

Machine Learning for Theorem Proving

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Speakers



Kaiyu Yang

Kaiyu is a postdoc at Caltech, working on machine learning for formal theorem proving



Albert Q. Jiang

Albert is a Ph.D. student at Cambridge, working on mathematical reasoning with language models



Emily First

Emily is a postdoc at UCSD, working on automatically generating proofs of software correctness

Panelists



Anima Anandkumar
Caltech



Zhangir Azerbayev
Princeton



Noah Goodman
Stanford



Alex Sanchez-Stern
UMass Amherst



Dawn Song
UC Berkeley



Sean Welleck
UW, AI2 -> CMU

Outline

Presentation (2 hours)

Panel (30 minutes)

LLMs, mathematical reasoning, code generation, verification, AI4Science, and more!

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- **Part I: Fundamentals**

- What is theorem proving? Why is it important for AI?
- Demo: a simple LLM-based prover

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- **Part II: Advanced topics**

- Recent work and open problems
- Machine learning, mathematics, and natural language
- Machine learning for software verification

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Teaser: LLMs as Copilots for Theorem Proving

Formal Theorem Proving

Theorem



Proof

Formal Theorem Proving

Theorem

```
theorem set_inter_comm (s t : Set α) : s ∩ t = t ∩ s
```



Proof

```
ext x
simp [Set.mem_inter_iff]
constructor
· rintro {xs, xt}
| exact {xt, xs}
· rintro {xt, xs}
| exact {xs, xt}
```

- Theorems/proofs represented formally as programs

Formal Theorem Proving

[Hales et al., "A Formal Proof of the Kepler Conjecture", 2017]
[Leroy et al., "CompCert - A Formally Verified Optimizing Compiler", 2016]

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Mathematics

Software

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- Proofs can be checked easily

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
Formalize

Mathematics

Software

Why is Theorem Proving Important for AI?

The Era of Large Language Models (LLMs)



[Ma et al., Eureka, 2023]



[Wang et al., Voyager, 2023]



A photograph of six cats of various breeds and colors (white, black, brown) gathered on a tiled floor, all looking upwards and slightly to the right with their mouths open as if meowing. A person's legs are visible in the background.

KA You

How many cats are there? What are they doing?

ChatGPT

There are six cats in the image, and they all appear to be looking up at something out of the frame with interest. Some have their mouths open as if they are meowing or expecting something, perhaps food or a treat, which is a common reason for cats to gather and look up like this.


Theorem Proving and LLMs



Mathematical reasoning
with LLMs


Code generation
with LLMs

Theorem Proving and LLMs



Mathematical Reasoning with LLMs

- GPT-4 scored 89th percentile on SAT Math



Mathematical Reasoning with LLMs

- GPT-4 scored 89th percentile on SAT Math
- Specialized math LLMs: Minerva, MetaMath, WizardMath, MAMmoTH, Llemma

Question: For every $a, b, b \neq a$ prove that

$$\frac{a^2 + b^2}{2} > \left(\frac{a+b}{2}\right)^2.$$

Model output:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{a^2 + b^2}{2} &> \left(\frac{a+b}{2}\right)^2 \\ \iff \frac{a^2 + b^2}{2} &> \frac{a^2 + b^2 + 2ab}{4} \\ \iff a^2 + b^2 &> \frac{a^2 + b^2 + 2ab}{2} \\ \iff 2a^2 + 2b^2 &> a^2 + b^2 + 2ab \\ \iff a^2 + b^2 &> 2ab \\ \iff a^2 + b^2 - 2ab &> 0 \\ \iff (a - b)^2 &> 0 \end{aligned}$$

which is true, because the square of a real number is positive.

Input:

Let $f(r) = \sum_{j=2}^{2008} \frac{1}{j^r} = \frac{1}{2^r} + \frac{1}{3^r} + \dots + \frac{1}{2008^r}$. Find $\sum_{k=2}^{\infty} f(k)$.

LLEMMA 34B solution:

We have

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} f(k) &= \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} \sum_{j=2}^{2008} \frac{1}{j^k} = \sum_{j=2}^{2008} \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} \frac{1}{j^k} = \sum_{j=2}^{2008} \frac{1}{j^2} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{j^k} = \sum_{j=2}^{2008} \frac{1}{j^2} \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{j}} \\ &= \sum_{j=2}^{2008} \frac{1}{j(j-1)} = \sum_{j=2}^{2008} \left(\frac{1}{j-1} - \frac{1}{j} \right) \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{1} - \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{3} \right) + \dots + \left(\frac{1}{2007} - \frac{1}{2008} \right) \\ &= 1 - \frac{1}{2008} \\ &= \boxed{\frac{2007}{2008}}. \end{aligned}$$


Final Answer: The final answer is $\frac{2007}{2008}$.

[Lewkowycz et al., **Minerva**, 2022]

[Azerbaiyev et al., **Llemma**, 2023]

Informal vs. Formal Mathematical Reasoning

ChatGPT 4 ▾



```
theorem gcd_self (n : ℕ) : gcd n n = n
```

```
cases n
```

- unfold gcd
rfl
- unfold gcd
rw [mod_self]
unfold gcd
rfl

```
cases n
· simp [gcd]
· rw [mod_self]
  unfold gcd
  rfl
```



Important for LLMs to tackle advanced mathematics

- Grounded in environments that can provide feedback
- Simple and rigorous evaluation: formal proofs can be checked (no hallucination)

Informal



Formal


Checking Mathematical Proofs is Hard for Humans




Titans of Mathematics Clash Over Epic Proof of ABC Conjecture

Two mathematicians have found what they say is a hole at the heart of a proof that has convulsed the mathematics community for nearly six years.

Theorem Proving and LLMs




Theorem Proving and LLMs



Code Generation with LLMs

```
def gcd (x : int, y : int) -> int:  
    """Compute the greatest common divisor of ``x`` and ``y``.  
    >>> gcd(10, 5)  
    5  
    >>> gcd(2, 3)  
    1  
    >>> gcd(8, 12)  
    4  
    """  
  
    if x == 0:  
        return y  
    if y == 0:  
        return x  
    if x < y:  
        return gcd(x, y % x)  
    return gcd(x % y, y)
```




Passing a few testing examples \neq correctness

In [3]: gcd(-10, -5)

Code Generation with LLMs

What if x and y are negative?

```
def gcd (x : int, y : int) -> int:  
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Code Generation with LLMs

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    return gcd(x % y, y)
```



```
In [3]: gcd(-10, -5)  
RecursionError  
Cell In[3], line 1  
----> 1 gcd(-10, -5)  
  
File ~/LeanDojo/tmp.py:16, in gcd(x, y)  
 14     return x  
 15 if x < y:  
----> 16     return gcd(x, y % x)  
 17 return gcd(x % y, y)  
  
File ~/LeanDojo/tmp.py:16, in gcd(x, y)  
 14     return x  
 15 if x < y:  
----> 16     return gcd(x, y % x)  
 17 return gcd(x % y, y)  
  
[... skipping similar frames: gcd at line 16 (2981 times)]  
  
File ~/LeanDojo/tmp.py:16, in gcd(x, y)  
 14     return x  
 15 if x < y:  
----> 16     return gcd(x, y % x)  
 17 return gcd(x % y, y)  
  
File ~/LeanDojo/tmp.py:11, in gcd(x, y)  
 2 def gcd (x : int, y : int) -> int:  
 3     """Compute the greatest common divisor of ``x`` and ``y``.  
 4     >>> gcd(10, 5)  
 5     5  
(...)  
 9     4  
 10    ....  
----> 11    if x == 0:  
 12        return y  
 13    if y == 0:  
  
RecursionError: maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison
```

Passing a few testing examples \neq correctness

How Can We Trust AI-Generated Code?


Freethink*

**GitHub CEO says Copilot will write 80%
of code “sooner than later”**

Theorem Proving for Verified Code Generation

- Generate code + formal specification (theorem) + formal proof


[Sun and Sheng et al., "Clover: Closed-Loop Verifiable Code Generation", 2023]



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
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Theorem Proving and LLMs: Takeaways



Mathematical reasoning
with LLMs

Code generation
with LLMs


- Elementary math -> advanced math
- Verified code generation
- Feedback & evaluation at scale: AI mathematicians/programmers

How to Prove Theorems (with Machine Learning)?

Proof Assistants (Interactive Theorem Provers)

Theorem


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```

Proof Assistants (Interactive Theorem Provers)



Examples of Proof Assistants




Isabelle

[Nipkow et al., 2002]



Coq

[Barras et al., 1997]



Lean

[de Moura et al., 2015]

- Large formal libraries: ~250K proofs
- >100K proofs in different repos
- Popular for software verification, e.g., CompCert [Leroy et al., 2016]
- ~100K proofs in Mathlib
- Liquid tensor experiment [Commelin, 2022]
- Polynomial Freiman-Ruzsa conjecture (led by Terence Tao)

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
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


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
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Proving Theorems Using Language Models

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theorem add_abc : ∀ a b c : ℑ, a + b + c = a + c + b := by  
| search_proof
```

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


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theorem add_abc : ∀ a b c : ℕ, a + b + c = a + c + b := by  
| intro a b c  
| rw [Nat.add_right_comm]
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
Proving Theorems Using Language Models

Input: Theorem

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theorem add_abc : ∀ a b c : ℑ, a + b + c = a + c + b
```



```
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```



[Vaswani et al., Transformer, 2017]

Output: Proof

Generating Proof Steps (Tactics)

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Generating Proof Steps (Tactics)


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```

Proof state

```
↑ ∀ (a b c : ℕ), a + b + c = a + c + b
```


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
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Generating Proof Steps (Tactics)


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Tactic generator




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```



Searching for Proofs

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


Searching for Proofs

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```

Classical proof search algorithms

- Depth first search (DFS)
- Breadth first search (BFS)
- ...




Demo:

A Simple Theorem Prover Using Language Models

Improving the Simple Prover


- Proof search
- Premise selection

Best First Search




- Explore the most promising node
- Use accumulated scores from the tactic generator to rank the nodes

Best First Search



- Explore the most promising node
- Use accumulated scores from the tactic generator to rank the nodes

Best First Search



- Explore the most promising node
- Use accumulated scores from the tactic generator to rank the nodes
- **Simple and widely used**

[Han et al., PACT, ICLR 2022]

[Polu et al., ICLR 2023]

[Jiang et al., Thor, NeurIPS 2022]


[Yang et al., LeanDojo, NeurIPS 2023]

Hyper Tree Proof Search

- Inspired by Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)
- Update visit counts and estimated values for each node


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
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
Hyper Tree Proof Search

- Inspired by Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)
- Update visit counts and estimated values for each node



Is Proof Search Really Necessary?

- Baldur: It's possible to build state-of-the-art provers without search
- 6B and 62B models finetuned from Minerva on Isabelle proofs



Premise Selection

```
theorem add_abc : ∀ a b c : ℕ, a + b + c = a + c + b := by
  intro a b c
  rw [Nat.add_right_comm]
```

- Premise selection: A key challenge in theorem proving

Premise Selection

```
theorem add_abc : ∀ a b c : ℙ, a + b + c = a + c + b := by
  intro a b c
  rw [Nat.add_right_comm]
```

- Premise selection: A key challenge in theorem proving
- Studied as a separate task w/o theorem proving

[Irving et al., DeepMath, NeurIPS 2016]

[Wang et al., "Premise Selection for Theorem Proving by Deep Graph Embedding", NeurIPS 2017]


- Recent work integrate premise selection into theorem proving

[Mikuła et al., "Magnushammer: A Transformer-based Approach to Premise Selection", 2023]

[Yang et al., "LeanDojo: Theorem Proving with Retrieval-Augmented Language Models", NeurIPS 2023]


Magnushammer

- Premises selected by Transformer + a simple symbolic prover




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
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

Magnushammer

- Premises selected by Transformer + a simple symbolic prover



Magnushammer

- Premises selected by Transformer + a simple symbolic prover



ReProver: Retrieval-Augmented Prover

- Given a state, we retrieve premises from accessible premises

All *accessible premises*
in the math library

State
$$\boxed{k : \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \text{gcd } ((k + 1) \% (k + 1)) (k + 1) = k + 1}$$

```
theorem mod_self (n : nat) : n \% n = 0
theorem gcd_zero_left (x : nat) : gcd 0 x = x


:
  33K on average
:

def gcd : nat → nat → nat
...
```

ReProver: Retrieval-Augmented Prover

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
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
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
ReProver: Retrieval-Augmented Prover

- Given a state, we retrieve premises from accessible premises
- Retrieved premises are concatenated with the state and used for **tactic generation**




ReProver: Retrieval-Augmented Prover

- Given a state, we retrieve premises from accessible premises
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Premise Retrieval Improves Theorem Proving




Recap

- Theorem proving can help LLMs understand mathematics and generate verifiable code
- LLMs for theorem proving
 - Tactic generator: state \rightarrow tactics
 - Proof search: tactics \rightarrow proof


Slides, demos, etc. will be available at:

machine-learning-for-theorem-proving.github.io



Open-Source Tools

lean-dojo/
LeanDojo




Tool for data extraction and interacting with Lean
programmatically.

8 Contributors 2 Used by 14 Discussions 350 Stars 41 Forks

Extract data & interact with Lean

lean-dojo/
ReProver




Retrieval-Augmented Theorem Provers for Lean

4 Contributors 1 Issue 5 Discussions 117 Stars 18 Forks

Training & evaluation

lean-dojo/
LeanCopilot



LLMs as Copilots for Theorem Proving in Lean

5 Contributors 2 Issues 1 Discussion 68 Stars 4 Forks


Use LLMs in proof assistants

- Isabelle: [PISA](#)
- Coq: [GamePad](#), [CoqGym](#), [Proverbot9001](#)
- Lean: [LLMStep](#), [lean-gym](#)
- Others: [HOList](#), [INT](#)

Related Events @ NeurIPS 2023


LeanDojo

- Oral: 10 AM Tuesday
- Poster: 10:45 AM Tuesday



MATH-AI Workshop

- Friday, Room 217-219
- Posters of Lean Copilot and other interesting works!



Outline

Presentation (2 hours)

- **Part I: Fundamentals**

- What is theorem proving? Why is it important for AI?
- Demo: a simple LLM-based prover

- **Part II: Advanced topics**

- Recent work and open problems
- Machine learning, mathematics, and natural language
- Machine learning for software verification

Panel (30 minutes)

LLMs, mathematical reasoning, code generation, verification, AI4Science, and more!

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
LLMs, mathematical reasoning, code generation, verification, AI4Science, and more!

Guiding Formal Maths with Informal Maths

Albert Q. Jiang, University of Cambridge

What is formal mathematics

Principia Mathematica
Russell and Whitehead



Simple theorems
about **simple** objects:

$$1 + 1 = 2$$

Kepler Conjecture
Hales



Complex theorems
about **simple** objects:

Optimal packing of
spheres

Liquid Tensor Experiment
Scholze and Commelin



Complex theorems about
complex objects:

Theorem about condensed
real vector spaces

1910

2015

2022

Formal mathematics *in real time*


Formalised in 3 weeks!

On a conjecture of Marton

W. T. Gowers, Ben Green, Freddie Manners, Terence Tao



Polynomial Freiman-Ruzsa conjecture



2023

What is a proof assistant?


- Has some logical/type-theory basis, with axioms, rules and theorems
- Proving a theorem:
 - Iteratively applying rules of the formal system to transform the goal
 - Until it becomes trivial

Example of a proof in Lean

```
2 ∨ example (m n k : ℕ) (h₀ : n ≤ m) : n + k ≤ m + k := begin
3   induction k,
4   ∨ {
5     | exact h₀
6   },
7   ∨ {
8     | rw nat.succ_le_succ_iff,
9     | exact k_ih
10  }
11 end
```


The diagram illustrates the Lean proof structure. A brace on the right side groups the first two cases of the induction. The first case is labeled "First subgoal: $n + 0 \leq m + 0$ ". The second case is labeled "Second subgoal: $n + k \leq m + k \Rightarrow n + k + 1 \leq m + k + 1$ ".

The goal of automated formal theorem proving




How can machine learning come in?

Components of a Markov Decision Process


	state	action	reward	transition
Go	A board position 	Place a stone 	1, 0, or -1 at end of the game	
Theorem Proving	Goal (s) to prove $\vdash 1+1 = 2$	Use a tactic <code>Eq.refl _</code>	1 for QED, 0 for failure	

How can machine learning come in? (cont.)



Silver, David, et al. "Mastering the game of Go with deep neural networks and tree search." nature 529.7587 (2016): 484-489.

How can machine learning come in? (cont.)



Lample, Guillaume, et al. "Hypertree proof search for neural theorem proving." Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35 (2022): 26337-26349.

But there's an important aspect of mathematics

Mathematics is mostly written in
natural language and not utilised by
machine learning at this point!





Annals of Mathematics, **142** (1995), 443–551

Modular elliptic curves and Fermat's Last Theorem

By ANDREW WILES*

Not yet fully formalised on a computer!

What we have



leanprover-community/
mathlib4

The math library of Lean 4

A: 181
Contributors



Issues



Stars



Forks



jrh13/hol-light

The HOL Light theorem prover

A: 12
Contributors



Issues




Stars




Forks



The goal of this presentation



Making better informal reasoners



Make better informal reasoners

1. Find high-quality mathematical content online

```
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html>
<head>
<script type="text/javascript" src="https://cdn.mathjax.org/mathjax/latest/MathJax.js?
config=TeX-AMS_HTML"></script>
</head>
<body>


<p>
This is a paragraph with inline math.

$$f(x) = 3x^2 + 3x + 3$$

You should see a quadratic function before this sentence.
</p>

</body>
</html>
```


Data collection: OpenWebMath



Paster, Keiran, et al. "OpenWebMath: An Open Dataset of High-Quality Mathematical Web Text." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.06786* (2023).

Make better informal reasoners (cont.)

2. Fine-tune or continue pretraining a strong base language model on it




CodeLlama

Lewkowycz, Aitor, et al. "Solving quantitative reasoning problems with language models." *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* 35 (2022): 3843-3857.

Azerbayev, Zhangir, et al. "Llemma: An open language model for mathematics." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.10631* (2023).

Specialising models on informal maths



PaLM
(closed)



CodeLlama
(open)


Google's secret
sauce mathematical
dataset ✨ (closed)

ProofPile 2 =
OpenWebMath +
Code + Arxiv (open)


Minerva
(closed)

LLEMMA ■

(open)





Turning informal data into formal ones




Turning informal data into formal data

Autoformalization with large language models



Few-shot

In addition to the task description, the model sees a few examples of the task. No gradient updates are performed.




Does this work?


Yes, to an extent.

Manually examined 150 informal → formal statement translations. Correctness rate is 25%.

Drawback: we don't automatically know which translations are right.



Put everything together



Alignment challenge: different levels of reasoning

Informal Statement: Show that for any real number a , $10a \leq 28a^2 + 1$.

Informal Proof:

It suffices to show $0 \leq 28a^2 - 10a + 1$. First, consider completing the square for $28a^2 - 10a$ and observe that $(a - \frac{5}{28})^2 = a^2 - \frac{10}{28}a + (5/28)^2$. Since $0 \leq (a - \frac{5}{28})^2$, we get $0 \leq a^2 - \frac{10}{28}a + (5/28)^2$. Multiplying by 28 and simplifying gives $0 \leq 28a^2 - 10a + (25/28)$. Since $25/28 < 1$, the result follows.

Formal Statement:


```
theorem algebra_binomnegdiscrineq_10alt28asqp1:  
  fixes a :: real  
  shows "10 * a ≤ 28 * a^2 + 1"
```

Formal Proof Sketch:

```
proof - (* it suffices to show 0 ≤ 28a^2 - 10a + 1 *)  
have c0: "0 ≤ 28a^2 - 10a + 1"  
proof - (* observe that (a - (5/28))^2 = a^2 - (10/28)a + (5/28)^2 *)  
have c1: "(a - (5/28))^2 = a^2 - 10/28a + (5/28)^2" <...>  
(* we get 0 ≤ a^2 - (10/28)a + (5/28)^2 *)  
have c2: "0 ≤ a^2 - 10/28a + (5/28)^2" using c1 <...>  
(* Multiplying by 28 and simplifying gives 0 ≤ 28a^2 - 10a + (25/28) *)  
have c3: "0 ≤ 28a^2 - 10a + 28((5/28)^2)" using c2 <...>  
have c4: "0 ≤ 28a^2 - 10a + 28((5/28)*(5/28))" using c3 <...>  
have c5: "0 ≤ 28a^2 - 10a + (25/28)" using c4 <...>  
(* Since 25/28 < 1, the result follows. *)  
show ?thesis using c5 <...>  
qed  
show ?thesis <...>  
qed
```


- **Solution: translate into proof sketches**
- Formal proof sketches encapsulate the high-level ideas of the proof.
- They are better aligned with the informal proofs
- We copy segments of the informal proof as in-line comments to create (even) better alignment.

Getting formal proofs: Draft, Sketch, and Prove




Jiang, Albert Q., et al. "Draft, sketch, and prove: Guiding formal theorem provers with informal proofs." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.12283* (2022).

Getting formal proofs: Draft, Sketch, and Prove



Jiang, Albert Q., et al. "Draft, sketch, and prove: Guiding formal theorem provers with informal proofs." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.12283* (2022).

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
Jiang, Albert Q., et al. "Draft, sketch, and prove: Guiding formal theorem provers with informal proofs." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.12283* (2022).

Benchmark

- MiniF2F = Reference benchmark developed by OpenAI
- Formalized problems from olympiads (IMO, AIME, AMC), high-schools and undergraduate math classes
- Valid / Test splits:
 - 488 problems
 - Metamath / Isabelle / Lean / Hol-light

			Test Set	Validation Set
	TOTAL		244	244
	IMO		20	20
	AIME		15	15
	AMC		45	45
MATH	Algebra	Level 5	14	14
		Level 4	14	14
		Level 3	14	14
		Level 2	14	14
		Level 1	14	14
		Level 5	16	16
	Number Theory	Level 4	11	11
		Level 3	11	11
		Level 2	11	11
		Level 1	11	11
		Algebra	18	18
		Number Theory	8	8
CUSTOM	Induction		8	8

Results



Takeaways

- Machine learning methods for formal mathematics should not discard informal mathematics
 - That's where (almost) all the data is!
- LLMs gave us the opportunity to realistically convert informal maths to formal maths
 - But the detailed implementation needs careful thought


Machine Learning for *Formal Software Verification*

Emily First, Albert Q Jiang, Kaiyu Yang



NeurIPS Tutorial on Machine Learning for Theorem Proving
December 11, 2023

Quick Recap


- Proof assistants



- Machine learning methods for theorem proving




- Formalizing and proving mathematics



**Why should you care about
formal software verification?**

Software Bugs Matter



Knight Capital Says Trading Glitch Cost It \$440 Million
BY NATHANIEL POPPER AUGUST 2, 2012 9:07 AM 356

Runaway Trades Spread Turmoil Across Wall St.



Errant trades from the Knight Capital Group began hitting the New York Stock Exchange almost as soon as the opening bell rang on Wednesday. Brendan McDermid/Reuters

1 of 4

AP May 25, 2010, 7:08 PM


Toyota "Unintended Acceleration" Has Killed 89



A 2005 Toyota Prius, which was in an accident, is seen at a police station in Harrison, New York, Wednesday, March 10, 2010. The driver of the Toyota Prius told police that the car accelerated on its own, then lurched down a driveway, across a road and into a stone wall. (AP Photo/Seth Wenig)

In 2020, CISQ estimated that software failures cost the economy **\$1.56 trillion dollars** annually


Formal Software Verification




Proof Engineer

- Think about the desired & actual behavior of the program
- Perhaps finding & fixing bugs in the process
- Make explicit which parts of the system are trusted
- Decrease the burden of trust as more of the system is verified

Specifications




Program implementation



Mathematical proofs

Software Development Life Cycle



Requirements




The length of a reversed list
is the same as the length of
the original list



Theorem `len_rev_unchanged`:
forall (A: Type) (l: list A) ,
length (rev l) = length l.



Software Development Life Cycle



Theorem `len_rev_unchanged`:
forall (A: Type) (l: list A),
length (rev l) = length l.


Lemma `app_length` : forall l l' : list A,
length (l++l') = length l + length l'.

Software Development Life Cycle



```
Fixpoint rev (l:list A) : list A :=  
  match l with  
  | [] => []  
  | x :: l' => rev l' ++ [x]  
  end.
```

Software Development Life Cycle




Proof.

```
induction l.  
- auto.  
- assert (H: rev (a :: l) = (rev l) ++ [a]) by auto.  
  rewrite H.  
  simpl.  
  rewrite app_length.  
  simpl.  
  rewrite IHl.  
  rewrite PeanoNat.Nat.add_1_r.  
  reflexivity.
```


Qed.



Software Development Life Cycle



Software Development Life Cycle



Does anyone actually do this?

Formal Software Verification: real-world examples



The CompCert formally-verified C compiler



CERTIKOS




Quark : A Web Browser with a Formally Verified Kernel

University of California, San Diego
Computer Science and Engineering

Funded by NSF Award 1228967


Formal Software Verification: real companies do it

AIRBUS




BEDROCK
Systems Inc




android






aws



CERTORA



Formal Verification: can produce better quality software



CompCert was the only one for which Csmith could not find bugs!

Prohibitively difficult

Verified software requires a lot of time and a lot of proofs in relation to code

**Proof is about 8 times
bigger than the
compiler code**

**3 person years of
work**

Formal Certification of a Compiler Back-end or: Programming a Compiler with a Proof Assistant

Xavier Leroy
INRIA Rocquencourt
Xavier.Leroy@inria.fr

Can you trust your compiler? Compilers are assumed to be semantically correct, but compiler bugs still often arise precisely because of the semantics of the source program. Yet compilers – and especially optimizing compilers – are complex programs that perform complicated symbolic transformation. We all know horror stories of bugs in compilers silently turning a correct program into an incorrect one.

For low-assurance software, validated only by testing, the impact of compiler bugs is negligible; what is tested is the executable code produced by the compiler; rigorous testing will expose errors in the compiler along with errors in the source program. The picture changes dramatically for critical, high-assurance software whose

program must be certified correct.

While there exists a considerable body of earlier work on machine-checked correctness proofs of parts of compilers (see section 7 for a review), our work is novel in two ways. First, recent work tends to focus on a few parts of a compiler, mostly optimizations and the underlying static analyses [18, 6]. In contrast,

Comprehensive Formal Verification of an OS Microkernel

GERWIN KLEIN, JUNE ANDRONICK, KEVIN ELPHINSTONE, TOBY MURRAY,
THOMAS SEWELL, RAFAŁ KOLANSKI, and GERNOT HEISER, NICTA and UNSW, Sydney,
Australia

We present an in-depth coverage of the comprehensive machine-checked formal verification of sel4, a general-purpose operating system microkernel.

We discuss the kernel design we used to make its verification tractable. We then describe the functional correctness proof of the kernel's C implementation and we cover further steps that transform this result into a comprehensive coverage of the kernel's formal specification. These steps include a proof of the assembly code of the kernel's correctly implemented C semantics, a proof of correct access-control enforcement, a proof of information-flow noninterference, a sound worst-case execution time analysis of the binary, and an automatic initialiser for user-level systems that connects kernel-level access-control enforcement with reasoning about system behaviour. We summarise these results and show how they integrate to form a comprehensive system, built by machine-checked end-to-end.

The sel4 microkernel is currently not just the only general-purpose operating system kernel that is fully formally verified to this degree. It is also the only example of formal proof of this scale that is kept current as the requirements, design and implementation of the system evolve over almost a decade. We report on our experience in maintaining this evolving formally verified code base.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verification; D.4.5

[Operating Systems]: Reliability—Verification

General Terms: Verification; Security; Reliability

Additional Key Words and Phrases: sel4, Isabelle/HOL, operating systems, microkernel, L4

**11 person years of
work**

the sel4 microkernel, which extend the domain of verification to more recent releases and security properties and

The target of our work is our motivation for st definition of a kernel is

proof to more recent releases and security properties and

I part of a system, which

is our motivation for st

definition of a kernel is

NICTA is funded by the Australian Government as represented by the Department of Broadband, Communi-

cations and the Digital Economy and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence

program.

Authors' address: NICTA, Level 4, 223 Anzac Pde, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia. Correspondence email:

gerno@nicta.com.au.

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DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2590537>

ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, Vol. 32, No. 1, Article 2, Publication date: February 2014.

Virtually all software that ships today is unverified.


AbsInt/CompCert



The CompCert formally-verified C compiler



sel4

How do programmers deal with hard things?





Automation!

Software Development Life Cycle



- Automating the process using ML
- Work that has been done with an eye towards ML approaches
- Parts of the process that are largely untouched — opportunities!



Constraint-solver based proof automation



- Restricted by precomputed facts
- Cannot perform induction
- Struggle with higher-order logic

Complementary to machine learning techniques!

Machine Learning: proof synthesis



Machine Learning: proof synthesis

QED

How well does this work for proofs of software correctness?

Succeeds at most 30% of the time

Are only “easy” proofs being synthesized?


Failing proofs means that your code is not verified!

Need methods for debugging and recovering from proof search failures

Proofster

QED

Proverbot



9 0 0 1

Enter a Coq theorem to prove, or select an example from the drop-down menu

Enter your own theorem

Following the theorem statement, start the proof with "Proof." and "Admitted."

Proofster will attempt to replace "Admitted." with a Coq proof.

Proofster it!

Proofster

QED

Enter a Coq theorem to prove, or select an example from the drop-down menu

list_forall2_app: If property P holds on corresponding pairs from lists a1, b1 and a2, b2, P also holds on pairs from a1a2, b1b2 ✓

Require Export List.

Variable A: Type.

Variable B: Type.

Variable P: A -> B -> Prop.

Inductive list_forall2: list A -> list B -> Prop :=

| list_forall2_nil:

 list_forall2 nil nil

| list_forall2_cons:

 forall a1 al b1 bl,

 P a1 b1 ->

 list_forall2 al bl ->

 list_forall2 (a1 :: al) (b1 :: bl).

Theorem list_forall2_app:

forall a2 b2 a1 b1,

 list_forall2 a1 b1 -> list_forall2 a2 b2 ->

 list_forall2 (a1 ++ a2) (b1 ++ b2).

Proof.


Admitted.

Following the theorem statement, start the proof with "Proof." and "Admitted."

Proofster will attempt to replace "Admitted." with a Coq proof.

Proofster it!

QED



Sorry, I couldn't synthesize a proof of this theorem for you.

QED

list_forall2_app with induction hint

Require Export List.

Variable A: Type.

Variable B: Type.

Variable P: A -> B -> Prop.

Inductive list_forall2: list A -> list B -> Prop :=

| list_forall2_nil:

 list_forall2 nil nil

| list_forall2_cons:

 forall a1 al b1 bl,

 P a1 b1 ->

 list_forall2 al bl ->

 list_forall2 (a1 :: al) (b1 :: bl).

Theorem list_forall2_app:

 forall a2 b2 a1 b1,

 list_forall2 a1 b1 -> list_forall2 a2 b2 ->

 list_forall2 (a1 ++ a2) (b1 ++ b2).

Proof.





induction 1.

Admitted.

```
Require Export List.  
Variable A: Type.  $\vdash$   
Variable B: Type.  $\vdash$   
Variable P: A  $\rightarrow$  B  $\rightarrow$  Prop.  $\vdash$   
  
Inductive list_forall2: list A  $\rightarrow$  list B  $\rightarrow$  Prop :=  
| list_forall2_nil:  
  list_forall2 nil nil  
| list_forall2_cons:
```

Visualization of the proof search tree could help programmer understand why search failed



```
forall a2 b2 a1 b1,  
list_forall2 a1 b1  $\rightarrow$  list_forall2 a2 b2  $\rightarrow$   
list_forall2 (a1 ++ a2) (b1 ++ b2).  $\vdash$   
  
Proof.  $\vdash$   
induction 1.  $\vdash$   
simpl.  $\vdash$   
intros.  $\vdash$   
eauto.  $\vdash$   
intros.  $\vdash$   
econstructor.  $\vdash$   
eauto.  $\vdash$   
eauto.  
Qed.
```




Online Learning



Tactician




Locality sensitive hashing
(LSH) forests for
online approximate k-NN



Online random forests


Ensemble learning

DIVA






Ensemble learning

DIVA




Software Development Life Cycle







Could potentially be improved using machine learning!




Sivaraman et al (2022) "Data-Driven Lemma Synthesis for Interactive Proofs"

Software Development Life Cycle



Software Refactoring





```
(roosterize) pynie@pynie-ThinkPad-T470:~/roosterize-demo/fcsl-pcm$ ~/projects/roosterize/bin/roosterize \
suggest_naming --file=$PWD/finmap/finmap.v
== Analyzed 110 lemma names, 8 (7.3%) conform to the learned naming conventions.
=====
== 21 can be improved and here are Roosterize's suggestions:
Line 851: fcatsK => eq_fcat (likelihood: 0.45)
Line 822: fcatC => eq_fcat (likelihood: 0.44)
Line 862: fcatKs => eq_fcat (likelihood: 0.43)
Line 1178: zip_supp' => eq_zip (likelihood: 0.31)
Line 1118: m
Line 1258: z
Line 769: disjC => eq_disj (likelihood: 0.30)
Line 962: mapf_disj => eq_map (likelihood: 0.29)
Line 526: fcats0 => fcat_nil (likelihood: 0.28)
Line 1273: zunit_disj => disj_zip (likelihood: 0.27)
Line 1186: zip_supp => eq_zip (likelihood: 0.27)
Line 937: mapf_ins => map_ins (likelihood: 0.26)
Line 525: fcat0s => fcat_nil (likelihood: 0.25)
Line 443: seqof_ins => path_ordP (likelihood: 0.24)
```

LLMs would likely help even more!

RNNs to learn and suggest *lemma names*



```

Lemma sec_left_sum_tree (X Y:Set) (p : WFT X):
  forall (A : X -> X -> Prop), SecureBy A p ->
  SecureBy (left_sum_lift A) (left_sum_tree Y p).
induction p.
intros A Zsec.
simpl in *. intros v w x y z.
destruct x; (repeat (auto; firstorder)).
destruct v; (repeat (auto; firstorder)).
destruct w; (repeat (auto; firstorder)).
destruct v; (repeat (auto; firstorder)).
destruct w; (repeat (auto; firstorder)).
intros. simpl.
eapply sec_strengthen. focus 2. apply H. apply H0.
intros. destruct x0; repeat (auto; firstorder).
  destruct y; repeat (auto; firstorder).
simpl in *. intro x.
destruct x; repeat (auto; firstorder).
eapply sec_strengthen. Focus 2. apply H. apply H0.
intros. destruct x0; repeat (auto; firstorder).
  destruct y0; repeat (auto; firstorder).
Defined.

```

```


Lemma list_find_app_Some l1 l2 i x :
  list_find P (l1 ++ l2) = Some (i,x) <-
  list_find P l1 = Some (i,x) ∨
  length l1 ≤ i ∧ list_find P l1 = None ∧ list_find P l2 = Some (i - length l1,x).
Proof.
split.
- intros ([?|[??]]%lookup_app_Some&?&Hleast)%list_find_Some.
  + left. apply list_find_Some; eauto using lookup_app_l_Some.
  + right. split; [lia|]. split.
    { apply list_find_None, Forall_lookup. intros j z ??
      assert (i < length l1) by eauto using lookup_lt_Some.
      intros j y ?%lookup_app_Some; naive_solver eauto with lia.
    }
    + rewrite list_find_Some, lookup_app_Some. split_and!; [by auto using lookup_app_l_Some..|].
      assert (i < length l1) by eauto using lookup_lt_Some.
      intros j y ?%lookup_app_Some; naive_solver eauto with lia.
    + rewrite list_find_Some, lookup_app_Some. split_and!; [by auto..|].
      intros j y [?|?]%lookup_app_Some ?; [|naive_solver auto with lia].
      by eapply (Forall_lookup_1 (not o P) l1); [by apply list_find_None|...].
Qed.

```


LLMs would likely help even more!

RNNs and N-grams to learn and suggest *space formatting*

Software Evolution



Change to dependency!




```
Lemma proc_rspec_crash_refines_op T (p : proc C_Op T)
  (rec : proc C_Op unit) spec (op : A_Op T) :
  (forall sA sC,
    - absr sA sC tt -> proc_rspec c_sem p rec (refine_spec spec sA)) ->
  (forall sA sC, absr sA sC tt -> (spec sA).(pre)) ->
  + absr sA (Val sC tt) -> proc_rspec c_sem p rec (refine_spec spec sA)) ->
  + (forall sA sC, absr sA (Val sC tt)) -> (spec sA).(pre)) ->
  (forall sA sC sA' v,
    - absr sA' sC tt ->
    + absr sA' (Val sC tt) ->
      (spec sA).(post) sA' v -> (op_spec a_sem op sA).(post) sA' v) ->
    (forall sA sC sA' v,
      - absr sA sC tt ->
      + absr sA (Val sC tt) ->
        (spec sA).(alternate) sA' v -> (op_spec a_sem op sA).(alternate) sA' v) ->
  crash_refines absr c_sem p rec (a_sem.(step) op)
    (a_sem.(crash_step) + (a_sem.(step) op;; a_sem.(crash_step))).
```

Need to change 10+ lemmas and definitions




Not just *tedious* – can be quite *challenging* even for experts!



5 broken proofs!

Only able to fix 1 proof!


Proof repair across commits dataset: PRISM




Important for considering large-scale ramifications of changes

Can be used by ML researchers!

Software Development Life Cycle



Autoformalization




Cunningham et al (2022) “Towards Autoformalization of Mathematics and Code Correctness: Experiments with Elementary Proofs”

LATEX

Theorem. Consider the following series of commands such that

```
S := 3;
S := 3 + S * Z;
S := 1 + S * Z
```

Allow $Z = y$, for any natural number y , ahead of running this code then $S = 3 \times y^2 + 3 \times y + 1$ after the set of instructions has executed.



Require Import String.

From PLF Require Import Imp.

From PLF Require Import Hoare.

Theorem poly_code_correct:

```
forall y : nat,
{{ Z = y }}
S := 3;
S := 3 + S * Z;
S := 1 + S * Z
{{ S = 3 * y ^ 2 + 3 * y + 1 }}.
```


Proof. By application of usual Hoare logic:

$$\begin{aligned} &\{Z = y\} \\ &S := 3; \\ &\{Z = y \wedge S = 3\} \\ &S := \\ &\{Z = y \wedge S = 3\} \\ &S := \\ &\{Z = y \wedge S = 3\} \\ &S := \\ &\{Z = y \wedge S = 3 \times y^2 + 3 \times y + 1\} \end{aligned}$$


Hence, this program is shown to be correct. \square

Autoformalization techniques may be useful for verifying code!



```
Proof.
intros.
apply hoare_seq with
  (Q := (
    (Z = y /\ S = 3)
  )%assertion).
apply hoare_seq with
  (Q := (
    (Z = y /\ S = 3 \times y^2 + 3 * y + 1)
  )%assertion).
all: eapply hoare_consequence_pre;
try (apply hoare_asgn || assn_auto').
Qed.
```



Software Development Life Cycle




Software Development Life Cycle



Need to carefully consider the
process when developing
ML-based tools



Aspirational ML-based tools



How about an LLM?


LLMs produce good answers

LLMs produce convincing wrong answers


Proof assistant is an oracle

Theorem proving is potentially a power domain for LLM use

Takeaways



- Current research in ML for formal software verification has only just scratched the surface!
- Need more consideration of the software development process
- Will lead to more usable tools for practitioners and adoption of techniques



Panel moderator



Zhangir Azerbayev