

them unintentional and attributable to ignorance of poll methodology.

Lack of awareness of the many problems in ascertaining opinion and the far greater number in forecasting voting behavior causes editors to lure pollsters into numerous traps, like polling too far in advance of elections so as to give the newspaper a front-page story on Sunday. Or like quoting percentages that are not properly qualified. Or like discarding essential methodological notes considered dross by journalists and perhaps indeed by the readers they pretend to understand.

Harmonizing scientific and journalistic interests is difficult. The Social Science Research Council analysis of the 1948 election polls contemplates the problem at some length. This writer believes that publication at present too often reflects the journalist's idea of a good story, and too infrequently reflects the pollster's idea of a careful, accurate report. My opinion — and I was trained as a newspaperman — is that poll stories can be more technical and the data more carefully treated without losing readers, which is the real test.

Ultimately, it is the pollster who must educate the editor to the nature of opinion research so poll releases will not be emasculated and so more analytical releases can be submitted in the first place. Once the pollster has accomplished this, the editor will be more willing to buy opinion polls, more charitable when errors occur, more willing to publish background material, and less annoyed with careful pollsters who properly qualify their forecasts. After all, the trend in newspaper reporting gen-

erally is toward more interpretation anyway.

The following opinions were voiced from the floor:

Because poll findings have social value, there should be freer exchange of data, as well as a general repository available to all pollsters and social scientists. A clearing-house organ, like *Opinion News*, formerly published regularly by the National Opinion Research Center, could fill this role. It was stated that 1,000 subscribers each paying \$50 a year could finance such a publication. The question was raised whether such service should be undertaken by universities, AAPOR, the National Industrial Conference Board, Cantlil's Princeton Index, or others. Microfilming of findings was also proposed.

Local polls can benefit greatly and make scientific contributions by collaboration in making inter-city comparisons and collecting trend data, along lines of the 1950 election study.

Present shortcomings in local newspaper polls are due to their being cast in news editors' terms of novelty and similar "newsworthiness." Mere news angles are not sufficient for collecting a significant body of sound data.

Press polls may be dangerous if an insufficient number of questions is asked and analyzed to provide any true understanding. Invalidity threatens under superficiality. Mere marginals are not enough; more analysis is needed.

If questions are asked on which people have not done any thinking or if intensity of opinion is ignored in the analysis, the democratic process is endangered.

## CURRENT RESEARCH ON PROBLEMS OF THE COLD WAR: FIVE BRIEF REPORTS

(Sunday, May 17, 1953)

*Chairman:* John W. Riley, Jr., Rutgers University

*Participants:* Gabriel Almond, Princeton University, "Methodological Aspects of 'The Appeals of Communism Study'"; Herbert Garfinkel, Michigan State College, "Communist Ideology in Korean War Atrocity Propaganda"; Paul W. Massing, Rutgers University, "Reactions to the Voice in Soviet Propaganda: A Technical Note on the Anti-Zionist Campaign"; Stanley Bigman, American University, "Some Methodological Problems in International Communications Research"; Raymond Bauer and David Gleicher, Harvard University, "New Approaches to the Study of Soviet Communications Behavior."

*Session Analyst:* Elmo C. Wilson, International Public Opinion Research, Inc.

Chairman Riley stressed the volume of research which a variety of academic and governmental agencies have done on aspects of the cold war since World War II. He spoke of the importance of such research and mentioned briefly the contributions of the session participants in the field.

*Gabriel Almond* described a project which involved interviews with persons who had left the Communist Party in the United States, France, Italy and Great Britain. Some 250 such interviews were made, about half of them with working-class subjects and the other half with intellectuals.

From the analysis of the interviews has come a definition of types of Communists as well as typical career profiles. Certain international differences were noted. For example, the process of leaving the Party was relatively mild in Great Britain as contrasted with the violent psychological effect which such a severance normally had on the individual in the United States. One of the chief gains from the research insofar as the cold war is concerned has been the development of hypotheses on how to increase the vulnerability and increase defection of Communist Party members.

*Herbert Garfinkel* reported on a study of Communist atrocity propaganda as revealed in monitored Communist radio broadcasts. Monitored broadcasts, furnished by a government agency, were sampled and subjected to content analysis procedures.

The speaker pointed out that understanding Communist atrocity propaganda involves an appreciation of the broadness with which the Reds define "atrocity." Thus, all war against a Communist state is an atrocity, as is everything which they regard as "warmongering"—propaganda for a new war. The fact that the Russian propaganda broadcasts stressed most heavily aggressive war and warmongering in their list of atrocities charged to the United Nations, while the Communist Chinese and North Koreans placed heavier emphasis on germ warfare and indiscriminate bombings, led the researchers to two major hypotheses: (1) There is a real

divergence between atrocity propaganda emanating from Moscow and from Peking; (2) Soviet atrocity propaganda emphasizes ideological themes while Communist Chinese and North Korean propaganda emphasizes nationalistic themes.

In working with these hypotheses the researchers broke down the atrocity charges into "motivational themes" and "general themes." In the analysis of motivational themes they discovered that:

1. The Russians place greater emphasis upon the ideological character of their opponents' motivation than do either Red China or North Korea.
2. All three Communist propaganda sources place less reliance on Communist ideology than might be expected. Thus, when identifying the enemy as motivated by either capitalist or imperialist considerations, all three Communist propaganda sources lean heavily toward the latter.
3. The racist theme gets very little play from any of the three Communist propaganda sources, although more from the Soviet Union than from the other two.

The analysis of general themes brought out the following:

1. General appeals to morality are the predominant themes for the Russians and for the Communist Chinese. While these are strongly emphasized by the North Koreans also, the latter place more emphasis on nationalistic themes.
2. Evidence in support of the hypothesis of a conflicting China-USSR relationship is found in the fact that Communist China places much less emphasis on Communist destiny than does the Soviet Union.
3. The greater degree of emphasis on nationalistic than upon international themes by all three Communist sources provides interesting evidence of the decreasing role internationalism seems to play among the Communist powers.

Several hypotheses developed by the researchers "bit the dust"—among them the assumption that in addressing Asiatic targets the Communists would cite Indian sources on the grounds that such sources

would make for higher credibility than the Communist press or Russian writers.

The researchers found little evidence in the monitored broadcasts to support the image of a Soviet mastery of psychological warfare techniques as contrasted with the presumed bungling of our own Voice of America. Communist propaganda in the portion of cold war propaganda examined under this project was by no means as refined as had been expected.

*Paul W. Massing* discussed some of the recent findings from the content analysis study he has been conducting for the Voice of America. The study was focused on Soviet reactions to VOA output as evidenced in the mass media of Russia and its satellites.

The speaker pointed out certain differences between satellite and Soviet treatment of VOA broadcasts:

1. Satellite reactions are quite specific, mentioning particular broadcasts and arguing with them; Soviet reactions tend to be generalizations and to ignore specific broadcasts.
2. To some extent this same evasion of specifics is present in the treatment of issues in U. S. politics. For example, the Soviets have made no reference to the McCarthy investigations, while the satellites' press has been full of them.
3. Satellites in recent months have tended to build up VOA as an operating agency of U. S. intelligence and espionage, while this has not been true in the Soviet Union.

Professor Massing noted that the most startling revelation of the study has been the fact that since the October Party Congress in Moscow, the mentions of the VOA by the Soviet press and radio, addressed to the home audience in Russia, have diminished almost to the vanishing point. In lesser degree this has also been true of Soviet propaganda addressed beyond the Russian borders. This decline in Soviet references to the VOA would appear to be a part of the diplomatic peace offensive being conducted by the new Kremlin rulers.

Among the methodological problems in international communications research, *Stanley Bigman* mentioned the need for

defining the research purposes clearly in advance of the study, and the importance of clarifying the sponsor's purposes. Mr. Bigman also stressed the possible methodological values in materials from historical sources. Such historical sources often provide hypotheses for research in other cultures. They also furnish substantive data to provide larger generalizations, and they afford an opportunity to obtain historical perspective for otherwise static data. It is important for the researcher to bear in mind that such materials are relatively readily available at little expense as contrasted with data from formal research projects.

*David Gleicher* told of a study of informal oral communications in the Soviet Union. The study was based on 2,700 pencil-and-paper interviews and 350 personal interviews with Soviet defectors. Results indicated that more than half of the respondents cited word of mouth as their regular source of news; only the press itself was mentioned more frequently.

The importance of news sources tended to vary by socio-economic groups. The press is the biggest source for all upper-occupational groups. Below the skilled-worker level the press becomes much less important, while the relative importance of informal communication increases tremendously.

The study indicated that the peasant seems to be pretty effectively isolated from the policies of the Soviet regime. He gets his information from middle men in the community who are informed, and from the political joke which travels through the informal oral network. The intelligentsia also depend to a remarkable extent on this same informal network for their information.

The study indicated that Soviet newspapers are regarded as very dull. News is reported when it best fits the propaganda line and without reference to its news value.

Although the intelligentsia report that the rumor network supplies more reliable information than the official network, this does not mean that the intelligentsia are disaffected from the Soviet regime; their sources of satisfaction in the system provide counter-pressures to any disaffection

resulting from this evaluation of the Soviet news system.

Raymond Bauer, in an addendum to Mr. Gleicher's remarks, pointed out that methodological "gimmicks" had been developed as the research among the defectors proceeded. These techniques which grow out of the research are worthy of study.

Dr. Bauer also made the point that intuitive familiarity with the problem, saturation in it, is a normal concomitant of research of this type. Such familiarity is natural in the case of research in America by Americans, but becomes much more difficult of attainment in research in foreign countries.

## THE PROJECT DIRECTOR MEETS HIS CRITICS

(A Memorial Session Dedicated to Julian L. Woodward)

(Sunday, May 17, 1953)

*The Project: The Authoritarian Personality*, by T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford (Harper and Brothers, 1950. Sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, Social Studies Series: Publication No. III)

"*The Study's Aims and Achievements*" — R. Nevitt Sanford, Vassar College

*Critics* — Paul Sheatsley, National Opinion Research Center; Marie Jahoda, New York University

*Turning the Tables: A Criticism of the Criticisms* — Else Frenkel-Brunswik, University of California

*Chairman*: Don Cahalan, Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University

*Session Analyst* — Preston Valien, Fisk University

This session was arranged by the AAPOR Committee on Ethics and Standards and was dedicated to the late Julian Woodward, who first initiated this annual AAPOR "Project Director Meets His Critics" session. It appears certain that "Woody" would have appreciated the high level of presentation and discussion which characterized this lively session.

The Chairman pointed out that this session was unusual in that the critics had been unwary enough to have written a critique of *The Authoritarian Personality* which the authors had read and would in turn criticize.

Dr. Sanford began the discussion with a presentation of the aims and achievements of the work, in effect setting up the target. The research was guided by the following major hypothesis: That the political, economic and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a "mentality" or "spirit," and that this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality. Dr. Sanford pointed out that the research was essentially a study of

the correlates of certain patterns of social attitudes. It undertook to measure, by means of Likert-type scales, anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, political-economic conservatism, and finally, potential fascism in the personality. The inter-relations among these measures were studied, and, in addition, their relations to factors in the individual's background and history, his personality and his contemporary situation — particularly his membership in groups. The theoretical orientation was mainly Freudian. An essential feature of the methodological approach was a kind of interlocking of questionnaires and clinical procedures (intensive interviews and projective techniques). After groups of subjects had filled out a questionnaire embodying preliminary forms of the scales, subjects obtaining extreme scores on the anti-Semitism or ethnocentrism scales were selected for clinical study, and on the basis of this study the scales were revised several times. The sample consisted of approximately 200 white Christian men and women from various walks of life, predominantly middle class, with more than