity has made significant operational progress, especially with respect to the establishment and implementation of the FBI's National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force.*
- **Increase Information Assurance programs and activities:** *This activity is making progress and is poised to serve as a model for wider Federal adoption.*
- **Increase predictive, behavioral, information and trend analysis of foreign intrusion activities and computer network operational threats:** *Foundational work to build the requisite workforce and analytic framework is under way consistent with the strategic plan.*
- **Increase investment in U.S Government cryptanalysis:** *Capabilities are under development.*
- **Develop, deploy, and manage an intrusion response capability:** *Substantial research and development is under way, and capabilities are being field tested within the Department of Defense's .mil environment.*
- **Monitor and coordinate implementation of the CNCI:** *The Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force model of a "steward" coordinating implementation has worked for the CNCI's start-up operations, but is not scalable or sustainable over the entire life-cycle of the program. It should evolve to a stronger central White House leadership effort.*

(U) The following table provides an overview of the status of the CNCI programs along with major recommended actions. The strategic goals of each of the CNCI programs are sound. An evaluation of

"Green" reflects that the strategy is sound and its implementation is proceeding as expected; "Yellow" indicates that progress is lagging and requires attention but that successful implementation of the strategy is still expected; "Orange" indicates that alternative strategies should be considered but work should continue in the meantime; "Red" indicates that implementation is so far off course that an alternative strategy is required.

This table is S//REL TO FVEY

CNCI Initiatives	Recommendation	Evaluation
Initiative 1: Trusted Internet Connections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review and re-baseline implementation schedule and approach Subsequent strategy must incorporate all connection types (SATCOM, Wi-Fi, Cable) Reconcile implementation timeframes with other Federal legislation (stimulus investments, omnibus budget provisions) Evaluate alternatives for achieving compliance with security objectives 	Orange
Initiative 2: Deploy Passive Sensors Across Federal Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In light of Initiative 1 delays, continue Einstein 2 while evaluating complementary approaches to achieve Initiative 2 goals Engage Congress and private sector interests in public dialogue regarding intrusion detection approaches and U.S. Government requirements 	Orange
Initiative 3: Deployment of Intrusion Prevention Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engage Congress and private sector interests in public dialogue regarding intrusion prevention approaches and U.S. Government requirements Work with the Attorney General, OMB, White House, and the Office of the DNI to fulfill legal, civil liberties, and privacy requirements already described in implementation plans Assess additional implementation concepts that could reduce risks to program implementation while meeting the goals and objectives of Initiative #3 	Yellow
Initiative 4: Coordinate and Redirect Research and Development Efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue as planned 	Green

This table is S//REL TO FVEY

CNCI Initiatives	Recommendation	Evaluation
Initiative 5: Connect Current Cyber Centers To Enhance Situational Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify resources to proceed with connectivity or for collocation of centers Develop integrated program/budget/ governance strategy for ensuring that individual tool capabilities may be acquired and used by all participants Establish data and product standards and an operational framework for common situation awareness and reporting 	Yellow
Initiative 6: Develop a Government-Wide Cyber Counter-intelligence Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluate as objectives are reached Need to ensure agencies are programming funds for next program build in order to pay for activities 	Green
Initiative 7: Secure Classified Networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluate as milestones reached Need to ensure agencies are programming funds for next program build in order to pay for activities 	Green
Initiative 8: Expand Cyber Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completely reshape to include a strategy for national-level leadership, comprehensive training programs, and broad-based public dialogue 	Red
Initiative 9: Define and Develop Enduring Leap-Ahead Technology, Strategies, and Programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Need to accelerate program activities 	Yellow
Initiative 10: Define and Develop Enduring Deterrence Strategies and Programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Need to implement key recommendations from previously approved strategy 	Yellow
Initiative 11: Develop Multi-Pronged Approach for Global Supply Chain Risk Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue to identify pilot programs Determine resource requirements for threat evaluation support to all departments and agencies Evaluate existing legal framework for effecting rapid, threat-based procurement 	Yellow
Initiative 12: Define the Federal Role for Extending Cybersecurity into Critical Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accelerate review of policy, legal, process, and resource barriers Ensure agencies are programming funds for next program build Catalogue, distinguish, and align current public/private partnerships 	Yellow

This table is S//REL TO FVEY

CNCI Enablers		
<i>Ensure Adequate Support To Neutralize, Mitigate, and Disrupt Domestic Illegal Computer Activity</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider how to expand capacity between and among federal, state and local law enforcement entities 	Green
<i>Increase DoD Information Assurance</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluate mechanisms for deploying capabilities more quickly Increase cybersecurity policy training efforts 	Green
<i>Strategic Analysis of Intrusion Activities and CNO Threats</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluate how this analytic effort will dovetail with other departments and agencies 	Yellow
<i>Increase Investment in U.S Government Cryptanalysis</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue long-term investment Evaluate additional national cybersecurity needs 	Green
<i>Develop, Deploy, and Manage an Intrusion Response Capability</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue to evaluate solution Resolve issues associated with adaptability for extending to state, local and private sectors 	Yellow
<i>Monitor and coordinate CNCI</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify single National Cyber Mission Owner Reaffirm CNCI roles and responsibilities to maintain momentum 	Green

SECRET//REL TO FVEY

CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW

(U) Appendix E: Case for Developing an International Cybersecurity Policy Framework

(U//FOUO) The United States lacks a comprehensive strategic international policy framework and coordinated engagement strategy that spans the full range of U.S. economic, national security, public safety and privacy interests in cyberspace. Before the United States can effectively engage its foreign partners, the U.S. Government first needs to make national-level decisions to:

- Identify and prioritize U.S. national interests in cyberspace;
- Review existing U.S. Government policy positions regarding cybersecurity;
- Consider the strategic connections and possible contradictions between the numerous U.S. Government policy objectives for cybersecurity;
- Develop new or refined positions regarding cybersecurity (where needed);
- Effectively engage the private sector, since it comprises the owners and operators of a majority of the information and communications infrastructure;
- Prioritize multi-lateral forums, coordinate positions in them with our close allies and other foreign partners, and assess the appropriate U.S. Government representation for those events;
- Prioritize countries that pose the greatest challenges or opportunities for bi-lateral engagement on cybersecurity issues; and
- Move forward with coordinated diplomacy and outreach efforts across the executive branch, including more proactive and targeted engagement to advance agreed upon U.S. positions.

(U//FOUO) Based on the feedback that departments and agencies provided to the 60-day cyberspace policy review team and discussions with key allies and members of the private sector, the priority topics for international engagement can be conceptually organized into three broad categories: Internet governance, international law and security, and multi-lateral public policy. Recognizing that several of the issues identified within these categories have implications extending beyond cybersecurity and require broader coordination, they all have a significant international component involving cybersecurity that requires attention. All three categories should be addressed in a coordinated fashion to advance national objectives of global prosperity and security.

- First, Internet governance refers to the decision making process for developing secure architectures, technical standards, administrative procedures, and best practices at the international level and ensure the secure, resilient and operation of the Internet.
- Second, because cyberspace now constitutes the primary domain for global communications and commerce, it has become a critical national asset for many nations. This criticality may lead to reexamination of traditional questions of public international law and military doctrine (e.g., strategic deterrence) in this new context.
- Third, because of the global nature of communications networks, an array of public policy, regulatory, and law enforcement issues that are being addressed within independent domestic jurisdictions have wider ramifications for the United States and other countries. Domestic

policies developed in isolation could significantly hamper necessary interoperability and cooperation at both the regional and international levels. Better coordination is required so that competing policy interests (e.g., data privacy, security, commercial innovation, etc.) are balanced by individual countries in ways that account for the global effects of those policies.

(U//FOUO) Each of those three general areas, in turn, encompasses both substantive issues for determination and procedural considerations for international engagement. Not only should the U.S. Government reach its own policy decisions on specific issues after concerted discussion within the U.S. Government and with our allies, but it should also strategize how best to engage the rest of the world to support these positions. Key to that process will be public-private exchanges within the United States as well as careful selection of the multi-lateral forums that are best suited to considering, deciding, and advancing each aspect of international cybersecurity policy. The United States and its allies should select forums for affirmative policy advancement and recognize where it is necessary to participate in others for defensive reasons. The multiplicity of international organizations currently striving to set international policy in cyberspace, with some developing as independent proponents of policy, is taxing many countries' abilities to staff participation in those organizations and track their respective activities. This situation poses the risk of producing disjointed, conflicting, or incomplete solutions while allowing some countries to advance interests adverse to the United States or its allies in forums where engagement by the United States is insufficient.

(U) Internet Governance, Technical Oversight, and Standards Issues

(U//FOUO) One of the U.S. Government's highest priorities should be to determine, in concert with its close allies and other partners in the international community of Internet users, how to ensure the continued stability and global interoperability of the Internet, while increasing security and reliability for all users. A core component of this endeavor is how to ensure the secure and efficient operation of the domain name and addressing system (DNS).

(U//FOUO) Enhancing the security of the global Internet will require the identification, development, and deployment of new technical architectures; improved engineering standards and protocols; and possibly the adoption of revised best practices. Immediate issues in this area include assessment of the strategic options for deployment of the DNS security extensions protocol (DNSSEC) in the root zone, for encouraging its deployment throughout the Internet infrastructure, and for facilitating the smooth migration to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). Other areas warranting attention include (but are not limited to) research and development of new methods and capabilities for identity management and authentication for certain types of online activity. Currently, these technical issues are being discussed in a range of specialized organizations like the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). As information and communications technologies continue to evolve, standards bodies will need to be able to adapt, identify, and promulgate new best practices and needed technical standards to address emerging needs of the next-generation architecture. The United States and its foreign partners should develop an action plan for working in these various forums to advance agreed upon strategic objectives in the standards area.

(U//FOUO) Finally, apart from the foregoing technical and operational matters, a broad range of other multi-lateral public policy issues also emanate from the operation of the Internet. These issues, some of which are more generally discussed below, hold strategic implications for the United States and its allies and cannot be fully or comprehensively addressed in any individual forum. They are presently the

subject of action in a range of organizations including the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the ITU, and other broader, multi-lateral venues such as the United Nations (UN), the G-8, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Organization of American States (OAS). While recognizing that the international dialogue on these various issues should (and invariably will) continue in multiple forums, the United States and its foreign partners should assess for each strategic objective which forums are most advantageous for achieving desired outcomes.

(U) International Law and Security

(S//REL TO FVEY) The international community has not yet achieved consensus on several key concepts of international law as they pertain to cyberspace. Different countries apply the traditional legal notions of territorial jurisdiction, use of force, and humanitarian law inconsistently in the cyberspace context. Accordingly, the United States needs to consider how to establish collective, acceptable international norms and redlines for nation-state conduct in cyberspace. Before engaging in that dialogue, the U.S. Government should first balance the need for increased international cybersecurity with its own need to develop and employ cyber capabilities to protect U.S. national security. Given the growing dependence of all sectors of our society on the Internet, the United States also needs to recognize that the international scale of cybercrime, because of the growing severity of its cumulative effects, increasingly constitutes a national security concern in its own right.

(S//REL TO FVEY) Several international efforts are under way to define and address evolving concepts of cyber arms control, cyberterrorism, and cybercrime. For example, the Russian Federation has advanced the position in the UN, OSCE, and a plethora of other forums that a new arms control regime is required for cyberspace. The United States does not concur with the Russian position or a related argument they make that a new international instrument is required to deal with cyberterrorism (where that term is used to describe terrorist attacks on information systems). The United States' position has been that no new international agreements are needed in these areas and that work should instead focus on implementing strong cybersecurity and cybercrime provisions. With respect to cybercrime laws, the United States advocates the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime as a way of building a common substantive and procedural criminal legal framework in countries around the world. Although the U.S. has worked with other countries on terrorist use of the Internet, that topic presents a number of challenges including differing legal protections for content and differing views on tactics and information sharing. The U.S. Government should take an active role in shaping international norms through its own diplomatic efforts, capacity building and military practices. The United States will need to determine its own national interests regarding a range of issues in cyberspace, carefully select the preferred forums for international policy development, and devise both affirmative and defensive issue positions that will enlist the support of other countries.

(S//REL TO FVEY) In addition, the United States and our allies will need to develop new technical capabilities, doctrines, and rules of engagement premised on any substantive future cybersecurity norms that are recognized by the international community. In the absence of effective technical methods for the timely attribution of cyber incidents, reliance on legal authorities that make theoretical distinctions between armed attacks, terrorism, and criminal activity may prove impractical. Moreover, what constitutes a proportional response in cyberspace is complicated by the fact that both public and private networks may be affected by a cyber action. Consideration should also be given to diplomatic and sovereignty issues where the networks of friendly countries are affected by a response. Another

key implementation priority is strategic deterrence. The United States should decide how state and non-state actors can be deterred, taking into account the general lack of credible verification procedures and reliable attribution methods.

(U) Multi-Lateral Public Policy

(U//FOUO) The global nature of cyberspace requires unprecedented cooperation to foster commercial interoperability, protect critical infrastructures, and enable effective transnational law enforcement. Cooperation and some consistent capability is required, in part, due to a “weakest link” problem; because malicious actors can easily route electronic attacks through the country with weakest domestic law, capacity or political will, every country needs robust, and relatively consistent, capabilities. The current discrepancies in national (or regional) data protection laws, substantive and procedural domestic criminal statutes, forensic capabilities, and investigative capacity all pose obstacles to international cooperation. By establishing consistent norms for non-state actors in cyberspace, ensuring that there is sufficient capacity and prioritization, and building and strengthening transnational cooperative networks for law enforcement and network defense, the international community could improve global critical infrastructure protection and law enforcement. Consideration of civil liberties, privacy rights, and other human rights, coupled with the recognition that good cybersecurity and law enforcement should enhance privacy, will be an integral part of this effort.

(U//FOUO) Accordingly, the United States, working with its allies, should continue to promote domestic legal structures, cooperative mechanisms, and national best practices in countries around the world. The United States will also need to prioritize resources (i.e., time, money, and personnel) and leverage the resources of its allies to build capacity through legislative, investigative, technical and other training of foreign partners. Moreover, in order to implement any mutually agreed policies, the United States will need to support greater information sharing both with other governments and the private sector (especially of time-sensitive and classified information, as necessary). Better information sharing will require identification of the best channels to use to share information, determination of the parties with whom it should be shared, and consideration of how information can be shared with multi-national companies.

(U//FOUO) Many of these substantive issues are already being discussed by international organizations, including the G-8, COE, EU, OSCE, and OECD. Implementation measures are also being pursued bilaterally with close allies, through U.S.-led regional programs, and through international organizations, such as the UN, the International Telecommunications Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the OAS, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Once again, the selection of preferred forums for international engagement on each relevant cybersecurity policy topic, and the prioritization of those topics, will eliminate redundancy, focus debate, and achieve more effective solutions.

(U//FOUO) The United States should also recognize and develop a strategy to address the domestic actions of countries that have a profound effect on U.S. businesses and security. As storage of computer data moves to “the cloud,” countries are increasingly requiring the data of its respective citizens be stored within its borders. Although the United States has occasionally required this as a condition of approving changes of ownership, it has no comprehensive policy on this issue. Some countries increasingly have demanded data from U.S. providers through subsidiaries of those companies located or operating within the foreign territory, even when access to that data, stored in the United States requires more stringent legal procedures under U.S. law. In addition, countries also have demanded

access to the source code of companies' software products as a condition of doing business in their jurisdictions. Censorship and free speech concerns are implicated when countries have laws restricting certain kinds of speech protected in the United States and try to apply that law to U.S. providers. Promotion of free speech is an even greater concern when authoritarian regimes seek to censor speech and put pressure on U.S. providers and subsidiaries to that end.