Pitfalls and tradeoffs in measuring support for violent extremism: Evidence from Niger and Burkina Faso[*]

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Abstract

Academics, policymakers, and other researchers use a mixture of disparate strategies to measure support for violent extremism in the Sahel and elsewhere. This paper leverages the confluence of five different measures of support for violent extremism to explore differences in how each captures the underlying phenomenon. These measurements include an original survey on support for violence among 1,772 youth in Niger and Burkina Faso, qualitative rankings of village-level vulnerability to violent extremism by local elites, and data from ACLED. Together, these data allows us to 1) provide insight into validly and reliably measuring violent extremism – a persistent challenge for scholars and policymakers – and 2) explore the extent to which commonly used measurement strategies capture the same underlying phenomena.

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Understanding attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors regarding the use of violence has become an urgent priority for scholars and policymakers. A growing array of academic studies, policy reports, and impact evaluations have tested interventions designed to reduce violent extremism. Researchers have used a number of different strategies to measure support for violent extremism. However, it remains unclear whether these strategies capture the same underlying phenomena. Moreover, despite the growing body of work that aims to measure levels of support for violent extremism, there is no scholarly consensus on best practices for how to do it. What are the costs and benefits of different strategies to measure support for violent extremism?

This paper leverages the confluence of five different strategies to illustrate the advantages of different approaches, their drawbacks, and the different phenomena they capture. We implemented an original survey of 1,772 youth in Niger and Burkina Faso that included three measurements. First, we directly ask respondents whether households in their village think that it is justified to use violence for a number of different reasons. Second, we use a list experiment to indirectly capture whether the respondent themselves thinks that violence is justifiable. Third, we ask a battery of questions which have been hypothesized to covary with support for violent extrenisn. To these survey questions, we add a unique qualitative ranking by customary chiefs, village elders, and other local notables. These elites rank both their village's experience of violence and its vulnerability to support for violent extremism. Finally, we include data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project to measure exposure to violent incidents at the village level.

We focus on the particularly low-information environment of the West African Sahel. This area has experienced a wave of violent conflict precipitated by the 2012 rebellion in northern Mali. Since the rebellion, armed groups such as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have escalated

attacks against civilians and local security forces in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The practical difficulties surrounding data collection in the Sahel limit the research available to understand this phenomenon. Beyond offering insight into the tradeoffs involved in measuring support for violent extremism, this paper advances the literature by examining support for violent extremism in this understudied context.

We show that strategies to avoid asking respondents sensitive questions about their own support for violence creates unexpected consequences. One such strategy is to ask individuals whether violence is considered to be justified or acceptable within their community; violently-inclined individuals can use the veneer of their village while expressing their own preferences. We show that individuals who perceive widespread support for violence within their community are *less* likely to support violence themselves when measured through a survey experiment. A second strategy is to ask about 'known' covariates of violence, such as measures of civic engagement or employment. We find that ten such indicators derived from the existing literature fail to predict support for violence with any accuracy. Survey experimental measures of support for violence posess meaningful downsides—more failure points and the need for a larger sample—but given the inconsistencies in alternative stratagies, these indirect measures are the clearest metric of support for violence.

Data from local elites only weakly correlate with survey measures of support for violent extremism. These data are qualitatively rich but are unfortunately limited in scope. ACLED data is more consistently correlated with our indirect measures of support for violence: individuals with a greater exposure to violence are less likely to support it themselves. However, both the qualitative village rankings and ACLED are potentially subject to selective reporting, which creates the potential for bias within observations.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we hope that this paper will serve as

a reference for both policymakers and academics who design programs to reduce support for violent extremism. By clarifying the costs and benefits of different measurement strategies, this paper will assist in identifying performance metrics which are best suited to a study or intervention's context. While we specifically focus on support for violent extremism, our conclusions are also likely to apply to measuring support for violence.

The second contribution of this paper is to take the first step in reconciling disparate findings across the academic and grey literatures. A growing body of work tests interventions meant to reduce support for violence and violent extremism. This paper suggests that the answers one gets depends on the questions one asks. Different measurements strategies have the potential to produce disparate outcomes, even in the context of the same intervention. In other words, this paper contributes to the existing literature by identifying the extent to which different strategies to measure support for violent extremism identify the same underlying phenomena.

Our argument advances in five parts. Section one clarifies our focus on support for violent extremism, rather than related concepts. Section two introduces the five overlapping measurement stratagies. Section three compares the results obtained by using the three survey measures of support for violence. Section four overviews how exposure to violence (measured via ACLED) and interviews with village experts compare to these survey methods. Section five concludes the paper and summarizes the costs and benefits of each measurement strategy.

1 Violence, violent extremism, and violent extremist organizations

This paper draws upon literature that studies three overlapping phenomena that are nevertheless distinct. It is important to distinguish between support for violence in general, support for violent extremism, and support for specific violent extremist organizations (VEOs). However, due to theoretical overlap and pragmatic constraints, these three phenomena tend to be measured in similar ways. For simplicity, this paper emphasizes how to measure support for violent extremism. However, the conceptual overlap between these three phenomena imply similar measurement strategies, which suggests that our conclusions would be useful beyond support for violent extremism.

These three phenomena are increasingly specific. An individual who supports violent extremism by definition supports using violence; an individual who supports a specific VEO clearly supports violent extremism in at least some cases. Support for violent extremism adds an ideological scaffold to support for violence by wrapping it in "social, economic, political, or religious objectives."[1] From a programmatic perspective, most interventions aim to either tackle the drivers and enablers of violent extremism or to strengthen the resilience of individuals against violent extremism.[2]

From this perspective, it is unclear whether measurement strategies for programs that address the drivers and enablers of support for violence would differ from measurement strategies for programs that address the drivers and enablers of support for violent extremism. Similarly, resilience against support for violence and resilience against support for violent extremism are likely to be measured using similar approaches.[3]

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[1] USAID 2020.

[2] A third approach is to mitigate the impact of violent extremism on communities, but this is less directly relevant to our study.

[3] A program designed to reduce support for a specific VEO such as JNIM would necessitate different perfor-

In other words, while the existing literature includes a variety of outcome variables, it tends to measure them in similar ways. This paper is empirical in nature; we are agnostic as to the theoretical differences in what enables or drives these phenomena. We study the strategies to measure support for violent extremism or violence—not the differences between the concepts themselves.

2 Data and Methods

The humanitarian NGO Mercy Corps collected our survey data as part of its Youth Connect (YC) program. The YC program took place in 20 communes across Niger's Tillabery and Maradi regions as well as four communes in Burkina Faso's Sahel and Est regions. Mercy Corps chose these areas non-randomly to maximize the potential impact of the YC program. We conducted the survey between September and early October of 2021 as part of the YC program's effort to establish baseline indicators for the program. In Niger, we surveyed a random 12 of the 20 project communes; in Burkina Faso, we surveyed all four project communes. Figure 1 shows the targeted areas and surveyed villages within the two countries.

Within communes, Mercy Corps selected villages using a Village Selection Tool (VST) designed to identify villages where the project would have the maximum impact. As part of the VST, project staff convened meetings with local notables such as chiefs, elders, and other elites to qualitatively rank the problems experienced by their village and the village's vulnerability to violent extremism. After adding the scores across 28 VST indicators, Mercy Corps chose the villages with the five highest scores in every commune to receive the YC treatment. The online appendix includes an example of a VST sheet. These five

mance metrics than a program which aims to reduce violence between farmers and herders at the individual level. However, such specifically targeted programs are rare compared to more broad-based interventions.

Figure 1. Project areas and surveyed villages

Burkina Faso   Niger

Non-project area
Project area

Burkina Faso   Niger   Surveyed village

Note: The project areas are the Tillabery and Maradi regions of Niger and the Sahel and Est regions of Burkina Faso. This figure includes 12 commune centers and 36 villages in Niger, as well as 4 commune centers and 20 villages in Burkina Faso.

villages per commune, along with the commune centers, comprise our sample frame.

In Niger, we randomly selected three of the five villages chosen by the VST process to receive the survey; in Burkina Faso, we surveyed all five villages. We also surveyed the commune centers—generally the largest town in each selected commune. We purposefully oversampled villages in Burkina Faso to ensure that there was an adequate sample size for country-level descriptive statistics. Using a random walk, we sampled 20 households per village, and 40 per commune center.[4] Within each household, we randomly selected a youth to participate in the survey. We define youth as between the ages of 15 and 29. This approach yielded a sample of 1,206 youth in Niger and 566 in Burkina Faso.[5]

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[4]Our sampling intervals were higher than those in many comparable studies to ensure that enumerators reached the outskirts of the villages, where herding and allochthonous populations tend to live.

[5]We ran power calculations for our survey experiments using estimates from G. Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014

Because Mercy Corps selected the project communes non-randomly to target the populations most vulnerable to recruitment by VEOs, we cannot gaurantee that these youth are representative of the broader population in the two countries. If the VST was even marginally successful, then these youth will be more vulnerable to violent extremism than other youth. However, for the purposes of comparing different measurement strategies, the important thing is that these increased levels of vulnerability are consistent across all five of our measurements. The individual measures of support for violence may be biased upwards, but the comparison between them is not.

3   Survey Measures

Academic studies, policy reports, and impact evaluations of programs aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) have used a range of different measures and survey tools to capture support for violent extremism. The simplest way to measure support for violent extremism within a community is to ask people directly. Studies and program evaluations in a variety of contexts have taken this approach, asking respondents about the extent to which they support the use of violence for a political, religious, or ideological cause.[6] Some studies focus on capturing attitudes about violence towards particular individuals, such as civilians[7], politicians[8], or security forces[9], or they ask about sanctioning the use of violence under particular conditions, including in defense of one's

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as benchmarks for acceptable minimum detectable effects.

[6]Aldrich 2014; Armaly and Enders 2022; Baumgardner-Zuzik and Myers 2019; Finkel et al. 2021; Grossman, Nomikos, and Siddiqui 2021; Lichtenheld and Ogbudu 2021; Uexkull, d'Errico, and Jackson 2020; Vijaya et al. 2018. The U.S. government defines violent extremism as "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated violence to further social, economic, political, or religious objectives" (see USAID 2020).

[7]Kiendrebeogo and Ianchovichina 2019.

[8]Elad-Strenger et al. 2021.

[9]Iqbal, O'Brien, and Bliuc 2022.

family or community, or in response to government repression.[10] This specificity is important because people's willingness to endorse violent extremism depends on the context in which it is used.[11] By asking about ideologically motivated violence, these studies all fall under our umbrella of support for violent extremism.

Consistent with this research, in our survey we ask respondents "[d]o people in your community think it is sometimes, rarely, or never justified to use violence to do each of the following: retaliate against violence; defend one's ethnic group; defend one's religion; or force the government to change its policies?" We then combine these four questions into one additive index of a community's belief that violence is justified.[12] Table 1 shows the baseline averages of these questions; never is coded as a one, rarely as a two, and sometimes as a three.

We can also attempt to measure support for violent extremism indirectly. Asking people direct questions about violent extremism, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected environments such as Niger and Burkina Faso, is extremely sensitive. Social desirability bias and nonrandom refusal to participate may significantly skew survey results.[13] However, it is important to note that sensitivity bias is not the only concern when it comes to direct questions about violent extremism. Such measurement strategies can raise ethical and practical challenges, from potentially endangering enumerators and respondents to increasing the risk of retraumatization.

In order to mitigate these risks and elicit truthful responses to these sensitive questions, conflict researchers have increasingly turned to survey experiments that use techniques to

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[10] Ash 2022; Berger 2014; Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020; Helmus et al. 2017.

[11] Westwood et al. 2022.

[12] We use the simple additive index throughout the paper. The results are qualitatively similar to an index created using PCA. However, some respondents chose not to respond to individual 'justified' questions, which means using a PCA index drops our sample size. We code nonresponse as a zero in the additive index.

[13] G. Blair et al. 2013; G. Blair, Coppock, and Moor 2021; G. Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014.

Table 1. Summary statistics

	Min	Mean	Median	Max	Std. Dev.	N
Violent extremism measures						
Justified: retaliate against violence	1	1.476	1	3	0.719	1747
Justified: defend ethnic group	1	1.586	1	3	0.777	1728
Justified: defend religion	1	1.687	1	3	0.828	1711
Justified: change govt. policies	1	1.498	1	3	0.759	1718
Index of 'justified' variables	0	6.082	6	12	2.478	1772
Survey indicator						
Secondary school or better	0	0.350	0	1	0.477	1772
Ethnic Majority	0	0.492	0	1	0.500	1772
Above median life skills	0	0.414	0	1	0.493	1772
Above median life efficacy	0	0.481	0	1	0.500	1772
Employed	0	0.468	0	1	0.499	1772
Above median days worked	0	0.553	1	1	0.497	1772
Recently improved land	0	0.263	0	1	0.440	1772
Access to market resources	0	0.383	0	1	0.486	1763
Civic engagement	0	0.198	0	1	0.398	1772
Social cohesion	0	0.493	0	1	0.500	1772
ACLED data (village level)						
N. of govt. events within 25km	0	0.208	0	3	0.580	72
N. of Jihadi events within 25km	0	2.069	0	12	3.234	72
N. of deaths within 25km	0	2.500	0	26	6.424	72

Note:
Data are from the YC baseline survey in Niger and Burkina Faso, as well as ACLED.

indirectly reveal people's responses to sensitive questions.[14] These techniques include list, endorsement, and randomized response experiments. In list experiments, respondents count the number of items on a list that they endorse or agree with, and the list includes a sensitive item (such as whether violence is justified). Endorsement experiments measure support for a particular actor or policy, typically a violent group. By ascertaining whether respondents support a policy or action endorsed by a specific actor, the technique reveals

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[14]G. Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014; Fair et al. 2018; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2012; Linke et al. 2018; Lyall, G. Blair, and Imai 2013; Lyall, Zhou, and Imai 2020; Nanes 2020; Tesfaye et al. 2018.

their support for that actor, whether ethnic community militias in Kenya,[15] the Taliban and other armed groups in Pakistan[16] and Afghanistan[17], or armed opposition groups in Somalia.[18] Finally, randomized response experiments vary whether respondents answer a sensitive or non-sensitive question, or whether they provide a predetermined response or an honest answer to the question.[19]

Our survey employed a list experiment to ask about support for violent extremism indirectly, for two reasons. First, list experiments are relatively easy to implement: they rely on a simple count technique and do not require the complex design and set-up that endorsement and randomized response techniques entail. Second, list experiments are particularly conducive to asking about attitudes and beliefs about violent extremism, whereas endorsement experiments are typically meant to measure attitudes towards one actor in particular, in this case a particular VEO.

Specifically, we asked respondents to tell us how many of a list of statements they agreed with: "Western powers should continue to intervene to keep the peace in Niger/ Burkina Faso; All children should go to school; Other people in Niger/Burkina Faso are not at all trustworthy; In line with our customs, we should respect our elders." The treatment condition also received the statement "It is justifiable to use violence for a political or religious cause."

Our direct and indirect measures of support for violence do not measure the exact same concept. The direct questions measure how the respondent perceives support for violent extremism in the village. The list experiment measures the extent to which the respondent themselves supports violent extremism. However, there are reasons to imagine that these

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[15]Linke et al. 2018.
[16]G. Blair et al. 2013; Fair et al. 2018.
[17]G. Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014; Kurtz, Tesfaye, and Wolfe 2018; Lyall, G. Blair, and Imai 2013; Lyall, Zhou, and Imai 2020.
[18]Tesfaye et al. 2018.
[19]G. Blair, Imai, and Zhou 2015.

two measures would be positively correlated. First, individuals who live in a village where support for violence is justified are themselves more likely to support violence. Second, if you support violent extremism yourself, then you may correctly or incorrectly perceive village support for violent extremism to be higher. Cognitive biases suggest that humans are more likely to perceive their own opinions as popular ones.[20]

Are these direct and indirect measurement strategies substitutes for each other? Are youth who perceive their communities to be supportive of violence more supportive of violence themselves? Table 2 shows heterogenous treatment effects for our list experiment. Interacting other variables of interest with the treatment indicator here tells us how the treatment effect increases or decreases with the covariates. In addition to the direct questions, we also include incidence of violent events within 25 kilometers of the respondent's village.

Table 2 shows that there is a background level of support for violent extremism. The treatment indicator for the list experiment is consistently positive and significant. [21] When presented with the additional option of 'It is justifiable to use violence for a political or religious cause,' approximately 12.7 percent of respondents selected an additional item with which they agreed. However, the key takeaway from these results is that individuals who thought that violence was accepted in their community were actually less likely to themselves believe that violence is justified. While the individual direct questions were not significant, the additive index of these direct measures is negative and statistically significant. An increase of one standard deviation in the index of perceived community support for violence is associated with a decrease of 12.5 percent in the probability that an individual supports violence themselves. The ACLED variables are not significantly

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[20]Weaver et al. 2007.

[21]These estimates are roughly in line with those of Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014 who deploy similar survey experiments to measure support for violent extremism in Afghanistan.

Table 2. Violent events and perception of support for violent extremism reduce support for violence in survey experiments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment indicator	0.127*	0.520***	0.431**	0.113	0.113
	(0.052)	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Treatment * Retaliate		−0.085			
		(0.116)			
Treatment * Religion		0.045			
		(0.057)			
Treatment * Defend		−0.037			
		(0.106)			
Treatment * Government		−0.183			
		(0.090)			
Treatment * Justified Index			−0.049*		
			(0.019)		
Treatment * Govt. Events				−0.093	−0.093
				(0.092)	(0.092)
Treatment * Jihadi Events				0.013	0.013
				(0.031)	(0.031)
Treatment * Deaths				0.002	0.002
				(0.010)	(0.010)
Demographic Controls	X	X	X	X	X
Village Fixed Effects	X	X	X		
Commune Fixed Effects				X	X
Num.Obs.	1769	1679	1769	1769	1769
R2	0.317	0.336	0.323	0.276	0.276

Note: This table uses data from the YC baseline survey and ACLED. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. Demographic controls include sex, ethnicity, age, and an index of household wealth. All regressions use survey weights. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

associated with the results of the list experiment.

Clearly, the direct and indirect questions are not substitutes for each other. What could explain these results? An individual's support for violence may color their assessment of community support for violence. Individuals who are themselves supportive of violence may feel more strongly that the community is not supportive of violence. They may consider their level of support to be 'average,' and that it is the community which is not the baseline. If I am eager to use violence for a political cause, and others in my village are only moderately supportive of violence, I may perceive myself to be the moderate ones and the other villagers to be overly dovish.

Indirect strategies such as our list experiment may be more effective at avoiding social desirability bias and eliciting individual preferences. However, these approaches are not without drawbacks. The first concern is statistical power. Survey experiments rely on dividing respondents into treatment and control groups. With smaller numbers of respondents engaging with the actual item of interest, these approaches require much greater sample sizes to be able to reliably detect effects.

A second drawback is that these approaches are more complex, and thus have a greater number of failure points. For example, in the YC survey we also included list and endorsement experiments to measure support for violent extremist groups. Security concerns prevented us from specifying a particular VEO from the several operating in survey areas. We were forced to rely on euphemisms—"bearded men" in French, "inta-âda" in Haussa, and "izéfoutay" in Zarma. Even respondents who might be supportive of a specific violent extremist organization are unlikely to be favorable to all "bearded men." Reports of confusion from enumerators led us to disregard the results of these experiments.

A third strategy for measuring support for violence within communities is simply to measure known or hypothesized correlates of support for violent extremism. This strategy

has the advantage of avoiding sensitive questions, which, as noted above, can increase rates of nonresponse among surveyed individuals and, particularly in less secure areas (such as Niger and Burkina Faso), endanger survey enumerators. Previous studies have focused on measuring attitudes and beliefs that correlate with people's attitudes regarding – and willingness to participate in – violent extremism, such as attitudes towards outgroups and social cohesion,[22] views on militancy,[23] concerns about extremism,[24] antisocial behavior[25] and participation in illicit activities,[26] and a sense of grievance and disempowerment.[27] The assumption is that measuring attitudes and behaviors that are associated with violence provide an approximation of respondents' proclivity towards violent extremism. But can these correlates actually effectively capture support for violent extremism?

From our survey, we distill 10 binary indicators which existing research on support for violence suggests would covary with support for violence. Employment measures whether an individual works and makes money in at least one sector. Above median days worked refers to the number of days the respondent reports having worked in the last month. Access to market resources measures extent to which the respondent agress that they "have access to economic resources to develop [their] business." Whether the respondent recently improved their land indicates if respondents "left any parcels fallow or made significant improvements, such as adding boundary shrubs, windbreaks or demi-lunes." The secondary school or better indicator excludes religious education.

The above median life skills indicator combined an index of the extent to which the respondent agrees with the following statements: "I am able to solve problems more creatively than my peers," "I excel at communicating with others," "It is easy for me to stick to

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[22]Bilali and Vollhardt 2013; Grossman, Nomikos, and Siddiqui 2021; Marrone et al. 2020.

[23]G. Blair et al. 2013.

[24]Grossman, Nomikos, and Siddiqui 2021.

[25]Blattman, Jamison, and Sheridan 2017.

[26]Blattman and Annan 2016.

[27]Baruch et al. 2018.

my aims and accomplish my goals," and "I have the skills necessary to provide for myself and my family." Social cohesion is another indicator, which combines the extent to which the respondent agrees with the following statements: "People around here are willing to help their neighbors across ethnic lines," "People in this area do not share the same values," and "People in this area see the benefits of working together to achieve common goals.

The above median life efficacy indicator combines the extent to which the respondent agrees with the following statements: "I feel like I have the power to influence my own life," "I always manage to solve difficult problem if I try hard enough," "if someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want," "my community respects me," and "I have the ability to decide about my future." The ethnic majority indicator is calculated at the country level (i.e. Mossi in Burkina Faso and Haussa in Niger). Finally, the civic engagement indicator measures whether the respondent has participated in the followig activities during the past year: participated in a demonstration against a government policy, contributed [their] time to a community project, contacted someone from the government or an elected official, sent a text message on behalf of a civic organization, sent a text message on behalf of a religious organization, or contributed funds to a religious organization.

Appendix A outlines the literature on which we predicate these indicators. However, these survey measures do not consistently predict support for violence. Table 3 shows the results of regressing our survey measures on the direct survey measures of support for violent extremism. These questions measure whether the respondent thinks that people in their community perceive violence to be justified in four scenarios. Columns one to four use the answers to each question as an outcome variable; column five combines these responses into an additive index. These different scenarios allow us to compare correlates across fine-grained measures of support for violent extremism, rather than whether one

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Table 3. Effect of survey covariates on the 'justified' outcomes

	Retaliate	Religion	Defend	Government	Index
Employed	0.031	−0.081	−0.025	0.015	−0.096
	(0.050)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.173)
Above median days worked	0.020	0.168	0.066	−0.005	0.224
	(0.063)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.067)	(0.255)
Access to market resources	−0.111	−0.038	−0.006	0.039	−0.013
	(0.123)	(0.102)	(0.089)	(0.114)	(0.428)
Recently improved land	0.009	0.059	0.004	0.175*	0.283
	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.105)	(0.074)	(0.298)
Secondary school or better	−0.075	−0.109**	−0.071	−0.148	−0.434
	(0.064)	(0.041)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.268)
Above median life skills	−0.084	0.041	0.152*	0.081	0.349
	(0.053)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.211)
Social cohesion	−0.029	0.012	0.167	−0.082	−0.019
	(0.082)	(0.095)	(0.111)	(0.101)	(0.336)
Above median life efficacy	0.178*	0.065	0.046	0.080	0.201
	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.101)	(0.093)	(0.330)
Ethnic Majority	0.856**	1.265***	0.849**	1.369***	4.902***
	(0.313)	(0.283)	(0.287)	(0.300)	(1.007)
Civic engagement	−0.008	0.110	0.057	0.215*	0.427
	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.081)	(0.092)	(0.293)
Demographic Controls	X	X	X	X	X
Village Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X
Num.Obs.	1737	1702	1718	1709	1761
R2	0.167	0.288	0.204	0.192	0.214

Note: This table uses data from the YC baseline survey. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. Demographic controls include sex, ethnicity, age, and an index of household wealth. All regressions use survey weights. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

supports violent extremism in general.

Improving land, a proxy for land tenure security, is associated with greater belief that using violence to oppose government policies is seen as justified, but not other reasons for using violence. Similarly, higher levels of education correlate with reduced support for violence, but this reduction is significant only for religious reasons to use violence. This finding likely reflects the fact that our education indicator excludes religious education, so these individuals are likely to be less religious on average. Respondents with greater life skills are statistically significantly more likely to think that violence is perceived as justified to defend one's ethnic group, but less likely to think it is perceived to be justified in retaliation for violence.

Life efficacy is associated with belief that using violence to retaliate against violence is justified, but not for other reasons. One explanation for this result is that life-efficacy may empower individuals to take matters into their own hands. Finally, there is limited evidence for the role of political factors in explaining support for violent extremism in our data. Interestingly, individuals with greater levels of civic engagement were *more* likely to think that using violence to oppose government policies—which begs the question of how our respondents define 'engagement.' Members of ethnic majorities (Mossi in Burkina Faso and Haussa in Niger) are much more likely to perceive all forms of violence to be justified within their community.

Do our survey indicators do any better at explaining variation within our list experiment? Figure 2 displays conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) for the first survey experiment. CATEs capture treatment effect heterogeneity; these numbers show the distribution of unit-level treatment effects for the subgroups defined by these survey mea-

Figure 2. Conditional Average Treatment Effects for the list experiment by survey indicator

Note: We calculate CATEs using a causal forest. This diagram shows the point estimate and confidence intervals for the average treatment effect estimates within each subgroup defined by the survey indicators. All calculations use survey weights.

sures.[28] We estimate CATEs using a causal forest.[29] These treatment effects remain (almost) universally positive, which suggests that a background level of support for violent extremism exists regardless of subgroup.

We find minimal heterogeneity among treatment effects. A standard test for heterogenous treatment effects—regressing the treatment effect on both the predicted values of $\tau(x_i)$ and the mean of $\tau(x_i)$—suggests the absence of meaningful heterogeneity.[30] The exceptions are social cohesion and life-efficacy. Respondents who reported above-average levels of social cohesion had lower levels of support for violent extremism than those who reported below-average levels. On the other hand, respondents who reported above-average life-efficacy were much more likely to support violent extremism. The latter finding echoes the direct measures of support, where above median life-efficacy increased the likelihood individuals supported retaliatory violence.

These results show that what you find depends on what you measure. Our measures of support for violent extremism capture different concepts. Within our sample, individual support for violent extremism is negatively associated with the perception that one's community supports violent extremism. These measurements are not substitutes. Each strategy is likely to be applicable in different scenarios. For example, to evaluate a program which targets a subpopulation which is particularly vulnerable to violent extremism, the list experiment may be more successful. However, if you want to gauge background support for violent extremism in a community, the direct questions may suffice. Each approach also has costs and benefits. Using a list experiment may decrease non-response, but it requires a larger sample size to be adequately powered.

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[28]We can define the CATE for outcome i as $\tau(x_i) = \mathbb{E}[Y_i^{(1)} - Y_i^{(0)} | X = x]$ where $Y^{(1)}$ is the expected outcome under the treatment for unit i, $Y^{(0)}$ is the expected outcome for unit i under control, and x_i is a vector of controls.

[29]Wager and Athey 2018.

[30]Wager and Athey 2018.

Moreover, our results indicate that attempting to measure support for violent extremism exclusively using hypothesized covariates of violent extremism does not capture the underlying phenomenon. It is worth noting that our sample of Nigerian and Burkinabé youth ought to be particularly vulnerable to violent extremism. If a lack of civic engagement or a lack of life skills was going to spill over into support for violent extremism, it would be most likely to happen in our sample. However, neither the direct nor the indirect measures of support for violent extremism are meaningfully associated with these and other proposed correlates. The benefit to measuring support for violent extremism using hypothesized correlates is that is avoids asking respondents sensitive questions, but the cost is a poor estimate of the variable of interest.

4 VST and ACLED Data

Besides surveying community members, two other measurement strategies have been employed to gauge support for violent extremism: interviews with local leaders and other key informants; and the count of violent events within a particular area or society. Elite and key informant interviews are often a critical component of conflict and violence assessments conducted by researchers, policymakers, and humanitarian and development practitioners. Guidance and strategy documents from multiple U.S. government agencies call for interviewing community leaders and local elites in order to assess risk factors for violence and violent extremism.[31] Local elites, particularly members of traditional or customary institutions, are considered to be the most trusted and informed sources of information on community dynamics, and therefore are best placed to provide insights on potential risk factors and the attitudes and behaviors of members of their communities.[32] Organi-

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[31]International 2017; USAID 2020.
[32]USAID 2012.

zations like Mercy Corps have therefore developed assessment tools that rely heavily on the perspectives of local leaders and other community members to assess communities' vulnerability to violence, conflict, and violent extremism.

The Village Selection Tool (VST) used in our context is just such a tool. These data come from both elite and key informant interviews. Specifically, the VST comprises qualitative rankings by local elites of how vulnerable their villages are to violence and violent extremism. The VST process yielded data on 28 indicators for 190 villages across the 20 Nigerien communes targeted to receive the YC program. There are 28 criteria in total. Some of these criteria one might expect to be positively correlated with violence, such as "negative impacts of security measures on the local economy and the well-being of populations" and "blunders by local self-defense groups." Other criteria one might expect to reduce support for violence, such as "access to education," "community dialogue", and "leadership and engagement of youth." The online appendix enumerates the specific elements of the VST.

In theory, these data ought to present a comprehensive view of support for and vulnerability to violent extremism for each village. The local elites who gave these rankings ought to have a privileged understanding of violent extremism in the area. Customary elites are often the cornerstone of civil society, particularly so in the areas where our surveys take place due to low state penetration. Customary elites play a particular role in dispute resolution, giving them unique insight into conflict dynamics and violent extremism-related risks in their villages. However, a potential disadvantage to these data is that elites are not passive observers. They have their own biases and agendas which could distort their reporting.

Leaders may want their villages to be ranked highly or considered especially vulnerable because they think it will increase the odds of their communities receiving aid. However, heterogeneity within answers suggests that this is not the case. For example, when

Table 4. LASSO coefficients for VST data and the 'justified' outcomes

	Justified questions				
	Retaliate	Defend	Religion	Govt.	Index
Religious tolerance	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	-0.862
Employment opportunities	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	-0.227
Negative impact of security measures	0.000	0	-0.057	0.000	-0.208
Mistakes by security groups	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	-0.044
Presence of development partners	0.000	0	0.000	-0.030	-0.010
Radicalized community leaders	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	-0.005
Incursion by VEOs	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	-0.004
Ethnic diversity in local government	0.000	0	0.024	0.000	0.000
Access to water	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	0.011
Access to markets	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	0.044
Sermons inciting hate	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	0.081
Leadership and engagement of youth	0.028	0	0.000	0.085	0.105
Inter/intra community conflict	0.000	0	0.000	0.108	0.325
Acess to development finance	0.000	0	0.000	0.000	0.453
Inter/intra religious dialogue	0.000	0	0.000	0.060	0.536

Note: Results from a LASSO regressing the VST data on the justified outcomes. All results use 10-fold cross validation. The full list of VST data is available in Appendix A2.

asked about negative impacts of security measures on local economies, 70 villages noted important impacts, nine noted moderate impacts, three noted weak impacts, and 108 noted no impacts at all. Similarly, only three villages reported radicalisation of leaders. This pattern of reporting is inconsistent with village elites misreporting to increase their likelihood of receiving assistance.

How do these data compare to the survey measures of support for violent extremism? One difficulty is the relatively limited overlap between the survey measures and the VST data. The VST was only used in Niger, and was not required for commune centers that were automatically selected into our sample. There are only 36 villages with both survey and VST data, comprising 720 respondents. With 28 seperate variables included in the VST, a potential degree of freedom problem results. Moreover, restricting the list experiment to 720 observations leaves us underpowered to detect any effects.

We use a LASSO (with cross-validation) to select only the most important variables. The advantage of LASSO over a Ridge regression or an elastic net is that the penalization forces some variables to zero, as opposed to close to zero. This shrinkage facilitates the analysis of a subset of variables. Table 4 includes all variables that are non-zero in at least one specification.

Unsurprisingly, the index that combined the direct measurements, i.e. the 'justified' questions, as the highest number of variables which endure the shrinkage estimator. 'Religious tolerance' is the strongest negative predictor of support for violent extremism. 'Inter/intra religious dialogue' is the strongest positive predictor of support for violent extremism. These contradictory results suggest a nuanced role for religious institutions in support for violent extremism. Access to development finance is also a strong predictor, which aligns with literature which suggests that development projects can lead to disputes over control. The existence of inter/intra community conflict is also a strong predictor,

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Figure 3. Distribution of conflict variables in survey areas

Burkina Faso
(All ACLED incidents)

Niger
(All ACLED incidents)

Burkina Faso
(Incidents by government forces)

Niger
(Incidents by government forces)

Burkina Faso
(Incidents by jihadist factions)

Niger
(Incidents by jihadist factions)

Burkina Faso
(All deaths)

Niger
(All deaths)

Note: Data are from the ACLED project; they cover the years 2020 and 2021. The project areas are the Tillabery and Maradi regions of Niger and the Sahel and Est regions of Burkina Faso.

which is not surprising.

Finally, we explored how the incidence of violence compared to our other measures of support for violent extremism. Given the challenges of collecting data on violent attitudes and behavior — and the fact that supporting violent extremism does not automatically lead someone to engage in violent extremism — previous research has also relied on an analysis of violent events to measure the extent to which individuals and communities support or are vulnerable to violent extremism.[33] The logic here is twofold. First, events data pro-

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[33]Blattman, Hartman, and R. A. Blair 2014; Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2016; Dasgupta, Gawande, and Kapur

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vide a more direct and objective measure of violent behavior, which is what most scholars and policymakers are concerned about and what most P/CVE programs try to influence. Second, there should be an association between the incidence of violent extremism and support for it in a particular locality – both because those who are more accepting of violent extremism are more likely to employ it, and also because exposure to violence is a significant predictor of engagement in violent behavior.[34]

The most widely-used dataset on violent events is the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), which contains micro-level data on different kinds of violent incidents by location, perpetrator, and victim. ACLED aggregates both social media accounts and local reporting on incidents of violence. This reliance on local data sources permits ACLED to be incredibly comprehensive for wide swathes of the world. However, inconsistent quality control means that biases in underlying news sources may permeate into ACLED itself. The data may not be a unbiased reporting of events on the group.[35]

Of the 190 villages for which we had VST data, we were able to match 183 with the 2012 Nigerien census of places (*Répertoire National des Localités*), which provides both population data and geographic coordinates. We matched both the survey and VST data to geo-located data on conflict events from ACLED. For the survey data, we used the center point of all enumerated households in a given village to generate village coordinates. Our ACLED variables are the count of all conflict events, the count of all events where government forces were the primary actor, the count of all events were Jihadist organizations were the primary actors, and the count of conflict deaths. For all ACLED variables, we include only incidents from 2020 to 2021. These variables are calculated with a 10 kilometer buffer, but results with a 25 kilometer buffer are substantively similar.

2017; Ivaschenko et al. 2017.

[34]Baskin and Sommers 2014; Black, Sussman, and Unger 2010.
[35]Eck 2012.

Figure 4. Conditional Average Treatment Effects for the list experiment by ACLED exposure

Note: We calculate CATEs using a causal forest. This diagram shows the point estimate and confidence intervals for the mean CATE estimates within each subgroup defined by the ACLED variables. All calculations use survey weights.

In Table 2 (above), we show that these ACLED data are not meaningfully associated with the direct measures of support for violence. However, we also want to know whether the ACLED data are meaningfully associated with individual support for violence as measured by our survey experiment. Figure 4 shows the CATEs for four subgroups defined by exposure to our ACLED variables. For each of the ACLED variables, we show the CATEs for villages with above median exposure to violence and below median exposure to violence.[36]

Figure 4 shows that individuals with below median exposure to violence were more likely to report that they individually supported the use of violence. This result holds for all four ACLED variables but is clearest for the count of all conflict events. One explana-

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[36]The fact that we measure ACLED variables only at the village level decreases the effective power of these analyses.

tion for these results could be that exposure to violence leads to 'violence fatigue' which would reduce support for violent extremism. However, our calibration test for heterogenous treatment effects still rejects the hypothesis of heterogeneity. These results suggest that exposure to violence is an extremely noisy correlate of support for violence.

Finally, we want to compare the exposure to violence measured via ACLED to the vulnerability to violence measured by local elites. As part of the VST process local elites ranked their villages on "incursions by unidentified armed groups." While the other 27 VST indicators are difficult to conceptually relate to the incidence of violence, self-reported violent excursions ought to be highly correlated with the count of ACLED incidents. Indeed, the correlation coeficient is 0.412 ($p < 0.01$). While this result does not feel sufficient to say that the ACLED and VST data capture the same underlying phenomenon, this result is nevertheless encouraging. The reported incidence of violence by local elites reflects the actual levels of violence reported by geo-coded event data.

5 Conclusion

The Sahel has become a hotbed for violent extremism. As a result, the question of how to measure support for violent extremism has become a crucial one. Academics, NGOs, governments, and other groups have used a plethora of strategies to measure support for violence. Beyond strict considerations of state-of-the-art survey design, logistical and ethical considerations often constrain the choice of how to measure support for violence. We leverage the confluence of five different strategies to enumerate the costs and benefits associated with each. We hope that these results are useful to a range of practitioners and researchers.

We show that indirect survey methods—chiefly survey experiments—remain the most effective tool for researchers to understand support for violent extremism. Beyond sensi-

tivity bias, direct questions about support for violent extremism create ethical and practical risks for both enumerators and respondents. Asking direct questions about community levels of support for violence is not a viable workaround: individuals who perceive widespread community support for violent extremism are actually less likely to support violent extremism themselves. Asking about 'known' correlates of support for violent extremism is also not a viable strategy. In our case, a battery of hypothesized covariates failed to predict support for violent extremism. Of course, indirect survey questions also create costs. Survey experiments require larger sample size to reach adequate statistical power and they introduce additional failure points.

Two additional measurement strategies prove limited. Following a number of NGOs and practitioners in the region, we asked local elites in 190 villages across Niger to gauge the level of support for violent extremism within their communities. However, these data only weakly correlate with village-level survey indicators of support for violent extremism, suggesting that local elites are not always reliable narrators. Data from the ACLED project are more reliably correlated with our individual-level indirect measures of support for violent extremism. Individuals with a greater exposure to violence are less likely to support it themselves.

This paper illustrates the trade-offs and benefits of different approaches to measure support for violent extremism. The paper also shows that measurement strategies do not always capture the same underlying phenomena, which may explain disparate results across the academic and grey literatures. By identifying the costs and benefits of these different approaches, this paper will help researchers and policy makers to better measure violent extremism and to select methods which are best suited to their particular contexts.

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Online Appendix: Measuring and explaining support for violent extremism

A1 Literature Review for Survey Indicators

Youth are particularly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment. For this reason, interventions aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), such as the USAID-funded YC program, often center youth.

A1.1 Survey questions

Our survey included modules on demographics; education and life skills; employment, income, and access to market resources; civic engagement; social cohesion; and support for violent extremism. For civic engagement, we aggregated people's responses whether they had participated in any of the following activities:

- Participated in a demonstration against a government policy

- Contributed your time to a community project

- Contacted someone from the government or an elected official

- Sent a text message on behalf of a civic organization

- Sent a text message on behalf of a religious organization

- Contributed funds to a religious organization

For social cohesion, we combined people's responses to the extent to which they agreed with the following statements (measured with a likert scale):

- "People around here are willing to help their neighbors across ethnic lines"

- "People in this area do not share the same values"

- "People in this area see the benefits of working together to achieve common goals"

Studies of violent extremism in the Sahel suggest a variety of risk factors for youth: political and social marginalization, community support for violence, resource competition, a lack of education, ineffective governance, and poverty and unemployment.[37] Yet these studies tend to focus on the structural conditions that enable, incentivize, or encourage violence and extremism. They cannot test why certain individuals radicalize or participate in violent groups, but why others do not.[38] Parsing out these different explanations is important both to better understand vulnerability to violent extremism in the region and to ensure that policies and programs to combat it are focusing on the "right" risk factors.

Many proposed explanations mirror the broader scholarly literature examining why people join or support violent groups. This literature tends to draw a distinction between economic, social, and political factors. We summarize these factors below and distill a number of hypotheses from them.

A1.2   Economic Factors

First, some studies indicate that poverty and employment can shape participation in rebellion.[39] Material incentives to fight increase the benefits of engaging in violence, and the impoverished and unemployed face low opportunity costs in opting to pick up arms. For instance, research with former fighters in Boko Haram found that financial support offered by the insurgent group increased recruitment and capitalized on frustrations over inadequacies in the Nigerian government's economic programs.[40] Other research has suggested that youth join VEOs to assist with specific expenses.[41] Some studies have found that economic inequality between different identity groups in society is a strong predictor of ethnic

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[37]Barry, Toure, and Kaba 2018; CNESS-Niger 2018; Inks et al. 2017; IOM 2016; Oxfam 2017; UNDP 2017.

[38]CNESS-Niger (2018) is an exception.

[39]Blattman and Annan 2016; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008

[40]Corps 2016

[41]Hudson and Matfess 2017

violence.[42] Economic explanations are prominent in the Sahel, as the moniker "a hungry man is an angry man" is often invoked by local communities to explain a range of violent behaviors, from criminal and gang activity to recruitment into Jihadist organizations.[43] Together, this body of work suggests a link between support for violent extremism and a lack of employment, income, access to market resources, or other critical assets—such as land—which are central to the agricultural and pastoralist livelihoods that predominate in the Sahel region:

H1: Individuals who are employed will be less likely to support violent extremism.

H2: Individuals who work more days and report a higher income will be less likely to support violent extremism.

H3: Individuals with greater access to market resources will be less likely to support violent extremism.

H4: Individuals with greater access to land will be less likely to support violent extremism.

A1.3   Social and Psychological Factors

Other research has questioned the notion that economic factors explain violent mobilization. These studies do not find a link between employment status or income and people's attitudes and behaviors regarding violence.[44] A second strand of the literature emphasizes social and psychological factors. One area of focus is education, which some studies show is negatively associated with violence in part due to its encouragement of tolerant views and less militant attitudes[45]—while others argue that greater education is actually

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[42]Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011.
[43]As observed by Mercy Corps' researchers and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) initiatives in the region.
[44]Mercy Corps, Youth Economic Opportunity, Civic Engagement, and Conflict (2012), Corps 2015
[45]Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Lipset 1959; Shayo 2008

associated with more violence, at least under certain conditions, because it increases people's expectations and desire to address their grievances.[46] This leads to the following hypotheses:

H5: Individuals with greater levels of education (including formal education and technical trainings but not religious education) will be less likely to support violent extremism.

H5a: Individuals with greater levels of education (including formal education and technical trainings but not religious education) will be more likely to support violent extremism.

H6: Individuals who self-report higher levels of soft skills (e.g., reading and writing) will be less likely to support violent extremism.

Beyond education, social networks and social norms, attitudes, and behaviors – collectively referred to as social capital and social cohesion – can motivate people to fight, or discourage them from it. Participating in violence can generate social benefits stemming from feelings of group solidarity, bonding, or conforming to social norms.[47] As with (non-violent) political participation, social networks can change the costs of participating in violence by providing people with the skills, resources, and motivation to be recruited and mobilized.[48] Thus strong ties between members of a group can encourage exclusionary behavior towards out-group members, including the use of violence.[49] On the other hand, social networks that integrate members of different groups—and facilitate greater cohesion across communities—decrease the costs of social transactions, allow for the peaceful

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[46]Ives and Breslawski 2021; Lange 2011
[47]Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991; Muller and Opp 1986.
[48]Campbell 2013; Fujii 2011.
[49]Alcorta et al. 2020; Bhavnani and David 2007; Portes 1998.

resolution of intercommunal conflicts, and promote trust, discouraging the use of violence.[50] This indicates that social cohesion could have a positive or negative relationship with violent extremism:

H7: Individuals who report greater levels of social cohesion within their village will be less likely to support violent extremism.

H7a: Individuals who report greater levels of social cohesion within their village will be more likely to support violent extremism.

Regardless of the underlying social dynamics, psychological mechanisms—namely self-efficacy, the notion that engaging in violence increases people's feelings of agency—can lead people to join violent groups.[51] Participating in such groups, particularly those that are bound by strong ideological commitments, can enhance feelings of belonging, shape one's identity, and provide a source of meaning.[52] Yet individuals who already report high self-efficacy are less likely to seek refuge and belonging in violent groups and fringe ideologies:

H8: Individuals who self-report greater feelings of self-efficacy will be less likely to support violent extremism.

A1.4 Political Factors

A third and final strand of the literature on violent participation focuses on political factors. Most of this research suggests that the principal drivers of recruitment and radicalization stem from political grievances and experiences of insecurity, corruption, repression, or abuse by state or non-state actors.[53] These studies emphasize injustice, rather

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[50]Alcorta et al. 2020; Lederman, Loayza, and Menéndez 2002; Varshney 2003.
[51]Wood 2003; Young 2020.
[52]Kruglanski et al. 2017; Raets 2017; Shayo 2008.
[53]Corps 2015; Proctor and Tesfaye 2015.

than poverty, as the primary source of anger and discontent that motivates violent action.[54] Thus political inequality, not just economic inequality, can inspire individuals and groups—particularly marginalized or oppressed ethnic and religious minorities—to take up arms.[55] This suggests that people who are excluded from civic institutions, and lack opportunities to engage in the political process and channel their grievances in nonviolent ways, should be at greater risk of violent extremism. In addition to marginalization, repression and abuse, especially when perpetrated by state actors, can also provoke people into joining armed groups or committing violence against others—either out of fear and uncertainty in response to insecurity,[56] or to enact revenge.[57] Indeed, violence against family or friends may cause people to become radicalized or make emotional decisions to seek retaliation. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H9: Individuals who are local ethnic minorities will be more likely to support violent extremism.

H10: Individuals who have faced greater exposure to violence - particularly violence by government forces - will be more likely to support violent extremism.

H11: Individuals who report greater levels of civic engagement will be less likely to support violent extremism.

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[54]Gurr 2011; Lichbach 1989.

[55]Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011.

[56]Arjona and Kalyvas 2012; Guichaoua 2012; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Lake and Rothchild, Lichtenheld.

[57]Balcells 2017; Kalyvas 2006.

A2 Example sheet for the Village Selection Tool

Domaine	Nbre critère	Critères	Definition du critère	Guide de notation
Éducation et formation	1	Niveau d'éducation global des populations dans le village	Les différents niveaux d'éducation sont : professionnel, primaire, secondaire, coranique, alphabétisation ou aucun. Professionnel (à partir du BEPC)	Pour décider qu'un niveau est majoritaire il faut qu'il représente le cas de 60% ou plus de la population.
				0 = Universitaire
				1 = Secondaire-Professionnel
				2 = alphabetisation-primaire-coranique
				3 = Aucun
	2	Accès à l'éducation	On parle d'éducation formelle et non formelle. Accès est défini par la disponibilité des infrastructures d'éducation au sein des communautés et les conditions d'inscription sans discrimination (en terme âge, sexe, groupe ethnique, groupe social etc.)	0= Il n'y a pas de discrimination
				1 = il y a parfois des discriminations mais cas rares liés au sexe et aux infrastructures
				2 = il existe de la discrimination mais non systématique ;
				3 = l'accès à l'éducation est discriminant
	3	Qualité de l'éduation	Exemple de mauvaises conditions d'étude: mauvaises infrastructures scolaires (classe, clôture, latrine, point d'eau), mauvais ou insuffisant matériel didactique et enseignant sans formation/compétence	0 = Toutes les conditions sont bonnes
				1 = Issufisance Infrastructures scolaires
				2 = Issufisance d'enseignants
				3 = Issufisance matériels didactiques
	4	Accès à la technologie de l'information et de la communication	Utilisation des téléphones, des reseaux sociaux, radios pour s'informer, communiquer et developper leurs affaires/compétences	0 = Accès facile aux moyens de communication
				1 = Accès limité aux moyens de communication
				2 = Issufisance de couverture réseaux
				3 = Non maitrise des TIC et absence de couverture réseaux/médias
Croyances idéologiques	5	Tolérance entre les tendances religieuses	On parle de tolérance envers les croyances idéologiques de l'autre. Il y a plusieurs religions et tendances qui cohabitent pacifiquement.	0 = grande tolérance a la diversité des religions et des tendances religieuses
				1 = conflits latents
				2 = Conflits ouvert
	6	Dialogue inter et intra religieux	Dialogue inter et intra religieux	0= Très bonne existence des dialogues intra et interreligieux
				1 = Existence moyenne des dialogues intra et interreligieux
				2 = Existence faible des dialogues intra et interreligieux
				3 = Absence des dialogues intra et interreligieux
	7	Opportunités d'emplois et moyens de subsistance	Existence d'opportunités d'emplois permettant de subvenir à ses besoins	3 = Plusieurs opportunités existent au-delà de l'agriculture et de l'élevage et permettent de vivre décemment
				2 = Agriculture/élevage dominent largement, petites opportunités complémentaires qui permettent de vivre
				1 = Agriculture et/ ou élevage seulement, peu d'opportunité complémentaire, subsistance aux besoins minimales
				0 = Absence d'opportunités d'emploi, impossibilité de subvenir aux besoins de subsistance de la famille

Socio-économiques	**8**	Accès aux financements pour la réalisation des projets	Existance des institutions des micros finances pour le soutien aux jeunes	2 = Presence de plusieurs des institutions de finances approximité et accessiblies
				1 = Accès difficile aux institutions de micro finance
				0 = Absence des institutions de micro finance
	9	Accès à la santé	La disponibilité des installations, services et le pouvoir d'achat des services par les populations. Il faut aussi noter que le terme service inexistant prend en compte l'absence d'infrastructure sanitaire	0 = Services existant à proximité et populations ont un niveau d'achat acceptable
				1 = Services existant mais population avec faible pouvoir d'achat des soins et produits
				2 = Services insuffisants et/ou éloignés et population avec faible pouvoir d'achat des soins et produits
				3 = Services existants mais désuet, inefficace et non opérationnel
				4 = Services inexistants
	10	Accès aux points d'eau	Tout ce qui permet d'accéder à l'eau (Mares, puits, forages, Mini AEP, puisards etc.) du village, grâce à leur statut ou autre considération. La disponibilité des installations et infrastructures	0 = Tout le monde a le même niveau d'accès et l'accès à l'eau existe à proximité
				1 = Les infrastructures existent mais certaines couches/classes ont plus accès que d'autres
				2 = les infrastructures existent mais sont éloignées et pas toujours accessible à certains groupes
				3 = certains groupes ont peu ou pas accès aux points d'eau ce qui crée des conflits autour des points d'eau
				4= Infrastructures existantes mais de mauvais état
				5= Absence d'infrastructures hydrauliques
	11	Existence des marchés pour la vente des produits	Tous les hommes, les femmes, les jeunes filles et garçons ont un même niveau d'accès au marché	4 = Les hommes, les femmes, les jeunes filles et garçons peuvent vendre dans le marché sans contraites
				3 = Les jeunes ont un accès limité au marché
				2 = Les jeunes filles ont un accès limité au marché
				1= Marchés précaires et inadaptés au besoin ;
				0= Absence de marché
	12	Existence de conflits intra-communautaires et intercommunautaires	Intra-communautaire veut dire des tensions ou conflits au sein d'une même communauté ou village. Intercommunautaire veut dire des tensions ou conflits entre les populations des différents villages ou groupes ethniques pour une raison ou une autre.	0 = Aucun conflit ou tension intracommunautaire, intercommunautaire
				1 = Tensions intra et/ou intercommunautaire mais existence de dialogue
				2 = Existence de tensions et conflits intra et/ou intercommunautaires non violents
				3 = Existence de conflits intra et/ou intercommunautaire parfois violents
				4 = Existence de conflits intra et/ou

	13	Incursion violente des Hommes Armés Non Identifiés (HANI)	Attaques sporadiques pour intimider ou se ravitailler en vivres et en logistique,	0= Aucune attaque
				1= Très peu voir négligeable attaque
				2= Attaques moyennes
				3= Beaucoup d'attaques faites
	14	Couverture de forces de défenses et de sécurité ou des groupes auto défense	Existence de forces de défense et de sécurité ou d'auto-défense sur place ou à une distance très proche qui assurent à tout moment la sécurité du village	0 = Existence de forces de défense et de sécurité sur place,
				1= Existence de forces d'auto-défense sur place
				2 = Existence de force de défense et de sécurité ou de groupe d'auto-défense a une distance proche (15km)
				3 = Force de sécurité inexistante (pas sur place et elles sont à une distance éloignée)
Politiques/gouvernance	**15**	Radicalisation de certains leaders communautaires	Leaders : Chef de village, leaders religieux/coutumiers, des jeunes, des femmes, des structures locales et/ou personnes influentes au sein du village. Radicaliser = adopter un comportement violent ou incitatif a la violence	0 = Aucun leader communautaire radicalisé n'existe
				1 = Très peu de leader radicalisé (1 à 2)
				2 = Un nombre de moyen de leaders (3-5) radicalisés
				3 = Beaucoup (plus de 5) de leaders radicalisés
	16	Prolifération des lieux de cultes (mosquées, églises, lieux de sacrifices etc.,)	Ici on parle de l'émergence des lieux de cultes avec des idéologies extrémistes, le terme lieu de culte (mosquées, églises, lieux de sacrifices etc.)	0 = Pas de prolifération de lieux de cultes
				1 = Très faible prolifération des lieux de cultes;
				2 = Prolifération moyenne des lieux de cultes (2 à 3)
				3 = Prolifération importante des lieux de cultes (plus de 3)
	17	Contenus des prêches incitatifs à la violence et/ou à la haine	S'il y a présentement ou dans le passé des prêches incitant les populations à la violence ou la haine	0 = Aucune prêche dans ce sens
				1 = Très peu de prêches dans ce sens
				2 = Il y a parfois des prêches dans ce sens (2 à 3)
				3= Beaucoup de prêches dans ce sens (plus de 3)
	18	Impact négatif des mesures de sécurité sur l'économie locale et le bien-être des populations	Mesures restrictives de l'état d'urgence; Interdiction AGR, délocalisation, fermeture des marchés, couvre-feu, restriction des libertés etc.	0 = Aucun impact négatif des mesures ~~~~~~
				1 = Impact très faible voir négligeable
				2 = Impact moyen des mesures sécuritaires
				3 = Impact important des mesures sécuritaires
	19	Bavures par les forces de défense et de sécurité ou des groupes d'auto défense	Les actes de bavures ou répressions justifiés ou non des forces de défense et de sécurité ou des groupes d'auto défense	0 = Aucune bavure ou répression des FDS ou des groupes d'auto-défense, la population a confiance et se sent protégée
				1 = Bavure/répression faible voir négligeable des FDS ou des groupes d'auto défense
				2 = Bavure/répression existantes des FDS ou des groupes d'auto-défense, la population ne se sent pas protégée
				3 = Bavure/répression importante/élevée des FDS ou des groupes d'auto-défense, la population a peur des FDS et/ou groupes d'auto défense
Psych a	**20**	Des représailles sur des	Des représailles sur des personnes engagées dans la defence des valeurs republicaines et de	0 = Aucune représailles
				1 = Très peu voir négligeable représailles

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osoci l	20	personnes engagées	la communauté (engagement civic, social, patriotique et defence de la communauté)	2 = Represailles moyennes
				3 = Beaucoup de represailles faites
Diversite ethnique /Dialogue	21	Mariage inter ethnique et brassage culturel	Mariage entre 02 éthnies différentes	0 = Mariage inter ethnique et brassage culturel est une pratique courante
				1= Le mariages inter ethniques et brassage culturel arrivent mais pas la majorité
				2 = Très peu de mariages inter ethniques et brassage culturel
				3 = Absence total de mariage inter ethnique et brassage culturel
	22	Representation des jeunes dans les structures de gourvernance locale	La presence des jeunes dans les differentes structures de gouvernance	1 = Fortement représentés
				2 = Faiblement representés
				3 = Pas du tout representés
	23	Representation ethnique diversifiée dans les structures de gourvernance locale	La communauté est composée de plusieurs groupes ethniques et aussi la présence des groupes marginalises	0 = Existence de plusieurs ethnies
				1 = Une seule ethnie majoritaire
				2 = Groupes marginalisés
	24	Existence de dialogue intergenerationel	Intergénérationnel veut dire entre les personnes des différents âges moyen de garantir une bonne cohésion sociale et la transmission des valeurs positives socio-culturelles et économiques communautaires	0 = Très bonne existence des dialogues intergénérationnels
				1 = Existence moyenne des dialogues intergénérationnels
				2 = Faible dialogues intergénérationnels
				3 = Absence des dialogues intergénérationnels
	25	Leaderschip et engagement des jeunes	Existence des jeunes leaders engagés au sein des communautés	0 = Des jeunes learders existent et sont engagés
				1 = il est fréquent d'avoir des jeunes leaders engagés
				2 = il est rare de voir des jeunes leaders engagés
				3 = Absence des jeunes leaders engagés
	26	Dialogue communautaire	Dialogue au sein de la communauté	0 = Très bonne existence de dialogue communautaire
				1 = Existence moyenne de dialogue communautaire
				2 = Existence faible de dialogue ommunautaire
				3 = Absence de dialogue communautaire
Existence de mesures d'accompagnement ou de dispositifs de	27	Existence des institutions de médiation formelle et informelle dans le village	Chef de village, juge coutumiers, Comité de Sécurisation Foncière en milieu rural Gendarmerie, etc. et qui sont assez actifs dans leur effort de médiation et promotion des dialogues en cas de problèmes ou tensions	0 = Institution(s) existe(nt) et bonne capacité dans la médiation, la population a confiance en cette institution
				1 = Institution(s) existe(nt) avec une capacité moyenne de médiation, certains jugements sont contestés
				2 = Institution(s) existe(nt) mais avec une capacité de médiation faible, la population ne considère pas juste les jugements rendus
				3 = Institution(s) inexistante
	28	Intervention des partenaires au développement	Existence des ONG ou projet intervenant ou ayant intervenues dans la localité ou dans le village	0 =Plusieurs intervention en cours
				1 = une seule intervention en cours
				2 = une seule intervention passée
				3= Aucune intervention