

# Autocrats Keeping Peace? Autocratic Contributions to UN Peace Operations and Civilian Protection

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## Abstract

Civilian protection has been an integral part of United Nations (UN) peace operations since 1999. Yet, since that time, the relative share of peacekeepers provided by autocratic troop and police contribution countries (T/PCCs) to UN peace operations has increased. What impact does the increased participation of autocratic contributors have on civilian protection? I argue that increasing personnel from autocratic contributors leads to increases in civilian fatalities through peacekeepers quotidian interactions with local actors (*trust* mechanism) and through training host country security forces (*transmission* mechanism). Quantitative evidence of contributions to UN peace operations from 1990-2020 suggest that increasing peacekeepers from autocracies in a mission leads to increases in civilian casualties as well as government violence against civilians across a range of model specifications. This research contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of peace operations and how domestic politics impacts foreign intervention.

**Word Count:** 9,353 (excluding references); 11,874 (including references)

# Introduction

In 1990, China participated in its first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission, sending five military observers to support the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the longest active peacekeeping mission in the UN's 75-plus year history of peacekeeping ([United Nations Peacekeeping N.d.b](#)). Since then, China's participation in UN peacekeeping has increased significantly. At the time of writing (August 2024), China is the 8th largest contributor and the only permanent five (P5) member of the Security Council (UNSC) within the top 20 troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs). China's increasing participation in UN peace operations mirrors a more general trend—missions are increasingly composed of peacekeepers from autocratic countries ([Duursma and Gledhill 2019](#)). Personnel from countries with political regimes that lack constraint and accountability have the potential to impede the UN's efforts to help make, keep, or build peace. In addition to autocracies, countries with histories of human rights abuses and repression are represented in the top contributors to peacekeeping, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, and Rwanda. Testimony from the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission (TRRC) in The Gambia illustrated how security forces who had engaged in the murder or abuse of political opponents of former president Yahya Jammeh were deployed to UN peace operations as a reward for their actions ([Dwyer 2024](#), 954).

At the same time that autocracies have increased their participation, UN peacekeeping has evolved from monitoring ceasefires to taking a more involved approach, adding tasks like election assistance, re-/standing up security forces, building state capacity, and civilian protection to its repertoire. Since 1999, all multidimensional UN peace operations have included civilian protection as part of their mandates ([Howard and Dayal 2018](#)). Yet modern missions operate in a fundamental paradox: states that shoulder the burden of providing peacekeepers are lower capacity, un-democratic states and may be dealing with their own internal struggles ([Adhikari 2020](#), 369-70). Though UN peacekeepers are tasked with helping

communities to, among other things, “strengthen democracy...[and] to secure human rights” ([United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council 2000](#)), what does it mean that personnel from countries that are deficient in either or both are carrying out these tasks? How do these twin phenomena of increased focus on civilian protection and increasing participation of peacekeepers from autocracies interact? This paper investigates these developments and addresses the following question: What impact does the increased participation of autocratic contributors to UN peace operations have on civilian protection?

Existing research has decomposed peace operations to explore how different characteristics impact peacekeepers’ ability to protect civilians, including ethnicity and language ([Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2020](#)); gender equality in contributing countries ([Karim and Beardsley 2017](#)); domestic institutions ([Rodriguez and Kinne 2019](#)); unit types ([Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020](#); [Dworschak and Cil 2022](#); [Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014](#); [Kathman and Melin 2016](#)); and the quality of peacekeepers ([Haass and Ansorg 2018](#); [Kreps 2010](#)). Yet, aside from [Duursma and Gledhill \(2019\)](#) who interrogate why autocracies are increasing their participation, [Melin and Kathman \(2023\)](#) who show that democracies are less likely to withdraw their personnel, and [Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri \(2020\)](#) who look at differences in democracy scores between peacekeepers and host country actors, existing research does not address the broader relationship between peacekeepers from autocratic contributors and civilian protection.

I argue that the regime type of contributors is important to understanding peacekeeper performance because the extent of accountability and constraint a regime faces impacts the way governments organize, train, and utilize their security forces. Without constraints on the government and its actions, regimes can utilize security forces in nefarious ways. The more autocratic a regime, the more likely it is to have fewer avenues of accountability and constraint. As a result, peacekeepers from autocracies negatively impact civilian protection in two key ways. First, as a result of domestic political characteristics and behavior that are externalized to host countries through peacekeepers deployment, peacekeepers erode trust-

building between peacekeepers and host country actors through their actions and behaviors— which I refer to as the *trust* mechanism. Second, by working with and training local security forces, peacekeepers from autocrat-led countries transmit their existing beliefs about the role of security forces and their tactics— the *transmission* mechanism. To empirically test the impact of peacekeepers from autocratic contributors on UN peace operations, I focus on violence against civilians in mission host countries. I argue that, through the trust mechanism, increasing peacekeeping personnel from autocracies relative to democracies will lead to an increase in the number of civilian fatalities and, through the transmission mechanism, an increase in one-sided violence (OSV) committed by government forces.<sup>1</sup>

In the analyses, I find that increasing the autocraticness of a UN peace operation leads to an increase in the number of civilian deaths and an increase in OSV by government forces in mission host countries. My findings hold across various time frames and have important implications for the future of peace operations. I take a first step in this paper towards better understanding how the regime type of contributors impacts mission outcomes which has important policy implications regarding peacekeeping training, a process that involves the UN but largely relies on member states. Given existing literature that points to the positive impact of UN peace operations ([Walter, Howard and Fortna 2021](#)), my research adds important caveats to demonstrate negative aspects of peace operations.

## Violence Against Civilians and UN Peace Operations

Civilian victimization in the context of violent conflict can follow an instrumental logic, with the aim of inducing cooperation ([Kalyvas 2006](#)) or thwarting political opposition ([Balcells 2017](#)), or be the result of lack of command control ([Hoover-Green 2018](#)). Governments and rebel groups alike use violence as a way of coercing support for their side or inducing civilians to withhold support for the opposite side ([Valentino 2014](#), 95). Since groups that depend

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<sup>1</sup>Here I am interested in the *relative* performance of contingents from autocracies to their democratic peers, recognizing that peacekeepers from democracies engage in similarly detrimental actions.

on civilian support are less likely to engage in violence against civilians (Weinstein 2009), leaders also grapple with the need to channel their fighters' violence such that they exercise restraint when necessary (Hoover-Green 2018). Violence can have a meaning beyond the act itself: "When actors put violence on display, they are bringing to life ideas about how the world should be and, more specifically, how it should be organized" (Fujii, Finnemore and Wood 2021, 2). Crucially, access to and availability of information drives levels of violence, as better information allows combatants to target more effectively as opposed to engaging in indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006).

Seeking to thwart violence, especially against civilians, UN peace operations deploy to contexts of violent conflict (or in the wake of violent conflict) seeking to help make, keep, or build peace; and they have a remarkably positive track record in doing so (Walter, Howard and Fortna 2021). Since the UN mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, all multidimensional UN peace operations have included a mandate to protect civilians, following well-known failures of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians in places like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Peacekeepers reduce civilian victimization by acting as a physical barrier between combatants and civilians, making the possibility of violence more difficult (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013), and imposing military and political costs for targeting civilians (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019; Reeder, Hendricks and Goldring 2022), thereby altering the incentives for combatants to engage in violence (Fortna 2008). By working with local communities, UN peacekeepers, particularly UN police (UNPOL), might lead civilians to provide information on rebel groups, helping to overcome information asymmetries between peacekeepers and belligerents (Hunnicuttt and Nomikos 2020). By creating space for inter-group dialogues, peacekeepers can help to establish or re-establish inter-group cooperation and lower biases, thereby reducing tendencies towards violence (Smidt 2020).

Recent literature has looked more closely at the composition of UN peace operations and how this impacts the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians. Peace operations are multinational undertakings, which creates the space for cohesion or friction between country

contingents. Higher quality military peacekeepers that are better equipped and trained tend to be associated with improved protection of civilians ([Haass and Ansorg 2018](#); [Kreps 2010](#)). However, having better quality troops (as measured by military expenditures) does not guarantee that better trained and equipped personnel will be the ones to deploy to missions: contributors could have higher levels of military expenditures but keep their best personnel at home to ensure domestic security, sending lesser trained and equipped personnel instead.

In addition to quality, diversity within the mission and between the mission and local actors, in terms of linguistic, religious, geographic, and cultural differences can impact the ability of UN peace operations to reduce violence against civilians ([Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2020](#)). While increasing the diversity within a UN peace operation can reduce violence against civilians, signaling the commitment of the international community to resolving violence, increased geographic and cultural diversity between UN peacekeepers and local populations can lead to increases in violence against civilians ([Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2020](#), 142).

The composition of UN peace operations also impacts other outcomes related to civilians in host countries. [Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney \(2021\)](#) find that peacekeepers, particularly UNPOL, from countries with more robust civil societies provide security and promote norms associated with non-violent forms of political engagement that, in turn, makes non-violent forms of protest more likely in post-civil war countries. Yet many UN peacekeeping missions, including the ones in Mali, Central African Republic, and, although not initially, South Sudan, are deployed to contexts where there is little to no peace to keep. Domestic contributor conditions also impact the propensity of peacekeepers to engage in abusive behavior—increased gender equality in T/PCCs reduces the prevalence of SEAV allegations in missions ([Karim and Beardsley 2017](#)), and increasing the number of peacekeepers from T/PCCs with free press and rule of law institutions reduces peacekeeper abuses ([Rodriguez and Kinne 2019](#)).

Yet the increased focus on protection of civilians can have negative implications for

the mission. [Day and Hunt \(2021\)](#) argue that the UN’s focus on civilian protection pulls resources from other mission tasks, creates host country reliance on the UN to provide this state function, and sets expectations for peacekeeper performance. [Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson \(2019\)](#), using data on mission in Africa between 2000 and 2011, find that UN peacekeepers are able to prevent OSV committed by rebel groups, but are not as effective in stopping OSV committed by government forces. Since the early 2000s, UNPOL have been involved in reforming host country law enforcement agencies, which, in the case of South Sudan, negatively impacted violence against civilians as the South Sudanese National Police, trained by UNMIS and UNMISS, then engaged in human rights abuses when violence broke out in the country in 2013 ([Hunt 2022](#), 18). Signaling from the UN that a peace operation might deploy also leads to an increase in civilian victimization in response to Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and prior to mission deployment ([Kathman, Benson and Diehl 2023](#)).

What is clear is that, following the failures of the UN in the 1990s, focus on protecting the most vulnerable in conflict has become a top priority for UN peacekeeping. While existing work points both to the efficacy and drawbacks both of the focus on civilian protection and the capabilities of peacekeepers to stop violence against civilians, we have yet to explore whether or how the changing composition of UN peace operations can impact the UN’s ability to provide this protection. Though the difference in democracy scores between T/PCCs and host country personnel impacts levels of violence against civilians in a conflict ([Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2020](#)), a more thorough consideration of the links between how security forces are organized and used in autocracies and how their peacekeepers then impact the course of violent conflict is lacking. I seek to fill this gap by arguing that the relationships we observe between, for example, peacekeeper quality and their experience with non-violent public engagement is driven by the regime type of contributing countries. I will demonstrate that autocrats tend to organize their security forces differently than their democratic counterparts, which has implications for how security forces maintain security that ultimately externalizes as they deploy to UN peace operations.

# Autocracies and UN Peace Operations

The differences between democracies and autocracies are well known across a variety of dimensions. Autocracies, and certain forms thereof, are more likely to engage in repression ([Davenport 2007](#))<sup>2</sup>, more likely to have security forces that engage in sexual violence ([Willis 2021](#)), more likely to engage in conflict ([Weeks 2012](#)), and more likely to under-perform in battle ([Talmadge 2016](#)), to name only a few. With different sources of regime support and lacking the threat of regular removal from office through elections, autocrats and their governments do not face the same kinds of constraints on behavior and accountability for actions taken in office. Constraint and accountability come from a variety of sources: citizens, civil society organizations, the media, the legislature, and the judiciary ([Lührmann, Marquardt and Mechkova 2020](#)). In democracies, these sources of accountability tend to have protections within the country's legal framework that sets the rules of the game by which actors have to play ([Wright 2021](#), 2). Citizens' right to vote in elections, systems of checks and balances, and protections for media and civil society ensure a robust system of government oversight and accountability, ultimately serving to constrain the behavior of elected officials and their appointees.

In autocracies, by contrast, the lack of some or all of these accountability mechanisms leaves leaders in a privileged position of power. Autocrats impose media restrictions, outlawing or closing those that are critical of the regime; curb access to the internet; and winnow or erase altogether the space of civil society organizations to effectively operate. Though autocrats may have party support or even hold elections, these elections are often superficial with little chance of turnover ([Hyde 2011](#); [Magaloni and Kricheli 2010](#), 124-5). While leaders in democracies seek support from citizens for elections, leaders in autocracies focus on maintaining support from the security forces ([Bellin 2012](#); [Lai and Slater 2006](#); [Slater et al.](#)

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<sup>2</sup>Correlation tests bear out the association between autocracies and repression: there is a strongly positive correlation (0.785) between V-Dem's polyarchy and repression indices (both reversed for interpretation purposes)



2023) and elites, including parties and other institutions autocrats use to maintain power (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Pepinsky 2014; Rivera 2017; Weeks 2008). Even in personalist regimes where power is concentrated in one individual, regime survival can hinge on the decision of security forces to side with or against the regime (Bellin 2012; Svolik 2012). The lack of constraint and accountability in autocracies compared to democracies creates different sets of incentives to leaders and, importantly, security forces.

Autocratic security institutions are often designed in a leader/regime-centric way that vests the interests of the security apparatus in the survival of the regime, especially where security institutions are patrimonially organized (Bellin 2012, 129). Leaders in autocracies engage in a variety of practices to ensure loyalty and protect against coups from security forces, including replacing heads of security forces (Dragu and Przeworski 2019); counterbalancing (De Bruin 2020) or fragmentation (Greitens 2016); and stacking based on ethnicity, location, and/or socio-economic status (Allen and Brooks 2023). These organizational practices seek to balance the ability of security forces to succeed while also ensuring they do not use their coercive power against the regime. While militaries in democratic regimes are often subordinate to civilian control <sup>3</sup> (Ruffa 2018), they often play an out-sized role in autocracies, sometimes leading the government or providing protection for the regime (Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2012). Autocrats use (secret) police to engage in repression, but also call on the military to do so in the face of mass uprisings (Svolik 2012, 125).

These practices, combined with the lack of avenues for accountability and constraint in autocracies, creates situations where actors (civilians, opposition, media, etc.) within the country become the object to provide protection *from* rather than *for*. This creates tense civil-security relations that incentivizes operating in the autocrat's and/or security force's interest, often with repressive tactics (Scharpf and Gläsel 2020), and existing research has demonstrated how this affects the performance of autocrat's security forces. Autocrats

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<sup>3</sup>A notable exception to this being China, which has civilian control of the military (Slater et al. 2023).

unconstrained domestically by elites or institutions are more likely to engage in or initiate conflict compared to elite-constrained forms of autocracy (Weeks 2012). In battle, militaries from autocracies tend to under-perform relative to their democratic counterparts (Talmadge 2016) because they lack the constraining power of political consent posed by the threat of removal from office through elections (Reiter and Stam 2002). They are particularly prone to failure when they reflect domestic inequality within society (Lyall 2020). Fragmented or counterbalanced security forces tend to be more violent, stoke competition (Greitens 2016, 5, 26), and, at least initially, increase the probability of coups (De Bruin 2020). These forces tend to be more violent when they don't regularly engage with civilians as they "perceive a lower social and psychological cost to violence against these strangers" (Greitens 2016, 52), again a reflection of the lack of accountability and constraint from civilians in autocracies. Because citizens don't have the ability to vote out politicians and the media are restricted from reporting negative coverage of the government, these behaviors often occur without repercussions. These situations become more drastic the more autocratic a government.

Military and police from autocracies externalize these practices and behaviors when they deploy abroad to UN peace operations— they are the product of the circumstances under which they operate domestically. Because police and military are on the frontlines of UN peacekeeping, they influence whether crisis situations are resolved or escalate (Dandeker and Gow 1999, 63). Missions must have the ability to effectively engage with host country actors with restraint if they are to be successful. Personnel that are instead accustomed to using coercion, exercising force in non-legal ways, all with low accountability (Gonzalez 2021, 15) signal a mismatch between UN priorities and the personnel carrying out the mission. Under-performance by peacekeepers from autocracies can manifest in failure to adhere to the mission's mandate or rules of engagement. Peacekeepers who fail to follow through on mission mandates or engage in abusive behavior can escalate already tense situations that negatively influences the trajectory of violence in host countries. For example, if peacekeepers are unfamiliar with facilitating or protecting nonviolent protests, they won't have the capacity

to train host country forces to do so or carry this out themselves (Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney 2021). Regardless of the flag on their uniform, peacekeepers' actions in mission provide local actors with information about peacekeepers' capabilities and resolve.

Though I argue that increasing the number of peacekeepers from autocracies will have negative implications for civilian protection, it is also the case that security forces in democracies fail to achieve their mandates and engage in violence and abuse both domestically and when deployed abroad. Police in the US and France have been accused and convicted of engaging in racial violence. In South Africa, security forces were accused of misconduct following their repressive response to striking mine workers, which led to electoral consequences for the incumbent party (De Kadt, Johnson-Kanu and Sands 2023). In some Latin American countries, police remain autocratic enclaves within democracies, engaging in violence and corruption (Gonzalez 2021). Internationally, a Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia in 1993 abused local civilians. After dealing with a rash of theft from the base, senior officials "authorized the men to 'abuse' prisoners caught sneaking into the camp as a deterrent to theft," which culminated in the torture and death of a teenager (Farnsworth 1994). US military forces abused prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. French peacekeepers in Central African Republic, deployed as part of Operation Sangaris, faced allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (UN News 2016). While security personnel from democracies have engaged in abuse/misconduct and/or failed to achieve their missions, I argue that this kind of behavior is *relatively* more likely to take place when personnel from autocracies are deployed to UN peace operations.

Based on this discussion, I argue there are two pathways through which peacekeepers from autocracies can impact violence against civilians in mission host countries as a result of domestic political characteristics that frame security force training and use— what I refer to as trust and transmission mechanisms. First, I argue that peacekeepers have the potential to build or erode *trust* with local actors, including civilians, government, and rebel group/s. Second, peacekeepers charged with training local police and military can impact violence

committed by government forces through the tactics and procedures they teach local security forces. Though training and co-deployment, peacekeepers *transmit* models and tactics of security they use at home in their training of host state forces. I explore each of these mechanisms in the following sections.

## Trust: Everyday Peacekeeper Behavior

Peacekeepers are deployed to foreign countries in situations of recently concluded or, especially in the last decade or so, on-going violent conflict. Peacekeepers need to demonstrate to local actors that they represent a peaceful presence, can provide protection, and represent the efforts of the international community to help. Failure to do so can result in local actors preferring not to engage with UN peacekeepers when they are in need of help ([Gordon and Young 2017](#)). While some peacekeepers may choose a more reserved, defensive posture ([Ruffa 2018](#)), others engage with the community and create the conditions for local actors to build trust with peacekeepers. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), like ones in Western Equatoria, South Sudan that seek to build rule of law and social cohesion, engender positive relationships between local actors and peacekeepers ([United Nations Peacekeeping N.d.a](#)).

Conversely, peacekeepers can erode or fail to build trust with civilians through their actions and behavior when deployed by failing to follow through on mission mandates or engaging in misconduct/abuse. For example, a civilian in a protection of civilian site in South Sudan, remarked that peacekeepers are “here for protection but when the real fighting comes, they run...I used to talk to the peacekeepers, but I don’t anymore. I am angry with what I have seen” ([Center for Civilians in Conflict 2016](#), 78). This followed a series of events where peacekeepers abandoned their posts during an outbreak of violence, failing to fulfil their mandate. Notably, a report on the UNMISS response to the violence in Juba in 2016 argued that the failure of the mission to provide protection to civilians “resulted in a loss of *trust* and confidence...in the will and skill of UNMISS military and police to be proactive and show a determined posture to protect civilians under threat” ([United Nations Security](#)

[Council 2016](#), 6, emphasis added). Furthermore, civilians that witness or experience abuse at the hands of peacekeepers hold more negative views of peacekeepers and are less likely to cooperate with them ([Gordon and Young 2017](#)), further damaging the mission’s ability to effectively protect civilians. In this way, violence can beget further violence when civilians no longer trust the abilities of peacekeepers to protect them.

I argue that these negative occurrences are, generally, more likely when peacekeepers from autocracies are deployed relative to peacekeepers from democracies, with peacekeepers seen as ineffective or, worse, contributing to a deterioration in peace. While advancing mission goals like demobilization and infrastructure projects can enable positive cycles towards developing trust and, ultimately, peace, failing to do so hinders trust-building and advancing these goals.

Autocracies are associated with a number of characteristics that are negatively correlated with security force performance, suggesting that their peacekeepers will be less able to effectively achieve mission outcomes and build trust. While training and equipment are important characteristics for peacekeepers to achieve their missions ([Haass and Ansorg 2018](#); [Kreps 2010](#)), it is not just about the equipment that security personnel have, but how they employ it that makes them effective ([Biddle 2004](#)). Political characteristics of autocracies, though, tend to make them less effective. Broadly, autocracies perform poorly in terms of human capital and harmonious civil-military relations that predict more effective military forces ([Biddle and Long 2004](#)). Furthermore, peacekeepers, both military and police, from autocracies that restrict civil liberties will be unfamiliar with how to protect budding civil liberties in post-violent conflict contexts ([Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney 2021](#)). Failing to aid civilians that experience abuse or violence or to prevent them from experiencing violence in the first place will diminish trust between civilians and peacekeepers.

In Central African Republic (CAR), the UN’s MINUSCA mission deployed in 2014 in an effort to address inter-communal violence. At an internally displaced persons (IDP) site in Alindao, Mauritanian peacekeepers were tasked with providing security for civilians. In

November 2018, a rebel group attacked the site, resulting in the deaths of at least 112 civilians ([United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 2019](#)). Reports from UN investigations following the attack demonstrate that the peacekeepers failed to deter crime committed by rebel group elements within the site, some of whom maintained their weapons ([United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 2019](#), 10). Witnesses also noted that peacekeepers often fraternized with rebel fighters ([United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 2019](#), 9). The failure of Mauritanian peacekeepers to gain a handle on crime within the site and their perceived connections with rebel fighters allowed inter-communal violence both within and outside the site to continue, ultimately resulting in the attack against the IDP site ([United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 2019](#)). Interviews with UN personnel following the violence reveal that the Mauritanian personnel responsible for the area were ill-prepared for their deployment, lacking an understanding of the UN's Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate as well as the rules of engagement ([Di Razza and Sherman 2020](#)). Though acting as a physical barrier and disarming combatants are key ways in which peacekeepers prevent violence against civilians ([Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013](#)), allowing arms in IDP sites, seeming to support rebel fighters, and then failing to engage the attackers eliminated the effectiveness of these mechanisms and trust between IDPs and peacekeepers.

Decreased or lack of trust between peacekeepers and civilians creates strained relations that put civilians in harm's way. If peacekeepers fail to protect civilians, belligerents, whether rebel groups or the government, view the targeting of civilians as a viable tactic to achieve their aims, as in the previous example of Alindao. Civilians also take matters into their own hands, as in DRC, Mali, and Haiti, where protests against the UN emerged following challenges in achieving missions' aims. In DRC, protests, sometimes violent, broke out against MONUSCO in Butembo as a result of multiple instances where peacekeepers were unable to protect civilians from rebel violence—peacekeepers in the area eventually retreated

in August 2022 ([Reuters 2022](#)). Similar occurrences have taken place in Mali in 2015, where protesters were killed by peacekeepers after a violent protest at the mission’s compound in Gao ([UN News 2015](#)), and in Haiti, where the mission drew down in 2019 amid multiple weeks of violent anti-government protests ([Martinez Casares 2019](#)). In addition to instances where peacekeepers have killed civilians, tense conditions create the opportunity for further civilian abuse. In Mali, discontent with MINUSMA led to the mission winding down amid reports of increased violence against civilians, especially women, committed both by Malian forces and “foreign security partners” the country has turned to stabilize the security situation ([Nichols 2023](#)).

As a result of their capabilities and/or behavior on mission, peacekeepers from autocracies negatively impact trust between themselves and host country actors, including civilians, government forces, and rebel groups. Lack of trust between peacekeepers and local actors has negative implications for civilian protection, leading to the following hypothesis:

***H1:** increasing peacekeeping personnel from autocratic regimes relative to personnel from democratic regimes will lead to an increase in the number of civilian fatalities.*

## **Transmission: Training Local Security Forces**

In addition to their quotidian interactions, UN personnel can also impact prospects for peace through the training they provide to host country security forces with both immediate and long-term consequences. I refer to this as the *transmission* mechanism. Recent work has highlighted how receiving military training acts as a space for norm diffusion ([Grewal 2022](#)) and can create norm conflict ([Joyce 2022](#)). In UN missions, military and police provide training to host country security forces, thus acting as a space for socialization and learning to occur between peacekeepers and the security forces with which they work. Both peacekeepers and host state security forces are “embedded in social environments, which not only constrain and provide incentives to act, but also reshape interests and identities” ([Checkel 2017](#), 592). Often peacekeepers are tasked with re-building security forces, providing the

opportunity to impart good practices. However, host country security forces can also be socialized into undesirable tactics and behaviors that negatively impact civilians and the trajectory of violence.

In the context of peacekeeping, UNPOL may be the most likely venue for these processes, given that UNPOL often train and co-deploy with host country police ([Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney 2021](#); [Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013](#)). Police officers from autocracies who are not accustomed to protecting civil rights or who engage in coercive means to achieve their ends are likely to train and socialize local police in these same behaviors and tactics. In this way, peacekeepers from autocracies further hamper mission outcomes, as well as longer-term prospects for peace, if the security forces they train are then engaging in violence and repression to maintain order. Police forces that engage in excessive force demobilize opposition in the immediate term but lead civilians to oppose the police in the long term ([Curtice and Behlendorf 2021](#), 167).

In the same way that peacekeepers undergo socialization when deployed on mission (see, for example, [Moncrief \(2017\)](#)), so too do security forces that engage in training and co-deployment with peacekeepers. This is especially the case when peacekeeping missions are tasked with re-training or even reestablishing security institutions, like in South Sudan where successive missions (UNMIS and UNMISS) were involved in training the South Sudanese National Police ([Hunt 2022](#)). The same police service was then implicated in violence that broke out in 2013 ([Hunt 2022](#)) and in 2016 ([United Nations Mission in South Sudan and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2017](#)). The UN's efforts in South Sudan "had essentially been working closely with government and UNPOL had bolstered the security agencies that turned on their own people to devastating effect" ([Hunt 2022](#), 18). As a result, UN peacekeepers could be enabling autocratic tendencies, especially when they refrain from punishing this kind of behavior for the sake of maintaining host state consent ([von Billerbeck and Tansey 2019](#)).

Trainings are often part of a larger program of reforms focusing on restructuring the



coercive capacity of security forces to be able to maintain peace (Toft 2009), but can also include efforts to increase restraint and inclusion (Karim 2019). Increasing the coercive capacity of police can lead to police violence, but reforms that decrease militarization and increase accountability have been found to reduce levels of police violence (Tiscornia 2023). Attitudes towards police and security forces more broadly are influenced by citizens’ interaction with these personnel and the latter’s actions (Curtice and Behlendorf 2021; Karim 2020), ultimately informing citizens’ willingness to engage with and trust the police (Blair, Karim and Morse 2019; Karim 2019).

In the context of modern UN peace operations, peacekeepers are most likely to train and work with government security forces (which may also include former rebel fighters integrated into government security forces). In South Sudan, DDR efforts were made to integrate members of the SPLA-IO into the SPLA, though these efforts have stalled at various points. Training and co-deployment offered through peacekeeping paired with security sector reforms institutionalize training outcomes for government security forces. As a result, training and co-deployment can have both immediate and long-term impacts on civilian victimization at the hands of government forces. This leads to the second hypothesis I test in this paper:

***H2:** increasing peacekeeping personnel from autocratic regimes relative to personnel from democratic regimes will lead to an increase in violence against civilians committed by government forces.*

## Data and Methods

To test the relationship between peacekeepers from autocracies and violence against civilians, I utilize panel data on contributions to UN peace operations from November 1990 to February 2020. The data for these analyses come from the International Peace Institute’s (IPI) Peacekeeping Database (Perry and Smith 2013). The IPI data include the number and type of personnel contributed to each peace operation in a given month.

To measure levels of democracy/autocracy, I rely on V-Dem’s measure of electoral

democracy, polyarchy. This variable is preferred over other measures because it captures the extent to which regimes face constraints and accountability which I argue impact the training and use of security forces: electoral competition with extensive suffrage; protections for civil liberties, the media, and civil society; and clean elections (Coppedge et al. 2021). Following previous studies (see, for example, Karim and Beardsley (2016) and Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney (2021)), I create a variable (hereafter referred to as the Autocracy Index) to measure a contributor’s level of democracy/autocracy, weighted by its proportional contribution to the mission in a given month.<sup>4</sup> The equation for this index is:

$$\text{AutocracyIndex}_{mt} = \sum_{k=1}^c \pi_{kt} \text{Polyarchy}_{kt}$$

Where  $m$  is the mission at time  $t$ , the number of contributing countries is given by  $c$ ,  $\pi$  is the share of peacekeepers from a contributor, and  $k$  the contributing country. While higher polyarchy scores signal regimes closer to democracy in the V-Dem data, I reverse this variable such that scores closer to one indicate more autocratic regimes. As a result, higher values for the Autocracy Index indicate that a mission is more largely composed of peacekeepers from more autocratic countries. In theory, the range of the variable could be from 0 (perfectly democratic) to 100 (perfectly autocratic). In the data, this variable ranges from 9.6 (UNOMIG between September and December 1993) to 84.26 (UNAMI between October and November 2009) with a mean of 36.92. On average, then missions in the dataset are more “democratic”. The resulting dataset contains a total of 6,096 mission-month observations, including 85 UN peace operations. In the Online Appendix, I test other operationalizations of democracy/autocracy.

To model the effect on violence against civilians for H1, I employ UCDP’s Geo-referenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 21.1 for civilian fatalities that take place in a given

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<sup>4</sup>Because they do not have polyarchy scores, small island nations’ contributions are not included in the data and analyses. These countries are: Grenada, Samoa, Palau, Brunei, Bahamas, and Antigua and Barbuda.

mission-month ([Sundberg and Melander 2013](#)). Following [Carnegie and Mikulaschek \(2020\)](#) and [Hultman, Kathman and Shannon \(2013\)](#), I focus on UCDP's estimate of civilian fatalities, excluding civilian casualties as a result of collateral damage or cross-fire to focus on the intentional killing of civilians. The dependent variable for H1 includes violence against civilians committed by any side to a violent conflict. For government perpetrated violence (H2), I focus on a subset of these data where the government of the mission host country is reported to have committed the one-sided violence (OSV) against civilians.

Peacekeepers can have both immediate and long-term impacts on violence against civilians in mission host countries. In the earlier example from CAR of the attack in Alindao, Mauritanian peacekeepers deployed to the area in February 2016 and the attack took place about 18 months later in November 2017. Certainly, it will take time for local actors to discern the resolve of peacekeepers and to build trust with them. Similarly, anticipated effects through the transmission mechanism could also take time, depending on the length of training. Yet, given that most modern peace operations are deployed to volatile contexts where there is little to no peace to keep, violent events could test the resolve and abilities of peacekeepers in a shorter time frame. As a result, I test different lead times for violence against civilians of one, three, and six months to measure the impact of peacekeepers from autocracies on violence against civilians. To assess the transmission mechanism, I also test a twelve month lead model as training likely lasts for a few months.

In addition to the main predictor of interest, I include control variables to address confounding relationships. I include the total number of observers, troops, and police present in a given mission-month as existing work has found that the presence of troops reduces battle fatalities ([White, Cunningham and Beardsley 2018](#)), especially while fighting is ongoing ([Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014](#)). [Kathman and Melin \(2016\)](#) find that observers typically do not reduce civil conflict violence. While [Hultman, Kathman and Shannon \(2013\)](#) find that police and troops are effective at reducing violence against civilians, [Carnegie and Mikulaschek \(2020\)](#) show that the presence of any kind of UN peacekeeper reduces violence

against civilians. In the models for this paper, observers and police are scaled to the 100s while troops are scaled to the 1000s.

The quality of security personnel could also confound the relationship between peacekeepers from autocracies and violence against civilians. While military expenditures are available for many countries, few countries provide reliable data on funding for police, making it difficult to directly capture expenditures on these security forces. As a result, I rely on GDP per capita data from the World Bank (in 2023 USD) as a proxy for the quality of security forces [The World Bank Group \(N.d.a\)](#). I multiply a country’s GDP per capita by the total number of peacekeepers contributed to a mission to arrive at a “contingent GDP” for each country’s contribution to a mission. I then sum these to a single mission-month value for each mission (logged in the analyses). Importantly, while this may be a confounding variable, my argument suggests that this is actually a post-treatment variable to regime type. As such, I expect that the inclusion of this variable actually works against my hypotheses causing an under-estimation of the main IV.

The analyses presented in this section follow the model specifications of [Hultman, Kathman and Shannon \(2013, 2014\)](#) and [Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri \(2020\)](#). I include a count of the number of contributors, which [Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri \(2020\)](#) find reduces the amount of conflict violence. I also include logged data for population ([The World Bank Group N.d.c](#)) and population density ([The World Bank Group N.d.b](#))—larger and more densely populated areas provide greater potential for civilian targeting. Additionally, I created a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there were civilian deaths captured in the month, given that violence in the previous month is likely to impact violence in a following month. Table O.A.7 in the Online Appendix provides summary statistics. Given the longitudinal nature of the data, the over-dispersion of the outcome variables, and the prevalence of zeros, I use negative binomial models with mission-level random intercepts.

## Selection Effects

Though we know that UN peacekeeping missions tend to go to the more challenging contexts (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hegre, Hultman and Nygard 2019), it may be the case that peacekeepers from autocratic countries are sent to more difficult violent conflicts, with democracies choosing to send their peacekeepers to safer missions or vice versa. I first test for these possible selection effects. To do so, I calculate the total battle, civilian, and all fatalities for up to five years before the start of the operation and model the impact of these on the autocraticness of a peace operation. If it is the case that autocracies select into more difficult missions, we should see that higher levels of violence will lead to a more autocratic mission. The results of a bivariate regression in Table 1 demonstrate that missions with higher/lower battle, civilian, or total fatalities are not more likely to receive more peacekeepers from autocracies.<sup>5</sup> In addition, I test to see if the relationship between the percentage of peacekeepers from autocratic countries is associated with the mean number of contributors, troops, police, or observers to a mission. I find that increasing any of these variables increases the autocraticness of a mission, suggesting that peacekeepers from autocratic countries tend to go to mission with higher numbers of contributors, troops, police, and observers.

While missions in the 1990s and early 2000s were deployed following peace agreements, as in Liberia and Sierra Leone, more recent missions, as in CAR and Mali, were deployed to contexts where violence was still ongoing. In cases like these, looking at violence leading up to mission deployment might not capture the severity of the conflict to be able to address possible selection effects. Table 2 looks at the relationship between civilian and battle casualties during the mission and the autocraticness of a mission, led by one, three, and six months. Across the different models, there does not appear to be a statistically

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<sup>5</sup>UCDP data begin in 1989 and some of the missions in the dataset were in existence before 1989. Therefore, not all missions have five years of violence data available. In the Online Appendix, I include models only on a sub-sample of missions with all five years of data with similar results.

**Table 1:** Pre-Mission Selection Effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	37.382*** (1.777)	37.419*** (1.780)	38.242*** (1.619)	29.859*** (2.447)	35.729*** (1.686)	36.220*** (1.664)	36.225*** (1.829)
Total Fatalities	0.0002 (0.0001)						
Battle Fatalities		0.001 (0.0004)					
Civilian Fatalities			0.0003 (0.0002)				
Mean T/PCCs				0.373*** (0.086)			
Mean Troops					0.001** (0.0003)		
Mean Police						0.007** (0.002)	
Mean Observers							0.026* (0.012)
Num.Obs.	85	85	85	86	86	86	86
R2	0.027	0.026	0.012	0.181	0.112	0.092	0.055
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.014	0.000	0.172	0.101	0.082	0.043
AIC	692.6	692.8	693.9	687.2	694.2	696.0	699.5
BIC	700.0	700.1	701.2	694.5	701.5	703.4	706.9
Log.Lik.	-343.315	-343.383	-343.955	-340.577	-344.087	-345.020	-346.774
F	2.312	2.174	1.036	18.616	10.572	8.544	4.843
RMSE	13.74	13.75	13.84	12.70	13.22	13.37	13.64

+ p &lt; 0.1, \* p &lt; 0.05, \*\* p &lt; 0.01, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.001

significant relationship between civilian casualties during the mission and the autocraticness of a mission. However, an increase in battle fatalities does predict a slight increase in the autocraticness of a mission in the model with a six-month lead of battle fatalities.

## Descriptive Trends

Before moving into the main results, I first explore descriptive trends in democratic and autocratic contributions to UN peace operations. Although democratic countries contributed larger shares of personnel during the 1990s ([Andersson 2002](#); [Lebovic 2004](#)), contributions to UN peace operations from Western nations have declined since ([Bellamy and Williams 2009](#)), with weaker states ([Gaibullov, Sandler and Shimzu 2009](#)), autocracies ([Duursma and Gledhill 2019](#)), and countries in Africa and Asia contributing a larger portion of the personnel for peacekeeping.

Over the course of the last thirty plus years, there have also been a number of domestic changes in contributing countries. During the 1990-2020 time period, 41 contributors have either trended towards democracy, towards autocracy, or fluctuated between democratization and autocratization.<sup>6</sup> Fifteen countries— Armenia, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Croatia, El Salvador, the Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Mexico, Moldova, Nigeria, Peru, and Tunisia— trended towards democracy. Sixteen countries— Albania, Burkina Faso, Fiji, Kenya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Ukraine, and Zambia— have, at times, trended both towards democracy and autocracy during the 1990-2020 period. Finally, ten countries— Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Honduras, Hungary, India, Montenegro, Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela— have trended towards autocracy.

Within just the top 10 T/PCCs, only four countries— Nepal, Indonesia, Ghana, and Senegal— are considered democracies (as of May 2023 and based on V-Dem v11.1). Though more democracies are within the top 25 T/PCCs, autocracies still outnumber democracies,

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<sup>6</sup>Based on countries' V-Dem polyarchy scores.

**Table 2:** In Mission Selection Effects

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	33.553*** (0.366)	33.492*** (0.372)	33.268*** (0.379)	33.609*** (0.371)	33.565*** (0.376)	33.460*** (0.384)
Civilian Fatalities	0.000 03 (0.000 03)	0.000 01 (0.000 03)	0.0009 (0.0004)			
Battle Fatalities				0.0005 (0.0004)	0.001 (0.0004)	0.001* (0.0004)
Num.Obs.	6012	5844	5606	6012	5844	5606
R2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
AIC	50 872.3	49 484.3	47 505.9	50 871.7	49 482.5	47 501.7
BIC	50 892.4	49 504.3	47 525.8	50 891.8	49 502.5	47 521.6
Log.Lik.	-25 433.171	-24 739.133	-23 749.943	-25 432.850	-24 738.250	-23 747.847
F	1.042	0.095	1.172	1.685	1.862	5.364
RMSE	16.63	16.68	16.74	16.63	16.68	16.73

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001






Figure 1: Total contributions from democratic and autocratic regimes: 1990-2020  
Alt text: Figure depicting contributions from democratic and autocratic regimes from 1990-2020.

with 15 out of the top 25 contributors considered autocracies. To illustrate, Figure 1 plots the changes in the composition of UN peace operations from late 1990 to 2020, including a trend line for the total number of peacekeepers deployed. Contributions from democracies composed the majority of missions until the early 2000s, when contributions from autocracies began to rise, crossing the 30,000 mark. Since then, autocracies have fairly consistently provided more peacekeepers than their democratic counterparts, with the more recent decline in peacekeeping personnel the result of a drop in participation of democracies.

These changes in the contributors to UN peace operations have meant that some missions are more largely composed of peacekeepers from autocratic T/PCCs. Most peace operations since 2000 have been deployed to African countries, including 6 of the UN's 12 ongoing missions, and Figure 2 demonstrates that UN operations in Africa are more likely to be composed of peacekeeping personnel from autocracies. Figure 2 averages the percentage of peacekeepers from autocracies over the course of all missions that have deployed to that country—for example, across all UNAVEM missions in Angola. Missions in Latin America and Europe, which mostly took place during the 1990s (aside from the ongoing missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Cyprus (UNFICYP)), are more likely to be composed of peacekeepers from democracies. Yet some UN operations to Africa have been more largely composed of peacekeepers from autocracies than others. Missions to CAR (80%) and Sudan (78%) have been more largely composed of peacekeepers from autocracies than those to Angola (28%) and Mozambique (19%). The latter two missions were also not as expansive as the missions in CAR and Sudan, in that they were both observer missions meant to oversee the end of hostilities and withdrawal of foreign forces. The missions in South Sudan, CAR, DRC, and others are involved in much more than monitoring ceasefires and troop withdrawals.

Of the missions in the dataset that had at least 1,000 peacekeepers deployed, UNISFA in Sudan (98.7%), UNFOR in Croatia (92.9%), MINUSCA in CAR (87.3%), UNAVEM I in Angola (76.6%), and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (75.5%) are the top five peace operations based on composition of peacekeeping personnel from autocracies. Conversely, UNFICYP in




Figure 2: Average Autocratic Pct. in UN Peace Operations

Alt text: Heat map that shows which countries have received more autocratic peacekeeping contingents.

Cyprus (99.8%), UNDOF in Syria (96.7%), UNPREDEP in Macedonia (95.7%), ONUSAL in El Salvador (91.1%), and UNMISET in Timor Leste (85.3%) are the top five peace operations in terms of composition of peacekeepers from democracies. As noted, other than Croatia, the remaining missions in the top five for peacekeepers from autocracies are in Africa, compared to the top five for peacekeepers from democracies, which are all outside of Africa. With these trends in mind, I turn now to the results of the statistical analyses in the next section.

## Findings

Table 3 presents the results of models with civilian fatalities as the outcome variable with one, three, and six month leads. Note that changes in the Autocracy Index variable can result from an increase in contributions from autocratic contributors, changes in contributors' polyarchy score, or a combination of the two. Table 3 shows that, across all model specifications, increases in the Autocracy Index for a UN peace operation predicts an increase in the number

of civilian fatalities in the following month/s, supporting H1. For each of the different lead times and specifications, the Autocracy Index remains positive and statistically significant.

To demonstrate the effects found in Table 3, Figure 3 plots the predicted number of civilian fatalities across the range of the Autocracy Index for two of the larger UN missions, MINUSCA and UNMISS. The predicted values are based on the one month lead of civilian fatalities found in the second column of Table 3, with covariates held at their means. At lower levels of the Autocracy Index, we see lower levels of predicted civilian fatalities, but at around an Autocracy Index score of 50, the predicted number of civilian fatalities is 145 in MINUSCA and 65 in UNMISS. Thus, the effect of increasing the autocraticness of a peace operation can have major consequences for civilians in mission host countries, especially as the Autocracy Index approaches its maximum value, 84.

I turn now to H2 and the results for models where the dependent variable is government-perpetrated OSV. Figure 4 shows coefficient plots for models of one, three, six, and twelve month leads of OSV.<sup>7</sup> All of the models underlying these plots include the same controls as the models in Table 3, but the coefficient plots focus on the Autocracy Index, peacekeeper types, and the number of T/PCCs. Like the previous results, the coefficient for the Autocracy Index is consistently positive and statistically significant: increasing the autocraticness of a peace operation leads to further OSV against civilians by the government.

The plots in Figure 5 again use the examples of MINUSCA and UNMISS to plot the expected government-perpetrated OSV at different levels of the Autocracy Index using the one-month lead of government OSV (Sub-figure (a) in Figure 4). Here, as the Autocracy Index approaches 50, the model predicts about 27 casualties in MINUSCA and 95 in UNMISS. These expectations comport with the contexts of CAR and South Sudan, where violence in the former has primarily been between rebel groups and, in the latter, between the government and rebels. In South Sudan, government forces have been responsible for atrocities against civilians while also blocking UNMISS's access to certain areas of the country.

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<sup>7</sup>Tables of the results appear in the Appendix, Table O.A.1.

**Table 3:** Negative Binomial Models- Civilian Fatalities, Autocracy Index

	1 Month	1 Month	3 Months	3 Months	6 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	-0.716*	-21.621***	-0.708*	-24.489***	-0.858*	-27.075***
	(0.326)	(2.677)	(0.328)	(2.801)	(0.347)	(3.048)
Autocracy Index	0.045***	0.028***	0.045***	0.031***	0.045***	0.034***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Total Observers		0.045		0.059		0.098*
		(0.036)		(0.038)		(0.039)
Total Police		0.004		-0.001		-0.002
		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)
Total Troops		-0.022		-0.028+		-0.041*
		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.017)
No. T/PCCs		-0.013*		-0.010		-0.022**
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Contingent GDP (log)		0.021		0.046		0.116*
		(0.045)		(0.048)		(0.052)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)		1.525***		1.215***		1.109***
		(0.075)		(0.073)		(0.074)
Population (log)		1.327***		1.479***		1.582***
		(0.161)		(0.169)		(0.187)
Population Density (log)		-0.050		-0.050		-0.054
		(0.126)		(0.133)		(0.148)
SD (Intercept Mission)	2.276	1.313	2.247	1.394	2.239	1.502
Num.Obs.	6010	5795	5843	5630	5605	5395
R2 Marg.	0.058	0.461	0.060	0.470	0.058	0.471
R2 Cond.	0.587	0.625	0.583	0.645	0.571	0.658
AIC	21 306.7	19 596.9	20 822.2	19 310.4	20 135.3	18 719.5
BIC	21 333.5	19 676.9	20 848.9	19 390.0	20 161.9	18 798.6
ICC	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.4
RMSE	172.57	174.56	175.08	177.65	175.27	178.13

+ p &lt; 0.1, \* p &lt; 0.05, \*\* p &lt; 0.01, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.001






Figure 3: Predicted civilian casualties for MINUSCA and UNMISS, including 95% confidence intervals

Alt text: Prediction plots for civilian fatalities for MINUSCA and UNMISS.


In the Online Appendix, I include a range of robustness checks to verify the results of the models presented in this section. Rather than using an indexing approach to measure the participation of democracies and autocracies, I include models that utilize the conventionally used cut-off of 0.5 for a country's polyarchy score to differentiate between democracies and autocracies in a binary way (see Table O.A.3). Though this approach dilutes the variation among democracies and autocracies, the results of the model comport with the findings presented here. In addition, I utilize V-Dem's measure of civil liberties and repression in an index form, demonstrating that increasing the number of peacekeepers from more restrictive and repressive contributors lead to increases in civilian fatalities (Table O.A.4). Finally, I also include models that use Polity V scores ([Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2015](#)) instead of polyarchy (see Table O.A.6). The findings from these additional models support the findings presented here.




(a) 1-month lead



(b) 3-month lead



(c) 6-month lead



(d) 12-month lead

Figure 4: Coefficient plots for models of government OSV with 1, 3, 6, and 12 month leads.  
Alt text: Coefficient plots for OSV committed by government forces.




Figure 5: Predicted government OSV for MINUSCA and UNMISS, including 95% confidence intervals

Alt text: Prediction plots for government OSV for MINUSCA and UNMISS.

## Conclusion

The UN remains the preeminent organization tasked with maintaining international peace and security. While initial UN missions during the Cold War mainly focused on inserting security personnel to maintain ceasefires, Blue Helmets have been called on to undertake additional and more complex tasks to keep and build peace both in countries experiencing and emerging from violent conflict. Existing evidence points to the remarkable ability of the UN's peace operations to bring peace to the violent conflict-affected areas. Furthermore, recent research has looked deeper into missions to interrogate how the composition of UN peace operations impacts outcomes, peeling back the layers of missions to determine what it is about peacekeeping that leads to peace.

In this paper, I have sought to contribute to and further this discussion, arguing that existing observations about the effectiveness of peacekeeping are attenuated when we look further into the places from which peacekeepers are deployed. Observations about quality and domestic characteristics are driven by a contributor's regime type. Regimes that are



less constrained and accountable to domestic actors, in general, have greater autonomy to engage in a variety of practices to restrict liberties and freedoms afforded to constituents of more accountable and constrained regimes. I propose that peacekeepers can be a detriment to peace operations when they fail to follow through on mandated tasks or engage with local actors, or when they engage in misconduct or abuse, causing an erosion or lack of trust between actors and the peace operation that peacekeepers will be able to help the country achieve peace. Since peacekeepers often train host country security forces, this provides an avenue through which peacekeepers can transmit their tactics and training to trainees. Utilizing data on the contributions made by member states to UN peace operations as well as data on levels of democracy, I have proposed and found quantitative evidence that increasing the autocraticness of a UN peace operation leads to an increase in the level of civilian deaths, demonstrating support for the trust mechanism, and OSV committed by government forces, showing support for the transmission mechanism.

My findings have implications for the UN and its peace operations more broadly. As an organization that relies on its member states to provide the resources for peacekeeping, the UN is both constrained by its position and uniquely positioned to affect change. Before being deployed on a peacekeeping mission, security forces are required to complete pre-deployment training, which is meant to be based on the UN's Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM). Through this training, the UN could ensure better human rights training for its peacekeepers. To this end, the UN should more heavily invest in earlier-stage peacekeeper training while also fully implementing assessments of both "operational readiness" and "human rights readiness" ([Di Razza 2020](#)). Doing so avoids the need to call out particular contributors and instead provides procedures that all T/PCCs can follow and implement. Better monitoring and evaluation of training outcomes, both at the domestic and UN levels, would also provide insight into practices that do and do not work when trying to prepare peacekeepers for deployment. The UN is in a unique position to try to bring about a change in the way that peacekeepers are evaluated and trained which could vastly improve the

quality of peacekeeping and lead to better outcomes.

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# Online Supplementary Information for “Autocrats Keeping Peace? Autocratic Contributions to UN Peace Operations and Civilian Protection”

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## 0.1 Table for Government OSV

**Table O.A.1:** Government OSV Against Civilians

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-27.525*** (4.602)	-30.596*** (4.780)	-33.544*** (5.396)	-40.537*** (6.530)
Autocracy Index	0.029*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.019** (0.006)
Total Observers	-0.024 (0.056)	-0.003 (0.058)	-0.017 (0.061)	-0.031 (0.065)
Total Police	0.012 (0.012)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.014)
Total Troops	0.034 (0.023)	0.045+ (0.024)	0.070** (0.025)	0.072** (0.027)
Contingent GDP (log)	0.028 (0.074)	0.029 (0.078)	0.057 (0.084)	-0.061 (0.097)
No. T/PCCs	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.031** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.011)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.271*** (0.110)	0.797*** (0.106)	0.771*** (0.108)	0.603*** (0.112)
Population (log)	1.576*** (0.268)	1.771*** (0.281)	1.954*** (0.325)	2.477*** (0.410)
Population Density (log)	0.136 (0.192)	0.128 (0.201)	0.089 (0.225)	-0.057 (0.280)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.833	1.936	2.094	2.550
Num.Obs.	5795	5630	5395	4976
R2 Marg.	0.400	0.415	0.436	0.492
R2 Cond.	0.635	0.659	0.687	0.766
AIC	8799.0	8662.9	8319.4	7524.7
BIC	8879.0	8742.6	8398.5	7602.9
ICC	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5
RMSE	161.76	164.34	168.08	62.60

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

## 0.2 Better without the mission?

Do missions that are mostly composed of peacekeepers from democracies perform better than those that are mostly composed of peacekeepers from autocracies compared to not receiving a UN peace operation at all? As extensive quantitative evidence has demonstrated, UN peace operations have a track record of bringing peace to violent conflict or post-violent conflict affected countries ([Walter, Howard and Fortna 2021](#)). But is it the case that a mission that is mostly composed of peacekeepers from autocracies is worse than not receiving a peace operation at all? If this were the case, it would significantly alter the ways in which we think about the broadly positive outcomes associated with UN peace operations.

In order to test this, I combine UCDP/PRIO data on armed conflicts ([Davies, Petters-](#)

son and Oberg 2023; Gleditsch et al. 2002) with yearly data on UN peace operations by taking the mean percentage of peacekeepers from autocracies within each year. Any interstate, intrastate, or internationalized intrastate conflicts with an intensive level of at least 25 battle deaths in a year are included, which excludes extra-systemic conflicts. Mission-years that are less than half composed of peacekeepers from autocracies are considered “mostly democratic,” while those mission-years that are more than half composed of peacekeepers from autocracies are considered “mostly autocratic.” The resulting variable consists of three levels. Level zero are violent conflict years that have not received a UN peace operation; level one are violent conflict years that have UN PKOs mostly composed of peacekeepers from democracies; and level two are violent conflict years that have UN PKOs mostly composed of peacekeepers from autocracies.

Table O.A.2 compares the performance of peace operations that are composed of less than half peacekeepers from autocracies (level 1), those that are more than half composed of peacekeepers from autocracies (level 2), and civil wars that have received no UN peace operation (level 0, omitted from the analyses). Given issues with model convergence, results presented only include the “peacekeeping levels” variable and either battle or civilian fatalities. While the coefficients for Mostly Democratic and Mostly Autocratic are all negative, suggesting that either of these mission compositions lead to decreased battle or civilian fatalities, none of the coefficients achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. As a result, we cannot rule out that the effect of either of these levels is statistically significantly different from zero. Therefore, it does not appear to be the case that missions that receive mostly peacekeepers from autocracies are worse off than those that receive mostly peacekeepers from democracies or no mission at all.

### **0.3 Polyarchy- Binary Indicator**

The models below use a binary indicator to distinguish between democracies and autocracies. I use a cut of 0.5 for a country’s polyarchy score to determine whether or not they are considered a democracy. Though the results are substantive less significant than in the main

**Table O.A.2:** Negative Binomial Model- PK Levels

	Civilian Fatalities
(Intercept)	4.705*** (0.089)
Mostly Dem.	-0.087 (0.097)
Mostly Aut.	-0.019 (0.119)
SD (Intercept)	0.544
SD (Observations)	757.166
Num.Obs.	1528
R2 Marg.	0.001
R2 Cond.	0.125
AIC	12 165.1
BIC	12 191.7
ICC	0.1
RMSE	1014.28
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

models, the coefficient remains positive and statistically significant.

**Table O.A.3:** Negative Binomial Models- Binary Polyarchy Variable

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	-13.005*** (2.906)	-13.700*** (3.026)	-13.744*** (3.296)
Pct. PK from Aut.	0.011*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)
Total Observers	-0.003 (0.038)	0.006 (0.040)	0.037 (0.041)
Total Police	0.010 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)
Total Troops	-0.029+ (0.016)	-0.031+ (0.016)	-0.035* (0.017)
No. T/PCCs	-0.012* (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.014* (0.006)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.506*** (0.075)	1.190*** (0.074)	1.077*** (0.075)
Population (log)	0.928*** (0.175)	0.986*** (0.182)	1.007*** (0.200)
Population Density (log)	-0.307* (0.142)	-0.363* (0.149)	-0.416* (0.166)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.305	1.357	1.457
Num.Obs.	5796	5630	5395
R2 Marg.	0.392	0.387	0.376
R2 Cond.	0.575	0.582	0.588
AIC	19585.2	19296.3	18710.8
BIC	19678.5	19389.2	18803.1
ICC	0.3	0.3	0.3
RMSE	174.06	177.57	178.01

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001



## 0.4 Repression Index

To further unpack regime type, I also explore how varying levels of domestic repression in contributing countries impacts violence in peace operations. To do so, I follow a similar indexing approach as described above for polyarchy, this time using V-Dem’s measure of “equality before the law and individual liberty.” The V-Dem variable captures 10 dimensions of physical integrity rights, such as freedom from political killings and torture, and civil liberties, such as transparent laws with predictable enforcement, property rights, and access to justice, with values ranging from 0-1 with values closer to 1 representing greater respect for civil liberties and physical integrity ([Coppedge et al. 2021](#); [Pemstein et al. 2021](#), 49-50). For these analyses, I flip the variable such that values closer to 1 represent more repressive contexts. Tables O.A.4 demonstrate across all model specifications that peace operations composed of more peacekeepers from more repressive contributors leads to increases in both civilian and battle fatalities.

## 0.5 Additional Selection Effects Model

**Table O.A.4:** Negative Binomial Models- Civilian Fatalities, Repression Index

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	-12.742*** (2.846)	-13.563*** (2.999)	-13.397*** (3.263)
Repression Index	0.026*** (0.005)	0.030*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.005)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.504*** (0.076)	1.182*** (0.074)	1.066*** (0.076)
Population (log)	0.896*** (0.171)	0.957*** (0.180)	0.970*** (0.198)
Population Density (log)	-0.312* (0.142)	-0.361* (0.151)	-0.424* (0.167)
Total Observers	-0.005 (0.038)	0.007 (0.040)	0.039 (0.042)
Total Police	0.008 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)
Total Troops	-0.036* (0.016)	-0.042* (0.016)	-0.044** (0.017)
No. T/PCCs	-0.010+ (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.012* (0.006)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.298	1.366	1.470
Num.Obs.	5796	5630	5395
R2 Marg.	0.382	0.378	0.364
R2 Cond.	0.567	0.578	0.583
AIC	19 581.4	19 290.4	18 707.7
BIC	19 674.7	19 383.3	18 800.0
ICC	0.3	0.3	0.3
RMSE	174.50	177.47	177.90

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## 0.6 Polity Model

**Table O.A.5:** Testing for Selection Effects- only missions with 5 years of violence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	37.539*** (4.400)	37.374*** (4.337)	39.316*** (3.824)
Total Fatalities (5yr)	0.0004 (0.0003)		
Battle Fatalities (5yr)		0.001 (0.001)	
Civilian Fatalities (5yr)			0.0005 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	57	57	57
R2	0.023	0.028	0.014
R2 Adj.	0.006	0.010	−0.004
AIC	541.1	540.8	541.6
BIC	547.2	546.9	547.7
F	1.317	1.584	0.778
RMSE	26.43	26.37	26.56

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

## 0.7 Summary and Descriptive Statistics

**Table O.A.6:** Negative Binomial Models- Civilian Fatalities, Polity V (1990-2018)

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	−11.275*** (2.841)	−12.301*** (3.018)	−13.023*** (3.253)
Polity Index	0.006** (0.002)	0.007** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
Total Observers	−0.014 (0.039)	−0.003 (0.040)	0.029 (0.042)
Total Police	0.002 (0.010)	−0.005 (0.010)	−0.009 (0.010)
Total Troops	−0.020 (0.016)	−0.022 (0.016)	−0.027 (0.017)
No. T/PCCs	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.006)	−0.007 (0.006)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.543*** (0.077)	1.220*** (0.076)	1.092*** (0.076)
Population (log)	0.843*** (0.171)	0.921*** (0.181)	0.980*** (0.196)
Population Density (log)	−0.351* (0.142)	−0.407** (0.151)	−0.454** (0.164)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.273	1.345	1.416
Num.Obs.	5584	5452	5267
R2 Marg.	0.361	0.359	0.363
R2 Cond.	0.546	0.558	0.570
AIC	18 614.3	18 485.5	18 144.1
BIC	18 707.0	18 577.9	18 236.1
ICC	0.3	0.3	0.3
RMSE	177.35	180.28	180.12

+ p &lt; 0.1, \* p &lt; 0.05, \*\* p &lt; 0.01, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.001

**Table O.A.7:** Summary Statistics

	Unique (#)	Missing (%)	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
Civilian Fatalities	240	1	18.3	173.9	0.0	0.0	9176.0
Govt. OSV	117	1	7.2	159.7	0.0	0.0	9167.0
Autocracy Index	5222	0	36.9	16.6	9.6	35.6	84.3
Total Observers (100s)	545	0	1.0	1.5	0.0	0.4	10.5
Total Police (100s)	1297	0	4.4	8.9	0.0	0.1	55.1
Total Troops (1000s)	2354	0	3.2	5.2	0.0	0.5	38.3
GDP per PK (Quality)	5230	0	25007372.8	52111768.7	710.3	7211466.7	568018718.8
No. T/PCCs	74	0	26.4	18.1	1.0	23.0	74.0
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	2	0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0
Battle Fatalities (binary)	2	0	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0
Population	536	0	22901600.0	38004447.8	766616.0	9186719.0	220892331.0
Population Density	522	4	125.3	134.9	3.7	74.2	670.5