

From Reciprocity to Rivalry: The Past, Present and Future of Canada–U.S. Trade Relations

Introduction

For nearly two centuries, the trade relationship between Canada and the United States has swung like a pendulum between free-flowing commerce and heated protectionism. These two neighbors built the world's largest trading partnership – exchanging about **\$3.6 billion (CAD)** in goods and services *every single day* ¹ – yet their economic ties have been tested by recurring disputes and power imbalances. **More than a quarter of all Canada–U.S. merchandise trade crosses a single span** – the Ambassador Bridge between Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan ². Such deep integration means that when tensions flare, both nations feel the strain. Today, with an openly protectionist U.S. stance re-emerging and Canada's new leadership determined to defend its sovereignty, many wonder if history is repeating itself. How did we get here, and what comes next? In this long-form analysis, we'll explore the **historical cycles** of Canada–U.S. trade (from early reciprocity through tariff wars and free trade deals), examine the **current clash** between the Trump Administration's America-First approach and Prime Minister Mark Carney's pushback, and use **scenario planning** to forecast where this critical economic relationship might head in the future.

Canada–U.S. trade has always been a story of both closeness and conflict. Geography and shared interests continually pull the two economies together, while political pressures and nationalism can drive them apart. As we'll see, periods of near **free trade** have been punctuated by episodes of **protectionist backlash**, often tied to broader historical forces. By understanding these past swings – and how Canadian policymakers navigated them – we can better assess the current moment and envision plausible futures. Whether you are a general reader, a business professional, or a startup CEO, the fate of North America's trading relationship will likely impact your world. In an accessible narrative style, let's journey through the **back-and-forth saga of Canada–U.S. trade**, draw parallels to the present Trump–Carney era, and then peer ahead using foresight analysis. The goal: to equip you with context and insight into one of the world's great trade partnerships – and its uncertain road ahead.

Historical Ebbs and Flows in Canada–U.S. Trade Policy

Early Overtures and Backlash (1854–1911)

The idea of free trade between Canada and the U.S. is *not* a modern NAFTA-era invention – it debuted over 160 years ago. In 1854, when Canada was still a set of British colonies, London and Washington signed the **Reciprocity Treaty**, eliminating tariffs on natural resources traded across the border. This was a landmark first step toward freer trade, **"a move toward free trade"** that mutual interests drove ³. For a decade, farmers and fishermen enjoyed booming cross-border commerce. But the honeymoon ended abruptly. After the U.S. Civil War (during which Britain showed sympathy to the Confederacy), American protectionists and annexationists joined forces to kill the Reciprocity Treaty in 1866 ⁴. Suddenly, tariffs snapped back into place, hurting Canadian exporters and souring relations. **Canada's response was essentially to turn inward and consolidate** – the colonies of British North America united in 1867 partly to foster internal

markets and present a united front to U.S. expansionism ⁴ . In short, losing the U.S. free-trade deal helped push Canada into nationhood.

For the next several decades, **high tariffs and nation-building defined Canadian trade policy**. After Confederation, Canada's leaders were ambivalent about relying on the American market. With the U.S. pursuing aggressive industrial growth behind tariff walls, Canada felt pressure to do the same. Prime Minister John A. Macdonald's "**National Policy**" of 1879 epitomized this era: it imposed steep protective tariffs to nurture Canadian manufacturing, coupled with transcontinental railroad construction and western settlement to create an east-west domestic economy ⁵ . Macdonald's Conservatives had campaigned on protectionism (defeating the free-trade Liberals in 1878) and delivered – the National Policy's **tariffs on imported manufactures, infrastructure expansion, and immigration drive** would shape Canada's economy for decades ⁵ . In fact, these protective tariffs remained a pillar of Canadian policy well into the mid-20th century ⁶ . The late 1800s were marked by **tariff wars** rather than trade deals: both countries raised duties (the U.S. Tariff of 1890, for example, and Canada's continued import taxes) in a tit-for-tat that limited bilateral trade. Canada instead traded more with Britain and within the Empire, while the U.S. mostly looked inward or to other markets.

Yet even during protectionist times, the lure of the U.S. market never disappeared from Canadian politics. A **brief flirtation with reciprocity resurfaced in 1911**, when Liberal Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier negotiated a new free trade agreement with the U.S. (often called "Reciprocity" like the 1854 pact). It would have eliminated most tariffs on natural products like grains and timber, hugely opening U.S. markets to Canadian farmers ⁷ . But the 1911 proposal triggered a nationalist backlash. The Canadian Conservatives, led by Robert Borden, thundered that freer trade would make Canada economically dependent on (and eventually part of) the United States – a direct threat to sovereignty and ties to Britain. They found ammunition in American arrogance: U.S. Congressman Champ Clark blustered that he looked forward to the day "**the American flag will fly over every square foot of [Canada] up to the North Pole.**" ⁷ This brazen annexationist remark horrified Canadians. Fear overshadowed hope, and Laurier's government was **swept out of power by voters wary of becoming the "51st state."** The 1911 election thus killed the reciprocity deal and entrenched protectionist sentiment for years. As one historian noted, talk of U.S.–Canada free trade "**ended for decades**" after 1911, with no comprehensive deal returning until 1988 ⁸ . In effect, **Canada chose political autonomy over market access**, setting a pattern: when forced to choose, Canadians often prioritize sovereignty and distinct identity in these trade swings.

Depression and War: Protectionism's Peak (1930s–1940s)

The **Great Depression** brought the **pendulum of trade policy to its protectionist extreme**, severely straining Canada–U.S. trade. The catalyst was the infamous **Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930** in the United States. As the Depression began, U.S. legislators jacked up tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods, aiming to shield American farmers and factories. Canada – deeply dependent on exports to the U.S. at the time – was hit immediately and hard. Ottawa retaliated with its own steep tariffs on U.S. goods ⁹ , and both economies spiraled deeper into crisis. The **numbers tell the story** of this beggar-thy-neighbor disaster: U.S. exports to Canada plunged from about **\$948 million in 1929 to just \$395 million in 1931** ¹⁰ – a nearly 60% collapse in two years. Canadian shipments to the U.S. likewise fell by roughly half in the same period ¹¹ . The two "best customers" had suddenly cut each other off at the knees, with trade volumes shrinking to a trickle. This **collapse in bilateral trade** exacerbated the economic pain of the Depression for both countries. In Canada, which relied on the U.S. for a large share of its export earnings, the impact was devastating – factories shuttered, commodity prices tanked, and unemployment soared.

Canadian officials were both alarmed and angered by America's protectionist turn. Prime Minister R.B. Bennett railed against the Smoot-Hawley tariff and vowed to "blast" open new markets for Canadian goods. **Canada pivoted back to the British Empire**, embracing a policy of "Imperial Preference" to lessen reliance on the U.S. market. At the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa, Canada and Britain struck agreements to give each other tariff preferences (e.g. Britain lowered tariffs on Canadian wheat, while Canada favored British manufactured goods) ¹². In essence, Canada tried to **replace lost American demand with British and Commonwealth trade**, leveraging historic ties. This provided *some* relief, but could not fully compensate for the U.S. market. Still, the episode reinforced a lesson: when the U.S. turns protectionist, Canada's instinct is to **diversify its trade partners** – a theme we will see again in modern times.

By the mid-1930s, the U.S. began rethinking its extreme tariffs as well. In 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, authorizing bilateral tariff-reduction deals. The U.S. and Canada signed new trade agreements in 1935 and 1938 that partially rolled back tariffs, marking a tentative **thaw in the trade war**. Then came World War II, which forced an unprecedented degree of economic cooperation. During WWII, the two nations coordinated production (the 1941 Hyde Park Agreement ensured the U.S. would buy Canadian war supplies and vice versa), effectively smoothing the way for more open trade in the post-war era. The Depression and war thus swung the pendulum from the **height of protectionism toward a new era of cooperation**. Both countries emerged from WWII convinced that **high tariffs had deepened the Depression**, and they embraced the creation of a multilateral trading system (the 1947 GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) to prevent a repeat. For Canada, the 1940s cemented a strategic understanding: **close economic ties with the U.S. were crucial for prosperity and security**, but they must be managed in a way that preserves Canada's independence. This balance – between integration and autonomy – would be tested again soon.

Postwar Integration and the Long March to Free Trade (1960s–1980s)

In the decades after WWII, Canada-U.S. trade blossomed under a generally liberalizing global climate, but it took a special bilateral breakthrough to truly integrate their industries. Tariffs gradually came down worldwide via GATT rounds, and the two economies became more entwined (the U.S. by now was Canada's dominant trade partner, as Britain's economic clout waned). Yet a **defining moment arrived in 1965** with the signing of the **Canada-U.S. Automotive Products Agreement**, known as the **Auto Pact**. This sector-specific free trade deal **revolutionized the continent's auto industry**. Prior to 1965, car manufacturing in Canada was inefficient and high-cost: automakers had to build separate models for the small Canadian market to avoid tariffs, resulting in short production runs and a **\$785 million auto trade deficit for Canada** that year (the industry relied heavily on U.S. parts and models) ¹³ ¹⁴. The Auto Pact changed the game by **eliminating tariffs on cars and auto parts** between the two countries, effectively treating the U.S. and Canadian auto sector as an integrated whole. In exchange, American automakers agreed to maintain certain production levels in Canada (to ensure Canada got its fair share of jobs and investment).



The Ambassador Bridge between Windsor, ON and Detroit, MI – the busiest border crossing in North America – became a critical artery for auto parts and other goods after the 1965 Auto Pact integrated the industries. Over 25% of all U.S.–Canada trade crosses this single bridge ², underscoring the tight economic linkage forged in the later 20th century.

The impact of the Auto Pact was **swift and profound**. Within a few years, Canadian auto plants were running full tilt, specializing in certain models for all of North America, while importing other models from the U.S. The previously duplicated production on each side of the border gave way to a **truly integrated continental supply chain**: for example, an engine might be cast in Ontario, installed in a car in Michigan, which is then sold in both countries. By the early 1970s, **automobile manufacturing had leapfrogged other sectors to become Canada's largest industry** ¹⁵. Canada's share of North American vehicle production jumped (it rose from about 7% in 1965 to over 12% by 1970, and kept climbing to nearly 20% by the 1980s) ¹⁶. The country went from chronic auto trade deficits to surpluses in finished cars (though still importing many parts) ¹⁷. The Auto Pact **lowered car prices, created tens of thousands of jobs (mainly in Southern Ontario) and raised wages** in Canada's industrial heartland ¹⁸. It was by all measures a win-win integration, and it demonstrated the potential benefits of free trade in a key sector. However, it also highlighted Canada's lingering concern: while jobs grew, the Canadian auto sector became essentially branch operations of U.S. Big Three automakers, with major decisions made in Detroit. This dependence was a microcosm of the broader relationship – economic integration brought efficiency and wealth, but also **asymmetry** (Canada's economy being far smaller and often at the mercy of U.S. corporate and political decisions). Still, the success of the Auto Pact set the stage for broader free trade. It proved that **given fair terms, Canada could thrive in an open trade relationship with the much larger U.S. economy**.

As the 1970s unfolded, the **pendulum** threatened to swing back again. Economic turbulence – the oil shocks, recessions, and the decline of some Canadian industries – led to periodic friction. The U.S. introduced "Buy American" policies and import surcharges in the early 1970s, worrying Canadian exporters. In Ottawa, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau floated a bold **"Third Option"** around 1972, which proposed reducing Canada's reliance on the U.S. by diversifying trade toward Europe and Asia. This echoed the instinct of earlier eras (find alternative markets when the U.S. seems risky). However, the Third Option

achieved limited success; the gravitational pull of the giant U.S. market remained overwhelming. By the 1980s, a new consensus was forming among Canadian business and political elites: rather than fight integration, Canada should **secure and formalize access to the U.S. market** through an explicit free trade agreement. Several factors drove this: the rise of globalization, concerns that Canada was falling behind, and pro-market leaders on both sides (Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan) who were philosophically inclined toward free trade. Thus began **negotiations in 1986** for a Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

The 1988 battle over the FTA was one of the most pivotal (and divisive) in Canadian political history – **a direct replay of 1911, but with opposite results**. Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government negotiated a comprehensive pact eliminating tariffs on most goods over a decade, easing investment rules, and creating dispute settlement mechanisms. It was *the first such broad trade deal* Canada had ever signed with the U.S. ¹⁹ ²⁰ . Fearing loss of sovereignty, the opposition Liberals (and many in the public) pushed back hard. They warned that free trade would make Canada a **"branch plant"** economy and erode its ability to chart independent social and cultural policies. Liberal leader John Turner famously called the FTA "the Sale of Canada Act" – arguing that Canada would **give away control over "water, energy, health care, and social programs"** in exchange for unhindered access to U.S. markets ²¹ ²² . This dire framing resonated with many Canadians' historic anxieties. Meanwhile, Mulroney championed the agreement as a leap of faith into prosperity, assembling a broad coalition of pro-trade supporters in business and academia ²³ . The **1988 federal election** became a de facto referendum on the FTA. In a mirror image of 1911, this time the pro-free trade side **won**. Mulroney's Conservatives were returned to power (with a healthy majority of seats, though just 43% of the popular vote), and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1989 ²⁴ ²⁵ . It was a watershed: **for the first time ever, the two countries had an across-the-board free trade regime**, locking in tariff-free access and rules for everything from cars to computers. Canadian proponents hoped this would spur investment and job growth by giving exporters guaranteed U.S. access, while critics braced for factory closures and U.S. encroachment.

In retrospect, the FTA (soon superseded and expanded by NAFTA) *did* profoundly increase cross-border trade and economic integration – but the benefits and downsides are still debated. By the mid-1990s, virtually all tariffs were gone, and two-way trade and investment surged. In 1994, Canada and the U.S. welcomed **Mexico into what became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)**, creating a continental market of 365 million people at the time. NAFTA **"was a landmark trade deal"** and it undeniably **"contributed to an explosion of trade"** among the three countries ²⁶ . North American supply chains became tightly interwoven – an automobile assembled in Ontario might contain Mexican-made wiring harnesses and American-made microchips, for instance. Total Canada-U.S. trade in goods and services roughly tripled from the late 1980s to late 2010s (from about \$290 billion in 1989 to over \$900 billion by 2019) ²⁷ ²⁸ . Consumers enjoyed lower prices and more variety, and many Canadian firms found new opportunities for growth under the pact. However, NAFTA remained *politically controversial*. It coincided with painful restructuring in manufacturing – many **U.S. and Canadian factories closed or moved operations to lower-cost Mexico**, costing jobs in certain sectors. While NAFTA itself was not the sole cause (technology and globalization played big roles), it became a **scapegoat for deindustrialization** in parts of the U.S. and Canada. Critics in the U.S. accused NAFTA of helping corporations outsource jobs, and in Canada critics warned that binding trade rules (like NAFTA's investor-state dispute mechanism, Chapter 11) could **undermine national sovereignty and social programs**. These fears echoed the 1988 debates – for example, Canadians worried about cultural industries being overtaken or pressure to privatize public services under trade disciplines. In short, **NAFTA brought major economic gains but also social dislocations**, and it attracted detractors across the political spectrum. Future U.S. President Donald Trump

would famously call NAFTA “the worst trade deal ever made,” tapping into a backlash that had grown over time ²⁹ ³⁰ .

Overall, by the early 2000s the pendulum had swung firmly to the **free trade/integration** side. Canada’s economy was now deeply enmeshed with America’s. Roughly **75% of Canadian exports were going to the U.S.** by the 2000s – a higher dependence than at any point in history ³¹ . Cross-border investment boomed as well: American companies owned vast swathes of Canadian industry (from factories to banks), and Canadian firms expanded into the U.S. The border became ever more fluid for commerce (though thickened somewhat for security after 9/11). A striking example of integration: the **Ambassador Bridge in Detroit/Windsor** alone carried over **25% of all trade** between the two nations ² , and a **2004 study found 150,000 jobs and \$13 billion in production in Ontario–Michigan depended on that one crossing** ² . That’s how interdependent the economies had become. And yet, lurking beneath the prosperity, the familiar Canadian unease remained: **Were we too dependent on the U.S.?** What if Washington suddenly changed course? That “what if” started to materialize after 2016, when the next swing of the pendulum began.

The Modern Era: From NAFTA to Trump and Carney – Protectionism Strikes Back

By the mid-2010s, North America’s free trade architecture seemed settled. NAFTA was two decades old; Canada and the U.S. had even furthered integration through initiatives like regulatory cooperation and joint infrastructure. Then, in 2016, American politics delivered a shock: the election of **Donald Trump** on a vehemently protectionist, nationalist platform. Trump gave voice to long-simmering discontent about trade in the U.S., especially in industrial states hit by factory closures. He railed against NAFTA as a “disaster” and vowed to either renegotiate it or scrap it. This marked a stark departure from previous U.S. administrations (Republican and Democrat alike) that, since the 1930s, had largely championed trade liberalization. **For Canada – which sends three-quarters of its exports to the U.S. – Trump’s ascendance was alarm bell.** Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government (in office since 2015) suddenly had to defend the very foundations of Canada’s trade strategy.

Trump moved quickly. In 2017 he forced Canada and Mexico into talks to renegotiate NAFTA. His administration demanded concessions to address what it saw as unfair aspects of the deal – ranging from rules of origin for cars to access to Canada’s protected dairy market. The negotiations were tough and often tense, but by late 2018 the three countries reached a new accord: the **United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA)**, known in Canada as CUSMA (and sometimes dubbed “NAFTA 2.0”). The USMCA made **important updates**: it tightened North American content rules for autos (from 62.5% to 75% regional content) and required higher wages for a portion of auto production to favor U.S./Canada factories ³² ³³ . It opened a bit more of Canada’s dairy market to U.S. farmers (a small 3.5% quota increase) ³⁴ ³⁵ . It added new chapters on digital trade, stronger intellectual property protections, and labor and environmental standards – addressing issues that didn’t exist in 1994 ³⁵ . It also preserved key features Canada wanted, like the state-to-state dispute resolution panels for unfair tariffs (Chapter 19) and an exemption for cultural industries. In essence, USMCA was **NAFTA modernized rather than revolutionized**, and many observers called it “NAFTA 2.0” ³⁶ ³⁷ . Importantly, it included a 16-year sunset clause with a review in year 6 (2026) ³⁵ , meaning the deal isn’t permanent – a nod to Trump’s skepticism of indefinite agreements.

The successful conclusion of USMCA in 2018 (it took effect in 2020) could have restored stability – but Trump’s trade offensives did not stop at renegotiating NAFTA. He used **tariffs as a blunt weapon** in a way not seen from a U.S. president in generations. In 2018, citing “national security,” Trump slapped tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports from **Canada (and other countries)** ³⁸ . This stunned Canadians, who pointed out the absurdity of treating Canada – a military ally – as a security threat. It was arguably the most acrimonious trade move since the 1930s. Trudeau’s government retaliated swiftly with counter-tariffs on C\$16.6 billion in U.S. goods, from steel to bourbon, matching the scale of U.S. penalties ³⁸ . The message: Canada would not back down. Simultaneously, other disputes flared: the long-running **softwood lumber war** (the U.S. again imposed duties on Canadian lumber, claiming unfair subsidies), threats of auto tariffs, and complaints about Canada’s protection of its dairy farmers. It felt like **the 1970s or 1930s all over again**, with tit-for-tat measures and nationalist barbs flying. The difference was, this was happening under the umbrella of a free trade agreement. It revealed a weakness: even trade deals can be blown off-course by determined populist leaders willing to invoke emergency statutes (in this case, a U.S. law allowing tariffs on national security grounds).

For Canada, 2017–2020 was a **harrowing rollercoaster**. Trudeau walked a tightrope – trying to maintain a cordial relationship with an unpredictable President Trump, while defending core Canadian interests. At one point, Trump openly insulted Trudeau as “weak” after a G7 summit spat, and Canadians rallied around their Prime Minister. The **power asymmetry** was on full display: the U.S. economy is about 10 times Canada’s, and Trump knew Canada needed access to his market far more than vice versa. He exploited that leverage without hesitation. Yet, Canada also had *some* leverage – notably in strategic exports like energy. The U.S. relies on Canada as its largest foreign supplier of oil and gas. Observers noted that Canada could play that card if pushed too far (for example, restricting oil exports or seeking other markets). Indeed, when Trump’s tariffs hit, Canada **“highlighted how [U.S.] reliance on Canadian energy”** could be used to even the field ³⁹ ⁴⁰ . Still, it was an unequal fight. By mid-2020, once USMCA was ratified and the tariff spats temporarily paused (Trump lifted the steel tariffs in 2019 in exchange for quotas), some calm returned. Little did anyone know, an even more dramatic chapter was about to unfold – one that would bring **Mark Carney** into the spotlight and raise the specter of an all-out trade rupture.

The 2025 Crisis: Trump’s Return and Carney’s Revolt

(A scenario-based narrative based on recent reports and expert foresight analysis.)

In this forward-looking scenario, imagine it is the year 2025 and the unthinkable has happened: **Donald Trump has returned to the White House** after winning the 2024 U.S. election, and in Canada, a new Prime Minister – **Mark Carney** – has just taken office, leading a reinvigorated Liberal government. This scenario, drawn from expert projections, envisions a collision of two very different leaders and policy approaches. Trump 2.0, emboldened by his comeback, immediately turns his ire again toward America’s trading partners. But unlike 2018, when Trudeau was a more conciliatory figure, Trump now faces a Canadian leader explicitly elected to **stand up to U.S. pressure**. **Mark Carney**, a former central banker with no elected experience until recently, ran for Liberal leader (and by extension Prime Minister) on a platform of tough economic nationalism – effectively promising Canadians he would not be bullied by Trump. How did this situation arise? According to this scenario, Trump’s aggressive trade threats during early 2025 so alarmed Canadians that it caused a political shockwave in Ottawa, propelling Carney to power on a wave of nationalist sentiment ⁴¹ ⁴² . The stage was set for a historic confrontation.

Trump wasted no time. In February 2025, mere weeks after inauguration, he **dropped a trade war bombshell**: an executive order imposing **25% tariffs on all imports from Canada and Mexico** (with a partial exception – 10% on Canadian oil and energy) ⁴³ ⁴⁴ . This was effectively a **near-universal tariff** – a stunning escalation far beyond his 2018 measures. Trump framed it as necessary to force action on issues like undocumented immigration and illicit drugs, even tying it to a bizarre notion that **Canada should either submit to U.S. demands or consider becoming “the fifty-first state.”** In this scenario, credible sources report that Trump privately floated the idea of **forcing Canada into the Union** – essentially economic annexation – if it didn’t bend ⁴⁵ . Publicly, he said Canada had “taken advantage” of the U.S. for too long and now would “pay the price.” Such rhetoric had shades of the 1911 Champ Clark speech, but coming from a U.S. President, it was unprecedented in modern times.

Canada, under outgoing PM Justin Trudeau, reacted with outrage. Trudeau announced immediate **retaliatory tariffs** mirroring the U.S. rates – 25% duties on American goods, targeting politically sensitive exports up to C\$30 billion at first, and expanding to C\$155 billion if the U.S. didn’t relent ⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ . Both sides initially agreed to a short delay (a one-month standstill to negotiate), but by March 2025 the tariffs **took effect**, and a full-blown **trade war** was on ⁴⁸ . The economic pain was felt on both sides of the border, but particularly in Canada, which saw its currency drop and exporters scramble to find alternative markets for tariffed goods.

Politically, Canada was incensed. **Public opinion hardened** against the U.S. like never before in recent memory. Imagine scenes of Canadian hockey crowds **booing the Star-Spangled Banner** at games – that’s exactly what happened in this scenario ⁴⁹ . In one highly charged incident, during a U.S.–Canada hockey match, **three fistfights broke out in the first nine seconds** of play, a vivid symbol of the broader conflict ⁵⁰ . Anti-American sentiment, usually muted in Canada, flared up. Prime Minister Trudeau, normally a moderate voice, delivered the **“most impassioned speech” of his career**, as reports put it ⁵¹ . He declared that Trump’s goal was **“the total collapse of the Canadian economy because that will make it easier to annex us. That is never going to happen. We will never be the fifty-first state.”** ⁵¹ This defiant statement – *“we will never be the 51st state”* – echoed nationwide. It galvanized Canadians across the political spectrum to rally around the flag. Even opposition parties largely stood with the government in condemning Trump’s actions.

However, Trudeau was a lame duck in this scenario. His popularity had been waning (after nearly a decade in power), and polls showed him on track to lose the next election to the Conservatives under Pierre Poilievre ⁴¹ . But Trump’s onslaught changed the calculus dramatically. In early 2025, Trudeau opted to step aside (or was pushed out by his party – accounts vary) to make way for a new Liberal leader better suited to the crisis. Enter **Mark Carney**. Carney, often floated as a potential future leader, was a renowned economist – former Governor of the Bank of Canada and Bank of England – with impeccable crisis management credentials from the 2008 financial meltdown and Brexit. More importantly, Carney harbored a **patriotic fire** that he unveiled during the Liberal leadership race. While known as a technocrat, Carney proved to be an effective populist as well, tapping into Canadian nationalism. He won the leadership **by a landslide (over 85% support)** on a promise to **take on Trump** ⁵² . As one report quipped, he came in “with hockey gloves off, ready to drop the gloves with Trump.” Indeed, Carney’s victory speech was anything but shy: he directly addressed the U.S. President’s taunts.

“America is not Canada. And Canada never, ever will be part of America in any way, shape, or form,” Carney declared, in a bold rebuttal to Trump’s insinuations ⁵³ . The line made headlines; it was rare for a Canadian leader to speak in such terms. Carney continued: **“We didn’t ask for this fight, but Canadians**

are always ready when someone else drops the gloves.” ⁵⁴ Using an ice hockey metaphor (“dropping the gloves” means starting a fight in hockey) struck a chord with Canadians. It painted Trump as the aggressor and Canada as the sturdy underdog willing to tussle. Carney effectively channeled the national mood of *fed-up defiance*. The Liberals, revitalized by his leadership, surged in polls. In a stunning turnaround, when a snap election was called (which Conservatives had demanded), **Carney led the Liberals to a fourth consecutive term**, defying expectations ⁵⁵ ⁵⁶. The election became, as some experts noted, **“the third time a Canadian election [was] fought on our relationship with the U.S., and sovereignty won”** ⁵⁷ ⁵⁸. (The other two times being 1911 and 1988 – where one went the other way, and one did not.) Carney now had a direct democratic mandate to **stand up to Trump**.

What does “standing up” look like? Prime Minister Carney immediately took a hard line. He **kept Canada’s retaliatory tariffs in place** and even expanded them on additional U.S. goods, despite the pain to Canadian importers. “We will keep our tariffs on *until the Americans show us respect*,” he vowed, garnering cheers ⁵⁹ ⁶⁰. He also hinted at more drastic measures: leveraging Canada’s position as the top supplier of oil, natural gas, and critical minerals to the U.S. **Carney openly floated using “U.S. reliance on Canadian energy to even the playing field.”** ³⁹ ⁶¹ This suggested possible export restrictions or taxes that could hurt American consumers – a strong negotiating tactic, albeit a risky one that could backfire on Canada’s economy too. Many analysts speculated this was bluster to get Trump’s attention, and that Carney as a former central banker understood the mutual economic destruction that a full cutoff would cause. Still, just raising that specter was significant; it showed a new steel in Ottawa’s approach.

Carney also embraced a rhetorical combative style unusual for Canadian prime ministers. He promised an **“elbows up”** approach – another hockey reference – implying he would play rough and not back down in scrums with the U.S. ⁶² ⁶³. At the same time, Carney had the credibility of an economic expert. Commentators noted that **“trade wars are also currency wars,”** and Carney’s experience leading central banks through crises gave him a unique skill set ³⁹ ⁶⁴. For instance, if the U.S. slapped tariffs that raised costs for Canadian exporters, the Bank of Canada under Carney’s influence might let the Canadian dollar weaken to offset the impact – effectively blunting Trump’s tariffs. *Few national leaders have both monetary and fiscal expertise to fight a trade war on multiple fronts*. Carney did, and he hinted at using “all available tools” to defend Canada ³⁹.

One of Carney’s most dramatic pronouncements during the campaign was that Canada’s **“long and deep friendship” with the U.S. “is over,”** and that Canada must learn to prosper in “a radically different world.” ⁶⁵ These words were striking. Canada and the U.S. have often been described as best friends and closest allies. For a Canadian leader to suggest that friendship is finished signals a historic rupture. Carney was essentially preparing Canadians for a future of **decoupling** from America – a seismic shift in mindset. He spoke of turning this crisis into **“an opportunity to build a new Canadian economy”** not beholden to the U.S. ³¹. That meant redoubling efforts to **diversify trade partners**, invest in domestic capacity, and reduce vulnerabilities. It was a call for economic patriotism that hadn’t been heard at this volume since perhaps the 19th century.

However, Carney is also a realist grounded in history. In quieter moments, he acknowledged that *quitting the U.S. cold turkey would be nearly impossible*. Fully **75% of Canada’s exports still went to the U.S.** at the time he took office ³¹. That kind of deep integration cannot be unwound overnight – or even in a few years – without massive economic damage. A former Canadian diplomat, John W. Holmes, once observed that Canada *“can disagree with the United States but not reject it.”* ⁶⁶ Carney cited this line, recognizing the truth

in it ⁶⁵ ⁶⁷ . In other words, Canada can – and will – push back, but it ultimately **cannot divorce itself entirely from its giant neighbor**. Geography and economics are stubborn things.

Thus, as 2025 progressed, the Carney government adopted a two-track approach: fight the trade war in the short term to force the U.S. to relent, while aggressively seeking out **new trade alliances and internal reforms** to strengthen Canada's long-term position. Carney's first trips abroad as PM were telling – he **flew to London and Paris** to shore up support from European allies ⁶⁸ . With Europe also wary of Trump's America, Canada positioned itself as a like-minded partner to the EU. Recall that Canada already had the **Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)** with Europe provisionally in force since 2017. Carney sought to **"expand CETA" and deepen Canada-EU ties** ⁶⁹ . Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, specifically hailed Canada under Carney as a **"like-minded" ally** in a time of global geopolitical strain ⁷⁰ . This was a promising avenue: if Canada could boost exports to Europe, it might alleviate some pressure from the U.S. market squeeze. CETA had already produced a **65% increase in Canada-EU goods trade by 2023** (and 70%+ in services) ⁷¹ , though it still awaited ratification by several EU states, and public protests in Europe had shown some resistance to aspects of the deal ⁷² . Carney's challenge was to get Europe to *fully implement* and perhaps broaden CETA, offering Canada a more reliable market. He pointedly spoke of forging partnerships with **"reliable partners"** – a thinly veiled jab at the capricious U.S. ⁷³ .

Beyond Europe, Carney looked to the **Asia-Pacific**. Canada was already part of the CPTPP (the trans-Pacific trade pact sans the U.S.). He aimed to leverage that to expand exports to Japan, Vietnam, Australia and others. However, relations with two of Asia's giants were troubled: **China and India**. China-Canada ties had hit a nadir after Canada's 2018 arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. extradition request, which led to China's retaliatory detention of two Canadians (an episode often called the "two Michaels" crisis) ⁷⁴ . Although Meng was released in 2021, trust was broken; and Canada had since restricted Huawei's 5G role and complained of Chinese interference in its affairs. Under Carney, Canada remained wary of China – diversification would not mean cozying up to Beijing, given both security concerns and lack of public appetite. India was also problematic: in late 2023, a serious diplomatic row erupted after Trudeau alleged the Indian government was involved in the assassination of a Sikh dissident on Canadian soil, leading both countries to expel diplomats ⁷⁵ . That put a chill on what had been a slowly warming trade relationship (talks on a Canada-India trade deal were paused). So, Carney's diversification targets were limited mostly to **like-minded democracies** – Europe, Japan/Korea, perhaps some Latin American countries (Canada has a deal with Chile, and could seek more in South America). He also emphasized working more with **allies like the UK (via a post-Brexit trade deal) and smaller partners**. All told, by 2025 Canada had **15 trade agreements covering 51 countries** ⁷⁶ – a sizeable network – but none of those individually matched the U.S. in importance. Carney knew that even if Canada maximized those deals, the U.S. would remain irreplaceable for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, he framed it as a long game: over a decade or two, Canada could perhaps reduce the U.S. share of its exports from ~75% to, say, 60% or 50%, through persistent effort. That would still be huge dependence, but relatively less so, giving Canada slightly more freedom of maneuver.

On the home front, Carney launched a campaign to **"bulletproof" the Canadian economy** against external pressure. One major initiative was to finally tear down Canada's notorious **internal trade barriers** – the myriad provincial regulations and restrictions that fragment the domestic market. Studies have shown that eliminating inter-provincial trade barriers (different standards, procurement rules, liquor sales rules, etc.) could boost Canada's GDP by **4–8%** ⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ . Every recent prime minister had talked about this, but progress was halting. Carney, armed with a fresh mandate and national unity imperative, made a strong push. If

successful, a more integrated domestic market would make Canadian firms more efficient and better able to scale up, and somewhat less reliant on exporting to one country. Carney also unveiled infrastructure investments aimed at reorienting trade flows – for example, improving ports and pipelines to enable more trade with Europe and Asia (export terminals on the East and West coasts, etc.). He promoted innovation and value-added industries, saying Canada must “move up the value chain” so it isn’t just exporting raw resources subject to tariffs. In short, Carney’s response to Trump’s aggression was a mix of **counterpunching in the short term and strategizing for resilience in the long term.**

It’s worth noting that south of the border, Trump’s hardball tactics were not universally popular either. U.S. businesses and consumers were feeling the pinch from 25% tariffs – which are essentially a tax that raises prices. Many American manufacturers that relied on Canadian inputs (think auto parts, machinery, aluminum) complained loudly. U.S. farmers, already reeling from lost markets in China due to Trump’s earlier trade wars, now faced retaliation in Canada (Canada had targeted U.S. agricultural exports like beef, ketchup, etc. with tariffs). Political opposition grew. By late 2025, the U.S. Congress was holding hearings on the economic damage of the trade war. There was pressure on Trump to reach some face-saving settlement. Under the scenario outlined by analysts, a potential off-ramp could involve Canada tightening some border security or drug enforcement (addressing Trump’s stated reasons) in exchange for the U.S. suspending the tariffs. Carney signaled openness to negotiation, but only if the tariffs were lifted first. It became a high-stakes staring contest. Carney’s stance won admiration internationally – pundits drew parallels to how smaller U.S. allies like France under de Gaulle or even Justin Trudeau’s father (Pierre Trudeau) had stood up to American dominance in the past. At the same time, real economic pain in Canada – factories idling due to lost U.S. sales, inflation from import tariffs – meant Carney had to be careful not to overplay his hand.

By early 2026 in this scenario, the crisis is still unfolding. Canada and the U.S. remain in a trade deadlock, though back-channel talks continue. Some predict Trump might relent due to domestic pressure (especially if the U.S. economy slows and voters become unhappy with trade disruptions). Others fear he might double down or link the trade war to other issues (for instance, demanding Canada increase defense spending or make concessions in other areas as a condition for peace). Either way, the **Canada-U.S. relationship has entered uncharted territory** – arguably the tensest economic confrontation since at least the 1930 Smoot-Hawley episode, if not the War of 1812.

Crucially, *the rest of the world* is watching too. America’s other allies see how Washington treats a close friend like Canada, and they take note. If even Canada is “not safe” from punitive tariffs and quasi-bullying, it sends a signal globally about the U.S.’s turn inward. This scenario underscores a broader trend: the era of U.S.-led free trade order is waning, replaced by a more zero-sum, politically driven approach to trade. As one Wilson Center analysis put it, there is a **“new Washington consensus on trade”** that combines economic nationalism with pragmatic alliance-building – often **helping allies against adversaries, but just as often undercutting even allies to boost domestic industries** ⁷⁹. In Trump’s case, the adversarial stance extended to allies like Canada. But even a hypothetical different U.S. leader (say a moderate or a Democrat) now operates in a Washington climate that is **skeptical of free trade** and focused on domestic revival (through measures like the Inflation Reduction Act’s massive subsidies for U.S.-made electric vehicles, which initially alarmed Canada). There is bipartisan agreement in the U.S. on reshoring supply chains and using industrial policy – a point not lost on Canada ⁸⁰. So Canada’s challenge is long-term: America’s trade posture has fundamentally shifted from the 1990s free trade enthusiasm to a more guarded, interest-driven stance. Even President Biden, for instance, maintained “Buy American” rules and

did not seek new trade deals. This suggests that **regardless of Trump, Canada faces a United States that is less open and more prone to protectionist actions going forward.**

To summarize the present (scenario) situation: **Canada and the U.S. have entered a period of trade turbulence not seen in decades.** Historical patterns have resurfaced – American protectionism and even annexationist rhetoric, met by Canadian nationalism and attempts to diversify. The roles of Trump and Carney are central – two personalities embodying these forces. With this understanding of history and the current clash, we now turn to the future. What scenarios might emerge from this turmoil? How could the Canada-U.S. trade relationship evolve in the next 5, 10, or 20 years? In the final section, we will use **foresight analysis** to outline a few plausible future scenarios, ranging from renewed partnership to prolonged estrangement, and consider their implications. The goal is not to predict exactly what will happen, but to map the possibilities so that businesses, policymakers, and citizens can better prepare for whatever comes next.

Future Forecast: Scenarios for the Canada-U.S. Trade Relationship

No one can say with certainty how the Canada-U.S. economic partnership will evolve – especially in these unprecedented times – but we can **envision distinct scenarios** based on key drivers and choices. Here we present three plausible futures for the trade relationship, each following the threads of our historical analysis and the current trajectory. These scenarios are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive, but they draw out different extremes to help illustrate the range of outcomes. Think of it as **scenario planning** for North America's trade:

Scenario 1: Reconciliation and Renewal – A Return to Stability

In this more optimistic scenario, cooler heads prevail before lasting damage is done. Economic realities and political pressure push both sides to step back from the brink. Perhaps as early as 2026, the U.S. and Canada reach a **negotiated settlement** to the trade war. Trump (or a similarly minded U.S. leader) might declare “victory” after extracting a token concession – say, an agreement by Canada to tighten border security on fentanyl or modestly raise its military spending (issues tangential to trade but important to the U.S.). In exchange, the U.S. lifts the punitive tariffs. The cycle of retaliation halts. This allows the USMCA framework to reassert itself. Under this scenario, **Canada-U.S. trade relations gradually stabilize and normalize through the late 2020s.** Both governments, chastened by the episode, turn back toward cooperation (at least pragmatically, if not with huge warmth). Regular forums like the USMCA joint commissions get to work smoothing irritants. The looming **2026 USMCA review** could become an opportunity to actually strengthen the agreement – for instance, clarifying rules to prevent misuse of “national security” tariffs among allies, or updating labor/environment provisions further. There might even be talks to **expand USMCA** in new areas (e.g. a chapter on critical minerals cooperation or more flexible rules on pharmaceuticals). Essentially, the two countries realize they are stuck with each other and decide to make the best of it.

Several factors could drive this reconciliation. For one, the *economic cost* of decoupling is simply too high. Companies on both sides lobby hard for relief. U.S. auto manufacturers, for example, could tell the White House that 25% tariffs on Canadian parts make their vehicles uncompetitive – leading to job losses in Michigan or Ohio, which Trump (or any president) would hate to see. Likewise, Canadian industries reliant on U.S. markets (from cattle ranchers to tech firms) press Ottawa to restore stable access. Public opinion, too, may shift – while nationalism surged initially, over time Canadians may experience “trade war fatigue”

as prices rise and certain exports languish. A desire for normalcy sets in. Another factor: *geopolitics*. If global tensions with countries like China or Russia worsen, the U.S. might recognize the strategic folly of fighting with Canada. A “North American alliance” could be seen as vital for supply chain security – for instance, jointly developing critical minerals (like lithium for EV batteries) to reduce reliance on China. Indeed, even amid current tensions, the U.S. **invested in Canadian mining projects for critical minerals** as part of its effort to build secure supply chains ⁸¹ ⁸² . That indicates a strong underlying incentive to cooperate. In a reconciliation scenario, we’d see **friend-shoring** take precedence over fighting. The U.S. and Canada (and Mexico) might form a tighter economic bloc oriented toward reducing dependence on overseas adversaries. This could mean **more integration in certain sectors** – ironically, a Trump-era concept called for reshoring production of essentials to North America, which would benefit Canada as a trusted partner. For example, if the U.S. pours subsidies into semiconductor fabrication or EV battery plants, Canada could partner and get a slice of that (as happened with a 2023 deal to build EV battery plants in Ontario with government support, aligned with U.S. goals). In essence, Scenario 1 ends up with a **re-energized North American trade relationship**, perhaps with a nationalist tint but still fundamentally cooperative. Carney’s push for diversification would not be abandoned – Canada would continue courting other markets – but the urgency would fade as the U.S. again becomes a reliable (if somewhat more protectionist) partner.

For businesses and investors, this scenario is relief: it means predictability returns. Tariffs come down, supply chains adjust back, and firms can plan for a future where North America remains one integrated market (albeit with some new rules). Over time, some of the trust and friendship at the political level could even be rebuilt – much as Canada-U.S. ties rebounded after past disputes (like the early 1970s Nixon shocks). By the 2030s, one could imagine a “**North American renaissance**” – the three USMCA countries leveraging their proximity and combined strengths in a world fractured into rival blocs. If the rest of the world splits into a China-centric bloc vs. a U.S./Europe bloc, North America’s cohesive trade region could be a major asset. But this happy ending requires that current leaders navigate back from confrontation and that future U.S. administrations refrain from America-First excesses. It may also require institutionalizing some changes (e.g. perhaps new USMCA clauses explicitly exempt Canada and Mexico from Section 232 national security tariffs, so this doesn’t happen again – a reform trade experts have advocated). In summary, **Scenario 1 is a future where pragmatism wins, the trade relationship heals, and North America emerges perhaps even stronger from the crucible.**

Scenario 2: Decoupling and Diversification – A Controlled Separation

In a more pessimistic (but not implausible) scenario, the breach in the relationship proves too wide to fully mend. North America does not formally dissolve USMCA, but the agreement becomes more of a shell while each country goes its own way economically. This “**decoupling**” scenario envisions Canada making a strategic decision that the U.S. market, while important, is *too risky* to depend on for the majority of its trade. Likewise, the U.S. continues a trajectory of unilateralism, where it’s willing to sacrifice some efficiency for sovereignty and control. The result is a gradual, managed disentangling of the two economies over a decade or more.

How might this look? Canada would heavily ramp up its **trade diversification efforts** to an unprecedented level. We’re talking big initiatives: for example, *fast-tracking export infrastructure* to ship oil, gas, grain, and minerals to overseas markets (perhaps doubling down on pipelines to Atlantic ports for oil/gas to Europe, given Europe’s hunger for non-Russian energy). **Asia-Pacific trade** would become a cornerstone – Canada might deepen ties with Japan and South Korea (already top-10 trade partners) and Southeast Asia. Joining regional agreements like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) or even rejoining a revised TPP if the

U.S. stays out could be options. If India's relationship improves (admittedly a big if given current tensions), a Canada-India trade deal could unlock access to that huge market. In this scenario, Carney or his successors also work to **complete full ratification of CETA** and expand it – maybe bringing in the UK (Canada already has an interim UK trade deal post-Brexit, which could be formalized into a comprehensive pact). Over time, if these efforts bear fruit, Canada could modestly reduce the U.S. share of its exports. For illustration, suppose by 2035 Canada manages to shift, say, 10-15% of what would have gone to the U.S. toward Europe and Asia. That might mean the U.S. is closer to 60% of exports instead of 75%. It's still dominant, but less so. The **goal** would be to avoid being held hostage by one partner's whims.

On the U.S. side, decoupling might manifest as a continued or intermittent use of tariffs and "Buy American" rules that marginalize Canada. Perhaps Trump (if still in power) or a similar populist leader keeps tariffs on Canadian goods in place for an extended period, effectively forcing companies to source domestically or elsewhere. Or even absent tariffs, the U.S. might pour subsidies into domestic manufacturing (as it is doing with the CHIPS Act, IRA, etc.) which make U.S. supply chains more self-contained. The new U.S. consensus, as noted, is to **"strengthen supply chains with allies but prioritize domestic industry"** ⁸⁰ ⁷⁹. In a decoupling scenario, the emphasis is more on the latter. Canada might find itself left out of some of these U.S.-centric plans. For instance, if the U.S. decided to impose strict electric vehicle credit rules favoring only U.S.-assembled cars (there was a proposal in 2021 for EV credits only for U.S.-made vehicles), that would hurt Canada's auto sector and push it to pivot to exporting EVs to Europe instead. **Supply chains could slowly reorient**: maybe fewer Canadian auto parts go south, and instead Canadian plants integrate more with European carmakers via CETA. Likewise, Canada might develop more capacity to process its own resources (like critical minerals or lumber) domestically if U.S. market access is uncertain.

This scenario would likely mean **USMCA languishes or is effectively neutered**. The 2026 review might be contentious; perhaps the U.S. doesn't outright pull out (which would cause huge investor uncertainty), but they might not renew it beyond the 16-year mark, meaning it could expire in 2036. Even before that, if tariffs remain in place, the spirit of "free trade" is gone. Canada could in theory challenge U.S. actions under USMCA dispute mechanisms (and likely win, since such broad tariffs violate the agreement's intent), but enforcement against a superpower's will is tricky – the U.S. could ignore panel rulings, as it has with WTO rulings. In decoupling, international trade rules become less effective. It's a bit of a Wild West of each country for itself.

What would the economic impact be? In the short to medium term, painful. Canadian industries that grew around easy U.S. access would need to downsize or reinvent for other markets. Some would inevitably shrink – e.g. parts of the auto supply chain might atrophy if the U.S. no longer imports much from Canada and if global competition is fierce. Consumers in both countries would pay higher costs due to less efficient supply lines. There could be a persistent drag on GDP growth. But decoupling doesn't mean total cutoff; the U.S. and Canada would still trade a lot (they are neighbors after all). It's more a relative shift. Perhaps the trade relationship becomes more **transactional and selective**. For example, energy might remain a strong link (the U.S. still needs Canadian oil unless it achieves energy independence; Canada needs to sell its oil somewhere, and the U.S. is easiest). But other sectors like manufacturing integrate less. Over time, both economies adapt. Canada becomes more like other mid-sized countries that spread their trade across multiple partners. The U.S. insulates itself with domestic production or sourcing from a diverse set (including maybe more from Mexico or allies beyond North America).

A decoupling scenario also has **strategic and political ramifications**. It could weaken the Western alliance system – if Canada can't rely on the U.S. economically, it may hedge more in foreign policy too (perhaps a bit

more independent stance in international forums, or working with Europe on issues where the U.S. isn't engaged). The U.S., for its part, might pay less attention to Canada's concerns (leading to more misunderstanding on everything from border issues to Arctic security). North America might lose some competitive edge globally as well; production might shift to Asia or Europe where scale is bigger.

However, one *potential upside* for Canada: decoupling might spur the country to address internal inefficiencies and innovate. If the easy path of selling to the U.S. is blocked, Canadian businesses might get hungrier and more outward-looking to the rest of the world. It could be a catalyst for diversifying the economy (for instance, boosting the tech sector to sell to global markets, or increasing food/agriculture exports to Asia). In a way, it's a return to the idea of the **"Third Option"** from the 1970s – building a more self-reliant yet globally diversified economy – but this time out of necessity, not just choice.

Overall, **Scenario 2 depicts a cooler, more distant Canada-U.S. trade relationship**, where the two countries aren't enemies by any means, but the special partnership erodes. Tariffs and barriers might come and go, but a level of mistrust persists, so firms plan with redundancy (no more assuming a plant in Ontario can always ship freely to California, for example). Canada leans on other allies, and the U.S. lumps Canada in with any other country when pursuing its protectionist agendas (no special treatment). This scenario is not a collapse – trade continues, but it's fundamentally reduced in importance and politicized. It's a world where the North American ideal of an ever-closer economic union fades, replaced by a more Westphalian trade environment.

Scenario 3: Muddle Through – Competitive Partners in a New Normal

In this middle-ground scenario, neither a full rapprochement nor a serious decoupling occurs. Instead, Canada and the U.S. **muddle through a prolonged period of semi-cooperative, semi-contentious trade relations**. You might call it a **"Cold Peace"** economically: the two countries remain fundamentally tied by geography and business ties, USMCA stays in force, but tensions and periodic skirmishes become the *new normal*.

Under this scenario, the current trade war might de-escalate somewhat – perhaps the blanket tariffs are lifted after a year or two, but **other disputes continue to flare up frequently**. We could see a reversion to the historical pattern of chronic sectoral spats: e.g., the **softwood lumber dispute** goes unresolved and duties yo-yo up and down (as they have for 40+ years); the U.S. might impose **"safeguard" tariffs on Canadian dairy or steel** if it deems surges are harming U.S. producers; Canada might challenge U.S. agricultural subsidies or "Buy American" policies through legal means but only win partial victories. Essentially, **friction is constant, but contained**. Both sides avoid nuclear options (like tearing up USMCA or all-out tariff wars) because the economic stakes are too high, but neither do they return to the trust and comity of the past. Political rhetoric may remain testy. For instance, Trump (or a successor) could continue to tweet barbs at Canada occasionally, and Canadian leaders use the U.S. as a convenient foil to score points at home ("we won't be pushed around," etc.), but behind closed doors they keep channels open to manage issues pragmatically.

One can liken this scenario to a dysfunctional but workable marriage – divorce doesn't happen, yet the bickering never fully stops. On the ground, companies adapt by building in buffers. A Canadian manufacturer, for example, might keep a small warehouse of inventory in the U.S. or a secondary supply source outside North America in case a sudden tariff hits one of its inputs. American buyers of Canadian goods might diversify their supplier base a bit, just to hedge against trade disruptions. Both countries'

governments possibly institute **early warning systems and rapid negotiations** whenever a dispute pops up, to prevent it escalating. They might strike *micro-deals* – e.g., an annual quota arrangement here, a temporary exemption there – to put out fires.

The **USMCA persists but isn't significantly expanded**. It's basically a framework that prevents the worst protectionism but allows for some leeway. Notably, USMCA's **dispute resolution mechanism** (state-to-state panels) could see more use. In a muddle-through world, Canada would likely bring cases against U.S. actions (and vice versa) frequently. For instance, if the U.S. applies a dubious tariff, a panel might rule against it, giving Canada some leverage to retaliate in a measured way if the U.S. doesn't comply. (We've seen this before under NAFTA: panels ruled repeatedly that U.S. duties on softwood lumber were too high, which led to negotiated settlements). This kind of legalistic managing of conflict becomes routine. It's not smooth sailing, but it keeps things from derailing entirely.

Canada in this scenario still pursues *some* diversification, but not with the urgency of Scenario 2. It may incrementally grow trade with Europe/Asia (simply because those economies are growing faster than the U.S.), but the U.S. remains the lion's share. Mark Carney's bold pronouncements about the friendship being "over" might be toned down once in office to "the friendship is changing." Canada's strategy could be to **align with the U.S. where possible (especially in areas of mutual benefit like defense production, critical minerals, etc.)**, to remind the U.S. that it's an ally, while quietly hedging bets elsewhere. The U.S., for its part, in this scenario recognizes Canada's value as a partner (especially vis-à-vis China/Russia) and thus tries not to push Canada too far. Think of something like: the U.S. continues "**Buy American**" rules in government procurement, but grants Canadian firms some waivers or access recognizing the integrated nature of industries. This actually happened historically (Canada often lobbies for exemption from Buy American, sometimes successfully, sometimes not fully). So some accommodations occur, but the protectionist ethos remains in Washington.

In a muddle-through scenario, both economies still grow and trade grows, but probably slower than it would in a fully harmonious relationship. There's an **opportunity cost** to the friction. For example, a big cross-border infrastructure project might get postponed because of uncertainty, or investors might choose to build a new plant in the U.S. South rather than Ontario to avoid border risks – not a dramatic withdrawal, but some lost opportunities for Canada. Conversely, some U.S. companies might refrain from sourcing in Canada even if cheaper, due to political risk. Over time, this can mildly erode competitiveness.

Politically, this scenario might be the most realistic given current trends: it assumes no dramatic reversal of U.S. trade policy, but also no complete breakdown – just a grind of continued negotiation. It's essentially **the status quo stretched out**: a bit like the 2018-2019 period (when NAFTA was uncertain, tariffs were on, but talks were ongoing), extended into a steady state.

One could argue that historically, Canada–U.S. trade relations have often been a version of muddle-through. Even during the NAFTA golden age, there were periodic disputes (softwood lumber wars, wheat fights, etc.). The difference now is the scope – the issues might be broader (touching autos, metals, etc., not just a few sectors) and the public attention higher. In this scenario, Canadians might simply get *used to* a more combative trade stance from the U.S. and factor that into their politics. It could become normal for Canadian PMs to openly criticize U.S. trade actions (something they usually tried to avoid in the past). On the U.S. side, Canada might fade a bit from the spotlight as attention goes to bigger rivalries (like with China). The trade relationship could slip into benign neglect punctuated by fights – not ideal, but not catastrophic.

In summary, **Scenario 3 maintains the core of the partnership but in a more contentious form.** Integration slows but doesn't reverse; decoupling is avoided but so is deepening. Essentially, the two countries *manage* their interdependence without fully trusting it. This scenario could prevail if neither extreme (cooperation nor conflict) delivers a knock-out blow – a kind of stalemate of moderate protectionism.

Which scenario will come to pass? Reality may contain elements of all three. For instance, we might see a near-term muddling through that eventually gives way to a renewal if leadership changes, or a period of cold peace that slowly drifts toward partial decoupling if conflicts aren't resolved. The **key drivers** to watch include: U.S. domestic politics (does a more protectionist or more multilateralist leadership hold sway after 2024?); global geopolitical context (a tense global scene can either unite or further divide North America); and Canada's strategic choices (how aggressively and successfully it diversifies its trade).

One hopeful sign is that **economic gravity is a powerful force.** The sheer volume of Canada–U.S. commerce – nearly **\$1 trillion USD in goods and services trade in 2023** ²⁷ ⁸³ – creates constituencies in both countries that want to maintain ties. Millions of jobs depend on cross-border business, from auto workers in Ontario and Michigan to farmers on the Prairies and the Great Plains, to tech companies in Toronto and California. These stakeholders act as a glue, advocating against severing the relationship entirely. History shows that while trade wars happen, they often spur counter-pressures for cooperation. For example, Smoot–Hawley's damage led to Roosevelt's reciprocal trade agenda; the 1980s sectoral spats led to the FTA/NAFTA to resolve them systematically. So it's possible the current turmoil could eventually prompt **new cooperative frameworks.** Perhaps out of the Trump–Carney drama, a renewed appreciation will emerge in Washington for North American integration (especially as it competes with China). Canada, too, will learn lessons – likely deciding to never again rely *quite so heavily* on one partner, and to invest in domestic resilience.

For businesses and investors, the best approach under uncertainty is to remain **agile and informed.** Scenario planning isn't about predicting the exact future, but preparing for different ones. Companies might consider strategies that are robust under multiple scenarios: e.g., diversifying export markets (which helps whether the U.S. market shrinks or not), strengthening **supply chain resiliency** (so a sudden tariff or border slowdown doesn't break operations), and engaging in policy dialogues (business voices can urge governments toward the reconciliation path by highlighting mutual benefits).

From a public policy perspective, Canada can take steps that pay off regardless of what the U.S. does: removing interprovincial trade barriers, investing in innovation and education, building trade infrastructure, and expanding trade promotion in new markets are all prudent moves that increase Canada's flexibility. The U.S., on the other hand, would do well to remember that **its closest allies like Canada are strategic assets** in a competitive world. Undercutting each other only aids competitors. As a U.S. strategist might note, a North America united economically is far stronger against external economic threats (like a more aggressive China trade policy) than a fragmented one.

In closing, the **Canada–U.S. trade relationship has weathered many storms** – from the cancellation of the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty, to the high-tariff era of the early 20th century, to the political dogfights over free trade in 1911 and 1988, and the recent renegotiation of NAFTA. Each time, the two nations found a new equilibrium, sometimes swinging toward openness, other times toward restriction. Today's challenges, though intense, are another phase in this long saga. As Mark Carney invoked hockey analogies to signal

toughness, it's worth extending the metaphor: **Canada and the U.S. are on the same ice, sometimes as teammates, sometimes as rivals, but ultimately playing in a league where they're bound by shared rules and rink.** The hope is that after the current scrimmage, they remember they're actually wearing the same colors more often than not – both benefit from a fair and open game. But if not, Canada will adjust and skate where it must, and the U.S. will play on, and the game will continue, just with new tactics.

In any outcome, one constant remains: the geography and economic complementarities that made Canada and the United States natural trading partners in the first place. Those fundamentals suggest that outright divorce is unlikely. Instead, we will see **ebb and flow** – periods of friction, periods of alignment. Smart policy and business strategy will account for this rhythm. As the pendulum of policy swings, the lessons of history counsel a balance: embrace the efficiencies and growth that come from integration, yet always be prepared with a Plan B when the winds change. Canada-U.S. trade has been a cornerstone of prosperity for both countries. With wisdom (and a bit of luck), it can continue to be so, even as it adapts to new political realities. The next chapter is yet to be written, and it will be up to leaders and citizens on both sides of the border to steer this relationship toward a future of shared prosperity – or, failing that, at least **manage a respectful coexistence** that minimizes harm and maximizes each nation's strengths.

The stakes are high. But if history is any guide, Canada and the United States will find a way – not without difficulty, not without disagreement – but ultimately in recognition that **their fortunes, like their peoples, are deeply intertwined.** And that is a bond not easily broken, tariff wars or not.

Sources: Historical data and events are drawn from a variety of sources, including trade archives and encyclopedias. The end of the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty and its link to Canadian Confederation are documented in scholarly accounts ⁴. Canada's protectionist National Policy and its long tenure are described in the Canadian Encyclopedia and related histories ⁵ ⁶. The defeat of reciprocity in the 1911 election, influenced by U.S. annexationist rhetoric, is recorded in historical analyses ⁷. Statistics on the collapse of trade during the Smoot-Hawley tariff era and Canada's retaliation come from contemporary reports (e.g., *Time* magazine) ¹⁰ ⁸⁴. The success of the 1965 Auto Pact in boosting Canadian auto production and jobs is supported by economic studies ¹⁵. Quotes and details about the 1988 FTA battle and NAFTA's impact (trade growth and criticisms) are reported in both academic and journalistic sources ²¹ ²⁶. Recent scenario elements regarding the **Trump-Carney era** are informed by expert commentary and scenario exercises – for instance, Atlantic Council and CFR analyses provide quotes from Carney and context on his approach to Trump ⁵³ ⁵¹. Trade data on daily and annual Canada-U.S. trade volumes come from official trade statistics ¹ ⁸³. The discussion of future scenarios synthesizes insights from policy think-tanks like the Wilson Center, which notes the new U.S. consensus blending nationalism with ally-focused supply chain strategy ⁷⁹. These sources collectively shed light on the enduring themes and current turning point in Canada-U.S. trade relations, helping inform a forward-looking view grounded in evidence and expert insight.

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