### CS 7545: Machine Learning Theory

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Lecture 8: Perceptron and Game Theory

Lecturer: Jacob Abernethy Scribes: Aditi Laddha, Jiayu Chen

**Disclaimer:** These notes have not been subjected to the usual scrutiny reserved for formal publications.

#### 8.1 Review of Prediction Setting

Given the loss function  $\ell :\in [0,1] \times \{0,1\} \to [0,1]$ , a pool of N experts, and an learning algorithm.

### Algorithm Prediction with Expert Advice

- 1: for  $t=1 \rightarrow T$  do:
- Experts predict  $x_1^t \dots x_N^t \in \{0, 1\}$
- Algorithm makes prediction  $\hat{y}^t \in \{0, 1\}$
- Observe  $y^t \in \{0,1\}$
- 5: end for

**Definition 8.1 (Regret)** In a prediction setting, regret is defined as the difference between the loss of the learning algorithm, and the loss of the best expert.

$$Regret_T = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \ell(\hat{y}^t, y^t) - \min_{i} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \ell(x_i^t, y^t)$$

Goal: to make  $Regret_T$  small. It would be ideal if  $\frac{Regret_T}{T} = o(1)$ .

#### 8.2 Review of Exponential Weights Algorithm

Given a pool of N experts, each expert i give prediction  $x_i^t$  at each round t. Given a parameter  $\eta$ .

### Algorithm Exponential Weights Algorithm

- 1:  $w_i^1 \leftarrow 1 \quad \forall i$
- Algorithm makes prediction  $\hat{y} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i^t x_i^t}{\sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i^t}$
- Observe  $y^t \in \{0, 1\}$   $w_i^{t+1} = e^{-\eta \sum_{s=1}^t \ell(x_i^s, y^s)}$ 5:
- 6: end for

**Theorem 8.2** Let  $\mathcal{L}_T(alg)$  be the accumulated losses for EWA,  $\mathcal{L}_Ti$  be the accumulated losses for each expert i, then EWA guarantees that  $\forall i$ :

$$\mathcal{L}_T(alg) \le \frac{logN + \eta \mathcal{L}_T i}{1 - e^{\eta}}$$

Corollary 8.3 For 'correct'  $\eta$ , which means well-tuned  $\eta$ , we have:

$$\frac{\mathcal{L}_T(alg) - \mathcal{L}_T i}{T} \le \frac{logN + \sqrt{2logN}\mathcal{L}_T i^*}{T} = O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$$

Where  $i^* = argmin_i \mathcal{L}_T i$ .

The last equation holds because the growth of  $\mathcal{L}_T i^*$  is always slower than that of T.

# 8.3 Action Setting/Hedge Setting

There are no predictions from experts, but instead the algorithm chooses actions. On each round t, there are N actions to choose from. Then the nature will reveal the associated loss. The setting is actually equivalent to previous setting.

## Algorithm Hedge Setting

- 1:  $w_i^1 \leftarrow 1 \quad \forall i$
- 2: for  $t=1 \rightarrow T$  do:
- 3: Choose  $\vec{p_1^t} \in \triangle_N$
- 4: Observe  $\vec{\ell^t} \in [0, 1]^N$
- 5: Algorithm pays  $\vec{p^t} \vec{\ell^t}$
- 6: The weight gets updated  $w_i^{t+1} = e^{-\eta \sum_{s=1}^t \ell_i^t}$
- 7: end for

 $\triangle_N$  is the set of discrete probability distribution of N choices, and  $\forall i, p_i \in [0,1], \sum_{i=1}^N p_i = 1$ .

## 8.4 Linear Prediction Setting

First, we define  $sign(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x \ge 0 \\ -1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ 

#### Algorithm Linear Prediction Setting

- 1: for  $t=1 \rightarrow T$  do:
- 2: Observe  $\vec{x}^t \in \mathbb{R}^d, ||x||_2 \le 1$
- 3: Algorithm predicts  $\hat{y^t} \in \{-1, 1\}$
- 4: Observe outcome  $y^t \in \{-1, 1\}$
- 5: end for

**Definition 8.4 (Linear Predictor)** A function  $h_w(\cdot)$  parameterized by the vector  $\vec{w} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ 

$$h_w(\cdot) = sign(\vec{w} \cdot \vec{x})$$

**Definition 8.5 (Perfect Linear Predictor)** In this setting, we assume that there exists  $\vec{w}^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$ ,  $\|\vec{w}^*\|^2 \le 1$ , called a the perfect linear predictor such that

$$sign(\vec{w}^* \cdot \vec{x}^t) = y^t, \quad \forall t$$

**Definition 8.6 (Perfect Linear Predictor with**  $\gamma$  margin) Assume for some  $\gamma > 0$ , there exists  $\vec{w}^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$ ,  $\|\vec{w}^*\|^2 \leq 1$ , called a the perfect linear predictor such that

$$(\vec{w}^* \cdot \vec{x}^t) y^t > \gamma, \quad \forall t$$

This can be equivalently stated as there exists  $\vec{w}^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$ ,  $\|\vec{w}^*\|^2 \leq \frac{1}{\gamma^2}$ , called a the perfect linear predictor with  $\gamma$  margin, such that

$$(\vec{w}^* \cdot \vec{x}^t)y^t > 1, \quad \forall t$$

In the Linear Prediction Setting, the assumption of the existence of a perfect linear predictor is similar to the assumption of a perfect expert in Prediction with Expert Advice. The perceptron algorithm for minimizing the number of mistakes in linear prediction setting is described below.

## Algorithm Perceptron

```
1: \vec{w}^1 \leftarrow \vec{0} \in \mathbb{R}^d
 2: for t = 1 \rightarrow T do:
            Observe \vec{x^t}
            Algorithm predicts \hat{y}^t = sign(\vec{w^t} \cdot \vec{x^t})
 4:
            Observe y^t
 5:
            if y^t(\vec{w}^t\vec{x}^t) > 0 then
 6:
                  \vec{w}^{t+1} = \vec{w}^t
 7:
 8:
            else
                  \vec{w}^{t+1} = \vec{w}^t + y^t \vec{x}^t
 9:
            end if
10:
11: end for
```

**Definition 8.7 (Hinge Loss)** Given  $\vec{w}, \vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$  and  $y \in \mathbb{R}$ , the Hinge Loss is defined as

$$\ell(\vec{w}, (\vec{x}, y)) = \max\{0, -\vec{w}^{\top} \vec{x} y\}$$

The perceptron algorithm can be thought of as gradient descent with the loss function as Hinge loss.

$$\vec{w}^{t+1} = \vec{w}^t - \nabla \ell(\vec{w}^t, (\vec{x}^t, y^t))$$

We are using the assumption that there exists a perfect linear predictor with  $\gamma$  margin in the mistake analysis.

**Lemma 8.8** for any vectors  $\vec{a}, \vec{b}$ ,

$$\|\vec{a}\|^2 - \|\vec{a} - \vec{b}\|^2 = 2(\vec{a} \cdot \vec{b}) - \|\vec{b}\|^2$$

**Theorem 8.9** Let  $M_T = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{1}[(\vec{w}^{t\top}\vec{x}^t)y^t < 0]$ . Assume that there exists  $\vec{w}^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$  and  $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}^+$  such that  $\|\vec{w}^*\|_2 \leq \frac{1}{\gamma}$  and  $y^t(\vec{w}^{*\top}\vec{x}^t) \geq 1, \forall t$ . Then  $M_T \leq \frac{1}{\gamma^2}$ 

**Proof:** Let  $\vec{w}^*$  satisfy the assumption. And let  $\text{Mistake}(T) = \{t \in [T] : (\vec{w}^{t \top} \vec{x}^t) y^t < 0\}.$  Define  $\Phi_t = \|\vec{w}^* - \vec{w}^t\|_2^2$ . As  $\vec{w^1} = \vec{1}$ ,  $\Phi_1 = \|\vec{w}^*\|^2 \le \frac{1}{2}$ . Also,  $\Phi_{T+1} = \|\vec{w}^* - \vec{w}^{T+1}\|^2 \ge 0$ .

$$\frac{1}{\gamma^{2}} \geq \Phi_{1} - \Phi_{T+1} 
= \sum_{t=1}^{T} (\Phi_{t} - \Phi_{t+1}) 
= \sum_{t=1}^{T} (\|\vec{w}^{*} - \vec{w}^{t}\|^{2} - \|\vec{w}^{*} - \vec{w}^{t+1}\|^{2}) 
= \sum_{t \in \text{Mistake}(T)} (\|\vec{w}^{*} - \vec{w}^{t}\|^{2} - \|\vec{w}^{*} - \vec{w}^{t} - \vec{x}^{t}y^{t}\|^{2}) 
= \sum_{t \in \text{Mistake}(T)} (-\|\vec{x}^{t}y^{t}\|^{2} + 2(\vec{w}^{*} - \vec{w}^{t})^{\top}\vec{x}^{t}y^{t})$$
(using Lemma 8.8)

$$= \sum_{t \in \text{Mistake}(T)} (-\|\vec{x}^t\|^2 + 2\vec{w}^{*\top}\vec{x}^t y^t - 2\vec{w}^{t\top}\vec{x}^t y^t)$$

$$\geq \sum_{t \in \text{Mistake}(T)} -1 + 2 - 2\vec{w}^{t\top}\vec{x}^t y^t \qquad (\forall t, \|x^t\| \le 1 \text{ and } \vec{w}^{*\top}\vec{x}^t y^t \ge 1)$$

$$\geq \sum_{t \in \text{Mistake}(T)} 1 \qquad (\forall t \in \text{Mistake}(T), \vec{w}^{t\top}\vec{x}^t y^t < 0)$$

$$= M_T$$

## 8.5 Introduction to Game Theory

**Definition 8.10** A two person bimatrix game is defined by matrices  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$  and  $N \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$  where each player selects a distribution  $\vec{p} \in \Delta_n$  and  $\vec{q} \in \Delta_m$ . If player 1 chooses  $i \in [n]$  and player 2 chooses  $j \in [m]$ , the utility for player 1 is defined to be  $U^1(i,j) = M_{ij}$  and the utility for player 2 is defined to be  $U^2(i,j) = N_{ij}$ .

Typically, we are in the randomized setting with  $U^1(\vec{p}, \vec{q}) = \underset{\substack{i \sim \vec{p} \\ j \sim \vec{q}}}{\mathbb{E}} [M_{ij}] = \vec{p}^\top M \vec{q}$ . Similarly,  $U^2(\vec{p}, \vec{q}) = \vec{p}^\top N \vec{q}$ .

**Example (Rock-Paper-Scissor)** In this game, each player choose among Rock(1), Paper(2) or Scissor(3). Scissor wins Paper, Paper wins Rock, and Rock wins Scissor. For the outcome, 1 means win, -1 means lose, and 0 means even. Each input  $x_{i,j}$  in M represents the outcome of player 1 choosing i and player 2 choosing j. Each input  $x_{i,j}$  in N represents the outcome of player 2 choosing i and player 1 choosing j.

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \text{ and } N = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

If M + N = 0, then the game is called a zero-sum game.

**Definition 8.11 (Nash Equilibrium)** Given  $M, N \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$  and  $\vec{p} \in \Delta_n, \vec{q} \in \Delta_m, (\vec{p}, \vec{q})$  is a Nash Equilibrium if

$$\vec{p}^{\top} M \vec{q} \geq \vec{\tilde{p}}^{\top} M \vec{q}, \ \forall \vec{\tilde{p}} \in \Delta_n \ and \ \vec{p}^{\top} N \vec{q} \geq \vec{p}^{\top} N \vec{\tilde{q}}, \ \forall \vec{\tilde{q}} \in \Delta_m$$

**Theorem 8.12 (Nash's Theorem)** For any  $M, N \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$ , there exists a Nash Equilibrium  $(\vec{p}, \vec{q})$ .

Theorem 8.13 (Minimax Theorem) Let  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$  then

$$\min_{\vec{p} \in \Delta_n} \max_{\vec{q} \in \Delta_m} \vec{p}^\top M \vec{q} = \max_{\vec{q} \in \Delta_m} \max_{\vec{p} \in \Delta_n} \vec{p}^\top M \vec{q}$$