

Modibo Camara

Northwestern Economics

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| Contact Information | Department of Economics Northwestern University 2211 Campus Drive Evanston, IL 60208 | Mobile: 202-415-2751 mcamara@u.northwestern.edu https://sites.northwestern.edu/mkc6866/ Citizenship: United States, Germany |
| Fields | Research: Microeconomic Theory, Economics & Computation Teaching: Microeconomics, Econometrics | |
| Education | Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University (anticipated) 2022 Dissertation: Complexities in Economic Theory Committee: Eddie Dekel (Chair), Jason Hartline (Chair), Marciano Siniscalchi, Jeffrey Ely M.A., Economics, Northwestern University 2018 B.A., Mathematics & Economics, University of Pennsylvania 2016 | |
| Fellowships & Awards | Distinguished TA Award 2021-22 Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University 2021-22 | |
| Teaching Experience | Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University 2017-2021 Econometrics (graduate), Econometrics (undergrad), Microeconomics (undergrad) | |
| Research Experience | Research Intern, Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research 2020 Research Assistant, Eddie Dekel, Northwestern University 2019 Project Intern, Yian Liu, Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2015 Intern, Esen Onur, Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2014 Research Assistant, Susan Wachter, University of Pennsylvania 2013-14 | |
| Conferences | European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society 2021 Cornell ORIE (invited) 2021 Economics and Computation (invited) 2021 Transatlantic Theory Workshop 2021 Risk, Uncertainty, and Decision (RUD) 2021 Decision: Theory, Experiments, and Applications (D-TEA) 2021 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society 2021 Africa Meeting of the Econometric Society 2021 European Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society 2021 World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAMES) 2021 Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) 2020 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society 2020 Young Economists Symposium (YES) 2020 Economics Graduate Student Conference (EGSC) 2020 Midwest Theory Day 2018 | |

Refereeing

American Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics, The Web Conference

Job Market Paper**“Computationally Tractable Choice”**

Abstract: I incorporate computational constraints into decision theory in order to capture how cognitive limitations affect behavior. I impose an axiom of computational tractability that rules out behaviors that are thought to be fundamentally hard. I use this framework to better understand common behavioral heuristics: if choices are tractable and consistent with the expected utility axioms, then they are observationally equivalent to forms of choice bracketing. Then I show that a computationally-constrained decisionmaker can be objectively better off if she is willing to use heuristics that would not appear rational to an outside observer.

Other Papers**“Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior”** (with J. Hartline, A. Johnsen)

Abstract: We study repeated games of incomplete information between a policymaker with commitment power and a single agent. We propose policies that adapt to historical data over time, assuming the agent does the same, without making any assumptions about the data-generating process. They are competitive with optimal static policies that rely on much stronger assumptions, like common prior beliefs. We conclude that robust solution concepts in mechanism design may be too pessimistic if they do not account for the possibility of learning over time.

“Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset”

Abstract: I propose a new approach to mechanism design: rather than assume a common prior belief, assume access to a common dataset. I restrict attention to incomplete information games where a designer commits to a policy and a single agent responds. I proposed a penalized policy that performs well under weak assumptions on how the agent learns from data. Policies that are too complex, in a precise sense, are penalized because they lead to unpredictable responses by the agent. This approach leads to new insights in models of vaccine distribution, prescription drug approval, performance pay, and product bundling.

Languages

English (fluent), German (native), Spanish (intermediate)

References

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