

# Mean Field Games: Numerical Methods and Applications in Machine Learning Part 2

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<https://mlauriere.github.io/teaching/MFG-PKU-2.pdf>

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## RECAP

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*How can we characterize MFG solutions?*

- State space:  $\mathcal{S} = \mathbb{R}^d$ ; action space:  $\mathcal{A} = \mathbb{R}^k$
- Dynamics for typical player: initial position  $X_0 \sim \textcolor{blue}{m}_0$ ,

$$dX_t = b(X_t, \textcolor{blue}{\mu}_t, \textcolor{red}{v}_t)dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad t \geq 0,$$

with  $\textcolor{blue}{\mu}_t$  = (mean field) population distribution at time  $t$

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with  $\mu_t$  = (mean field) population distribution at time  $t$

- Cost for typical player :

$$J(v; \mu) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T f(X_t, \mu_t, v_t)dt + g(X_T, \mu_T) \right]$$

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- **Mean Field Nash equilibrium:**  $(\hat{v}, \hat{\mu})$  s.t. for all  $v$

$$J(\hat{v}; \hat{\mu}) \leq J(v; \hat{\mu})$$

where

$\hat{\mu}$  = (mean field) population distribution if everybody uses  $\hat{v}$

## Many Possible Extensions

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# Outline

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## 1. Equilibrium conditions for MFG

- PDE viewpoint
- SDE viewpoint

## 2. Optimality conditions for MFC

## 3. Example: Crowd Motion with Congestion

## 4. Example: Systemic Risk

## 5. Toward Algorithms

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## Single agent control problem

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- Assuming population at equilibrium, i.e.,  $\hat{\mu}$ , optimal control problem: min. over  $v$

$$J(v; \hat{\mu}) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T f(X_t, \hat{\mu}_t, v_t) dt + g(X_T, \hat{\mu}_T) \right]$$

subject to:

$$dX_t = b(X_t, \hat{\mu}_t, v_t) dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad t \geq 0, \quad X_0 \sim m_0$$

- Value function:**  $u(T, x) = g(x, \hat{\mu}_T)$ ,

$$u(t, x) = \inf_v \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T f(X_s, \hat{\mu}_s, v_s) ds + g(X_T, \hat{\mu}_T) \mid X_t = x \right]$$

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- Dynamic programming

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- Dynamic programming
- Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE** ( $\nu = \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2$ ):

$$0 = -\frac{\partial u}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta u(t, x) + H(x, \hat{m}(t, \cdot), \nabla u(t, x))$$

where  $H$  is the **Hamiltonian**:

$$H(x, m, p) = \max_{v \in \mathbb{R}^k} \{-L(x, m, v, p)\},$$

where  $L$  is the **Lagrangian**, defined by

$$L(x, m, v, p) = f(x, m, v) + \langle b(x, m, v), p \rangle.$$

# PDE for Population Evolution

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- $N$  particles controlled by  $v$ :

$$dX_t^i = b(X_t^i, \color{red}v(t, X_t^i)\color{black})dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad t \geq 0, \quad X_0^i \sim m_0$$

with empirical distribution

$$\mu_{\color{blue}t\color{black}}^N = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \delta_{X_t^j}$$

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<sup>1</sup>Sznitman, A. S. (1991). Topics in propagation of chaos. In *Ecole d'été de probabilités de Saint-Flour XIX–1989* (pp. 165–251). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

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- Propagation of chaos [Kac'56; Sznitman'91]<sup>1</sup>

$$\mu_t^N \xrightarrow[N \rightarrow +\infty]{} \mu_t = \text{MF population distribution}$$

- $\mu_t = \mathcal{L}(X_t)$  where  $X$  is a typical particle:

$$dX_t = b(X_t, v(t, X_t))dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad t \geq 0, \quad X_0 \sim m_0$$

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$$dX_t = b(X_t, v(t, X_t))dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad t \geq 0, \quad X_0 \sim m_0$$

- $\mu$  driven by control  $v$  solves **Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP)** equation:

$$0 = \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta \mu(t, x) + \operatorname{div}(\mu(t, \cdot) b(\cdot, v(t, \cdot))) (x), \quad \mu_0 = m_0$$

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# PDE for Population Evolution for MKV Dynamics

- $N$  interacting particles controlled by  $v$ :

$$dX_t^i = b(X_t^i, \mu_t^N, v(t, X_t^i))dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad t \geq 0, \quad X_0^i \sim m_0$$

with empirical distribution

$$\mu_t^N = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \delta_{X_t^j}$$

- Propagation of chaos [Kac'56; Sznitman'91]<sup>2</sup>

$$\mu_t^N \xrightarrow[N \rightarrow +\infty]{} \mu_t = \text{MF population distribution}$$

- $\mu_t = \mathcal{L}(X_t)$  where  $X$  is a typical particle with **McKean-Vlasov (MKV)** dynamics:

$$dX_t = b(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v(t, X_t))dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad t \geq 0, \quad X_0 \sim m_0$$

- $\mu$  driven by control  $v$  solves **Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP)** equation:

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## MFG PDE system

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It can be shown (see e.g., [BFY'13, §3.1]<sup>3</sup>) that a necessary condition for  $\hat{v}$  to be an equilibrium control for MFG is that:

$$\hat{v}(t, x) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\substack{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^k}} \left\{ -L(x, \mathbf{m}(t, \cdot), \mathbf{v}, \nabla u(t, x)) \right\},$$

where  $(u, m)$  solves the following forward-backward PDE system:

$$\begin{cases} 0 = -\frac{\partial u}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta u(t, x) + H(x, m(t, \cdot), \nabla u(t, x)), \\ 0 = \frac{\partial m}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta m(t, x) - \operatorname{div}(m(t, \cdot) \partial_p H(\cdot, m(t), \nabla u(t, \cdot))) (x), \\ u(T, x) = g(x, m(T, \cdot)), \quad m(0, x) = m_0(x) \end{cases}$$

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Coupling:

- Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE for the value function
- Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) PDE for the population distribution (density)

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Coupling:

- Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE for the value function
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Notation:  $\mathbf{v}^*(x, \mathbf{m}, p) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^k} \left\{ -L(x, \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{v}, p) \right\}$

So:  $\hat{v}(t, x) = \mathbf{v}^*(x, m(t, \cdot), \nabla u(t, x))$

<sup>3</sup>Bensoussan, A., Frehse, J., & Yam, P. (2013). *Mean field games and mean field type control theory* (Vol. 101). New York: Springer.

- Setting:  $d = 1$ ,

$$b(x, \mu, v) = b(x, \bar{\mu}, v) = Ax + \bar{A}\bar{\mu} + Bv$$

$$f(x, \mu, v) = f(x, \bar{\mu}, v) = \frac{1}{2} [Qx^2 + \bar{Q}(x - S\bar{\mu})^2 + Cv^2]$$

$$g(x, \mu) = g(x, \bar{\mu}) = \frac{1}{2} [Q_T x^2 + \bar{Q}_T (x - S_T \bar{\mu})^2]$$

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- Lagrangian:

$$L(x, \mu, v, p) = L(x, \bar{\mu}, v, p) = f(x, \bar{\mu}, v) + b(x, \bar{\mu}, v)p$$

- Hamiltonian:

$$H(x, \mu, p) = H(x, \bar{\mu}, p) = \max_{v \in \mathbb{R}^k} \{-L(x, \bar{\mu}, v, p)\}$$

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- Lagrangian:

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- Hamiltonian:

$$H(x, \mu, p) = H(x, \bar{\mu}, p) = \max_{v \in \mathbb{R}^k} \{-L(x, \bar{\mu}, v, p)\}$$

- Optimal control:

$$\hat{v}(t, x) = \dots$$

- **Mean process:** integrate KFP on  $\mathcal{S}$

$$0 = \frac{\partial m}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta m(t, x) - \operatorname{div} (m(t, \cdot) \partial_p H(\cdot, m(t), \nabla u(t, \cdot))) (x)$$

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- **Value function:** plug the following ansatz

$$u(t, x) = \frac{1}{2} p_t x^2 + r_t x + s_t$$

in the HJB equation:

$$0 = -\frac{\partial u}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta u(t, x) + H(x, m(t, \cdot), \nabla u(t, x)).$$

Then, identify terms

(see e.g., [BFY'13, §6.2])

# Outline

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## 1. Equilibrium conditions for MFG

- PDE viewpoint
- SDE viewpoint

## 2. Optimality conditions for MFC

## 3. Example: Crowd Motion with Congestion

## 4. Example: Systemic Risk

## 5. Toward Algorithms

## Stochastic Optimal Control – Bellman viewpoint

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- Consider  $X_t$  following:  $X_0 \sim \textcolor{blue}{m}_0$ ,  $dX_t = b(X_t, \hat{\mu}_{\textcolor{blue}{t}}, \hat{v}_{\textcolor{red}{t}})dt + \sigma dW_t$
- Let  $\textcolor{green}{Y}_t = u(t, X_t)$
- It solves the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE):

$$\begin{cases} Y_T = g(X_T, \hat{\mu}_T), \\ dY_t = -f(X_t, \hat{\mu}_t, \hat{v}_t)dt + Z_t dW_t \end{cases}$$

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<sup>4</sup>Carmona, R., & Delarue, F. (2018). Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I: Mean Field FBSDEs, Control, and Games (Vol. 83). Springer.

- Consider  $X_t$  following:  $X_0 \sim m_0$ ,  $dX_t = b(X_t, \hat{\mu}_t, \hat{v}_t)dt + \sigma dW_t$
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- Optimality condition (from **Bellman** dynamic programming principle):

$$\hat{v}_t = v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \sigma^{-1}Z_t)$$

where  $(X, Y, Z)$  solves the **McKean-Vlasov (MKV) FBSDE** system:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = b(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \sigma^{-1}Z_t))dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = -f(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \sigma^{-1}Z_t))dt + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim m_0, \quad Y_T = g(X_T, \mathcal{L}(X_T)) \end{cases}$$

(see e.g., [CD'18, Vol. I, §4.4]<sup>4</sup>)

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## Stochastic Optimal Control – Pontryagin viewpoint

---

- Consider  $X_t$  following:  $X_0 \sim \textcolor{blue}{m}_0$ ,  $dX_t = b(X_t, \hat{\mu}_{\textcolor{blue}{t}}, \hat{v}_{\textcolor{red}{t}})dt + \sigma dW_t$
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- Optimality condition** (from **Pontryagin** stochastic maximum principle):

$$\hat{v}_t = \textcolor{red}{v}^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t)$$

where  $(X, Y, Z)$  solves the **McKean-Vlasov (MKV) FBSDE** system:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = b(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \textcolor{red}{v}^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t))dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = -\partial_x H(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \textcolor{red}{v}^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t))dt + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim \textcolor{blue}{m}_0, \quad Y_T = \partial_x g(X_T, \mathcal{L}(X_T)) \end{cases}$$

(see e.g., [BFY'13, §3.2; CD'18, Vol. I, §4.5])

## McKean-Vlasov FBSDE systems

---

Summary: two possible MKV FBSDE systems:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = b(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \sigma^{-1}Z_t))dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = -f(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \sigma^{-1}Z_t))dt + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim m_0, \quad Y_T = g(X_T, \mathcal{L}(X_T)) \end{cases}$$

or

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = b(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t))dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = -\partial_x H(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t))dt + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim m_0, \quad Y_T = \partial_x g(X_T, \mathcal{L}(X_T)) \end{cases}$$

⚠ Same notation  $(X, Y, Z)$  but different meaning for  $Y$  (and  $Z$ )!

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Generic form of a **MKV FBSDE** system:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = B(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t, Z_t)dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = -F(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t, Z_t)dt + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim m_0, \quad Y_T = G(X_T, \mathcal{L}(X_T)) \end{cases}$$

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or

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = b(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t))dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = -\partial_x H(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t))dt + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim m_0, \quad Y_T = \partial_x g(X_T, \mathcal{L}(X_T)) \end{cases}$$

⚠ Same notation  $(X, Y, Z)$  but different meaning for  $Y$  (and  $Z$ )!

Generic form of a **MKV FBSDE** system:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = B(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t, Z_t)dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = -F(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), Y_t, Z_t)dt + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim m_0, \quad Y_T = G(X_T, \mathcal{L}(X_T)) \end{cases}$$

Rich theory; in particular: **existence** of solution:

- Banach fixed point theorem (short time)
- Schauder's fixed point theorem (see e.g., [CD'18, Vol. I, §4.3])



# Outline

---

1. Equilibrium conditions for MFG
2. Optimality conditions for MFC
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## Distribution control problem

---

- Mean field control problem: minimize

$$J(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T f(X_t, \boldsymbol{\mu}_t^{\mathbf{v}}, \mathbf{v}_t) dt + g(X_T, \boldsymbol{\mu}_T^{\mathbf{v}}) \right]$$

subject to:

$$dX_t = b(X_t, \boldsymbol{\mu}_t^{\mathbf{v}}, \mathbf{v}_t) dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad t \geq 0, \quad X_0 \sim \mathbf{m}_0$$

- Population distribution  $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\mathbf{v}}$  driven by control  $\mathbf{v}$ :

$$0 = \frac{\partial \mathbf{m}^{\mathbf{v}}}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta \mathbf{m}^{\mathbf{v}}(t, x) - \operatorname{div} (\mathbf{m}^{\mathbf{v}}(t, \cdot) b(\cdot, \mathbf{m}^{\mathbf{v}}(t), \mathbf{v}(t, \cdot))) (x)$$

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- Value function?
- Dynamic programming?

## MFC PDE system

---

It can be shown (see e.g., [BFY'13, §3.1]) that a necessary condition for  $\mathbf{v}^*$  to be an optimal control for MFC is that:

$$\mathbf{v}^*(t, x) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^k} \left\{ -L(x, \mathbf{m}(t, \cdot), \mathbf{v}, \nabla u(t, x)) \right\},$$

where  $(u, m)$  solves the following forward-backward PDE system:

$$\begin{cases} 0 = -\frac{\partial u}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta u(t, x) + H(x, m(t, \cdot), \nabla u(t, x)) \\ \quad + \int_S \frac{\partial H}{\partial m}(\xi, m(t, \cdot), \nabla u(t, \xi))(x) m(t, \xi) d\xi, \\ 0 = \frac{\partial m}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta m(t, x) - \operatorname{div}(m(t, \cdot) \partial_p H(\cdot, m(t), \nabla u(t, \cdot))) (x), \\ u(T, x) = g(x, m(T, \cdot)), \quad m(0, x) = m_0(x) \end{cases}$$

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where  $\partial H / \partial m$ :

- Gâteaux derivative if density in  $L^2$ : see e.g., [BFY'13, §4.1]
- L-derivative if measure: see e.g., [CD'18, Vol. I, §5 and §6]

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Coupling:

- Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE for  $u$   $\triangleleft$
- Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) PDE for the population distribution (density)



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- Consider  $X_t$  following

$$\begin{cases} X_0 \sim m_0, \\ dX_t = b(X_t, \mu_t^*, v_t^*)dt + \sigma dW_t \end{cases}$$

- Let

$$Y_t = u(t, X_t)$$

- It solves the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE):

$$\begin{cases} Y_T = g(X_T, \mu_T^*) + \dots, \\ dY_t = -f(X_t, \mu_t^*, v_t^*)dt + \dots + Z_t dW_t \end{cases}$$

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- Optimality condition** (from **Bellman** dynamic programming principle):

$$v_t^* = v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \sigma^{-1}Z_t)$$

where  $(X, Y, Z)$  solves the **McKean-Vlasov (MKV) FBSDE** system:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = b(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \sigma^{-1}Z_t))dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = -f(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), v^*(X_t, \mathcal{L}(X_t), \sigma^{-1}Z_t))dt + \dots + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim m_0, \quad Y_T = g(X_T, \mathcal{L}(X_T)) + \dots \end{cases}$$

- Consider  $X_t$  following

$$\begin{cases} X_0 \sim \textcolor{blue}{m}_0, \\ dX_t = b(X_t, \mu_t^*, \textcolor{red}{v}_t^*)dt + \sigma dW_t \end{cases}$$

- Let

$$Y_t = \partial_x u(t, X_t)$$

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$$\begin{cases} Y_T = \partial_x g(X_T, \mu_T^*) + \tilde{\mathbb{E}}[\partial_\mu g(\tilde{X}_T, \mu_T^*)(X_T)], \\ dY_t = -\partial_x H(X_t, \mu_t^*, \textcolor{red}{v}_t^*)dt + \cdots + Z_t dW_t \end{cases}$$

# Stochastic Optimal Control – Pontryagin viewpoint

- Consider  $X_t$  following

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- Optimality condition** (from **Pontryagin** stochastic maximum principle):

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(see e.g., [BFY'13, §4.3; CD'18, Vol. I, §6.2])

# MKV FBSDE systems for MFC

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## Crowd models with Congestion effects

---



- Agents = people (pedestrians, ...)
- Dynamics / decision, planning
- Geometry: possibly complex (building, ...)

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- **Crowd aversion:** not comfortable when density is high
- **Congestion:** difficult to move quickly when the density is high
  - ▶ slower movement → drift function
  - ▶ more effort (“soft” congestion) → cost function
  - ▶ maximum density (“hard” congestion) → density constraint

## Mean Field Model

---

- Given population density flow  $\mathbf{m} = (\mathbf{m}_t)_{t \in [0, T]}$ , minimize over  $\mathbf{v}$ :

$$J(\mathbf{v}; \mu) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T f(X_t, \mathbf{m}(t, x), \mathbf{v}_t) dt + g(X_T, \mathbf{m}(T, x)) \right]$$

subject to:  $dX_t = b(X_t, \mathbf{m}(t, x), \mathbf{v}_t) dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad t \geq 0, \quad X_0 \sim \mathbf{m}_0$

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- Players directly control their velocity:  $b(x, \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{v}$   
and pay a running cost:

$$f(x, \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{v}) = C_\beta (1 + \mathbf{m})^\gamma |\mathbf{v}|^{\beta^*} + \ell(x, \mathbf{m}), \quad (x, \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{v}) \in \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}^d$$

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$$\beta^* = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1}, \quad C_\beta = (\beta - 1) \beta^{-\beta^*}, \quad \gamma = \frac{\alpha}{\beta - 1}$$

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- Remarks:
  - **local** dependence on  $\mathbf{m}$ :  $\mathbf{m}(t, \mathbf{x})$
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- local dependence on  $\mathbf{m}$ :  $\mathbf{m}(t, \mathbf{x})$
- non-local variant:  $(1 + \rho * \mathbf{m}_t(x))^\gamma$ ,  $\rho$  = regularizing kernel
- congestion VS aversion → roles of  $\alpha$  VS  $\ell$
- case  $\beta = 2, \gamma = 1$ :  $f(x, \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{v}) = C_\beta (1 + \mathbf{m}) |\mathbf{v}|^2 + \ell(x, \mathbf{m})$

## *N*-Player Model

---

- Hamiltonian:

$$H(x, \textcolor{blue}{m}, p) = \max_{\textcolor{red}{v} \in \mathbb{R}^k} \{-L(x, \textcolor{blue}{m}, \textcolor{red}{v}, p)\} = \frac{|p|^\beta}{(1 + \textcolor{blue}{m})^\alpha} - \ell(x, \textcolor{blue}{m})$$

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
- Take  $\beta = 2$  for simplicity
- MFG PDE system:

$$\begin{cases} 0 = -\frac{\partial u}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta u(t, x) + \frac{|\nabla u(t, x)|^2}{(1 + m(t, x))^\alpha} - \ell(x, m), \\ 0 = \frac{\partial m}{\partial t}(t, x) - \nu \Delta m(t, x) - 2 \operatorname{div} \left( m(t, \cdot) (1 + m(t, \cdot))^{-\alpha} \nabla u(t, \cdot) \right) (x), \\ u(T, x) = g(x, m(T, \cdot)), \quad m(0, x) = m_0(x) \end{cases}$$

- MFC PDE system: analogous but with an extra term

## Example: Exit of a Room – Distribution

Example: evacuation of a room with obstacles and congestion [Achdou, L:15]<sup>5</sup>





Geometry of the room

---

<sup>5</sup>Achdou, Y., & Laurière, M. (2015). On the system of partial differential equations arising in mean field type control. *Discrete & Continuous Dynamical Systems*, 35(9), 3879.

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Initial density (left) and final cost (right)

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
Density in **MFGGame** (left) and **MFControl** (right)

---

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



## Example: Exit of a Room – Distribution

Example: evacuation of a room with obstacles and congestion [Achdou, L.'15]<sup>5</sup>



<sup>5</sup> Achdou, Y., & Laurière, M. (2015). On the system of partial differential equations arising in mean field type control. *Discrete & Continuous Dynamical Systems*, 35(9), 3879.


## Example: Exit of a Room – Velocity



MFG & MFC velocity fields (controls) at 4 time steps

## Example: Exit of a Room – Price of Anarchy

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Price of Anarchy:  $\frac{\text{Nash Eq.}}{\text{Social Opt.}} = \frac{\text{MFG cost}}{\text{MFC cost}}$

## Outline

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1. Equilibrium conditions for MFG
2. Optimality conditions for MFC
3. Example: Crowd Motion with Congestion
4. Example: Systemic Risk
5. Toward Algorithms

## MFG for Systemic risk

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MFG for inter-bank borrowing/lending [Carmona, Fouque, Sun'13]<sup>6</sup>

- State  $X = \log\text{-monetary reserve} \in \mathbb{R}$ ,
- Control  $v = \text{rate of borrowing } (> 0) \text{ or lending } (< 0) \text{ to central bank} \in \mathbb{R}$

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<sup>6</sup> Carmona, R., Fouque, J. P., & Sun, L. H. (2015). Mean Field Games and systemic risk. *Communications in Mathematical Sciences*, 13(4), 911-933.

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- Control  $v = \text{rate of borrowing } (> 0) \text{ or lending } (< 0) \text{ to central bank} \in \mathbb{R}$
- Dynamics:

$$dX_t = [a(\bar{\mu}_t - X_t) + v_t]dt + \sigma dW_t$$

where  $\bar{\mu} = (\bar{\mu}_t)_{t \geq 0}$  is the mean log-reserve

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# MFG for Systemic risk

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- Cost:

$$J(v; \bar{\mu}) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T \left[ \frac{1}{2} v_t^2 - q v_t (\bar{\mu}_t - X_t) + \frac{\epsilon}{2} (\bar{\mu}_t - X_t)^2 \right] dt + \frac{c}{2} (\bar{\mu}_T - X_T)^2 \right]$$

- Interpretation:

- ▶  $a(\bar{\mu}_t - X_t)$  with  $a > 0$ : borrowing or lending between banks
- ▶  $q v_t (\bar{\mu}_t - X_t)$  with  $q > 0$ : incentive to borrow if  $X_t$  is below the mean  $\bar{\mu}_t$
- ▶  $q$  can be viewed as chosen by the regulator ( $q$  large  $\Rightarrow$  low fees)
- ▶  $(\bar{\mu}_t - X_t)^2$ : penalizes departure from the average
- ▶ running cost is convex in  $v$  provided  $q^2 \leq \epsilon$

<sup>6</sup> Carmona, R., Fouque, J. P., & Sun, L. H. (2015). Mean Field Games and systemic risk. *Communications in Mathematical Sciences*, 13(4), 911–933.

- Hamiltonian:

$$H(x, \bar{\mu}, p) = \max_{v \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ \left[ \frac{1}{2} v^2 - q v (\bar{\mu} - x) + \frac{\epsilon}{2} (\bar{\mu} - x)^2 \right] + [a(\bar{\mu} - x) + v]p \right\}$$

so

$$\hat{v}_t = q(\bar{\mu}_t - X_t) - Y_t$$

where  $(X, Y, Z)$  solves:

- Hamiltonian:

$$H(x, \bar{\mu}, p) = \max_{\textcolor{red}{v} \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ \left[ \frac{1}{2} \textcolor{red}{v}^2 - q \textcolor{red}{v} (\bar{\mu} - x) + \frac{\epsilon}{2} (\bar{\mu} - x)^2 \right] + [a(\bar{\mu} - x) + \textcolor{red}{v}]p \right\}$$

so

$$\hat{v}_t = q(\bar{\mu}_t - X_t) - Y_t$$

where  $(X, Y, Z)$  solves:

- MKV FBSDE from Pontryagin principle for MFG:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = [(a + q)(\mathbb{E}[X_t] - X_t) - Y_t] dt + \sigma dW_t \\ dY_t = [(a + q)Y_t + (\epsilon - q^2)(\mathbb{E}[X_t] - X_t)] dt + Z_t dW_t \\ X_0 \sim \textcolor{blue}{m}_0, \quad Y_T = c(X_T - \mathbb{E}[X_t]) \end{cases}$$

- Hamiltonian:

$$H(x, \bar{\mu}, p) = \max_{\textcolor{red}{v} \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ \left[ \frac{1}{2} \textcolor{red}{v}^2 - q \textcolor{red}{v} (\bar{\mu} - x) + \frac{\epsilon}{2} (\bar{\mu} - x)^2 \right] + [a(\bar{\mu} - x) + \textcolor{red}{v}]p \right\}$$

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- Or Bellman principle: MKV FBSDE with  $Y_t = \text{value function}$

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Reminder: Forward-Backward system of equations

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Based on the LQ examples seen in Part I, we can think about using:

- Fixed point iterations
  - ▶ pure Banach-Picard iterations
  - ▶ damped version
  - ▶ Fictitious Play
  
- Newton's method

- Backward equation
  - ▶ HJB PDE
  - ▶ BSDE

- Backward equation
  - ▶ HJB PDE
  - ▶ BSDE
- Discretization of time and space







