Comparing Different Jailbreak Detection Methods

Bartosz Jezierski [1] Mateusz Jarosz [1] Vladimir Zaigrajew [1]

[1]Warsaw University of Technology

What the jailbreak is?

Large Language Models such as GPT, Llama, and others have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in natural language understanding and generation. However, these models are susceptible to a type of prompts known as **jailbreaks**, which induces the model to generate malicious responses against the usage policy and society by designing adversarial prompts. Jailbreak attempts may take various forms, including prompt injections, role-playing scenarios, or adversarial rephrasing.



As LLMs are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains from customer service to healthcare and education the need to reliably detect and prevent jailbreaks becomes critical. To combat jailbreaks, **guardian models** were invented, which act as safety layers around LLMs. They detect harmful prompts before the main model responds, helping keep AI outputs safe.



At first, we wanted to check how free commercial models work.

Exploring Guardian Models

We tested several versions of Meta's safety-oriented models from the Llama family on two datasets from Hugging Face:

- jailbreak-classification
- RedTeam2K

Specifically, we evaluated models:

- **Llama Guard 3** with **1.5B** and **8.03B** parameters
- **Llama Guard 4** with **12B** parameters

However, our initial results showed that their performance in jailbreak detection was limited. On RedTeam2K dataset, the results were barely better than coin tosses. That motivated us to explore other solutions.

Model	Parameters	Jailbreak-classification		RedTeam2K	
		Accuracy	FNR	Accuracy	FNR
Llama Guard 3	1.5B	67.18%	54.68%	54.60%	45.40%
Llama Guard 3	8.03B	61.07%	71.94%	54.15%	45.85%
Llama Guard 4	12B	68.57%	61.79%	50.75%	49.25%

Table 1. Comparison of Llama Guard model results on two datasets. FNR – False Negative Rate.

Alternative Approach

- **Light model approach:** We used **ModernBERT**, a lighter transformer model with approximately **150M parameters**. We experimented with gradually unfreezing and finetuning the last several transformer blocks to improve sensitivity while keeping computational costs low.
- **Large model approach:** We also tested a modified version of **Gemma**, replacing its original language modeling head with a classification layer. The model version which we chose has around **1B parameters**. We also tried to use the LoRA finetuning technique to efficiently adapt the model without retraining all parameters.

The results of both finetuning strategies are summarized in the table below. The finetuned models demonstrated a noticeable improvement compared to the baseline Llama Guard systems.

Model	Finetune type	Jailbreak-classification		RedTeam2K	
		Accuracy	FNR	Accuracy	FNR
ModernBERT	2 last block	98.09%	**0.00%**	**96.75%**	**3.25%**
Gemma 3	LoRA	**99.62%**	0.72%	96.25%	3.75%

Table 2. Results of the best variants of the ModernBERT and Gemma 3 models

Additional Observations

To better understand the sources of model errors, we looked at the distribution of jailbreak types that were most frequently misclassified as safe.



Privacy Violation prompts posed the greatest challenge for both of the best-performing models. These prompts often contained indirect or subtle requests for personal information for example:



This highlights the need for more targeted training on privacy-sensitive examples.

Contributions

- **Zero-shot Llama Guard is insufficient** for robust jailbreak detection.
- **Small, specialized classifiers** can outperform large zero-shot LLMs in identifying jailbreak prompts.
- **Targeted training subsets and heuristic privacy filters** help reduce false negatives, especially for privacy-related violations in real-world applications.