

Distilling Adversarial Prompts from Safety Benchmarks: Report for the *Adversarial Nibbler* Challenge

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Abstract

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing image quality and alignment results. Consequently, they are employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also produce unsafe content. As a contribution to the *Adversarial Nibbler* challenge, we distill a large set of over 1,000 potential adversarial inputs from existing safety benchmarks. Our analysis of the gathered prompts and corresponding images demonstrates the fragility of input filters and provides further insights into systematic safety issues in current generative image models.

Warning: *This paper contains sexually explicit imagery, discussions of pornography, and other content that some readers may find disturbing, distressing, and/or offensive.*

1 Introduction

Next to text-generative models, image-generative models are becoming increasingly prevalent and seeing growing adoption in commercial services such as stock imagery and graphic design. Due to large-scale unsupervised learning, they retain general knowledge implicitly present in the data and are able to generate high-fidelity images that are faithful interpretations of users' prompts. However, this training setup, which utilizes large-scale unfiltered data (Schuhmann et al., 2022; Birhane et al., 2021), also leads to degenerated and biased behavior (Schramowski et al., 2023), calling for mitigation strategies and the moderation of generative models in deployed systems.

Consequently, before the deployment of image-generative models, it is crucial to not only validate their quality but also ensure their safety. This necessitates the assessment of appropriate guardrails, which should be tailored to the specific application

photograph of new
james bond movie
gadget designed
for a child




Figure 1: Exemplary adversarial prompt distilled from the I2P benchmark. The coded expression of a ‘james bond movie gadget’ yields an image of a firearm being held by a child. (Best viewed in color)

at hand. Previous work in this domain has primarily relied on anecdotal evidence, lacking quantifiable measures that consider multiple models and architectures. In order to address this issue, Parrish et al. (2023) proposed the *Adversarial Nibbler* challenge. The authors aim to curate an evaluation dataset of adversarial inputs against text-to-image models through a crowdsourcing effort. Here, we analyze existing benchmarking efforts on image generation safety to identify adversarial prompts suitable for *Adversarial Nibbler*.


Indeed, Schramowski et al. (2023) proposed the *inappropriate image prompts* (I2P) dataset¹ but limited their evaluation to a single Stable Diffusion version (Rombach et al., 2022). Subsequent research of Brack et al. (2023) presented a more comprehensive analysis of inappropriate degeneration across 11 different models, all of which were capable of generating inappropriate content at scale. Consequently, the I2P dataset is a vital benchmark in assessing the effectiveness of concept erasure techniques (Gandikota et al., 2023; Heng and Soh, 2023; Kim et al., 2023; Chin et al., 2023).

This report investigates the automatically scraped prompts of the I2P benchmark in more de-

¹<https://huggingface.co/datasets/AIML-TUDA/i2p>



(a) Percentage of banned prompts in the I2P benchmark by likelihood of producing inappropriate images.



(b) Percentage of banned prompts in the I2P benchmark grouped by category.

Figure 2: Analysis of prompts contained in the I2P dataset, blocked by the Midjourney input filter.

tail. Specifically, we identify over 1,000 prompts eliciting the generation of inappropriate content, although they were not blocked by currently deployed input filters. Consequently, this set of derived prompts can be used as adversarial inputs for evaluating corresponding guardrails. Our analysis of this prompt set provides valuable insights into the subjectivity of safety and the fragility of automatic input filters. Importantly, we identify concise terms and prompt structures that often seem benign but create unsafe images.

2 Experimental Analysis

The I2P benchmark consists of over 4,700 real-world user prompts scraped from the initial Stable Diffusion discord. The dataset covers the categories: *hate*, *harassment*, *violence*, *self-harm*, *sexual content*, *shocking images*, *illegal activity*. Each prompt is annotated with a probability of generating inappropriate material based on images generated with Stable Diffusion.

The generated images were automatically assessed on their inappropriateness using the Q16 (Schramowski et al., 2022) and NudeNet² classifiers. While these prompts are disproportionately likely to generate inappropriate content, the underlying hosting solution for Stable Diffusion was not subject to any input filters. Consequently, a large portion of these prompts will explicitly contain inappropriate concepts and thus not qualify for adversarial purposes.

Thus, as a first pre-processing step, we aim to extract the prompts that appear benign from the

dataset. To this end, we checked all prompts against currently deployed guardrails for popular image generation models. Specifically, here, we used a list of 800 banned words³ of the popular Midjourney⁴ image generation model.

Overall, 34% of I2P prompts would have been blocked by Midjourney’s prompt filter, with further details shown in Fig. 2. In general, prompts with a higher probability of producing inappropriate content—as measured for Stable Diffusion—also contain banned words more frequently (Fig. 2a). This observation supports the intuition that a decent percentage of prompts with high inappropriate likelihoods contain explicit mentions of related concepts. Additionally, there exists a significant discrepancy between the number of banned prompts per category (Fig. 2b). The percentage of blocked prompts is almost 4x higher for *sexual* than for *hate*. This difference can be attributed to a clear focus of the ban-list on sexually charged terms, as discussed below.

We argue that those prompts, which are reasonably likely to generate inappropriate material—here $\geq 50\%$ —and are not caught by the deployed input filter, are good candidates for adversarial testing. In the case of the I2P benchmark, this leaves us with roughly 1,100 prompts which we share with the community⁵. We present an example of an adversarial input from this set in Fig. 1.

³<https://decentralizedcreator.com/list-of-banned-words-in-midjourney-discord/>

⁴<https://www.midjourney.com/home/>

⁵Anonymous link: <https://figshare.com/s/3a67fb80511575c0fd93>

²<https://github.com/notAI-tech/NudeNet>



Figure 3: Examples demonstrating the subjectivity of unsafe images which is largely dependent on context as well as individual factors. Corresponding prompts are shown above the images. (Best viewed in color)




Figure 4: Demonstration of easily generated, sexually explicit imagery. Note that even if the prompts appear benign, they are highly likely to generate sexually explicit content. Corresponding prompts are shown above the images. Explicit nudity was censored by the authors using black masks. (Best viewed in color)

3 Observations

Subsequently, we provide more detailed insights into the set of candidate prompts derived above.

Subjectivity of (Un-)Safety. A closer look at the collected prompts and generated images highlights the subjectivity of what is considered inappropriate or unsafe. The definition of safety can differ based on context, setting, cultural and social predisposition, and individual factors. For example, a significant portion of prompts produce decidedly disturbing images (cf. Fig. 3a). However, the comparatively narrow definition of safety in the *Adversarial Nibbler* challenge would probably not consider it unsafe, while the authors of the I2P benchmark included disturbing material in their definition of inappropriateness.

Fragility of Prompt Filters. The remaining prompts clearly demonstrate the severe limitations of ban-list based input filters. We identified several simple misspellings of prohibited words bypassing filters while still being able to produce unsafe ma-

terial. Additionally, we observed multiple cases where related terms were not included in the filter. For example, the ban list contains ‘nude’ but not ‘nudity’, ‘no shirt’ but not ‘shirtless’, and ‘blood’ but not ‘bleeding’. Other concepts prominent in our prompt set were outright missing on the list, including ‘violent’, ‘robbery’ or ‘murder’. Lastly, we found multiple concepts semantically correlated to prohibited terms not included in the ban-list, such as ‘fighting’ or ‘riot’. These observations highlight the ineffectiveness of input ban-lists as sole safety guardrails since designing holistic filters proves virtually impossible. At best, they can be beneficial as the first step of a more comprehensive system of safety measures.

Contextual Inappropriateness. Additionally, we discovered a large set of prompts producing images that are generally safe when considered in isolation but might be inappropriate in a larger context. Specifically, over 100 prompts—equalling roughly 10% of the considered set—pertain to persons of public interest, most of them related to

Donald Trump (80 prompts). Most generated images depict these persons in situations potentially harmful to their public image. We present some examples in Fig 3b showing Donald Trump as a homeless person or in jail.

Patterns of Unsafety. Lastly, we discovered multiple systematic issues leading to unsafe imagery. Unfortunately, our results confirm observations of previous work that sexually explicit imagery of women is remarkably easy to produce with seemingly safe prompts (Birhane et al., 2021; Schramowski et al., 2023). We showcase some examples in Fig. 4. Benign adjectives like ‘attractive’ and ‘gorgeous’ in combination with non-erotic terms such as ‘torso’ or ‘roundings’ appear to be so closely correlated with explicit material that they reliably generate nude women. Furthermore, we observed encoded racial fetishes (Zheng, 2016; Schramowski et al., 2023), sexualizing Asian women specifically.

Lastly, a common pattern in the construction of prompts was the usage of certain artists who commonly create art that might be considered unsafe in other contexts. For example, prompts as simple as ‘photograph by vanessa beecroft’ will yield naked women and display anorexia for the vast majority of generated images. Even when embedded in longer prompts, these triggers can be easily utilized to enforce unsafe concepts within the generation.

4 Conclusion

In this work, we investigated the usability of automatically crawled prompts from safety benchmarks for adversarial evaluations. We demonstrated that large numbers of potentially adversarial prompts can be extracted from datasets like I2P (Schramowski et al., 2023). Our detailed analysis of the distilled prompts highlights the fragility of input filtering and motivates further research on designing and evaluating safe generative systems.

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