

# Modibo Camara

## Northwestern Economics

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<b>Fields</b>	Research: Microeconomic Theory, Economics & Computation Teaching: Microeconomics, Econometrics	
<b>Education</b>	Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University Dissertation: Complexities in Economic Theory Committee: Eddie Dekel (Chair), Jason Hartline (Chair), Marciano Siniscalchi, Jeffrey Ely M.A., Economics, Northwestern University B.A., Mathematics & Economics, University of Pennsylvania	(anticipated) 2022    2018 2016
<b>Fellowships &amp; Awards</b>	Distinguished TA Award Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University	2021-22 2021-22
<b>Teaching Experience</b>	Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University Econometrics (graduate), Econometrics (undergrad), Microeconomics (undergrad)	2017-2021
<b>Research Experience</b>	Research Intern, Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research Research Assistant, Eddie Dekel, Northwestern University Project Intern, Yian Liu, Federal Reserve Board of Governors Intern, Esen Onur, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Research Assistant, Susan Wachter, University of Pennsylvania	2020 2019 2015 2014 2013-14
<b>Conferences</b>	European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society Cornell ORIE (invited) Economics and Computation (invited) Transatlantic Theory Workshop Risk, Uncertainty, and Decision (RUD) Decision: Theory, Experiments, and Applications (D-TEA) North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society Africa Meeting of the Econometric Society European Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAMES) Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society Young Economists Symposium (YES) Economics Graduate Student Conference (EGSC) Midwest Theory Day	2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2020 2020 2020 2020 2018

**Refereeing**

American Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics, The Web Conference

**Job Market Paper****“Computationally Tractable Choice”**

*Abstract:* I incorporate computational constraints into decision theory in order to capture how cognitive limitations affect behavior. I impose an axiom of computational tractability that rules out behaviors that are thought to be fundamentally hard. I use this framework to better understand common behavioral heuristics: if choices are tractable and consistent with the expected utility axioms, then they are observationally equivalent to forms of choice bracketing. Then I show that a computationally-constrained decisionmaker can be objectively better off if she is willing to use heuristics that would not appear rational to an outside observer.

**Other Papers****“Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior”** (with J. Hartline, A. Johnsen)

*Abstract:* We study repeated games of incomplete information between a policymaker with commitment power and a single agent. We propose policies that adapt to historical data over time, assuming the agent does the same, without making any assumptions about the data-generating process. They are competitive with optimal static policies that rely on much stronger assumptions, like common prior beliefs. We conclude that robust solution concepts in mechanism design may be too pessimistic if they do not account for the possibility of learning over time.

**“Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset”**

*Abstract:* I propose a new approach to mechanism design: rather than assume a common prior belief, assume access to a common dataset. I restrict attention to incomplete information games where a designer commits to a policy and a single agent responds. I proposed a penalized policy that performs well under weak assumptions on how the agent learns from data. Policies that are too complex, in a precise sense, are penalized because they lead to unpredictable responses by the agent. This approach leads to new insights in models of vaccine distribution, prescription drug approval, performance pay, and product bundling.

**Languages**

English (fluent), German (native), Spanish (intermediate)

**References**

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