ML5 PROTOCOL

draft-ietf-mls-protocol-08

Richard Barnes, Raphael Robert,

Benjamin Beurdouche

YOU ARE HERE

draft-11 issued Dec 22, after issue resolutions at IETF 109

Since then, we have been in feature freeze, allowing for implementation

Initial interop testing has begun!

Few issues/PRs since then with clarifications, bugfixes

INTEROP!

GRPC-BASED TEST HARNESS


MLS client = gRPC server

Test runner = gRPC client, commands MLS implementations to do stuff

Two types of tests:

- Test vectors: Generate / Verify sample data from subsystems
- Scenarios: Actual protocol operations

Automatically generates permutations of ciphersuites / roles



PROGRESS SO FAR

Two implementations: mlspp and OpenMLS

Interop verified on test vectors:

- Tree math
- Key schedule joiner_secret
- Encryption
- TreeKEM
- Message encoding

FIRST INTEROP!

```
"test vectors": {
 "tree math": [{
      "generator": "mlspp",
                                              mlspp accepts its own test vector
     "verifier": "mlspp"
     "generator": "mlspp",
                                              OpenMLS accepts a test vector from mlspp
     "verifier": "OpenMLS"
     "generator": "OpenMLS",
                                              Mlspp is unhappy OpenMLS didn't do all the cases
     "verifier": "mlspp".
     "error": "rpc error: code = InvalidArgument desc = Error: parent (nullopt) != 9"
      "generator": "OpenMLS",
                                              OpenMLS accepts its own test vector
     "verifier": "OpenMLS"
```

BUGS FOUND SO FAR

Not generating full tree math test vectors

Swapped order of HKDF. Extract inputs

Wrong algorithms associated with a ciphersuite

No spec bugs ... yet

More to come as we test more surface...

SPEC ISSUES / PRS

BREAKING CHANGES (EDITORIAL OMITTED)


- #461 Truncate tree size on remval / #459 Trim tree after removal
- #455 Make PreSharedKeys non-optional in GroupSecrets
- #453 Use the GroupContext to derive the joiner_secret
- #439 Identities SHOULD be unique per group
- #457 Clarify ParentHash verification
- #443 External commit for resync used with PSK
- #XXX Resolve ambiguity around which context is used when

#459 / #461 - TREE TRIMMING

In draft-07, we made the tree smaller on Remove:

o Truncate the tree such that the rightmost non-blank leaf is the last node of the tree, for the time of the computation

This got lost in draft-08 and later, just need to restore it



#455 - MAKE PRESHAREDKEYS NON-OPTIONAL

Ambiguity in GroupSecrets:

PSK field is optional...

... but can also be zero length

What if it is present, but empty?

In other words, no need for the field to be optional

```
struct {
    PreSharedKeyID psks<0..2^16-1>;
} PreSharedKeys;
struct {
    opaque joiner_secret<1..255>;
    optional<PathSecret> path_secret;
    optional<PreSharedKeys> psks;
    PreSharedKeys psks;
} GroupSecrets;
```

#453 - GROUPCONTEXT TO DERIVE JOINER_SECRET

Goal: Prove that joiner knows GroupContext

```
Circular dependency:
```

joiner_secret <- GroupContext <- welcome_secret <- joiner_secret

```
commit_secret -> KDF.Extract
               DeriveSecret(., "joiner")
               ExpandWithLabel(., "joiner", GroupContext_[n], KDF.Nh)
                joiner_secret
```

#439 - IDENTITIES SHOULD BE UNIQUE PER GROUP

... or rather, unique within the context of a group

Each leaf has a Credential => (identity, signature public key) pair

The current spec allows an identity or signature key to appear multiple times

Proposal is to require that both identities and public keys be unique

#457 - CLARIFY PARENTHASH VERIFICATION

Obvious problem just a typo:

If R is a blank leaf node, the check fails

More broadly: "I suggest to add a more formal description of the parent hash generation and verification (e.g. pseudocode) to reduce ambiguity"

#443 - EXTERNAL COMMIT FOR RESYNC WITH PSK

External commit introduces the possibility of a "resync" operation

Remove(old self) + Add(new self) within same external Commit

But "new self" doesn't have to prove past membership

... notionally, with a PSK derived from an earlier epoch

Should we RECOMMEND / REQUIRE that this be done?

With identity uniqueness, this case is clearly recognizable

... but assumes that a client that has otherwise lost state still has PSK(s)

#XXX - RESOLVE GROUPCONTEXT USAGE AMBIGUITY

Generating and handling commits requires that committer/processor use a few different GroupContexts:

- 1. Encap/decap an UpdatePath "provisional" GroupContext, proposals applied
- 2. Ratcheting forward the key schedule GroupContext for next epoch
- 3. Signing the MLSPlaintext of the Commit GroupContext for last epoch

Propose to clarify, align terminology around old / provisional / new

WAY FORWARD

FINAL TODOS

- 1. Finish interop testing based on draft-11 (without further changes)
 - a. ETA: April?
 - b. EVERYONE GET ANY LAST ISSUES / PRS IN WHILE THIS IS HAPPENING
- 2. Issue draft-12 with the last round of changes
 - a. ETA: As soon as we're done with interop testing
- 3. Update implementations and re-validate interop
 - a. ETA: A couple of weeks after draft-12
- 4. Final WGLC and on to the IESG!
 - a. ETA: May?