

The Ouroboros of Sovereignty: An Analytic Investigation into the Logical and Philosophical Paradoxes of the 2024 South Korean Martial Law Crisis

Minseong Kim

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ORCiD:0000-0003-2115-081X

mkimacad@gmail.com

Abstract

The declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk-yeol on December 3, 2024, and the subsequent counter-mobilization by the National Assembly and civil society, represents a watershed moment in contemporary democratic theory. It constitutes a profound logical paradox within the architecture of modern constitutional governance, transcending the conventional boundaries of political science and entering the realm of analytic philosophy and modal logic. While the immediate political narrative frames the event as a binary clash between authoritarian overreach and democratic resilience, a rigorous investigation reveals a deeper, structural tension: a **Gödelian incompleteness** within the constitutional order itself.

In this dynamic, both the Executive (Yoon) and the Legislature (the Democratic Party-led opposition) invoked the preservation of the constitutional order to justify actions that formally suspended or paralyzed that very order. Yoon utilized the "State of Exception" (Carl Schmitt) to combat what he termed "anti-state forces," while the opposition utilized "Militant Democracy" (Karl Loewenstein) to preemptively neutralize the executive through impeachment and budgetary asphyxiation. This paper dissects these competing claims to sovereignty, analyzing the event not merely as a failure of politics, but as a recursive logical loop where the mechanisms designed to protect democracy became the instruments of its potential negation. The analysis posits that the crisis in South Korea demonstrates the limits of Karl Popper's *Paradox of Tolerance*—which posits that a society must be intolerant of intolerance to survive—and instead manifests a deeper logical antinomy regarding the locus of sovereignty when the procedural machinery of the state enters an infinite regress of mutual negation.

Disclaimer

The view expressed in this paper has nothing to do with the political view of the author. In particular, I do not believe President Yoon proceeded with the martial law declaration after deep philosophical and legal contemplations. This paper should therefore be read as a (hypothetical) experiment. More information regarding this experiment will be disclosed at later dates.

Part I: The Phenomenology of the Crisis and the Collapse of the Symbolic Order

1.1 The Event Horizon: The Night of December 3, 2024

At 22:27 KST on December 3, 2024, President Yoon Suk-yeol appeared on national television to declare emergency martial law. This act, the first of its kind in South Korea since 1979, was not precipitated by foreign invasion or armed domestic rebellion in the conventional sense, but by what the President described as a "paralysis of state affairs" caused by the opposition's "legislative dictatorship". The phenomenology of this declaration is critical to understanding the philosophical stakes. Yoon did not frame his actions as a coup *against* the state, but rather as an "act of governance" *for* the state. The declaration was a performative speech act intended to alter the ontological status of the political order, transforming the "normal" operational mode of the republic into a "State of Exception."

The text of the declaration and the subsequent Martial Law Command Proclamation No. 1 prohibited all political activities, placed media under control, and ordered striking medical personnel back to work. Yet, the rationale provided was distinctly metaphysical: the elimination of "anti-state forces" (ban-gukga seryeok) accused of sympathizing with North Korea and subverting the constitutional order from within. This rhetoric stripped the opposition of their status as legitimate political adversaries, relegating them to the category of existential enemies. The immediacy of the military deployment—helicopters descending on the National Assembly, special forces scaling the dome, and the physical barricading of the legislative chamber—served as the kinetic manifestation of this metaphysical claim.

1.2 The Recursive Response: Proceduralism as Counter-Weapon

The response from the National Assembly was immediate and strictly procedural. Utilizing Article 77 of the Constitution, which mandates the lifting of martial law upon a majority vote of the National Assembly, 190 lawmakers convened to nullify the decree. The logistics of this assembly were dramatic: lawmakers scaled walls and physically wrestled with soldiers to enter the chamber, a visceral assertion of legislative sovereignty against executive force.

Here lies the first layer of the paradox: The President declared martial law to bypass a

"paralyzed" legislature that he deemed an existential threat to the state. The legislature then used the very constitutional powers the President sought to suspend to negate the suspension. The military, caught between the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and the constitutional authority of the Assembly, largely hesitated or complied with the latter, leading to the revocation of the edict six hours later. This sequence of events produced a "dual state" reality where two competing sovereignties—the Executive claiming emergency prerogative and the Legislature claiming procedural supremacy—clashed within the same legal spacetime.

The subsequent impeachment of President Yoon and the charges of "insurrection" leveled against him signaled the transition from a political dispute to a battle over the fundamental definition of the state itself. The conflict ceased to be about policy and became a struggle over the "meta-rules" of the system: Who has the authority to decide when the system is broken? Is the constitution a suicide pact, or does it contain an unwritten clause of executive salvation?

Part II: The Logic of the Executive — The "Anti-State" Singularity

2.1 The Epistemology of "Anti-State Forces"

To understand the pro-Yoon forces' justification, one must analyze the epistemological framework Yoon employed. His argument was not merely political dissatisfaction but a claim to a "higher truth" regarding the nature of the opposition. He categorized the Democratic Party (DPK) not as a "loyal opposition" but as "anti-state forces" (*ban-gukga seryeok*) explicitly linked to North Korean communist interests.

The evidentiary basis for this claim, as presented by pro-Yoon forces, relied heavily on the "KCTU Spy Ring" cases. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) had uncovered that high-ranking officials of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) had held meetings with North Korean agents in Cambodia and China, receiving over 100 directives from Pyongyang. These directives included orders to organize anti-government rallies and "paralyze" the Yoon administration. Yoon's logic was transitive: The DPK supports the KCTU; the KCTU is infiltrated by North Korean spies; therefore, the DPK acts as a conduit for North Korean subversion.

This syllogism, while politically contentious, provided the *internal logical consistency* for the martial law declaration. If the legislature is indeed acting as a proxy for a hostile foreign power (North Korea), then the normal constitutional mechanisms (elections, parliamentary debate) are compromised. The "infection" is within the system itself. Therefore, the system cannot heal itself; it requires an external intervention—martial law—to excise the "cancer".

2.2 The "Legislative Dictatorship" as a Denial of Service

Yoon's second justification was the operational paralysis of the state, which he termed "legislative dictatorship". This was not a rhetorical flourish but a description of a specific strategy of governance denial employed by the opposition.

Table 1: Metrics of the "Legislative Dictatorship" (as cited by Yoon)

Action Category	Specific Measures	Strategic Intent (Pro-Yoon Interpretation)
Impeachment Warfare	22 motions against officials, including the Interior Minister, Defense Minister, and Prosecutors.	To decapitate the executive branch and halt criminal investigations into opposition leader Lee Jae-myung.
Budgetary Asphyxiation	4.1 trillion won cut from the national budget, including disaster response reserves and youth employment funds.	To induce administrative failure and economic crisis, eroding the government's legitimacy.
Judicial Paralysis	Threatening judges and impeaching prosecutors; refusing to appoint Supreme Court justices.	To dismantle the rule of law and create a zone of impunity for opposition corruption.
Legislative Blockade	Refusal to pass spy-law amendments or economic revitalization bills.	To prevent the state from defending itself against espionage and economic decline.

From Yoon's perspective, these actions constituted a "Denial of Service" (DoS) attack on the state's operating system. The opposition was using the *forms* of democracy (voting, motions) to destroy the *substance* of governance (security, budgeting, justice). This created a logical paradox: Can a democracy be allowed to vote itself into paralysis? Yoon answered "No," invoking the Schmittian principle that the survival of the state precedes the validity of the law.

2.3 The "Empty Gun" Paradox and the Failure of Performative Violence

A critical anomaly in Yoon's coup was the nature of the force deployed. Reports indicate that

many of the troops sent to the National Assembly were armed with "empty guns" or non-lethal equipment. Yoon later argued that this proved his intent was not to seize power permanently but to make a "symbolic" shock to the system—to "sound the alarm" to the sovereign people.

This reveals a deep performative contradiction. Martial law relies on the absolute threat of kinetic violence to suspend the law. By deploying a "symbolic" martial law, Yoon engaged in a "semiotic coup"—an attempt to change reality through the *image* of force rather than force itself. This failure to commit to the brutal logic of the coup allowed the "reality" of procedural democracy (the 190 lawmakers) to assert itself. The "empty gun" became a metaphor for the hollow nature of executive sovereignty in a highly institutionalized democracy; the symbol could not override the procedure.

Part III: The Logic of the Legislature — Proceduralism and Militant Democracy

3.1 The Proceduralist Defense

The opposition's defense was grounded in strict legal positivism. Regardless of the President's grievances, the Constitution provides specific remedies for political conflict, none of which include martial law in the absence of war. The Democratic Party argued that the budget cuts and impeachments were legitimate exercises of legislative checks and balances. If the President disliked them, the remedy was political negotiation, not military suppression.

By physically entering the Assembly and voting to lift the decree, the opposition asserted the supremacy of **Procedural Truth** over **Substantive Truth**. Even if Yoon's claims about "anti-state forces" were substantively true (a point they vehemently denied), the *procedure* for addressing them must be legal. By stepping outside the procedure, Yoon became the "anti-state" force.

3.2 The Weaponization of "Militant Democracy"

Following the failure of martial law, the opposition pivoted to a strategy of "Militant Democracy" (*Streitbare Demokratie*). This concept, originating from post-war Germany, posits that democracy must proactively disable forces that seek to destroy it.

The opposition applied this logic to the President himself. They argued that Yoon's "insurrection" proved he was a danger to the democratic order and must be removed immediately. The swift impeachment and the demand for "severe justice" (including the death penalty for insurrection) were framed not as political retribution, but as a necessary defense of the constitution.

This creates a symmetry of intolerance. Yoon used martial law to "protect democracy" from the legislature. The legislature used impeachment to "protect democracy" from the President. Both sides claimed the mantle of the "Guardian of the Constitution," employing the tools of the state to annihilate the other.

Part IV: Beyond Popper — The Symmetry of Intolerance

4.1 The Inadequacy of the Paradox of Tolerance

Karl Popper's *Paradox of Tolerance*, articulated in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, suggests that if a society extends unlimited tolerance to the intolerant, it will eventually be destroyed by them. Therefore, a tolerant society must reserve the right to be intolerant toward intolerance. In the context of the Korean crisis, both sides mobilized this paradox as a primary justification for their actions.

Table 2: The Dual Application of Popper's Paradox

Actor	The "Tolerant" Self	The "Intolerant" Other	Justification for Suppression
President Yoon (Pro-Yoon Forces)	Guardian of Liberal Democracy and the Free Constitutional Order.	The "Legislative Dictatorship" (DPK) that impeaches prosecutors, cuts budgets, and tolerates N. Korean sympathizers.	Martial Law is necessary to "eradicate" forces that refuse to engage in rational democratic governance and seek to overthrow the system.
The Opposition (Democratic Party)	Representative of the People's Will and Procedural Democracy.	The "Prosecutorial Dictatorship" (Yoon) that criminalizes politics and attempts to rule by decree/martial law.	Impeachment and "Militant Democracy" are necessary to remove a leader who threatens the democratic order with

			authoritarianism.
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4.2 Why Popper Fails: The Absence of a Neutral Baseline

The limitation of applying Popper to the 2024 crisis lies in the symmetry of the claims. Popper's paradox assumes a clear distinction between a "tolerant" majority or status quo and a specific "intolerant" faction (e.g., Nazis, totalitarian movements) that operates outside the norms of rational argument. However, in South Korea, the conflict was not between a democratic state and an external anti-democratic faction, but between two co-equal branches of the constitutional government, both claiming to represent the "true" democratic order.

- Yoon argued that the Opposition's use of democratic procedure (budget cuts, impeachments) was substantively intolerant and destructive.
- The Opposition argued that Yoon's use of executive power (vetoes, enforcement decrees, and finally martial law) was substantively intolerant and autocratic.

When both sides successfully claim the mantle of "protecting tolerance" to justify the elimination of the other, the paradox collapses into a tautology. It ceases to be a guide for preserving democracy and becomes a rhetorical weapon for Schmittian friend-enemy distinction. The crisis in Seoul was not that one side was tolerant and the other intolerant; it was that both were strictly "intolerant of the other's intolerance," leading to a spiral of escalation that shattered the norms of mutual forbearance. Consequently, we must transcend Popper and look to more structural logical paradoxes: those of Carl Schmitt's sovereign decisionism and Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

Part V: The Schmittian Turn — Sovereignty and the Category Mistake

5.1 The Schmittian Definition of the Enemy

Carl Schmitt, the German jurist and political theorist, defined the political as the distinction between **Friend and Enemy**. For Schmitt, the specific nature of the political enemy is not a personal adversary, but a public enemy (*hostis*)—an existential threat to the collective's way of life.

President Yoon's rhetoric leading up to and during the martial law declaration is textually Schmittian. He explicitly categorized the opposition not as "political opponents" (a category within parliamentary democracy) but as "anti-state forces" (*ban-gukga seryeok*) and "forces seeking to overthrow the system".

- He linked the opposition to "North Korean communist forces," thereby externalizing the internal opposition.

- He described the National Assembly as a "den of criminals", stripping it of its institutional legitimacy and reducing it to a criminal enterprise.

This represents a profound **Category Mistake** within democratic theory. Democracy relies on the categorization of rivals as "opponents" (who are legitimate and temporary) rather than "enemies" (who are illegitimate and existential). By framing the opposition as an existential threat to the "free and democratic constitutional order," Yoon moved the conflict out of the realm of parliamentary debate (liberalism) and into the realm of the *political* (existential struggle). In Schmitt's framework, liberalism attempts to neutralize the political by turning the enemy into a debating partner; Yoon's declaration was an attempt to re-politicize the state by identifying and eliminating the enemy.

5.2 The Sovereign Decision and its Failure

Schmitt's most famous dictum is: "*Sovereign is he who decides on the exception*". The state of exception (*Ausnahmezustand*) is a situation where the legal order is suspended to save the legal order. Yoon's defense of martial law rests entirely on this logic. In his closing arguments during the insurrection trial, Yoon stated:

"The president's exercise of emergency powers cannot be an insurrection... I declared martial law to inform the sovereign people of this national emergency."

Here, Yoon claims that the "paralysis of state affairs" (budget cuts, impeachments) constituted a **substantive** emergency that the **procedural** law (parliamentary votes) could not address. He argued that the written constitution (the "law on the books") was being used to destroy the existential constitution (the state itself). Therefore, as the Sovereign (entrusted by the people), he had to decide on the exception to preserve the state.

However, the crisis arose because Yoon's claim to sovereignty was contested and ultimately rejected. Schmitt argues that sovereignty is demonstrated by the success of the decision—the ability to actually suspend the norm. Yoon declared the exception, but the norm (the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court) swallowed the exception. The National Assembly's refusal to accept the "enemy" designation, and the military's reluctance to enforce it with lethal force, meant that Yoon failed the Schmittian test of sovereignty.

Part VI: The Gödelian Gap — A Constitutional Incompleteness Theorem

To fully understand the logical tension where pro-Yoon forces justify martial law and opposition forces argue for insurrection charges, we must apply a lens from mathematical logic: **Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems**.

6.1 Gödel's Theorem Applied to Legal Systems

Kurt Gödel proved that in any sufficiently complex formal system (like arithmetic), there exist statements that are true but unprovable within the system. Furthermore, a system cannot prove its own consistency from within itself. Constitutional scholars have long applied this to law: A legal system cannot fully regulate its own creation or its own suspension. There is always a "gap" where the law runs out, and power must step in.

6.2 The South Korean Constitutional Paradox

The South Korean Constitution contains a Gödelian self-reference paradox that fueled the crisis.

1. **Article 77 (The Martial Law Power):** Allows the President to suspend the constitutional order to protect it. This is the system attempting to account for its own potential failure.
2. **Article 65 (The Impeachment Power):** Allows the Legislature to suspend the President to protect the constitutional order.

Yoon's argument was that the Legislature was abusing Article 65 (impeachment) and the budget power to create an "inconsistent" system—a government that existed on paper but could not function in reality ("vegetative government"). He attempted to step *outside* the system (via Martial Law) to "reboot" it. The Opposition's argument was that Yoon was abusing Article 77 to create an "inconsistent" system—a democracy without a parliament. They used the system's internal logic (voting to lift martial law) to prove its consistency.

The Logical Paradox:

- Yoon claimed the system was **inconsistent** (broken by opposition) and therefore required an external fix (Martial Law).
- The Opposition claimed the system was **complete** (functioning via checks and balances) and therefore Yoon's external fix was illegal (Insurrection).

This is a classic Gödelian bind. Yoon tried to act as the "meta-language" deciding on the validity of the system. The Constitutional Court and the Assembly asserted that there is no meta-language higher than the Constitution itself. By ruling that the President's act was "insurrection," the Court effectively stated that the system *must* be closed; there is no "outside" from which a President can save the state.

6.3 The "Anti-State" Singularity as the Undecidable Proposition

The term "anti-state forces" functions as the **undecidable proposition** in this system.

- If the opposition parties are truly "anti-state" (North Korean agents), then the Constitution cannot protect them, because the Constitution presupposes the existence of the state. Yoon's logic is valid *if* this premise is true.
- However, the legal system provides no mechanism to prove the opposition is "anti-state"

- other than through the very judicial processes Yoon claimed were paralyzed.
- Thus, Yoon attempted to solve an epistemic problem (are they spies?) with an ontological act (Martial Law). This category error—treating a political rival as a confirmed military enemy without judicial proof—caused the collapse of his legitimacy.
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Part VII: The Infinite Regress of Institutional Checks

The crisis also demonstrates the problem of **Infinite Regress** in democratic theory: "Who guards the guardians?".

7.1 The Cycle of Accountability

The logical structure of the South Korean crisis can be mapped as a circular firing squad of accountability:

1. **The Prosecutors** investigate the Opposition Leader (Lee Jae-myung) for corruption.
2. **The Opposition (Legislature)** impeaches the Prosecutors to stop the investigation.
3. **The President** vetoes the Legislature's bills and refuses to appoint officials, paralyzing the Judiciary (Supreme Court justices).
4. **The Legislature** attempts to impeach the President's cabinet (defense, interior).
5. **The President** declares Martial Law to dissolve the Legislature.
6. **The Legislature** votes to lift Martial Law and impeaches the President.
7. **The Constitutional Court** decides on the President's impeachment.

The paradox arises because each step is formally constitutional (except arguably the declaration of martial law without proper cabinet deliberation), yet the aggregate result is the destruction of governance. This is what Yoon termed "Legislative Dictatorship" and what the Opposition termed "Executive Dictatorship."

7.2 The Collapse of the Neutral Third

In a stable democracy, the Judiciary acts as the neutral arbiter to break this regress. However, the crisis in Korea was exacerbated because the Judiciary itself became a combatant. The Opposition impeached prosecutors and threatened to impeach judges, and Yoon cited the paralysis of the Judiciary as a reason for Martial Law. When the referee is dragged into the fight, the game collapses. The Infinite Regress problem suggests that there is no logical end to the checking of power unless there is a shared normative commitment to *restraint*—a commitment that had evaporated in the polarized atmosphere of Korean politics.

Part VIII: The Role of Civil Society and the "Right of Resistance"

8.1 The "Right of Resistance" as Constitutional Safety Valve

While the legal battles raged, the streets of Seoul witnessed a reactivation of the "Right of Resistance" (*Jeohanggwon*). This concept, though not explicitly codified in the main text of the current Constitution as a standalone right, is rooted in the Preamble's reference to the "April 19 Revolution" and has been recognized by the Constitutional Court as a natural law right of citizens to resist the destruction of the constitutional order.

On the night of December 3, citizens physically blocked armored vehicles with their bodies and cars, acting as the ultimate "check" on executive power. This mobilization was not merely a protest; it was a constitutional act. By physically enforcing the separation of powers (preventing soldiers from arresting lawmakers), the citizenry resolved the logical deadlock that the institutions could not.

8.2 The "Gwangju Trauma" and Historical Memory

The swift and overwhelming public reaction was driven by historical memory. The specter of the 1980 Gwangju Uprising, where martial law troops massacred civilians, meant that the "symbolic" martial law of 2024 was immediately interpreted through the lens of historical trauma. This historical weight stripped Yoon's declaration of any potential legitimacy. The public did not see a "necessary measure against anti-state forces"; they saw the return of the military dictatorship. This demonstrates that constitutional interpretation is not just a matter of text, but of historical context and collective memory.

Part IX: Analytic Investigation of the "Insurrection" Charge

The legal crux of the aftermath is whether Yoon's act constitutes "Insurrection" (*Naeran*) under Article 87 of the Criminal Act.

9.1 The Paradox of the Sovereign Insurrectionist

A "self-coup" creates a linguistic and logical problem: Can the Head of State commit insurrection against the State?

- **Yoon's Argument:** No. The President *is* the embodiment of the State's executive power. Exercising constitutional emergency powers (even if judged incorrectly) is an "act of governance" (*Regierung*), not a crime. To charge the President with insurrection is to confuse the State with the *Government*.
- **The Prosecution/Court's Argument:** Yes. The "State" is the Constitutional Order, not the person of the President. When the President mobilizes troops to blockade the National Assembly (the representative of the Sovereign People), he is attacking the State.

This confirms the victory of **Legal Positivism** and **Constitutional Sovereignty** over **Schmittian Decisionism** in the Korean courts. The ruling that Yoon "abused his enormous influence... to prevent the execution of legitimate warrants" and "undermined democratic institutions" cements the idea that the President is merely an organ of the law, not its master.

9.2 The Role of "Intention" (Mens Rea)

The paradox deepens when examining intention. Yoon claims his intention was to "restore" the order. The Court ruled his intention was to "obstruct" the order. From an analytic philosophy perspective, this highlights the **Indeterminacy of Political Action**. The same physical act (deploying troops) can be interpreted as "saving the state" or "destroying the state" depending entirely on the success of the act and the *political narrative* that prevails. Had the military successfully dissolved the Assembly and "found" evidence of North Korean collusion, history might have judged it a necessary rescue. Because it failed, it is an insurrection.

Part X: Conclusion – The Ouroboros of Sovereignty

The South Korean martial law crisis of 2024 is a textbook case of a logical paradox manifesting in political reality. It transcends Popper's Paradox of Tolerance because it is not a case of a tolerant society facing an intolerant fringe, but of a divided society where two constitutional powers viewed the other's existence as logically incompatible with the survival of the state.

10.1 Summary of Logical Tensions

Philosophical Concept	Yoon's Position (Executive)	Opposition's Position (Legislature)	The Resulting Paradox
Sovereignty (Schmitt)	Sovereign is he who decides the exception. The President must act <i>extra-legally</i> to save the law.	Sovereign is the Constitution/People . The President must always act within the law.	A clash between Decisionism and Normativism . The Norm defeated the Decision.
Incompleteness (Gödel)	The system is inconsistent (paralyzed); it requires an external	The system is complete (self-correcting); the "fix" is an error	The "Anti-State" force is an undecidable proposition . The

	"fix" (Martial Law).	(Insurrection).	legal system cannot prove its own consistency without breaking its own rules.
Tolerance (Popper)	We cannot tolerate those who use democracy to destroy the state (impeachment abuse).	We cannot tolerate those who use the state to destroy democracy (martial law).	Mutual Intolerance: Both sides claim the "Right to Suppress" based on the defense of tolerance, leading to total polarization.

10.2 The Final Insight: The Vulnerability of Procedure

The deepest insight from this investigation is that **Procedural Democracy** (the rules of the game) is dangerously fragile when **Substantive Consensus** (the shared values) evaporates. Yoon was technically correct that a legislature *can* use its procedural powers (impeachment, budget cuts) to paralyze a government to the point of dysfunction. There is no logical check against a "Legislative Dictatorship" within the constitution other than the good faith of the actors. Conversely, the Opposition was correct that an Executive *can* use emergency powers to dissolve the legislature, and there is no logical check other than the military's refusal to obey.

South Korea survived not because the system was logically perfect, but because the **Civil Society** and **Bureaucracy** (the "Deep State" in a positive sense) refused to accept the "State of Exception." The citizens who blocked the armored vehicles and the lawmakers who scaled the walls inserted a "human variable" that resolved the logical deadlock. Ultimately, the crisis proves that the "State of Exception" is not a button the President can press, but a social reality that must be accepted by the people. Yoon declared the exception, but the people decided the norm still applied. In doing so, they resolved the paradox not through logic, but through the **Right of Resistance**—the ultimate, extra-legal foundation of all democracy.

Part XI: Data Appendix

Table 3: Timeline of the Logical Breakdown (Dec 3-4, 2024)

Time (KST)	Event	Logical Significance
22:27	Yoon declares Martial Law.	Schmittian Decision: The Sovereign asserts the Exception.
23:00	Military enters Assembly; Police block entrance.	Coercive Enforcement: Attempt to physicalize the metaphysical claim of "emergency."
01:00	190 Lawmakers vote to lift Martial Law.	Procedural Counter-Strike: The System uses its internal logic to negate the Exception.
04:30	Yoon rescinds Martial Law.	Collapse of Sovereignty: The Norm swallows the Exception.
Dec 14	Assembly impeaches Yoon.	Militant Democracy: The System purges the "error" (The President).

Table 4: The "Anti-State" Ledger (Competing Definitions)

Yoon's "Anti-State Forces"	Opposition's "Insurrection Forces"
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Pro-North Korea: Accused of sympathizing with Pyongyang.	Pro-Authoritarian: Accused of mimicking 1980 military rule.
KCTU Spy Ring: Union officials meeting N. Korean agents.	New Right/Far Right: Ideologues pushing for "pre-emptive strike" politics.
Legislative Saboteurs: Impeaching 22 officials to paralyze state.	Constitutional Vandals: Suspending the assembly and media freedom.
Drug/Safety Neglect: Cutting budgets for public safety.	Self-Coup Plotters: Using military to bypass election results.