

Connivance and coercion: Spatial networks of state enforcement in Lagos, Nigeria*

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Abstract

Why do states often fail to enforce their own policies, especially those governing the poor and vulnerable? This paper argues that state actors can use forbearance coercively, in order to produce precarity in vulnerable populations and expose them to exploitation. I provide a conceptual framework which shows how this strategy of *connivance* is advantageous for state actors insofar as it empowers non-state allies who profit off of the vulnerability of regulated populations. These allies aid ruling parties, including by mobilizing voters and perpetrating election violence and interference. I focus on the role of transport unions in Lagos, Nigeria—extractive actors who extort drivers, and work as purveyors of electoral interference and violence for the ruling party—in determining state enforcement of a ban on okada motorcycle taxis in the state. First, using evidence from several months fieldwork in Lagos; as well as an original networked data on the Lagos transport union, I show how the Lagos State Government’s selective enforcement of its ban on motorcycle taxis was preceded by clashes between operators and union members. Second, I use original geocoded data on enforcement locations, union territory, and traffic patterns along the Lagos road network to show how the political geography of the ban’s enforcement displaced riders into areas controlled by the union. Third and finally, I exploit the timing of a surprising election result to show how a shock to state reliance on the union affects enforcement patterns. This paper not only explores how states can exploit an understudied ‘enforcement lever’ to and redistribute to their allies, but how powerful—but not necessarily criminal—groups can trade extralegal violence for such redistribution.

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1 Why do states often fail to completely enforce their own policies, especially those governing
2 the poor and vulnerable? All over the world, state actors propose, debate, and pass laws targeting
3 informal economies and populations: including bans on hawking, squatting, driving an unregistered
4 taxi, or crossing borders without documentation. However, enforcement of these policies often
5 varies significantly over time and space—even from one week to the next, even within a single city.
6 Most scholarship chalks up gaps in policy enforcement to gaps in state capacity; more recent work
7 on *forbearance*,¹ proposes welfarist motives for state nonenforcement of the poor.

8 However, incomplete enforcement cannot always be attributed to state failure, or to state
9 sympathy with its most vulnerable populations. In many cases, offenders are not key to the
10 selectorate: undocumented migrants for example, who cannot vote for or against the incumbent and
11 have few allies among registered voters. And while forbearance is often described as benevolent,
12 incomplete enforcement is not always for the offenders' benefit. When a politician blackmails
13 Romani workers about tax nonpayment in direct exchange for votes—as described by Mares and
14 Young (2019)—the state is extending not a favor, but a threat. When U.S. police across the Jim
15 Crow South declined to enforce racist laws, only for lawbreakers to be attacked by extrajudicial
16 militias, the state was not *conceding* anything to Black populations.²

17 In this paper, I argue that strategic gaps in enforcement can ‘produce precarity’ in offenders
18 and facilitate their exploitation, a strategy I refer to as *connivance*. I argue that enabling this
19 exploitation can be advantageous for states insofar as it empowers their non-state allies who profit
20 from the vulnerability of those being regulated. In other words, forbearance against the poor
21 can be used as payment to third-party allies of the state. I add to existing conceptualizations of
22 forbearance by integrating theories of repression, and describe how selective enforcement can act

¹Defined as “intentional and revocable government leniency towards violations of the law” (Holland, 2016, 233)

²One such example occurred during nonviolent sit-ins by Black college students at segregated lunch counters in Nashville, Tennessee in 1960. Several days into the demonstration, on February 27 of that year, the police began to engage—not just with arrests, but by standing aside as violent proxies attacked protesters. One demonstrator Bernard Layfayette noted that on that day “we were told in advance... that they are gonna allow the hoodlums to beat us up, and *then* the police were gonna arrest us.” Once the sit-in began, “as predicted, the police held back for the first fifteen minutes,” resulting in severe violence against the Black students. For more, see (York, 1999, minutes 0:35:22–0:36:22).

¹ as a strategy of political control (Hassan et al., 2021) and consolidate relationships between state
² agents and exploitative, often coercive third-party actors who serve state actors by (among other
³ things) perpetrating election interference and violence.

⁴ I elucidate the concept of connivance against the backdrop of the informal transport industry in
⁵ Nigeria. Specifically, I analyze the 2022 selective enforcement of a ban on ‘okada’ motorcycle taxis
⁶ in Lagos, Africa’s largest metropolitan area. Okada operators are usually economically displaced
⁷ persons from the north of Nigeria, often fleeing climate-induced land scarcity and political violence
⁸ (Grasse and Pavlik, 2025). While the Lagos okada ban applied to all major roads in the state, it
⁹ was enforced only across select bridges, intersections, streets, and neighborhoods. Capacity-based
¹⁰ explanations do not explain the ban’s uneven enforcement; Lagos streets are heavily policed by at
¹¹ least a half a dozen branches of law enforcement. The ban’s partial enforcement also drew operator
¹² outrage, calling into question any benevolent motivation by the reticent state.

¹³ I use original micro-level geospatial data on enforcement and extortion points on the Lagos
¹⁴ roadways, informal transport density, as well as qualitative data both from fieldwork and archival
¹⁵ news reports, to show that selective enforcement of the okada ban was a strategy of connivance by
¹⁶ the Lagos State Government. The ban’s incomplete enforcement was not for the purpose of redistribu-
¹⁷ tion to vulnerable operators, but to ease their extortion by extralegal violence entrepreneurs—in
¹⁸ this case, the Lagos branch of the country’s largest transport union: a mafia-like organization that
¹⁹ behaves as a key source of thugs-for-hire for Lagos’s leading political party. Selective enforcement of
²⁰ the ban acted as payment to the union. Drawing from participant observation on Lagos roadways and
²¹ amongst union members and okada operators, 75 stakeholder interviews, and a near-comprehensive
²² collection of local newspaper reports spanning decades of union activity, I describe how enforcement
²³ timing corresponded with operator resistance to union extortion, prompting state intervention on the
²⁴ union’s behalf. Using a ‘randomization inference’ simulation technique on the Lagos road network,
²⁵ I demonstrate that the geography of enforcement displaced operators into areas controlled by the
²⁶ union, increasing its ability to exploit operators during this tumultuous period. I show that spatial

¹ patterns of ban enforcement do not cleanly vary with other potential explanations, such as variation
² in state capacity or traffic congestion. Finally, I exploit a surprising election result from the year
³ following the ban, which served as a shock to the state government's perception of union reliability.
⁴ Using fine-grained satellite-based measurements of commercial transport presence, I find that when
⁵ state reliance on the union is shaken, enforcement diminishes.

⁶ This paper contributes to several substantive agendas in the study of politics. I add to an
⁷ increasingly common focus on spatial economics in urban centers of low-income countries (Bryan,
⁸ Frye and Morten, 2025), especially the informal transport sector and traffic politics (Agbiboa, 2022;
⁹ Goodfellow, 2015; Fourchard, 2023) as well as road networks and their disruptions (Nathan, 2023;
¹⁰ Schouten, 2022; Dell, 2015; Sánchez De La Sierra et al., 2024). While many studies examine roads
¹¹ and their construction,³ modern laws *governing* the roads get less attention.⁴ In what follows, I
¹² show how states can use instruments as seemingly anodyne as traffic policy enforcement to advance
¹³ the interests of exploitative third parties and alter a city's political geography. In doing so, I build
¹⁴ on work by Xu (2023) and others on how spatial externalities foster inequality in such contexts.

¹⁵ Moreover, I add to existing work on the role of non-state actors in weakly-institutionalized
¹⁶ democracies; bridging the gap between work on civil society groups like unions (Dean, 2022;
¹⁷ Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent, 2022) and violence entrepreneurs including gangs, mafias, and
¹⁸ political militias (Carey, Mitchell and Scharpf, 2022; Tapscott, 2021; Acemoglu, Robinson and
¹⁹ Santos, 2009). Indeed, in this context they are one and the same. With this focus, I also shed light on
²⁰ the supply-side dynamics of election interference and violence by non-state groups (Turnbull, 2021).
²¹ Rather than focusing primarily on the state's role or interest in cultivating interference (Acemoglu,
²² Robinson and Santos, 2009), I examine how these third-party groups behave strategically and
²³ negotiate concessions from their state allies, and how state actors pay their debts. I focus on what

³See works on colonial expansion (Cowen, 2020), conflict dynamics (Zhukov, 2012), and large-scale infrastructure corruption (Williams, 2017) for examples.

⁴This is despite the fact that in urban areas worldwide, parking tickets, traffic fines, and checkpoints are among the most frequent ways in which citizens directly interact with the state. There are notable exceptions, however: See Su and Buerger (2024) and Ben-Menachem and Morris (2023) for two examples in the U.S. context; and Sánchez De La Sierra et al. (2024) for a detailed dive into the Congo's traffic agency.

¹ we might call the ‘day jobs’ of political thugs, emphasizing how these actors exist within—and
² influence—politics even between elections.

³ Most fundamentally, I expand our understanding of the concept of forbearance by exploring how
⁴ non-enforcement against precarious populations can counterintuitively be a tool of political control,
⁵ rather than a form of benevolent redistribution. Studies of repression still largely assume the strategy
⁶ to be a function of a state’s capacity to enforce its own repressive policies.⁵ As such, studies of
⁷ repression have incompletely grappled with the coercion produced where the state selectively does
⁸ *not* engage in enforcement. I show how in some contexts, uneven governance and policing patterns
⁹ should be interpreted not as lapses in capacity to enforce the law, but as purposeful tactics used to
¹⁰ enable their exploitation of the vulnerable. These findings not only elaborate on existing scholarly
¹¹ accounts on policing (Eck, Conrad and Crabtree, 2021) and strategic non-enforcement (Holland,
¹² 2017), but have significant implications for our understanding of a state’s willingness to concede
¹³ its monopoly on violence (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2009; Carey, Mitchell and Scharpf,
¹⁴ 2022). In doing so, this paper answers a call by Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent (2022) to expand
¹⁵ considerations of state repression “beyond capacity to also consider intent” (Hassan, Mattingly and
¹⁶ Nugent, 2022, 157).

¹⁷ This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1 I outline connivance as a strategy of coercive
¹⁸ forbearance by states, in particular to serve their relationships with third-party actors. Section 2
¹⁹ describes the Nigerian transport industry, and outlines my argument in the context of this case.
²⁰ After discussing the difficulties of collecting *direct* evidence of intention, Section 3 lays out the
²¹ combination of strategies and data I use to test this argument. I organize the evidence across three
²² sections: first, in Section 4 I trace the dynamics between three actors in the lead-up to the ban: the
²³ Lagos State Government, the union and transport operators. Second, in Section 5 I address spatial

⁵Most studies of repression focus on the state’s ability to inflict physical violence (Thachil, 2020), maintain high levels of censorship and control over speech (Sullivan and Davenport, 2018), or even actively engage in distribution for coercive purposes (Albertus, Fenner and Slater, 2018; Pan, 2020). Although the study of how states inflict violence has recently expanded to include subtler modes of political control (Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent, 2022), though the latter still focuses on the key dimension of state capacity.

1 variation in the ban’s enforcement, and show how uneven state enforcement displaced operators
2 into union territory. Third and finally, in Section 6 I interrogate temporal variation in the ban’s
3 enforcement, showing how a shock to the state government’s confidence in the union impacted
4 this displacement. I conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of the implications of my findings,
5 especially for our understanding of how governing actors—even in democracies—produce precarity
6 in their most vulnerable populations.

7 **1 Connivance**

8 **1.1 When forbearance is coercive**

9 Why do agents of the state⁶ enforce certain policies and not others, and what explains vast variation
10 in enforcement across time and space? Most work blames enforcement gaps on a lack of state
11 capacity, a concept at the center of explaining both how states form and how they operate—especially
12 how they utilize and build their coercive power (Tilly et al., 1992).⁷ However, the concept of state
13 capacity often bundles distinct qualities of bureaucratic performance and policy implementation,
14 leading to over-generalized theories which do not account for idiosyncratic constraints and incentives
15 (Williams, 2021). In response, scholars have increasingly explored cases where governments are
16 able, but unwilling, to comprehensively enforce a policy—refusing to use the capacity they possess.
17 These efforts have resulted in alternative ‘agent-based’ approaches, which theorize that enforcement
18 will vary not just with state capacity, but with interests.⁸

⁶Throughout this section I use the term ‘state’ as a catch-all term for governing institutions, for the sake of theoretical parsimony. In general however, states are not unitary, homogeneous actors; they are made up of a wide variety of individuals, organizations, and institutions (Williams, 2021). My hope is that taking this simplifying liberty clarifies, rather than obscures, the concept. I define the state actors in more specific terms in Section 2.

⁷In fact, the concept of state capacity is often defined explicitly in terms of the state’s ability to enforce its laws; including by monopolizing coercive power (Weber, 1978) and expending resources to regulate relationships (Migdal, 1988). In a recent review of the concept, (Hanson and Sigman, 2021) define a state’s capacity as a function of its power, or in terms of Dahl’s pluralist ‘first face,’ the ability of the state to get its citizens to do things they would not otherwise do—the power to enforce its preferences (Hanson and Sigman, 2021; Dahl, 2007). See Cingolani (2013) for a detailed review of the intellectual history of the concept of state capacity. For a recent example of a study linking capacity with enforcement, see Cook and Fortunato (2023) on state legislative capacity and the enforcement of data provision laws.

⁸For instance, where non-enforcement is popularly preferred; One example finds that enforcement of traffic violations falls dramatically in the lead-up to sheriff’s races in the U.S.(Su and Buerger, 2024).

1 These agent-based explanations largely attribute incomplete enforcement to state incentives to
2 appease the population breaking the law. In other words, when offenders are key allies or members
3 of the selectorate, state agents may refrain from enforcement in order to retain this population's
4 support: a *concessional* logic of non-enforcement. The literature has considered two varieties of
5 this phenomenon. Contingent non-enforcement occurs in exchange for favors from the infringing
6 population, as detailed in the extensive literatures on corrupt and clientelistic exchanges. However
7 in her seminal book Holland (2017) shows how politicians decline to *broadly* enforce certain
8 policies targeting the poor in order to purposefully engage in "welfarist" forbearance (Holland,
9 2016). In the context of Latin America, Holland (2017) shows how forbearance towards squatting
10 and street-vending violations depends on the importance of poor voters to the ruling party. However,
11 not all forbearance is so benevolent. In a more sobering example, Wilkinson (2006) describes how
12 Hindu politicians in India decline to call in law enforcement to suppress militia violence against
13 Muslim protesters during elections.⁹ Forbearance can also be conceptualized in terms of regulatory
14 capture¹⁰ on the enforcement lever, rather than the policymaking lever.

15 Building on these existing explanations for incomplete state enforcement, I use the term *con-*
16 *nivance* to describe the selective enforcement of law-breaking through which the state intentionally
17 'produces precarity'¹¹ in the infringing population and renders it vulnerable to exploitation.¹²
18 Connivance occurs when the state is within its legal right (and obligation) to enforce a law, but instead
19 alters enforcement patterns for the purpose of exacerbating offender vulnerability to exploitation.
20 Connivance offers a framework for integrating the concept of forbearance with the vulnerability
21 imposed on offenders through the selective enforcement of *de jure* policies. A core characteristic of

⁹Concessional forbearance is not exclusively tied to electoral considerations, as in these cases. In highly industrialized countries of Western Europe,Dewey and Di Carlo (2022) shows how states engage in 'regulatory' forbearance as a form of industrial policy, declining to enforce firm tax violations as a way to shape markets.

¹⁰Dal Bó (2006) defines regulatory capture broadly as "the process through which special interests affect state intervention in any of its forms" (Dal Bó, 2006)[203]

¹¹Precarity refers to "a situation lacking in predictability, security or material and social welfare" (A. et al., 2022)

¹²While this paper focuses on how the state's relationships with third-party allies influence enforcement to both their benefit (see Section 1.2), connivance may also be used to facilitate exploitation by the state itself.

¹ forbearance is that it is revocable.¹³ In concessional forbearance, revocability solves the credibility
² problem of non-contingent clientelistic exchanges (Holland, 2016, 236). But this characteristic not
³ only “cements political dependency” to the forbearing politician (Holland, 2016, 236) but cements
⁴ precarity in the population violating the policy. This precarity is *not* revocable. And while one of its
⁵ advantages is its existence outside the formal lawmaking system (Holland, 2016, 236), forbearance
⁶ does first require that a ban pass through this very system. Revoking the precarity produced by
⁷ non-enforcement therefore requires a shift in policy, not enforcement—meaning this vulnerability
⁸ is integral to a strategy of forbearance.

⁹ Connivance, then, is when forbearance is strategically wielded to weaponize this vulnerability,
¹⁰ manufactured by the gap between law passage and enforcement. These paired conditions of an
¹¹ existing law and the choice to not enforce it create a dynamic closely captured by the concept of
¹² domination, combining close dependency and the arbitrary wielding of power (Lovett, 2001). It
¹³ invokes a type of state power beyond its ‘first face’ (Lukes, 2021) and invites parallels with the
¹⁴ concept of coercive control in literature on domestic violence.¹⁴ Mann (1984) distinguishes between
¹⁵ the state’s power to impose mandates (despotic power) and to penetrate territory and implement
¹⁶ policies (infrastructural power) (Mann, 1984, 190). Many studies of coercion reference only the
¹⁷ former; indeed Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent (2022) explicitly define political control in terms of
¹⁸ despotic state power. Connivance instead focuses on how power is exerted through selective and
¹⁹ instrumental use of the state’s infrastructural power, in the presence of despotic mandates.

²⁰ Crucially, connivance requires intention to produce precarity in infringing populations such that
²¹ it can be exploited by the state or (as is the focus here) by its allies. An extensive literature shows how
²² non-enforcement can empower criminal groups (Sobering and Auyero, 2019; Dewey, 2012; Wilkin-
²³ son, 2006), enable mass inefficiencies (Mahadevan, 2024), and produce negative externalities such

¹³That is, a policy forbids the offending behavior, the state has the right to enforce it, and offenders believe that sanctions are possible (Holland, 2016, 234)

¹⁴The concept of *coercive control* represents attempt to broaden understandings of domestic abuse beyond those of physical violence, and has been defined by Stark (2007, 228) as combined coercion—“force or threats [used] to compel or dispel a particular response” and control—“structural forms of deprivation, exploitation, and command that compel obedience indirectly” (Stark, 2007, 229) resulting in “a condition of unfreedom” and entrapment (Stark, 2007, 205).

Table 1: Types of State Assistance to Allies

	<i>Direct beneficiary</i>	<i>Indirect beneficiary</i>
<i>Expenditure</i>	Support (i.e., clientelism, bribery)	Burdening (i.e., regulation of competitors)
<i>Withdrawal</i>	Leniency (i.e., concessional forbearance)	Connivance (i.e., coercive forbearance)

Columns describe the ally's role in transactions, and clarify whether the allocation is targeted towards them (as a direct beneficiary), or towards other actors such as their competitors (making them an indirect beneficiary). Rows characterize the type of inducement provided by the state, whether the strategy involves an extension of resources (expenditure) or a removal of resources (withdrawal).

- ¹ as environmental degradation (Dipoppa and Gulzar, 2023; Harding et al., 2024).¹⁵ But connivance
- ² does not simply imply forbearance against 'bad' actors or with 'bad' consequences. It requires that
- ³ the state purposefully look away, not from criminal co-conspirators or key constituencies, but from
- ⁴ populations in whose vulnerability the state or its allies have a vested interest.

⁵ 1.2 Cui Bono? Third parties as profiteers of precarity

- ⁶ If connivance is used to produce precarity and facilitate predation, it begs the question: Predation
- ⁷ by whom? Who benefits ('Cui bono') from this coercive forbearance? The majority of studies
- ⁸ of forbearance focus on the relationship between the state and the population being enforced (or
- ⁹ not).¹⁶ in many cases it requires evaluating the incentives and distributional consequences for more
- ¹⁰ than just the infringing population and the state. I focus on the role of 'third party' actors, other than
- ¹¹ the state or the population directly affected, who are nevertheless interested in a law's enforcement.
- ¹² One straightforward example is those who profit off the illicit labor of lawbreakers, such as mafias
- ¹³ (Dipoppa, 2025), militias (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2009), or exploitative employers. How
- ¹⁴ can ruling parties effectively foster and maintain relationships with such third parties? Table 1
- ¹⁵ presents two dimensions along which state support to non-state allies can vary. Rows represent

¹⁵Or, as when not enforcing mafia waste dumps on Italian farmland, all three (Walters, 2013; D'Alisa et al., 2010)

¹⁶Connivance may not necessarily involve a third-party actor. Such is the case of 'blackmail' as described by Mares and Young (2019), in which state actors fail to enforce tax nonpayment by traveller populations in Hungary and Romania. While on its face a concession, these same state actors make a point to remind workers of their nonpayment in the lead-up to elections. In this case then, forbearance is not concessional but coercive. Its purpose is not conciliatory, but to foster vulnerability that can be exploited to gain votes.

¹ whether the inducement is a positive expenditure (e.g., providing cash or contracts) or a negative withdrawal of resources (e.g., revoking overburdensome regulations). Columns represent the target beneficiary—whether it is an explicit allocation towards the ally in question, or is targeted towards other, related actors such as the ally’s competitors, labor pool, or consumers.¹⁷

⁵ A great deal of work in the social sciences focuses on column 1, in particular direct *support* from the state in the form of a targeted transfer. However recent work from Holland (2017); Cunningham and Owens (2020); Harding et al. (2024) and others focus on strategic *leniency*, where state actors support non-state allies by declining to enforce their myriad offenses; respectively poor voters (engaged in squatting), specific sectors and firms (engaged in tax evasion), construction contractors (engaged in deforestation). With some groups however, states have an incentive to avoid explicit favoritism, especially when they are engaged in extralegal violence (Carey, Mitchell and Scharpf, 2022). In such instances, the state may opt for indirect forms of support. A positive but indirect strategy of ‘burdening,’ could include targeting rivals with excess regulation or repression. Finally, ¹⁴ *connivance* refers to state assistance characterized by a negative expenditure targeted towards an indirect beneficiary. It is a coercive forbearance, where the state facilitates exploitation—through inaction—at the behest of its non-state allies (see Figure 1). I contend that connivance becomes an especially viable strategy when states heavily rely on just such actors.




Figure 1: Relationships between key actors in connivance

¹⁷For a discussion of how to map connivance onto Holland’s own typology of forbearance, see SI §B.1.

1 Four (stylized) potential examples of connivance are laid out in Table 2. It is beyond the scope
2 of this article to lay out each case in its full complexity, but a few points are instructive. To begin
3 with, there is important variation between cases. The examples are drawn both from generally
4 high-capacity and income contexts such as the U.S. and Spain and middle- and lower-income states
5 such as Colombia and Kenya. The third-party allies vary from industrial farms and urban developers,
6 to armed groups and landlords. The ignored infraction varies as well, encompassing illicit electricity
7 hookups, border crossings, informal settlements and artisanal mining.

8 What remains consistent is the nature of the relationships between the three primary actors
9 featured in each case, summarized in Figure 1. Connivance requires that the enforcing actor actively
10 restrains from enforcement, in part or in total; a feature it shares with more traditional ideas of
11 forbearance. The key distinguishing feature of connivance is that the intended distributional benefits
12 are not for offenders, but for those who stand to gain from offender precarity. In many cases this is
13 a ‘third-party’ ally with its own relationships to the enforcer (through the provision of votes, bribes,
14 etc.) and to the infringing population (through exploitation). It is this exploitative relationship
15 which makes connivance a potent tool for state actors seeking to assist allies.

16 There are other commonalities between the cases which help elucidate the advantages of
17 connivance either as a substitute or complement to other strategies of state support (see Table 1). It
18 is notable for example that each of these stylized cases take place in democratic contexts. This is
19 not necessarily a strict scope condition, and it is beyond this article to definitively state democracy’s
20 role in enabling connivance as a strategy. However, democracy may foster the relationship between
21 the state and third parties which is itself a common feature of connivance. When the state is not
22 all-encompassing or autocratic, parties and politicians may increase their reliance on non-state allies
23 in gaining and maintaining power. Moreover, democracy discourage state actors from publicly
24 favoring specific third parties over others, making connivance—an indirect and ‘negative’ strategy,
25 as described in Table 1—attractive. This is especially true in contexts where the ally is itself violent
26 or illicit (Carey, Mitchell and Scharpf, 2022).

Table 2: Empirical examples of connivance

<i>The Example</i>	<i>The Policy</i>	<i>The Actors</i>	<i>Connivance</i>
In the midst of an ongoing crackdown on undocumented immigrants, the U.S. federal government directed enforcement agencies to selectively pause raids and arrests; specifically targeting the agricultural industry.	A January 20, 2025 Executive Order by President Donald Trump “Protecting the American People Against Invasion” (The White House, 2025); Immigration & Nationality Act (INA).	Enforcer: The U.S. federal government; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); local enforcement partners Infringing population: Undocumented and unregistered immigrants in the U.S. Third party: U.S. agricultural employers	The abrupt shift of the U.S. administration’s ongoing mass deportation campaign towards <i>selective non-enforcement</i> of undocumented immigrants working on farms was aimed at avoiding “hurting industries...[President Trump] does not want to lose” (Aleaziz and Kanno-Youngs, 2025). President Trump himself acknowledged this in a social media post: “Our great Farmers...have been stating that our very aggressive policy on immigration is taking...workers away from them, with those jobs being almost impossible to replace” (Aleaziz and Kanno-Youngs, 2025). In lobbying for this position, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins reportedly explained that “farmers rely on immigrants to work long hours” (Pager et al., 2025), because they “cannot find Americans willing to do the physically onerous work” (Pager et al., 2025). By exercising forbearance only selectively, against immigrant farmworkers, the Trump administration has engaged in connivance—consolidating the vulnerability of undocumented workers in the interest of agricultural employers who rely on the “cheap and disposable labor” (Ngai, 2014, 3) made possible by these workers’ precarious legal position. While enforcement writ large continues, selective non-enforcement was exercised against the populations on whose labor Trump’s allies exploit.
Despite laws against settling on public land, officials in Nairobi, Kenya have selectively declined to enforce laws against the habitation of slums and sub-standard shacks and tenement buildings which proliferate in the city’s periphery.	Kenya’s Land Act of 2017 requires that authorities “shall issue a notice to the unlawful occupiers of public land to vacate the land” and evict tenants (Government of Kenya, 2017, Part VIII Section 64.(1), 2612)	Enforcer: Politicians, chiefs, and officials responsible for enforcing land grabs in Nairobi, Kenya Infringing population: Informal settlers on Nairobi’s public land Third party: Well-connected landlords overseeing construction and habitation in these informal slums	Urban land markets in Nairobi are “heavily influenced by what the local government does (or fails to do)...and the extent to which these rules are applied and for whom they are enforced” (Earle and Grant, 2019, 2). Landlords in Nairobi profit enormously from illicit settlements erected on public land: as noted by (Mwau and Sverdlik, 2020, 487), “hazardous informal shelter in Nairobi can be highly lucrative,” with up to four times higher returns than middle- and high-income housing. Kenyan authorities selectively engage in a “a lack of approval or enforcement...a “silent” policy of enabling tenement production,” (Mwau and Sverdlik, 2020, 495) which enables landlords and structure owners to extract from the city’s most vulnerable communities in the form of from informal rent, illicitly collected. Political appointees, including chiefs, have private interests which “can mean some criminal activity is tolerated due to the income it generates” (Price et al., 2016, 15). In addition to corrupt kickbacks, tenants often maintain coercive patronage relationships with structure-owners and landlords in which tenants are expected to support “the political interests of the latter” (Rigon, 2015, 2768). A strategy of connivance by local officials towards residents of informal areas run by their allies benefits these specific landlords and structure-owners, who both pass on profits and votes to (non-)enforcers.

<i>The Example</i>	<i>The Policy</i>	<i>The Actors</i>	<i>Connivance</i>
The Colombian government has failed to consistently enforce artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) of gold along the pacific coast, especially in territory populated by indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations.	Decree 2235 in 2012 instructed police to destroy untitled mining operations, effectively criminalizing long-informal ASM operations (Mindefensa, 2012).	Enforcer: Colombian law enforcement agencies Infringing population: Informal, small-scale subsistence gold miners (<i>barequeros</i>) Third party: Armed actors including Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)	Between 80% and 90% of gold in Colombia comes from seldom-enforced ASM (Massé and Munevar', 2017). This “uneven and insufficient” enforcement (Martínez-Fernández, 2019, 7) is not due to an inability to locate mines, which often operate in full view of authorities (Massé and Munevar', 2017; ABColombia, 2012). Instead, it is a function of the selective complicity of local authorities towards armed groups who extort illicit mining operations for profit (Massé and Munevar', 2017). A common complaint is that “all the world sees [them] coming and going...except public officials” (Translated by author; Massé and Camargo', 2012, 41), and security forces have been accused of withholding protection of miners in order to facilitate their extortion (Massé and Munevar', 2017, 17). Gold has surpassed cocaine as the main source of armed group revenues in Colombia (Berg, Ziemer and Kohan, 2021), and the ELN in particular relies on its highly profitable extortion—not operation—of illegal mines (Massé and Munevar', 2017; Martínez-Fernández, 2019). These Colombian authorities are engaged in connivance: perpetuating, through selective non-enforcement, the vulnerability of local miners in order to enable their exploitation by armed groups in return for kickbacks.
City officials in Madrid, Spain failed to enforce extensive illicit electricity hookups by residents of a specific area of the city: Cañada Real, often called “Europe’s largest shantytown” (Gil, 2022), a 15km strip of informal housing on public land to the city’s Southeast.	Spain’s Criminal Code Chapter VI Subchapter 3 Article 255 prohibits illegal connections to the electrical grid, and provides precise guidelines for penalties and enforcement of the offense (Ministerio de Justicia, 2016)	Enforcer: Law enforcement officials in the Autonomous Community of Madrid, Spain Infringing population: Residents of Cañada Real informal settlements with illicit connections to the electrical grid (the majority) Third party: Commercial real estate developers in Madrid	In 2020, electricity supplier Naturgy cut off electricity supply to Cañada Real, forcing most residents—largely migrants, most of whom are children—to abandon their powerless homes (Jones, 2021). At the time of the shutdown, only 4 out of 1,800 total connections to the electrical grid in the settlement were legal (Duran, 2021). The state’s restraint cannot be attributed to lack of capacity (EFE, 2021), popular will or ignorance of the situation (EFE, 2020), ambiguous jurisdiction (Sánchez, 2022) and certainly not a desire to appease the population of the neighborhood (Bradock, 2021; Quesada, 2023). A representative for Cañada Real argued in a complaint that the state’s restraint was a form of “direct coercion for the most vulnerable to abandon their homes ... [with the purpose of benefiting] the urban developments of southeast” Madrid (Marín, 2022). The beneficiaries of this state restraint certainly included urban real estate developers, whose sprawling developments in eyesight of the settlement have been continually stalled due to complaints from residents (Montaner, 2021). Benefiting too is Madrid Community President Isabela Díaz Ayuso’s administration, whose reelection campaign proposed ambitious urban development projects and expansions to Madrid’s Metro System southeast, in the area surrounding the settlement (Comunidad de Madrid, 2022). In declining to enforce its own policies, her administration engaged in connivance, ultimately passively displacing the population in order to benefit its own political agenda.

1 Another similarity is the scope, if not the nature, of the infringement—all of these are vast
2 informal enterprises which are likely difficult to entirely enforce. The ability to plausibly disguise
3 enforcement gaps as state capacity gaps may make it easier to portray these patterns as benign.¹⁸
4 And just as concessional forbearance is cheaper than welfare through official state programs such as
5 social security (Holland, 2017), connivance is cheaper than bribes, physical repression, crackdowns,
6 or evictions. Finally, when the offending population is an already vulnerable outgroup—as is true in
7 every case described above—connivance can, in a phrase, ‘kill two birds with one stone:’ both assist
8 their allies and increase control over suspect populations, all with little risk of backlash.

9 The remainder of this article explores a fifth example: connivance by the state government of
10 Lagos, Nigeria through selective enforcement of a ban on motorcycle taxis.

11 **2 Connivance in the Lagos transport sector**

12 In what follows, I argue that the state government of Lagos, Nigeria engaged in a strategy of
13 *connivance* on behalf of the Lagos transport union with its selective enforcement of a ban on ‘okada’
14 motorcycle taxis starting mid-2022. As illustrated in Figure 2, the state (enforcer)¹⁹ chose to enforce
15 the ban at such a time—and in such a way—so as to increase the vulnerability of okada operators
16 (infringing population) and ease their exploitation by a key ally of the state: The Lagos transport
17 union (third party). This union operates a complex system of coerced taxation through controlling
18 motorparks along Lagos roadways, where they extort passing informal commercial transit operators.
19 Around elections, the union also mobilizes voters and commits violence in support of Lagos’s ruling
20 party. With an election six months away, and okada operators in the midst of mobilizing against
21 union extortion, the state acted. The strategic timing and geography of the ban’s enforcement not

¹⁸Perceptions of capacity matter for deterrence in a positive sense; Cingano and Tonello (2020) show that when local governments suspected of Mafia infiltration in Italy are dismissed, the resulting fall in petty crimes is due less to high capacity for enforcement, but to perceptions that the state is more powerful than it is. This mechanism may work in the other direction as well, meaning perceptions of state capacity challenges may help states ‘get away with’ connivance.

¹⁹While previously I referred to ‘the state’ as a conceptually broad actor, as I move into the case my discussion of this ‘enforcing’ actor becomes more precise, and specifically consists of the Lagos State Government and its officials, and of the party that rules it—The All Progressives Congress (APC), run by (former Lagos governor, now) President Bola Tinubu.

- ¹ only dulled the existential threat okada operators posed to the union, but forced operators into
- ² motorpark-laden areas and therefore increased the union's opportunities to exploit them.




Figure 2: Relationships between key actors in connivance: The case of the Lagos okada ban

³ 2.1 ‘Eko traffic’ and the okada ban

- ⁴ Lagos is Nigeria’s (and Africa’s) largest city, and the center of power in the southwest of the
- ⁵ country—almost the furthest southwest you can get without crossing the border into Benin, or
- ⁶ wading into the Gulf of Guinea (see Figure B.3a and B.3b in SI §B.2). Lagos houses 10% of the
- ⁷ country’s massive and rapidly growing population, crammed into only 0.5% of its physical landmass.
- ⁸ And though it is no longer the federal capital²⁰ it remains a crucial economic and social powerhouse.
- ⁹ Like the country, there are strong and evident political geographies in Lagos. And like the country,
- ¹⁰ Lagos wealth and (formal) employment is densely concentrated in the south, especially on small
- ¹¹ islands near the port. Meanwhile the vast majority of residents live on the mainland. As in many
- ¹² major cities, the residents of Lagos generally live and work in geographically separate areas.

¹³ As a result, there is a never-ending need for the road transport of millions throughout the city
¹⁴ on a daily basis. Lagos’s economic geography means that Lagos traffic is infamous; a trip of ten
¹⁵ kilometers can easily take two or three hours, and sometimes up to eight.²¹ Public transportation

²⁰Negotiations between the country’s highly disparate north (the country’s most populous and poorest region, largely Muslim and Fulani or Hausa) and South (largely Christian and Igbo in the Southeast, and Yoruba in the Southwest) in the early 1990s moved the capital to the more centrally located and neutral planned city of Abuja

²¹‘Eko Traffic’ (Lagos Traffic) is the name of a cocktail I enjoyed at three different bars across three different neighborhoods of Lagos in the summer of 2023, it is so ubiquitous of a joke. While the precise recipe differed from place to place, its strength did not.

1 options are limited and unreliable. Roads are overburdened and not always in good repair. The
2 result is a multifaceted landscape of informal transit options, and a near-universal reliance on them
3 (Agbibo, 2020): these include bright yellow mini-buses ('danfo'), tuk-tuk-like tricycles ('keke
4 papep' or 'keke marwa'), and okada motorcycles. Until recently okada motorbikes were one of the
5 most commonly used transport options for many Lagosians. Okada weave in and out of traffic jams
6 with a dangerous deftness. Because of their ability to navigate road congestion, as well as much
7 lower fuel requirements and costs, many thousands okada have generally been in operation across
8 the state, ready to be hailed both from inner residential roads and major highways (see Figure 3a).

9 However on May 18, 2022 Lagos State Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu held a press conference
10 in which he announced that starting on June 1, his administration would begin enforcing a ban
11 on okada motorcycle taxis originally passed in 2018 (Adelagun, 2022; Osazuwa, 2017). The
12 announcement of the ban's enforcement provoked high anxiety across Lagos, as individuals feared
13 its effect on their already intolerably long and expensive commutes (Enimola and Joseph, 2022; Ige,
14 2022; Mosadioluwa, 2022; Enimola, 2022). However, the state government stood firm; according
15 to Governor Sanwo-Olu and various spokespersons, the ban was necessary for crime prevention
16 (Adelagun, 2022; Reporters, 2022), traffic control (Adekoya, 2022), and for reducing environmental
17 degradation across the state (Badmus, 2022). But there was one curious aspect of the 2022 Lagos
18 okada ban's enforcement: namely, its selectivity. While the ban being enforced technically applied
19 to all major roads across Lagos State (Lagos State of Nigeria, 2018), the government in 2022
20 detailed a specific list of areas in which it intended to enforce the ban (Reuters, 2022).²² This left
21 many parts of Lagos under the letter of the law, but outside the scope of proposed enforcement.

22 The okada ban is a prime example of a traffic restriction which maps neatly onto pre-existing
23 socio-political cleavages. Many okada operators are from Muslim and Hausa or Fulani-majority
24 northern states who have traveled to Lagos in search of work, often as a result of conflict and
25 climate change in the country's north. In particular, there exist differences in ethnic group, region,

²²See SI §B.5 for more details on the technicalities of this ban, as well as on the history of okada bans within and beyond Lagos.



(a) Photo: Okada operators, Lagos. Sourced from *The Punch*

(b) Photo: Lagos motorpark (July 10, 2023)

Figure 3: Photos of Lagos Informal Transport

¹ language, and religion between native Lagosians and many okada operators, which adds a communal
² dimension to the ban's enactment. News reports on the ban tend to be tinged with inter-ethnic
³ suspicion, often conflating okada operators with perpetrators of jihadist violence in the north such
⁴ as Boko Haram (Odunsi, 2022), as well as crime writ large (Mosadioluwa, 2022; Tribune Online,
⁵ 2022). Riding an okada is an extremely vulnerable occupation and is viewed with hostility and
⁶ suspicion by many Nigerians, even as they make daily use of the services these operators offer.

⁷ 2.2 The third party: Touts and transit policy in Lagos

⁸ In the late 1970s, as the population grew and Lagos traffic steadily became more congested, the
⁹ burgeoning informal transport industry began to organize. Given the rising transportation needs of
¹⁰ the city, the sector became a primary growth industry—but also one where extractive actors stood to
¹¹ make enormous profit and gain enormous power.

¹² Today, transport unions are commonplace: extractors from commercial drivers, rather than
¹³ representative unions *of* drivers. Transport unions set up shop along the Lagos road network, in
¹⁴ areas called ‘motorparks,’ where they charge every commercial driver that passes a ticket for usage
¹⁵ of the road. The money unions collect from drivers does not go towards the improvement of public
¹⁶ infrastructure, or to the state at all, and Lagos drivers and operators see no assistance or benefits
¹⁷ from ‘their’ union. The unions monitor, manipulate, tax, and coerce commercial drivers of all

¹ types of vehicles on a daily basis; in this way, it is perhaps as accurate to describe Lagos transport
² *mafias*, as it is to describe transport *unions*. It is estimated the unions bring in many billions of
³ naira every year through their extraction from drivers,²³ and over its roughly 50-year existence,
⁴ these unions have become some of the most powerful players in Lagos politics. This is in part
⁵ because ground-level ‘bureaucrats’ of the unions—also referred to as ‘touts,’ ‘agberos,’²⁴ or ‘area
⁶ boys’,²⁵—are crucial tools for politicians around election time(Fourchard, 2023). Agbiboa (2022)
⁷ provides a succinct summary of the most powerful branch of the transport unions:

⁸ “Consider the NURTW branch in Lagos. Founded in 1978, the NURTW constitutes the
⁹ primary support base for the Lagos state governor during election campaigns. The state
¹⁰ is often unwilling or unable to rein in the union’s predatory treatment of its workers.
¹¹ The union routinely engages in patronage politics and voter mobilization to support
¹² various parties and candidates in return for permission to levy taxes on informal transport
¹³ operators in public spaces.” (Agbiboa, 2022, 179)

¹⁴ During elections, union touts—at the behest of their powerful, well-connected chairmen—block
¹⁵ voting places, beat voters of the opposition party, participate in rallies, and perform other services
¹⁶ for the dominant All Progressives Congress (APC) political party.²⁶ The rest of the time, they set
¹⁷ up fiefdoms in motorparks and adjacent bus terminals, their primary points of extraction, where
¹⁸ they collect their daily wares from informal commercial transport operators (see Figure 3b). union
¹⁹ touts are a source of constant strife for many commercial transport operators, who find themselves
²⁰ at the whim of these henchmen on a day-to-day basis (see Section 4 for more).

²¹ Lagos transport unions do not fit neatly into the categories social scientists have offered

²³See investigative reports from the International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR) Nigeria, including Odinaka Anudu’s “Money for the boys: How ‘agberos’ pocket billions of Lagos transport revenue.” ICIR.

²⁴The word *agberos* comes from Yoruba and the literal translation refers to someone who beckons or herds (agbo) a group of passengers onto a bus (akero)

²⁵‘Omo Area’ (Area boy) culture is a distinct Southwestern Nigeria phenomenon, sharing some similarities with gang culture. It connotes the thousands of (mostly young, mostly male) individuals crowding motorparks demanding money from, cajoling, and harassing commercial transportation drivers, often violently—the foot-soldiers of transport unions. I use these terms interchangeably for the sake of simplicity; but there are some subtle differences in their local use. In particular, ‘agberos’ sometimes implies the area boys who have ‘made it.’

²⁶See SI §B.2 for more on the APC and the political context of Lagos and Nigeria.

¹ describing non-state actors in politics. They are a union in both name and technically in function.
² They are sector-constrained interest groups; they don uniforms, collect dues, and any litigation by or
³ against them is handled by the industrial courts of Nigeria. Like many unions before them, this union
⁴ uses strategic violence, especially in its relations with the political machine of Lagos. However,
⁵ they are largely unrepresentative of their workers; and do not engage in collective bargaining with
⁶ employers on behalf of transport operators. For these reasons, and because of their engagement
⁷ in violence, the transport unions are also close in type to criminal organizations and gangs in the
⁸ context of Latin America (Lessing, 2024; Arias, 2017; Blattman et al., 2025; Feldmann and Luna,
⁹ 2022) or the mafias of southern Europe (Dipoppa, 2025; Calderoni, 2011). Lagos transport unions
¹⁰ exert occasional fatal violence and frequent extortive violence over civilian actors, and maintain
¹¹ control over particular industries and pockets of urban territory. However, their main source of
¹² income is not from protection rackets, drug smuggling, human trafficking, illicit natural resource
¹³ extraction, or any other inherently criminal enterprise. They also share some similarities with
¹⁴ paramilitary groups and pro-government militias (Carey, Mitchell and Scharpf, 2022; Acemoglu,
¹⁵ Robinson and Santos, 2009), in that they can and do influence elections through interference and
¹⁶ violence, and maintain a symbiotic relationship with politicians. However unlike paramilitaries,
¹⁷ these groups' primary function is not the perpetration of political violence, and they are not, in fact,
¹⁸ generally 'armed.'²⁷ Lagos transport unions are formally recognized interest groups whose income
¹⁹ comes from the collection of dues and ticket sales—higher and more frequent fees than necessary
²⁰ perhaps, but not illegal. I continue to refer to them as a union, with these caveats in mind.

²¹ 2.3 Argument and hypotheses

²² My principal assertion is that the Lagos State Government varies enforcement of the ban in order
²³ to 'produce precarity' in okada operators on behalf of the Lagos transport union. My contention
²⁴ is that the selective enforcement of the Lagos okada ban over both time and space is an example

²⁷It would be highly atypical for the vast majority of members to carry a firearm.

1 of *connivance*, and its patterns are motivated by the interests not of the lawbreakers themselves
2 (okada operators) but of exploitative non-state allies (Lagos transport unions) on whom the enforcer
3 (Lagos State Government/APC) relies. I argue the Lagos State Government selectively enforced this
4 policy in order to ease operator exploitation by the union, the government's third-party ally. With
5 the okada ban, as with many laws, enforcement is not all or nothing: there was neither a completely
6 absent nor a completely comprehensive enforcement regime. In fact, I contend that there is strategic
7 variation in enforcement which neatly aligns with union interests. Specifically, my theory predicts
8 that enforcement patterns will vary *spatially* according to where union extraction takes place (H1),
9 and *temporally* according to the government's reliance on the union to maintain power (H2):

10 **H1.** The state follows enforcement patterns that benefit the union.

11 **H2.** When perceived union reliability decreases, the state follows enforcement patterns which
12 benefit the union less.

13 **3 Empirical Strategy**

14 I probe these hypotheses across the three subsequent sections. Following the suggestion of Hassan,
15 Mattingly and Nugent (2022) to consider that “the reason why a state implements a policy is
16 analytically distinct from why that policy succeeds or fails, and it deserves its own study” (157),
17 I aim to cast light on the *intentionality* of the Lagos State Government and its ruling party in the
18 passage and (selective) enforcement of a ban on informal transport. It is empirically challenging
19 to identify intent or purpose; absent an explicit confession from state officials, most evidence
20 is necessarily circumstantial. It is therefore through a combination of tests that I empirically
21 evaluate my claims. To this end, in Section 4, I trace the lead-up to the law’s enforcement with
22 data from primary sources, participant observation, and field interviews. I find that the lead-up
23 to enforcement was fraught with tension between the government’s preferred union faction and
24 sub-unions representing two and three-wheeled vehicle operators.

1 In Section 5 I test H1, or the *spatial* variation of the state's selective enforcement. I count
2 okada motorbikes on individual road segments across multiple dates both before and after the ban's
3 proposed enforcement. I show that not only did the number of okada decrease in enforced areas
4 after June 2022, but it increased substantially where there are motorparks. I then transform maps
5 of the Lagos road system into a connected spatial network and simulate routes between random
6 points on the network. I show that blocking segments enforced by the state disproportionately
7 drives operators into union territory. I then collect data on potential *counterfactual* enforcement
8 areas, based on Lagos State Government statements motivating the ban, including traffic congestion,
9 pollution, and income. Re-running simulated routes under these counterfactual constraints, I find
10 that none of them have the same effect of pushing okada operators into motorparks.

11 Finally, in Section 6, I address H2, or *temporal* variation in state enforcement. I utilize an
12 unexpected and close election result in the Lagos presidential elections of 2023, in which former
13 Lagos State Governor—and primary union patron—Bola Tinubu of the APC lost in his home state
14 to an upstart challenger. I argue this close election acted as a signal to the APC and the Lagos
15 State Government, reducing their confidence in the union's ability to sway elections on their behalf.
16 While the union turned this around with rejuvenated efforts during the Gubernatorial election about
17 a month later,²⁸ I show that this inter-election period was marked by a significant decrease in the
18 number of okada present in motorparks. I treat the elections as shocks to the state's interest in
19 fostering operators' precarity on behalf of the unions, and argue that resulting changes during the
20 inter-election period were the result of perceived union defection during the Presidential election.

21 Before presenting this evidence, I detail the original data collection supporting these efforts.

22 **3.1 Geolocated data along the Lagos road network**

23 **Locations of ban enforcement** I consult policy documents to code the areas in which the
24 okada ban was selectively enforced in the period following June 2022. The government announced

²⁸See SI §D.4 for analyses of these elections.

1 ahead of time the areas of the state and city that it would actively enforce.²⁹ The ban's (selective)
2 enforcement went into effect on 1 June 2022. The state listed roughly 60 stretches of road, highway,
3 or specific bridges or flyovers; as well as over a dozen local government areas and specific councils
4 and neighborhoods, in which the government would enforce the ban. I hand-code these individually
5 and merge this dataset with geospatial road data in Lagos³⁰ to get a full universe of areas in which
6 the state could choose to enforce, with an indicator of where they announced their intention to. I
7 refer to these areas as 'intention to enforce' or ITE areas. I these data to map cross-sectional state
8 enforcement (see Figure4 for a map of ITE areas, marked with ×).

9 **Motorpark locations in Lagos** Measuring the geographic presence of motorpark operations
10 is slightly more complicated; motorparks are largely informal, but they are palpably visible (see
11 Figure 3b). They are also mostly permanent; while new parks sometimes do crop up, change hands,
12 or split, the general locations of most parks have mostly stayed the same over the decades. I utilize
13 a list in an appendix of a transport statistics report produced by former Lagos Governor Ambode's
14 administration in 2019.³¹ This strategy avoids post-treatment bias. I am left with a list of roughly
15 100 motorparks, which represent the primary locations of union extortion in Lagos. Figure 4 shows
16 maps these park locations represented by red bus icons.

17 **Satellite and Streetview-based informal transport density estimates** Where are informal
18 commercial transport operators—particularly okada operators—located? My primary measure of
19 this is constructed through analysis of very high resolution (VHR) remote-sensing imagery. I use
20 primarily commercially available imagery from Airbus and Maxar VHR satellite images, which have
21 a spatial resolution of 30-50cm—meaning each pixel in the resulting geo-located image measures
22 less than half a meter.³² At this resolution, it is possible to distinguish individual commercial
23 vehicles, including okada motorcycles, and therefore to measure of okada presence over space and

²⁹See SI §B.5 a table of example ITE areas as announced by the ban.

³⁰Data available at https://data.humdata.org/dataset/hotosm_ng_a_roads?

³¹Available here: <https://mepb.lagosstate.gov.ng/>

³²See §C.3 for more details

time on the Lagos roadway. I utilize both manual coding and computer vision models to count of the number of motorcycles present per segment of road. My VHR data consist of roughly 5-10 observations per road segment between 2021 and 2023, covering a continuous 75km² stretch of Lagos; including roughly a quarter of banned areas and motorparks in the state.




Figure 4: Motorpark and ITE locations in Lagos, Nigeria. Motorpark (red bus) and ITE (×) mapped by author.

Type	Number
State and law enforcement officials	10
NURTW union officials (all factions)	17
Okada operators	38
Other transport operators	10
<i>Total</i>	75

Table 3: List of interviews with stakeholders between June 1, 2023 and the present.

3.2 Interviews, participant observation, newspaper archives

Fieldwork and interviews I spent about 6 months observing the aftermath of the ban while living in Lagos.³³ My fieldwork³⁴ encompassed participant observation; as well as semi-structured and unstructured interviews with 75 stakeholders. Participant observation focused on engaging with the Lagos transportation system as a curious passenger. I conservatively estimate that I took 400 separate trips through Lagos traffic, to all corners of the city, including via taxis and Uber, informal transit and public transit. I also spent time sitting in or walking through busy bus stops, markets,

³³Being a white, foreign, female researcher, this research setting had its challenges and its opportunities (see SI §A).

³⁴Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol #2000035418. See more on fieldwork strategy in SI §C.2 and ethical considerations in SI §A.

1 and motorparks; observing the behavior of informal transport operators, touts, and law enforcement.
2 Beyond my participant observation, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with multiple
3 types of relevant stakeholders. Interviews largely took place in person, at locations ranging from
4 government offices, in quiet corners of motorparks or unregistered watering holes down the road,
5 and in the lobbies of immaculate hotels. Roughly half of these interviews were with okada operators
6 themselves. The other half were divided between union officials across the organization's complex
7 hierarchy (about half), high-ranking policy and law enforcement officials, and other informal transit
8 drivers, private operators or logistics business owners and entrepreneurs (see Table 3).

9 **Newspaper and social media archives** Utilizing archives of mostly English-language Nigerian
10 newspapers over the past half-century, social media, official documents, and other primary source
11 material, I create a localized network dataset for Lagos, which combines and links information on
12 hundreds of relevant actors, places, and events and covers the passage and enforcement of relevant
13 laws, factional battles, and interpersonal rivalries. These Transport Operator & Union Tracking
14 (TOUT) data allow me to analyze trends in the political dynamics between the union, the Lagos
15 State Government, and informal commercial transport operators qualitatively.³⁵

16 **4 Evidence: The role of the union**

17 In what follows, I analyze interactions between three actors: the Lagos State Government, the
18 union, and informal transport operators in Lagos, particularly okada operators. Figure 5 plots okada
19 presence over time in Lagos. This section deals with the lead-up to the ban's enforcement and lays
20 the groundwork for testing its spatial (H1 in Section 5) and temporal (H2 in Section 6) implications.

21 **4.1 Politicking with gangsters: Motorparks and the power of a union**

22 The Lagos informal transport sector is extremely lucrative, and transport unions have over the years
23 developed rigorous hierarchies and distinct organizational cultures (Fourchard, 2023; Agbiboa,

³⁵See SI §C.1 for more on the record-gathering process.




Figure 5: Okada presence over time. Plots the number of okada per road segment over time, via VHR remote sensing imagery. The unit of analysis is a road segment-date. Red represents road segments which feature a motorpark, blue ITE segments. The first vertical dotted line represents the date the ban enforcement commenced; the second the 2023 Nigerian Presidential Elections, and the third the 2023 Lagos Gubernatorial race.

1 2022). The national level union presides over state-level chapters, themselves affiliated with
 2 sub-unions which represent particular types of transport workers. For example, affiliated with
 3 NURTW are the Tricycle Owners and Operators Association of Nigeria (TOOAN) which manages
 4 tricycle ('keke') operators, and the Motorcycle Operators Association of Lagos (MOALS) which
 5 manages okada operators. The precise nature of the relationship between TOOAN, MOALS, and
 6 NURTW chapters at the state level has been the source of considerable strife.

7 The foot soldiers of the union are the touts working in the motorparks. Touts are there to bring
 8 some level of organization to the chaos, mainly via collecting ticket fees from commercial drivers
 9 who pass through— fees which have steadily increased in price over the last couple of years.³⁶
 10 Union-led motorparks are thriving centers of commerce and chaos. Some are gated tracts of land

³⁶ Interviews with author, including July 22, 2023

1 along the side of a road; others are less officially delineated, and consist largely of the people and
2 vehicles stretching across the roads and spilling over the side. Usually parks and their personnel
3 stretch across multiple lanes of a road, slowing traffic. Agberos make their way in and out of lines of
4 traffic to ensure that every commercial vehicle passing through the park that day purchases a ticket.
5 The conglomeration of passengers boarding and alighting, drivers passing through, and touts milling
6 about collecting their dues means that motorparks are packed with people. The masses in turn
7 attract street vendors and hawkers, so many motorparks also feature makeshift stalls selling grilled
8 maize, apparel, or gin in small hot sauce-like packets. There are often representatives of various
9 branches of law enforcement ‘hanging out’ in the park, chatting to touts, admonishing drivers, or
10 simply surveying the scene. At one motorpark on the mainland, I was struck when I noticed a small
11 group of Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA) agency officials—obvious in their
12 yellow, red-trimmed uniforms—laughing and looking on as a tout, yelling over the chaos of the
13 park, chased after a slow-moving danfo mini-bus, whipping the already-cracked windows with a
14 long wooden rod, a wad of apparently not-enough cash clutched in his other fist. Touts’ jobs are
15 violent and often dangerous; though they are also important community members. More than once,
16 an agbero kindly helped direct me when I was lost.

17 Touts are presided over by ‘unit’ chairmen who rule over a particular junction, intersection, or
18 park. They in turn are directed by ‘area’ chairmen, who are directed by zonal chairmen; meanwhile
19 the chairman of the state-level chapter of the union exerts authority over the whole operation. The
20 work of chairmen at all levels is very political, dangerous, and delicate. When I interviewed one
21 unit chairman representing tricycle operators on the mainland, he spent 15 minutes (in Yoruba) at
22 the beginning of the interview interrogating my colleague, a Nigerian, about his background and
23 purpose for being there, in order to make sure that he was not a spy for another faction or for rivals
24 who sought the chairman’s coveted position. “Chairman work is very dangerous,” he explained to
25 me apologetically afterwards, “we have many enemies”.³⁷ There are often clashes, as rival factions

³⁷Author interview, July 14, 2024

¹ fight over control of particularly hotly contested motorparks.³⁸

² However, the dangerous political maneuverings of union leadership only escalate as they ascend
³ the ladder, and as the stakes get correspondingly higher. The chairman of the NURTW Lagos
⁴ branch (as of 2019) MC Oluomo is a longstanding ally of President (as of 2023) Bola Tinubu,
⁵ the first governor of Lagos after the fall of military rule. Tinubu has long exercised control over
⁶ the state politics of Lagos as a sort of “godfather.” Tinubu’s unique hold on formal institutions in
⁷ Lagos has its roots in his earlier life and in his Lagos governorship, in which he cultivated and
⁸ strengthened ties with informal networks of power such as the union (Whiteman, 2013). Most
⁹ relevant for our purposes, Tinubu and MC Oluomo were both reportedly area boys in their youth
¹⁰ (Momoh, 2000, 188). During his governorship of Lagos, Tinubu was frequently referred to as the
¹¹ “Area Boy Governor,” and is quoted by prominent journalist Kaye Whiteman as saying of the area
¹² boys “These are my boys; I care for them.” (Whiteman, 2013, 217)

¹³ MC Oluomo’s rise to power in the union was riddled with violence and with interference from
¹⁴ Tinubu, though this is not to underestimate his vast and loyal following. In particular, he has historically
¹⁵ been in conflict with drivers of keke and okada, and publicly rivals with the leaders of two- and
¹⁶ three-wheeler operations. When he took over as Lagos NURTW Chairman in 2019, then leader of
¹⁷ TOOAN (tricycle union) Fatai Adeshina³⁹ was also vying for the top spot in the Lagos NURTW
¹⁸ chapter. Reports suggest Tinubu personally called him and demanded he cede the nomination.⁴⁰

¹⁹ He fared better than his MOALS (okada union) colleague, however, who crossed paths with
²⁰ MC Oluomo two years earlier. Rasaq Bello, who was rumored to support a different APC faction
²¹ than MC—and who operated in the same neighborhood, Oshodi—was shot to death in 2017, almost
²² certainly by MC’s men (Akinkuotu, 2019a; Akinsanmi, 2017; Odesola, 2022). The assassination
²³ caused then Lagos State Governor Ambode to temporarily suspend NURTW from operating in

³⁸Indeed once, after one long afternoon of chatting to reticent touts in the back of a beat-up minibus parked in a motorpark in the north, a battle for supremacy over the park broke out between loyalists of the park’s general chairman and rival foot soldiers in a nearby neighborhood. About twenty minutes after I had vacated the park, the entire stretch of road leading to the roundabout was deserted, as touts battled with guns, cutlasses, bottles and stones.

³⁹Interviewed by author, July 10, 2023

⁴⁰See SI §B.3 for a chart mapping these changes.

¹ Lagos (Bankole, 2017; Akinsanmi, 2017), leading to an ambitious transport sector reform law which
² attempted to regain state control over the industry (Infrastructure News, 2017; Olawoyin, 2017).⁴¹
³ Shortly thereafter, Tinubu, then leader of the APC, refused to allow the party to nominate Governor
⁴ Ambode for a second term (Akinsanmi, 2018; Abiodun, 2019), earning public support from MC
⁵ Oluomo on social media. Ambode’s reputation amongst people I spoke with remains one of a man
⁶ who got too close to disrupting big corruption, and whose second term candidacy Tinubu halted as
⁷ a result (Abiodun, 2019). MC Oluomo’s role in this rearrangement of Lagos politics—albeit in a
⁸ way that suited him quite well—is less clear. What is clear is that at least some Ambode supporters
⁹ connected the dots. During an APC rally for Sanwo-Olu, the *new* nominee for governor to replace
¹⁰ Ambode (and Lagos’s current governor, reelected in 2023), MC Oluomo was stabbed by an assailant
¹¹ who reportedly blamed him for Ambode’s ruined political fortunes (Egbas, 2019). MC’s political
¹² allies allegedly ensured he got medical treatment abroad (Elezuo, 2019). When MC recovered,
¹³ Tinubu ushered him into the union’s top spot, over the incumbent chairman, an Ambode loyalist
¹⁴ (Akinkuotu, 2019b; Inyang, 2019; Oyero, 2022b; Society Now, 2019).

¹⁵ As is evidenced throughout the decades, the relationship between Tinubu’s APC and Oluomo’s
¹⁶ union has been integral to the success of both. The union is not just thugs on demand for the APC,
¹⁷ and the APC is not just the political pawn of the union. Theirs is a complex, dynamic relationship;
¹⁸ the internal politics of the APC are intricately related to the internal politics of the union, and the
¹⁹ political success of particular factions. They have separate but overlapping goals, and their power
²⁰ depends on each other—and, in the union’s case, on drivers whom they extort for billions.

²¹ **4.2 The lead-up to the ban’s enforcement**

²² Shortly after MC Oluomo overtook leadership of the union, he made moves to integrate okada and
²³ keke operators directly under his control, usurping their existing unions—which had previously
²⁴ operated independently, if under the same umbrella (Oboagwina, 2022). As a result, okada and keke

⁴¹ It was Ambode who then, in fact, passed the 2018 okada ban in the first place, in his effort to consolidate state control of the industry and chip away at the union’s source of power ().

1 operators began to publicly complain about the rise in extortion at Lagos motorparks (Daily Trust,
2 2022b; Edema, 2022). In late 2021, this culminated in the then leader of TOOAN⁴² announcing that
3 excessive extortion from MC Oluomo's NURTW meant that he was looking to form an alternative
4 union of these operators, outside the purview of NURTW (Premium Times, 2022). He then went
5 over MC Oluomo's head, directly to the national NURTW president, to complain of the extortion
6 from MC's regime (Olaoluwa, 2022). The National President of NURTW demanded MC Oluomo
7 work to prevent extortion of these operators (Olanrewaju, 2022). MC Oluomo refused (Faith, 2022;
8 Balogun, 2022). On March 9, 2022, the National NURTW umbrella suspended MC Oluomo as
9 chairman of the Lagos State NURTW Branch (Olaoluwa, 2022), and appointed in his stead Fatai
10 Adeshina, former TOOAN leader and MC Oluomo rival.⁴³

11 A rapid series of developments occurred in quick succession—in fact, all on the same day. MC
12 Olumo withdrew his membership from the national union, and announced that not only was he still
13 head of Lagos chapter, but that the chapter was breaking away from the national union entirely
14 (Akoni, 2022). That evening, Lagos Governor Sanwo-Olu announced that all parks and garage
15 management would now be under the purview of MC Oluomo's union—now to be dubbed Lagos
16 State Parks and Garage Management (LASPG) (Alilyu, 2022; Society Now, 2022; Oyero, 2022b).
17 They also announced that it was suspending the activity of the national union from the state entirely
18 (Oyero, 2022a); leaving MC Oluomo's faction as the only one operating with the state's blessing.

19 These developments did not unfold without protest. NGOs and rights organizations publicly
20 called out the role of the LSG in manipulating the law over the course of the leadership tussle;
21 one organization claimed that over 1,000 of these operators' vehicles were vandalized by union
22 members over the course of one week in April (Sahara Reporters, 2022). Multiple motorparks were
23 forcibly overtaken (Oyero, 2022c; Daily Trust, 2022a), extortion by touts continued (Agha and
24 Aliyu, 2022), and violence erupted between area boys and okada operators that resulted in multiple
25 fatalities (Oyeleke, 2022; Lambo, 2022). And on May 8, a Justice of the Federal High Court in

⁴²Interview with author August 28, 2023

⁴³See SI §B.3 for a chart mapping these changes.

¹ Lagos ruled that MC Oluomo and his union stop levying fees against operators (Titlola, 2022).

² After having promised MC's men that he would "act on [their] grievances" (The Nation,
³ 2022), Governor Sanwo-Olu announced a week later that his government would pursue imminent—
⁴ and selective—enforcement of an okada ban, originally passed in 2018 by reformist Governor
⁵ Ambode.⁴⁴ Okada operators and their tricycle-riding counterparts had long been a thorn in MC's
⁶ side, and they bore the brunt of the extortion from a union that they did not feel they were members
⁷ of. They had begun the protesting excessive extortion in motorparks across the city, and in fact were
⁸ at the root of MC Oluomo's—one of the most powerful and connected men in Lagos—ongoing
⁹ beleaguerment.

¹⁰ **5 Evidence: The political geography of enforcement**

¹¹ My theory requires that selective enforcement of the ban will vary in ways that benefit the union;
¹² allowing them to more effectively exert control over (and profit from) recalcitrant okada operators.
¹³ Therefore we should expect *spatial* variation in the ban's enforcement according to Hypothesis 1:

¹⁴ **H1** The state follows enforcement patterns that benefit the union.

¹⁵ Hypothesis 1 implies two component hypotheses. First, that enforcement along ITE areas causes
¹⁶ more okada to be present at motorparks after enforcement commences:

¹⁷ **H1(a)** After enforcement commences, the number of okada in motorparks *increases* compared to
¹⁸ before the ban.

¹⁹ I test this assertion using a panel of satellite-based measures along road segments before and after
²⁰ the ban. I show that okada density shifted in the aftermath of the ban; and that it shifted differentially
²¹ for (i) ITE areas vs. non-ITE areas; and (ii) for motorparks vs. non-motorparks. Second, it implies
²² that this choice of ITE areas is driven, at least in part, *in order to bring about* this result:

⁴⁴See SI §B.5 for more on the ban and other okda bans across Lagos history.

1 **H1(b)** Actual ITE areas will increase okada density in motorparks *more* compared to counterfac-
2 tual enforcement areas.

3 I use randomization inference and simulations on the Lagos road network to not only show that
4 enforcement along ITE areas increases okada presence in motorparks, but that it does so significantly
5 more than other plausible counterfactual enforcement patterns. These propositions were validated
6 by some news reports (Olasupo, 2022), as well as by many of the conversations I had with okada
7 operators throughout Lagos. When I asked operators specifically whether the union, allegedly their
8 representatives, were troubled by the ban, I got more than one laugh of derision. One operator said:

9 “The ban ... did not disturb [the union] much. Why? Because if you cannot go [on
10 enforced routes], you go to the streets. That is where they collect their dues ... so while
11 you struggle, you still give them their dues.” (Okada operator, Badagry, 20 July 2023)

12 Every operator I spoke to opined about the union’s increased collection, even though what they
13 were collecting on was technically an illegal activity. They often cited the union’s collusion with the
14 state. In Ikorodu, northeast Lagos, one operator stated “... all money they are collecting is illegal
15 ... they know that Lagos state has stopped bike. They stop okada. And they are *still* selling ticket,
16 and Lagos State did not stop them ... they are selling it, and we are buying it.”⁴⁵ Other operators
17 confirmed the increased fees and interaction with the union faced after the ban:

18 “The problem is the ticket[s you must buy to pass through the motorparks]. You buy one,
19 200 naira. You buy another, 200... [Now] you have to buy four, five, six tickets. You
20 cannot now ride bike [without passing a park]...So you have to go more, more, more—but
21 then you pass more and pay more.” (Okada operator, Mile 2, 23 June 2023)

22 Some operators noted that their union membership ID card no longer exempted them from paying
23 ticket fees.⁴⁶ Moreover, many operators mentioned how many new okada operators had been

⁴⁵Interview with author on June 12, 2023

⁴⁶Interview with author July 27, 2024

¹ crowded into pockets where okada riding was relatively safe from state enforcement, resulting in
² increased competition and rate depression.⁴⁷

³ 5.1 Okada presence before and after ban enforcement

⁴ **H1(a)** After the ban, the number of okada in motorparks *increases* compared to before the ban.

⁵ I test H1(a) directly by investigating the ban's differential effect, if any, on motorparks: I
⁶ run a standard two-way fixed effects model with two-periods, which estimates the *differential*
⁷ effect of the ban between areas with and without motorparks. The outcome Okada_{it} is the number
⁸ of okada counted in satellite imagery from date t on road segment i . I regress this count on an
⁹ interaction between Motorpark, which represents whether i road segment features a motorpark
¹⁰ (1) or not (0), and Post $_t$, which accounts for whether whether t is before (0) or after (1) the
¹¹ ban's announced enforcement date. I include time-period t and road segment i fixed effects for
¹² (respectively) time-invariant, road segment specific characteristics and space-invariant, date-specific
¹³ shocks. Given that each date represents a different satellite image, time period fixed effects also act
¹⁴ as a control for image-specific variation such as percentage cloud cover. Errors are clustered by
¹⁵ a 0.25×0.25 degree grid squares to account for possible spatial autocorrelation. To account for
¹⁶ time-shifting traffic trends (especially workweek "rush hour" traffic patterns affecting some types
¹⁷ of roads more than others), I include a separate term accounting for whether the observation was
¹⁸ captured on a weekend, and allow that the term to vary according to class of road (e.g., highway,
¹⁹ residential). My preferred specification also includes fixed effects for grid-square linear time trends
²⁰ to account for (linear) shifts over time clustered in space.

²¹ I first establish that the ban was enforced as intended; namely by estimating the ban's differential
²² effect across enforced (ITE) areas, and non-enforced areas and substituting ITE_i (whether a road
²³ segment i is listed as an enforcement area) for Motorpark $_i$.

²⁴ Unsurprisingly, and as shown in Model (1) of Table 4, the presence of okada significantly

⁴⁷Interview with author on August 15, 2024

Table 4: Post-enforcement trends in motorbike density

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
ITE × Post	−1.84** (0.82)	−2.28*** (0.78)		
Motorpark × Post			3.13*** (1.46)	4.24*** (1.52)
Observations	29,071	26,061	29,071	26,061
Segment FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Grid Linear Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Grid Quadratic Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Weekend × Road Class FE		✓		✓
R ² (full model)	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.48

Units are individual road segments. Models 1 and 2 consider presence in ITE areas, Models 3 and 4 in motorparks. All models include segment and date fixed effects and 0.25×0.25 degree grid square linear and quadratic time trends. Models 2 and 4 also include differing intercepts for weekends versus weekdays which vary by class of road. Errors are clustered by time period and grid square. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

- ¹ decreases after June 1, 2022 in areas where there is stated enforcement, by about 2 okada per road
² segment when accounting for localized time trends. Meanwhile, and in line with H1(a), the number
³ of okada significantly increase after the ban on road segments which feature motorparks, by about
⁴ four okada per segment (see Model 4). This is consistent with okada being displaced after the ban's
⁵ enforcement to areas controlled by the union.


⁶ 5.2 Randomization on a road network

- ⁷ **H1(b)** Actual ITE areas will increase okada density in motorparks *more* compared to counterfac-
⁸ tual enforcement areas.

- ⁹ Above, I show that the number of okada increased around motorparks after the ban's enforcement.
¹⁰ Next, I contend that this was the result of a purposeful strategy of displacement by the state (H1(b)).
¹¹ Figure 6 lays out a simplified example of the process by which this may occur.⁴⁸ Panel (a) shows
¹² an abstracted road map of a particular neighborhood of Lagos, with two points marked A and B.

⁴⁸Based, incidentally, on the route I took from my residence (A) to the supermarket (B) during fieldwork.

1 Union-run motorparks are marked with red buses. Before the ban, if one attempted to travel via
 2 okada from point A to point B along the road network, the quickest route goes straight north and
 3 east (marked in green). Notice on this route, no motorparks are passed.



(a) Example okada route (in green) from point A to point B, before okada ban enforcement. Union-led motorparks represented by red bus symbols. The route outlined passes no motorparks.

(b) Example okada route (in green) from point A to point B, after okada ban enforcement. Union-led motorparks represented by red bus symbols. The route outlined passes two motorparks.

Figure 6: Example of affected route.

4 In panel (b), areas enforced during the okada ban—bridges, streets, and intersections—are
 5 denoted with red lines. These represent areas which, after the ban, are untraversable by okada
 6 operators. Adapting to avoid the enforced areas, the green line in this bottom panel shows the new
 7 shortest route from A to B. Not only is the route longer and more circuitous, but the okada is now
 8 forced to pass two motorparks. This figure represents the type of displacement I suggest occurred
 9 on a systematic scale after the okada ban. It demonstrates that while okada can still traverse through
 10 many areas, even in neighborhoods directly affected by the ban’s enforcement, the risk of arrest
 11 and bike confiscation at key points on the road network forces operators to alter their routes, landing
 12 them in the hands of touts who can exploit their precarity to extort them.

13 To investigate whether the chosen enforcement areas have this systematic effect, I use Open
 14 Street Maps (OSM) geospatial road data to construct a networked dataset, where roads ('edges') are

1 connected by intersections ('nodes'). This allows me to flexibly simulate travel through the Lagos
2 road network under a variety of circumstances—including before and after the ban took place.⁴⁹ I
3 merge the network with above-described motorpark and ITE locationd data. I use this networked
4 dataset to calculate features of the paths traversed by operators between points.⁵⁰

5 Results from 30,000 simulations provide suggestive evidence that the specific geography of the
6 okada ban enforcement served the union's interests by displacing okada routes into areas in which
7 the union runs motorparks. Okada operators face curtailed freedom of movement as a result of ban
8 enforcement in ITE areas; just under $\frac{1}{4}$ of randomly selected routes become intraversable after the
9 okada ban; that is, the okada ban prohibits passage from point A to point B at all, by any route.
10 Moreover, enforcement in these areas results in a significant increase in cost, on average NGN
11 1,192.48 more after enforcement than before, either because of added mileage from circumventing
12 ITE areas, or because of passing extra motorparks.⁵¹ While no routes will see a *decrease* in cost,⁵²
13 the scale of the increase is significant.

14 While it is evident that the okada ban's enforcement resulted in significant costs to okada opera-
15 tors, my primary analysis concerns the degree to which the union benefited from the displacement
16 of okada operators prompted by this selective enforcement. Indeed, simulations suggest that the
17 union would have benefited enormously. The majority of okada routes pass at least one additional
18 motorpark after the okada ban prior to before.⁵³ Less than 2% of routes pass fewer motorparks
19 after the ban than before (see Figure 7a). The total portion of routes which pass a motorpark
20 before the ban's enforcement is also significantly less. Before ban enforcement on ITE areas, only
21 3% of simulated routes pass motorparks. In contrast, after ban enforcement, nearly 61% of the

⁴⁹For more details on the technical approach, see SI §C.4.

⁵⁰SI §C.4.2 contains extensive details of this analysis process.

⁵¹Cost here is a straightforward function of a routes length, and the number of motorparks passed. I estimate with insight from fieldwork that each km of road traveled costs roughly NGN 100 (wear and tear, petrol costs), and with tickets each motorpark costs an addition NGN 500. See SI §C.4 for more on cost calculations

⁵²Mechanically, the shortest route between points A and B after barriers will either remain unaffected or get longer.

⁵³Importantly, the increase in 'motorparks passed' holds *even* when extending the sample to all routes traversable in the pre-period. That is to say, even across $\frac{1}{4}$ *fewer* rides, the number of motorparks passed increases nearly 5.5 times after the enforcement of the ban on ITE areas.

Joint Distribution of Change in Route Cost and Motorparks Passed




Figure 7: Density plots of road network simulations. The y-axis is the change in the number of motorparks passed on a given route, compared to no ban enforcement/roadway impediments. The x-axis is the approximate difference in ‘cost’ of the route in NGN. The darkness of the shaded area indicates frequency of cost/motorpark difference combinations. Inspiration for this plot comes from Artes et al. (2025).

- ¹ traversable routes pass motorparks. This large difference attests to the significant displacement of
- ² okada operators into areas where the union can take advantage of the ban’s enforcement to extort
- ³ from them.⁵⁴

⁴ Are these effects unique?

- ⁵ **H1(b)** Actual ITE areas will increase okada density in motorparks *more* compared to counterfac-
- ⁶ tual enforcement areas.

- ⁷ The previous analysis makes clear that the ban’s enforcement along ITE routes serves to displace

⁵⁴This trend holds *even* considering the larger sample of all routes, including those intraversable after the ban; over all simulated routes, less than 10% pass motorparks before the ban is enforced, compared to 36% afterwards.

1 okada operators into motorpark-laden areas, increasing the power wielded by the union over these
2 operators. However, this alone does not imply that these ITE routes were chosen (at least in part) in
3 order to produce this effect. I now turn to additional analyses which make use of *counterfactual*
4 ITE areas which could have—given the purported goals of the ban—reasonably been chosen as
5 enforcement locations instead. There are a variety of potential logics which *could* have guided the
6 government’s choice of enforcement priorities, including those drawn directly from stated reasons
7 for the ban in first place; such as easing traffic congestion, preventing road accidents, or reducing
8 pollution. There are also alternative logics less likely to have been stated in so many words by
9 state agents, such as enforcing the ‘eyesore’ of okada operators in the richest areas of the city, or
10 prioritizing places where law enforcement had the highest pre-existing capacity.

11 I then construct *counterfactual* ITE areas based on these logics by selecting approximately 60
12 areas of the road network chosen from appropriately-weighted distributions, then re-run simulations
13 under these hypothetical constraints. My goal with this exercise is to determine whether these
14 counterfactual configurations have effects similar to the actual ITE areas chosen by the state. I
15 suggest that choosing enforcement areas in these ways would have benefited the union substantially
16 *less* than actually enforced areas.

17 The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 5. The effects of the okada ban’s
18 enforcement along ITE routes is substantively unique. For example, ‘traffic-driven’ hypothetical
19 enforcement areas make more routes intraversable to operators, more efficiently curtailing okada
20 use with identical capacity. Most crucially is the difference in the effect on motorparks passed. The
21 ‘true’ ITE configuration prompts operators to pass roughly one additional motorpark per journey on
22 average. Meanwhile, a traffic-driven hypothetical ban have the opposite effect, and in fact *reduce*
23 the number of motorparks okada pass on their routes; the majority of routes pass fewer motorparks
24 under this enforcement logic. This analysis confirms not only that most counterfactual enforcement
25 patterns fail to benefit the union, but also that the actual enforcement patterns followed by the LSG
26 *uniquely* benefit the union amidst a variety of plausible alternatives. This lends some credibility to

Table 5: Counterfactual enforcement patterns and their effects.

<i>Enforcement logic</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>	<i>Effects</i>
Actual ITE areas	Actual LSG enforced areas	Coded from policy announcement	75% routes traversable; 87 more motorparks
High traffic congestion	Ease traffic flow	Highest traffic incident density (via 96.1FM data)	35% routes traversable; 21 fewer motorparks
High state capacity	Utilize existing capacity	Closest to police stations (via OSM)	61% routes traversable; same number of motorparks
High offense areas	Target areas of high-okada density	Highest pre-ban okada level (via Streetview)	55% routes traversable; 4 more motorparks
High income areas	Appease wealthy constituents	Highest nightlight density (via EOG)	91% routes traversable; 8 fewer motorparks
High priority areas	Prioritize public safety	Closest to primary schools	84% routes traversable; 51 fewer motorparks
High pollution areas	Reduce pollution by okada	Highest particulate matter density (via NASA)	54% routes traversable; 23 fewer motorparks
Most efficient areas	Maximize enforcement efficiency	Areas with highest betweenness centrality on Lagos road network	27% routes traversable; 12 more motorparks

Results are based on 30,000 simulated different start and end points randomly chosen from a uniform distribution across the Lagos road network. Number of motorparks passed is per 100 simulated routes, compared to pre-ban counts. I test additional counterfactuals, including concessions to commuters and road condition constraints, in SI §C.4.2.

- ¹ my assertion that the enforcement patterns of the ban were intended, at least in part, to prop up the
- ² union's ability to exert coerce rebellious operators.

³ 6 Evidence: Sudden disillusionment as a shock

- ⁴ In previous sections, I described the peculiar political circumstances surrounding the conflict
- ⁵ between operators and the union in the lead-up to an announcement of the ban's enforcement
- ⁶ (Section 4), and demonstrate, consistent with H1, that spatial variation in the ban's enforcement
- ⁷ served to displace operators into areas where the union can extort them (Section 5.1). I show that this

¹ pattern is not replicated when considering counterfactual enforcement areas based on traffic report
² density, law enforcement presence, or other potential motivations for enforcement configurations
³ (Section 5.2). I now turn to an analysis of *temporal* variation in ban enforcement:

⁴ **H2** When perceived union reliability decreases, the state follows enforcement patterns which
⁵ benefit the union less

⁶ The evidence for this hypothesis comes from exploiting a shift in the state's reliance on the union,
⁷ stemming from a surprising national election result at the state level. The Nigerian Presidential and
⁸ Gubernatorial elections of 2023, held about six months after enforcement of the ban began, did not
⁹ happen simultaneously. Federal elections—including for the President—were held on 25 February
¹⁰ 2023. Meanwhile Lagos state elections—including for the governor, as well as for seats in the state
¹¹ assembly—were held about a month later, on 18 March 2023.

¹² The national election results were in one sense unsurprising; the incumbent APC's candidate
¹³ Bola Tinubu was elected against rivals Atiku Abubakar of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and
¹⁴ Peter Obi of the Labour Party (LP), the upstart populist candidate who captivated young Nigerian
¹⁵ voters in particular. The APC's stronghold is in the southwest, especially in Lagos where the party
¹⁶ has won every election it has ever stood. Therefore, one unexpected result of the 2023 presidential
¹⁷ election was that the people of Lagos state voted en masse not for their former governor Tinubu,
¹⁸ but for the charismatic and populist LP candidate Obi. While the Lagos results did not sway the
¹⁹ election in Obi's favor, they nevertheless shocked the political elite of the state, who had been
²⁰ expecting a comfortable APC victory, guaranteed (as usual) by the efforts of the union. A former
²¹ Lagos commissioner of transport under the APC asked me: "Did you see the election? The union
²² didn't deliver. Their days are numbered."⁵⁵ I contend that the national election provided a shock to
²³ Lagos state leadership's perception of the union's reliability in guaranteeing an election victory for
²⁴ the incumbent APC, and therefore a shock to their willingness to cater to union demands. As with
²⁵ H1, H2 can be broken into two component observational implications:

⁵⁵ Interview with author on June 18, 2023

- ¹ **H2a** Okada density *decreases* after the Presidential election around motorparks.
- ² **H2b** Okada density *increases* after the Gubernatorial election around motorparks.




Figure 8: 2023 Nigerian Presidential Election Results for Lagos State

³ I test whether okada density changed after the national election, in the lead-up to the Gubernato-
⁴ rial election a month later. If the government is selectively enforcing the ban for the union, we should
⁵ expect a shock to the state's trust in the union to serve as a signal of unreliability and enforcement
⁶ patterns to shift accordingly. Interviews, including with okada operators, substantiate this strategy.
⁷ Several (unprompted) brought up abrupt changes in enforcement between the elections.⁵⁶

⁸ I define InterElec_t as $\text{PresElec}_t - \text{GovElec}_t$. The variable PresElec_t takes the value of 1 when t is
⁹ after the date of the Nigerian Presidential Election, and GovElec_t when t is after the date of the Lagos
¹⁰ Gubernatorial election. $\text{PresElec}_t - \text{GovElec}_t = 1$ if t denotes a time period between the presidential
¹¹ and gubernatorial elections. I measure the change during the inter-election period because, as I
¹² analyze further in SI §D.4), the union's behavior changed significantly during the gubernatorial

⁵⁶Interviews with author, including 15 June, 2023

1 election. After the ire from their patron expressed after the presidential election, the union increased
2 its election interference and mobilization, meaning that I expect the enforcement dynamic to return to
3 pre-Presidential election patterns after the gubernatorial election is complete. Importantly, I truncate
4 the sample to only observations which follow the okada ban's initial enforcement, so as to isolate
5 the disruption in the inter-election period from effects of the ban's enforcement writ large. I estimate
6 a two-way fixed effects linear model in the same fashion as above, where $(\text{Motorpark}_i \times \text{InterElec}_t)$
7 denotes whether a given i, t is a road segment with a motorpark in the inter-election period.⁵⁷

8 Results are given in Table 6. There was a general decrease in okada presence across the road
9 network across all categories in the inter-election period, as can be seen in Figure 5 in Section
10 4. However, not all road segments saw uniform decreases during this time. The estimate of the
11 coefficient for ITE is positive ($p = 0.06$), though not consistently significantly different from the
12 trend downward experienced by most road segments during this period. However, the number of
13 okada in *motorparks* during the inter-election period decreased substantially, at a significantly lower
14 rate than that of other types of road segments. These trends lend credence to my theory that the state
15 reacted to the union's failure to sway the election for the APC by reducing selective enforcement.

16 7 Conclusion

17 In this paper, I argue that states can selectively enforce policies aimed at vulnerable populations
18 in order to ease their exploitation by important third-party groups. I examine the case of uneven
19 enforcement of a ban on specific types of informal commercial transport in Africa's largest city,
20 and provide evidence that uneven enforcement of this ban is in the interest of appeasing powerful
21 transport unions, political allies of the regime who are relied upon around election time to provide
22 political violence on demand in favor of the ruling party. I demonstrate first, that the period before
23 enforcement was rift with intra-union politics, and specifically unrest from commercial drivers
24 fighting back against their exploitation by the union. Next, I demonstrate that variation in okada ban

⁵⁷As before, I replicate analysis with ITE_i in place of Motorpark_i . See SI §D.2 for additional specifications.

Table 6: Inter-election trends in okada density

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
ITE × Inter-election	0.54 (1.22)	2.01* (1.08)		
Motorpark × Inter-election			-8.28*** (2.89)	-8.34*** (2.96)
Observations	21,717	21,714	21,717	21,714
Segment FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Grid Linear Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Weekend × Road Class FE		✓		✓
R ² (full model)	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.73
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.50	0.50	0.53	0.53

Units are individual road segments. Models 1 and 2 consider presence in ITE areas, Models 3 and 4 in motorparks. All models include fixed effects for road segment, date, and 0.25×0.25 degree grid-square linear and quadratic time trends. Models 2 and 4 also include fixed effects for weekends versus weekdays which vary by class of road. Errors are clustered at the grid square and time period level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

- 1 ITE areas *systematically* and *uniquely* alters okada operator routes towards union-led motorparks,
 2 where they face increased exploitation and extortion. Finally, I use VHR remote-sensing and
 3 Streetview data to count the number of okada motorcycles present on road segments over time,
 4 specifically in the lead-up to and in the immediate aftermath of a shocking Lagos-level result in
 5 the Presidential election. I find that okada presence *increases* in areas enforced by the ban (and
 6 decreases in areas with motorparks) in the period after the Presidential and before the Gubernatorial
 7 elections, a period of immense tension between the Lagos State Government and the unions.
- 8 This project, while focusing on the micro-level dynamics of a single policy enacted in a
 9 single city, has implications far beyond the streets of Lagos. My findings underline the necessity
 10 of integrating third parties—beyond state agents and directly regulated populations—into our
 11 understandings of why states pursue certain policies and their enforcement (Artabe et al., 2023;
 12 Albertus, Fenner and Slater, 2018). I build upon prevailing understandings of repression and
 13 forbearance by integrating them into a broader framework of how states assist their non-state
 14 allies. My focus on *connivance* as a strategy emphasizes how governments may aid allies not

¹ only through direct concessions, but through manipulating enforcement to produce vulnerability
² in populations challenging these allies' power, or whose exploitation underwrites that power—or
³ both. Moreover, my focus on these third-party state allies shows the 'flipside' of a phenomenon
⁴ of great interest to the study of politics: election violence. I examine the supply-side dynamics
⁵ of election interference and violence by non-state groups, clarifying the independent motivations,
⁶ incentive structures, and interests of such groups. Moreover I provide a portrait of the 'day jobs'
⁷ of election thugs, emphasizing how these actors exist within—and influence—political structures
⁸ even between elections. In doing so, I highlight the need for research on the relationships between
⁹ governments and allied 'violence entrepreneurs' in the years and months before potential flashpoints.
¹⁰ Finally, I contend that even nominally benign policies (and their level of enforcement) are motivated
¹¹ by complex, and often corrupt, political arrangements. Like Holland (2016), I caution against
¹² interpreting a particular policy's lack of enforcement as necessarily implying an *inability* to enforce.
¹³ As I reinforce above, a government's reticence may instead be strategic; and—crucially—is often
¹⁴ coercive. Future work should take these lessons to heart, especially in probing why governments
¹⁵ tolerate illicit and informal industries; or engage only halfheartedly in enforcing violations such as
¹⁶ irregular migration. Such light-handedness is not always out of benevolence.

¹⁷ Policy enforcement—like its passage—is highly political with distinct distributive consequences.
¹⁸ And indeed, enforcement is often the policy stage in which many citizens first convey their demands
¹⁹ and interact with the state, especially in the Global South (Scott, 1969, 1142). This article deepens
²⁰ our understanding of how democracies might use this 'enforcement lever' to contribute to the
²¹ oppression of vulnerable populations, and to the empowerment of exploitative third parties.

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1

Supplemental Information

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A ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

2 Consideration of this project's ethical ramifications has been an integral part of the research process
3 over its entire course. This project was approved by Yale Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol
4 #2000035418. There are five primary areas which require additional discussion.

Positionality

6 This project entailed going into spaces where I was not only an outsider, but quite an obvious
7 outsider. I am a young, white, female, Western, and economically privileged researcher venturing
8 into environments primarily dominated by Nigerian men working in a dangerous and precarious
9 industry. In some ways, this positionality presented opportunities. I found that my appearance
10 often meant that when alone, I was perceived as apolitical, uninformed, or non-threatening. Some
11 respondents were more candid when I approached them on my own than when I approached them
12 accompanied by (male) Nigerian colleagues. However, my outsider status also imposed limits: I
13 was often excluded from key conversations, surveilled by authorities or gatekeepers, or otherwise
14 constrained in my movement. I was often mistaken for a foreign journalist of some kind. It was
15 impossible to go unnoticed. I have sought to remain reflexive about the extractive dynamics that can
16 accompany international fieldwork, especially when the topic concerns illegalized and marginalized
17 livelihoods. Throughout the project, I relied on local research assistants and collaborators, especially
18 when language barriers made this practice necessary, and I practiced discretion in how I recorded
19 and shared fieldnotes, as outlined by my IRB.

Semi-structured interviews

21 Apart from the general issues arising from interviewing vulnerable or politically exposed individuals,
22 there were additional considerations unique to this project. Some interviewees were members of
23 organizations implicated in coercion or extortion; others were informal workers operating outside
24 legal protections. In both cases, I was careful to avoid questions that could compromise their

1 safety or trigger suspicion. All interviewees were provided with a clear explanation of the research
2 and verbally consented to participate. I did not record interviews unless explicitly permitted, and
3 anonymized responses immediately afterward to minimize risk. I was the only person to have access
4 to recordings (unless of course, as occasionally happened, interviewees made their own recordings
5 of the interview). I often stopped recording on the request of the interviewee when a particularly
6 delicate matter arose; especially when it came to political relationships and leadership at the top.
7 I also refrained from asking about criminal behavior directly, instead focusing on institutional
8 relationships, everyday practices, and subjective perceptions of the informal transit industry in the
9 state.

10 **Participant observation**

11 Participant observation was especially valuable for understanding the dynamics and routines of
12 informal transport hubs. However, it also presented challenges. I sometimes had to choose between
13 participating in conversations and writing real-time notes, or between observing closely and avoiding
14 drawing attention to myself (already a very obvious outsider). I never concealed my identity if
15 asked or recorded anyone's likeness without their permission, but my presence and purpose may
16 still raise concerns regarding power and reciprocity. I maintained an ongoing dialogue with local
17 contacts as to the nature and locations of my research activities, and allowed myself to be guided
18 by them and by my growing experience in the selection of field sites and the strategies followed
19 once there. More than once I refrained from visiting field sites on the recommendation of Nigerian
20 colleagues.

21 **TOUT data and social networks**

22 My analysis of transport union (TOUT) presence and influence relies on multiple data sources,
23 including public records, newspaper articles, social media and public forums, informal accounts
24 and anecdotes. In mapping the social networks of the actors involved in the transport industry, I
25 took care to focus where possible on those whose names or positions were already in the public

¹ domain. I have refrained from sharing this collection of data, and from publishing or disclosing any
² data that could be used to target individuals or localities, especially geo-referenced data.

³ **High-resolution data**

⁴ Finally, some of my quantitative data sources—most notably Very High Resolution (VHR) satellite
⁵ imagery—present ethical considerations worth mentioning. In this project, I study an industry made
⁶ illicit. My use of VHR imagery allowed me to detect activity patterns in otherwise hard-to-reach (or
⁷ at least hard-to-measure) and sometimes sensitive spaces. However, the power of these data stems
⁸ from the very qualities which give rise to ethical concerns about its use: its precision, permanence,
⁹ and invisibility to those being observed. I have mitigated these by aggregating spatial results to
¹⁰ avoid pinpointing individuals or vehicles, and by avoiding direct identification of informal operators;
¹¹ I have not published or shared any fine-grained geolocated and georeferenced data. I have also
¹² refrained from sharing raw imagery or training data that could be repurposed for enforcement or
¹³ repression. Indeed, sharing raw imagery is prohibited by my access agreement. These decisions
¹⁴ reflect a broader commitment to ensuring that the research does not increase the visibility or
¹⁵ vulnerability of people already under informal or formal surveillance.

¹ B BACKGROUND APPENDIX

² B.1 On forbearance and connivance

³ I conceive of ‘connivance’ as a type of forbearance that is characterized by the intent to foster
⁴ vulnerability in offenders. The 2×2 provided in this paper (Table 1 in Section 1; replicated below
⁵ as Figure B.1) contextualizes connivance (and other varieties of forbearance) within a typology of
⁶ ways state actors may distribute to non-state allies. Holland (2016, Figure 2, 235) also provides
⁷ a 2×2 to elucidate her concept of welfarist forbearance ⁵⁸, focusing on whether law exemptions
⁸ are provided to wealthy individuals, or to poor, and whether the law exemptions are contingent or
⁹ non-contingent (see Figure B.2).

	<i>Direct beneficiary</i>	<i>Indirect beneficiary</i>
<i>Expenditure</i>	Support (i.e., clientelism, bribery)	Burdening (i.e., regulation of competitors)
<i>Withdrawal</i>	Leniency (i.e., concessional forbearance)	Connivance (i.e., coercive forbearance)

¹⁰ Columns describe the ally’s role in transactions, and clarify whether the allocation is targeted towards them (as a direct beneficiary), or towards other actors such as their competitors (making them an indirect beneficiary). Rows characterize the type of inducement provided by the state, whether the strategy involves an extension of resources (expenditure) or a removal of resources (withdrawal).

Figure B.1: Types of state assistance to allies

<i>Mode of Distribution</i>	<i>Economic Incidence</i>	
	Retrogressive	Progressive
Contingent	Corrupt	Clientelistic
Non Contingent	Plutocratic	Welfarist

Figure B.2: Holland (2016, Figure 2, 235)

⁵⁸A similar figure appears in (Holland, 2017, Figure 1.2, 22)

¹ In Table B.1 and in the main text I am not classifying *types* of non-enforcement, but whether the
² intended beneficiary of its distributive gains is the *direct* or *indirect* target of the law exemption.
³ Holland (2017)'s typology assumes the target of the law exemption (for example, squatters) is
⁴ the population the forbearance is intended to benefit, whereas I allow the possibility that a third
⁵ party is the intended beneficiary of the distributive consequences of forbearance. Incomplete
⁶ enforcement of immigration, for example, would to Holland be “progressive” because of whom
⁷ the law exemption applies to. And indeed, if this enforcement pattern was intended to benefit
⁸ undocumented populations themselves, I would consider this example of *leniency* (akin with
⁹ Holland's welfarist forbearance), not connivance. However, this assumes that undocumented
¹⁰ immigrants are the ‘ally’ the state is intending to assist with this policy (in which case they
¹¹ are the direct beneficiary of the withdrawal of state resources). If this incomplete enforcement
¹² were, instead, intended to benefit agricultural employers who exploit undocumented immigrants'
¹³ “illegality” for cheap labor, the distributive winner is not the target of the law, and the relevant
¹⁴ third-party here—agricultural employers—are the indirect beneficiary of *connivance*.

¹⁵ Connivance does not necessitate that exploitation be produced *on behalf of* third-party actors. In
¹⁶ some cases the intended ‘beneficiary’ might be the state itself. However, third-parties are a common
¹⁷ feature of many of examples of connivance, including that examined in the Nigerian transport
¹⁸ industry and in each case outlined in Table 2 in the main text. An Appendix in Holland (2016)
¹⁹ briefly outlines what the author calls ‘economic incidence,’ by which she means the secondary and
²⁰ tertiary reverberations of the initial act of forbearance. I meanwhile make *central* the intentional
²¹ winners of the distributional act of forbearance, taking seriously that ‘economic incidence’ can be
²² central to enforcement, rather than an unintentional if inevitable after-effect.

¹ B.2 Primer on Nigerian and Lagos politics

Table B.1: List of acronyms

APC	All Progressives' Congress
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission (<i>of Nigeria</i>)
LASP&G	Lagos State Parks and Garages
LP	Labour Party
LSG	Lagos State Government
MOALS	Motorcycle Owners and Operators Association of Lagos State
NIC	National Industrial Court (<i>of Nigeria</i>)
NLC	National Labour Congress
NGN	Nigerian Naira
NURTW	National Union of Road and Transport Workers
PDP	People's Democratic Party
RTEAN	Road Transport Employers' Association of Nigeria
TOOAN	Tricycle Owners and Operators Association of Nigeria
TUC	Trade Union Congress

² Nigeria is the 6th most populous country on earth, with more than 230 million people who speak
³ over 500 different languages. It is a weakly institutionalized democracy with high inequality and
⁴ extensive corruption across all levels of government. It features a federal system in which states hold
⁵ immense power, and in which local-level politics often ‘trickle upward,’ making salient overlapping
⁶ regional, ethnic, religious, and linguistic divides. This is especially so between the rural, poorer,
⁷ more populous North—largely Muslim, and Hausa or Fulani—and the richer South, primarily Igbo
⁸ in the Southeast and Yoruba to the Southwest. Though it has a long history of elections, Nigeria’s
⁹ democracy remains exceptionally violent and corrupt. Beyond the high-profile episodes of violence
¹⁰ perpetrated by armed groups, Nigerians also face daily exploitation, coercion, and repression at the
¹¹ hands of non-state actors who use force to exert power and extract profit, permeating everyday life
¹² with extortion and violence. In Nigeria, the advent of democratic institutions has not effectively
¹³ protected the country’s most vulnerable from victimization by such groups.—one that saw over
¹⁴ 3,000 civilians killed in 2024 by myriad rebel groups, communal and political militias, and the


¹ state.⁵⁹

² Nigeria has seen long and varied periods of military rule, oscillating with short-lived democ-
³ racies and brutal civil wars. The current iteration, the Fourth Nigerian Republic, began in 1999.
⁴ Nevertheless, Nigeria's first President to be voted out of office only stepped down in 2015, when
⁵ the All Progressives Congress (APC) unseated the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria's
⁶ first – and so far only – peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party. The APC, at the time a
⁷ newly formed coalition merging several opposition parties and PDP defectors, remains in power to
⁸ this day – led former governor of Lagos Bola Tinubu who was elected president in the most recent
⁹ 2023 general election. President Tinubu was inaugurated two days before my arrival in Lagos for
¹⁰ fieldwork; the 2023 election was the first in the country in which one of the major candidates was
¹¹ *not* a former military ruler.

¹² President Tinubu's reign makes especially evident the key role of Lagos politics in the national
¹³ political scene. President Bola Tinubu is a native Lagosian, and indeed was born to the family of
¹⁴ a traditional leader (chief) of the Yoruba people in Lagos, the *iyálòrún* (a title his daughter now
¹⁵ controversially occupies). Tinubu was governor of Lagos for two terms in the immediate aftermath
¹⁶ of the transition to the fourth republic, and it is thought that he amassed most of his significant
¹⁷ wealth through his near-total control of the state during this time. He has since played the role of
¹⁸ 'kingmaker' or 'godfather' of Lagos politics. Lagos has been firmly in the APC's hands since its
¹⁹ founding (in which Tinubu played a part) and Tinubu has hand-selected every governor of the state
²⁰ since his own rule ended.

²¹ Lagos is both a state and a city; Lagos *state* is broken up into 20 local government areas (LGAs)
²² and 37 local council development areas (LCDAs), while the Lagos metropolitan area encompasses
²³ 13 of these LGAs grouped in the center, generally considered the heart of the *city* of Lagos. In
²⁴ keeping with general colloquialisms, and in the interest of parsimony, my references to Lagos are
²⁵ to the state writ large. Lagos is the commercial and cultural center of Nigeria as well as the most

⁵⁹Analysis conducted by author using ACLED data.



(a) Nigeria, West Africa

(b) (Central) Lagos, Nigeria

Figure B.3: Maps of Nigeria and Lagos

- 1 populous city in the country and the continent, and it is growing daily. Its dominant cultural group is
- 2 Yoruba, with prominent Muslim and Christian contingents, but because of its mega-city status and
- 3 perceived economic opportunity, it attracts settlers from all over Nigeria, and even from elsewhere
- 4 in West Africa. The Governor of Lagos at the time of writing (2025), Sanwo-Olu was—like his
- 5 predecessors before him—likely hand-picked by President Tinubu. He was Tinubu’s selection after
- 6 his direct predecessor Governor Ambode displeased Tinubu during his first term.

1 B.3 Primer on (Transport) Union Politics in Nigeria

2 B.3.1 Unions in Nigeria The right to a union is one that is protected directly by the Nigerian
3 constitution, and members of unions are afforded certain rights and distinctions under Nigerian law:
4 for example, union disputes are settled in the National Industrial Court (NIC) of Nigeria. Today,
5 there are two broad ‘umbrella’ unions in the country: the National Labour Congress (NLC) which
6 generally represents *employees* across industries, and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) which
7 generally represents *employers* across industries.

8 Unions began to emerge as formidable political players in Nigeria during industrialization in the
9 first half of the 20th century and played a large role in Nigeria’s successful bid for independence
10 from the British in 1960 (Sokunbi, Jeminiwa and Onaeko, 1996; Adewumi, 1997). In the period
11 between decolonization and the adoption of its current system in 1999, Nigeria oscillated between
12 military rule and short-lived democratic projects. Because of a concerted effort by both the British
13 and by post-independence regimes to repress, reorganize, and split unions among ethnic lines—and
14 because regional divisions overlap significantly with occupational patterns—the landscape of
15 labor and sociocultural organizations in Nigeria is dense and highly localized (Adewumi, 1997;
16 Sokunbi, Jeminiwa and Onaeko, 1996). Especially after the advent of presidential federalism in
17 1978, individual chapters, informal community-based advocacy networks, and breakaway factions
18 established varying levels of presence and power across Nigeria’s highly disparate regions. And
19 a perhaps surprising number of these organizations act not only as advocates for their members’
20 interests in bargains with employers and with the state, but also as what we might call ‘violence
21 entrepreneurs;’ non-state brokers who use and sell violence, extortion, or exploitation to achieve
22 political and economic ends.⁶⁰

23 Literature on trade union activism in developing democracies largely focuses on the combative

⁶⁰For example, the infamous Bakassi boys of Southeast Nigeria, eventually a militia group wanted for mass extrajudicial killings, was originally organized by the Shoemakers Industrial Union as a means of protecting Ariaria Market in Aba from criminal elements (Ukiwo, 2002).

1 and repressive relationship between the government and trade unions (Dean, 2022); or on state
2 infiltration into unions as a form of political control (Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent, 2022). While
3 umbrella unions in Nigeria often call general strikes or publicly protest against government policies
4 at the national level, this paper illuminates how localized factions of labor unions can also act as
5 strategic partners to local parties, often in open defiance to parent labor organizations.

6 **B.3.2 The Transport Unions of the Southwest** The transport unions of Lagos have been
7 powerful political players for half a century, organizations older than Nigeria's current republic.
8 Transportation in Lagos for many years was a public enterprise run by the Lagos State Transport
9 Corporation (LSTC), begun in 1958. Today, there are two major transport unions, each affiliated with
10 one of the umbrella labor organizations of Nigeria. The first is the National Union of Transport and
11 Road Workers (NURTW) associated with the NLC, and the second is the Road Transport Employers'
12 Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) associated with the TUC. Both are national unions with state
13 chapters across the country, especially in the southwest, and *especially* in Lagos. NURTW⁶¹ and
14 RTEAN Lagos state chapters coexist, but their operations are not divvied up as might be suggested
15 by their umbrella organization. Their membership pools are rather idiosyncratically assigned;
16 sometimes based on this division, sometimes based on location. The transport unions are rigorously
17 hierarchical: Figures B.4 and B.5 show stylized organizational charts of the unions and within state
18 chapters.

19 **B.4 Union-state relations and elections**

20 The transport unions are highly involved in [politics and elections in Lagos. They engage
21 in widespread electoral interference, by which I mean a combination of strategies which include
22 violence (e.g., beating members of opposition parties) physical intimidation (e.g., standing outside
23 voting places) verbal intimidation (e.g. telling Igbo voters not to come out to vote), ballot-box
24 snatching, ballot-box stuffing, and also pure mobilization efforts such as rallies in the lead-up to

⁶¹The more powerful of these unions tends to be NURTW, and when I say 'the union,' I refer to the Lagos branch of NURTW.




Figure B.4: Transport union organizational chart

- 1 elections, and encouraging (and insisting) that members vote for a particular candidate. Internal
 2 factions of the union are united with different factions of the APC. These alliances often produce
 3 assassinations and violence, as described in the main text.
- 4 The union is by no means the only organization, either in civil society or in the universe of
 5 violence entrepreneurs, that assist the APC in mobilization in Lagos. Some of the power of the
 6 transport union in particular stems from the fact that it is both. Excellent work by Turnbull (2021)
 7 speaks to other violent militias who undertake election violence in Nigeria generally and Lagos
 8 in particular. The association of market women and other types of organizations are also highly
 9 involved in advocating for Tinubu in Lagos. Currently the head of this organization is Tinubu's
 10 daughter. It is difficult to know who was fully to blame among the groups that worked to secure a
 11 win for Bola Tinubu in Lagos. It is possible that other steps were taken to address failures by other
 12 organizations in Lagos. This is beyond the scope of this paper, but is an important lane of further
 13 inquiry.




Figure B.5: Union chapter organizational chart. Each Union chapter is led by a chairman, who resides over zonal chairmen of both the parent organization (NURTW) and sub-unions (TOOAN, MOALS). Zonal chairmen exert authority over ‘area’ chairmen, and area chairmen over ‘unit’ chairmen, who rule a particular junction, intersection, or park.

1 B.5 Okada and bans within and beyond Lagos

2 B.5.1 Okada riding and riders Okada riders in Lagos are often from the north of the country.

3 After the ban's enforcement was announced, a Hausa⁶² leader in Lagos threatened that the APC
4 might lose the Hausa vote after the ban; but the low official reports of Hausa populations in Lagos
5 mean that this population is likely underrepresented among voting Lagosians.

6 Okada are often viewed with hostility by Lagosians and associated with crime in general, and
7 sometimes jihadist violence in the north. In the recent 2023 election, it was big news when one
8 newly elected member of the parliament admitted during his campaign that he had at one point been
9 'an okada man.' Many Lagosians I spoke to claimed that the okada riders are "not even Nigerians,"
10 but foreigners from Niger and the Sahel who fled past Nigeria's porous borders to make their way
11 to Lagos.⁶³ It is all but impossible to verify this claim. Nevertheless, its omnipresence speaks to the
12 general disdain the riders face from the population they serve.

13 Typically, okada operators do not own the bikes they ride, but instead borrow in exchange for a
14 portion of their daily earnings. The various fees associated with moving throughout the city mean
15 that okada riders make a meager living, and are offered no social protection or security. In general,
16 their wages by the end of the day will last them only that day.⁶⁴

17 B.5.2 Banning okada Okada bans are not unique to Lagos; other states in Nigeria have adopted
18 or considered adopting similar bans. Okada bans began in the north, as motorbikes were a key
19 means of transport for early members of Boko Haram. This association is part of the reason okada
20 riders in the South are sometimes associated with the group. Okada bans have been experimented
21 with in Lagos in particular multiple times. The most recent ban was enacted by Lagos Governor
22 Ambode in 2018 as part of his ambitious transport sector reform law pursued in order to regain state

⁶²As detailed earlier, Hausa is one of the main ethnicities of individuals in Northern Nigeria in particular, along with Fulani. Many transport operators in general, and okada riders in particular, are Hausa or Fulani and come from the North of the country.

⁶³Interviews with author; including on June 14, 2023

⁶⁴Interviews with author, including July 7, 2023

¹ control of the industry after union assassinations disrupted the city for several days.

² The current ban being enforced is this 2018 ban. However, not all areas covered by the original
³ ban are being enforced. See Figure B.6 for examples of ITE areas for the current ban.

Examples of enforced areas announced by Lagos State Government 2022

Agege Motor Road/Oshodi Loop, Oshodi, Ikeja/Mushin Local Government
Mushin/Isolo Link Bridge, Mushin Oshodi Local Government
Dorman Long Bridge Surulere/Lagos Mainland Local Government
Ojuelegba Bridge, Surulere/Lagos Mainland Local Government
National Stadium Flyover, Surulere Local Government
Iganmu/Funsho Williams Bridge Surulere Local Government

Figure B.6: Selection of ITE areas

C DATA APPENDIX

C.1 Transport Operators Union Tracking (TOUT) data

3 Searching online archives of mostly English-language Nigerian daily newspapers over the past
4 decades, as well as social media content, official press releases and documents, and other archival
5 and primary material; I collect over 2,500 articles and reports regarding the politics of the Union
6 and its allies, and hundreds more pieces of primary material and documentary evidence. Using
7 these sources, I build a localized event and network dataset for Lagos, which combines and links
8 information on hundreds of relevant actors, places, and events, covering both recent internal political
9 dynamics of the union and events such as passage and enforcement of the okada ban, protests by
10 vehicle operators, battles between rival union factions, and interpersonal rivalries and relationships.
11 These data allow me to analyze trends in the political dynamics between the union, the Lagos State
12 Government, and informal commercial transport operators qualitatively.

13 A number of major newspapers, especially Nigerian dailies, were used in the construction
14 of this dataset. These include (but are not limited to): *PM News*, *This Day*, *Daily Independent*,
15 *The Nation*, *The Will*, *The Punch*, *The Nation*, *Nigerian Tribune*, *Weekly Trust*, *International*
16 *Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR)*, *Naija News*, *Daily Post*, *Times Watch*, *The Guardian*,
17 *Sahara Reporters*, *TBI Africa*, *The Independent*, *The Premium Times*, *Peoples Gazette*, *Foundation*
18 *for Investigative Journalism*, *Vanguard*, *The Daily Trust*, *News Agency of Nigeria*, *The Guild*,
19 *British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)*, and *Echo News*. A selection of old newspapers before
20 their digital publication were accessed via <https://archivi.ng/>, a non-profit dedicated to
21 digitizing Nigerian newspapers. Many sources were obtained through targeted boolean searches on
22 LexisNexis.⁶⁵ Others were provided by interview subjects or obtained during fieldwork, such as
23 videos or photographs of union attacks on transport operators, or tickets provided to operators from
24 the union. I also obtained some data from social media posts by both the union's official social

⁶⁵E.g., “lagos” AND “okada” OR “motorbike” OR “motorcycle”




Figure C.1: A section of the networked TOUT dataset. Yellow dots represent events; blue places; red people; and white, groups.

- ¹ media channels and from Union leadership; including through occasional live-streamed meetings
- ² and ceremonies for which I was in (virtual) attendance.

C.2 Interviews and fieldwork data

Qualitative interviews about the political geography of Lagos lend sharp focus to the data described in the main text. Beyond that, interviews allow me to ask affected actors directly about their preferences, concerns, and perceptions surrounding the ban and traffic politics in Lagos in general. Interviews come from directly contacting relevant individuals via email, WhatsApp, and other means; as well as from interacting with individuals over the course of their day-to-day life. My time in Lagos yielded hundreds of anecdotes and observations, as well as informal conversations with scores of individuals affected by the okada ban and transport issues more broadly in Lagos, from commuters at bus stops to traffic enforcement officials at intersections.

Many of my most meaningful conversations were with drivers as we were in transit, whether to the local supermarket or to a far-flung motorpark. My sampling strategy for participant observation was partly based on convenience—where I believed I could safely go, or had a connection—but purposefully spanned the entire geography of Lagos, from the northern border with Ogun state, to the marina on the Gulf of Guinea, and from Ikorodu in the far northeast of the city to Badagry in the far southwest.

¹ **C.3 Remote-sensed data**

² **C.3.1 Imagery details** I purchased VHR satellite images as listed in Table C.1.

Image	Area	Satellite	Date
1	Area 1	WV3	2022-06-13
2	Area 1	WV3	2023-03-24
3	Area 1	WV2 HD	2023-01-04
4	Area 1	PNEO	2023-12-18
5	Area 1	WV3	2022-04-30
6	Area 1	WV3	2021-05-23
7	Area 2	WV2 HD	2023-02-2
8	Area 2	WV3	2023-03-24
9	Area 2	WV3	2023-03-17
10	Area 2	PNEO	2022-06-02
11	Area 2	WV3	2021-05-23
12	Area 2	PNEO	2023-12-13
13	Area 2	PNEO	2023-06-25
14	Area 2	PNEO	2023-04-20

Table C.1: Satellite images obtained (as of August 2025). Eight additional images are pending processing and analysis.

³ The majority of the images are less than 5% obscured by cloud cover; a few outlier images have
⁴ higher cloud cover. These images are included, despite some missing data, because of other key
⁵ features such as the date they were collected. In analyses, I drop any road segments where there
⁶ is significant cloud cover. All images have 30cm spatial resolution either at baseline or after HD
⁷ enhancement.

⁸ **C.3.2 Manual coding procedure** Counting motorcycles on the road is a challenging exercise.
⁹ There are several things I do to make sure that, in initial manual coding, we limit both ‘Type I’ and
¹⁰ ‘Type II’ errors in identification.

¹¹ First, okada are on the roads and just off them, limiting the coding scope to only to road segments
¹² rather than the whole image. Moreover, the size of the features is key. The typical motorcycle
¹³ in Nigeria measures measures 2-3m long. Given that the images pictured are 30cm per pixel,

1 the okada objects are roughly 6 pixels long. This distinguishes okada from other ‘dots on the
2 road.’ Additionally, other vehicles in the motorpark are all larger and more easily identified. The
3 comparison helps clarify which features are indeed okada as opposed to other modes of informal
4 transit potentially located in the same area.

5 Additionally, fieldwork participant observation provided me with on-the-ground information
6 about how okada riders position themselves around the road network, and where in specific areas
7 the ‘okada zone’ is. Okada often form distinctive ‘clumps’ in particular areas of the road, including
8 along highway dividers and at intersections. These qualities help distinguish features that are
9 likely okada during manual coding, from other features likely not okada. Okada also are common
10 around areas with other types of informal transport, such as minibuses and keke, which are easier
11 to spot—being larger, and bright yellow. I use this hand-coded dataset to train a computer vision
12 model to conduct object-based image recognition of motorcycles in the rest of the images.

13 **C.3.3 Computer vision** I adapt a computer vision model to recognize features as okada
14 automatically based on the training set manually coded above.

15 First, I take my road network dataset, which as described in Section 5 consists of Open Street
16 Map data separated into road segments according to junctions in the road. I ‘buffer’ this line data
17 into polygons, meaning that each road segment ‘edge’ becomes a polygon which spans five meters
18 out each side of the road. This represents a pre-processing segmentation step, to avoid difficulties
19 that can arise from models incorrectly placing okada on areas that are not roads. Because okada
20 are so small and coding them is such a context-dependent procedure—they look at first glance
21 like ants on the road—this step is necessary for ensuring that other similar shapes in the satellite
22 imagery are not falsely coded as okada despite not being on road segments. I then overlay these
23 polygons on satellite imagery. Purchased satellite imagery are in ‘raster’ format, meaning they are
24 detailed geo-coded mosaic images with several ‘bands’ merged together to create an image. I take
25 these images and split them into smaller individual images, each associated with a specific road
26 segment. These steps are all done in ArcGIS with ArcPy python code. Each of these individual

¹ images represent then a (literal) snapshot of a particular road segment on the date the satellite image
² was taken.

³ Second, using Label Studio, an open-source image annotation software, I manually circle okada
⁴ on a sample of the road segments collected. I use this manually coded sample to train a detectron2
⁵ model to code the rest of the road segment images for that date. Because each satellite image
⁶ has different qualities, including different times, reflectance, and resolution, images have slightly
⁷ different qualities which may affect the model's ability to interpret the image. All satellite analysis
⁸ includes image/date fixed effects to account for any differences that arise in this regard. .

¹ **C.4 Road network data**

² **C.4.1 Constructing the road network** I take data from Open Street Maps (OSM) open
³ source geospatial road data, and transform these data into a road network.⁶⁶ OSM data provide
⁴ information on the geography of roads of all types – from major highways to tertiary trails and
⁵ footpaths – in the form of spatial files of polyline data, one line (row) for each road. OSM also
⁶ provides information about each road, including classifications according to road type (primary,
⁷ footway, path, motorway, etc.), road name, and other characteristics, including whether the road is a
⁸ tunnel or a bridge, and whether traffic is bidirectional or one-way.


⁹ I utilize these latter three characteristics in particular to construct a spatial road network.⁶⁷
¹⁰ Namely, I abstract the map of roads in Lagos into a network of edges, representing the roads
¹¹ themselves, which are connected by nodes – in this case, placeholders for intersections and the ends
¹² and beginnings of particular streets. The network is determined entirely by geospatial characteristics:
¹³ that is, the length of a road ‘edge’ between two intersection ‘nodes’ is simply the length of the road.
¹⁴ Figure C.2 illustrates this process of segmenting the Lagos road network into edges and nodes.

¹⁵ However, the process of transforming OSM data into a network requires several discrete steps.
¹⁶ Simply taking OSM data as they are and segmenting each road, at every place where they intersect
¹⁷ or overlap, is insufficient. To see why, Figure C.3a shows this same 10km² OSM data displayed in
¹⁸ Figure C.2, overlaid on a graphical representation of this road network. For the sake of clarity, the
¹⁹ second image zooms in further, to one particular intersection in mainland Lagos.

²⁰ A naive division of the road data into edges and nodes would split roads at every location they

⁶⁶The building process is adapted from Karduni, Kermanshah and Derrible (2016)’s protocol in ArcGIS which creates an arc.py network dataset based on OSM street data.

⁶⁷By ‘road network,’ I mean an abstraction of the road polylines into ‘edges,’ connected to each other through ‘nodes.’ In a traditional network (or ‘graph’) set-up, nodes are objects of interest – for example, members of a community – and edges are connections between nodes – for example, relationships between community members. Both nodes and edges have characteristics which can be analyzed. For example, the edge between the nodes representing a parent *A* and child *B* might be short, indicating a very close relationship; while the edge between *A* and the local banker *C* might be longer, indicating a more distant connection. Nodes can also be connected to each other through other nodes; that is, the relationship between *A* and a second cousin *D* passes through another node: a shared great grandparent. Of course, networks are not always between people, and in what follows, the network I construct and examine is a spatial one.



(a) Road data, features abstracted, containing a multitude of separate roads connected through intersections.

(b) This same road data, where separate roads are differently colored. Each separate road segment represents an ‘edge’.


(c) This same road data where ‘nodes’ are added for each location where edges start, end, or intersect with each other.

Figure C.2: Random selection of OSM road data in Lagos, Nigeria (roughly 10km²), through the process of being constructed into a road network.


1 intersect with other roads. Figure C.3b shows the results of such a naive division, with nodes drawn
 2 in blue. Such a division presents problems for analysis (Karduni, Kermanshah and Derrible, 2016).
 3 For example, take the node drawn furthest to top the top of the figure, drawn at the intersection
 4 between the yellow road and the red road. If abstracted into a network, the creation of this node
 5 would artificially create a connection between the red and yellow roads at this point, allowing travel
 6 on the network directly from the yellow road to the red road at this points. Figure C.3c shows this
 7 example, where the black line with arrows demonstrates how a traveler along the network could
 8 move between the roads at this node. In reality, a traveler along the network could not pursue
 9 the route represented in C.3c without jumping off the yellow bridge, and onto the red road below.
 10 This node therefore falsely creates a direct path between these roads when in fact, none exist. In
 11 reality, a traveler would have to take a much more roundabout route in order to move from this
 12 node on the yellow bridge, to the red road below. C.3d ×s out these types of nodes, which are
 13 inappropriately created at several points. As such, transforming OSM data into a road network
 14 requires differentiating between genuine intersections in which roads are connected to each other,
 15 and ‘false’ intersections. Like Karduni, Kermanshah and Derrible (2016) I separate OSM data
 16 according to road classifications as bridges and tunnels. I then transform each class of road into
 17 nodes and edges separately, before combining (based on OSM locally-constructed ‘layer’ data to




(a) Lagos roads with OSM basemap, zoomed in to one intersection.



(b) Roads marked with where they intersect other roads (marked with blue dots)



(c) Example route if considering all intersections (blue dots) as ‘nodes’ in the road network



(d) Intersections (blue dots) xed out if they should not be considered ‘nodes’ in the road network.

Figure C.3: Combining roads into a network

- ¹ ensure only genuine intersections) into one interconnected network dataset, resulting in a network
- ² which does not include such ‘false intersections.’
- ³ I also take into account one-way streets. Networks can be either ‘directed’ or ‘undirected’:
- ⁴ ‘Undirected’ networks imply that edges between nodes operate in both directions, and that a traveler
- ⁵ along the network can move from point A to point B via the same route as from point B to point
- ⁶ A, while ‘directed’ networks imply that each edge has a start node and an end node, and cannot
- ⁷ be traversed in the opposite direction. Road networks are by their nature, complex, containing
- ⁸ both directed edges (namely, one-way streets) and undirected (two-way). I take this complexity

1 into account by duplicating all edges that represent two-way streets, reversing start and end nodes,
 2 allowing for the creation of a ‘directed’ graph in which bidirectional travel is allowed for two-way
 3 roads through the creation of pairs of edges.

4 **C.4.2 Road network randomization** My measurement strategy calculates the change in routes
 5 along the road network between pairs of points before and after the okada ban, if simulating shortest
 6 distances between these points. I propose that the ban will displace riders from non-motorpark
 7 areas to motorparks, as well as curtail freedom of movement generally and increase the cost of the
 8 average ride. I pursue measurement in several steps.

9 The first step is to establish baseline routes undertaken by okada riders before the ban. To this
 10 end, I select a random pair of discrete points from a uniform distribution along the road network,
 11 simply meaning that every point on the road network has equal chance of being selected. This initial
 12 uniform distribution assumption is not necessarily problematic; indeed, one of the points of okada is
 13 that they were commonly available all over the city to go all sorts of distances. However, additional
 14 sets of simulations relax this uniformity assumption in order to more closely mimic actual traffic
 15 and travel throughout Lagos (see SI §

16 These points represent a potential ‘start point’ (i) and ‘end point’ (k) of an okada’s journey,
 17 between which okada riders may be hired to take passengers. I utilize network analysis tools to
 18 evaluate the shortest path⁶⁸ that can be taken between each of these start and end points for an okada
 19 rider along the road network. I calculate the *cost* of each route, a function of both the length in
 20 meters of the route, and the number of motorparks passed, as demonstrated below in Equation (1):

$$(1) \quad \text{Cost}_{i,k}^{pre} = \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}_{i,k}} \left(\sum_{e \in P} \ell(e) \times r + \sum_{e \in P \cap m} f \right)$$

21 Here, $\text{Cost}_{i,k}$ is the cost of traversing from point i to point k and $\mathcal{P}_{i,k}$ represents the set of all
 22 possible paths between point i and point k , where each path \mathcal{P} is made up of multiple edges e . $\ell(e)$

⁶⁸Specifically, I use `shortest_paths` and `distances` functions from R package `igraph`.

1 is the length, in meters, of a given edge. Simply, the formula clarifies that the *cost* of a journey
 2 from point i to point k on the road network is the path which minimizes the length of the edges
 3 traversed. An assumption here is that the cost to an okada rider of a particular route determined
 4 by how far they have to travel along the road network. This cost-per-kilometer is represented
 5 by ‘rate’ variable r . If $e \in m$, this simply means that that edge houses a motorpark. For every
 6 edge which passes a motorpark in a given path P , an extra cost is incurred represented by ‘fee’
 7 variable f . Based on extensive interviews with okada riders, as well as rides on okada, I estimate
 8 the approximate cost-per-kilometer traveled r at NGN (₦) 100. As of 23 April 2023 the exchange
 9 rate was approximately NGN 1,282.00 to USD 1.00. While the price of tickets f also vary over
 10 time, interviews suggest they seem to hover around NGN 500 per motorpark. This allows me to
 11 take into account the incentive okada riders have to avoid passage through motorparks, even if they
 12 lie on the shortest possible route between points.

13 The second step of my analysis takes explicit account of the okada ban. I rerun shortest distance
 14 calculations between these same random points i and k ; however this time I account for areas which
 15 are enforced during the course of the ban. Equation (2) simply states that in calculating the shortest
 16 possible path between points i, k after the ban, I discard paths in which any edges e are in the set b ,
 17 where b is enforced areas ($e \notin b$).

$$(2) \quad \text{Cost}_{i,k}^{post} = \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}_{i,k}} \left\{ \left(\sum_{e \in P} \ell(e) \times r + \sum_{e \in P \cap m} f \right) : e \notin b \forall e \in P \right\}$$

18 Finally, I count the number of motorparks passed for each route i, k as demonstrated in (3).

$$(3) \quad \text{Count}_{i,k}^{pre(post)}(m) = \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}_{i,k}} \left(\sum_{e \in P \cap m} 1 \right)$$

19 I conduct the above analysis across 30,000 simulated routes between different start and end
 20 points on the road network of Lagos, which allows me to compare several telling route characteristics
 21 between the period prior to and after the okada ban enforcement. Most simply, I can calculate

¹ the cost of the okada ban for riders, represented by (4), by simply taking the difference between
² the costs after the ban and the costs before the ban. This takes into account both the extra cost
³ of additional motorpark tickets incurred by riders, and the extra mileage required to circumvent
⁴ enforced areas.

$$(4) \quad \text{Cost of Okada Ban} = \sum_{i,k} \left(\text{Cost}_{i,k}^{post} - \text{Cost}_{i,k}^{pre} \right)$$

⁵ More precisely related to my hypothesis, I calculate the difference in the number of motorparks
⁶ passed post-ban from pre-ban (Equation (5)), as well as the share of all shortest routes between all
⁷ points i, k that pass at least one motorpark before and after the ban enforcement (Equation (6)).

$$(5) \quad \text{Difference in motorparks passed after ban}_m = \sum_{i,k} \left(\text{Count}_{i,k}^{post}(m) - \text{Count}_{i,k}^{pre}(m) \right)$$

$$(6) \quad \text{Prop}^{pre(post)} = \frac{\sum_{i,k} \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}_{i,k}} (\mathbf{1}_{\{|P \cap m| > 0\}})}{\sum_{i,k} 1}$$

⁸ I also provide additional descriptive statistics, including the number of routes displaced entirely
⁹ by ban enforcement (i.e., a start and end point which one cannot travel between without passing an
¹⁰ enforced area), and geographic displacement of riders.

¹¹ **C.4.3 Constructing counterfactuals** I complete these simulations using the actual locations
¹² of the okada ban, allowing me to compute the ultimate effects of selective enforcement on okada
¹³ rider welfare and union profit. However, these results do not necessarily imply that the areas of
¹⁴ okada ban enforcement were selected *in order to* benefit the union; it is possible that any positive
¹⁵ results for the union are an incidental consequence of enforcement locations that were chosen
¹⁶ for other reasons. Along with other tests for possible alternative explanations, I guard against
¹⁷ this possibility by re-running this road network analysis, substituting for actual enforcement areas
¹⁸ *hypothetical* possible locations of enforcement.

1 More precisely, I select (for each iteration) the top 50 areas on the road network in which the
2 okada ban could have been – but was not – enforced. I then re-run the above analysis *as if* these areas
3 were those enforced, in order to see whether other areas of enforcement result in the same effects on
4 okada riders. This allows me to calculate whether the areas in which the ban was *actually* enforced
5 *uniquely* benefit the union, compared to other hypothetical enforcement areas. This approach is
6 analogous to one of ‘randomization inference,’ in which hypothetical treatment assignments are
7 systematically shuffled among all units in a study to robustly assess the causal impact of the actual
8 treatment. This technique helps in isolating the unique contribution of the treatment by comparing
9 outcomes under real and randomized enforcement scenarios, thereby enhancing the validity of the
10 inferences drawn from the analysis.

11 One valid concern is whether this exercise—a complicated technical endeavor—is really
12 representative of the decision-making process of state agents when working through the okada
13 ban. Certainly I do not expect that lawmakers utilized this exact method to decide where to
14 enforce the ban. Indeed; I do not even claim that such considerations were the *only* reasons for the
15 particular areas chosen by the state. And despite my interviews with state agents and transportation
16 officials, I do not have ‘smoking gun’ evidence from individuals involved that this was the logic
17 they followed—nor did I expect to receive such confirmation, even from officials speaking to me
18 off the record. Such a statement would be tantamount to admitting the power the Union holds over
19 operational decision-making by the state. Instead, my contention is that state agents considered a
20 variety of factors, including the presence of motorparks, in deciding where and where not to enforce
21 the okada ban. It also doesn’t take as much computational power to construct enforcement patterns
22 that have this effect as one might expect. Most motorparks are located off highways, including
23 underneath major bridges and intersections, on parallel thoroughfares and following off-ramps from
24 major roads. Banning okada primarily on a given bridge, for example, which has a motorpark
25 beneath it, will obviously push riders from that bridge to the parallel side-street on which motorparks
26 are located.

1 C.5 Additional datasets

2 **C.5.1 Polling-unit level election data** I use a sample of polling-unit level election results
 3 from the 2023 Presidential and Gubernatorial elections in Lagos to show how the Union increased
 4 election interference after facing its dissatisfied patron; resulting in differentially higher vote shares
 5 for the APC during the Gubernatorial election in areas closest to Union territory.

6 Election results in Nigeria are collated by the Independent National Electoral Commission
 7 (INEC). The 2023 elections introduced new technology to that data collation process. In particular,
 8 INEC introduced a system by which individual polling stations (of which there are only 13,000 in
 9 Lagos alone) could upload signed PDFs of the final vote tallies for that polling station, which were
 10 read in using OCR and collated automatically.

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT 2023 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION		
S/N: PE/005597 FORM EC 8A		
State	LAGOS	
Local Government Area	IBEAULEKKI	
Registration Area	IBEJU I	
Polling Unit	PREMISES OF CPS. IBA OLOJA II	
	Code 0 2 4	
	Code 0 9	
	Code 0 1	
	Code 0 1 0	
1. Number of Voters on the Register	339	
2. Number of Accredited Voters	348	
3. Number of Ballot Papers issued to the Polling Units	348	
4. Number of Used Ballot Papers	347	
5. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	0	
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	0	
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	59	
8. Total Number of Used Ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	64	
S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES IN WORDS
1	A	0 Zero
2	AA	0 Zero
3	AAC	0 Zero
4	ADC	0 Zero
5	ADP	0 Zero
6	APC	57 Fifty Seven
7	APGA	0 Zero
8	APM	0 Zero
9	APP	0 Zero
10	BP	0 Zero
11	LP	0 Zero
12	NNPP	0 Zero
13	NRM	0 Zero
14	POP	2 Two
15	PRP	0 Zero
16	SDP	0 Zero
17	YPP	0 Zero
18	ZLP	0 Zero
TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)		59 Fifty Nine
I, <u>Akoko Agbada</u> (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED		
Sign/Stamp of Presiding Officer		
Date: Sat 25/12/23		

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT 2023 GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION		
S/N: 4040 FORM EC 8A		
State	LAGOS	
Local Government Area	BADAGRY	
Registration Area	AWHANJIGOH	
Polling Unit	LOCAL AUTHORITY PRY. SCHOOL BADAGRY I	
	Code 0 2 4	
	Code 0 6	
	Code 0 2	
	Code 0 1 1	
1. Number of Voters on the Register	109	
2. Number of Accredited Voters	144	
3. Number of Ballot Papers issued to the Polling Unit	600	
4. Number of Used Ballot Papers	456	
5. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	0	
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	0	
7. Number of Total Valid Voter (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	144	
8. Total Number of Used Ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	144	
S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES IN WORDS
1	A	
2	AA	
3	AAC	
4	ADC	
5	ADP	
6	APC	119 One hundred and nineteen
7	APM	1 One
8	APP	
9	BP	
10	LP	7 Seven
11	NNPP	
12	NRM	
13	POP	
14	PRP	
15	SDP	
16	YPP	
17	ZLP	
TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)		144 One hundred and forty four
I, <u>AKOKO Agbada</u> (Name of presiding officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this Polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED		
Sign/Stamp of Presiding Officer		
Date: 25/12/23		

Figure C.4: Example of polling unit-level results

11 These original PDF receipts were accessible to the public and to INEC commissioners. As

1 with any new technological rollout, there were extensive issues during the Presidential election in
2 January 2023 and afterwards, and all polling-unit result reports have been sine rendered publicly
3 inaccessible on INEC's website. Election observers and eager citizens did a great deal of work
4 in the aftermath of the Presidential election in January to collate polling-unit observations for the
5 election; and in many previously uploaded polling-unit level PDFs are available through internet
6 archives.

7 However, polling unit-level data on Lagos governorship election, which took place on March
8 18 2023, are more difficult to access comprehensively. While some images appear to have been
9 captured by web crawlers from original uploads, no systematic collection seems to exist. I therefore
10 resort to idiosyncratic collection of governorship election results for those polling units I can find
11 online. This includes collection through internet archives, cached pages, old news reports, and
12 social media for any images portraying polling-unit level results. I find polling unit level results for
13 roughly 150 polling units , across every local government area in Lagos and almost 70 separate
14 voting wards. I compare these to the polling-unit level results from the Presidential race a month
15 earlier. I add polling station information (and results) to the Lagos road network dataset described
16 above.

17 **C.5.2 Twitter traffic data** These are real-time reports on traffic incidents and actor presence
18 through geo-coded text from the tweets of Lagos Traffic Radio, 96.1 FM in the Lagos metropolitan
19 area. The station began broadcasting in 2012—the first radio station of its kind in West Africa—with
20 the intention of alleviating heavy road congestion and expanding access to traffic updates to
21 commuters across the state. As of 2020, the station began utilizing a Twitter handle in which it
22 tweeted dozens of times per day with specific information about traffic, impediments, and presence
23 on Lagos roadways.⁶⁹ I scraped this data to create a universe of traffic-related incidents and reports
24 on Lagos roadways from 2020 through 2023. I match phrases and terms in these time-stamped
25 tweets with geo-located features and roads in Lagos. These data also provide a way to measure which

⁶⁹See <https://x.com/lagostraffic961?lang=en>

¹ roads and areas are most densely frequented by commuters, and other tweet-level information—such
² as reporting an accident involving okada riders—provides information on actor presence across the
³ Lagos road network.

⁴ **C.5.3 Income levels** Income levels are approximated using remote-sensed nightlight data. I
⁵ use the VIIRS (Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite) nighttime lights dataset, produced by
⁶ the Earth Observation Group at NOAA/NGDC. These data provide monthly composites of light
⁷ intensity at the 15 arc-second (approx. 500m) grid-cell level, which are widely used as a proxy for
⁸ local economic activity and household income. See https://eogdata.mines.edu/nighttime_light/.

¹⁰ **C.5.4 Pollution** Pollution is measured at the $0.25^\circ \times 0.25^\circ$ grid-cell level using NASA's
¹¹ Global Annual PM_{2.5} Surface dataset, which provides satellite-derived estimates of fine particulate
¹² matter concentrations worldwide. These data combine remote sensing with chemical transport
¹³ models and ground-based observations. See <https://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/sdei-global-annual-gwr-pm2-5-modis-misr-seawifs-aod>.

¹⁵ **C.5.5 Okada density** Pre-enforcement okada density is measured by averaging the presence
¹⁶ of okada (motorcycle taxis) per road segment in Lagos before the ban. Counts are derived from very
¹⁷ high-resolution (VHR) satellite imagery (e.g., Airbus Pleiades Neo, Maxar WorldView-3). These
¹⁸ are measured at the road-segment level along Lagos' network. These data are described in detail
¹⁹ in SI §C.3.

²⁰ **C.5.6 Informality** I use Google Street View data to measure informal markets along Lagos
²¹ roadways as a proxy for local informality. Street View provides ground-level panoramic images
²² collected by Google mapping vehicles. Coverage in Lagos is incomplete and temporally uneven, but
²³ many areas have imagery across multiple years. I train a computer vision model to detect informal
²⁴ marketplaces, roadside stands, and transport activity from these images. There are advantages and
²⁵ disadvantages to Streetview data as a source. For one, Streetview requires Google staff to drive

¹ a car with a camera down every road, recording panorama images as it goes. This requires that
² Google's vehicle can make it down the road; and that conditions are such that this is reasonably
³ possible. This eliminates some roads non-randomly from the sample; namely those which are
⁴ smaller, in worse repair, or peripheral. Moreover, in part due to these restrictive scope conditions,
⁵ Google Streetview routes are not recorded often. Most locations in Lagos have at least two or three
⁶ images associated from them, as much as ten years apart. While the data is rich in terms of spatial
⁷ granularity; it is sparse temporally. What Streetview fails to provide in terms of comprehensiveness,
⁸ it makes up for in the richness of data it can provide at a hyper-granular spatial unit of analysis.
⁹ See <https://www.google.com/streetview/>.

¹⁰ **C.5.7 Political violence** Political violence data come from the Armed Conflict Location &
¹¹ Event Data Project (ACLED). I use the Nigeria country file, subset to events with precise geographic
¹² coordinates. I include all types of political violence and protest, aggregated to the $0.25^\circ \times 0.25^\circ$
¹³ grid-cell level over time. See <https://acleddata.com/>.

¹⁴ **C.5.8 Police Stations** Geolocated data on police stations are sourced from OpenStreetMapâ's
¹⁵ "Points of Interest" (POI) dataset. These data include tagged facilities such as police stations and
¹⁶ posts, measured at the facility level with lat/long coordinates. See <https://www.openstreetmap.org/>.

¹⁸ **C.5.9 Schools** Geolocated data on schools come from the World Bank's Nigeria
¹⁹ Education Management Information System (EMIS) and harmonized global datasets such
²⁰ as the Global Education Facilities (GED) database hosted by the Humanitarian Data
²¹ Exchange. These provide lat/long coordinates of primary and secondary schools across
²² Nigeria. See <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0039597> and
²³ <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/global-school-locations>.

¹ D ANALYSIS APPENDIX

² D.1 Characteristics and Correlations

³ Figure D.1 shows correlations between road segment characteristics. All correlations are close to
⁴ zero, indicating weak *linear* relationships between variables.



Figure D.1: Correlations between road segment characteristics




Figure D.2: Coefficients of random effects OLS models regressing variable (Y-axis) on either Motorpark presence (red) or classification as an ITE area (blue). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

D.2 Enforcement analysis

D.2.1 Covariate interactions

Table D.1: Effect heterogeneity by covariates

	Okada Count							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Post × Police Station	−1.26 (0.75)							
Inter Elec × Police Station		−0.79 (0.77)						
Post × Market			0.09 (0.39)					
Inter Elec × Market				−0.44 (0.63)				
Post × Political violence					0.59 (0.36)			
Inter Elec × Political Violence						0.10 (0.19)		
Post × Traffic							−0.21 (0.68)	
Inter Elec × Traffic								−2.95 (1.75)
Num. obs.	29061	21714	29061	21714	29061	21714	29061	21714
Road Segment FE	7375	7251	7375	7251	7375	7251	7375	7251
Time period FE	12	9	12	9	12	9	12	9
Grid square linear time trend	1139	837	1139	837	1139	837	1139	837
Grid square quadratic time trend	1139	837	1139	837	1139	837	1139	837
Weekend × Road class	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
R ² (full model)	0.65	0.71	0.65	0.71	0.65	0.71	0.65	0.71
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.47	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.47	0.50

All models include segment and date fixed effects. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, · $p < 0.1$.

¹ **D.2.2 Sub-setting panel** In Table D.2 I re-run analyses of the impact of the ban after dropping
² observations during the inter-election period. Figure D.3 then is showing a world in which the time
³ series were not ‘interrupted’ by elections, which had their own temporary impact on enforcement.




Figure D.3: Okada presence over time; dashed line is shape of trend without the election shock.

Table D.2: Full vs. subsets

	Okada Count	
	Model 1	Model 2
Post × ITE	−2.04 (1.25)	
Post × Motorpark		6.51*** (1.82)
Num. obs.	22518	22518
Road segment FE	7375	7375
Time period FE	10	10
Grid square linear time trend	881	881
Grid square quadratic time trend	881	881
Weekend × Road class	30	30
R ² (full model)	0.71	0.72
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.51	0.52

All models include segment and date fixed effects. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, · $p < 0.1$.

¹ **D.2.3 Facet by time heat map** FigureD.4 shows a slice of Lagos over time featuring both a
² motorpark and ITE areas. Road segments are colored by okada density.




Figure D.4: Heatmap of Lagos roads over time.

¹ **D.2.4 Interacting with categories** Table D.3, instead of running specifications with ITE
² and Motorpark designations separately, I treat them as mutually exclusive groups and run a single
³ regression. This ensures that road segments that feature a motorpark or ITE designation are not
⁴ being compared to each other in estimation.

Table D.3: Heterogeneity within categorical variables

	Okada Count	
	Model 1	Model 2
ITE × Post	−1.80** (0.72)	
Motorpark × Post	3.99* (1.91)	
ITE × Inter Elec		−0.02 (0.82)
Motorpark × Inter Elec		−8.34** (2.70)
Segment FE	✓	✓
Time Period FE	✓	✓
Grid Linear Time Trend	✓	✓
Grid Quadratic Time Trend	✓	✓
Weekend × Road Class FE	✓	✓
R ² (full model)	0.65	0.73
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.51	0.56

Units are individual road segments. All models include fixed effects for road segment, date, 0.25×0.25 degree grid-square linear and quadratic time trends, and for weekends versus weekdays which vary by class of road. Errors are clustered at the grid square and time period. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

¹ **D.2.5 Alternative clustering strategies** I cluster by electoral ward and by LGA instead of by grid id.

Table D.4: Clustering by ward, LGA

	Okada Count							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Post × ITE	−1.52*				−1.78**			
	(0.75)				(0.60)			
Post × Motorpark		3.62**				3.84*		
		(1.40)				(1.75)		
Inter-election × ITE			0.00***				0.17***	
			(0.00)				(0.00)	
Inter-election × Motorpark				−7.59***				−8.14***
				(1.06)				(1.22)
Num. obs.	29073	29073	21724	21724	29073	29073	21724	21724
Segment FE	7377	7377	7253	7253	7377	7377	7253	7253
Time period FE	12	12	9	9	12	12	9	9
LGA Linear Time Trend	32	32	21	21				
LGA Quadratic Time Trend	32	32	21	21				
Ward linear time trend					204	204	129	129
Ward quadratic time trend					204	204	129	129
Weekend × Road Class FE	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
R ² (full model)	0.57	0.58	0.64	0.67	0.59	0.59	0.66	0.68
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.43	0.43	0.46	0.50	0.44	0.44	0.47	0.50

38

Units are individual road segments. All models include fixed effects for road segment, date, 0.25×0.25 degree grid-square linear and quadratic time trends, and for weekends versus weekdays which vary by class of road. Errors are clustered at the grid square and time period. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

¹ **D.3 Road network analysis**

² **D.3.1 Counterfactual enforcement area analysis** As described in the main text (Section
³ 5) and elaborated in SI §C.4, I run routing simulations taking into account multiple counterfactual
⁴ possible enforcement configurations, based on the purported logic of the ban. Figure D.5 illustrates
⁵ the results per route traversed, compared to no ban enforcement.

⁶ **D.3.2 Relaxing uniformity of routes and demand-side weighting** The main road network
⁷ analysis comes from analyzing routes along an origin-destination matrix where the origin and
⁸ destination points on the road network are chosen uniformly, or at random. As explained in SI §C.4,
⁹ this was done in order to avoid biasing route selection in any way, and is not unrealistic, as okada
¹⁰ motorbikes are able to pick up passengers from essentially anywhere on the road network.

¹¹ However, realistically there are some journeys that are more likely than others. I therefore
¹² re-run the simulations described in Section 5 and in SI §C.4.2 with points chosen not at random,
¹³ but weighted based on the route's likelihood of being taken according to Lagos transport patterns.
¹⁴ I use TomTom realtime traffic data (See SI §C) to collect information on traffic across different
¹⁵ routes in Lagos throughout August 2024.⁷⁰ I use these data construct an origin-destination matrix
¹⁶ of 200 Lagos regions (based on operational wards) in order to estimate how common certain trips
¹⁷ are compared to others. Figure D.6 for example shows how commonly trips originating in Region 1
¹⁸ (Lagos Mainland) have a destination located in other regions of the city.

¹⁹ I use this information to weight the likelihood of drawing particular origin/destination pairs to
²⁰ construct routes for the simulations. More precisely, instead of randomly choosing a precise origin
²¹ and destination point from the road network, I instead follow three steps:

- ²² 1. First, I simultaneously select an origin and destination *region* according to how relatively
²³ prevalent routes between these two regions are. For example, if across all trips in August 24

⁷⁰August 2024 was the time period for which the data are freely available from TomTom's API. Future iterations will run similar analysis based on traffic data from the pre-treatment time, if available.




Figure D.5: Counterfactual simulations: Joint distribution of change in and motorparks passed

- 1 there was a 0.31% chance the trip was between Region 1 and Region 28, I will select the *pair*
 2 “Region 1–Region 28” with 0.31% probability.
- 3 2. Next, I randomly choose a point within the Origin region as my starting point
 4 3. Finally, I randomly choose a point within the destination region as my endpoint




Figure D.6: Map flows from Region 1 to other regions in August, 2024. Image from TomTom.

1 I repeat this process 10,000 times in order to analyze whether the trends pointed out in the main
 2 text hold when accounting for these demand-side weights. I replicate Figures 7 and D.5 with these
 3 weighted data in Figure D.7. The main effect of weighting route selection by frequency is to reduce
 4 variation in the number of motorparks passed, especially in some counterfactual scenarios based on
 5 traffic congestion, pollution, and income levels. ITE areas still have by far the largest impact on
 6 number of motorparks passed.




Figure D.7: Counterfactual simulations: Joint distribution of route cost and motorparks passed on 10,000 routes selected from a distribution weighted by route frequency according to traffic patterns

D.4 Election analysis

I also analyze changing electoral patterns across Lagos across two elections in February and March 2023: for President of Nigeria, and for Governor of Lagos. To do so, I rely on polling-unit level election results in the form of PDF images of handwritten result tallies for these two elections. I find polling unit level results for roughly 200 polling units, across every local government area in Lagos and almost 70 separate voting wards. I compare these to the polling-unit level results from the Presidential race a month earlier. I add polling unit results to the Lagos road network dataset described in Section 3 in the main text. I contend that this shift in enforcement patterns was a signal to the Union of the APC's dissatisfaction with its loss in Lagos's Presidential election in February. The rapidly approaching Gubernatorial elections, however, provided an opportunity for course-correction by the Union. Did they take this opportunity?

I use a small subset of polling-unit level electoral results to investigate the impact of differential electoral interference by the Union in the February vs. March elections. All election observers over the course of the elections in 2023 noted a substantial uptick in election interference—violence, ballot-box snatching, and invasion of voting places—in the Gubernatorial as opposed to the Presidential election. Consistent with this story, I see no significant relationship between votes for the most viable opposition party (Labour Party) and distance to a motorpark in the first round of presidential elections in February 2023 (Model 1 in Table D.5). Meanwhile—though statistically insignificant with $p = 0.10$ —Model 2 suggests a different relationship between the distance to a motorpark and votes for the Labour Party in the gubernatorial election. In the March election, the closer a polling unit was to a motorpark, the lower the vote count for Labour.

Finally, I estimate the relationship between a polling unit's distance to a motorpark and the difference between the total number of votes for the Labour Party candidate in the Presidential vs. the Gubernatorial races. These results indicate that as a polling unit gets further away from a motorpark, the number of votes for Labour are more consistent between the Presidential and

¹ Gubernatorial races. Put another way, as a polling unit gets closer to a motorpark, the *difference*
² between the number of votes cast for the Labour Party in the Presidential vs. Gubernatorial
³ races increases—indicating a significant reduction in Labour votes, concentrated in areas close
⁴ to motorparks. This analysis corroborates an account where the Union more successfully altered
 voting behavior in the Gubernatorial elections, in response to backlash from its APC patrons.

Table D.5: Votes for the Labour Party in 2023 and distance to motorpark

	LP Votes (Pres Elec)	LP Votes (Gov Elec)	LP Votes (Pres - Gov)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model
Distance to Motorpark	-0.0011 (0.0012)	0.0050 (0.0030)	-0.0276** (0.0126)
LP Votes (Pres Elec)		0.4691*** (0.0233)	
Segment FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	197	197	197

Units are individual road segments. All models include segment fixed effects. Errors are clustered by 0.25^2 grid-square. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.